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POLYETHYLENE "C" PLANT
REACTIVE CHEMICALS REVIEW
MAY 18, 1989
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POLY C
REACTIVE CHEMICALS REVIEW
May 18, 1989
Trains 1 and 2: Process Introduction and Flow Diagram Raw Materials and Supplies Unloading and Storage Catalyst Preparation Ethylene Purification and Compression Reaction Calcium Stearate Devolatilization Pelletizing Material Handling Additive System Solvent Recovery and Purification Dowtherm System Flare
Kim Switzer Alvin Hebert Danny Leblanc Kim Switzer Kevin Alexcee Bruce Miles Kim Switzer George Shofoluwe George Shofoluwe Jeff Sims Kevin Alexcee Kevin Alexcee Kim Switzer Danny Leblanc
Do A m Co^o^
Train 3: Train 3 Overview Ethylene Compression Differences Solvent System Changes Furnace Modifications
Robert Moore Wesley Gibbs Brenda Lane Dan Bucholtz
KES S/1 1/89
DO A 013249 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFJb
POLY C RAW MATERIALS
MONOMERS AND HYDROGEN
MATERIAL ETHYLENE HYDROGEN OCTENE-1
STORAGE CAPACITY
PIPELINE
PIPELINE/ TUBE TRAILER
258,000 GALS. (2 TANKS)
VENDORS DOW AIR PRODUCTS ETHYL, SHELL
5-4-89
DO A 01 CONFIDEN
POLY C RAW MATERIALS
ADDITIVES
MATERIAL
CONTAINER
QUANTITY STORED
CALCIUM STEARATE TOTE BINS (2,100 LBS)
ERUCAMIDE (SLIP)
100 LB. FIBER PK.
IRGAEOS 168
110 LB. FIBER PK.
IRGANOX 1010
110 LB. FIBER PK.
ADDITIVE CONCENTRATES (SUPERFLOSS, IRGAFOS, SLIP)
DHT-4A
180.000 LB. BRC 45.000 LB. H.TRK.
44 LB. BAGS
28 MAXIMUM 0 LBS. 0 LBS. 12,000 LBS. MAXIMUM 650,000 LBS.
3000 LBS.
VENDORS
MALLINCKRODT ARMAK, HUMKO CIBA-GEIGY CIBA-GEIGY SOUTHWEST CHEM BAYSHORE
MITSUI
5-4-89
018252 DO A COMF1 DFNTt AL.
CATALYST COMPONENTS
MATERIAL
TRIETHYL ALUMINUM (ATE) (10% IN HEPTANE)
BUTYL ETHYL MAGNESIUM (BEM) (15% IN HEPTANE)
TETRAISOPROPYL TITANATE (50% IN HEXANE)
HCL - ANHYDROUS
ETHYL ALUMINUM DICHLORIDE (EADC) (15% IN HEPTANE)
DIBUTYL MAGNESIUM (DBM) (21% IN HEPTANE)
TITANIUM TETRACHLORIDE (TIC14)
VANADIUM TETRACHLORIDE (VCI4)
POLY C SUPPLIES
STORAGE CAPACITY 12,000 GALLONS
20,000 GALLONS
2 - 250 GALLON CYLINDERS PIPELINE 12,000 GALLONS
16,000 GALLONS
2-5 GALLON CYLINDERS 2-5 GALLON CYLINDERS
VENDORS TEXAS ALKYLS, ETHYL TEXAS ALKYLS
AKZO
DOW TEXAS ALKYLS, ETHYL LITHIUM CORPORATION
AKZO
STRATCOR
5-4-89
DO A 018253 CONFIDENTIAL
/
OTHER
MATERIAL
ACTIVATED ALUMINA DOWTHERM A
ISOPAR E (666 SOLVENT)
KATALCO
MINERAL OIL MOLECULAR SIEVE
SILICA GEL
POLY C SUPPLIES
STORAGE CAPACITY
10,500 LBS.
