Document r6kz895MVwv1vaBdz7kMoyQEG

Journal of the International Jo-dety hi nncnHcwnontaorerv R Forum for -Social Impact Evaluation a Spring 1976 Science and Tachnology Publishers, Israel HONS 085067 Editor-In-Chief MARVIN J. CETKON, President Forecasting International. Ltd. 1500 Wilson Blvd. Arlington, Vq. Associate Editors Joseph I- Colics Office of Technology Assessment Sharon Sugarek Forecasting International. Ltd. Robert IV Ay rev International Research and Technology Co. Samuel Bar-Zakay, Israel Richard A. Carpenter, National U ademv it) Sciences Horatio Castro, Uruguay Vary Coate?, (leorge Washington University. Washington D.C. Linda P. DcAngdo, Brock University. Canada G, M. Dobiov, Russia Joel D. Goldhar, National Science Foundation Editorial Advisory Board Theodore J. Cordon. The Futures Croup Harold Green, George Washington University R. W. Jackson, Qnnala David M. Kiefer. Chemical and Engineering News Harold Linstone, Portland Slate University R. Derek Medford, Oxford University Jay S. Mendel), Florida Atlantic University VI. Jesus Moneo, Spain Keichi Oshima, OECD Krcd L. Polak. European Translation Centre. Delft. The Netherlands Stephen Rosen, Marketing Planning Group William L>. Rowe, Environmental I'rotei lion Agent-v Raymond Saim-Paul, France Craig Sinclair. Great Britain Klaus-Heiruich Standke. Director of Science and Technology, United Nations Daniel Sundstrom, Sweden P D. VVilmot. Switzerland IN fhRN A I'lONAL SOCIETY FOR TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT PHILIP D WILMOT. President Vary Coates, Executive Vice President Robert Levin, Secretary- Treasurer Vernon 1`crwcrda Vice-President ISTA Documentation Walter Hahn Past President Chairman. Board of Directors Marvin Cetron Vice-President Editor. ISTA Official Journal of Technology Assessment A Forum for Social Impact Evaluation George E. Humphries Vice-President. Technnlogv A ssessmenl Update Editor In many countries academics, industrialists, government officials and growing numbers of the public are aware that there are ways man can assess the social, economic and environmental consequences of existing and potential technological initiatives. There seems to be acceptance of the idea that by means of analysis, planning and wise goal setting and policy making, man can enjoy more of the benefits of his advancing technology and less of its negative and unexpected effects. The name given this movement, or "social invention" as it has been termed, is Technology Assessment. The International Society for Technology Assessment (ISTA) is a new world membership organization con cerned with the conduct of these activities and studies. It is established as an international society with offices m Washington, D.C., U.S.A. The membership of ISTA is drawn from a variety of institutions, communities and persons all over the world, interested in the exploration and resolution of problems facing local, regional, national and international communities. Individual membership is $28.00 (U.S.) per year and includes a suhscnplion to the Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment: A Forum for Social Impact Fvaluation. The Society also sponsors a bi-annual international Congress and interim regional or topical meetings for which special rates are available to members. Reduced membership rates also apply to ISTA DOCUMEN TATION, a paperback series of hard-to-get, new and timely TA literature. A newsletter featuring current happenings in the field is planned. To become an ISTA member send your name and address and check payable to l he International Society for Technology Assessment in the amount of $30.00 (U.S.) to ISTA, Box 4926, Cleveland Park Station, Washing ton. D.C. 20006 U S A. Subscription Rates: $44.00 postpaid per volume of four issues. Subscriptions should be sent to- Science ami Technology Publishers, North America: P.O.B. 4926, Cleveland Park Station, Washington, D.C. 20006 U.S.A. Other countries: P.O.B. 2580, Jerusalem, Israel. 1975 International Society for Technology Assessment. MQNS 005068 JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT; A Forum for Social Impact Evaluation Official Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment (ISTA) VOLUME 2 Number I Spring 1976 2 Under the Cover Marvin J. Cetron 3 President's Message Philip D. Wilmot 5 A Fundamental Philosophical Frame of Reference on Technology Assessment J, Morley English 12 Technology and Growth: An Exploratory Dialogue on Technology Assessments and Limits to Growth George E. Humphries 15 Techcom: An Evaluative Model for Comprehensive Assessment of Public Policy Actions from a Social Goal-Oriented Perspective Danny A. Lubin 21 Multiple Technology Assessment Frederick A. Rossini, Alan L. Porter and Eugene Zucker 29 A Case Study: Polychlorinated Biphenyls Edward J. Burger, Jr. 37 Technology, The Past and the Future Philip L. Bereano 44 Technology Assessment as a Political Process Wm. Thomas Keating 51 Acquiring Baseline Data on Potential Uses of New Communication Technologies Carey Hershey and Elizabeth Savhler 62 Coates' Corner MQNS 085069 Under the Cover Cary Hershey and Elizabeth Sachter discuss the meth ods of baseline data collection employed by a Cornell University technology assessment of new mobile tele communications technologies. The use of fieldwork and survey research in organizations where ante cedent technologies are used is suggested as an effi cient means, in many cases, to develop baseline data on newly emerging technologies. J. Mortey English presents a philosophical frame work based on the view of the purpose of mankind as a part of the "grand design" of the universe. Because biological systems such as man are entropy accelera tors. this leads to the suggestion that technology assessment should be made by examining the extent to which a proposed new technology contributes to the cosmic purpose of entropy increase. Morley notes that some entropy-increasing activities which threaten survival, such as pollution, require adaptive counter measures. These risks are the true costs which must be considered and weighted against the new tech nology. George Humphries' article presents a view of the ISTA Regional Conference held in Ottowa, Canada, in February 1975. The subject of the conference was Technology and Growth, a topical subject then and now. Danny A. Lubin's paper discusses the partially field-tested model (Techcom). which relates national resources policy actions to the attainment of social goals. In addition, recommendations are made for Techcom's implementation as a workable means of social evolution of public policy actions. Frederick A. Rossini, Alan L. Porter and Eugene Zucker attack the problems which arise in T A. due to the varying forms that a technology can take, and potential implementation in varying cultural and geo graphical contexts. They propose the concept of mul tiple technology assessments which consider these factors and which appear potentially more valid than the "one-shot" mode of assessment. In February 1975. the National Academy of Sci ences organized a working conference to explore the process of government decision-making to regulate chemicals in the environment. Edward J. Burger s paper presents a case study of the decision-making process regarding the regulation of polychlorinated biphenyls. Philip L. Bereano's paper. `"Technology, The Past and The Future", gives an overview of forecasting and social indicators and attempts to put them in a politi cal context. 2 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring 1976 MONS 085070 President's Message Widely celebrated in America as the Bicentennial Year, 1976 also marks the end of Technology Assessmeat's initial decade of development. As such. 1976 offers a good opportunity to evaluate our progress and our prospects; the Second International Congress on Technology Assessment to be held in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in October, will provide the forum for such an evaluation. Progress, at least according to superficial measures, is undeniable; the concept and the language of tech* nology assessment have spread through much of the world; many national governments and international organizations have become involved in such policyoriented analysis. The literature is vast, and still grow ing. Universities and other educational institutions offer courses in technology assessment. More im portantly, there is now a respectable corpus of com pleted technology assessments, available in reports and books, which can be evaluated as to the sound ness of methodology, the scope of analysis, and the potential utility of conclusions and recom mendations. Evaluating the actual impact of technology assess ment on decision-making and on public wisdom is more difficult. For any decisions, it is difficult to identify, much less measure, sources, consequences, and wisdom with any confidence. Further, attitudes of the public and of the decision-makers have so clearly shifted in this decade of environmental con cern, growing scarcity, political upheavals, interna tional violence, and economic instability, that "public wisdom" is itself difficult to determine. Yet those who closely observe the decisional and policy arenas can hardly doubt that technology as sessment has had an impact. Here, although I seek and welcome all information as to what is developing on the international scene, I can most usefully speak from my vantage point in Washington as an observer of the American Government. The superficial signs of progress are spin plentiful. The words "social impact analysis" and "potential secondary consequences" ap pear with increasing frequency in government re search solicitations, statements of agency missions, and even job descriptions. Broader and harder ques tions are asked when technological projects and pro grams are presented for funding (e.g., the National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer). Encour agement of innovation is phrased in terms of finding solutions to national problems. And in every federal agency at least a few people can be found, like leaven ing in the bureaucratic dough, seeking ways to make more prescient and sensitive decisions. Nonetheless, little progress has been made on some fronts. There have been few advances in method ology, particularly in techniques of forecasting, measuring, or evaluating those possible impacts that cannot be translated into monetary units. Technology assessment has made little if any contribution to a theoretical understanding of the relationship between technological change and social change. The problems of translating analytical findings into useful alterna tive strategies for policymakers have barely been touched. The questions of appropriate scope for as sessments - local, regional, national, international and the appropriate function and mechanism for pub lic participation, are as puzzling as ever. In short, the epistemological and theoretical underpinnings of technology assessment are still to be developed, it remains an ad hoc, pragmatic, and atomistic enter prise. The prospects for the immediate future, again from the standpoint of an observer of the American Federal Government, are mixed. The National Science Foundation, which has up to now provided strong leadership, appears to be drawing back. As the eco nomic situation tightened, the cry in Washington was for "action rather than studies" (for demonstrable results and quick payoff), and for research not vulner able to the facile criticism of Congressional critics on grounds of "questionable" methodology or innova tive approaches. Interdisciplinary applied research is highly vulnerable to disciplinary jealousies, which is a problem when a peer review system is used, as at the NSF. Until the 1960's the NSF was responsible only for basic, highly disciplinary research which could be adequately disseminated through scholarly journals; it has barely begun to develop mechanisms for active ly disseminating applied research and policy analysis to the decision-makers, including the public interest groups, who are its potential users. Thus, the NSF is now handicapped in defending its technology assess ment products on the ground of demonstrated utiliza tion and impact. The Office of Technology Assessment, which serves Congress, began its work in the midst of this scep tical environment. It has quite reasonably taken a very cautious approach, limiting its activity to re sponding to requests from legislative committees, and relying largely on conventional techniques, wellestablished research organizations, operating in tradt- Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring 19 76 J> MGNS 063G71 tional engineering/economic modes of analysis and narrowly defined subject areas. Thus it has broken no new ground in developing technology assessment ap proaches and techniques and is far from providing the "early warning system" for decision-makers which was originally envisioned for it. But the OTA is grad ually but effectively building Congressional ac ceptance and confidence, which will ultimately strengthen technology assessment as a recognized ap proach to problem identification and attack. Fortunately, the conservatism and caution of the lead agencies in technology assessment have come at a time when most of the line agencies of the Government are at last adopting the idea of technology assess ment; thus (he opportunity to bring TA techniques to bear on decision-making is broadeniog rather than narrowing. Until recently, there was little shared learning; each new assessment began almost from ground zero. Now there is a growing body of ex perience, duplication and overlapping, and we can at last begin to build productively on what has been tried. TA has survived its infancy and the prospects for a useful future are bright. ISTA's contribution to these developments has been substantial. Through our conferences in Hol land. Japan. Canada, and Monaco, and through our publications, we have provided a network and mecha nism for this shared learning to be communicated and absorbed. Our annual meeting this October in the U.S. will provide an opportunity to plan for the future of TA as a movement and ISTA as an organiza tion. It is our hope that ISTA members and their colleagues in each country are already seeking sup port, where needed, from their national governments, industries, universities, foundations, and other institu tions, to attend lliis meeting. Our goal is to have as many decision-makers and TA analysis as possible present, to actively participate in the many activities and consultations that are planned, thereby facili tating the fruitful sharing of their experience, their learning, and their problems. PHILIP o wit MOT HUNS 085072 A Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring 1976 A Fundamental Philosophical Frame of Reference on Technology Assessment J. Morley English Professor of Engineering and Applied Science University of California, Los Angeles, 405 Hilgard A ve. l.,'s Angeles Ca. 90024 ABSTRACT How to make policy decisions to adopt new tech nologies that will influence the course of human af fairs for a future beyond any time for which out comes are predictable is a problem that requires a new philosophical basis. Conventional methods ofdis counting and comparing predicted benefit and cost streams are not satisfactory because benefits are in /lately long term and uncertain while a large part of costs are immediate and sure. A new phil osophical viewpoint is presented for overcoming this difficulty. The approach requires that we con ceive of man's purpose from a vantage removed from man's own introspective objectives. In other words, the reader is asked to view the purpose of mankind from the point of view ofa grand design of the universe, into which the species fit just as any other biological component. From this perspective, it is observed that biological systems grow and adapt in such a way that, although neg-entropic within them selves, serve to increase the entropic rate of natural processes. Biological systems are entropy accelerators. This leads to a suggestion that technology assessment should be made by examining the extent to which a proposed new technology contributes to this cosmic purpose of entropy increase, ft must be acknowl edged, on the other hand, that the effects of entropic processes are recognized as pollution, and, as such, present threats to the survival of the organism. Such threats require adaptation-counter measures. These are the true costs, measured as risks, that must be considered and weighed against the new technology Technology assessment (TA) purports to evaluate the long term consequences of decisions to introduce new technology into society. The emphasis on the "New" poses one of the principal difficulties in applying con ventional economic methods to obtain good assess ment results. Normally, new technology it it turn* out to be viable, may be expected to affect the world for a very long run future. In a strict sense, adoption of a new technology initiates an irreversible process. Correspondingly this would imply the need for mtuv ite foresight if we are to make accurate assessments but unfortunately our ability to predict the future in any detail is extremely restricted. In many cases, if we are able to look ahead 10 years we are doing remarkably well. Yet 3 new technology often Joes not have perceptible effects before that time. Mow then can we make technology assessment an eliecuve instrument of policy? This question indicates the need lor a philosophi cal frame of reference against which new technology may be rationalized so as to obtain positive approval for undertakings that in the very long run will lit a larger purpose of mankind. Unfortunately present methods may more often lead to a negative bias. This paper presents a philosophical basis for TA from a somewhat different and contrary view than is present ly conventional. The arguments presented are illus trated by the specific example arising out of the pos sible impact on the earth's climate as a result of stra tospheric flight by supersonic aircraft. A new technology often will take a significantly long time to develop before its introduction mro ser vice will start to influence the environment. Follow ing its introduction, it then takes a further long time before the system can grow to significant sue to Teveal any effects. If, then, the recognized and measur able effects arising out of implementation of the new technology are deemed to be adverse, the actions that world societies inay lake to reverse undesirable trends, already set in motion, will require a compar ably long time again. Many effects that may. in the end, prove to be the most important might not be recognized for hundreds of years Journal of the International Society foe Technology Assessment. Spring I976 `D IS 71 - International Society for technology Assessment. Washington, D.C. HONS 085Q75 We jre kneed lo recognize the tact that man's ability lo project the future is extremely limited. There are a few things he can forecast with virtual certainty, such as the movements of planets m the solar system, but even within this essentially fixed physical reference system, ability to predict how such things as world climate will change, even without in flue nee hy man. is extremely imprecise. There is in variably considerable doubt about long-term under lying environmental (rends. For example. Is the world currently m a warming or cooling (rend? Clearly even the problem of population predictions which is a fundamental variable in projecting overall economic aciiviiy of the world, is fraught with enor mous sociological and political uncertainties. Histori cal population predictions have generally missed the mark by wide variations even for relatively short run forecasts.1 Thus when one attempts to predict a single component of the economy that is dependent on some new technology for which there lias been no experience, the variation of the predicted outcome from reality as it unfolds, will be very large indeed. Frequently it may be desirable to make predic tions bused on upper- and lower-bound situations. If future environments can be bounded, policy decisions may be predicated, at least in part, on '"worst case" conditions. However, even here (he fuzziness of the worst-case prediction does not lead to an excess of confidence. No wonder then that forecasts of future environments are limited to small extrapolations of past trends. This difficulty suggests that rather than start with a forecast of the system being considered, it may be much easier to extrapolate the broader general eco nomic environment than it is the more specific new technology. Having accomplished the former, the new technology may then be predicted by relating it to the future economic environment in some plausible way.2 Nevertheless one should have no illusion that the world of, say, SO years hence will be anything approaching the projected description either of the economic environment or of the system which is embedded m it. While the analyst may consider a very long time, such as 50 years, even that may be all too short lor nuking much of a judgment of the impacts of many new technologies. This may seem to pose an impossible situation for making any rational decision to do anything. It clear ly establishes an atomsphcrc in which emotional biases conie to the fore as crystallized views which are often bused on pseudo-rationales. These views lead to strongly biased opinions on what should, or should not, be done. For example, should an SST be per- 1 fate, W., Population forecasting; in Cole. H.S-U- <ed) Modals of doom: A critique of the limits of growth (Universe Books. New Yoik 197J), 1 I ngtlsh, J.M.: Economic concepts to disturb the engineer. Kngin. Kcon /9: 3 (1974). milted to tlyDepending only on the most specula tive natures, equally strong arguments can be pre sented on either side of such an issue. An SbF o economically viable because of A. or an SST is nomtcally unsound because of B. where neither \ nor B is a very probable condition. Nevertheless, we al ways do have to moke some choice about present actions. How do we do so? What is j rjtional pro cedure lor choice when ultimate outcomes must re main mu only unde finable but even unknowable' ] submit that the answer to this question must be sought within some frame of reference compute!) exogenous to the puiticuiar system being uunsidcu-J. It is suggested that this answer may be lound by ^>>nsidering the purpose of nun himsell. A HYPOTHESIS OF THE PURPOSE OF MAN Down through the ages, man's behavior has been ex plained m relationship to some divine purpose In general, tills was translated into a very personal set n goals related to a highly personalized God. Modern philosophy, in downgrading the importance or a Deity lor explaining normative behavior, still lends in focus on personalized motives. Human actions are ex plained by what objectives are deemed to be desirable from either individual, or in some cases collective points-ol-view. These objectives are related largely m what is perceived from the point of view ui the indi vidual in relation to his own well being. Likewise, collectively, we are inclined to view mankind trom our traditional introspective view of man's purpose The same basic premise underlies econojnic theory which has been structured on the principle of maxi mization of the consumer's utility. While the eco nomist is concerned with production functions, the motivation for production is centered in the driving force of a consumption need. A somewhat different view has been suggested by Galbraith1 who contends that consumption motives are stimulated by the in dustrial complex in order artificially to expand production activities. AJso from a still different new the author4 suggests that the driving incentives, while explained in part by consumption needs, jre hugely centered in a need for production activity. Because of the motivation arising from wiilun man's perceived needs, the economist has largely focused on the mechanism of allocation ol resources to consumers. In this context the market has served admirably, through pricing as an indexing mechanism, to accomplish tills purpose. However, the market mechanism starts from a micro economic view. Macro measures can only be obtained through some device ` Galbraith. K.: hconomics and (he public purpose (Hou<h ton-Mifftin, Boston 1973). * kngtish. op. ere. b Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring I{), b MONS 085074 of aggregating. Furthermore, the market is a present time device. It does not accommodate the future ex cept to the limited extent that contracts tor future deliveries enter present markets. The long-term future raises endless philosophical debates about imer-generalional values. In essence, how should allocations be made lodav for values to be realized by those yet unborn and whose vote m the market can not be recorded? However, it is these very long term value problems that are at the root of TA. To solve this, it is suggested that a larger purpose of man must be examined. This larger purpose may only be consider ed if one is willing to view, from a perspective outside of man. tlie economic actions of men. In other words, we must question man's purpose from a cosmic stance and not from the personalized objective of in dividual men. If we depersonalize our perspective of man and consider him as just another biological species, then interesting implications may be developed. It is not necessary to answer the question: Why does man be have m his economic interactions as he does'* Neither is it essential to identify a unique Deity to explain men's actions: although this might be a more com fortable view for many. We can simply base our views on tile universe as we have known it to be throughout time and on a reasonable expectation of its con stancy. We might consider the physical world, or un iverse. in which we live as an overall design into which man fits as just another small biological component. Tills system may then be examined in terms of our concepts of natural phenomena. Perhaps the most interesting concept for explain ing the physical universe is that of entropy. Entropy is a measure of disorder or randomness of physical systems. Its original definition by R. Clausius, in 1867s and its use in thermodynamics and thermo statics was used as a measure of unavailable energy. It was much later that Willard Gibbs demonstrated that the macro measure of entropy (an increment of heat divided by lermperature) could be explained by the statistical distribution of the motion of molecules in a gas. Subsequently Shannon4 used the same concept in developing information theory. In all cases the fundamental concept can be shown to be the same. For uur purpose the general concept of entropy may be taken as a measure of disorganization and its oppo site. neg-entropy. as a measure of organization. The concept as used for explanation of energy may be * Clausius. K The mechanical theory of heal; translated by Hirst. T.A. (Van Voorsl. London 19671. And for a good Jescoplion of entropy, see Tribus M.; ThermoKtatintics and thermodynamics (L>. Van Nosirand, Co.. Inc., Princeton 1961). * Shannon, C.. A mathematical iheory of communication (University of Illinois Press. Urbana 1948). generalized to include the disorganization of mater ials. For example, copper is available in j somewhat concentrated torm as ore to be mined, By processing it into metal its entropy is decreased. By consuming n in products that end up in waste eventually, its en tropy is increased to the point that its entropy !> higher in the end than it was at the start of the pro cess. The production process was entropy decreasing and the consumption process was entropy increasing, In ihe complete cycle operated by man. cupper went from lugh entropy to low entropy and back to a (ugli er entropy than Jt (he outset. A universal principle is that withm any closed sys tem. entropy tends lo mcieuse. Any one sub-sysiem may exhibit a decrease in entropy hut onl\ at the expense of an oven greater increase in the emrup> oi its environment, Living organisms are highly organized systems that have come into being accompanied by j reduction ui entropy. Indeed this neg-entropic nature of biological systems may be a fundamental characteristic ot Ino." This amazing phenomenon is not only associated with the individual living organism, but perhaps even more significantly, the species as an organism in its own right. Man in particular, as the highest order of hie system, exhibits continued evolution by an advancing social organization that has mobilized the specialized productive capabilities of individuals. Man. of course, not only conforms to the principle as characterized by his physical activity, but even more, is representa tive of a collective coordinated intelligence,8 A further interesting phenomenon of life systems is that a living organism, coupled with its entropic environmental system, serves to increase the rate <>i the overall entropic process. In other words a biologi cal system is. innately, an entropy accelerator When ever a biological system fails over some extended time to maintain tliis role as an entropy accelerator, it may no longer be fulfilling its essential cosmic purpose and, accordingly, may be expected to die. At the same time the changing environment that the organ ism creates for itself by this entropy process, poses threats to its existence from another direction. It may not find the higher entropy environment compatible to its continued survival. In effect, the changed envir onment has been polluted. In tins sense pollution may be defined as a change to the environment m a way that is unfavorable to the organism. It may well be that we regard pollution as sometliing that is also unfavorable for the chances of survival to other life ' Lotka, A,J.; Natural selection as a physical principle. Proc Nat. Acad. Sc. V[U (1972). 1 da Chardin, t he phenomenon of man (Harper and Kow. London 1959). Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring i9~6 7 MONS 085075 forms. However, if such threats to others are not really also perceived to threaten us in the end we are not likely to view the environmental effect as pol lution. Survival of a dynamic organism depends on its adaptation to constantly changing environmental challenges. Thus a course must be charted between the Charybdis of too fast a change that produces new threats faster than our adaptability can tolerate and the Scylla of non-change that violates our essential entropic puipose. By increasing the entropy of the physical environment, man is necessarily increasing the environmental challenge to which he must adapt. His consumption patterns are entropic processes for which pollution is the manifestation of the corres ponding environmental challenge. On the other hand inaction from fear of pollution-effects may induce economic stagnation, lack of challenge, and eventual decline into depression and despair. The notion presented here is compatible with Arnold Toynbee's theory9 of the history of civilization. Toynbee argues that civilizations have nourished only when chal lenged within rather narrow limits. Too severe a chal lenge, on the one hand, will arrest its development even with heroic effort on the part of the people to adapt. The kskimos are an example of such an arrest ed civilization. Too bland a challenge on the other hand will be lacking in the essential stimulus for growth and development. The South Sea island peoples are examples of these. ENERGY AND MATERIALS CONSUMPTION The economic processes of production and consump tion have been shown by Georgescu-Roegen10 to be fundamentally entropic. In fact, Georgescu-Roegen argues for a view of economics starting from this es sential entropic principle rather than from the mech anistic concepts on which economic theory has so far been largely based.11 The economic organization of society requires that (he neg-entropic processes of production in order to accelerate consumption orenircpy-increasing processes or, in other words, in order to transform low-entropy material sources into high entropy sinks. Material resources are finite and lim ned to the earth, whereas energy resources are es * Toynbee, A.J.: A sludy of history (Oxford University Press, London 1934-1939). 19 (Jeorje*cu-Roe|en. N.: The entropy law and economic processes (Harvard University Press. Cambridge 1971). " Georgescu-Roegen tn Daly's Toward a Steady Slate Eco nomy (W. M. Freeman & Co.. San Franctaco, 1973). draws from this the exactly opposite conclusion from that pre sented in this paper. He contend* that because of scarce or limited low-entropy sources of natural resources, including energy, that we should work to conserve them. His argument may be valid if viewed from the efficiency perspective dis cussed later. sentially infinite if considered Irom nun's timu; perspective. We can perceive die reducing supplies ...i oil, copper, etc., but the energy of (he sun is essemi.il ly constant. Furthermore, the process of decreasing the entropy ol the earth's material resources, to or ganize them into more useful forms for man's use. re quires ever increasing consumption of energy. This implies that the ratio of the rate of entropyincrease of materials, may also have to increase. In other words, the trend of energy intensiveness ot human activity must continue to grow. Whatever ihe damage to our environment from pollution, implied by this dictum, we must learn to manage it - that is. to adapt to it. There may be no other choice except possibly to gamble on human survival by somehow maintaining economic growth just at the margin ot viability, a boundary that is probably unknowable and may court a risk of disaster by skirting a non change course. THE CONCEPT OF EFFICIENCY Efficiency is defined as a ratio of desired output r,> input. The important word here is desired All of the energy input into any man-directed system is eventu ally dissipated into the background entropy of the earth and thereby becomes unavailable. W)ur is im portant to man in the transformation is j purely intermediate and transitory effect that he consider* to be useful work that he wanted along the way. The automobile will divide the energy used by the car between the waste dissipated by the radiator and the useful work of moving the car. From this point ot view the efficiency is the ratio between the usetu) component that goes into moving the car and the total energy that was available in the organized mo lecular arrangement of the hydrocarbons of the gas oline in the first place. The difference between these energies is lost immediately in the heat dissipated by the radiator. However, from a larger perspective, both the useful wofk and the immediately dissipated heat, in the end. fade into the background entropy level of the earth. Thus, efficiency is a truly local. o( micro, concept associated with a choice of means for ac complishing some transitory individualized objective as an intermediate effect. In each such intermediate stage (he striving tor improved efficiency is desirable. However, this does not alter the more fundamental problem of increasing the overall consumption of energy. A man's choice between using more energy to drive his car or to heat iris home represents a problem in allocation, not in efficiency. Price, as an economic mechanism, handles such allocation, but, whatever the choice is. the macro-cconomic system has the effect and I would say the purpose of making even more resources avail able for allocation. 8 Journal of the international Society for Technology Assessment. Spring 19~6 HUNS 085076 TRANSPORTATION ENERGY An important intermediate means of energy con* sumption is transportation, accounting for 26^ of all eneigy-consumption in the U.S. in 1968.45 Ol course, from an efficiency viewpoint, we might wish to use as little energy as possible to transport one person one mile, or one ton of goods one mile, but in the overall macro-purpose of man's need to consume more, this personalized objective may be relatively unimportant. Compared with the macro-purpose of using more energy, the trend of per capita energy use for trans portation in the U.S. has increased steadily. This trend started out in the mechanical age with the rail road locomotive and steamship. The train gave way to the automobile and bus that, in turn, have been yield ing to the much higher energy-intensive airplane. It is interesting to note the relationship of efficien cy in this process. Wlule a transition occurs from one mode of transportation to the next more energy intensive one. the effect of striving lor efficiency produced corresponding reductions in the intensity of energy consumption. Ii is also of note that as efficiency objectives reduce the potential energy intensiveness of any mode, the actual use of that mode is increased in a way to compensate for the efficiency gains. Thus, as the potential for energy intensiveness of the airplane has declined - measured by BTU/seat mile - the load factor representing a utilization ratio likewise de clined. The automobile is another good example. As efficiency imptoved, the mass of metal moved with each person grew to more than offset the efficiency effect. This might lead to a suspicion that the present trend to small cars is a temporary aberration. Little energy is used for space propulsion, but when one considers the possibility for further expan sion. the space transportation component may eventually become quite significant. It certainly of fers an outstanding opportunity for enormous ex pansion of our consumption of energy, At the same time its potential damage to the environment must be iciugnized. When one considers the potentials for expanded consumption of transportation energy, some inter esting constraints become immediately apparent. In the first place, we move from a two-diinensional world constrained by physical boundaries of linear networks to a virtually unconstrained three-dimen sional space. This means that the potential for expan sion by rising above the earth's surface is a Junction of cube to square. Furthermore, the greatest prnpor- " l uher, J.C.: lineriry crises in perspective (John Wiley and Suns, New York IV74). " I ikher.tJP. rn tion of travel now is urban. The possibility lor expan sion of urban transportation energy intensities are limited. The annoyances and inconveniences associ ated with moving about in the private car have been increasing to the point where now people have been forced reluctantly to reconsider the desirability ot mass rapid transit systems that are innately less energy intensive. Whether or not ways will be found to devise other urban transport systems, such as people-movers, remains to be seen. In any event new urban systems may be less energy intensive rather than more energy intensive. Furthermore, private autouiubilcs are not likely to grow larger, if for no other reason than the problem of limited space tn the city in which to fit them. The networks on which the automobile moves, are approaching saturation. Bv means of various new technologies, density of traffic may still be increased, but uudet even the most optimistic conditions, this will be a small factor change and not an order of magnitude change. Ocean freight transport is also limned by its fiat topography. Higher speeds, using surface-effects devices, may account for a tremendous increase m energy intensity. However, there may be a break-even point for surface-effects machines beyond which it will pay to leave the surface and fiy. This virtually leaves the field open to air transport for intensifying energy use, at least until such time as space travel begins to supplant air transport in its turn. But space travel, as a commonplace, may be part of a future we cannot visualize as yet. In the meantime, the only effective way for increasing energy intensities in air transport is by speed super sonic and hypersonic aircraft. The proportion of total energy devoted to trans portation could decrease in the future, relative to energy-use for other things, but from the point of view of efficiency, the amount of energy used directly in many other applications is likely to de cline. Perhaps the best example is in space heating or cooling: as better methods of insulation are developed the energy demand will decline.14 On the other hand, industrial needs will grow because of two things: 1) Our needs for materials as part ot our consumption growth will expand: and 1) As we exploit out low entropy sources of materials, we are forced to seek even higher entropy sources all the time. This latter requirement, in turn, has two aspects. The newer sub stitute materials require more energy ro transform them for use (e g., titanium to replace aluminum! and secondly, we have been using up our lugltet grade ores and are increasingly forced to resort to lower grades, requiring even greater units of energy to reduce the ores to finished metals. While it may be difficult to assess how the growth of energy-use will divide in the long-run future be tween transportation and all other needs, based on the principle of insufficient reason, it may be reason- Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring l V 76 <-) HONS 085077 able lo assume the split will remain essentially un changed for a very long time to come. THE CONCEPT OF COST Cost may be viewed as disbenefit. One may be ex pected to accept any cost as long as the expected benefit marginally exceeds the expected disbenefit. However, this is an individualized rather than an ag gregate concept. It is a perfectly legitimate exercise to add individualized costs arising from a choice of soc ial action in order to assess a total or social cost that may then be compared with a corresponding social benefit provided that two things hold true: ^Con sideration of the total cost is being addressed as some thing to be minimized, given no change in total ben efit; and 2) Prices are not affected by the proposed change In the system. The latter condition holds reasonably true for an individual or even quite large collectives of individuals in present times, but at some level of aggregation and certainly for an unknown future it does not apply. For both conditions, this concept of cost derives from the individualized or introspective viewpoint. U does not fit into the framework of an externalized view of mankind and his enlropic purposes in the cosmos. While it may be an acceptable way of assessing a partial cost of a new technology, such as stratospheric flight in a short run of 25 years, it does not afford a satisfactory long-run measure. It may be best, and perhaps the only thing we can do in the short run. However, it should be observed that present methods of benefit-cost analy sts would most likely result in assessing a net cost to any change, be it good or bad in the long run. The reason lies in the problem of prediction. Our ability to assess costs is limited by our ability to predict future demands as well as supplies. As pointed out above, under the most favorable circumstances wc can only look a few years ahead. At some point the variances of our estimates become so large that we cannot differentiate between a net benefit or net dis benefit. At the same time, this net difference will be far more significant than the shorter range costs or benefits. For example, in considering stratospheric flight, the short-'ange effects of change will always be revealed as net costs. Therefore, any change at all will show an assessable cost which we will never be able to judge in conventional ways against the unknown future. This alone might suggest that we should look for a better way to arrive at a decision to adopt a proposed new teclinology. In order to consider cost in the long run, we are forced to start with a macro or societal view rather than the individualistic view of cost. Here the measure of GNP with its acknowledged shortcoming 13 may still be the best measure. In effect, GNP is a proxy measure of the economic organizational out puts and, as such, may be taken as a measure of the societal entropy output. From this perspective, any activity that increases GNP may be good provided only that it docs not induce instabilities that may threaten long-run growth of GNP. However, this al ways runs into two dilemmas. One Is that much activ ity that is economic in nature, is simply not measured in GNP (such as the work of the housewife). The other is that some things measured in GNP are costs of acknowledged disservices. For example, more crime would increase GNP hut while more crime does satisfy the need to increase entropy, its undesirable feature is that of a societal inefficiency and, at the same time, it is destabilizing. In other words, we de cry crime not because it increases entropy, but be cause of the way in which it increases entropy; it represents a threat to the viability of the social order. Turning again to the question of flight in the stratosphere, we may examine this technology from a macro viewpoint. Clearly, the potential of strato spheric flight for increasing the rate of entropy growth is manifest and, in fact, it may be the only practical way for the transportation component of energy consumption to expand significantly. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that like all other entropy-expanding systems, supersonic flight may, by increasing pollution faster than we can adapt, present loo great an environmental threat. These are the horns of the dilemma: We do nor expand transportation into the stratosphere with supersonic aircraft and so perish because we fail to meet our cosmic purpose of entropy-expansion or we do expand into the stratosphere without being able to cope with the induced pollution effects and perish because of the hostile environment we have created. I would suggest the first choice with confidence (hat we can adapt, simply on the principle of not bucking the established trend of adaptation over countless centuries. The costs of stratospheric flight in the context of this philosophy, then, are not money costs, but rather risks expressed as probabilities of survival resulting from an inability to adapt. If we were to try to place such costs on a monetary scale, the only way the risks would then be acceptable is essentially on the basis of the same choice faced by any individual. Insofar as there is a marginal net benefit associated with an action, from the individual's viewpoint, it is worth while for him to take that action. Likewise from a societal viewpoint, if the GNP increases incrementally as a result of stratospheric flight over what it would do without stiatospheric flight, then the answer is lo fly in the stratosphere. The diseconomies net out to be the risks of a aon-reversible change in trend Ralph D'Arge, F.conomic and Social Measures of Biologic and Climatic Change, Monograph VI. U. S. Department of Transportation (Review Draft), U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington. D. C.. 1974. 10 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring 19 76 MGNS 085078 which are costs - associated with spending on mon itoring- and control-measures - that are also GNP in creasing (as, for example, police protection in the analogous counter example of crime). In other words, the costs are the control of the pollution effects. In conclusion, it must be pointed out that such an argument in favor of the stratospheric flight example has not encompassed alternative ways for increasing GNP. This becomes a matter of overall economic ef ficiency. There may be better ways to direct our resources for increasing the rate of the entropic pro cess but these must be not only economically demon strable but also politically acceptable. Whether these better ways will permit a marked change in the energy intensity of transportation, relative to other economic activity, is an open question. The principle developed in this paper is that we must adopt new technologies that, in one way or another, serve to fulfill man's purpose as an entropy accelerator. The approach does not serve to answer the question as to which of a number of ways is best. For example, the development of an SST may not represent the best allocation of limited ami scarce resources but, we cannot make that decision simply by comparing the costs and benefits of an SST only in the context of its environmental impact. We must go further and examine what the effects might be by allocating those resources instead, into expanding some other technology (for example, increased auto mobile travel) to a comparable energy intensity of the SST. The important point is the inexorable need to expand must be recognized and if we don't exploit one technology we must find another. In conclusion, it must also be pointed out that the paper does not address (he question of an optimal rate of expansion. It certainly is likely that some moderate rate may prove to be better than the rate of development we have witnessed in this century. We may well discover that we can fulfill our destiny as agents of the entropic process at a more relaxed pace than what we have been maintaining. This remains to be seen. Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring 1976 11 HONS 085079 Technology and Growth: An Exploratory Dialogue on Technology Assessments and Limits to Growth An ISTA Sponsored Regional Conference George E. Humphries In February 1975. one of the most successful ISTA Regional Conferences was held in Ottawa. The subject of the conference was Technology and Growth, a topical subject then and now. Although icporied on briefly in the TA Journal's sister publica tion. TA Update, the nature, subject and success of the conference warrant fuller exposition. This article attempts to give that expanded view. Sponsored jointly by ISTA and the Canadian Government, the conference was organized and run by the Business Planning Group of the Bell Telephone Company of Canada, and a consulting firm. Daiacap Limited, of Ottawa, ISTA provided guidance on program and speakers through Immediate Past President Walter Hahn. Chairman for international Meetings Derek Medord. and Chairman for Corporate Affairs Larry Day. Larry Day. as Head of Bell Canada's Business Planning Group, also spoke for one of (he Organizers, and acted as Co-Chairman of the Conference. Peter Charsley acted for the other organizing group. Datacap Ltd., and was the other Co-Chairman. The sub-title of the Conference tells the general purpose of the meeting "|to provide) An Explor atory Dialogue on Technology Assessment and the Limits of Growth'*; As the Conference brochure pul ir Technology assessment has been defined as the search for unanticipated secondary conse quences of proposed technologies, the identifi cation of affected parties, evaluation of the social and environmental impacts, and the con sideration of feasible teclmological alternatives. World wide support for the broadening of technology assessment comes at a critical time when the human race is neither master nor slave of technology, and we are faced with increasing pressures of population growth, voracious demands for, and possible despoliation of, ter restrial reserves of natural resources, instab ilities in social, ecological and economic envi ronments. and increasing dependence on tech nology . The purpose of tins conference is to provide a forum m which to explore the problems jnd prospects ot technology, resources, institutions and social objectives. A secondary purpose is to stimulate communications among a wide au dience of practitioners and observers on nuior issues of the next two decades. In addition to this brief statement of purpose .1 Conference Background Paper I by Co-Chairman Peter Charslev) was furnished to each registrant. The paper is an excellent summarization of the important o^ies facing Technology and Growth in ceneral and i. r which the Conference was convened to deal with m particular. The Conference was held in Ottawa, ihe .apit.il .1 Canada, at the request of one of the Sponv.'K nlte Canadian Government) in order to attract j' nun Canadian Government personnel as possible V a result it was possible for several Members of the Canadian Parliament to jttend specific sessions ot the Conference. The meeting was held in the Government Confer ence Centre, a mamouth hall that was. in times past the main coticourse of the Ottawa railroad station. The lull was quite adequate, however, inasmuch is simultaneous translation was given in Frenclt Lnghsh. and the only sound system available was throudi ear phones. Frcnch-English tunslatiun was necessity because of the bilingual politics of Canada, however on Is the Keynote Speaker (Canadian Munster of Science ami Technology, the Hon. C. M. Drury) used French m his remarks, and this was limited to token paragraphs interspersed throughout his presentation. I he formal sessions ol the Conleience were trum '> 3.m. until 5 p.m. on each of the two scheduled Javs. however there were useful meetings among planners panelists and speakers, and others on the Jj\ preceedmg, as well as late into the evening on all three days. Of particular interest was a voluntary, or voltorganized session held ftom seven until 11 p.m on Journal of the International Soactvjor lechnolnxv ,h'st'iJWu. .Y/'rnr? / v 'ft .jJST I International Seen t jor rcchnolofv Assessment. H'ashinxntn. P C. *ONS 085080 the subject of social impact analysis, policy capturing, and public participation in general. This "jump session" was triggered by a regular presentation, given by Marvin Cetron of Forecasting International about which there is more discussion later. This extra session, however was extremely uselul to the 45 people who attended and participated, tn (Jtat it broadened their perceptions of TA and its method ologies, and deepened their understanding of the goals and limitations of the art of TA. The Conference was attended by approximately 400 people, all but a few of whom were regular paying participants. This number could well have been larger had the size of the hall permitted - there were only 400 chairs and thus the organizers were careful about exceeding the physical capacity of the hall. An overwhelming percentage of the people attend ing was from the Canadian government: 36% (includ ing provincial governments: 45%V, Canadian corpora tions: 24`V. U.S. Corporations: 12%; Canadian Universities: 9%; U.S. Universities: 6%, and miscel laneous others. The participation of the audience was lively, scep tical, sometimes critical, often well informed, but indicated a tack of complete audience understanding of the issues involved in technology, growth and tech nology assessment. The purpose of the conference, of course, was to mitigate these deficiencies, and to every indication it succeeded admirably in doing just that. The conference opened with gracious remarks of welcome by the Executive Vice President for Opera tions of Bell Canada, Mr. J. C. Thackery, by whose organizational largess Beil Canada's Business Planning Group participated in the planning and execution of the affair. The principal keynoting remarks were made for die Government of Canada by the Minister of State for Science and Technology, the Honorable C. M. Drury, MP. Billed as a "statement of conference ob jectives and (heir relevance to national and inter national priorities", Mr. Drury's speech was an excel lent and thoughtful opening barrage in an intellectual tour de force of both magnitude and depth. Mr. Drury noted the responsibility of science for the consequences of its acts, cited the systemic and international, if not global, implications of science am) technology, and commended the nascent tech nology of innovation consequence-estimation called technology assessment. The Minister described the secrecy of proprietary science and die inevitable lack of complete information on which to make decisions. These limitations, he asserted, are no excuse for avoiding thoughtful policy decisions. Mr. Drury decried the uselessness of post mortem alaysis as a means of forestalling disaster, and he wished the conferees well in their pursuit of a better understanding of disaster prevention through tech nology assessment. In die first conference session of the morning. Conference Co-Chairman Larry Day introduced and coordinated the colloquy following prepared state ments by John McHale. Director of the Center t\>i Integrative Studies at State University ot New York. Binghamton, and Walter Hahn, immediate Pasi Pre sident. and Chairman ot die Board of 1ST V In lus charming Glascovian accent, jtui his best pedantic manner. Professor McHale held forth on the general theme from Forgy and Bess, "h Ain't Neces sarily So", or as the Program summarized tt. ' \ dis cussion of the fallacies of extrapolation and the need for more thorough conceptual reorientation in rela tion to present problems 3nd future alternatives'1, which, upon close semantic analysis, is a verv near approximation of die content of McHale's provo catively aphoristic distain for the predictions of others which his assertions disparaged. This presenta tion. as did his more substantive one later in the pro gram, evoked considerable adverse audience response Since controversy was McHale`s apparent intention, he evidenced delight in the mental coinbat. and demonstrated his prowess in an extremely dry intel lectual appreciation of the art of Steven Potter. Walter Hahn, a Senior Specialist in the Science and Technology Division of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, as well as an 1ST A director, reviewed the history of TA and recounted the several sets of definitions and tabulations of unresolved issues applicable to the evolving tech nology of providing data for policy formulation. In the best Congressional Research Service fashion. Hahn's presentation was the antithesis of McHale's vocal provocations, in that tt presented in an even handed manner all of the yet unresolved issues of technology assessment and wished the Conference well in their discussion of them. In the second morning session. Professor Joint Woods, Chairman of the Department of Political Science of the University of Calgary Chaired a session on the International Imperatives of Technology. Of particular interest, among several stellar presenta tions, was ISTA Chairman for International Meetings. Dereck Medford's, comprehensive review of what in ternational organizations such as the UN, OECD. EEC. Euroceans and the EVAF, are doing m the way of TA and related subjects. Other sessions in the two day conference included the following subjects: Cases in Technology Assess ment, Social Values and the Politics of Technical Change. Energy. The Institutional Condition, ami Technology and Growth. A full review of each of these sessions is impossible, however some random impressions should provide the reader with a feci of the conference, and encourage him to obtain a copy of the Proceedings which are m press. Journal oj the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring I97f\ 13 MQNS 085081 The session on Energy, wlule a little uneven, was of course very timely. And the presentation by Amory Lovtns of the Friends of she Earth was a masterful collection of ironies concerned with power generation and the environment. Harold Lmstonc presented a very concise and cv'gem discussion of his theory of discounting the future. He postulates and then demonstrates the human tendency to devote less attention and re sources to impending crises as a function of time, jegardless of iheir magnitude, importance or cer tainty. And he insists that knowing this proclivity, planners should compensate for it. Harold Gicen o! the George Washington University Ljw School reviewed the inevitability of adversarial proceedings when values conflict and laws are applied. Ji>e Coates. Assistant to the Director of ihe Con gressional Office of Technology Assessment, alter jsscssmg the (m (adequacy of the hall for the intended purpose of the meeting, well described ihe