Document ypyjLkz4d62ZvN1Nvmd8a7NXd

AEMUn~od SIJIOO t1111 Environmtntll Protection - Agency Region 6 Compliance Assurance and Enforcement Division INSPECTION REPORT Inspection Date(s) : Media: Regulatory Program(s) Company Name: Facility Name: Facility Physical location: (city, state, zip code) Mailing address: (city, state, zip code) County/Parish: Facility Contact: FRS Number: Identification/Permit Number: Media Number: NAICS: 10/23/2017-10/27/2017 Air Clean Air Act Section 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. Part 68 Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions Valero Energy Corporation Valero Refining Co.- Texas, L.P.- East Plant 1300 Cantwell lane Corpus Christi, Texas, 78047 P.O. Box 9370 Corpus Christi, Texas, 78469 Nueces County Aimee Almaraz Aimee.almazaz@valero.com I PSM Coordinator 110000501993 Title V Air Operating Permit: 02238 RMP EPA Facility Identifier: 100000045033 32411- Petroleum Refinery Personnel participating in inspection: Aimee Almaraz Valero Refining Co. Benny Perriraz Valero Refining Co. I PSM Manager I PSM Coordinator EPA Lead Inspector Signature/Date ~~M~ AauV KaylaAf{chanan Supervisor Signature/Date J!,m~;) 1~ Samuel Tates (361)231--0345 (361)289-3146 1~ jJqft<ot? Date I z j ;rjz.~ , ry Date 6ENFORM-019-R7 {2/15/2017) 1 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} Section I - INTRODUCTION PURPOSE OF THE INSPECTION I, EPA Region 6 Inspector Kayla Buchanan, arrived at the Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant (Valero East) at 9:00 AM on October 23, 2017, for an announced inspection. I met with Aime Almaraz (PSM Manager) and Benny Perriraz (PSM Coordinator) at the opening conference. I presented my credentials to both Ms. Almaraz and Mr. Perriraz and informed them that this was an EPA inspection to determine compliance with Clean Air Act Sections 112(r)(1) and 112(r)(7). The scope of the inspection was a partial compliance evaluation of the facility pursuant to 40 CFR Subpart 68 - Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions. An employee representative was invited to participate in the inspection but did not attend. The facility does not have union representation. FACILITY DESCRIPTION Valero East is a 95,000 barrel per day refinery. It is capable of processing heavy, high-sulphur crude oil into light products including: gasoline, jet fuel, petrochemicals, propane, butane, and light naphtha. The refinery also produces multiple grades of asphalt and petroleum coke. Approximately 320 people are employed at Valero East. Section II - OBSERVATIONS On Tuesday, October 24, 2017, I conducted a drive-through of the facility accompanied by Kelli Coates, Senior Environmental Engineer, to observe the covered processes, equipment, operations, and emergency equipment. 40 C.F.R. Part 68 - CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROVISIONS Subpart A - General 40 C.F.R. 68.10 Applicability - Valero East is a Title V stationary source facility that has an air operating permit and more than a threshold quantity of regulated substances (flammable mixtures) in its process streams; therefore, these regulations are applicable. Valero East re-submitted a Risk Management Plan (RMP) on January 20, 2014, that described the processes containing regulated chemicals held at more than a threshold quantity. In addition, this facility is subject to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard (29 CFR 1910.119), categorizing them as a Program 3 facility. 40 C.F.R. 68.12 General requirements - I reviewed the re-submission of Valero East's RMP that was submitted on January 20, 2014, that listed flammable and toxic chemicals for its Program 3 processes. 40 C.F.R. 68.15 Management - I reviewed the management system implemented at Valero East that oversees the implementation of the Risk Management Program elements. The responsibility for implementing individual requirements was assigned to multiple people, who are organized into committees. The Safety/PSM Steering Committee was at the top of the management system and consisted of upper management (Directors, Regional VP, and an Executive Secretary). The Risk Management Review Committee fell below the Safety/PSM Steering Committee and was comprised of subject matter experts and mangers. There was a committee for each element of the RMP comprised of personnel from the Safety/PSM Steering Committee and the Risk Management Review Committee, as well as, hourly representatives from various facility departments. 2 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} Subpart B - Hazard Assessment 40 C.F.R. 68.20 Applicability - Valero East is a Program 3 stationary source subject to this subpart; therefore, it is required to prepare a worst-case release scenario analysis and complete the five-year accident history. 40 C.F.R. 68.22 Offsite Consequence Analysis Parameters - Valero East used the parameters specified by EPA in this rule by using RMP*Comp TM software. I reviewed the offsite consequence analysis and supporting documentation with Aime Almaraz to assure the data was accurate and correct. Valero East's most recent RMP submission indicated the use of PHAST modeling software to determine offsite consequences (specifically the alternative release scenario); however, according to Ms. Almaraz, PHAST is no longer used (AOC #1). 