Document wGE8Eg9rOQw52VwMQgZN64oD

FILE NAME: Doubt Science (DBTS) DATE: 2005 DOC#: DBTS010 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: McCullock Journal Article from IJOEH - Mixing and Mendacity, or How to Keep a Toxic Product in the Marketplace Mining and Mendacity, or How to Keep a Toxic Product in the Marketplace JO C K M CCULLO CH, PHD \ TTofheasbceosrtrouspbtieognanofwmitehdtichael Cevanidaednicaen ambionuets.thQeuheabzeacrdast companies have always claimed that asbestos is safe and that there is little or no disease among Canadian oconnedtiitmioensboinasttheed mteinneosfwtheere1h3amrsihn,esanind Cthaenamdiall.sWwoerrke miners. The industry's management of medical knowl edge has been the key to the continued use of asbestos. fQululeobfeacirbmoirnnees fiwbeerr.eGwivheenrteheosciczeupoafttihoneailndaussbtreys,totshies should first have been identified, but research at the In 1930 the principal manufacturers, including Johns-Manville, Turner 8c Newall (T&N), and Philip mstainffeesdwbays cdoomnepainnycdoomcptoarnsy. Stoiwncnes,twhehelraetecl1i9n2ic0sswUe.rSe. Carey, arranged a cartel that divided the global market into spheres of influence. The arrangement assured a pmaarienntat icnoemdpthanaitetshearnedisthliettilreCifaannaydidainsesausbesaidmiaorniegsmhainvee supply of asbestos and set prices to the companies' advantage. It in effect guaranteed the industry's prof whaosrkbeeresn. Adsubeesttoostihseincotenxdtiitleiownsoriknerths,atthienydhuasvtreycalanidmneod,t itability and created a framework within which the big companies could flourish,2,3Canada was the key to the tthoeshinahpeertehnet ddiasncgoeurrsseofabasobuetsttohse. uTsheafut lfnicetsisonofcoasnbteinstuoess. global industry. Most of the asbestos used in the United States during the twentieth century was mined in Key words, asbestos; industry influence; Canada. Quebec, which at one time boasted ten of the 13 mines INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH 2005;11:398-403 itnheClaanrgadesat. oTpheeny-pinitcalusbdeesdtotshemJienfefrienytMheinweo, rwldh.iJcohhwnass- he global asbestos industry was born in the final MaInnviClleancaodnatroaslleedlsoewvehre4re0,%thoef Cinadnuasdtiraynroeulitepdutu.4pon decades of the nineteenth century. By 1920 mines in Canada, South Africa, the SovietUnion, the mines to produce fiber cheaply. The most expen sive items in the manufacture of asbestos products such and ture So of uatshbeersntoRs-hboasdeedsiparsoudpupcltisedinfiWbeersfteorrnthEeumroapneuafancdWasabgreask e a lin nd ings a labor nd insulatio amounted n were to less the tha raw materials. n 40% of the North America. Large companies such as Turner & Newall (U.K.) and Johns-Manville (U.S.A.) owned final cost of production.4 Canadian asbestos could be produced for less than $35 a ton, and it proved Canadian and South African mines in what was an early twentieth-century example of vertical integration. In extremely profitable for Johns-Manville and its com petitors such as Philip Carey to operate their own the OECD states the manufacture of asbestos products peaked in the 1970s, with worldwide production mines.5 To make the mines safe would have eroded profits, and the comparative advantage of asbestos over exceeding five million tons per annum. Despite the known dangers, today more than two million tons of synthetics would have been lost Since the late 1920s, U.S. parent companies and chrysotile, or white asbestos are mined and shipped around the world each year.