Document rx2qbkM6vEkwomqGE4EE9EBzq

4 Iii Twenty-fir.il t 'tujrcss--National Safely Council Safety--Its Application to the Individual By D. F. STEVENS General Superintendent of Transportation, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad TIkj >jnak.T said it: jart: The exj*ericnce fathered from 25 years of railroad mirk lias cnal.lnl me t ciussity tlte railroad worker in his relation to safety into three lit tlte ftT>t rlafN 1 might plate tlte employee who is inherently saie under any ondhi*t of routine service: second, tbc employee who has convinced him self tlu: safety is a tine thin? x'ur every one else. Inn flat he himself docs not need it: and third, the whose attitude is almost ojicnly antagonistic and who is generally a fatalist. Men \vh- nay l<e classified as sale under any condition of routine service are usually c!iaraocriz-d hr iuyahv. dependability and stability. I would say their home live; are usually such tlxat they du not carry with them to their work any mental conditions that might aggravate fir disturb them as they perform their duties, and as a result they can think clearly. They are the jieople who do not ftecome easily excited: Uvausc their nrr\i*> are in good shajie. and they are able to face any situa tion tlut normally arises with dear Thinking. 1 believe that 90 jer cent oi tlte railroad j**>>plc cutne under this classification. The second class. those who feel that the safety work is for others lust that they themselves d* not nrrd it. srrrn ! nip to constitute the biggest problem we have. They lave aliout convinced themselves that they are superior to anything occurring to them, and ntuse to give safety much thought. Generally speaking, employees oi this cla.-s are unable t<* distinguish lieUvecn the things that are safe and tlte things tltat are VM safe. 1 lave noticed me thing that is generally common with all. Their views *n safety are * a parity with their views of other things. They seem to get alone all right until vnneihiuu liajijunis and then tltcy are usually helpless. Tins class worker can nly lie converted hv the untiring constant efforts of those who supervise his activities. Periapt as an instrument to aid the safety campaigner can use tlte other tttcrttl*Ts ni tlie crews or gangs with whom the)* work, to constantly keep driving at them and break down their resistance to unsafe practices. These employee* must lnr educated to differemiaie between the sate and llie unsafe. Then we cotne t the third cla*s. whom I lave mentally classified as the fatalists or antagonistic to safety measures. These people constitute a problem all to itself, and in dealing with them there arc only two avenues open, namely, intensive and Insistent training, or dismissal. I have not yes convinced myself that any large l*ercmtau* of them arc sitM*eptihle at all to the first cure, and I have censored myself tr.mi time u time fur not laving dismissed more employees of this type, liecansc in a nutul*r ot cases 1 have ktter come to see them killed or injured tn the service, due solely to their mvo ncii<rt>. Of eursc. the thing that is still worse about this type of jierson is that lircaue of his actions he not only subjects himself to the possibility ot injury or death, hut involves others as well. I seem to see in this class oi people certain distinguishing cVoracteristics. Generally (lie man tvt only* w? red m relation to safety matters, but his thoughts arc along the same line in oilier nutters. Frequently be is a nervous, fretful individual, with in many cases not a gvd home condition, and m most cases with his private habits not any too good. With jicrlaps very few exceptions, the safety question finds ready response from the employee mnjjiany. tlie labor organization to which the man belongs, bis family, his friend*, and generally speaking, himself, if you are able to reach him through the junicular channel that ap)>eals to him. In the final analysis, the success of these mra.cures depends upon tlie force and sincerity of purpose that the supervising officer put* into the work. It is worse than useless for a foreman to talk safety to hfs gang, if they can see that he is daily doing things that are unsafe himself. Safely Section, A.Rui.--Slraiii Railroad Section, X.S.C. 417 WEDNESDAY MORNING SESSION October 5, 1932 Report of Committee on Train Service Accidents By D. G. PHILLIPS Superintendent of Safety. The Wabash Railway The speaker said in part: In the year 1931. out of 5.099 fatalities and 35.>5fi per sons injured, according to reports to the interstate Commerce Commission. 4,024 of these fatalities and 18,849 of the persons injured occurred in tram service accidents. While ft is true that a large proportion of these fatalities occurred in grade crossing accidents and to trespassers, it is also true that over halt of the fatalities to employee* on duty occurred in what is known as train service accidents and aloiu one-third of the irriurics to employees occurred in train service accidents. We feel, therefore, tlut wc are justified in saying tiiat the prevention of tram service accidents is probably the most important safety problem confronting us today, as far as accidents in and around railroads are concerned. Under the Ileading "coupling or tmcoupling car* or locomotives*' m 19.41 12 persons were killed and 394 jicrsons injured. This may lie cntnjxared pit the year 19.11). when 3d persons were killed and fifM injured. The year 131. therefore. shows a decrease of 60 i*cr cent in the number of fatalities and 35 jkt cent in tlie numlier ot jicrsotal injuries: and these may lie coinjared iunlicr with the record for 1920. when there were 151 fatalities and 2.450 injuries due to this cause. Tlie principal reason for personal injuries under this heading is due to employees stcjrpmg in letwcm moving cars, usually at a time when cnupliiie is alKutt to lie made, to determine if tlie knuckle las tally opened, to adjust l<atkjn oi couplers, or to adjust the coupling or uncoupling lever, with the result tiiat they are caught between the couplers: or |>erhaps due to tripping or falling while performing this art. and are thus run over by tlie car. Our remedy tor correcting this dangerous practice is for each and every railroad to make a positive and definite rule prnhflntmc employee* from going between moring cars when nearing each other, to examine tlie employees to see tlut the rule is understood by them, and that supervisory officers see tint the rule is enforced. Under the headirur *tc<mplmg or uncoupling air or ylcani l.i*e." in 19.11. 11 persons were killed and l/c persons injured, which may he compared with the record for 1930. when 7 persons were killed and 232 injured. The increase of ftf (ter cent in the numlier oi fatalities is decidedly regrettable, although the record shows a decrease of 24 per cent in the number at injuries. The principal cause ot employee injuries under this head is due to their failure to protect themselves by j*cri< irming this work in accordance with tlie rules. The remedy ior this class of accidents where car men arc employed rests in a full and complete enforcement of the blue signal rule which is quite uniform on all railroads. RaiJr<od managements should improve this hltxe signal so as to make h as efficient as possible. The rule should also govern the placing m the blue signal so as to make sure that rt is in a location where it will serve tlie first purpose as a signal to warn train, engine and yard men who might l>e guided by it. Where en gine is coupled onto cars and trainmen are performing this work without blue signal jirotection. they should not permit themselves to get into a place where an unexpected movement of the cars might cause an accident, without first notifying the engitie nan and fireman so as to be fully protected. Under the heading "operating hand brakes." in 1931 there were 18 fatalities and 824 jiersons injured, as compared with tlie record for 1930 when 26 |*ersom were killed and 1.154 injured. The year 1931 shows a decrease of 31 per cent in