44,000 GALLONS (2 TANKS)
24,000 GALLONS (50,000 GALLONS IN PROCESS)
3,000 LBS. (2 BEDS)
5,900 GALLONS
63,100 LBS. (9 BEDS)
61,400 LBS. (6 BEDS)
VENDORS COASTAL CHEMICAL DOW EXXON
KATALCO INC. WITCO UNION CARBIDE COASTAL CHEMICAL
5-4-89
DO A
4
comf rD^NTTAL
POLY C SUPPLIES
WATER TREATMENT CHEMICALS
MATERIAL
STORAGE CAPACITY
BETZ DEI187 CHLORINE
1,000 GALLONS 2 - 1 TON CYLINDERS
SODIUM CARBONATE
4-55 GALLON DRUMS
CORRSHIELD 736
1-55 GALLON DRUMS
VENDOR
BETZ VAN WATERS AND ROGERS CHARLOTTE CHEMICAL CO. BETZ
5-4-89
DO A 018255 CONFIDENTIAL
MATERIAL ETHYLENE HYDROGEN OCTENE - 1
MOHOHKRS AND HYDROGEN QUALITY CHECK
--/GAS CHROMATOGRAPH INFRARED
MATERIAL CALCIUM STEARATE ERUCAMIDE (SLIP) IRGAFOS 168 IRGANOX 1010 SUPERELOSS DHT-4A
additives
QUALITY CHECK INFRARED INFRARED INFRARED INFRARED ASH INFRARED
5-4-89
DO A 018756 CONFIDENTIAL
MATERIAL
ATE BEM TITANATE HC1 EADC
DBM TiCI4 VC14
CATALYST COMPONENTS
QUALITY CHECK
TITRATION FOR A1 TITRATION FOR Mg INFRARED
TITRATION FOR A1 TITRATION FOR Cl TITRATION FOR Mg ATOMIC ABSORPTION ATOMIC ABSORPTION
5-4-89
00 A 01S?B7
confidential
MATERIAL
activated alumina
DOWTHERM A ISOPAR E (666 SOLVENT) KATALCO MINERAL OIL MOLECULAR SIEVE
SILICA GEL
OTHER
QUALITY CHECK
BULK DENSITY/VISUAL INSPECTION INFRARED INFRARED
INFRARED
BULK DENSITY/VISUAL INSPECTION
BULK DENSITY/ INSPECTION
material
BETZ 1187 CHLORINE SODIUM CARBONATE CORRSHIELD 736
WATER TREATMENT CHFMTCAT^ QUALITY CHECK
--
5-4-89
DO A 018258 CONFIDENTIAL
m&mmm&m swm&mmm
DO A 018759 CONFIDENTIAL
UNLOADING / STORAGE CONCERNS
POSSIBLE PROBLEMS / PREVENTIVE MEASURES
X. TRANSFER MATERIAL INTO INCORRECT STORAGE VESSEL
PREVENTIVE MEASURE
A. Each sstorage vessel has a dedicated fill line with no common piping from the unloading rack
B. Raw materials are compatible C. Unloading rack piping is labeled
2. SPILL AT UNLOADING AREA OR STORAGE AREAS
PREVENTIVE MEASURE
A. Storage area diked B. Both drain to containment pond c. All connections are leak checked before unloading begins
3. RUPTURED HOSE
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A. Operator will wear a slicker suit when unloading catalyst components
B. Emergency nitrogen depad system for all raw material un loading
C. Check valve in piping to each catalyst storage vessel D. Hoses are pressure tested once per year
4. STATIC CHARGES
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A. Procedures require everthing to be grounded B. Solvent and octene unloading pumps will not start without
a ground
5. OVERPRESSURE OF STORAGE VESSELS DURING UNLOADING OPERATION
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A. Nitrogen used to unload is regulated and has PSV'S in lines B. Depad regulators are bypassed during unloading to ensure
that the vessel does not overpressure C. Safety valves lift to D-308
6. CATALYST STORAGE VESSEL RUPTURE
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A. High pressure and high temperature alarms B. Diked area C. Containment pond D. Monitor gun with fog nozzle E. Deluge system
DO A 013260 CONFIDENTIAL
7. CATALYST COMPONENT VAPORS BACKING UP IN NITROGEN LINE PREVENTIVE MEASURES A. Nitrogen line has higher pressure B. Check valve C. Double block and bleed
8. CONTAMINANTS GETTING INTO CATALYST VESSELS PREVENTIVE MEASURES A, Positive pressure nitrogen pad B. High and low pressure alarm
OO A 01.B26T CONFIDENTIAL.