* Besides dominating world their Canadian subsidiaries have maintained that there is little or no disease among mine workers. Asbestosis in utrsaedoefinasabsebsetostsoisn, Cdeavnealdoaphinags acgogurnetsrsiievselaynpdrohmasouteseddthites textile workers, so they have claimed, has been due to the specific conditions in that industry and not the influence in international forums to protect its export markets.f Canadian producers and their U.S. parent inherent dangers of the mineral. That fiction continues to shape the discourse about the usefulness of asbestos, and has enabled the industry to keep its products in Received from the School of Social Science and Planning, RMIT the marketplace. University, Melbourne, Australia, Supported by the Australian Research Council. ASBESTOSIS Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Jock McCul loch, Social Science and Planning, RMIT, GPO Box 2476V, Mel Asbestosis is a form of pneumoconiosis caused by the bourne 3001, Australia; e-mail: <jock.mcculloch@rmit.edu.au>. inhalation of asbestos fiber. As lung tissue loses its elas *While there were three major commercial varieties of asbestos, chrysotile (white), am osite (brow n), and crocidolite (blue), over itincgitya, pitrsocgarepsasciivtye stohofrutnncetsisonofisbrreeadtuhc.eTdh, ethdeirseebasyecmauasy 90% of the fiber used during the twentieth century was chrysotile. JFor an account of Canada's attempts to retain access to the French market for its asbestos see Sentes.1 rneusmulbt eirnofapacrpieprpslionngasfibbersotsoissi.s Bapepgeinanreindgininthe19B2r4it,isha 398 PMreicdeicableJgoaunrnaasl.tuIdny iFnebrersupaorynse19t2o8e, mMeergreinwgetehveirdeanncde of disease in U.K factories.6By 1930, it was well under stood that asbestosis was a serious fibrosis of the lungs, and that after ten years of employment, industry work ers had a 50% chance of disability.3Asbestosis could be fatal and would progress even when exposure had ceased. In a memorandum published in 1933, Merewether noted that asbestosis was a more serious disease than silicosis. It destroyed the body's reserve capacity to resist other infections, so even a moderate degree of disability could be life-threatening.7 Since 80% of the asbestos imported into the United Kingdom came from Canada, any major variation in disease rates between the two settings was unlikely. asbWesittohsisnofotacbuslesedexucpeoptniotnhse, ftahcetoreyarwlyorlkiteerrsaitnureWeosnt ern Europe who made asbestos-based products. It was nmoitnewdriattsebnesatobsouint tChaenmadean,anwdomSoenu,thaenrdn Achfirlidcar.enLawbhoor cesopnedciitaiollnysfoinr bAlafcrikcawnormkeinrse.s Inwe1r9e28n,otFo.riWou. sSlyimbsoadn,, from the South African Institute for Medical Research, published a short article on fibrosis. On examining post-mortem material from a small number of South ern Rhodesian miners, Simson found curious yellow bodies in sections of lung tissue.8Simson had no data on the subjects' work histories, but at the least his research suggested that miners faced a risk of contract ing asbestosis. wasAcfoamr mploerteediminpo1r9ta3n0t bsytudGyeoofrgSeouStlhadAef,riacapnhymsiinciearns Temrapnlsovyaeadl, awthtihceh Nweaws oApmeriaatnetdhubsymT&inNe .inSltahdee Ehaasdtenron x-ray equipment, so he relied upon a careful physical examination of each of the miners. He found that 70% osufftfheerseedwfroormkerwsehiagdhtslhoosrst,ntehses towfobrcelaastshicansydmaplmtoomsst aollf asbestosis. He concluded that over half the mill and mine workers had that disease.9By matching work his tories against medical profiles, Slade was able to estab lish an association between exposure levels and illness. Despite their importance, Slade never published his results, nor was his thesis cited in the literature. He attended no conferences, and as far as is known, he never acted as a consultant for the Departments of Mresineeasrcho,r SHlaedaelthle.ftHthaveinignducostmryplaeltmedostpaimthm-beredaiaktienlgy ianndJospheanntntehsebruersgt ofbheifsocrearereertiarsinaggentoeratlhperaCcthitaionnneerl Itsiolannadls.heHaeltnhe.1v0eTr haegaiSnowutohrkAefdriicnanthMe feideilcdalofRoecgciustpear, wcihanicsh, hdaoscunmo ernectsotrhdeonfaSmlaedsea'sndhaavdidnrgespsreasctoicfeadll pmheydsii cinCeainnaSdoaupthroAdfurcicead. far more asbestos than did South ern Rhodesia, with its mines supplying most of the fiber uomseydabnyd,Ui.nS.thienodruystaryt .leCasat,nCadaanahdaidanawdoervkeelrospweedreecporon tected by the law, unlike their South African counter parts. In 1930, Dr. Frank Pedley, then director of the Department of Industrial Hygiene at McGill University in Montreal, published two articles on asbestosis.