40 C.F.R. 68.25 Worse-case release scenario analysis - Valero East determined a worst-case release scenario for flammable substances using the RMP* CompTM software. Hydrogen sulfide was the only toxic substance present at the facility; however, it was not held above threshold quantity in a covered process; therefore, it was not considered in a worst-case release scenario analysis. The substance considered in the flammable worst-case release scenario analysis was propylene (flammable) stored in a storage tank. The worst-case release scenario would occur in a vapor cloud explosion in the tank area. 40 C.F.R. 68.28 Alternative Release Scenario Analysis - Valero East identified and documented an alternative release scenario for the RMP covered flammable substances. The alternative release scenario for flammable substances was the release of the flammable mixture used in its Light Ends Unit (LEU) Deisobutanizer overhead receiver from a 1" hole of a vessel. 40 C.F.R. 68.30 Defining offsite impacts- Population - Valero East used the most current (2010) Census Bureau population data and the distance to endpoints, as specified in the regulations, to calculate the population numbers reported in their RMP. Valero East used MARPLOT to define the population surrounding the facility. In addition, Valero East provided a Google Earth image documenting their nearest public receptor. 40 C.F.R. 68.33 Defining offsite impacts- Environment - Valero East used US Geological Survey maps data to determine the environmental receptors and the distance to endpoints 40 C.F.R. 68.36 Review and Update - Ms. Almaraz stated that the offsite consequence analyses were updated every five years, as required by this subpart. 40 C.F.R. 68.39 Documentation- Valero East maintained records on the offsite consequence analyses in accordance with this subpart. These records included: documentation of vessels or pipelines and substances selected as worse case and alternative release scenarios, documentation of estimated quantity released, release rate, duration of release, methodology used to determine distance to endpoint, and data used to estimate population and environmental receptors. 40 C.F.R. 68.42 Five-year accident history- I reviewed Valero East's five-year accident history and I did not observe any accidental releases from covered processes that resulted in deaths, injuries, significant property damage on site, known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage. I examined Valero East's OSHA's Form 300 logs from 2012 to 3 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} present and queried the National Response Center (NRC) database to ensure additional releases from the facility that could possibly be included in the facility's five-year accident history were not omitted. There were no accidental releases included in Valero East's five-year accident history; therefore, a report was not required. Subpart D- Program 3 Prevention Program 40 C.F.R. 68.65 Process safety information - Valero, in accordance with this subpart, completed a compilation of written process safety information. Its process safety information included: information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substances used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information pertaining to the equipment of the process. Valero East maintained an electronic document entitled "Compliance Index for OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 (D) Process Safety Information" that listed the specific process safety information required by this regulation; where the documentation for that information can be located, and a contact person that can provide additional information, if needed. This document was accessible to all employees via the company's intranet. 40 C.F.R. 68.67 Process hazard analysis (PHA) - Valero purchased the East plant in 2000 and conducted initial PHAs at that time. I reviewed the two most recent PHAs for the Coker, Crude, #2 Hydrodesulfurization(HDS)/Reformer, and Gas Oil Treater (GOT) units. Each PHA reviewed was conducted every five years. Valero provided the PHA schedule for every unit. I was informed that prior to 2016, Valero East only addressed PHA nodes that were initiated by a Management of Change (MOC) (AOC #2). This was also documented in the facility's 2013 compliance audit (see Appendix #2). Currently, all PHA nodes are assessed as a part of the PHA revalidation process. Each PHA reviewed was performed by a team with appropriate personnel knowledgeable in the process. The PHAs addressed all the elements required by the rule. Valero East presented all recommendations to its PHA committee. That committee decides which recommendations will be accepted. Action items are generated from accepted PHA recommendations and are tracked in the IMPACT system. The IMPACT is an electronic tracking system that captures the status, priority level, and target due date for each action item. 40 C.F.R. 68.69 Operating Procedures - Valero's Operating Procedure Management Policy outlined how procedures are written and