existing instnuiiona) arrangements for TA in the U S. govern ment. One of the best descriptions of an actual techno logy assessment conducted for Bell Canada was given by Larry Day. One of the most inciting presentations of the Con ference was made under the heading of Social Values and the Politics of Technical Change. Chaired by Joel Guldhar, a Program Manager in the Office of Science Information Service of the National Science Founda tion. this session consisted of a comprehensive des cription by Marvin Cetron of how social forecasting is done by Forecasting International, using Sweden as a precursor to social change in the U.S., followed by a dialogue with Discussant Professor Murray Turroff of the Newark School of Engineering and some heated colloquy with the audience. Coming as it did at the end o( the first day, ihe controversial exchange was continued after dinner and well into ihe night. From a learning standpoint, this was certainly one of ihe most profitable events of the conference. The closing session on Technology and Growth was chaired by Rodney Dobell and included Derek Medford. Dennis Meadows of Limits of Growth fame. John McHale again and James R. Bright of the Uni versity of Texas at Austin and Director of the Indus trial Management Center. Although not very well interrelated, these strong personalities made for a suitably provocative closing dialogue with ihe audience Meadows was particularly good at fielding questions that stemmed from a lack of knowledge of what his book had satd. In total, the conference was very successful Random sampling of attendees indicated that the gojl of raising the awareness and understanding of ihe nature and utility of technology assessment was well accomplished. The issue of the necessity for and desirability of continued exponential growth was less well addressed, but it was better than could reasonably be expected of a two day conference. As noted above, the Proceedings (including much of the discussion) will soon be available, and they will be a valuable addition to the TA literature, it is. how ever, worth observing that as good as proceedings may be, there is no substitute for attendance at con ferences. Technology Assessment (as a movement) is bur geoning. and one cannot meet the personalities, make the personal contacts, carry on the arguments, and get deep into a social technology merely from reading the published proceedings of conferences. A book about circuses lacks (as the title of a recent play puts it) "The Roar of the Greasepaint, the Smell of the Crowd". MGNS Od50d2 14 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring 19 76 Techcom: An Evaluative Model for Comprehensive Assessment of Public Policy Danny A. Lubin yiianrifartve Planning ami Support Control Data Corporation, Arlington, Virginia ABSTRACT This paper presents a comprehensive description and critique of what is considered to be a major accom plishment in devising a reliable means for generating probable social impacts resulting from projected change. Designed for water resources planning pur poses, the Techcom model described below is readily applicable to other situations in which the interplay of diverse human values must be taken into account. INTRODUCTION The Technical Committee of the Water Resources Re search Centeis of the Thirteen Western States has for the past four years been engaged in the development of a methodology for comprehensive evaluation of water resources development and use (Techcom) for the Office of Water Resources Research, U.S. Depart ment of the Interior. The final report of the Techni cal Committee, released on 31 December 1974,' describes a partially field-tested model which relates natural resources policy actions to the attainment of social goals. The basic structure of the model is both flexible and modular and has the potential of pro viding an evaluative framework for the comprehensive assessment of public policy actions in general. This paper presents a brief description of the Tech com system with recommendations for its implemen-1 1 The Techmcel Committee of the Water Resources Research Centers of the Thirteen Western States, 1974: Water re sources planning, social goals, and indicators: Methodological development and empirical test. Prepared by the Office of Waier Resources Research, Utah Water Research Laboratory Publication PRWG 131-1. Utah University. Logan, Utah. union as a workable process for comprehensive social evaluation of public policy actions. THE ASSESSMENT STRUCTURE The Techcom Model consists of a hierarchical array of elements called (social) goals, subgoais. social indi cators and action (or decision) variables. The goals and subgoals are derived through a group consensus approach (e.g. Delphi, surveys) and are specified in words. The actual process of selecting a primarv goalset is arbitrary; however, the approach taken needs to be comprehensive in the sense of capturing the aspira tions, needs and desires of contemporary American society. The procedure adopted by the Technical Commi'tee in field-testing the model, relied on a synthesis of public and "elitist" inputs. An initial set of primary goals was established by a panel of experts, and con sisted of: 1 Collective Security 2 Environmental Security 3 Individual Security 4 Economic Opportunity 5 Cultural and Community Opportunity 6 Aesthetic Opportunity 7 Recreational Opportunity 8 Individual Freedom and Variety 9 Educational Opportunity. Each primary goal was then disaggregated into a un ite number of word stated subgoals. This stage of the Techcom development process was facilitated by a lexicographic analysis, i.e. content analysis of inter views with public representatives. Additional levels of subgoals were utilized to add definition to immediate- Journatofthe International Society jar Technology .Assessment. Spring IVt o/.ST.-l - International Suaen for Technology 'Assessment, Washington. D C. MQNS 085083 Figure i. Structure of the Techcom System \ b Journal o f the In te rn a tio n a l Society fo r Technology Assessment, S pring 1976 \j\ O ly superior subgoals. This definitional process yielded a tree-like goal structure illustrated in Figure 1. At the lowest end of the hierarchy one finds quan tifiable propeities which collectively describe condi tions relevant to the achievement of a subgoal. These variables are referred to as social indicators. For ex ample, the Technical Committee describes (defines) subgoal 414 "stability of the economy" as some com bination of the following set of social indicators: 414 (l) growth rate of per capita income (2) rate of inflation (3) unemployment (4) business failures as a percent of total busi nesses. The first digit of each subgoal index number refers to the primary goal; each successive digit indicates the subgoal number; the level of the hierarchical echelon is indicated by the position of (he digit in the index number. For social indicators, the last digit is paren thesized. The various elements in the hierarchy are linked by a network of mathematical "connectives", where a connective refers to a scalar, vector or set of coefficients of functions. Connectives express the ef fect of: "A subgoa! on an overarching goal or another subgoal; a social indicator on a subgoal, a set of sub goals, or another social indicator; or, an action vari able on a social indicator or set of social indicators" (Technical Committee, I971).1 Public actions result in changes in social indicator variables which in turn affect the achievement or non achievement of social goals. These actions or policy changes are referred to as action (or decision) vari ables, For example, construction of a nuclear power plant will induce changes in social indicators which will probably relate to one or more subgoals under all or most of the primary goals. By predicting changes in social indicators for various actions, considering poli cy options, one can judge the relative effects on sub goals and primary goals. Techcom provides a methodology for quantifying these effects. SPECIFYING THE CONNECTIVES The tremendously complex and painstaking process of formulating connective relationships between the various elements in the hierarchy has in no sense been either alleviated or diminished by the Technical Com mittee. However, several unique approaches to the problems of deriving relationships and aggregating connective measures have been proposed. 1 The Technical Committee of the Water Resource* Centers of the Thirteen Western States, 1971: Water resources plan ning and social goals; conceptualisation toward a new meth odology. Prepared by the Office of Water Resources Research. Utah Water Resources Publicstion PRWG 94-1. Logan. Utah. NTIS No. PB 2042228. Connectives can and should be formulated from a broad base of scientific, economic, and social theory. Further, the search for and modelling of connective patterns should not be restrained by the availability of empirical data. In several instances a degree of value judgment may be required in estimating con nectives between measured or measurable social indi cators and goals and subgoals. In the latter case, the Technical Committee suggests the use of a modified Delphi approach. The expert consensus approach (Delphi) offers a viable mechanism for obtaining a description of the functional relationship between achievement of sub goals and changes in social indicators, by questioning experts and technicians about the impacts of those changes. Operationally, indices are constructed for each lowest-level subgoal, which, based upon the values of pertinent social indicators, describe quanti tatively the achievement of tlm subgoal. These social indicators are of the form P = \ W| Qj. where P is the value of the index. W| is the unit weight of the nh indicator, and Q, is an expression of the achievement of the subgoal as a function of the value of the ith indicator. The social indicator weights (W'sj) are ob tained by normalizing the median responses of a panel of experts who are asked to assign weights to each of the indicators of particular subgoals so as in express the importance of each indicator relative to the achievement of the subgoal. Information required to generate the Qj functions can similarly be obtained via the Delphi approach. For each indicator, experts can be asked to draw a graph of the achievement of the subgoal on a 0-100 scale across a tange of indicator values. The median values of selected points on each graph can then be normalized and used in an interpolation procedure to yield a Q value for each of the social indicator. Al ternatively. the data points could be used to con struct regression equations from which the Q values could be obtained using computerized regression tecliniques. Many of the logistical problems in using the Delphi method - e.g. performing the necessary statistical calculations, and writing and reproducing successive rounds of questionnaire - can also be solved through the use of a computer. Indices of superior level subgoal achievement can be formulated by utilizing public opinion survey tech niques to generate simple numerical coefficients as perceived by various audiences (parties of interest). As ratio comparisons of preferences are essential to Techcom in terms of the mathematical requirements of the system, the Technical Committee suggests the use of Metfessel's (1947) General Allocation Test' as an appropriate weighting methodology. With this or a 3 Melfessel. M.: a proposal Tor quantitative reporting <>f comparative judgments. J. Psychol. 24 229-235 (1974). Journalofthe International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring I97c> 17 HONS 0B50S5 similar tool (e.g. Thurstone-Likkert models), the determination of empirical preference scores (weights assigned to lowest level subgoals for purposes of ag gregating into measures of liigher order goals) can be accomplished through mail questionnaires to repre sentative cross-sections of the impacted population. This questionnaire-instrument can be easily adapted to yield measures of the desire for improvements in subgoals wiihin each goal hierarchy and in goals. A biograpliicai information section affixed to the mail questionnaire will also facilitate the specification of preference weights cross-classified by major general interest groups as well as for the general public. The built-in flexibility of the Techcom system permits continual modification of the connective relation ships. as well as numerous unique approaches to (heir derivation. IMPLEMENTING TECHCOM AS A SYSTEM FOR QUANTIFIED PLANNING INQUIRY The Techcom model forms the basis for design of an interactive computerized planning information sys tem. In applying the metholology, several alternative policy options (action plans) are postulated by the planners. Resulting values of social indicators at vari ous future times must then be predicted. Procedures relying in large part on the utilization of available econometric input-output models have been incor porated in the model for this purpose. The basic approach consists of specifying alternative scenarios for future growth and change for various regional economies which would likely be affected by the in troduction of the proposed action plans. It is im portant that these action plans be represented by mutually exclusive scenarios of economic and social development so that planners can contrast the flexi bility. degree of irreversibility, consistency, and effi ciency of various decisions across alternative scenarios. Having specified the social indicator set and The consequent interaction system, one then has a policy tool for evaluating the effects of alternative actions on social welfare as defined by the goal-set. Actions in this system are nothing more than first round perturbations of one or more of the social indi cators. Further, action plans or alternatives can only be expressed as outcomes on social indicators. That is. if an action plan is to perturb the goal set in some meaningful way in lieu of purely qualitative assess ment, the plan must be expressible as a set of out comes (immediate, lagged or indirect) on social indicators. Thus, investment in nuclear energy be comes meaningful only when expressed in terms of outcomes such as firm power kilowatt hours pro duced, or tonnage of nuclear waste generated. Once tHe initial impacts of social indicators lake place, then primary and secondary repercussions on other social indicators occur via the various measured connecmes between them. Tlte Technical Committee has included m its re port a dynamic computer program which is capable of aggregating social indicator values into relative in dices ot superior subgoal achievement, and combining lower level subgoals into indices of superior subeoal aclucveinent utilizing the connective reiationsiups and weighting coefficients derived via Delplu interviews, public opinion surveys, empirical data or oilier means. The program is written in the Foitran lan guage for batch compilation under SCOPE and use under KRONOS (two operating systems utilizing CDC6400 hardware commercially available on the CDC CYBERNET time sharing system). This computerized Techcom system offers several unique advantages to public planners. - The planner or evaluator can use a cathode rav tube computer terminal as a display deuce tu compare the relative consequences of alternative actions on (he goals and subgoals as perceived bv various audiences. - By interrogation he can retrieve detailed informa tion about relative weights of specific interest groups or reference publics, or he can assign his own preference weights. - He can retrieve information on the social indica tors used and their relative values. With these assessments, he can revise and amend his plans to improve the achievement of perceived goals and subgoals. In applying the methodology for plan ning purposes, all necessary considerations of policy imposed administratively, by statute, or by common agreement, can readily be taken into account by con sidering these as constraints oil the system. The ef fects of the constraints can be visualized by considering alternative actions without constraints. CONCLUSION It is important to note that the Techcntn method ology has yet to be fully tested. However, the under lying concept of the model, in contrast to the single criterion of benefit-cost efficiency, appears to provide a workable basis for comprehensive social evaluation of actions relating to public policy decisions. Further, the methodology has the potential of narrowing the gap wluch currently exists between the definition of national goals on the one hand and the implementa tion of action programs to achieve such goals on the other. As an interactive planning information system it should lead to more socially optimum plans at the field level; and, being comprehensive, it should sub stantially decrease the risk of error by ommission. .is I 8 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring IV "ri HONS 085086 well as increase the reliability (credibility) of the re sults. Since statements of social goals are derived through a public consensus approach, and subse quently used as a basis of deriving social indicators, lhe resulting social indicator set should be both com prehensive and socially relevant. Techcom offers not only a significant advance in the development of technology assessment method ologies, but provides a mechanism for coordinating and synthesizing various currently diverse and unre lated policy capturing techniques (of which this paper has mentioned but a few) into a unified sttuciuie. MQNS 085087 Journal oj the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring I9 7t> I u International Society for Technology Assessment A Forum for Social Impact Evaluation in many countries academics, industrialists, government officials and growing numbers of the public are aware that there are ways man can assess the consequences of existing and potential technological initiatives. There seems to be acceptance of the idea that by means of analysis, planning and wise goal setting and policy making, man can enjoy more of the benefits of his advancing technology and less of its negative and unexpected effects. It is in this climate of an observable ongoing social im pact evaluation movement that ISTA enters its second year. Membership has climbed to approximately 500 persons from 20 nations and representing practitioners from many disci plines. government and private executives, legislators and interested members of the public. The Society's role is to serve as a forum for exchange of information on Tech nology Assessment among individuals (and organizations) from many nations, sectors of society and of differing professional disciplines. MEMBERSHIP ORENEWAL ^APPLICATION Included in the dues are a subscription to The Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, the quarterly journal of the Society, the privilege of purchasing publications in the ISTA DOCUMENTATION series and attendance at ISTA conferences at reduced membership rates. Enclose check or bank draft pavable to The International Society for Technology Assessment (or ISTA) in the amount checked below. Member $30.00 (U.S.) DStudent Member SI 1.00 (U.S.) Name (please print) ________________ ________________________________________ Address _ _________________ _________________________________________ SignatureDate MAIL TO NEW ADDRESS: International Society for Technology Assessment P.O.B. 4926 Cleveland Park Station Washington, D.C. 20006 HONS 085008 Multiple Technology Assessment Fredrick A.Rossini Department o) Social Sciences. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta. Ga. 30332 Alan L. Porter School of Industrial and Systems Engineering. Georgia Institute of Technology. Atlanta, (ja. 30332 Eugene Zuker Office of Telecommunications. U S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D C 20230 ABSTRACT Technology assessment (TA) is interpreted today to mean a single study of the potential impacts of a technological change. Most technologies being as sessed can be implemented in a number of ptnsible technical fornts as well as in different geographic and cultural contexts. Such multi-faceted complexity sug gests that the possibility of using multiple technology assessments (MTAs) should be explored to see if, in some situations, various of the possible multiple as sessment strategies may provide more effective assess ment. To provide grounds for comparison of various modes of TA, we list nine objectives of TA, divided into three categories: (l) validity, issues concerning the soundness of conclusions arrived at through TA; 12} utility, issues concerning the usefulness of TA findings; and (3) advancement of the state of the art of TA methodology. We differentiate between and ex amine five types of studies involved in TA: (l) macro assessments, full-scale analyses by multidisciplinary teams costing on the order of S300,000 or so; (2} mini-assessments, an order of magnitude smaller in scale; (3) micro-assessments, an order of magnitude smaller still; (4) monitoring, an ongoing information processing system; and (5) secondary evaluation, wherein a TA is re-assessed These elements may be combined in various sequences to form MTAs. Six appealing examples ofMTAs are selected for compari son with each other and with the standard "one-shot " assessment by considering each, in turn, against the set of TA objectives. Finally, we illustrate the MTA concept by discussion ofa recent multi-national, mul ti-component effort dealing with the assessment of the likely effects of alternative work schedules. We conclude that MTAs appear potentially more valid, and more useful in a number of respects, as well as more helpful in the development of TA methodolog-, titan the "one-shot" mode of assessment. Uaue. these alternative TA designs meat tnal to ascertain their practicality and worth in actual practice. INTRODUCTION The archetypal technology assessment is today under stood to be a single, ad hoc study performed by i multidisciplinary team, on a budget of the order of $300,000, in a period of about one year. While actual studies undertaken to date vary greatly m terms of budget, time, available expertise, and sponsorship, they have rarely diverged from the notion of a single assessment effort. Paraphrasing two of Joseph Coates' definitions (4, 5], TA should anticipate, forecast, and evaluate the impacts of a technological intrusion particularly the unintended, indirect, and delayed un pacts - on all sectors of society. This is simply not feasible in a single study, no matter how well done We argue that such an ideal can be better approxi mated by a combination of studies linked into j coherent research program - a multiple technology assessment. To initiate critical consideration of the pros and cons of various types of MTAs as opposed to snwle assessments, we offer a set of nine objectives for TAs as a basis for comparison. We then examine, in turn, each of seven potential types of TA design as to how well they promise to fulfill these objectives. TA OBJECTIVES The following listing of objectives is offered as a first step toward critical appraisal of the TA process. Tech- Journalofihc International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring 19'6 0 fSTA - International Soar is. for technology Assessment, Washington, D C. HONS 085089 noiogy assessors wil! always face difficult trade-offs among such objectives as they attempt to perform their task under serious constraints of knowledge, time, and resources. Each assessment team, in con junction with its sponsors and eventual users, will have to choose for itself its priority of objectives. And (lie TA community as a whole will need to learn better the implications of the available choices. An example of such a trade-off which intimately affects efforts to analyze complex, many-faceted problems is the issue of appropriate depth versus breadth. Given budgetary and temporal guidelines, as well as the sponsor's preferences, (he task group can try to cover ail possibilities and contingencies as Dickson (9) did in the assessment of the videophone; or focus on one aspect only, which was the path chosen by Grad et al. (II) in their study of the automobile; or operate somewhere in between. Either focusing on breadth or focusing on depth causes information loss. Breadth treatment offers a coarse grain analysis with out much detail. The danger in this approach is super ficiality to the extent of being grossly wrong. On the other hand, a depth analysis loses scope and, by pick ing the wrong subject(s) for analysis, the perspective of the study may become irrelevant to the users. To decide such issues wisely, assessors must clearly visu alize their objectives. Our nine objectives for TA are divided into three categories; validity, utility, and the state of the TA art (see Table I). Validity, being well-grounded in fact, is represented by three objectives, a meager beginning on this crucial matter. In a related study area, evaluation research, with the more manageable task of assessing.the effects of programs already im plemented, some thirty threats to "internal validity" have been identified [7]. Any of these threats can invalidate the results of an assessment study. Tech nology assessors should realize that they are operating without sound scientific bases in terms of developed assessment designs, appropriate statistics, or sampling criteria pertinent to generalization of study findings. While serious scientists would correctly shrink from such adventuresomeness, TA nonetheless is justified in that decisions will have to be made with or without sound information, and TA promises information. The second category of five objectives reflect utility, the usefulness of the TA. Advancing the state of the art of TA methodology is proposed as the third cate gory of objectives. We view this as essential to im proved long-term fulfillment of the prior eight objectives and development of TA into a defensibly sound enterprise. We discuss the objectives one-byone with some reference to prior TAs (see Table I). Validity; I Cause-effect understanding. TA is clearly imbued with a causal orientation in that one is attempting to determine the effects of a technological change. Of the several conditions requisite tor causal inference [cf. I], the one most suspect in our case is to demonstrate a thorough system understanding. How can we anticipate the effects of a particular technological change when we lack understanding of the other causal influences at play, interactions, and feedbacks encompass ing "all sectors of society"? Indeed, no presently existing theory of social change is an adequate basis for treating the effects of the introduction of a technology on society |10). Usually, effect analysis is partitioned into classes of effects amenable to a single disciplinary analysis - a dif ficult task itself - without investigating mutual causal relations between the various classes of ef fects [17]. For example, in the Jamaica Bay and Kennedy Airport Study [13|. the possible et> fects of the primacy of environmental values (which the report seems to champion) on trans portation needs and capabilities, is not thorough ly explored. The report never confronts squarely the value trade-offs involved. 2 Balance. Secondly, according to Daddario (8). technology assessment should provide a balanced (underscoring ours) appraisal to the policy maker. The reconciliation of competing interests within the context of a single report means that the authors of a report must strike the balance. One can distinguish between two basic ap proaches to this issue; (1) scientific neutrality perpetuation of the myth that there is such a thing as value-free study, especially in policy relevant matters (for background on this point see the excellent article by Striven |2I)). or (2) adversarial - assumption that the truth will somehow out if we provide for opposing posi tions (cf. 12). The first approach was taken in the "one shot" Jamaica Bay TA mentioned previously It is our judgment that the balance was struck somewhere on the side of the environmental - as opposed to the transportation - interests. The question of whether the "right" balance was struck cannot be answered, for who is to decide? The policymaker would have to do his own TA to find his own balance. The desideratum of a balanced appraisal must deal with the question of: Balanced relative to whom? And the answer, of course, is the authors - or perhaps the spon sors - of the TA. The second approach follows the suggestion of Mitroff and Turoff (19) (see also Churchman (3)) for dealing with management situations in which there is conflict. Our version of this ap proach allows the policymaker to face not a balanced appraisal, but a collection of deliberate ly unbalanced appraisals, each reflecting a defl- 22 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring 19 76 HONS 005090 Table I. Multiple TA Designs and TA Objectives DESIGNS One- Multiple assess shot ments at one point in time Multiple assessments at different times A. One-shot, full-scale assessment B. Double assessment (macro-) C. Macro-plus two m ini assessments (probably adversarial) D. M icro, then macro assessment F. Macro-, then m ini assessment G. (Macro-) assessment, then monitor w ith interm ittent (m ini ) assessments OBJECTIVES c a o "T co 2E Ac t-s ui Validity: 1. Cause-effect understanding 00 0 0 ++ + 2. Balance 3. Methodological soundness -0 + - 00 0 0 0 0 0 ++ Utility. 4. Pertinence of the causal factors, issues, and impacts considered 5. Timeliness 6. Credibility 7. Communicability 8. Economy of assessment -0 00 0+ 00 0" + 0 ++ + 0 -+- 0 + 0 ++ + 0 00- 0 '0 State of the Art: 9. Advancing TA methodology -+ 0 -++ + "+" indicates a strong likelihood of fulfilling the objective; "0" indicates a fair possibility of fulfilling the objective; indicates little likelihood of satisfying the objective. nite interest focus. With the interest groups making their strongest cases for their particular perspectives, the policymaker can then strike his own balance. For Jamaica Bay, one might expect at least assessments from the environmental and transportation interests. Other TAs would offer other mixes of assessments. 