} The Department had been set up by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in 1926 to provide it with informa tion on morbidity and mortality in Canadian industries, including the asbestos industry. In an article in the Canadian MedicalAssociationJournal, Pedley claimed that mining and milling in Canada might not present the risk associated with manufacture of asbestos-containing products in the United Kingdom.11 In a second piece, Pedley remarked that there had been no case of aashbaezstaorsdisininQCuaenbaedca'samnidnetsh.a12tPtheedrleeywmasadneoreevfeidreennccee toof Simson's study of Southern Rhodesia but failed to men wtioasntthheastatmheeftiobewrhciacuhsiCnagnaasdbieasntomsiisnienrsSwouerteheerxnpAosferidc.a CaInnadMiaany J1o9h3n0s,-MDra.nSvtiellvee,nsgoanv,e aampinapeeprhyosnicioacncwupitah tional disease to members of the Quebec Asbestos Pro ducers Association. Stevenson was at that time engaged with Frank Pedley in a survey of asbestosis, and no doubt his audience assumed his presentation was based on data from that study. Stevenson explained that asbestosis rarely occurred in Canadian mine workers. While there might have been cases in the distant past, Johns-Manville was such a fastidious employer that as a preventive measure it transferred mill workers to other jhoabds aacfcteesrsteton tyheearxs-raoyfssoerfvSicoeu.t1h8 SAtferviceannsomn iwneisrshesdo hhee could become more familiar with the disease. CaSnaudcihanasmseirntieornss waebroeutretpheeataebdseandcenoaufsaesabmestboysisthine itnhdeufisrtsrtymovoenrththseonfWexotrhldalWf caernItIu,rwy.hFenorpeuxbalimcpaluet,hdourirtiinegs began reviewing the Workmen's Compensation Act, Johns-Manville informed the Quebec government that there had been no case of asbestosis at its mines, and any reference to that disease in the legislation would only encourage groundless claims for compensation.14 Despite Pedley's and Stevenson's claims, they and the industry were fully aware of high levels of disease among Canadian workers. In 1930, the Metropolitan Lniiefes,Infsuunrdaendce aCosmtupdaynyo,falaosnbgeswtoitshisthaemmoanjgorQcoumebpeac miners. The project, which was coordinated by Dr. F14ra1nkCaPneaddleiayn aJnodhnass-Msisatendvilbley eDmr.pSltoeyveeenssoant, Ainsvboelsvteods Tanhdetf5o4rdmmenineartsThhaedtfohradd. tEeinghytye-afrivseopf esrecrevnicte,ofcotmhe pared with only 22% of those at Asbestos. Pedley and JThe center was founded in 1926 by the Metropolitan Life Insur ance Company, VOL 11/NO 4, OCT/DEC 2005 w w w .ijoeh.com Mining and M endacity 399 Stevenson began with a review of the miners' general health.18 Half of those in each group needed dental care; 10% of the men from Asbestos had hearing loss, while over half of the Thetford subjects had marked industrial deafness; 27 from Asbestos and 13 from Thet ford had infected tonsils, and 10% of both groups had hernias, a serious disability in men required to do heavy work. Around 10% of the Thetford men had asbestos corns or raised areas of skin, similar to a small wboatrht, gcraouuspeds wbyasimpoboerd, desepdefciibaellrys.foTrhme egnenwehraolwheeraeltfhulolyf employed. Unlike their U.K colleagues, Pedley and SteTvhenesocnlindiicdalnoetxtaamkeinwatoiorknhoisftotrhiees.men's lungs was ethveenmmosotrefredqisuteunrbticnogm. Bplaasianltrwalaessswhoerretnecsosmomfobnre, abtuh,t itnheedclabsysicDsry. mSptetovmensoofna,sb1e4s,tosoirs. 