STANDARD CATALYST RAW MATERIALS
ISOPAR E (Flammable Liquid) BUTYL ETHYL MAGNESIUM, 15% IN HEPTANE (Pyrophoric When Heptane Evaporates)
ANHYDROUS HCL (Corrosive)
ETHYL ALUMINUM DICHLORIDE, 15% IN HEPTANE (Pyrophoric When Heptane Evaporates)
TETRA ISOPROPYL TITANATE, 50% IN HEPTANE (Decomposes Slowly in Air and Moisture to Form
Isopropanol)
kes 5/11/89
D0 A 01826? CONFIDENTIAL
STANDARD CATAriL
Magnesium Dialkyl(MgR2) + 2 Anhydrous HCI----- > Magnesium Chloride + 2 RH + 3800 Btu/lb HCI
40 Magnesium Chloride + 12 Ethyl Aluminum Dichloride + 3 Tetra Isopropyl Titanate----- > 40 Magnesium Chloride * 3 TiC!20C3H7 + 12 AI(C2H5)(0C3H7)2 "Premix Catalyst11
KES 5/11/89 DO A 01 a?AO
OONFTDFNTIAL
T CATALYST RAW MATTRIA L5
isopar E (Flammable liquid)
Dibutyl Magnesium, 21% in Heptane
(Pyrophoric when Heptane evaporates) Anhydrous HCI (Corrosive) Titanium Tetrachloride (Reacts violently with water ) Vanadium Tetrachloride (Reacts violently with water to produce combustibles)
KES/ 5-11-8# Do A 018264 CONFIDENTIAL
LT CATALYST PREPARATION
Dibutyl Magnesium + 2 Anhydrous HCi------ > Magnesium Chloride + 2 RH + 3800 Btu/lb HC!
40 Magnesium Chloride + 2 Titanium Tetrachloride + 2 Vanadium Tetrachloride------ > 40 Magnesium Chloride * 2 Titanium Tetrachloride * 2 Vanadium Tetrachloride
KES/ 3-11/89 D0 A 018265
CONFIDENTIAL.
E/CC TIPT
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CATALYST PREPARATION FLOW DIAGRAM
I
KES
5/1 1/8$
CATALYST KILL IN D-308
MgCI2 + H20 --> MgCI(OH) + HCI + H20 ~> MgO + 2HCI + H20 -> Mg(OH)2 + 2HCI
C2H5AICI2 + 3H20 ~> 2HCI + 3AI(OH)3 + C2H6 Ti(OC3H7)4 + 2H20 --> Ti02 + 4C3H70H VCI4 + H20 --> VOCI2 + HCI
(+ VOVCI4 + VOCI2 + V02CI + V203 + V205) TiCI4 + H20 ~> TIOCI2 + HCI (+ Ti02)
kes 5/1 1/89 Dow Confidential
DO A 01B9h7 CONFIDENTIAL
CATALYST PREPARATION
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS/PREVENTIVE MEASURES
1 . RUNAWAY REACTION IN D-305 OR D-305A A. HCI ADDITION SHUTDOWN ON HIGH TEMPERATURE BY MOD V B. PSV'S TO D-308
2. OVERFILL D-308 AND BACKUP THROUGH VENT HEADER A. REDUNDANT HIGH LEVEL ALARMS B. TRANSFER SHUTDOWN ON HIGH LEVEL BY MOD V C. N2 PURGE ON VENT LINE TO D-308
3. FLUSHING UNKILLED CATALYST FROM D-308 TO D-809 A. D-308 CONTAINS WATER AT ALL TIMES B. SAMPLE REQUIRED FOR TRANSFER
4. MATERIALS BACK-FLOWING FROM MIX VESSELS TO STORAGE VESSELS A. HIGHER N2 PRESSURE ON STORAGE TANKS B. AUTOMATED BLOCK VALVES
kes
5/1 1/89
DO A ni$?68 CONFIDENTIAL,
Tia30LB^omNG ETHLEME
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DO A 01B270 CONFIDENTIAL
MATERIALS
ETHYLENE SiLiCA GEL KaTALCO NITROGEN
27 HL E M E r L'R! F! C AT i C- N
I. CONCERNS
A. OVERHEATING KATALCQ. SILICA BEDS DURING PRELOADING
'.ALARMS AT '00 C (SILICA GEL) AND 120 C (KATALCQ) 2. REGULATOR ON PRELOAD LINES (SILICA BEDS) 3. LOW PRESSURE PRELOAD LINE (KATALCO) 4. HV'S WHICH OPEN TO THE FLARE ON THE SILICA BEDS 5. PSV'S