3 Methodological soundness. This is a catch-all category given the current state of the TA art. At a minimum, one could expect that TAs evidence some reliability (reproducibility of findings), do not violate established scientific tenets (e.g.. sur vey techniques or statistics), and contain evi dence of suitable peer review. (See Cook and Campbell [7] for a discussion of a multitude of further issues in gauging effects.) Utility: 4 Pertinence. This refers to several dimensions - causal influences (independent variables) con- Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring 1976 13 MONS 085091 sidered, issues evaluated (technological or policy options included), and impacts assessed. In es sence, if the TA does not ask the right questions, it is of no value. An example of this objective is in the ability to generalise results from one TA setting to another, e.g.. at different times, con cerning somewhat different technological op tions. under different constraints and external influences, or in different locales. For instance, in the case of the TA on alternative work sched ules, presently in preparation by Haldi and Asso ciates (discussed in some detail later in the paper), there are differences in the laws, social structures and institutions, in the forms of the organization of work, and in the cultural tradi tions among the various other countries and the Untied States. These differences might make the problem of whether to adopt an alternative work schedule and, if so, wtiich one, look different under analysis in different contexts. The results of the original U.S. TA, although designed in loose international coordination, would need some "massaging" for use by other nations. In this case, possibly one or more smaller studies might add perspective. Indeed, broadening the perspective to include other contexts offers the potential of enhancing understanding of the orig inal context. Such might have been the case in the Jamaica Bay and Kennedy Airport Study if Chapter 5 - Public Policy: National Issues Raised by the Jamaica Bay Study - had con tained more extensive analyses of the salient features of other airports to firm up the report's factual base for Us discussion of national issues. The problem of pertinence is well-expressed by Grad et al. [II, p. 4) as it relates to their TA on the automobile: . . . any lengthy study - such as this one . . . operates on constantly changing terrain. In the course of the past two or three years there have been numerous technical advances . .. that have cast new light on pollution control technology, causing, in turn, a need for reevaluation of poll* cies considered either more or less favorably in the earlier stages of the study. Other develop ments . . . have also called for changes in direc tion . . . One such development. . .that was not fully predictable at the beginning of the study is the sudden awareness of the existence of an energy crisis. This development, though it may threaten to overshadow everything else in the field of environmental regulation, occurred so late in the course of the study that it finds only minor reflection in this report. Any major study in isolation, unaccompanied by follow-ons or a monitoring program, is vulnerable to this problem. 5 Timeliness. In a policy context, it is imperative that a TA be available when the time is ripe. Many TAs were needed before they were begun This is a major constraint on the depth ot anal ysis possible m a given TA. 6 Credibility. Whatever the validity of a report, it is valueless unless the audience believes the report to be worthy of consideration. A fine example of a credible report is the oft-noted Jamaica Bay/ Kennedy Airport Study whose conclusions were implemented the day after public release. 7 Communicability Unless the findings are pre sented in a usable format, the TA may receive scant attention. This threat is particularly acute in the case of more quantitative approaches that use more esoteric techniques, particularly those that combine a plethora of impacts under a weighted utility function (also those that present a multi tude of impacts without a viable means to ag gregate toward conclusions!). 8 Economy of assessment. After consideration of the preceding, we duly note that cost is a con sideration. In the extreme, one must ask if a cost ly assessment is worth doing in the first place. Do the potential benefits of a study outweigh its costs? What arc the risks involved in not doing the TA? State of the Art: 9 Advancement of TA methodology. Unlike some other emergent areas of study, TA has not had the luxury of an academic birth. As a policy loot, it has been bom close to the firing line. Despite such a pragmatic role, it is incumbent on the TA group to develop a means to assure that assess ments present valid conclusions. One approach to further this end is the undertaking of secondary evaluations designed to critique both conclusions and methods. More generally, several of the suggested MTA designs offer a potential for comparison of methodological effectiveness lacking in the 'oneshot" study. MULTIPLE TA DESIGNS If the MTAs should be considered as a potential im provement over the "one-shot" study, what are their possible components and how can they be assembled? In this section five types of components and their possible temporal relationships are discussed' "macro", "mini", and "micro" studies; monitoring programs; and secondary evaluations. Then selected combinations are considered in the light of the nine TA objectives. The most common and well-known type of TA is the "macro-" or full-scale TA (the "one-shot" ot fable 24 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring 19 76 MONS 085092 1). in which a leam of investigators analyzes many fac ets of the effects of a technological system. Such an effort might typically run between one and two years and have a cost range of $300,000 or more (V, Coates [6J, and C. Patrick Johnson, private communica tion). By every measure, the full-scale TA is a largescale research project. The Jamaica Bay Study, the STOL TA (LaPoite et al. (IS, 16]), and the Assess ment of (he Automobile, cited above, fall into this category. Their results cover a wide variety of tech nological consequences, including some fairly detailed analyses, as well as overview impressions. The diversi ty of the scope and contents of such TAs is truly amazing. Another type of TA is smaller in scale, say by an order of magnitude, than the full-scale TA. Such an effort could not usually aim at comprehensiveness. However, as a pilot study, as a supplementary study, as a Study of a single effect or problem area, or as an assessment of another study from a different cultural context, it lias definite potential value. In some cases, a full-scale study breaks down into an aggregate of smaller, relatively isolated substudies. The second re port of the STOL TA (LaPorte et al. (16|) broke down into an integrative essay and three separate, essentially unrelated, studies dealing with social change, public attitudes toward technology, and regu lation of technology. Fach mini-assessment is general ly useful only as a part of a total view; it lacks the capability of presenting anything like the complexity of the effects of a technology in reasonable depth. Even more limited in scope than the mini assessment is the micro-assessment. For discussion purposes, this can be considered an order of magni tude smaller than the mini-assessment. As such, it cannot be much more than the assessment analog of a thought experiment. Yet the micro-assessment can serve, for example, by way of a dry run, to focus and anticipate problems with larger-scale assessments. It also has potential for attacking specific conceptual problems within the larger context of an assessment. The micro-assessment is brainstorming rather than hard study, quick and dirty rather than careful and thorough. It should usually be tied closely to a larger assessment effort. Not usually considered in the context of tech nology assessment is (he monitoring program by which information from the environment is selected and processed to provide a continuing update on ambient conditions. Technology assessment, as Grad et al. [II] discovered, is operating in a constantly changing environment. Not only do technical per formance parameters and political and economic con ditions change, but the values of a society and its members are constantly changing. The groundwork lo help TA sponsors to determine which assessments should be undertaken appears as the result of a (usually informal) monitoring process. Besides pro viding information useful m determining ulut f\ should be done and when, monitoring can allow tor changes in an assessment already under wav. While such major events as the "energy crisis'1 certainly atlect the TA on the automobile, a cumulation of much smaller events, including marketing and regulatorsdecisions, might also affect Dickson's TA on the videophone [9|. The final component to be considered here for MTAs is an evaluation of the TAs themselves, sec ondary evaluation. Self-study and evaluation has not been a strong point of technology assessments. In deed. none of the assessment reports cued earlier con tained introspective components. A state of the art review of 13 selected TAs by Jones (14) offered only a relatively superficial critique, confining itself hugely to exhibiting a comparison of the studies along speci fic dimensions, such as managerial approach and Jata collection procedures. Since there is no fixed, agreed upon methodology for doing TAs. evaluation can not be a "checklist" procedure. But evaluation should receive more explicit consideration precisely because of the massive uncertainties in TAs. It is to be ex pected that a competent TA team is constantly aware of the need to correct procedural and substantive errors as they anse, but this informal, internal review is not a long-term substitute for mote formal and systematic evaluation. Secondary evaluation or evalu ation of TAs themselves is listed here because of us potential usefulness rather than its current applica tion. Table II illustrates a schematic representation ot the components of MTAs and the representation ot the combinations selected in Table (. The com ponents can fit together in time in avanety of ways. An MTA may be made up of sequences of com ponents. For example, a monitoring program in j particular area of technology may reveal the need for a major TA effort. A micro-study scopes out the dimensions of a full-scale undertaking. An evaluation of the full-scale effort reveals a deficiency which is correctable by a mini-assessment. The monitoring program continues. This sequence of activities illus trates the possibility of viewing TA as a process rather than an event, as indeed are technological change and its human consequences. Turning now to the designs assembled in Table I. we consider seven, in turn, as key samples of ihe endless array of possible combinations of full-scale, mini-, or micro-assessments in conjunction with moni toring and secondary evaluation of TAs. We caution the reader to interpret both the following comments and the tabular entries with great caution - too many variants are conceivable and lack of experience with all but the "one-shot" design preclude definitive statements. The evaluations were done by the authors on their personal experience and judgment in order to indicate the points at which various MTAs appeared a Journal of the International Soi ietyfor Technology Assessment. Spring 1 v 25 MONS 065093 Table 11. Full-Scale (Macro-) Assessment Mini-Assessment 777777}, Monitoring Program Evaluation Micro-Assessment One Way Interaction Mutual Interaction Wiilt positive time flow from left to tight horizontally the designs of Table l may be diagramed as follows A. One-Shot B. Double: C. Macro Plus Two Mini: or other interactive combination D. Micro-Macro: E. Macro-Monitor: or Mini-Monitor: | } +<777771 F. Macro-Mini Macro-Evaluation: G. Macro-Monitor with Intermittent Mini-Assessments: Other MTA designs can be diagramed similarly. priori stronger or weaker than "one-shot" assess ments. A One-shot Assessments. The standard TA is con sidered particularly weak in terms of balance, per tinence. and contribution to TA methodological development. In each case, the flaw is the ab sence of any basis for comparative analysis. B Double Assessment. This alternative compares favorably to the one-shot in providing a basis tor comparison, hence strengthening the three weak nesses noted. In addition, credibility may be enhanced: but all these gains are at (he expense of doubled assessment costs. Two very different variants are worth considering: (1) independent, "scientifically neutral'* assessments, or (^ad versarial assessments wherein most opposite view points are afforded a means for development of bases for their positions, C Macro- (full-scale) Plus Two Mini-Assessments. This implies that the full-scale TA. most likely "scientifically neutral", would share its generated data base as it became available with two adver sarial groups oriented toward elaboration of opposing viewpoints. An alternate version would support two "scientifically neutral" mini assessments designed to elaborate different tech nological alternatives or different contextual assumptions. The advantages of such a design are along the same lines as noted lor double assess ments, with even greater potential for balance and pertinence. D Micro-, then Macro-Assessment. This adds a lO Journal of the International Society fur Tei hno/ogy Assessment. Spring / v 'h MGNS 085094 small-scale pre-assessment effort to better define the critical parameters for the full-scale TA to follow, and involves perhaps a small loss in timeliness. E .-IssMsmen/ (Macro or Mini-1, then Monitor. This is the prototype for the "process" designs. It offers the strong advantage over the preceding designs in that it is ongoing. Monitonng can be undertaken in a variety of styles: formal or in formal: focused or scanning; intermittent or con tinuous. As indicated in Table I. this appears to olfer great potential on all counts, excepting economy, but the level of the effort does not have to be very large. Timeliness is of course a function of the need for information. F Macro-Assessment, then -Mini'Assessment!s) or Macro then Evaluation. This design offers good potentials via a number of alternatives. For in stance. one could evaluate the TA by means of a secondary analysis - this would be particularly rich in terms of advancing TA methodology. Ot one or more small-scale assessments couldelaborate on particular issues raised by the initial assess ment. or by changed circumstances, or by strident opposition. Informal assessments by con cerned parties could also be considered as vari ants of this design. In all cases, the result should be considerably richer than the "one-shot"; how ever. one could anticipate less expeditious deci sion processing, greater confusion if divergent opinions are apparently supported, and higher costs. G (Macro) Assessment, then Monitor, with Intermit tent (Mini-) Assessments. Without belaboring the notion, this is a reasonably attractive mode of extension of (he multiple TA concept toward an ongoing effort. Advantages appear attractive, similar to Design E. Since the MTA concept has not been widely ac cepted. we turn to consider activities which embody some of the salient features of MTAs. AN MTA EXAMPLE We now consider a technology assessment of Alterna tive Work Schedules (AWS) supported by the NSF as part of a loose international coordination among the OECD member nations. These efforts were handled by the OECD Directorate of Science, Technology and Industry under its work groups on Humanized Working Conditions in the Social Assessment of Tech nology research area. The NSF effort, lasting 18 months, funded at about $207,400, was performed by Haldi Associates Inc. of New York, with John D. Owen serving as principal investigator. The Principal Investigator and members of the Oversight Committee met with European experts to discuss their countries' experiences to date with AWS forms. In its analysis, the team made use of the tech niques of historical analysis and trend evaluation, econometric analysis, inter-disciplinary brainstorming and matrix analysis. Work schedules were analyzed from the aspects of both the number of hours worked and the timing of those hours, as well as from the focus of the degree of choice of employees and em ployers. Scenarios were reduced to three < I) status quo (with overtime premium pay requirements of the present Fair Labor Standards Act continuing): (2) "Flexi-time" (with no premium pay fur hours worked over 8 in a single day), and (3| compressed work-weeks (e.g.. 4-day. 40-hour or 4-day. 36-hour week). Because the project's final report lias mu yet been issued, it is premature ro discuss us conclusions. During the Haldi study, two micro efforts at the assessment of AWS were undertaken by two teams of six undergraduates each at the Georgia Institute of Technology. The details of these efforts are analyzed elsewhere {20|. It suffices for present purposes to mention that one group undertook an evaluation of 'llexiweek". a novel AWS consisting of alternating 4and 6-day work weeks of 8-hour days with businesses remaining open 6 days per week, while the other studied worker satisfaction under four different work schedules using an operationalized version of Maslow's [I8| hierarchy of needs. In May 197S, the Haldi group's methodology and results to date were reported to an OECD work group, at the group's exploratory meeting. The OtCD will probably hold further sessions tying together on going projects and publishing a wrap-up containing final reports of the various national studies. Project results and methodologies would thus be shared. The OECD Observor, No. 81. May-June. 1976 presents some comparative information regarding flexitime in France. Germany. Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Projects related to the Haldi effort are taking place in other OECD member nations. In Great Britain, the Work Research Unit of The Department of Employment (2j set up a Steering Group on Job Satisfaction. This group set up a series ot projects to explore ways in which the content and organization uf work could be changed to meet individual needs for job satisfaction. The Swedish Work Environment Fund (22] has devoted considerable effort to the study of shift work and its medical, social, and pro ductivity effects. Additional research in this area has been suggested. Apparently. OECD supports no coordinated datagathering studies or evaluations of the work. U is. ol course, too early to form any meaningful judgments of the validity and utility of the output of this pro gram. Journal of the International Society Jor Technology Assessment. Spring 1V '6 27 MCNS 085095 observations and conclusions REFERENCES As is apparent, uur *'MTA Example" of the last sec tion really wasn't an example of an MTA. Instead, it represented a loose attempt to coordinate diverse efforts to assess a broad and important topic - alter native work schedules. That we chose such an example is a reflection of the current state-of-the-TAart. The complexity of the assessment problem is rec ognized and a plurality of studies is undertaken. However, overall (as opposed to limited) design plan ning and coordination is not yet being used. Brief mention should be made of two other groups of assessments. One example of a true MTA design consists of a full-scale assessment of earth quake amelioration possibilities under Kd Dickson of the Stanford Research Institute, and a coextensive inini-assessment by Martin Jones, both supported by the NSF. The second assessment reputedly did not significantly intluence conclusions and partly on this basis we have not included the concurrent '"macro" plus ''mini" as an interesting MTA design. The second group of TAs is cunentiy under way with support from the Office of Technology Assess ment on various aspects of materials resources. Ihis effort shows promise of excellent coordination as a single advisory committee serves to oversee five fullscale assessments at this time with a potential for several more. However, this design is also not in cluded in our seven favorites because it simply divides the topic into essentially non-overlapping sub-topics, whereas our MTA designs provide for various forms of replication. Two problems exist. Since TA is not a discipline, but a collection of ad hoc, problem-oriented studies, there is no cumulative body of knowledge being developed. At the same time the management and coordination of TAs is fragmented, with each frag ment possessing a short time horizon. Studies in social change due to technology and in TA methodology may make some progress in solving the first problem. However, we feel that improve ments in this area will be increments rather than breakthroughs. It may prove necessary to provide continuity through systematic monitoring of im portant areas of technology and their effects on man. This, coupled with long-term commitment to study various classes of impacts, may provide continuity to what is, after all, the assessment of a process. What ihe mechanisms of coordination, control, monitoring, and evaluation should be we leave to the further deliberations of TA practitioners, users and sup porters. If the need for understanding the human effects of technologies is as great as we believe it to be, the replacement of the present hodgepodge of isolated efforts of uneven quality with assessment programs possessing continuity and form seems a logical next step. 1 Blalock. H.M. Jr Causal interdicts in noncxpcnmcntal research (University ot North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill 1964) 2 British Work Research Unit: The job satistactiun research pro-am iDepartmcnt ol employment, London I9'$> 3 Churchman. C.W.: The design ol inquiring systems ( Basic Books. New York 1971). 4 Coates. J.F.: Technology assessment The benefits the costs . the consequences, The futurist. 225 - ' M (1971). 5 Coates. J F. as quoted in New Scientist. 58 466iW3i. 6 Coates. V : Technology and public policy: The process ol technology assessment in the federal government. Wash ington. D C., Program ot policy studies in science and technology, George Washington University I 1972) 7 Cook. r.L). and Campbell. D T. The UcMiin and coiidiu > .t qua$i-cxpenmcms and true experiments in Held >ctrinc\. in Dunne(tc. M.D. (cd.) Handbook <>l industrial and or cuniiutional research (Rand McNally. New York |4*5i 8 Daddario, E.Q.: Subcommittee on science, research and development ot the Committee on Science and Wn>- imutics. U.S. House of Representatives, 90th Ooncrcss. 1st Session (1968). 9 Dickson. F.M.. The video telephone (National Science foundation Research Applied to National Needs. NS! RA-S-73-004. 1973). 10 forester, J. and Rosenthal. S : Towards a tcvhnolo*> assessment. The case ol V.'STOL aircratt systems, m I LaPorte et at.: Social change, public response, and the re gulation of large scale technology (Berkeley. Cj. ln-.iitute of Governmental Studies, University ot California. 17-70. 1972). 11 Grad, I P. et al. The automobile (University ot Oklahoma Press, Norman 1975). 12 Green, H.P.: The Adversary Process in Technology Wcsv ment. Technology and Society. 5 163-167i19*i>j 13 Jamaica Bay Environmental Study Group: Jainjua Bjv and Kennedy Airport (National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering. Washington. DC I o * i , 14 Jones, M.V.: A comparative state-of-the-art review of selected U.S. technology assessment studies (National Science foundation Office of Exploratory Research and Problem Assessment. Washington. D.C. 1973). 15 LaPorte, T.R.: A perspective in the assessment of large scale technology: The case of the STOL aircratt transport system (Institute uf Governmental Studies. University ol California. Berkeley 1971), 16 LaPorte, T.R.: Social Change, public response, and the regulation ol large scale technology (Institute ol Govern mental Studies. University ol California. Berkeley 19721 I 7 Maruyama. Vt. Paradigmatology and its application to cross-disciplinary, cross-protessionai and cross-cultural com munication, Cybernet tea. pp. I 36- 1 56 and 237 - 281 t |9*4i. 18 Maslow. A.H.: Motivation and personality i Harper and Row. New York 1954). 19 M it rot f. 1.1. and M. Turoff: The why* behind the hows. IE lit Spectrum. 10. 62-71 11973). 20 Porter, A.L . Rossini. F. A. and Connolly. T. Individual differences and complex problem solving groups: An ex ploratory study, Proceedings. Eleventh Annual Mecumr, Southeastern Chapter. The Institute of Management Sciences. 6-10(1975). 21 Scriven, M.: The exact role of value judgments in science, in Schaffncr. K.F. and Cohen. R.S. Icds.i. PSA 19'2; pp. 219-247 (D. Reidel. Dordrecht. Holland 1974). 22 Swedish Work Environment Fund: Scheduling the hours of work, in Research for a better work environment (Swe dish Work Environment Fund. Stockholm 1975). 2.X Jnumui of the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring /V 76 HONS 085096 I A Case Study: Polychlorinated Biphenyls Edward J. Burger, Jr., M.D., Sc.D. Office of the President s Science Adviser. Science and Technology Policy Office, Washington, D C. ABSTRACT The Government "decisions" on polychlorinated biphetiyls (PCBsl constituted atTunusual regulatory exercise compared to much of (lie experience of ffie past few years. ` PCBs had been developed in the late }V2i)s to' serve in instances where high physical and chemical stability were advantageous, lit part, precise ly because of these peculiar properties, they became recognized as particular environmental hazards. The processes of analysis and study by the Government for decision were fuller and more deliberate than is often the case. A number of scientific reviews were joined in the process. Benefits as well as hazards were explicitly considered. Regulatory type action was not taken until suitable information was marshalled and recent scientific evidence was given the benefit of interpretation. Finally, the process of deliberation was an unusually open one with the results of analy* sis fully displayed. 'Written for the study on Decision Making for Regulating Chemicals in the Knvtronment, Environmental Studies Board. National Research Council. National Academy of Sciences, and undertaken at the request of the U S. Environmental Protection Agency, Contract No. 49-01-2262. this caoer v^^jjMjjple^edjt^December^^Ta^1 1 In February 167$. the National Academy of Sciences or- gtnired a working conference to explore the process of Government decision-making to regulate chemicals in the en vironment. To assist this conference, a series of case studies of past regulatory decisions was solicited from parsons who had reasonably detailed knowledge of them. What follows is the case study of polychlorinated biphenyls as one of the series used in the NaS study. The maiority of the Govern ment pronouncements and decisions in this instance derived from a series of studies and analytic exercises convened by the Office of the President's Science Adviser. (TtULiUld^il also to appear as s part of a book by the author on retuiation and human hf^ hv in- > INTRODUCTION - NATURE OF THE DECISION The process of Federal Government deliberation and decision on polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) was relatively circumscribed and straightforward. The Government actually possessed little m the way of legal, regulatory authority. Hence, the decisions' leaned heavily on persuasion and on para-regulatory moves. Nevertheless, the Government's decisions m this case did lead to the intended and recommended actions (reduction and restriction in certain uses of PCBs) and a tightening of the procedures governing the manufacture, importation and continued use of these chemicals. Most important, perhaps, was the fact that the de cisions and actions assumed by the Government (and by parts of the private sector) were taken deliberately and on the basis of unusually good analysis and infor mation. The PCB decisions, in brief, were unusually well informed decisions when compared to others of this type, and the analyses used to arrive at the d?C pistons were probably fuller and of a higher quality than is the case with most regulatory actions. The several agencies ol the federal uovernment concerned with the PCB question contributed to the deliberations and to the analyses. At the same time, an outside group of scientific experts was engaged by the Office of Science and Technology to consider PCBs from a broad perspective as a case study of a hazardous substance existing in the environment in trace quantities. The Government's major deliberative body for its decisions was an interagency. PCB Task Force - run jointly by the OST and the CEQ. The case study of the outside advisers to the OST was time ly and useful to the Government's own analyses. Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring IQ 'rt r 1ST-l lnt,rnatnnii Socu-tv for Technology Assessment. Washington. D.C. HONS 085097 THE ENVIRONMENT - OFTEN DISTANT FROM APPARENT SOURCES PCBs were among the materials found, but when analysed they were often confused with other sub stances, PCBs were first distinguished from the "unknown interfering compounds'* found in nature in l`*66 by Jensen12 *and the next year by Widmark,1 On the basis of this latter report, the Food and Drug Administration was moved to develop analytic methods to distinguish between PCBs and chlorinated organic pesticides encountered in monitoring for regulation. In February 1969. Dr, Robert Risebrough gath ered attention by warning, in an article in the San Francisco Chronicle, of the dangers of PCBs in the eco-system. Over the next 6-7 months, the FDA in creased its surveillance of foodstuffs for evidence of PCB residues. Notable positive findings were in fish. Monitoring of foodstuffs, raw agricultural products, fish, and feeds for PCBs was augmented throughout 1970. PCBs were found in fish and in marine animals in liigh concentrations close to plants which manufac tured (he chemical. ACCIDENTAL SPILLS OR LEAKAGES OF LARGE QUANTITIES OF POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS WITH CONSEQUENT CONTAMINA TION OF FOODSTUFFS AND ANIMAL FEEDS. In 1968. PCBs. used as a heat-exchange fluid in a pasteurizer, leaked into rice oil being manufactured for heme cooking use in a plant in Japan. More than 1,000 persons were affected by the contaminated rice oil. many of whom exhibited persistent skin lesions as well as systemic disease (Yusho disease). In July 1971, leakage of heat exchange fluid caused con tamination of pasteurized fish meal which was used as a feed ration for-chickens and catfish. In addition to these two major areas of concern, PCBs began to be reported with increasing frequency in poultry and in eggs, and in packaging material for food. PCBs appeared with increasing frequency in 1970 and 1971 in the professional scientific literature deal ing with wildlife and the environment.4'* * In Sep tember 1970, the National Swedish Environment Pro tection Board held a conference on PCBs.0 One of 1 lenten. S.: A new chemical hazard. New Scientist. 32 612 (19661. ' Widmark. G.: Possible interference by chlorinated biphenyls. 1. Assoc. Offie. Anal. Chem.. JO. 1069 (1967). 4 Peakall. D.B.. nd 3.C. Line**-. Polychlorinated biphenyls. Another long-life widespread chemical in the environment. Bioicience. 20: 9S8-964 (1970). ' Pichirallo, 1.: PCBs: Leaks of toxic substance raises issues of effects, refutation- Science, i 73 899-902 (1971). * PCB Conference. National Swedish environment Pro- the sessions of this conference highltghtcJ :lie .-nvironmental problem " This conference, perhaps i.,, the first time, brought together the extent oi undo: standing on the manufacture, use. jmJ biologic.il effects of. the extent of environmental contamination by, and the analytic methods for. PCBs.' In August 1971, an Environmental Qualitv Work shop was convened in Durham, New Hampshire. b\ the National Academy of Sciences, to consider Marine Environmental Qualify and Ocean Pollu tants.7 *P*CB contamination was highlighted. In addition, provoked by both the accidental spills and by the widespread finding ot trace quanti ties of PCBs in ihe environment, there emerged m ilic lay press a series of stories and articles de.iiuu ,uth PCB contamination. Most of them occurred in hie 1971 and reflected especially (lie contamination o| foodstuffs.'14 The FDA, aware that PCBs were to be lound js a contaminant in the environment, and alert to the occasionally reported cases of accidental '.pillages, elected to engage in watchful suneillance of iu>u It did this in part in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture. As a result of the findings >i PCBs .specifically in fish and milk, the FDA established, between December 1969 and February "Action Levels" for PCBs in milk, poultry and iish. Action levels are temporary thresholds lot regulators decision pending the establishment of j more per manent regulatory policy and procedure. In kugiui 1970. the FDA established a similar action le\el t.-r eggs. During 1970 and 1971. the FDA used these guideline values in various seizures of foods inund contaminated with PCBs. The number of reported contaminations of foods, recreational fish, packaging materials and animal feeds increased toward the latter half of h)~l Accompanying the announcements in the public press (and. undoubtedly, reflective of them), there also occurred toward the end of 1971 a series ol inquiries from Congressmen and other elected officials o\er PCB contamination of food and the environment On lection Board. Research Secretariat. Wenncr-Gien tenter. Stockholm. Sweden. 29 September 1970. 1 Marine environmental quality. A special <tuJy held under the auspicet of the National Scientific Committee on Oceano graphy of the National Academy ot Science) Ocean -Mijir. Board. Durham. New Hampshire. 9- I 3 August 19* i 1 Monsanto limits food plants' me ,>f chemical PCU. The Washington Post. 30 September 1471. * Some dried foods found tainted by perilous chemical. The Washington Post. 28 September |VH 10 Tainted turkeys. The Washington Post 24 September 1971. " Turkeys, salmon tainted by PCBs. The keening Star. IS September 1971. '* A contaminant is found in cardboard, the New x ,.tk Times. 28 September I97|. '* If you think DDT's a problem, meet PCB, The New y.,rk Time*. 30 September 197|. '* FDA studying chance of contamination in containers i >r food. The Wall Street Journal. 28 September 1471. 30 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring I V "o MONS 085098 16 August 1971, Senator McGovern addressed a let ter to the Commissioner of the FDA. reflecting this concern. In September. Governor Miliken of Michigan sent a telegram to Elliott Richardson. Secretary of HEW. in which he announced a restriction of com mercial salmon Ashing because of the finding of PCBs in fish. By August 1971. the FDA (and to some extent, the USDA) found itself rapidly propelled into a posi tion where it would be "required" by public pressure and advocacy to take a stronger and more forthright position against PCBs. The scientific issues were still not clear and there were glaring gaps in information. What really were the biological effects of the complex known as PCBs? How did the various PCBs vary in human toxicity and which members of the PCB fami ly were found as contaminants? Was observed tox icity due to PCBs proper or to contaminants pro duced during (heir manufacture? How widespread was the contamination, and how good was the moni toring system in picking up accidental spills? Further more. it was clear that the twin issues of widespread environmental contamination, by trace quantities of PCBs. and the selective, higher level contamination of foods and feed, had to be joined at some point m Government decision-making. On 5 August. 1971, the FDA, on Us own initiative, called a meeting of spokesmen from each of several Government agencies and Federal research labora tories to review the state of scientific understanding of PCBs. The text for the meeting was the reported senes of accidental spills and leakages.15 Shortly fol lowing that meeting, the Department of Agriculture and the Commissioner of the FDA asked the Office of the President's Science Adviser to provide assis tance and act as a focus for the Government's actions and decisions concerning PCBs. This request was made because'. (1) the issue cut across several Federal agencies and also involved outside scientists. (2) the issue was rapidly becoming uncomfortable for the FDA to handle alone, and (3) the Office of Science and Tecltnology already had under way a scientific review of polychlorinated biphenyls and had quietly begun to gather information several months back. In April 1970, spokesmen for the Monsanto Com pany agreed to meet with the staff of the President's Science Adviser in the OST to discuss a number of issues concerning PCBs. including a series of animal toxicology studies which Monsanto had undertaken. During this meeting, Monsanto was asked for infor mation concerning the amounts of PCB it manu factured and distributed. The company, being the sole producer in the U.S., was reluctant to make pub lic this information, although it reported that it might " Transcript of proceedings of ilie interagency meeting on polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), Food and Drug Adminis tration. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Washington. D.C.. S August 1971. be able to provide the data on a confidential, nunpublic. basis to the Government. In October 1970. a review was begun, in the Office of Science and Technology, of the general subject of hazardous substances existing in the environment m trace quantities. This review, known ultimately as the Panel on Hazardous Trace Substances, had as its major goal the identification of the needs for infor mation by the Government in making judgments about trace hazardous substances. The Panel was composed principally u! non government experts in the fields of ecology. Jienustry, biology, environmental and occupational medicine and geology. Three case studies were begun from which it was hoped to draw gcneralizable ex perience. The particular subjects for the case studies were chosen because they were thought to be of im portance, because regulatory or other governmental action had not yet been taken but could be expected at some time in the reasonably near future, and be cause it was thought that there existed sufficient information from which to draw conclusions. The choices were cadmium, arsenic and PCBs. Thus, as the Government began to develop its own position on PCBs in 1971. the OST-imtiated study was already under way. What followed, in part, was for the Government to borrow the experience devel oped by the OST Panel and even for the two exercises to be joined to some extent. Notwithstanding, j separate and identifiable PCB report was published bv the members of the Panel on Hazardous Trace Sub stances.16 On 1 September 1971. the FDA held a meeting with the USDA. the EPA. the Council on En vironmental Quality, and the Office of Science and Technology, to explore options for further action concerning PCBs. The FDA and the USDA lequested that the Office of Science and Technology take a lead role in handling this matter. OST acceeded to this req uest and agreed to collaborate with theCEQin the task. This became known as the Interdepartmental Tusk Force on PCBs. The Task Force was announced on 5 September in a joint FDA-USDA press conference.1'' On 15 September 1971. the OST Panel un Haz ardous Trace Substances and the governmental Task Force met jointly with representatives of the Vlonsanto Company. The principal agenda item of this meeting was a request for information concerning the amounts of PCBs produced, patterns of distribution and usage, and estimates of losses into the environ ment.18 Again, the manufacturers expressed their 14 Polychlorinated biphenyls - environmental impact. X review by (he panel on hazardous trace substances. March 1972. Environmental Research. J. 249-J42 (1972). 11 Press release on interdepartmental PCB task force, hood and Drug Administration. Department of Health. Education. & Welfare. S September 1971. * Letter from Edward J Burger. Jr., M.D. of the OST to Mr. John Mason. The Monsanto Company, | S October, i 9' i. Journalo! the International Society jar Technology Assessment, Spnng IV % \ MGNS 083099 willingness to supply information of this sort to the Government, but with the understanding that the data would not be released publicly except m a full and detailed fashion. In addition, the Monsanto Com pany expressed some concern over the seemingly disconnected character of the Government's activities up to that time and the difficulties involved in finding responsible spokesmen for each of the agencies in volved. Monsanto made a strong plea (in the form of a condition for their supplying information) that they be permitted to deal with a single spokesman for the Government. The office of Science and Technology, on the advice of the Counsellor to the President, did reach agreement with Monsanto on the terms of receiving the information.^ These were shortly rendered moot by a lequest from the Environmental Defense Fund for the same information. This information ultimate ly served as important background for the Govern ment's decisions and was leaned on heavily by both the OST Panel and the Task Force. The OST Panel combined the production figures and the data on distribution and use with knowledge of the physical properties of PCBs to develop a com posite picture of the rates and routes of environ mental transport and disposition. The data were reflected in a series of coefficients for a model of transport of PCBs. While this was necessarily a crude description, it served as a very useful instrument for placing PCBs in peispeclive. It replaced what other wise would have been a totally qualitative - even intuitive - exercise. It pointed up important gaps in knowledge. Finally, some verification was afforded by the results of physical measurement and monitor ing. This attempt at environmental modelling was a major contribution by the Panel (o decision-making. The OST Panel report was also appropriately criti cal in its review of biological effects and analytic methods for PCBs. It considered what was known of the mechanisms of observed biological effects, and relationships between variations in chemical structure and biological activity, and it attempted to compare the effects of controlled laboratory experiments with observations made on animal populations in nature. The Interdepartmental Task Force reflected much of (his information in its report. It explored addi tional territory as well - reflective of the fact that it was a Government report which focused on a number of specific, pragmatic, governmental or public problems. Thus, as well as serving as a review of the scientific aspects of PCBs. the Task Force explicitly reviewed a number of broad aspects of the PCB ques tion. Most important, perhaps, was (lie exploration of the benefits or utility of PCBs and of the industrial >* Memorandum from John Dean. Counsellor to the Presi dent. to Edward /. Burger. Office of Science and Technology, concerning the t-rei-dom nf Information Act. 4 October 197 I . and commercial dependencies built up over the years. This explicit review of the benefits of PCBs. which is often not done for regulatory decisions, was of vital importance for decision-making on PCBs. The Nation al Bureau of Standards engaged in a review and analy sis of the benefits and even the "essentiality" of each of the several uses of PCBs. In this, the NBS received advice from the National Industrial Pollution Control Council, especially concerning the electrical uses of PCBs. In each of the cases examined, the question ol a possible and satisfactory replacement lor PCBs was raised. This review became the basis for the ultimate decision to preserve electrical uses of PCBs (for which there were true dependencies and no satisfactory sub stitutes) and to restrict other uses.20 The Government Task Force report included a sys tematic summary of monitoring experience for PCRs in food, it had been tins matter of PCBs in food as much as any other which had brought PCBs to public notice. Hence, it was thought highly desirable to sys tematically lay out the apparent extern of food contamination and to consider what the patterns of contamination would suggest for public policy and Government action. The Task Force Report explicitly reviewed all of the pertinent Federal regulatory laws for their appli cability to PCBs. This was. therefore, an exploration of the power of the Government to control and limit the manufacture, distribution, use and disposal of PCBs. This review pointed out something that was already known - that existing regulatory authorities were capable of responding to specific incidents of contamination of foodstuffs once they were rec ognized. However, it acknowledged that the Govern ment's legal armamentarium was generally . inadequate to prevent more PCBs from entering the environment".20 In addition to the above, the Interdepartmental Task Force review considered the chemical and physi cal properties of PCBs. the occurrence, transfer and cycling of PCBs in the environment, and the known biological effects - especially on man. During the time that the Government review of PCBs was being pursued, the level of public concern over these chemicals continued to nse con siderably. For tins reason, the Commissioner of the FDA felt compelled to hold a press conference to ". . . try to help establish a perspective on PCBs. . ." roughly a month after the Task Force had begun its work.21 This was an appropriately reasoned state ment which attempted to allay fears and discourage demands for a sudden, outright ban on PCBs (even if is Polychlorinated biphenyls and the environment. Interde partmental task force on PCBs. Washington. DC. May 1972. National Technical Information Service. II s. Department of Commerce. Springfield. Virginia, No. COM-72- 10419, n Statement by Charles C Edwards. M.D.. PCB press brief ing, Food and Drug Administration, 29 September 1971 M Journal uj llie Inierniuionul Society jor Technologyt Assessment, Spring lv7(> MONS 085100 the Government had been capable of invoking one). The statement deferred to the ongoing process of re view and deliberation as (he basis for considered de cision and action. There was. finally, a third review of PCBs under taken within the Federal walls. One of the national institutes of health, the National Institute of Environ mental Health Sciences, had sometime before elected to conduct a series of `'scientific" reviews of materials which were of impending regulatory concern and for which no systematic accounting of scientific informa tion had been done. The pltilosophy in this case was to bring together, in a conference, spokesmen for the principal research projects - published or under way - in order to take the measure ofjlie available scien tific understanding. At the same time, members of the press - especially scientific writers - were invited lo attend these sessions, in order to en)oy the pro ducts of this review process. The aim was to educate both the scientists and the public. Jn December 1971. the National Institute of En vironmental Health Sciences held the first of this series of conferences in North Carolina, and it was on PCBs."(Since then, the NIH has held similar reviews on lead, automotive emissions, and other substances of current public and governmental concern.) Many of the same spokesmen who were engaged in the other reviews made presentations at the "open" conference. One of the major accomplishments of this meeting was to impart an understanding to the press and sci ence writers of the character of the scientific evidence and the scientists' own interpretation of experimental findings. The net (and immediate) effect of that ex ercise was to take the newsworthiness out of the PCB issue and to remove it fiotn the category of the sensalional. Very little was actually reported in the press of that meeting. More important, relatively little more was reported on PCBs in any form in the lay press. The principal ``control" actions for PCBs were the result of persuasion by the Federal Government rather than by direct regulatory exercise. The Govern ment possessed no real regulatory authority to conirol the manufacture, distribution or use of PCBs. However, the persuasive influence of the several Government inquiries - especially the PCB Interde partmental Task Force - was not doubted. Thus, the major action was taken "voluntarily" by the Mon santo Company, the sole U.S. manufacturer. Beginning in 1970, the Monsanto Company had begun to reduce the sales of PCBs - especially for non-electrical uses. Domestic sales for PCBs for non- electrical uses liad risen from 12.000 tons in 1968 to 16.000 tons in 1970. By 1971, this figure was re duced to approximately 4.000 tons.2' In addition, the Monsanto Company quietly assumed lor itself the role of distributor as well as manufacturer in order to exercise some control over end-use of PCBs. In this way. the manufacturer was able to "discontinue sales of PCBs for use in paints, plasticizers, sealants, ad hesives and other `open-system' uses". Thus, during 1971 and 1972. the Monsanto Com pany also restricted (or attempted to restrict) sales of PCBs to installations in which food or animal feed was processed. The principal recommendation of the PCB Task Force was the discontinuance of all uses of PCBs ex cept in electrical capacitors and transformers. These latter were judged to be essential uses and represented "closed systems" " To the extent that it could exer cise tills type of restriction on distribution, the Monsanto Company again undertook "voluntarily" to control end-use through its control of the manu facture and sale of PCBs. OBJECTIVES The Interdepartmental Task Force report on PCBs was issued publicly in May 1972 and was accom panied by a statement of governmental "thinking" and governmental "action". Perhaps the major con clusion reached in the report, which became an objec tive tn Government decisions, was that of limited restriction on PCBs. PCBs were seen as having certain essential uses in eiectncal transformers and capacitors and it was judged in the country's best inteiest not to be totally denied the use of PCBs. This was a direct reflection of the analysis performed by the National Bureau of Standards of the utility and essentiality of PCBs. which pointed to the possibility of an increase in fires and explosions from encased or enclosed transformers if PCBs could no longer be used - repre senting the possibility of trading one hazard for an other hazard, in addition, it denved from the attempts to map out the patterns of environmental dispersal of PCBs which had been lost from human use. Electrical applications were seen as ` closed" ap plications and were not thought to contribute to en vironmental distribution. Other uses of PCBs were reviewed as either not essential, potentially or actually contributory to the environmental "load", or were found to have suitable substitutes, This, then, pointed to an elimination of National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences meet- nil on polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Rougemnunt. North Carolina. 20 21 December 1971. Proceedings pub lished in Environmental Health Perspectives. Experimental Issue Nu. |. April 1972. Nilional Institute or Environmental Hralth Sciences. Research Triangle Park. North Carolina. >i Monsanto Industrial Chemicals Company, press release Monsanto releases PCB production figures to Department of Commerce, 30 November 1971. Press release accompanying the release of the PCB interde partmental task force report on PCBs. Washington. D C , 12 May 1972 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring 19 76 33 MQNS 085101 essentially all other uses - heat exchange fluids, hy draulic lluids, and the miscellaneous category of "plasticizer'* uses. The objective ol limited restriction became the basis for governmental persuasion of the Monsanto Company to restrict its distribution and sales of PCBs - in fact, the principal governmental action. Highlighting of the fact that true regulatory con trol by the Government was limited, became the text lot a plea lor passage of a then-pending bill in Con gress to close this gap. A second objective, then, be came the enactment of the Toxic Substances Control Act which would permit the Government to exercise useful control of industrial chemicals at their source. The regulatory tools which the Government did possess in (his case permitted enforcement action alter PCBs were found in foods for human consump tion and in animal feeds. Here, the FDA and the USDA re-stated their thresholds for action (which had been evolving over the previous four years!, and announced the strengthening of their monitoring and analytic efforts. The other avenue of governmental control was that over industrial effluents and ambient water quality. Here, the Environmental Protection Agency stepped up its effort to assess the foreign chemical content of waters downstream from plants manufacturing PCBs and the Justice Department was close behind with enforcement teeth. The processes of review in this case explicitly sought information for a broadly-basd Jcimou Thus, there was a dedicated attempt, for example, to determine the benefits or utility of PCBs and of the costs that could be expected if their uses were re stricted or denied. This information was later luund to have been highly influential and important in formulating the Government's position. One other element of information which pruveJ to be important was the analysis of environmental distri bution and dispersal. The analysis itself was sometlung of an experiment. It was reasoned eurlx tin bv the participants in the OST review that it should be possible, starting with some elementary mtorination on total amounts of PCRs produced, and patterns ot distribution in commerce and disposal, and armed with a certain elementary understanding ol plixoc.il and chemical properties, to build a model predicting PCB distribution in the environment. This, in tact, was done, and the coefficients used in the model were pattially tested or "validated" against (he ptnucjl measurements of PCBs in the environment which had been reported in the literature. This exercise anJ the information from it became the basis, fur example. >*i the judgment that PCBs used in electrical capacitors disposed of in the earth by burying m landfills would not be expected to migrate very far tltruugh the ,oil and would not represent a significant source of en vironmental pollution. INFORMATION The PCB "decisions" were perhaps among the best informed of governmental actions of this type in re cent years. There was, it turned out. a certain body of scientific and teciuiical knowledge about PCBs and a modest documentation of past experience. In addi tion. this information was better assembled and analyzed than was usually the case. Perhaps time was an important factor since time was permitted for deli berate and reasonably careful study and reflection before decisions were announced. Thirdly, there was more opportunity for public airing and scientific interpretation before decision-making than is usually the case. A Swedish scientific meeting on PCBs had been held in 1970.6 The Office of Science and Tech nology had begun its review and analysis of PCBs by December 1970, and the results of its analysis were made available as they emerged. The Government s own scientists reviewed and interpreted the base of teciuiical knowledge over roughly six months begin ning in September 1971. In December 1971. a third forum of scientists was convened by the N1H to re view much of the same material. Thus, the process of interpretation and maturation of data by scientific peers - while characteristic of the traditional scienti fic process but unusual in regulatory decision-making - was played out in tius case. IMPLEMENTATION The principal "decisions" deriving from this exercise were to restrict PCBs to "closed-system " electrical uses. There soon emerged a few additional issues which reflected either loose ends or areas which de serve some additional study. The principal reason for denying the use of PCBs as heat-exchange fluids was to avoid accidental spills and leakages of PCBs into foodstuffs (where heat was used to "pasteurize" the food material). However, there were often PCB heat exchanger applications One of these, for example, involved the use ot heat on off-shore oil rigs to maintain low viscosity of the oil. PCBs had been chosen here because of the charac teristics of high thermal stability and low probabfiuv of fire and explosion, and many of the heat e.\ciunge devices had been designed specifically around the use of PCBs. Denial of the use of PCBs in this case raised the spectre of an increase in the number of fires m off-shore oil rigs or the continued use ut PCBs from imported sources. This general question of worldwide (as opposed to U.S.) production and use of PCBs, became a matter of immediate concern. There was an early visit ui a spokesman from the Swedish Government to the Office of Science and Technology. The I ant r Com- 3-1 Journal of the International Society for Fft hut/logy Asse\Mnenf. S(>nn)( / V MQNS 085102 mission and the Customs Bureau were pressed to search for signs of imported PCBs.IS Perhaps most useful was the fact that the OECD was persuaded to lake up the question of the industrial production and commercial use of PCBs in the industrialized parts of (]) world. PCBs, in fact, became the major example of intergovernmental '"consultation" in a mechanism which the OLCD had established for this purpose. Die U.S. position and the information behind it be came major elements in the OECD position paper*'6 and in the deliberations at the OECD in November 1972. Trace amounts of PCBs in packaging materials be came a matter of particular concern. In part, this was due to uncertainty over their origin. There was some evidence that trace quantities of PCBs were magnified in the process of recycling paper. To the extent that this was true, the Government and national policies aimed at recycling were seen to be in possible jeopar dy. One of (he principal motives for exploring this paiticular issue, apart from the economics of paper and cardboard production, was the contamination of food wrapped with PCB-containing paper. There fol lowed. therefore, a series of investigations by the Food and Drug Administration into the process and rate of migration of PCBs from packaging materials into foodstuffs which the packages contained. In December 1972. the FDA produced an Environ mental import Statement (perhaps the only one of its kind from that agency) on its proposed rule-making for PCBs.21 Among other tilings, this document sum marized the FDA investigations and positions regard ing PCBs and packaging. CONCLUSIONS. OBSERVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Government `'decisions'' on PCBs constituted an unusual regulatory exercise compared to much of the experience of the past few years. In the first place, the Government's position was generally well pre pared. Related to that was the fact that time was taken for deliberate study and deliberate action, even in the face of public outcries for immediate action. Thirdly, the ``decisions'' were taken without much tangible legal authority for governmental control. Leder from Alvin Aim. Council on Environmental Quali ty. to Mr Vernon Acre*. Commissioner. Bureau of Customs, 32 June 1972. > Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop ment, Environmental Directorate, Sector Croup on Unintended Occurrence of Chemicals in the Environment. Polychlorinated biphenyls - proposals for concerted action. 