3O5f%th, eh4a0dmsetangeexoamne asbestosis; of the 56 men x-rayed at Thetford, almost half had asbestosis; and of the 141 at Asbestos, 17 had the disease.15The high incidence at Thetford was con sistent with the longer average period of service, and in his report Pedley wrote: "From this table one would conclude that asbestosis is not likely to develop with an exposure of less than five years, but that with exposure of more than ten years there is a great possibility of it developing."15 Pedley concluded that while asbestosis wnoasaccocmommpoann,yiitnwgasinocfalpiatdceityim. Ipnorrteaanccheinsginctheatthceorencwlaus sion he ignored the heavy physical labor required of mcoimnemrsoann. dHheisaloswonigfinnodriendg tthheatmsheodrictnaelslsitoerfabtrueraethfrwomas the United Kingdom, which was cited widely in the leading North American journals.3 neePdeeddlepyewrmanistseidonto. HpuebalpisphrotahcehsetdudDyr,.bAunttthoondyoLsoanhzea at Metropolitan Life, which had provided part of the funding, but Lanza refused, and the study was never raebloeaustedd.isFearosemitnhatthteimme,inthese vviaerwiesdexapcrceosrsdeidnbgytLoanthzea aeudgdeiednctheaht eclawiamssaadbdoreustsitnhge. aIbnsepnrciveaotef ahsebeasctoksnioswinl Canadian miners were motivated by the self-interest of the Canadian asbestos companies.16 In public Lanza endorsed the fallacy that the Canadian mines were safe.17 The final evidence of Lanza's view about the shaisfeetymopflothyeer.asMbeesttroospmoliintaens iLsiffoeucnadmien ttohevibewehaasvbieosrtoosf wlooardkienrgs taos stuhcehirahheiaglhth-riisnksugrraonucpeipt aredmdeiudmasn.3e,1x9tra 40% In April 1940, with asbestos production levels rising, DCra.nSatdeivaennsmoninpersesaetntSedhearnborothoekre.paHpeer eoxnptlhaeinseadfettyhoatf J5o0h7nsm-MenanavtiAllesbsetsatfofswweirteh xm-roaryeedthaannnuteanllyyeaanrsd,oof fsetrhve ice, only 22, orjust over 4% showed early signs of fibro sis. In fact there was so litde disease in Canada it was almost impossible to conduct research. Stevenson did, however, admit that the Thetford mill was full of dust, and he wondered: "if it would be possible to have small ventilated chambers erected in certain locations in the mills where operators of machines could be kept, a part of the time, while sdll watching their machines, so that they could get clean air."20Paradoxically, there was dust and disease in the South African mines, but in Canada there was supposedly only dust. State authorities may have believed Stevenson, butJohns-Manville's competi torsStwevereensleosns'sguplalpibelre.was distributed within the indus try and copies were sent to Johns-Manville's competi ttohresminintheeinUSniotuetdhKerinngAdformica. TwuhrenreerS&laNdeewhaaldl odpoenreatheids research in the late 1920s, and it also had mines in cQhuaeibrmeca.nTShierreSfaomreu,elitTwuarsnenro, twsausriprrriistiantegdthbayt STte&vNen's son's claims about the absence of disease. He com mented that asbestosis was difficult to diagnose and that it was common for more cases to show up post mortem than during clinical examination.21Sir Samuel was certain that if the U.K Medical Board had exam ined Johns-Manville's employees they would have found plenty of asbestosis. J. A. Cann, a senior execu tive with T&N. agreed.22 Cann noted that x-rays were not a reliable method of diagnosis, and for that reason British physicians always took detailed work histories. UexnpliekreiemncaenyofoCf hainsacdoiallneamguineess,,Cwahninchhagdavheahdifmirsftu-rhtahnedr rtehaesKonintgoMquinees,tiConanSntehvaednsfoonu'nsdclwaiomrsk. cDounrdiintgioansvitsoitbtoe very poor. There was not enough draught to remove even the palpable dust from the mills, and pollution was particularly bad in the bagging areas. Under such conTdhiteiroenswdeirseeaasenwuamsbineervoitfabrleea.sons why Stevenson's paper irritated his British readers. The most obvious was the claim that while there was disease at T&N's African mines there was none among Johns-Manville's North America workers. It is certain that Sir Samuel was aware of the conditions in Canada. He may also have been aware of research from a decade earlier in which Stevenson had been directly involved. But his irritation did not lead to any improvement in the work conditions on T&N mines. THE M INES pCrhorbylseomtisleams minienresrsinelCseawnahderae,faicnecdlumdianngyloowf tphaey,sdamane gmearnoaugsecmoenndti,tiaonnds,shteifcthwnoorlko.giIcnaladcdhiatinogne,, thinetrQacuteabbelec miminpeasctpuopllountecdotmhemeunnvitiireosntmhaetnwt aenred dheapdenandeinnttruuspiovne them for employment.23There were also technical fac tors that made asbestos mining particularly hazardous. 