B. COMPRESSOR INCIDENTS (E.G. ETHYLENE DECOMPOSITION. ETC...)
1. HIGH TEMPERATURE SHUTDOWN 2. LOW SUCTION PRESSURE SHUTDOWN 3. HIGH PRESSURE SHUTDOWN 4. HIGH VIBRATION SHUTDOWN
FLAMMABILITY: ETHYLENE 2.1% TO 36.0 % IN AIR
oo conf TNTTAL
A. REACTION AREA RAW MATERIAL LIST 1. ETHYLENE 2. SOLVENT (ISOPAR E) 3. HYDROGEN 4. COOLING AND CHILLED WATER 5. TRIETHYL ALUMINUM (ATE) 6. PREMIX CATALYST 7. CALCIUM STEARATE
8. MINERAL OIL 9. NITROGEN B. FLAMMABLE MATERIALS AND EXPLOSIVE LIMITS 1. ETHYLENE (3.0 TO 34.0%) 2. SOLVENT (0.9 TO 7.0%) 3. HYDROGEN (4.1 TO 74.2%) 4. ATE (PYROPHORIC IF > 15% BY WEIGHT) 5. CALCIUM STEARATE 6. PREMIX CATALYST (IE SOLVENT
0.9 TO 7.0%)
00 A 018J7P cNFrDE-NTTft|'
H20CH2
AT.VS[ - CHHJ0 fKH3
HEAT OF REACTION: 1470 BTU/LB OF POLYETHYLENE
1. LOW PRESSURE REACTION (405-500 PSIG)
2. REACTOR TEMPERATURES 180-200 C
3. CONVERSION GREATER THAN 90%
4. REACTION STOPPED BY DEACTIVATING CATALYST
5-10-89
DO A 018273 CONFIDENTIAL
1. UNCONTROLLED TEMPERATURE RISS IN REACTORS
A. CATALYST BECOMES INACTIVE AT HIGH TEMPERATURES
B. CAPABILITY OF STOPPING CATALYST PUMP FROM CONTROL ROOM
C. LARGE SOLVENT FLOW ACTS AS COOLANT
2. TUBE LEAK ON REACTOR PRECOOLERS
A. ETHYLENE/SOLVENT MIXTURE WILL FILL UP CHILL WATER TANK
B. FLANMABLE MIXTURE FORMS IN VAPOR SPACE OF COOLING TOWERS PREVENTATIVE METHOD
COMBUSTIBLE GAS DETECTORS IN VAPOR SPACE OF CHILLED WATER AMD COOLING TOWER - ALARMED IN CONTROL ROOM
3. REACTOR OVERPRESSURES
A. REDUNDANT HIGH PRESSURE ALARM
B. DUAL SAFETY VALVE ON EACH REACTOR WITH FLOW PROBES TO D212/222
C. AUTOMATIC DUMP VALVE ON BOTTOM OF REACTORS TO D212/222
BEM 5-10-89
DO A 018774 CONFIDENTIAL
4. REACTOR THERMOCOUPLE FAILURE-READ 0
A. REACTION WILL BEGIN TERMINATION BECAUSE INCREASED TEMPERATURE WILL DEACTIVATE CATALYST
B. REDUNDANT THERMOCOUPLES THROUGHOUT REACTORS
5. REACTOR SEAL FAILURE
A. INTERNAL LEAKAGE
B. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
PREVENTATIVE METHODS
A. MINERAL OIL WILL LEAK INTO REACTORS. NO REACTION WILL TAKE PLACE
B. MINERAL OIL LEAKS OUT BEFORE COMPLETE FAILURE; COMBUSTIB GAS ANALYZERS LOCATED NEAR REACTOR SEALS
C. FLOW INDICATION ON MINERAL OIL TO SEALS
BEM 5-10-89
A 018275 confidential
6. FLAMMABLE MATERIAL
A. COMBUSTIBLE GAS DETECTORS LOCATED THROUGHOUT AREA
B. DELUGE SYSTEM COVERS AREA
ATE EXPOSURE TO AIR
A. SMALL LEAK WILL NOT IGNITE. ATE REACTS WITH MOISTURE IN AIR FASTER THAN SOLVENT VAPORIZES AND GIVES PYROPHORIC MIXTURE.
B. LINE OPENING-SOLVENT FLUSH PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BEFORE OPENING
C. LARGE LEAK-WATER MIST FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
BEM 5-10-89
DO A 018276 CONFIDENTIAL
5".