13 October 1972. i' Food and Drug Administration, Final environmental impact statement. Rule making on polychlorinated biphe nyls. Department of Health. Education, and Welfare, 18 December 1972. They represented, instead, persuasion and vulunijiv action. It is worthwhile, perhaps, to examine ionic >>i the (actors which contributed to jny successes that can be claimed. 1 The PCB decisions represented, perhaps, a some what more manageable challenge than many Only a single U.S. manufacturer was involved. Further, the majority of commercial and indus trial uses and the major users were known. 2 There was some information which proved useful in decision-making. Quantitative figures showing production were provided - albeit only alter a delay - which were essential in determining the scale of the problem and its change with time. Similaily, the corresponding figures for com mercial distribution were essential in ascertaining the patterns ol human use and dispersion. To complement these data, there were at least some results of physical measurement and monitoring of PCBs in the environment or indices of dis persal. In terms of hazards, there was a legacy of ai least some documentation of previous human ex posure and some laboratory data. However, many questions remained. Perhaps, most impor tant. was the luxury of critical review tin fact, several critical reviews) of this information. Fur ther. these reviews engaged some very good scien tific talent - both inside and outside the Government and in a way which permit led die decision-makers to be very well informed of their advice. In terms of benefits, a specific analysis was commissioned of the utility and essentiality of PCBs. (It is interesting to note that while this was done well, the National Bureau of Standards en tered into this exercise very reluctantly, seeing in it the perils of the battery additive episode of some years before,) Finally, there was performed the unusual but highly useful attempt at modeling the pat terns of rates and routes of distribution ol PCBs in the environment. This was done lor the most part as an experiment to determine whether such an exercise could be performed. It did. in Ijct. provide some useful and immediate insight. 3 There was a single spokesman for the Govern ment. Tire agencies involved early determined that the PCB question cut across several depart ments. This, by itself, was probably not per suasive and the joint request from the FDA and the USDA to the OST to "lake on" the PCB question arose also from a desire on their pan to push on to someone else a tough or 'hot" de cision. It should be noted, also.that the OST had already begun a review of PCBs. The fact that there was a single spokesman Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, St>nms l '> 35 MQNS 085103 proved important in arriving at an orderly de cision. The Monsanto Company insisted on deal ing only with a single spokesman alter months of unconnected and frustrating interchanges with a variety of Government agents. The fact that there was a single spokesman also undoubtedly made it easier to amass and analyze in an orderly fashion the variety of information from several sources. The fact that it was an Executive Office spokesman was probably important in soliciting certain other studies in parallel (such as the National Bureau of Standards' study of benefits) and the review of the Government-wide legal option for regulatory action. 4 Although already mentioned, the scientific infor mation (especially that related to biological ef fects) underwent the benefit of several reviews. This had two salutary effects. It assured scientific interpretation by peers and it developed a con stituency among scientists for the decisions ultimately taken. 5 The decisions were deliberately broadly-based. While this may appear elementary, this facet is generally not characteristic of regulatory de cisions concerned with human health. Both bene fits and hazards were explicitly explored. Economic consequences were considered. Each of several avenues of possible action was ex amined in turn. Again, a single spokesman lor the Government and one placed above the opeijung agencies was probably a necessary feature in tins broad examination. 6 The decision process was a relatively open one The fact that there was an Interdepartmental Task Force was public knowledge from the out set. The Task Force published its lull report. Similarly, the reports of the OST Panel on Haa ardous Trace Substances and the report of the NIH meeting on PCBs were published. Funliei, science writers and other members of the press were specifically invited to participate in the MM meeting. (Note that the question ot freedom oi information was a matter of some concern duimg the deliberations of the Interagency Tjsk Kor^e in the Office of Science and Technology.1'1) 7 Time was permitted for deliberate decision making, At one point, in fact, the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration held ,i press conference in which he specifically an nounced that he would not proceed with an umright ban on PCBs and deferred to the study process that was then underway.14 This. *i course, contradicts the classical argument wlujt insists that Governments tnuu make reguljiory decisions immediately without the luxury of time for good decisions. HONS 005104 36 Journal of the International Society J'or Techno/ugy Assessment. Spring l v Technology, The Past and the Future Philip L. Boreano University of Washington, Seattle Washington 98195 ABSTRACT This paper presents an overview of forecasting and social indicators and discusses some of the difficulties which are encountered in the methodology. An at tempt is made tv consider these factors in a political context. Ascertaining the futuie has been a human concern since ancient times. Greeks would travel to Delphi where the priestess of the Oracle would forecast for them (usually ambiguously), and Romans would study the entrails of birds and animals. Ln the East, the I Ching was developed. Astrology has been prac tised in many cultures and retains its vitality even in post-industrial times. The scientific method itself is a form of forecasting; when Mendeleyev constructed the periodic chart, one of its functions was to predict the existence of undiscovered chemical elements, ln a nun-technical area. Justice Holmes once defined the law as a prediction of what courts will, in fact, do. People engage in futurology in order to understand the present and its contradictions; in order to under stand future possibilities and the alternatives open for choice; in order to set up goals and objectives, to construct utopias; and in order to investigate the im plications of social change because, since change is not neutral, its burdens fall unevenly. Predictability is important because it is intimately tied to notions of security, stability, and the ability to plan. In other words, most of us have a gut reaction that if we can know the future, we can control the future. 0p> right * hv Hhtlip L. Nerrann Dm uriiclc is from the forthcoming book. Technology a* a Social and Political Phenomenon, by P.L. Bereanu (John Wiley A Sons, Inc.. 1976). It derives in part From work done under National Science houndslion. Grant No. GY-832S. * Parts of (his paper derive from work done by a colleague, Michael Teel. Beginning around the turn of the century, specula tion on die future commonly involved speculation about technology. Thomas Edison made forecasts about the applications of electricity in popular maga zines from 1910 to 1914 and Charles Steinmeiz of General Electric wrote an article for Ladies' Home Journal in 1911 discussing home uses of electricity After the First World War, U.S. General Billy Mitchell predicted the importance of aviation tor military pur poses and was such a vigorous proponent of his con clusions that he was court-martialled. In I^20. Scientific American published 65 predictions lor die year 1995; the predicted events in general occurred much sooner than expected, and of course some im portant breakthroughs were not foreseen at all. The current increased interest in forecasting, and the attempt to develop methodologies of some rigor, can be generally associated with the high techno logical level of contemporary society. More particu larly, this development has been strongly influenced by the military (and to a lesser extent by the asso ciated space interests). The impetus here has been to anticipate enemy innovations, to suggest areas for technological investment and to improve ongoing research and development, and to foster analytictechniques which would be used directly for tactical and strategic planning. In other words, modern fore casting is clearly goal-oriented and linked to the no tion of control. Forecasts may be described by general charac teristics. For example, we may distinguish between technological or non-technological predictions. An other distinction is between exploratory and norma tive forecasts. In an exploratory forecast, we start with today's knowledge base and look towards (he future; in other words, with a materialist perspective we look at what might be probable scientific develop ments, innovations, and inventions as well as the characteristics or capabilities of new technologies. An Journal ofthe International Sociciv for Technology Spring IV 16 01STA International Soaetv Jor Technology Assessment, Washington. D C MONS 085105 example would be extrapolation. A normative fore cast. on the other hand, is based more on future goals, needs, desires, and values; in other words, from a non-materialist orientation one would work back wards to the present in order to facilitate change and assure that the desired goals are served. Scenario writ ing is an example of this technique (obviously, normative forecasting raises important issues as to whose goals and whose norms are used in the con struction of the desired future state). /Knottier classification of predictive techniques divides them into explicit and implicit. Explicit meth odologies are those which are consciously based on various environments or events which structure tech nological change; in other words, a methodology which might be looking at developments of a particu lar technology but emphasizes the effects which eco nomic, political, sociological, and marketing factors, as well as other technologies, have on the subject teclinology. In contrast, an implicit methodology is one which does not focus on the external environments (for example most extrapolations are of tlus type). Increased pressures for systemization of forecasts arise from a suspicion of intuitive processes, a desire to render information more explicit, functional at tributes of prediction which tend to favor hierarchical organizations and the exercise of power by those in key roles. a desire to speed up change and -- as men tioned - to control it. PREDICTIVE TECHNIQUES Some writers Itave identified over 100 proposed fore casting methodologies.1 All of these techniques should be judged by the criteria of what they can tell us about the future magnitude of the variable being studied and what degree of certainty or confidence we can place in them. Trend extrapolation is perhaps the most familiar predictive tool. With it we read the future by study ing the past, it comes in five varieties, but each of them share two basic assumptions: that the forces which Itave created the past pattern are likely to con tinue, and (hat the forces which have created the past pattern are likely to extend that pattern, in other words, trend extrapolation is an evolutionary mode of analysis; it is unable to forecast radical changes. In addition, because of its heavy reliance on past data, the accuracy of this base information is of critical importance. The first subtechnique here is that of "persistence". Very simply staled, this method is based on there being no change in the future, for 1 <5e Jaimch. I-;.: Technological forecasting in perspective (Organization lor Economic Co-operation and Development. Paris l V67). example, records indicate that about to-" ,,i ihe nine the weather tomorrow will be just like it is iuda\. thus, one can predict tomorrow's weather uuli con siderable accuracy by looking out the window (modem meteorology, it should be noted, has raised the level ol accuracy to approximately S5- WH The next method is perhaps the most common tra jectory" (or '"projection" or sometimes just `'trend"), This is our old friend `"extending rhe curve". The assumption here is that while there is change, the change is stable. Although projections may be per fectly line in the short-run, they can lead io ridi culous long-term claims if taken literally. There is the story that in ihe early days of the telephone system, one of the Bell analysts nude the startling discovery that, based on their experience at the time, by in ascertainable future year the demand lor telephone operators would exceed the total tenvale population of the United States; sexism is not the only error in tills prediction, because the technique could not toresee the introduction of superseding tecltnologics mechanical and then electronic operatmgequipmetu. A variant of trend analysis, the use of envelope curves, may be helpful in dealing with this latter problem. A macrovariable (such as ``vehicle speed") may be plotted against time and separate curves created in a series in which each individual curve rep resents a development of a single device or technique which, when its improvement begins to run up against natural barriers and its development slows down, is teplaced by a new technique represented by a new curve within the overall envelope. The third form of trend extrapolation is called "c> clical". Here it is posited that the underlying pattern is stable and recurring. This technique is helpful tor the prediction of certain natural events such as (he return of comets, sunspotting, and insect infestations. It also plays a role in astrological calculations. A fourth technique is "associative" or trend correlation. In this method, one uses data from one event or vari able in order to predict about another. The assump tion here is that there is a stable relationship between the two, and this might be. for example, a cause-andeftect relationship. Usually the two variables are on similar levels of complexity, but many fortune-telling devices - such as reading tea leaves ot cards - use very different event sets. Finally, we may classify cer tain extrapolation techniques as "analogue". Here there are also two sets of events but one is explicitly simple or familiar and the other complex and,or unknown; the technique is based on first making a prediction for the familiar event set and then trans ferring over the reasoning to the complex one. Such a technique underlies the modern notion of modeling. Models and ganung have assumed such importance and frequency in contemporary forecasting that thev can legitimately be described as a major category on their own. The construction of a model or game is Journal <>J the liiiernaiiwtal Society for Technology Assessment. Spring 10 76 HUNS 085106 always beset by two opposing desires -- to create a simple enough model so as 10 be able to manipulate it conveniently and yet not to abstract it so much that if loses meaningful relationship to the real world. What frequently happens is that the factors or vari* abler in the model (each of which lias error possi bilities) are manipulated to such an extent that the potential for error in the outcome is quite large. Tlte Delphi technique is a "scientific" resurrection of the old visit to the Oracle. This is an intuitive process retying on a group of wise people who are sent sequential interrogations or qucstionnaiies inter, jperwd with information and opinion, and with feed back derived from earlier rounds as iterations. Usually the pocplc answer these questions anonymously, and the desire is to minimise the influences of personality and status. A question on a Delplii study might be of the form: when will technology x be developed? After all the answers have been received, usually the analyst eliminates the extremes: for example, a com mon practice is to report just the mid-50% of re sponses. If the responses collect about more than one mode, we can assume that there are different under lying assumptions which can be explored in turn. Tlte limitations in Delplu studies involve the selection of the experts, and the design of the questions. Scenario writing is a process in wluch statements are made about sequences of factors which might lead from one situation (the present) to another. The se quential steps are related by probabilities, often of a conditional nature. Some scenarios focus on the description of the end state or social future, others are more concerned with the transitional processes. The idea is to develop knowledge about likely events, interactions, and future branching points at which de cisions will be made by forcing the analyst to deal with details and dynamics otherwise easily overlooked. This technique has usually been employed in economic, political, and social spheres: in other words, to describe the environment for technological change. Utopian literature falls within this category, as does a more analytical work such as Kahn and Weiner's Tlte Year 2000 (although these authors use scenarios, they say these are not predictions at all).1 The identification of all possible means to a given end is sometimes given the fancy name of morpho logical analysis. Here a checklist of possibilities is created by identifying (he problem or end state accutately, identifying all of the characteristic para meters. and dividing all the parameters into their states or cases. One example in the literature concerns possible jet engines.3 The alternatives are: ; ths I ord IDundaiion's Knorgy I'olicy Protect made con siderable use of three scenarios (historical growth, techno logical fU. mo-energy growth) in its report. A time to chooae < Cambridge J9ld). ' in Ayres, K.U.: Technological forecasting and long-range planning, p. 7 3 (McGraw-Hill. New York 1969). Parameter and States V,J. ,)/ States 1 Intrinsic or extrinsic chemically activemass 2 Internal or external thrust generation 3 Intrinsic, extrinsic, or zero thrust augmen tation 4 Internal or external thrust augmentation 5 Positive or negative jet 6 Possible thermal cycles (adiabatic, iso thermal, etc.) 7 Medium (vacuum, air. water, earth) 8 Motion (translatory, rotatory, isolatory. none) 9 State of propeilant (gas. liquid, solid) 10 Continuous or intermittent operation 11 Self-igniting or non-self-igniting ptopellam 2 2 t ' 2 4 4 4 3 2 2 Tlte total number of combinations described by these parameters and their various states is 36.*64. Of these. 35.344 appear to be possible. One of the uses of the morphological analysis such as the above u that it may lead to new inventions by suggesting pos sibilities for further exploration: what is probable and where does a new item tit in regard to the exist ing state of the art? A morphological analysis may also reflect the era in which it was performed. The above example was constructed in 1951 and therefore could be augmented by more recent knowledge about nuclear state variables: however, a first exercise 01 this type done in 1943 contained only 576 possibili ties. A form of morphological analysis which stresses the known ways of achieving a certain capability is called the contingency tree. These may be categorized as either `directed" or "undirected". The former type of tree consists of networks which lead to 3 siated objective. The idea is to identify those condi tions which are necessary to achieve tlte objective (functional prerequisites) and those which are suf ficient (alternative means of achieving sub-goals). Each subobjective can be further broken down. As an example, we can list the major technological develop ments which were necessary to achieve a Polaris sys tem4: nuclear reactors for marine propulsion, accurate self-contained inertial navigation and guid ance systems, solid-fuel rocket boosters, compact nuclear thermal warheads, and ablating re-entry nose cones. Undirected contingency trees are exploratory forecasts which do not aim towards a specific goal. The purpose is to explore the various consequences which might follow from a particular hypothetical technological development. This technique highlights technical interrelationships between the subject tech nology and those beyond it. Another form of morphological analysis is the relevance tree. These are networks of relationships organized into one of two complementary types, 4 Ibut. p. 90. Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring l V "ri W MQNS 085107 "horizontal" or ``vertical". A horizontal relevance tree is designed to lead to the definition of specific objectives, to be a guide to areas of threat or oppor tunity. Us purpose, in other words, is identification and guidance rather than solving a problem. When the specific objectives are identified these may be arranged in a vertical tree which is nothing more than an hierarchically linked pattern of objectives useful for normative forecasting. society, has increased centralization and the power ,<i organizational hierarchies. By emphasizing ihe inter actions of organizations and groups (rather than mdividual diversity), forecasting has attempted to humlarge organizations more effective. As a result, torecasters and kindred analysts are plated in elite rules. SOCIAL INDICATORS CRITIQUES OF FORECASTING In large part, the attention given to forecasting as sumes that societal problems are due to surprise rather than to indifference: it is not at all clear that if we could truly anticipate a troublesome future we would have (he social willingness to be able to al leviate it. Many predictions have a limited utility because the analyst either engaged in oversimplification or lacked the necessary imagination or nerve. At the other ex treme. some forecasts exhibit overcompensation and excessive fantasy, It is often difficult, but necessary, to transcend the specific technological, political, and social configurations of one's own circumstances (which was not done in the above example of the telephone system). Incorrect calculations ate an obvious, but recurring, problem. The choice of the time span over which to predict is also critical, since uncertainties and accidents will be more likely in a longer period. A common error in prediction, also, is a failure to anticipate the effect of converging devel opments; the subject of the forecast will be in fluenced by changes in its future environment. This leads to another common drawback with pre dictive techniques - the assumptions of stability which underlie many methodologies. Many functions are not continuous over time, many developments arc not evolutionary. Discontinuities, revolutionary changes ~ in either technologies or social structures do occur. It is a naive form of technological deter minism which ignores changes in competitive system relationships and the supplanting of one structure by another. It should be noted that some interesting work has been done which focuses on this specific experience: "substitution analysis'* is an attempt to document the way in which one technology supplants an earlier, competing one (for example, the replace ment of natural fibers in clothing by synthetics). We should also not fail to ignore the relationship between predictive techniques and normative con cerns. Our attitude towards forecasting usually is tied to an ideological position or political philosophy, even if it is not acknowledged. Obviously, the ancient problems of free will are involved here: Can we create the future? Are individuals and societies autono mous? Forecasting, as it has primarily evolved in tliis Closely aligned with the concept of forecasting t-, the recent development of social indicators. Forecasting K concerned with predicting the future, but indi cators may be thought of as telling us where we .ice now. especially tn relationship to where we have been and perhaps m the light of where we would like to be A social indicator may be defined as . . j statistic of direct normative interest which tacilitjtes concise, coinprelurnsive. and Kil uuco judgments about the condition of mator ispe-ts of the society. It is in all cases j direct mca-utc of welfare and is subject to the interpretation that, it it changes in the "right" Jirectiutt. while other things remain equal, things have gotten better, or people are "better oil"/ In other words, social indicators are not merely stativ tics or raw information, but the organization of that information and measurement witlun the framework of a trend. They are not absolute but lelative. They are also normative, because one of their functions is to tell us whether or not thing? have improved. Pro ponents of social indicators claim that the technique will help decision-makers in rational planning jnd societal management. It should also enable society to set priorities and to evaluate programs by measuring the degree of attainment of stated goals: in tlus light, it is better for an indicator to reflect social outputs rather than inputs. The development of social indi cators is strongly tied to improved and rationalized data gathering. In many ways, the development of social indi cators was predicated on the earlier work done *n regard to economic indicators. Over the past 30 yejrs or so. we have all grown familiar with economic vu tistics presented along a trend or spectrum where their position indicates a more or less desirable suie of affairs: unemployment statistics, cost-of-living in dex. Dow Jones stock market avenge, and the like. What was there in tius earlier experience in economics which led other social scientists to try to develop similar tools? Beginning with the Depression and World War II, the U.S. was much more willing tu embark on explicit economic planning. Despue the * U.S. Department of Health. Education, and '\elfare Toward social report, p. 91 (Government Printing oiflce. Washington 1969). The seven areas investigated m ihudum ment are health, mobility, environment, poverty, crime education, and alienation. 40 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring /V"o mqns 00510a laissez-laire capitalist myth, we have experienced price and wage controls, regional economic develop* menc programs, conscious alteration in fiscal policies, and similar, governmental involvement in the econ omy lor the purpose of certain economic objectives. Social scientists in other fields may have fell like second-class academics as post-industrial society arrived. Economists, as the "hardest'* of the social scientists, were moving close to the centers of power as consultants and advisers, and plunging into quanti fication and other apparently rigorous methodologies Uhhough some of tins, at least, appears to be a false scientism). The economists developed indicators, they devised elaborate accounting procedures (most nota bly tlie Gross National Product), and they began to exercise an important influence over governmental decision-making, with the development of benefitcost analysis and PPBS (Program Planning and Bud geting Systems).6 Social Indicators 1973, a recent government pub lication, prepared by the Office of Management and Budget with the assistance of the Department ol Commerce, examined eight major social areas in which improved social statistics and analysis were seen as necessary to reflect broad social concern: health, public safety, education, employment, in come, housing, leisure and recreation, and popula tion.7 The study claimed that for each indicator there was a widely held basic social objective or definition of a satisfactory condition: "good health and long life, freedom from crime and the fear of crime, suf ficient education to take part in society and make the most of one's abilities, the opportunity to work at a job that is satisfying and rewarding, income sufficient to cover the necessities of life with opportunities for improving one's income, housing that is comfortable wiihln a congenial environment, and time and oppor tunity for discretionary activities."8 The authors claimed that Tor each of these social areas one or more indicators, statistical measures of important aspects of the concerns, have been identified. Ideally, an indicator would show, in a timely fashion, (he status of (he population in relation to a particular concern. It could be disaggre gated to show which groups of the population were affected, and it could be linked statistical ly with other indicators to relate change in one condition to change in another. Thus, an tndi- ' A food Mirvey of (he history, problems, end frame of mind of (he proponents of indicators is in Reinhoid, R. Changes in social attitudes monitored in broad surveys of ihe quality of lire*. New York Times, p. 1. 