400 McCulloch w w w .ljoeh.com INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH While methods of extracting asbestos ore have varied from open cut to depth mining, the aim of pro cessing fiber is always the same, namely to preserve the mineral's physical properties. For that reason, asbestos is milled dry, which means that milling creates dust. After arriving at a mill, ore is fed into primary crushers, then crushed and sorted.24 The ore is then crushed again, and the fiber lifted off by suction. The further into the milling process, the more dust is generated. The most hazardous jobs at Wittenoom (Australia), Penge (South Africa), and Shabanie (Southern Rhode sia) were in the bagging sections, were fiber was pressed, often by hand, into burlap sacks. Evidence from mines in Southern Africa from as late as 1980 shows that between a third and halfofmillworkers con struapcpteodsedasbtoesbtoesins.o25'd26iseInaseC.aTnhadoase, hwohwoevraenr, tthheerme iwneass like the insurance industry knew better. In June 1946, Wonheeaoltfy,MveistritoepdotlhiteanThLeiftefo'srdchmieinf eo,ffwicheersre, Dher. mGeetorthgee ntheewmmeeddiiccaall dsiurrevcetoyr,oDf rw. PoarkuelrCsarthtiaert. CWahretiaelrtyhthadoujguhstt begun would uncover a lot of asbestosis, as well as tuberculosis. He wrote to his colleague Anthony Lanza: `The more thorough the job the more problems they are going to discover. Since asbestosis is compensatable, this is going to cost them much money."27 During January 1949, the Montreal newspaper Le Devoircarried a series ofarticles on work and living con ditions in the village of East Broughton. The author, Burton Le Doux, interviewed miners and their families athnedy dlievsecdriabneddwthoerkdedep. lEoarsatbBlerocuognhdtiotinownsasuanpdoeor rwchoimch munity in Canada's poorest province. The sole source othfeemQupelobyemc eAnstbfeostrosthCe ovriplloargaet'ison3,,0a00suinbshiadbiaitraynotsf wthaes U.S. company Philip Carey. The mine lay next to the Tcohreporartaetsioonf'spfaayctworeyr,ewphoiocrhaonpderwaoterkd csioxnddaityisonaswweeerke. hard. The mill was bitterly cold in winter, and there was not even a place for the men to eat away from the dust and noise. To keep the costs of production to a mini mum, the corporation relied upon manual labor, and even the cleaning of the mill was done by hand. There was no safety equipment, and workers would them selves buy goggles to keep the fiber out of their eyes. Every part of the operation, from mining, to process ing, to the bagging of fiber created dust. Le Dome found that the men's clothes were encrusted with greygbrroewens, feibaresr,, aansdwheareir.t2h8eTirhehawnedsstearnndsidfaeceosf,ththeevirilleaygee wwaass dinuustnidnataelldtwheithhoaussbeess.tos from the mill, and there ThAeswionrsatnjyobmsianteE, assotmBerjooubgshwtoenrewweroersien tthhaenboagthgeirnsg. section, where empocheurs bagged fiber by hand. Empoch.eurs'were not corporation employees but worked for private contractors and were paid piece rates rather than wages. They would fill the burlap sacks, then shake and press the fiber, before sewing the sacks closed. Pileurs picked up the leaking sacks and piled them in the storeroom. The system provided the cor poration with cheap labor and sheltered the parent company Philip Carey, from the possibility of legal action by workers who contracted asbestosis. The men were never warned of the dangers they faced, nor did company physicians tell them when they had con tracted an occupational disease. Le Doux also found that the environmental exposure from, the waste