changed and how employees can access them. This policy also outlined the new operating procedure format that the facility is transitioning to. I reviewed this policy, as well as, the operations manual for the Crude, #2 HDS/Reformer, and GOT units. The operating procedures within the operations manual I reviewed addressed the steps for each of the operating phases, consequences of deviation and steps to correct and/or avoid deviation, safety and health considerations, the properties of and hazards presented by chemicals used in the process, the precautions necessary to prevent exposure, quality control for raw materials, and the safety systems and their functions. Valero's operating procedures were accessible to employees via hard copy, a company-wide electronic shared drive, as well as, Policy Tech, which is an online system found on the facilities intranet that controls the authorship, approval, and distribution of the facility's documents. While on the facility site drive-through, I requested randomly selected process operators to dictate, as well as, demonstrate how to access the operating procedures. All selected process operators were knowledgeable about the various ways to access the procedures. 4 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} I observed documentation that verified Valero East certified annually that operating procedures were current and accurate. Each unit supervisor certified the operations manual had been reviewed for their unit. Regular reminders are sent to unit supervisors when an annual certification is approaching to ensure the certification is done on time. 40 C.F.R. 68.71 Training - The subpart requires that each employee presently operating a process and each employee newly assigned to a covered process has been trained or tested to be competent in the operating procedures provided that pertain to their duties. The training shall include an emphasis on specific health and safety hazards, emergency operations, and safe work practices. In order to meet this requirement, Valero East established a technician progression process. New operators go through a 12week Basic Operator Training Program. The trainee then undergoes seven levels of progression, with each progression time ranging from three to six months. I reviewed training records for randomly selected employees to ensure that initial training was documented and that each employee involved in operating processes received and understood the training. Valero East maintained paper copies and an electronic records of training for further documentation. 40 C.F.R. 68.73 Mechanical Integrity - I reviewed the written procedures for Valero East's mechanical integrity program. Their mechanical integrity program conformed to a corporate-wide policy referred to as Commitment to Excellent Management System (CTEMS). This policy ensured that Valero East's mechanical integrity program incorporates recognized and generally accepted engineering practices into their inspection and testing procedures. Each inspection and test performed on process equipment that I reviewed identified the date of inspection or test, the name of the person who performed the inspection, identifier of the equipment on which the test was performed, and the result of the inspection or test. Valero East also documented corrected deficiencies in equipment that were outside acceptable limits Valero East uses the Plant Condition Management Software (PCMS) to maintain inspection and test records for fixed equipment. Valero East is currently transitioning all inspection and testing to a schedule that follows the American Petroleum Institute's (API) 580 Risk Based Inspection method. There were no inspections overdue, as of the date of this inspection. Preventative maintenance was conducted on all rotating equipment. For larger horse-powered equipment, an online monitoring system was used and provided real time vibration data. If during preventative maintenance an issue was discovered, a work order was generated. Valero East's mechanical integrity staff was trained in an overview of that process, its hazards, and in the procedures applicable to the employee's job tasks. These training records were maintained in the training department. 40 C.F.R. 68.75 Management of Change (MOC) - I reviewed Valero East's Management of Change Policy which was the written procedure the facility had implemented to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, procedures, and changes to stationary sources that effect a covered process. The procedures assured that the following considerations were addressed prior to any change: technical basis for change, impact of change on safety and health, modifications to operating procedures, necessary time period for the change, and authorization requirements for a proposed change. The facility assured employees involved in operating and maintaining the process and contract employees, whose job will be effected by the change, are informed of and trained in the change prior to startup of an effected part of the process by creating, at minimum, a computer based awareness 5 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} training that must be completed. For each MOC I reviewed, I also reviewed the training records for randomly selected employees associated with the training generated from that MOC. If a change resulted in a change to safety information, this subpart requires such information be updated accordingly. I reviewed several MOCs that required an update to safety data sheets. Ms. Almaraz was able to show me that these updates were completed. I also reviewed an MOC that required a procedural change. Ms. Almaraz provided me with that updated procedure. 