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CALCIUM STEARATE AREA RAW MATERIALS
CALCIUM STEARATE IRGANOX 1010 ISOPAR E NITROGEN
KES 5/11/89
00 A 018280 CONFIDENTIAL
ISOPAR E
1 V I1 N 3 Q I JNO'J
t &<?& t o w o n
CALCIUM STEARATE SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
i
KES 5/11/89
CALCIUM STEARATE AREA
CATALYST DEACTIVATION
2TiCI2P + 4H20 -> 2Ti02 + 2HP + 4HCI + H2 P = growing polymer chain
MgCl2 + H20 -> MgCI(OH) + HCI + H20 --> MgO + 2HCI + H20 --> Mg(OH)2 + 2HCI
C2H5AICI2 + 3H20 -> 2HCI + 3AI(OH)3 + C2H6 ' Ti(OC3H7)4 + 2H20 -> Ti02 + 4C3H70H AI(C2H5)3 + H20 ~> AI203 + 6C2H6 AI(OH)3 + 3C2H6 VCI4 + H20 ~> VOCI2 + HCI
(+ VOVCI4 + VOCI2 + V02CI + V203 + V205) TiCI4 + H20 --> TiOCI2 + HCI (+ Ti02) MgCI2 + CaSt2 -> MgSt2 + CaCI2 CaSt2 + 2HCI --> CaCI2 + StH
kes 5/11/89 Dow Confidential
C NFlDpNTlAL
CALCIUM STEARATE AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS/PREVENTIVE MEASURES
=> DUST EXPLOSION * N2 PADS ON UNLOADING LINES AND VESSELS * ALL EQUIPMENT GROUNDED
=> SOLVENT/CALCIUM STEARATE EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE IN UNLOADING LINES * N2 FLOW IN UNLOADING LINES REQUIRED TO OPEN SLIDE VALVES * LOW PRESSURE IN TANK REQUIRED TO OPEN SLIDE VALVES
=> LOSS OF FLOW TO PROCESS * LOW FLOW ALARM * DEVIATION ALARM ( MICROMOTION VERSUS WEIGH CELLS) * WEEKLY ANALYSIS
DO A 018283 CONFIDENTTAi
r. rW r\ n
(3 OS S/f2/89
DO DOfyp-
* 018^84 TD^NTTai.
POLYMER ENTER THE 1ST DEVO. D511 TANGENTIALLY ON THE SIDE, CAUSING SPIRAL EFFECT TO HELP KEEP POLYMER FROM BEING CARRIED OVERHEAD WITH SOLVENT VAPOR. 98% OF THE SOLVENT IS VAPORIZED IN 1ST DEVO. THE POLYMER ' IS PUMPED INTO THE SECOND DEVO. D512, BY THE FIRST GEAR PUMP (P511) THROUGH THE PLATE HEAT EXCHANGER E 512. THIS EXCHANGER IS HEATED WITH DTA AT 260 DEGREE CENTIGRADE.
IN SECOND DEVO (D512) PRESSURE IS REDUCED TO UNDER 5MM HG ABSOLUTE REMAINING SOLVENT IS VAPORIZED AND FLOWS TO THE TOP OF THE DEVO WHERE IT IS REMOVED THROUGH THE VACUUM SYSTEM.
THE SECOND GEAR PUMP P512 PUMPS THE POLYMER FROM THE SECOND DEVO D512 THROUGH THE STATIC MIXER MX512 TO THE PELLETIZER.
GOS 5-11-89
DO A 018285 CONFIDENTIAL
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS/AND PRECAUTION
1) OVERFILL OF DEVOS
(A) HIGH LEVEL SWITCH PROVIDED TO ALARM AT 60% OF DEVO LEVEL
2) RESTRICTED DISCHARGE LINE ON PUMPS P511/P12
(A) HIGH DISCHARGE PRESSURE ' SHUTDOWN
(B) HIGH GEAR BOX TORQUE SHUTDOWN (C) LOW TEMPERATURE ON DISCHARGE
LINE OF BOTH PUMPS PREVENTS STARTUP
3) TUBE LEAK IN E512-0TA TO POLYETHYLENE (A) NO REACTIVE CHEMICAL PROBLEM BUT WILL CREATE PROCESS PROBLEM
4) HIGH DEVO UACKET DTA PRESSURE (A) BOTH DEVO HAVE PSV"S THAT RELIEVE TO DTA STORAGE DRUM D-502
GOS 5-11-69
DO A 018286 CONFIDENTIAL
IZING
MATERIALS HANDLED
1) WATER
2) DOWTHERM
3) POLYMER (PELLETS)
REACTIVE CHEMICAL HAZZARD: NONE
SAFETY PRECAUTION
MX512 (STATIC MIXER) UPSTREAM OF PELLETIZER HAS RUPTURE DISC IN CASE OF EXCESSIVE PRESSURE.