dumps was such that whole families were afflicted with respira tory illness. The provincial government in Quebec was well aware of the situation, according to Le Doux, but chose to do nothing. The conditions described in Le DSoeuvothirwAefrreicaas,bawdhaesrethousnedeenrdaupreadrthbyeibdlacmkiwneorrskewrsenint uDnopurxo'tsecretepdorbtys,triandeFuenbirounasryor1t9h4e9lamw.i1n0eFrsollaotwJionghnLseManville's Asbestos mine began a dramatic strike for better pay and work conditions. The strike, which soon spread to Thetford, lasted for five months and became a turning point in the history of labor relations in Qtiouneable'oc.r Ietndviidronnomt,ehnotawleivnejur,rye.nd the threat of occupa Over the next 20 years, there was some improvement in working conditions in Canada's mines. When T&N's company physician Dr. J. F. Knox visited Thetford in December 1964, he found there was less dust on the ppraevveimouesnvtsisaitn1d2ryoeoafrssoefardloiemr.eBstuict hdewneolltiendgsththaatnnoonnehoisf the new houses or the schools had been "positioned with the idea of avoiding dust blown off the encircling t(haasbtefsibtoesr)frdoummtphse."22950Hteonws aosf wpaarsttiecudluamrlypecdoenaccehrndeady laatteBr,elTl&MNin'sesewnaisorbplohwysnicoiavne,rDtrh.eHd. iLsetrwicint2s9ohAn,dfeocuandde Athsebeasrteoas wheaasvcilhyopkoeldluwteidth. dEuvsetn; htheelanmewenmteidll tahtaLt athkee ventilation system had been designed to enhance output rather than improve occupational safety.30 Ten years later, conditions were much the same. In 1976, the Beaudry Commission into the Quebec asbestos industry concluded that the mines and mills were unsafe, and that some 15,000 Quebec workers had spent their entire lives in a hazardous environment. "It is obvious" the Commission wrote, "after our study that the technical means to ensure a healthy working envi rcoonmmmeennttdedo eoxfisetmapnldoyaerres:re`aTdhileyyahvaavileabklee.p"3t1aBveaailuadbrlye information about the dangerous effects of asbestos Cduosmt mawisasyionfrowmas tahlesowcorirtkicearsl oafndthethsetatueniionnsps.e"c31toTrahtee which had allowed such conditions to continue. wBeeraeudbroyrnfiendoiuntgbsyabsuobustethqueernistkreosfeoacrccuhp.3a2tional disease VOL 11/NO 4, OCT/DEC 2005 w w w .ijoeh.com Mining and M endacity 401 Company medical officers play an important--if ambiguous--role in occupational health and safety. In theory, medical officers stand between labor, employ ers, and regulatory authorities. In practice they have to reconcile their duties as physicians with the commer cial demands of industry. One such physician, Dr, Cartier, the director of the company clinic at Thetford, gtoalvdetehveidCeonmcembiesfsoiorne tthheatBheeauodftreynCaodmvimseidssmioinn.eCrsawrtiiethr aesvbeensitofsaissbnesottottioc wseoerkkwerosrlkeeftrst'hceoirmjopbesn,stahteiopnr,ogbreecsasuivsee nature of the disease would not have been halted: "So I figured it was in their best interest to stay at their jobs. Besides they didn't want to be reported ill and trans ferred to a lower paying job where they might of earned as much as $50 less a week."33Cartier admitted that there had been cases of workers who died a few months after receiving a clean bill of health from his clinic. He was surprised that the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association did not try to improve work condi tions but he made no complaints. He was `just a French-Canadian doctor from the boondocks" and the Association were employing world experts at McGill University to research asbestos disease. Over time those experts had included Drs. Pedley and Stevenson. C O N C LU S IO N Why were conditions so hazardous in the Canadian mines, and why did employers such as Johns-Manville and Philip Carey make no effort to prevent occupa itniognafrlodmisetahsee?pTolhiteirces woferme eadnicuaml breesreoarfcrheatsoontsh,eraencgo nomic structure of the industry. Neither should we forget the failure of company physicians