Document x5Kn1v354L8jv48MR50VZ3b7m

CONTENTS -- Continued Safe Handling of Low Level Radioisotopes .......................................C. R. Harris 59 Safety Rule Enforcement----A Key to Accident Prevention. . .Richard R. Wiley 62 Damage Control--A New Horizon in Accident Prevention. . .Frank C. Bird, Jr, 66 Training the Plant Defense Corps . . . . John E. Twomey 70 What Do We Expect of the Safety Engineers?...............................G. W. Harper 73 Design Specifications for a Safety Engineer T. H. Rockwell, Ph.D. 75 Preparing the Safety Engineer and Upgrading Performance . .0. A. Wcover 79 The Kintz and Browne Fire and Static Electricity Demonstration............ . . G. M. Kintz and H. F. Browne 85 Better Driving for the Whole Family. ................................ William F, Sobota 87 Getting People to Understand Law Enforcement.................Franklin M. Kreml 93 Officers of the Industrial Conference 1961-62............................................................ 95 Other Volumes in the 1961 National Safety Congress Transactions. . . Back Page A industrial Subjects Sessims INTEGRATING ACCIDENT PREVENTION WITH PRODUCTION By THOMAS A. SULLIVAN A. O. Smith Corporation, Milwaukee, Wis. We would like to offer the experience of our Granite City plant as a case study in the integration of accident prevention with production. We have tried to present facts to you and not draw conclusions. If these facts can give you clues as to steps you can take in your own plants to tie accident prevention into your production processes this is the most that we believe can come from such a study. We would be the last to claim we have discovered any panacea for the complex subject of plant safety . This case study is interesting because it was a new plant in a new area for A. O. Smith Corp. The exposure volume is sig nificant. about 3,000,000 manhours per year. From the beginning we had a safety direc tor. who is still there. He is a staff man and must get alt action through the operat ing people. At the start-up ot the plant two problems developed which complicated our problem immediately: Certain automatic assembly equijment \vanot ready when product deliveries had to be made. Our comjctitor> were not ready to pro duce at alt so we had to carry ihe entire requirements of our customer for the first few months o: our operation. As you might suspect, this required the hiring of green workers and green super visors and made the training problem almost insurmountable at the beginning. We itavc tried to put our whole story on this chart. It looks complicated but if you will follow* along with me we w*il! take it one step at a time. The chart is divided into four areas: The accident frequency data. Production demands and union ships. Management action. Safety and housekeeping. relation Accident and frequency data show the number of lost time accidents per month since the plant began production in Sept. 1954. You will note that we have identified injuries to maintenance men separately from production people as the nature of their ex posure is different and may be of some sig nificance. For example, in 1959 and i960 every other accident was in maintenance, although the hours of exposure of the pro duction people is 10 times that of the main tenance men. The frequency rate is a 12 month running average. Production demands and union relation ships are grouped together as things over which the management of the plant did not have complete control The start-up of new models in the summer of each year should have an adverse effect on safety because new equipment t* present and men are back from a layoff of 4 to 6 weeks and presumably "out of practice.** An examination of the chart docs not dis close such a trend. Rather the accidents seem to bunch up in the later months when the heat is on to produce at peak efficiency. How*ever, the data is not conclusive here eithe*. The effect oi union activity yn safety, while at first appearing adverse--after the union certification in 1955--doe* not show any discernible pattern. The accidents oc curring after the major work stoppages in 1956 and 1957 do not $cem to be relate*! to the stoppage any more than to the model changes which occurred shortly thereafter. In tact, it looks as though the formation >* the L'nion-Management Safety Commit tee in 1959 had a major favorable effect un accident frequency. The frequency rate tor the two year period since April 1959 is 0.78 per million manhours of exposure. Management actions -- There were lour manufacturing superintendents during the period on the chart--identified as A. B, C and D. The frequency rate for each was: A--3.47; 15--1.20; d--3.15 and D--1_53