40 C.F.R. 68.77 Pre-startup review (PSSR) - I reviewed Valero East's written PSSR procedures, as well as, various PSSRs completed by the facility in the past five years. The PSSRs reviewed confirmed that prior to the introduction of regulated substance into the process, construction and equipment were in accordance with design specifications, and safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures were in place and adequate. The PSSRs also ensured that training of each employee involved in operating a process was complete. 40 C.F.R. 68.79 Compliance audits - I reviewed Valero East's two most recent compliance audits. The audits were conducted internally by a corporate audit group. The first audit report reviewed encompassed both the East and West Refineries and was completed on February 4, 2013 from an audit that was conducted on July 23-27, 2012. The second audit report I reviewed only encompassed the East Refinery and was completed on October 23, 2015, from an audit that was conducted on June 15-19, 2015. Both audits noted repeat findings from previous audits. Ms. Almaraz explained that action items were generated for all audit findings and tracked in Valero Easts IMPACT system. If an action item exceeds its target completion date, an explanation must be provided to an upper management official at the corporate office. Ms. Almaraz provided the justification for the 2009 and 2012 repeat findings, both of which dealt with API-570 piping inspection activities (see Appendix #3). 40 C.F.R. 68.81 Incident investigation - Valero East provided me a list of all incident investigations that occurred within the past five years. Of those reviewed, the incident investigation teams consisted of at least one person knowledgeable in the process involved. Valero East inputs its incident investigations into its IMPACT System. This subpart requires the facility to prepare a report at the conclusion of each incident investigation. This report must include at a minimum: (1) Date of the incident; (2) Date the investigation began; (3) A description of the incident; (4) The factors that contributed to the incident; and, (5) Any recommendations resulting from the investigation. Each of these requirements were documented in a report except the date the investigation began. Ms. Almaraz informed me that it is a facility practice to initiate incident investigations within 24 hours and that the investigation start date is logged when the incident investigation is created in IMPACT; however, the incident investigation reports I reviewed did not document this date (AOC #3) (see Appendix #4) The facility's written procedure for preparing an incident investigation report does not designate the incident start date to be documented (see Appendix #5). 40 C.F.R. 68.83- Employee Participation - Employee participation was inherent in Valero East's management system; likewise, the site does have a written employee participation plan as required by this subpart. The plan explained how Valero East consults with employees on how to conduct and the development of process hazard analyses and other elements of process safety management. Valero East classified employee participation in three categories: employee involvement, employer-employee consultation, and employee access to information. 40 C.F.R. 68.85 Hot work permit- I reviewed hot work permits issued by Valero East. Each permit that I observed documented that the fire prevention and protection requirements had been implemented 6 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} prior to beginning hot work operations. The permits indicated the dates authorized for hot work and the identity of the object on which the hot work was performed. 40 C.F.R. 68.87 Contractors- Valero East utilized the ISNetworld online system as an initial screening tool for contractors. Valero East performs quarterly audits on its contactors to ensure they are maintaining all of its requirements and any deficiencies found during these audits are tracked in the IMPACT system. Contractors receive training through the Contractor Safety Council (a local program), as well as, from Valero East. Valero East provides contractors with annual lock out tag out, confined space, and other safe work practices training. It meets with contractors weekly to ensure they are provided with up to date and relevant information regarding the process. Subpart E- Emergency Response 40 C.F.R. 68.90 Applicability- Valero East employees are first responders that respond to fires and releases onsite. 