such as Steven son and Cartier to protect their patients. Until the 1970s, the industry funded most of the medical research into the effects of exposures to asbestos. Where the results were favorable they were released into the public domain and used as evidence that employers were providing a safe work environ ment Where the results were unfavorable they were wsueprperpeussbeldis,haenddinficthtieoinraplliazceed. aTchceouynetasr o1f93d0isweaassearactreus cSitaelvemnsoomnesnttudiyn othfeThinedtfuosrtdryw'sashicsotomryp.leTtehde iPne1d9le3y0-. iSslhaedde,'sawnodrktohne aMsbeersetwosemthienre-PrsriicneSosuurtvheAyfroicfaawsbaessftions manufacturing in the United Kingdom was released. Trahteestohfreaesbsetsutdoiseiss awtemreinpersecainpditfaatcetdorbiyesthaendbubrygtehoenriinsge of asbestos-related litigation in the United States. That research coincided with the Great Depression, which saalswo asadwramsilaictiocsifsalbl eincodmeem aanndaftoiornaaslbeissstouse.pTrohdeucintst.roIt dleuvcetliso, nanodfthpeorwebery ttohoelsinicnidefonucendorfiedsisainbcilrietya.seSdilicdoussist is dose-related and there was a clear boundary separat ing the wider public from the men and women who worked with silica. That made it possible for the indus try to resolve the issue in its favor and thereby con demn two generations of foundry workers to disability and poverty. Although silicosis was an occupational dis ease, as Rosner and Markovitz have shown, the events of the 1930s in the United States to some extent undermined optimism about the safety of new tech intsoelolfg.3i4esUnandder tthheoseeffciicraccuymsotfanicnedsutshtreiarlespurlotsduocftitohne Pedley-Stevenson study could have seriously damaged the asbestos industry The industry was dependent upon the mines for its profits. To make the mines safe would have required such a massive investment that asbestos would have lost its comparative advantage over substitutes. The situa htiiodndwenascmosutschofthperosadmucetiionnSwouetnhteurnnaAcfkrnicoaw, wlehdegreedthbey state authorities, who had no interest in the welfare of black workers. As a consequence, the in-house studies by Slade in South Africa and Dr. Pedley in Quebec had no impact upon occupational health or safety. In Canada, internal factors also played a role. Regionalism in Quebec and the need for jobs encour aged state patronage and collusion over occupational ddi'Asemasiea.ntWe iitnh 1th9e78,crleaartgieonpaorftsthoef tShoeciienteduNstartyiownaerlee nteamtiobnearli1z9e9d2.,Pwuabsliicntoewnndeerdshtoip,wwrehsitchcolnastrtoedl furnotmil SUe.Sp. companies. The nationalization encouraged public isluypspuobrstidfoizreadnbiyndtuhsetrfyedtheraatlfogrodveecrnadmeesnht.adTbheeemn ihneianvg companies have also been supported by pension funds, ttihoenst.r23adMe inuinnigontsa,xeasnidn tQhueebQeucebhaevce cbroewenn facrorlpoowrear than the subsidies the industry has received. In 2002, for example, only 6,992 people worked in all types of mines in Quebec, yet total public expenditure on the industry was well above $107 million.23 In various guises, that system of patronage goes back to the 1930s. The industry's commercial success did not enrich mining communities such as East Broughton. Instead, over successive generations, those communities have borne the hidden costs of production, including pollu teinovniroofntmheenlatanld dainsedausen.coTmhpeeneasraltyeddoencciaulpsaatiboonuatl atnhde existence of asbestosis ensured the industry'slong-term soufravsibvaels.toHsiasviinngthaergCuaendafdoiar ndemciandeerss,aibt owuats tahsemaablslesntecpe for the major producers to argue, as they did after 1960, that neither was there mesothelioma. That fallacy has been maintained until the present. References 1. sSteundtyeschKallAensbgeisntgosthaenldegtihtiemWacoyrlodf TthreadWeTOOrgaasnaizfaotriuomn: fAorctahsee 402 McCulloch www.iJoeh.com INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH athdejsuids,icUantiiovnersoitfypoufbAlilcbehretaa,lt2h00a2n.d environmental issues. MA 2. AofsbAesstboesstaonsdaCnedrtCaienrAtasibnesAtossbePsrtoodsuPcrtso:dAucRtse.pTorhteonMthoenoSpuoplpielys COoffmicme,is1s9i7o3n:.78L.ondon, England: Her Majesty's Stationery 3. ACsapstelnemLaanwBan. Ad sBbuessitnoes:ssMBeodoikcas,l 1a9n9d6:L3e5g.al Aspects. 