A GUARD IS PROVIDED OVER THE DISC TO PREVENT INJURY TO PERSONNEL IN CASE OF RELEASE.
SHOULD DTA LINE TO DIE OPEN TO THE PELLET WATER, NO REACTIVE CHEMICAL HAZZARD IS PRESENT.
GOS 5-11-89
00 A 018?87 ^onftdenttai
PELLETIZER
60 S 5|2lS9
DO A 01.8288 CONFIDENTIAL
PELLETIZER OPERATION
POLYMER FROM GEAR PUMP ENTERS THE PELLETIZER WHERE IT GOES THROUGH A DIE PLATE WITH SEVERAL HOLES (APPROX. 1096 HOLES AND 0.125" DIA.) AFTER POLY IS FORCED THROUGH THE HOLES, IT ENTERS THE WATER CHAMBER WHERE IT IS CUT INTO PELLETS BY A ROTATING CUTTER ASSEMBLY POSITIONED AT DIE FACE. HOT DOWTHERM ON THE DIE RINGS KEEP POLY HOT. WATER ENTERING THROUGH BOTTOM OF WATER BOX, RAPIDLY COOLS THE POLY AS THEY ARE CUT AND TRANSFERS IT TO THE SPIN DRIER WHERE THE WATER IS REMOVED AND RETURNED TO THE WATER STORAGE TANK DPW 500. Th PELLETS ARE FORWARDED TO CLASSIFIER WHERE IT IS SCREENED TO THE RIGHT SIZE. FROM THE CLASSIFIER, THE PELLETS ARE TRANSFERED TO THE STORAGE SILOS.
GOS 5-11-89
0 A 0l82fi9 confidential
MATERIAL HANDLING SYSTEM-
CONCERNS: * Dust Explosions * Solvent Buildup in the Check Hoppers SAFEGUARDS: * Combustible gas detectors in all hoppers and Silos * Air purge on all hoppers and Silos * Optional Nitrogen purge on check hoppers * Calculated solvent content based on process conditions
J5 5/12/89
DO A 018290 CONFIDENTIAL
-iDiVTiV'ES
'''EM AH IDE t :J 'RGaNGX IRGAFQS SUPERFLOSS II. CONCERNS EXTRUDER OVERPRESSURING - PROTECTED BY RUPTURE DISK aND HIGH
PRESSURE SHUTDOWN ADDITIVES ARE MON-REACTIVE WITH PLANT CHEMICALS
00 A 018?9] CONFIDFNTIAL
rj A 0X8P9P
ONF10FNTTAL
MATERIAL HANDLING SYSTEM-
CONCERNS; * Dust Explosions * Solvent Buildup in the Check Hoppers SAFEGUARDS; * Combustible gas detectors in all hoppers and Silos * Air purge on all hoppers and Silos * Optional Nitrogen purge on check hoppers * Calculated solvent content based on process conditions js
5/12/89
A 018P9' CONFIDENTIAL
H'Dm VE5 KEMAMIDE E :J iRGaNOX iRGAFOS SUPERFLQSS II. CONCERNS EXTRUDER OVERPRESSUR1MG - PROTECTED BV RUPTURE DISK AND HIGH
PESSURE SHUTDOWN ADDITIVES ARE NON-REACTIVE WITH PLANT CHEMICALS
00 A 018P94
CONFIDENTIAL
r-
HAS VX.
FILTER
WEIGH FEEDER
2
BLOWER
MIXER
HA
WEIGH FEEDER HAH
DO A 01829^ CONFIDENTIAL
SOLVENT "ECQVEPV CONCERNS 1 TUBE LEAK iM E-513A/B - WATER INTO SOLVENT A. NO REACTION WILL TAKE PLACE. PROCESS EFFICIENCIES Will BE