40 C.F.R. 68.95 Emergency response program- I reviewed Valero East's emergency response plan with Joseph Cantu. Mr. Cantu manages the facility's emergency response plan. The emergency response plan was accessible to all employees through Valero East's Policy Tech system. The plan contained procedures for informing the public and local emergency response agencies about accidental releases, documentation of proper first-aid and emergency medical response after an accidental release, procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its testing and maintenance, training for all employees in relevant procedures, and procedures to update and review the plan as necessary. Valero East meets regularly with the Local Emergency Planning Committee and has shared its emergency response plan with that group. Valero East stored breathing air equipment and bunker gear on site. It partnered with the Refinery Terminal Fire Company, which provided Valero East with industrial firefighting equipment and personnel in the event of an emergency. Mr. Cantu provided me with testing and inspection records for the emergency response equipment stored onsite, which included fire extinguishers, pumps, and deluge systems. Valero East currently has 74 members on its emergency response team (ERT). I reviewed the training records for four randomly selected employees (one from each shift) and each had documentation reflecting the required initial and refresher training. Valero East utilizes the ERT Online Support System, which provides real time data about which ERT members are onsite as ERT members badge in for work each day. Subpart G- Risk Management Plan 40 C.F.R. 68.190 Updates- The Risk Management Plan for this facility was re-submitted on January 20, 2014. The next RMP submission is due by January 20, 2019. 40 C.F.R. 68.195 Required corrections- An update is required and subsequent updates are required every five years or if the facility meets the criteria of 40 C.F.R. 68.190 & 195. Per this requirement, Valero East's RMP should have submitted a correction to its RMP within one month of the departure of its listed emergency contact. (AOC #4). 7 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} Section III - AREAS OF CONCERN 1. 40 C.F.R. 68.185 requires the owner or operator to submit in the RMP a single certification that, to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the information submitted is true, accurate, and complete. Valero East failed to ensure that the method used for its offsite consequence analysis was accurate. 2. *40 C.F.R. 68.67(f) requires that at least every five (5) years after the completion of the initial process hazard analysis, the process hazard analysis shall be updated and revalidated by a team meeting the requirements, to assure that the process hazard analysis is consistent with the current process. By only reviewing PHA nodes that were affected by a MOC, Valero failed to assure that the process hazard analysis (in its entirety) is consistent with the current process. 3. 40 C.F.R. 68.81(d) requires that a report shall be prepared at the conclusion of the investigation which includes at a minimum: (1) Date of incident; (2) Date investigation began; (3) A description of the incident; (4) The factors that contributed to the incident; and, (5) Any recommendations resulting from the investigation. Valero East failed to document in a report the date the incident investigation began. 4. 40 C.F.R. 68.195(b) requires that beginning June 21, 2004, within one month of any change in the emergency contact information required under 68.160 (b)(6), the owner or operator shall submit a correction of that information. Valero East failed to submit a correction when its emergency contact information changed. *Note: AOC #2 was determined subsequent to the closing meeting that occurred on October 27, 2017 Section IV - FOLLOW UP No information was received by EPA after exiting the Facility on October 27, 2017. Section V - LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix 1 - Opening Conference Sign-in Sheet Appendix 2 -- 2013 Compliance Audit Finding #6 - PHA Appendix 3 - Compliance Audit Repeat Findings Justification Appendix 4 - Sample Incident Investigation Report Appendix 5 - Incident Investigation and Reporting Procedures Sections 6.0 and 7.0 8 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} Appendix 1 {Opening Conference Sign-in Sheet} 9 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} 10 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} Appendix 2 {2013 Compliance Audit Finding #6 - PHA} 11 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} 12 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} Appendix 3 {Compliance Audit Repeat Findings Justification} 13 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} 14 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} Appendix 4 {Sample Incident Investigation Report} 15 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} 16 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} Appendix 5 {Incident Investigation & Reporting Procedures Sections 6.0 & 7.0} 17 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} 18 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} 19 {Valero Energy Corporation} / {Valero Refining Co. - Texas, L.P. - East Plant} Inspection Date {10/24/2017-10/27/2017} 20