4th ed. NJ: 4. rTaetsiotinm,oannydoPfrLeeswidiesnHt.oBfrAoswbne,stPorseIsnidsteintut,tJeo, hinnsH-MeaarnivniglleonCCoropdoe HofeFaariirnCg oamnpdetAitipopnefnodrixth. eNAastbieosntaols IRndeucostvreyr:yTrAadnmscirnipisttsraotfiothne, 5. WMaasnhaignegmtoenn,tDbCy,MOocrtg1an9.,1F9o3r3tu. ne. 1934; 3. 6. UTwnieveedrasilteyGP.reMssa,g2ic0M00i:n2e0r-a2l.to Killer Dust. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford 7. M19e3r3e-w34e;th1e5r. ERA. A Memorandum on Asbestosis. Tubercle. 8. S1:i8m8s5o-6n. FW. Pulmonary asbestosis in South Africa. BMJ. 1928; 9. ESlmadpeloGyeFd. TinheAIsnbceisdtoesncMe ionifnRgewspitihratSopryecDiailsaRbeilfietyreinnceWtoorktehres TMyDpethoefsiDs,isUanbiivlietyrsiCtyauosfetdhebyWtihtweaItnehrsarlaantdio,n19o3f0.Asbestos Dust 10. MthecCSutalltoecihn JS.oAutshbeAsftroiscaBLluoensd: oLna,bEonugr,laCnda:pJitaaml,ePshCyusricreiayn, s20a0n2d. 1112.. PPeeddlleeyy FF.. AAssbbeessttoossiiss.. CCaann.. MPuebdl.icAHsseoacl.tJh. J1,913903;202;2:215:537-46.-7. 13. AAssbbeessttoossisP. rPoadpuecrerps,reSsehnetrebdroobkyeDQrU.S,teCvaennsaodna, to23thMeayQu1e9b3e8c. TPa&pNersP)arpeefresrsRteoetlh0e0a9r/c1h6iv6e2.he[lTduartnethre&ScNheowolalol fPBaupseirnses(sTH&iNs ltaonryd,. TMhaonscehpesatpeerrsMaeretrocpoopliietsanofUinntievrenrsailtyc,omMpaanncyhecsoterrre, sEponng 14. Mdeenmceo,mQadueebaevcailOabclceutphaotuiognhallegDailsedaissceosveLreyg.]islation, Vandiver 15. BPerodwleny,F1.5RAepporirlt1o9f4t0h.eTP&hNysiPcaapl eErxsaRmeienla0ti0o9n/s16a5n5d-5X7-.Ray Exam iQnuaetiboenc,oNf oAvsebmesbtoesr 1W93o0rk.eMrsetinLiAfesbCeosntosspiraancdy.Thetford Mines, 16. LSaertatenracfr,oDmecA.1L3,a1n9z3a7, .Metropolitan Life, to Mandred Bowditch, 17. LluanngzsaoAf,asebteaslt.oEsfwfeocrtkseorsf.tPhuebilnichaHlaetailothn Rofepa.sb1e9s3to5s;5d0u(Jsatnounartyh)e. 18. LmaonnzaarAy Jd,iVseaansee.RAJ.mInRdeuvsTtruiablerdcuusltossaisn.d1t9h3e9;m39o:r4t1a9li.ty from pul 19. L19e3tt9e.r from Buell toJ. C. McConnell, Metropolitan Life, Aug 22' 20. ACsabneasdtoas,i1s.5PAappreirl 1p9re4s0e.nTt&edNbPyaDpre.rsStReveeelns0o0n9,/1S6h4e3r-b5r0o.oke, QU, 21. 0M0e9m/1o6,41S-i4r2S. amuel Turner, 25 May 1940. T&N Papers Reel 22. PMaepmeros,RJ.eeAl.0C09a/n1n64t1o-4C2.. S. Bell, London, 3 June 1940. T&N 23. IKnuteyrenkaJt.ioAnsableBstaons AMsibneisntgosinCoCnafnearedna.ceP,aOpettrawpare, sCenanteaddat,oStehpe 24. Itenmvebsetirga1t3i,on20s0o3f. the asbestos mines. In: Report of the Commis sSiaolnisbtuoryS,tuUd.Ky.:SiGliocovseirsnamnedntoPthrienrteIrn,d1u9s3tr8i:a8l 2P.neumonocinosis. 25. AVipsriitlto19S8h7a.bTa&niNe PanapdeGrsa0th3s0M1/1in5e3s7,-M15a4r0c.h 1987, Dr. P. Elmes 14 26. AtesebMesteoestidnugsMt laevrcehls1i9n8o1v. eTr&seNasPcaopmerpsa2n8ie5s/0E59x1ec.utive Commit 27. PMaepmeros 0fr0o9m/18G93eo. rge Whealty to A Lanza, 15/6/1945. T&N 28. BLeroDugohutxoBn.aAndviallsabgeestoofsitsh.rLeee Dtheovuoisra.nJadnsuuafrfoyc1a2te,s19in49d.ust. East 29. KRnepoxo,rt1o7nDveicseitmtobeTrh1e9t6fo4.rdT&MNinePsa,paesrbse2stRoseealn1d0M1/1o3n5tr1e-a3l.. J. F. 30. RanedpothrtefrBoemll MH.inLee,wTihnestofhonrdoMn ivniesist, tCoaAntaldasa,A1s9b7e3st.oTs&CNomPpaapneyr Reel 76/1150-61. 31. mBeeanuddartyionC.oTm&mNisPsiaopne,rsCRoenecllu4s1i7o/n1s25a3n-d71,Preliminary Recom 32. tNeircmhomlsoonrtaWliJt,ySeelxipkoerfifeInJ,ceSeoidfmcahnryHso,tLilielismRi,nFeorsrminbyTPh.eLtfoonrgd 33. MChinieefs,dQocuteobresca,yAs hnen tNriYedActoadbSechi.u1m9a7n9.; 1M1-o2n1t.real Star. Nov 20, 1975. 34. ROocscnuepraDtio, nMaalrkDoivseitazseGs. iDneTadwlyenDtiuestth:-SCileincotusirsyaAndmtehreicPa.olPitriicnscoef ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. VOL 11/NO 4, OCT/DEC 2005 . w w w .ljoeh.com Mining and M endacity 403