AFFECTED. COULD RESULT !N A PLANT SHUTDOWN I. TUBE LEAK IN E-514 - REFRIGERANT 22 INTO SOLVENT
A. NO REACTION WILL TAKE PLACE. PROCESS EFFICIENCIES WILL BE AFFECTED.
I. FLAMMABLE A. GAS DETECTORS LOCATED THROUGHOUT AREA B. FOAM AND WATER AVAILABLE IN AREA
DO A 018297 CONFIDENTIAL
DO A 0 1 8 2 9 8 C O N F ID E N T IA L
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SOLVENT PURIFICATION
CONCERNS V E-6 r 7 TUBE LEAK SOLVENT/ OCTENE INTO WATER
A. LEAK WILL BE DETECTED BY COMBUSTIBLE ANALYZERS IN CHILL WATER
2. E-6H TUBE LEAK - SOLVENT INTO CONDENSATE SYSTEM A. COMBUSTIBLE GAS DETECTOR ON CONDENSATE DRUM 0. PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE ON CONDENSATE SURGE DRUM
3. E-613 TUBE LEAK - SOLVENT INTO WATER SYSTEM A. LEAK WILL BE DETECTED BY COMBUSTIBLE ANALYZERS IN COOLING TOWER
4. RE-611 TUBE LEAK - WATER IN SOLVENT A. PROCESS EFFICIENCIES WILL BE EFFECTED
5. FLAMMABLES IN ENTIRE AREA A. ANALYZERS NEAR PUMP AREA TO DETECT LEAKS B. FOAM AND WATER AVAILABLE TO ENTIRE AREA
6. OVERHEATING MOLECULAR SIEVE BEDS A SOLVENT ABSORBS ANY HEAT THAT IS GENERATED
7 REACTIONS OR POTENTIAL REACTIONS A. NONE
A 018299 CONFIDENTIAL
DOWTHERM AREA RAW MATERIALS
DOWTHERM A FUEL GAS/OFF GAS COOLING TOWER WATER
235 PSIG STEAM NITROGEN AIR
US 5/11/S*
A 018300
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VAPOR TO E-511
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POTENTIAL PROBLEMS/PREVENTIVE METHODS
1. LOSS OF FLAME IN FURNACE
A. DUAL PILOT DETECTORS/DUAL FLAME DETECTORS
B. AUTOMATIC FURNACE TRIP
2. EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE IN FURNACE WHEN LIGHTING
A. FURNACE PURGED AUTOMATICALLY PRIOR TO LIGHTING SEQUENCE
B. AUTOMATIC DOUBLE BLOCK AND BLEED ON MAIN/PILOT GAS
3. TUBE RUPTURE INSIDE FURNACE
A. INTERNAL INSPECTION OF FURNACE TUBES
B. REMOTELY OPERABLE VALVE FOR SNUFFING STEAM
C. REMOTE EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN
D. REMOTELY OPERABLE EBVS ON FLASH DRUM
E. HIGH CONVECTION TEMPERATURE TRIP
4. WATER LEAKAGE INTO SYSTEM DURING SHUTDOWN
A. TRIP ON HIGH PRESSURE IN FLASH DRUM
B. PSV'S ON FLASH DRUM
C. NON-CONDENSIBLE VENTS OPEN TO STORAGE TANK DURING STARTUP
5. PROCESS LEAK INTO E-511
A. HIGH PRESSURE ALARM ON E-511 SHELL SIDE
B. PSV'S TO PROTECT D-519 AND D-500
C. REMOTELY OPERABLE VALVE FOR ISOLATING E-511 SHELL do a 018303
FROM D-500
CONFIDENTIAL
KES 5/1 1/89
FLARE POSSIBLE PROBLEMS / PREVENTIVE MEASURES 1. LEAKAGE OF AIR INTO SYSTEM PREVENTIVE MEASURE A. Nitrogen purge on each branch of flare header B. Oxygen analyzer C. Small positive pressure on flare 2. OUTSIDE SPILL WHICH COULD BE IGNITED BY FLARE A. Remotely operated steam valves to snuff pilot 3. HIGH OR LOW WATER LEVEL IN FLARE A. High and low level alarms B. High pressure alarms
D0 A 01830*5
confidential
DIFFERENCES IN TRAINS 1&2 AND TRAIN 3
May 15, 1989
Train 3 is designed for 320 MM lbs/yr - Single-Post Reactor Configuration (No dual reactor products) 1.0 MI Products - 49.66 Klbs/hr Ethylene - 6:1 Solvent to Ethylene Ratio
Ethylene Feed Compressor - C-131 - Constant speed motor
~ Pocket valves to control capacity (40,000 to 50,000 lbs/hr) - Ability to upgrade to 60,000 lbs/hr
No High Speed Sundyne Pumps for solvent recirculation - Byron Jacksons (low speed, high capacity)
Reactor Solvent Heater (E-232) - Preheats solvent to the reactor with steam
Devolatilizer Preheaters (E-531's) Three exchangers, independent monitoring and control"'
Larger Devolatilizers (D-531 and D-532) - 14 ft in diameter - Steeper angled cone - Sits on legs instead of hung from steel - Tangential Entry to the first devolatilizer - Vacuum system all welded to prevents air leaks
Lastest Gear Pump Design and Instrumentation - Hung on bottom flange of devolatilizer - Rupture Disc on P-531 discharge to D-531
No Steam Generator (e-631) in recycle solvent system
Four Fin Fan exchangers (E-632's) in recycle solvent loop
Dewax Column (T-631) - New design (16 trays with internal coalescer) - Bottoms to Train 3 DTA Furnace, F-505
No wax filters before the Solvent Recovery Beds (No fl631's)
One set of Solvent Recovery Beds (Y-631's) - Stacked bed - Two Sections - Canned blower (YB-631) - Solvent collection drum (YD-632) - Solvent bed area bleeds piped to YD-632 - Beds are pumped empty using the YD-632 bottoms
pump,
P-634
Solvent/Ethylene Separation Drum (D-631) - Larger than D-611/D-621 - No Train Solvent Storage Drum (no D-831) - Will use D-811/D-821 - Capacity to hold all of Train 3 solvent
DO A 01.8306 CONFIDENTIAL
DIFFERENCES IN TRAINS 1&2 AND TRAIN 3
page 2
Canned pumps in solvent and DTA return service (No external seal)
No recycle compressor (C-711/C-721 will handle recycle)
Pelletizer (K-531) - New field panel design - No screen pac
Pellet Water Exchangers (E-537A/B) - Plate & Frame Exchangers
Pellet Water Filter (FL-537) - Auto-Backwash
Production Weigh Belt Feeder (WF-531)
Only one HUH Transfer Blower (BACP-30) - Backup is Check Hopper Transfer Blower (BACP-9B)
Additive Extruder - Egan (Same as Train 1) - Will add fluorlastmer capability after Startup
Check Hoppers - Purge and transfer air collected and used in Train 3 DTA furnace, F-505
DTA Furnace (F-505) - Burns bottoms from Dewax Column, T-631 - Collects vents from hoppers and uses as combustion air
ARU' s - Total Mod V Control
No freon compressors in the vacuum system
Hopper Truck Loading Facility (PMS)
Solvent Storage - Added a second fresh solvent bed, Y-801B - Added a second fresh solvent pump, P-801B
* These items will be covered in more detail
00 A 018307 CONFIDENTIAL.
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00 A 018318 CONFIDENTIAL,
Do A 018319 ___ CONFIDENTIAL
CHECK HOPPER AND BLENDER VENT RECOVERY
PURPOSE '
TO REDUCE HYDROCARBON EMISSIONS
SAFEGUARDS
%LEL ALARMS IN EACH VESSEL AND THE COLLECTION HEADER %LEL ALARMS ARE ACTIVE IN ALL STEPS %FL-505 AND FPA-4,5 CAN TAKE FRESH AIR MOD-V CONTROLLED EACH VESSEL CAN BE ISOLATED VENT COLLECTION HEADER IS OPEN TO ATMOSPHERE
06 5/89
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DO A 0 1 8 3 ? 3
CO NFIDENTIAL.
BURNING WAXES IN F-505
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
%
REACTMIY BETWEEN T--631 AND F-505 COMPONENTS
BURNER SAFETY
OPERATOR INTERVENTION
DO A 01 S3?,
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REACTIVITY OF COMPONENTS
COMBUSTION
2% EXCESS AIR BASED ON 15 LB AIR/ LB FUEL ALL MAJOR COMPONENTS FORM C02 AND H20
CORROSION
TRACE CHLORIDES SHOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM? STACK TEMP. CONTROL WILL MINIMIZE CONDENSATION
REACTIVITY
NO REACTIVITY BETWEEN FUEL GAS AND LIQUID FUEL ONLY COMBUSTION PRODUCTS WILL CONTACT ONE ANOTHER
DRB 3/89
00 A QJ8323 confidential
BURNER SAFETY
BURN LIQUID FUEL ONLY IN THE "RUN" STEP FUEL FLOW IS CONTROLLED AND MONITORED BY MOD-V ATOMIZING STEAM IS CONTROLLED AND MONITORED BY- MOD V SIMULATION RUNS PERFORMED BY OPERATORS, ENGINEERS
PEIiAYS RESPONSIBILITY
PURGE THE LIQUID FUEL GUN MANUALLY UNBLOCK THE FUEL AND ATOMIZING STEAM RAISE OR LOWER THE LIQUID FUEL GUN VISUALLY INSPECT THE FURNACE DAILY
sV A 0 1 $$ 4 CONF T DFNT TAL