20 August 101 J See. also. She), don. and Parke. K.: Social indicators. Science, pp. 693-699 (16 May 197$); and Wilcox el at : Social indi cator* and societal monitoring; An annotated bibliography (KUevier Scientific Publishing Co.. Amsterdam 1972). ' 1 eeruiive Office of Ihe President. Office of Menegement and Budget, Social indicators 1973 (Government Printing Office, Washington 1913). ' Ibid, page xlll. cator would reveal noi only iho status ot >1kpopulation in relation to a perceived social objective, but it would also furnish some idea of what forces were influencing that stains. \t the present time, not enough is known about thr cause and effect of social conditions to develop such ideal indicators. Rather, the indicators presented in this publication represent simply a first step toward the development of j more extensive indicator system.' The indicators chosen were based on two main cri teria frequently overlooked in past work: that they measure individual and family - rather than institu tional or governmental - well-being.and that the\ mea sure outputs of the social system rather than inputs As an example, the accompanying figure is a tiny fragment from this 258-page icpuit which is crammed full of graphs, charts, and tables. Of course, it lacks the sense of breatldess excitement conveyed by the original four-color illustration (red. light blue, inagenta and black). The accompanying text reads EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES. The unemployment rate is the proportion of persons in the civilian labor force who do not have jobs but are actively looking for work fhe civilian labor force is made up of all nomnstilutionalized civilians 16 years old and ulder who are employed or unemployed. ( The total labor force includes members of the Armed Forces as well.) The seventy of unemployment may be judged in terms of the duration of unemploy ment (the number of weeks) and by the num ber of spells ol unemployment in a year. The unemployment rate is based upon a monthly survey m which household members are asked a series of questions, one of which seeks to find out if a person who does nut luve a job looked for work at some time during ihe preceding 4 weeks. Those luuking for work are considered in the labor force but unemployed. Those not looking for work (even if they say they would like work) are not considered in the labor force and are not counted as unemployed. Thus, those who have become discouraged with the lack of opportunity to find work and have stopped looking are not included in unemploy ment statistics. Information on this group, the so-called "hidden unemployed'' is given n (another chart). The information is disaggregated along many dif ferent purameters, but what does it tell us? Is society getting "better"? Note on the graph that unemploy ment dropped in the late 60s. This was the period of the Viet Nam buildup (and members of the Armed Forces are included in the ranks of the employed): is increased militarism "good" for society because it provides jobs? This period also saw the beginning of j major inflationary trend (also related to Viet Nam, 1 Ibid. Journal of the International Society tor Technology Assessment. Spring l9?ty 41 MONS 085X09 total UNEMPLOYMENT 1947'40 -go 52 54 '56 58 60 '62 '64 l ipurel. Unemployment Rates- 194 7- 1073. bv Duration * '66 '68 '70 '72 `Soufee: Social Indicators 1973. page 113. M0N5 083110 42 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring / V "6 because Jutuixon tricci to finance the war without 4 tax increase which would have added to its political unpopularity!: in Hut ion tends to reduce unemploy ment because of increased expenditures, so is it good" lor the country'' People who have given up losing lor work because they are too discouraged (l.l million m April ll>75) are not even included m ihe unemployment rate, the social statistic which is used in Congress and elsewhere during policy debates. Is the social indicator movement another example ol technological determinism, another mechanism by which a burgeoning technocracy attempts to monitor jnd control social forces? This is an important thresh old issue Some of (he proponents of these new statis tics argue that they represent a radical change and a liberalizing humanism. Maybe these individuals, like Lady Macbeth, protest too much; the social indi cators movement may be u mere aping of prior developments in ihe field of economics and a part of die quest lor powci It may be jiiuihci "technological lix" lor social problems. It is still too early to tell. The more successful indicator efforts are in rela tively 'hard" areas and a number have been devel oped lor the environment."' One chapter of an early annual report of the U S. Council on Environmental Quality was devoted to the subject." Some of the difficulties with constructing and using social indicators are methodological in nature. Should (he indicator represent an input to. or an output of. the social system (for example, money expended per pupil in elementary school or average reading level attained)? Since in most areas we do not have data extending over long time frames, there are difficulties in ascertaining the base line fur the indicators. Defining the indicator variable itself is not easy either. What units should be used.' In this regard, economics has a much simpler task - money is most frequently the unit selected. Once we move away from dollars and cents to other variables, however, we introduce a great number of problems; lack of com parability betwen different quantities, so that we can not express trade-offs the way the economic market place does with the concept of selling price (how many units of sulphur dioxide pollution are equiv alent to a unit ol airborne particulates?), nor effective ly aggregate and weigh variables (if "pollution" is a problem, how do we measure it in terms of summing up contaminated air, dirty water, noise, pesticides, radiological exposure, diminution of biotic diversity, altered possibilities for scenic and esthetic experi ence?). Individual preferences cannot always be easily aggregated.11 What is the desirable scale for the vari- '* Se* Thoms*, w (U.) Indicator of environmental qua! uy (Plenum Press. New York 1*72). " U S, Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental quality: The third annual report (Government Printing Of fice. Washington 1972). " On the 'patadoK of Aggregation", so* Arrow, K.J.: A Jif- jble - local, regional, national, or global ' A lurther problem not to be overlooked concerns the jciu.il measuring ot the variable of interest. To ve an example, there are several techniques lor attempting 10 measure the amount of sulphur dioxide in the ambient air, and the interpretation of (lie numbers arrived at may be dependent on suv.lt things as the location ol the monitoring station Extrapolations and inferences add other problems: the "poverty line" is derived from estimates of expenditures for one requirement, food, lot a limited emergency period (therefore, not accounting foi long-term mimtioni, multiplied by a factor derived Irom other governmental statistics. Upon the result are based government policies intimately affecting the lives ot about 50 million Americans. There are more general, and even political, prob lems as well. What arcus of social lite should we con centrate on. and how should we define ihe goals' What is "goud" and what is better Are social indi cators really non-ideologtcal?1 ' If we look at the area of crime statistics, reported every year by the Federal Buicau of Investigation, we should notice that certain criminal activity is included because it happens to tall within Federal jurisdiction (auto theft), but other il legal behavior (such as price fixing or the use ol chemical warfare agents) are not part of the statistics. (These statistics are also suspect because of the ease with which the raw data may be manipulated by (he local police departments supplying it. and the changes in reporting procedures and emphasis which have ,<ccurred over time.) Unlike economics, for social indi cators there is no generally accepted social theorv purporting to explain the system's structure and per formance; in particular, we often do not understand cause and effect relationslups in a social system and the best we can work with are merely correlations. And information can alter or distort political percep tions and preferences. Indicators share a questionable assumption with forecasting techniques, that social problems are due to a lack ol information rather than a lack of will; also, they ace similarly premised on stability and continuity in underlying trends, yet they deal with change which may at times be more abrupt. Increased information techniques always lead to questions about the costs incurred in making de cisions. They can also exercise an anti-detnoctatic pressure if they result in a lessening ol citizen partici pation because public issues are tied to a "scientific'' jargon. Here is the fundamental paradox presented by indicators (as well as prediction methodologies); tech niques which appear to increase rationality and social understanding may operate to overwhelm citizen comprehension, thus increasing social alienation. ficulty tn ihe concept <>f \c>cnl welfare ) PoIm t,->n . pp. 3 2 8- 346 (August l*S0). 0 I-nr an early warning, see Kopkmd. the future plan ner*. New Republic, pp. i*-2 3 (25 February 1*67>. Journal of the International Society for Technology A.r.econent. Spring 10 ~n i.i HONS oasm Technology Assessment as a Political Process Wm. Thomas Keating Department of Political Science. Arizona State University. Tempt, Arizona 85281, U.S.A. ABSTRACT Technology assessment is usually considered to have the dual function of developing information as to the full consequences of technological innovation, and of shaping decisions as to the most appropriate utiliza tion of technology. Verv often, attention is concen trated on the first of these functions, to the exclusion of the second. If it is undertaken for the purpose of influencing the implementation of technology, tech nology assessment inescapably becomes a political activity. . It such, it is subject to a wide and \ arcing range of pressures and challenges. In this article, (tarticular attention is given to the pressures and chal lenges to which the assessment of nuclear power has been subjected. From this case study, conclusions are drawn as to the role of technology assessment within a democratic political system, and rhe critical impor tance of the structural and procedural aspects of such assessments if they are to accomplish their intended objectives. INTRODUCTION Technology assessment is, at the same time, both a very recent and a well-established activity. As a field of intellectual inquiry and investigation, technology assessment does not date back more than a few years. There is. of course, a much longer record of a few individuals and isolated groups seeking to identify and evaluate the full social, political, environmental, and other side-effects of particular technologies and technological systems. Much of this effort, however, has been more sporadic than routine. Quite clearly, the interest now evident in the routine and systematic assessment of the side-effects of technological innova tion has developed, for the most part, only in the last ten to fifteen years. And the emergence of tech nology assessment as a distinct intellectual discipline lus taken place only in the past five r ten > j,i- If looked upon as a form of poliik.il utiMiy u an aspect ut the political process, howov-ji 1 nology assessment indeed lias a kiwhi>i->rv i mem Ivas long had the unique responMi'ilrv protecting ihe interests of those who ma> ~e - r .i-' have been, injured by the jctions of others 1)1.e \ important purpose of law and adjudication ha-. 1':v to provide the means by which suji amine-. :ni\ e compensated for. Tims liability laws, when .mp.ied : matters involving technology . assign responsibility : ' any unintended but detrimental consequent m n r- liculat technological piojeav Individuals >mJen An : such projects, are accordingly given strong nu.mnvcs to identify and limit the most serious ot t.'kwc vn-.e- quences. Further, in some areas, such as pliac.-'.kc hi- cal regulation, governments have taken a imiJi m-ue active role in limiting the side-effects or >.>mo ie.li- nologies. And. on the positive side, n lias inn been o all unusual for a government to actively Mippmt those technological innovations which holJ mo promise of alleviating a particular social problem. of providing a needed public service. A situation such as this suggests that the pnc'kul experience gained in this latter lurm ot' jse:>4iiicm would be invaluable to those seeking more wmijih and effective means of achieving the mil obiectnes <u technology assessment. In spite of this, however. .1 would appear that only limited atremion U.i' ''ecu given to this experience. It is the purpov.* if..-. papeT to focus attention on one such j*ismeiM lhat of commercial nuclear puwer technology. whiJt has been carried out by the United States government over (he last thirty years. As will become evtdeio below, (his on-gomg assessment has several stemik.ini aspects. Of interest here will be the unprecedented nature of this assessment, the procedural and mb stantive guidelines followed in the assessment and the pressures and stresses to which these guidelines have been subjected. Journal of (he International Society for Technology Assessment. Simng / V 0ISTA htienunumjl \'o. /. < for Technology Assessment, Washington, D C. HONS 045114 THE ASSESSMENT OF NCCLEAR ENERGY As an example of technology assessment, U.S. govern ment policies lor the development and implementalion of nuclear power reactors are quite unique and important. One very critical aspect of technology' assessment is that explicit attention be given to iden tifying and evaluating the ptobable consequences of a icchnolugy well before it is implemented. While this may be a desirable goal, it certainly has not been tcali/ed wuh many technologies. An important exception to this, however, is nuclear energy. Its lull assessment was mandated in law well belore there was even any certainly (hat it had any commercially prac tical uses. The uniqueness of this situation has ptotnpied the comment that the Atomic Energy Act of 144b. which mandated this assessment: . is a radical piece of legislation - in some respecis as radical and unprecedented as the scientific discovery that occasioned it It is. m sober fact, jii act without precedent in the legislative history of this or any other country. Never before have men in any state, standing on the threshold of a new technological era. at tempted to provide in advance for rational control of the forces to be unleashed.1 The major impetus for controlling this technology, of course, was due to its obvious international and mili tary implications. Beyond this, however, was also a growing concern for the non-military risks and dan gers posed by unclear energy. Rather early in the development of this technology it was recognized that its use would create some very serious hazards for the public. Indeed, the government was quick to conclude that, as a means of generating substantial amounts of electricity, nuclear energy was . . by long odds the most dangerous manufacturing process in which man has ever engaged."2 And it was clearly recognized (hat some means had to be found for con trolling. if not eliminating, these dangers, The Atomic Energy Act established the legal and organizational features ot the assessment of nuclear energy. For one. it created the Atomic Energy Com mission (AEC) and gave this agency nearly complete power to control the development and implementa tion of this technology. Among its powers, the AEC was juthoii/ed: 1 To license the manufacture of any equipment or device utilizing nuclear energy.1 2 To take ownership of unv material found to be capable of releasing energy through nuJe.ii fission. * ' To restrict and control the use. possession, anj dissemination ol information, patents, and inven tions found to be esseniial to the utilization ol nuclear energy.' This Act lurther required the AEC to exercise its powets m such a way js to pioiect both national security and public health and salety. Lastly, tins taw authorized the Commission to adopt and enforce such rules and regulations it " . may deem necessary or aesirablc to protect health or to minimize danger from explosions and other hazards lo lile or property. From the perspective of subsequent interest in technology assessment, the Atomic Energy Act is in deed important. At several places in this law. die Congress explicitly stated us intentions tegardmg the full assessment of nuclear energy. At one point, the law states; The effect of the use of atomic energy lor civilian purposes upon the social, economic, and political structures of today cannot now be determined. . . . Accordingly, it is hereby de clared to be the policy of the United States that . . . the development and utilization ol atomic energy shall, so far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public weltare. increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace. This certainly was a clear statement of congressional intention that the development of nuclear energy not proceed in such a way as to jeopardize significant values held within the United States. The Atomic Energy Act. of course, went far beyond stating intentions and goals. Of significance m this regard is the requirement of this law that; Whenever in its opinion any industrial, com mercial. or other non-military use of fissionable material or atomic energy has sufficiently devel oped to be of practical value, the Commission shall prepare a report to (he President staling all the facts with respect to such use, the Commis sion's estimate of the social, political, eco nomic. and international effects of such use and the Commission's recommendations for necessary or desirable supplemental legislatioa.'* Certainly few pieces of legislation enacted in this country, or in other countries, have been quite as 1 Newman. J. H. jnd Miller. B. S.: The control of atomic cnerg) . p, J (McGraw-Hill Hook Co . Inc., New York I V4B). Mornu- I itergy Commission Hghtli semiannual report; p. J (Government t'riniini Office. Washington 1950). ` the Atomic fnergv Ad of 194A: (Public Law 585 71th (ongrrss. h0 Slat 755-75). Section 7(a). * Ibid.. Section 5. ' Ibid.. Sections lOtaiind It. * Ibid., Section 121a). ' Ibid.. Section 1(8). * Ibid., Section 7(b). Journal oj the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring /V"6 45 MOMS 0U5U3 explicit in mandating the full assessment of a tech nology. and doing so prior to the implementation of the technology. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS ASSESSMENT The assessment of nuclear energy is significant for reasons other than (hat it was mandated and begun before the technology achieved commercial imple mentation, Beyond this, it is significant in that those seeking to proceed with this implementation were assigned (he burden of proving (hat doing so would pose no undue risks or dangers to the public, that a strong role was assigned to a group of independent experts in evaluating the nature and extent of these risks; and that the public was assured the opportunity of participating in this assessment process. As will become evident below, this assessment has achieved quite varying results in each of these areas. In seeking a permit to construct a nuclear power reactor, the applicant was required to submit reports to die Atomic Energy Commission detailing the nature of the proposed reactor, the variety of safety factors designed into the reactor, and the risks and dangers that would be posed should the reactor be built and operated 3S designed. For its part, the AEC would issue such a permit only if it was satisfied that the reactor would not be . . inimical to the com mon defense and security, or to the health and safety of the public."4 In turn, the Commission translated this mandate into the requirement that the applicant, among other things, ",,. provide, to the Commis sion's satisfaction, reasonable assurance that the proposed reactor can be constructed and operated at the selected site without undue risk to public health and safety." 10 Certainly not much clarity was added in the AEC's translation of this legal requirement into its own administrative standards. In actual practice, however, these standards have been quite demanding of the applicant. For example, the various reports required of the applicant can consume between several man-months and ten or more man-years in preparation." In addition to being reviewed and accepted by the AEC's regulatory staff, the reactor application and supporting reports must be reviewed by the indepen dent Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). This Committee, which is composed of a variety of non-AEC scientists and engineers, ttaces its history to the early years of power reactor develop * Tlii? Ainmic l.ner gy Act of IVS4: (Public Law 83-703, 68 Slat. 919), Section 104(d). Atomic t nergv Commission Twenty.first temuonual re port; p. i 2 I (Government Printing Office, Washington 1957). Lowe, W. w. Creating power plants; The costs of control ling icchnniogy. Technology Review, p. 25 (January 1972). ment. While its initial role was mainly jtt jJmm-ia one. this was changed in l^57.; In ihat w.u die independence of the ACRS was strengthened, and u wjs required to report publicly on its evaluation ut each reactor license application. The etfect ut ihe>e changes was to assure that, as far as is possible, the ACRS reports would be complete and impartial evalu ations of proposed reactors. Tile final aspect of this assessment to be examined here is (hat of public participation. The Atomic Ener gy Act as amended in N54. was quite explicit m making this requirement "when . . . granting, ^spend ing. revoking, or amending . . . any licenw ouvnviinwtion permit . . .. the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest mjv be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit ,m\ such peisun as a party to such proceeding."11 \nJ even later changes in this law further opened this opportunity for public participation. On all applica tions to construct a power reactor, a public hearme was made mandatory.M The thinking behind tins change is rather important - it was that "lull. nee. and frank discussion in public of the hazards imo|\<M in any particular reactor would seem to be the hum certain way of assuring that the reactor would indeej be safe and that the public would be apprised ot this fact." THE POLITICS OF ASSESSMENT The evolution of this assessment of nuclear energy over the last several years has been quite significant and often dramatic. What once seemed to be a rather well structured means of assessing and controlling the side-effects of this technology turned out to be other than it-seemed. In the latter years of its existence js an independent agency, the Atomic Energy Commis sion lost much of its credibility as well os its control over this assessment process. And. instead of pro viding a means by which (hose interested in and di rected by a particular proposed reactor could participate in determining whether and how to pro ceed with this proposal, all semblance of cooperation had been lost. In fact, this carefully constructed as sessment process came to resemble a battle-ground on which the contending parties maneuvered to achieve their objectives by whatever means could be devised. As will become evident below, this disintegration was largely due to flaws which soon became apparent in the participatory features of this assessment. To understand (his, it is necessary to appreciate the re- 11 Atoinic Energy Commission, op cit . p. 120. 11 The Atomic Energy Act af 1954, Section 189(a) '* Public Law 87-615 (76 Stat. 409HI96Z). " Rxtracts from committee reports on 1957 amendment* t<< Atomic Energy Act Joint Committee on Atomic t- nergy. U S Congress. ARC licensing procedure, p. 1687 (Government Printing Office, Washington 197 i). 4(1 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring }V?f) HONS 085114 suits - or lack of results - achieved in the public hearings held on reactor proposals. Here the conclu sions of the Administrative Conference of the United States are quite significant. After a lengthy review ol this assessment process, it concluded that the public hearings had little if any impact on the licensing deci sion. Indeed, the Conference's conclusion was that 'There has never been an instance m which reactor design has been altered by the public hearings. '16 Ami the Cuiileietice oiTeied the even stronger con elusion that "The hearing in contested cases is largely devoted to an affirmation of a result already achieved as i result of pnor negotiation and settlement." n Since the public was seldom involved to any sub stantial degree in these negotiations, this meant that the critical decisions had already been made by the time it was allowed to participate in this assessment. This outcome of the hearing process does not seem to be significantly at variance with the intentions of the Atomic Energy Commission. Indeed, the AEC often stated that certainly one of the functions, if not the most significant function, of license hearings was that of public relations. Rather than participating in shaping (he substantive decisions, the public was to be shown the reasonableness of decisions that had already been made. Indicative of this are the con clusions of a committee appointed by the AEC to review its assessment process. The committee con cluded that the hearings were proving to be of value for the following reasons: 1 The public gains a firsthand impression of the applicant's character and competence and his whole approach to the safely and siting of nucle ar facilities. 2 The public is shown that the AEC has been dili gent in protecting the public's interest. Especial ly, the hearing can make it unmistakably clear that the staff and the ACRS have only the public's interest in mind as they conduct these reviews, inquiries and inspections. 3 The public receives a convincing demonstration that the regulatory process includes a thorough and competent review of the applicant's pro posal.18 In light of subsequent events, this may well have been mote wishful thinking than well-formed conclusions. These conclusions, however, do seem to indicate more of a concern with creating the image of assured safety, than the substantive of participation in deter mining the degree of this safety. " Administrative Conference of the Untied Stales; Licensing nf nuclear power plants by the AFC. in Joint Committee on Atomic F.nergy, op. at.. pp. SSO-Sl. r Ibid . p. ssa. 11 Seaborg, 0. T.: Statement. Joint Committee on Atomic knergy: Licensing and regulation of nuclear reactors, p. id (Government Printing Office. Washington 1967). There were other indications that the Commission intended the public hearings to have a limited pur' pose. This is most clear in the limitations it placed on the issues to be considered in these hearings. Among other reasons, nuclear energy has become a matter of controversy because of the radiation created in the process of nuclear fission; the adverse impact that reactor operations can have on nearby bodies of water; and the need for strong protection of the reac' tor facility against the threat of sabotage ami other destructive forces. These matters, again, do not ex haust the dangers which have been associated with nuclear energy. They do. however, indicate some of the most significant of these dangers. For those who became concerned with these dan gers, the reactor assessment ptocess did not prove to be a useful means of voicing and giving effect to these concerns. This is because the AEC systematically dis allowed these issues from being considered and re solved in this process. The Commission, in fact, became more than a little insistent on its position that its authority extended only to health and safety issues involving nuclear energy, and that its " regu latory interest is further restricted to public health and safely questions relating to special (that is. radia tion-related) characteristics of nuclear materials and atomic energy." 19 And further, with iegaid to these radiation issues, the Commission refused to allow any consideration of. or challenge to. its radiation emis sion standards In the assessment process. Thus it became routine that the AEC denied participation in this process to anyone seeking to raise one or another of these issues.11 THE DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTER-ASSESSMENTS Being excluded from significant participation in tlus assessment process did not stop those most concerned with the implementation of nuclear energy from seek ing to have an effect upon tlus implementation. Rather, a range of counter-strategies was developed and pursued by these individuals. Some continued to participate in this process, but not for the purpose of accepting some pre-ordained conclusion. This partici pation, instead, was pursued for the purpose of bring ing direct and indirect pressure upon the license applicant and the Commission. Thus, one advocate of this strategy suggests: If the licensed project will damage the environ ment. it must be opposed irrespective of the '* Atomic l-.ncrgy Commission Jurisdiction uf ihe AtC and other federal and state agencies with respect 10 nuclear power facililies. Washington, nd.. p. 2. J0 L>K\ ir. 11 10 Code of Federal Regulations 2. Appendix A. js of I Jin uarv 1970. Journul of the International Society fur 7V< hinjlogy I sse^sment. S/'rin,q I o o 47 MONS 085115 prospects of defeat or victory. The administra tive arena must be used as an educational forum to ^lert the public to the project's adverse effect on environmental quality. The environ mental stakes must he vividly dramatized as a prelude to organizing political action to block the protect or correct its deficiencies. Viewed in this perspective, a losing environmental cause is worth lighting for because it adds to the eco logical enlightenment of the public.22 Very often those pursuing this strategy did not have to strive for such moral or principled victories. One reason for this involves the tremendous investment utilities have in the design and constiucticm of nu clear reactors, it has not been unusual for tills to go beyond S500 million tor one reactor. With an invest ment this large, utilities are necessarily anxious to have their project licensed so as to bring closer the day they will begin to realize a return on their money. And those seeking to more strictly regulate the utilization of nuclear energy have been able to take advantage of this anxiousness. As one disgusted proponent of nuclear energy has observed: Requests for nearly unlimited discovery thousands of documents, hundreds of Interroga tories. extensive pretnal dispositions - objec tions to evidence, prolonged cross examination, demands for adjournment, exceptions to rulings and intermediate appeals-techniques like this can be used to hold up a project, . . . and to force utilities to make nearly any concession just to get the plant authorized. These tactics often have been used so successfully that utilities have agreed to upgrade reactor radiation treatment systems, waste water treatment systems, and cooling systems.24 And these have been conces sions that the AEC had refused to make or require. Even these relatively significant achievements failed to satisfy some of those concerned with the many side-effects of nuclear energy. Thus some have extended their strategies to include activity outside of the formally established assessment process. In several instances, environmental and other groups have sought to have individual states assume assessment and regulatory authority over nuclear energy.The Like. I.: Multi-media confrontation - The environ mentalists' strategy for a 'ninvin' agency proceeding. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, AF.C licencing procedure, pp. 1404 - S. ' Atomic Industrial Forum. Inc.: A new approach to reac lor licensing. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, op cir . 0 1448. ** Gendlin. K: The Palisades protest: A pattern of citizen intervention; Science and Public Affairs 27 53-56 (Nov. 1971). FOE won't try to block Turkey point license, but Siegel might: Nucleonics Week, 12 4 (2 Dec. 1971). Com monwealth Edison signs with mtervenors, avoids Dresden-3 fight; Nucleonics Week 12: 2 (id Feb. 1971). n For example, see Gillette. R.' Reactor emissions. AEC guidelines move toward critics position; Science l 72. 1215 (Id June I97|). Illinois blocks Dresden-3, challenged AKC hope, of course, is that (he states will be mme severe with nuclear energy rhan the AEC has been (it her groups have sought to use (he judicial process for tins purpose. In one suit, the plaintiffs alleged Hut tlwv were denied their due process right to an tmparti.il hearing on rhe licensing of a reactor, because uf ilie AEC's dual responsibility for promoting and regulat ing this technology.16 The purpose of this suit ot course, was to limit, if not abolish, the Commission's tight grip on the full assessment of this technology In an even more wide-ranging series of suits, the licens ing of each and every existing and proposed reactor was challenged as illegal.27 The purpose here w.is to have the courts enjoin ihe further issuance of am, licenses until ihe AEC could demonstrate convincing ly that each reactor would pose no undue nsk to public health and safety. IS TIfIS ANY WAY TO ASSESS TECHNOLOGY'' From the above discussion, it is quite apparent that the assessment of nuclear energy has encountered serious and persistent problems. The underlying cause of these problems is clear - the assessment process proved incapable of resolving the many conflicting positions and opinions which developed regarding die rang? and acceptability of benefits, costs and risks associated with nuclear energy. Those who held serious doubts about the acceptability of these costs and risks were often far from satisfied with the out come of the formal assessment process. And rather than accepting the Atomic Energy Commission s assurances as to the reasonableness of these costs and risks, these people sought alternative means of in fluencing the implementation of this technology Thus thjs assessment became entangled in very serious conflict, with the parties to this conflict pursuing a variety of strategies to achieve their objectives. Perhaps the most significant lesson to be drawn from the experience gained in this assessment is Hut decisions made in structuring an assessment are ex tremely critical, and must be made with careful de liberation. And probably the most critical of these decisions is that relating to the purposes lor which the assessment is to be conducted. In the broadest sense, assessments may be conducted for either or both of two purposes. One such purpose would be informational in nature. Thus it may be intended to radiation preemption: Nucleonics Week 12 J Ml Mir 197|). An escape clause on control of radioactive efilueni'. Nucleonics Week tl 5-6 (30 July 1970). The Vetmuni Board of Health has proposed standard* suffer than AFC ': Nucleonics Week II. 2 (8 Oct. 19701. Quad cities nils new regulatory holdup; Nucleonics Week J2. 4 (13 Sept \97i> 14 Conservationists challenge atomic energy act constitu tionality; Nucleonics Week 12 I (14 Oct. |97|). '' The Arizona Republic. I S July 19' J, p. 4. park K. 48 Journal of the Internationa! Society for Technology . {ssessment. Spring l 9 > HONS 083116 develop information (hat is as complete and as im partial 'as possible concerning the consequences of implementing a particular technology, and to predict the future course and direction of technological in novation. This is reflected in the suggestion of Vary Coates: Technology assessment implies identification of the social impacts or secondary consequences both detrimental and beneficial - of a new technology or ait existing technology; it also includes prediction of technological develop ments early enough to allow weighing of the relative social desirability of alternative lines of development.J8 Beyond tills, technology assessment may have the more ambitious purpose of having a significant impact upon near-term decisions relating to the implementation of particular technologies. Here it would be intended that technological decisions be made only within a context which allows due con sideration of the varying consequences of the alterna tive choices which are available. This, accordingly, is a more action-oriented type of assessment. Reflecting (he concern for tills is (he sentence immediately fol lowing the above quotation from Coates; Technology assessment looks to both the prevention of secondary consequences harmful to the physical environment or to the quality of life, and the alleviation of existing environ mental and social problems through exploita tion of technological application.*9 There is obviously more of a concern here with the effect of assessment than is apparent with the first purpose cited. To state these as two separate purposes of assess ment is not intended to suggest that they are in any way incompatible. Under the appropriate circum stances, it would be possible to accomplish both of these purposes in the same assessment. To do so, howevet. would certainly require very deliberate deci sions. followed by careful planning of the assessment structure and process itself. To do otherwise, would be to invite confusion, with neither purpose likely to be accomplished. And this confusion and ineffective ness would seem at times to have characterized the assessment of nuclear energy. If an assessment is intended to develop relevant information as to the full consequences of existing or future technologies, this will most nearly resemble, in the best sense of the phrase, an academic exercise. To accomplish this, one would want to get the most qualified experts available, and to assure them what- ' Coaui, V. T.: Example* of technology uiessments for the f'eder*! Government, Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. Congress. Technology Assessment; p. 283 (Government Printing Office. Washington 1970). ** I.oe. cit. ever means may be necessary to develop the desired inlormation. Further, such an assessment would prob ably be most successful if it were isolated. In other words, one would probably not want these experts subjected to the distractions and interference of out side pressure and demands. And finally, such an as sessment could be quite successful even with a narrow focus. In other words, the range of desired informa tion could effectively be limited to a single tech nology, or even a few aspects of a single technology. The scope of the assessment thus could be limited or expanded depending upon the issues of interest. If rite purpose of an assessment is to shape and influence technological decisions, a process such as that just described would clearly be inadequate. An assessment with (his larger purpose would inure approximate a political than an academic exercise. The reason.for this is that the decisions at issue would relate to the range and distribution of technological benefits and costs. A range of choices would almost certainly be available in all but the most exceptional circumstances. And, depending upon the choice which is made, some would be better off and some worse off titan if another choice were made. Certainly this would indicate that the choice would inevitably be a political one. Assessments which are thus political in nature, if they are to be successful, must be more open and comprehensive than assessments which are more informational in nature. The reasons lor this can per haps best be understood by examining the flaws in the assessment of nuclear energy. This, without ques tion, was intended to be, in the above terms, a politi cal assessment. Indeed it was given the legal mandate of assuring that the risks posed by utilizing nuclear energy were not .. inimical to the common defense and security, or to the health and safety of the pub lic."30 The assessment thus had two tasks - to iden tify the risks posed by a particular power reactor, and to determine whether any of these were inimical to the above values. Once an assessment sets out to accomplish this latter task, it would seem inevitable that no one individual or group of individuals can claim to be expert in making such decisions. Rather, once the relevant information had been developed, a democratic political system would seem to insist that all mature citizens have some minimal competence to participate in shaping and influencing these decisions. In the case of nuclear energy, the Atomic Bnergy Commission obviously was not in complete sympathy with this conclusion. If anything, the severe restric tions it imposed on those aspects of the assessment which would have made participation meaningful, indicate its reluctance to share decision-making in this area. This certainly is reflected in its efforts to keep the assessment of nuclear energy as narrow and con- The Alomlc Energy Acl of 19S*. Section 104(d) Journal oj the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring 19 76 HONS 06511? fined as possible. Thus it soughl to restrict this assess ment to one energy source - that of fissionable fuels; to one technology tor converting this into usable energy - that of nuclear power reactors: and to one type of pollutant resulting from this conversion pro cess - that of radiation. This may be a meaningful framework within which to conduct an assessment for the purpose of developing desired information. It certainly is not. however, a meaningful framework for an assessment the purpose of which is to make deci sions regarding the development and implementation of technology to aclueve a specific social goal. In othei woids. a decision-making process becomes inceasingly inadequate as it excludes possible alterna tives and their consequences from consideration. And certainly the assessment of nuclear energy did not allow the consideration of more than one alternative - namely, that of not constructing the proposed reactor. Recent changes in tlus assessment have had the effect of more nearly assuring consideration of the range of available alternatives. One of the most signi ficant of these changes was the enactment, m 1970. of the National Environmental Policy Act. The effect of this law has been to require federal agencies to assess fully the environmental consequences of activi ties they sponsor or regulate. More specifically, the agency must prepare a public statement in which it assesses the following aspects of these activities: 1 The environmental Impact of the proposed action. 2 Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented. 3 Alternatives to the proposed action. 4 The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity. 5 Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented." Under this law, as interpreted and enforced, it be came impossible for the AEC to maintain its narrow, singularly-focused assessment of nuclear energy. And this broader, comparative assessment more nearly assures that full consideration will be given to the tange of alternatives by which the desired objective may be realized. The result of (his is that the ultimate choices which must be made, are more likely to be made in a more meaningful and realistic context. A further, and more recent, change in this assess ment has been the abolition of the Atomic Energy Commission, with the creation of the Energy Re search and Development Administration, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The effect of this was to abolish what had been ihe dual lesponsibilme-, ol the AEC both to promote |U reeuljte the implementation of nuclear energy. It is now ilk- responsibility of the Energy Administration to assess the full range of alternative energy technologies, and to promote the development of those which show the greatest promise of satisfying (his country's long-term energy needs. And it has become the responsibility oi the Nuclear Regulatory Commission o regulate ihe implementation of nuclear energy in such j way that it complies with the requirements of the Atomic tn- ergv Act and the National Environmental Police \^t With these changes, it now becomes possible to aclueve a truly comparative, problem-oriented assess ment ol nuclear energy. Of further benefit is the uu that these changes are beginning to have the eifeet -t extending assessment to the other energy tech nologies. In a very meaningful way. these changes indicate the healthy integration of technology assess meiu into the political decision-making process. So longer is assessment merely intended to >erve some abstract purpose. Rather, at least in the areas Jis- cussed here, this assessment is structured so as to h.ne a substantial impact on dccision-inakmg. The final thing to be commented upon here is that, as technology assessment is extended to other areas of activity, the politics of public choice must be taken into consideration in structuring future assess ments. In the assessment of nuclear energy, the most persistent conflict involved its scope or boundaiies - that is. the scope of issues and choices which weie to be considered as part of the assessment process. The AEC sought to restrict this scope, while some mem bers of the public sought to expand the scope to include a wide range of issues and choices. As was suggested several years ago by political scientist E E Schattschneider. the most critical political decisions are those determining the boundaries within which conflict occurs.The reason for this is that different boundaries will produce different outcomes or deci sions. As long as nuclear energy was assessed without regard to the social benefits and costs of alternative energy technologies, the outcome was quite likely to be favorable to its implementation. Now. however, since it must be assessed in comparison with these alternatives, the outcome is no longer pre-ordained in its favor. Again, this lesson must not be lost on oilier assessments. If the assessment process is structured so as to allow meaningful compansons and choices, con flicting opinions and positions, while not done away with, will be channeled in a way that more nearly encourages their satisfactory resolution. Otherwise, this conflict will not be resolved, but rather will grow and spread to the point where resolution will indeed become difficult if not impossible. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law 91 - 190. 93 Slat. 0S2 -56, Section 102. ,J Schattschneider. E. E.. The semi-sovereign people iHnii. Rinehart and Winston. New York i960). 50 Journal of (lit- International Society for Technology Assessment, .'spring IV~<> MONS 085118 Acquiring Baseline Data on Potential Uses of New Communication Technologies Cary Hershey and Elizabeth Sachter Department of City A Regional Wanning, 2<>~ UV\7 Sthtcv Hull. Cornell University, Ithaca. .Wu- )ork NSyi llie auihors would like to thank Barry lii'enburg. Barbara R.bm> and i.nc Shot! lor their assistance in licld data collection, and Ra> niond Bowers ior Ins atticism oi' earlier dims oV ibis paper. Ot cottrsc. the jutliors arc sole)' responsible for any errors and misinterpretations wltu.lt remain. Sponsored bi the National Science foundation. Giant No. LHP74 - 20555. and Kiel near foundation. ABSTRACT Widespread deployment of portable telephones, made possible by a new cellular telecommunication system, could create major social change - altering social re lationships, organizational processes, and lifestyles. To anticipate the possible nature and scope of such changes, a technology assessment of potential social impacts of new mobile communication technologies is being undertaken at Cornell University. To collect baseline data, a methodological approach combining Jieldwork and survey research is employed. Using in place mobile communication systems - paging $>$tents and dispatch services - as proxies for the new cellular system, preliminary findings drawn from 24 public and commercial organisations arc presented. Employing fieldwork and survey research in organi zations where antecedent technologies are used is suggested as an efficient way, in many instances, to develop baseline data on newly emerging technolo gies. INTRODUCTION The emergence of a Post-Industrial Society based in large part on the generation of new knowledge, the development of new technologies, and the diffusion of innovations has profound consequences for social life in the United States.1 Inherent in the concept of 1 See Bell. 0. The coming of the post industrial society (Basic Book*. New York 1973). the Post-Industrial Society are several important trends; increased private disposable income and pub lic transfers, development of new and more tempo rary organizational forms and work patterns, greater emphasis on productivity as well as greater leisure time, increased importance of professional and tech nical workers in the economy, development of new and alternative lifestyles, increased politicization of public planning and corporate business decisions, and the continuing development of national communi cation networks. The maturation of these trends will have a major influence on the types of new techno logies that are developed and the manner in which they are absorbed into the economic and social sys tem.2 Technologies do not develop in isolation.J The forms that new technologies take, as well as their impacts on society, ace integrally related to the dynamics of social and organizational structures. The ' Gross. B.: friendly fascism: A model for Amend Social Policy / id 54 (1070); IJrczmski. Z.. Between two ,iges iViktn*. New York W73>; Kahn. H. anil Weiner. \ . The nexi thirty-three years: A framework for speculation, in Bell. D. (ed.) Toward (he year 2000. pp. 7 3- I 01 (Beacon Press Boston). Hinshaw, M L.: Wiring (he metropolis Two *cenartos, in Gerner, G., ctitl. (eds.) Communications technology and social policy, pp. 307-318 (Wiley, New York). Best. ) (ed.): The future of work (Preniice-Hall. Knglewood Glttfs 1473); Benms. W.. and Slater. P : The temporary smiets (Harper and Row, New York I4t.8). 1 McDermott, J.; Technology. Opiate of the inielleciuals, in Tetch. A H. (ed.) Technology and man's future, pp. IS | - (`*7 (St. Martins. New York (973). Journal ofrite International Society for Technology A \scssmcnt. Spring ! V ~'> 0 ISTA International .SVntt'/v for Technology Assessment, Washington, 0 C. M0NS 085119 familiar concept of `cultural lag" (behind technol ogy) has a counterpart in ''technological lag", or the development of technologies that respond to and facilitate the expression of new social forms and cul tural styles.4 This is well illustrated by the increased mobility of American society, which is related to the above-noted trends, and the appearance of new mo bile communication technologies. The term "mobile communications" labels a type of communication activity that, by its very nature, is linked to the state of mobility. In the most general sense, mobile communication technologies are movable apparatus, including hand-carried and vehicular-mounted equipment, that permit com munication among persons in mobile units such as cars, trucks, trains, and recreational vehicles; among pedestrians: and between persons who are moving and persons at fixed locations. Present users of this tech nology can be further divided into categories such as commercial (e.g., taxi companies, delivery services), public (e.g.. police and tire departments, ambulance services), and private (e.g., boat owners, and citizensband and walkie-talkie enthusiasts). Most vehicles, and certainly most people, are not piesenily equipped with mobile communication devices. Nevertheless, the potential for utilization of these devices exists in every instance of mobility, and if any significant proportion of this potential were to be realized (i.e., if mobile communications became a "mass event") the character of society could be sig nificantly altered. This paper addresses the problem of anticipating, in a systematic and disciplined manner, patterns of use of technologies currently in the development stage. The methodological approach undertaken here - fieldwork and survey research -- appears promising to apply to areas other than communication technol ogies, although not to all technological analysis. An important constraint in such efforts is obtaining the necessary information at a reasonable cost, in terms of both financial and human resources. This precludes undertaking the large-scale social experiments neces sary for full confidence in the results. This is a prob lem of increasing importance as more and more effort is devoted to technology assessment, in which at tempts are made to evaluate, for policy-making pur poses, some of the higher order costs and benefits of deploying new technologies. There is considerable advantage in conducting a technology assessment of an innovation in its early stage of diffusion because there is more potential to guide its future course in directions beneficial to users and "the public interest". A technology assessment appears to possess special utility when the technological mnovo- * Oghuru.W V.-. On culture and social change (University of Oticain 1`rcss. Chic ago 1964). tion under consideration has begun to take j concrete form hut has not yet been deployed or readied a critical concentration. Since it may take several years to go irom pilot demonstra tion to wide-spread deployment there is ample time for deliberate policy decisions to attca the nature, regulation and deployment oi the technology.*5 The Cornell group's technology assessment. ,,f uliidi the work reported here is a part, is concerned speci fically with mobile communication technologies" \\ is a `'technology initiated" assessment m that the starting point is the development of a particular tech nology. and the research objective is to study a wide range ol possible socio-economic, political. anJ tech nological impacts.1 The principal technology imdor investigation is the "cellular system" which makes possible the introduction of portable telephones \n area is divided into small "cells", each covered b> low power transmitter receivers, which can be connected to a central station by means of a laud line or luin frequency directed electromagnetic link. \s the mobile unit - either hand-held, vehicular mounted, or both - moves from cell to cell, a monitoring sys tem relays this information back to a central com puter and switching structure so that communication can be maintained. While (he cellular system is the central focus oi the study, examination of the research-developmentdiffusion networks of existing mobile communication technologies is of crucial concern since they provide both competition and support for the cellular system. Moreover, they serve as proxies for it. By obtaining baseline data on the capabilities of existing techno logies. on producers' marketing strategies for them and actual diffusion patterns, and on some of their impacts, we are able to obtain clues as to some pu- ' Dickson. K.. and Bowers, K.: the video telephone \ ih-w era in telecommunications t\ preliminary re.hnoiogv .is,,.,, merit), p. SiPraeger Publishers. Sew York i9'.ft. * The Program on Science, Technology, and Society, directed by Hjymond Bowers, is underuktng a ihree-year project which began in 1974 on `A Technology Assessment in the Area of Mobile Communications" sponsored by the Vjnonat Science foundation and the Cogar foundation. The "Ne,. tives of the research are to analyte: (I) the likely course >f development of the technology, .is well is supporting mj competing technologies. (1)potential uses. economic political and legal issues associated with regulation, particu larly competition in ilte industry; (4) issues of .peclrum allocation; (S) impact on medical praciice. safety >erwcev and crime prevention; t6) potential for new work paitemc. (7) potential legal problems including privacy, liability. indi vidual freedom; (8) energy and transportation issues, and (4) some of the intenvationat Issues, emphasizing the special case of electronics competition with Japan. This approach contrasts with "problem initialed" i,,,-,, ments where the starting point is some social problem ..r need, such as the improvement of health services or -Ju cation. With this approach, the research explores a wide vs riety of technological means for alleviating ihe problem. iHet man, fr.-. Society and the assessment of technologv . p (Office of Fconomic Cooperation and Development I'i'ii i 5 2 Journal of the International S</eieiy for Technology Assessment. Spring 1V "6 HONS 005120 tential impacts of the cellular system. In Hetman's terms; the process of generating relevant data is of the utmost importance and constitutes undoubted ly the most responsible part of the assessment. In a sense, technology assessment may be viewed as a manysided, multidisciplinary and continuous process of inference. Schemes of future events, courses of possible evolution jnd situations or stales of society must be derived irom some existing data base, either statistical or conceptual, be it in the form of givens of past experience or in (hat of logical constructs of desirable images of the future.9 Accordingly, the objective of this component inves tigation is to generate a data base on the uses and impacts of several currently in-place mobile commu nication technologies - radio dispatch services, paging systems, conventional mobile car telephones, and citizens-band units - based on the collection of primary data from commercial, public service, and private organizations. This data should shed some light on the following questions: Why do organi zations and private citizens presently use mobile communication devices? What are the advantages and disadvantages of these mobile technologies? What factors wuuid increase or decrease the attractiveness of the new cellular system for present users of com petitive mobile technologies, as well as for persons not using these technologies? What is the magnitude of the potential demand for advanced mobile com munications? What are some of the more important likely organizational impacts of such use, e.g., on work activity patterns, on speed and effectiveness of service to clients and customers, and on organiza tional structure? This paper will be divided into two parts. The first will consist of a brief introduction to some of the telecommunication literature, with a special focus on the methodologies used by researchers to collect empirical information about uses and impacts of communication technologies. While much important work has been published, it is clear that there are major gaps in tills area. In addition, there are lew generally accepted theories and techniques which can guide an analysis of either existing or newly emerging technologies. Thus, the second part of the paper will briefly describe the approach being employed to col lect baseline data and undertake anticipatory analysis as part of a comprehensive technology assessment of mobile communications. It is not our intention to present final results, as the research is still in progress and many of the conclusions must be regarded as tentative. Consequently, we are presenting only suf ficient material on dispatch services and paging sys- ` Ibid. ,p. 200. terns to illustrate the conceptual framework and re search design being employed. AN OVERVIEW OF TELECOMMUNICATION RESEARCH Telecommunication studies range from those based on existing and/or potential impacts resulting from the deployment of a technology, to those examining the contribution of a technology to the solution of a particular social problem. Included in the latter cate gory are studies which seek short- and long-range solutions to current technological problems, such as congestion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Technology-Initiated Studies The telephone, although a more stationary form of communication technology, has capabilities parallel to those of a two-way mobile radio. Long since a "mass event", tire telephone would seem the ideal technology to examine in order to determine method ological guidelines for assessing less widely deplosed communication technologies. However, it has re ceived scanty attention in the social science literature. In an attempt to fill this research gap. Aronson, m an article entitled "The sociology of the telephone", examines those areas of American life most obviously and pervasively affected by the telephone, the eco nomy, mass communications, and community and social relationships.9 While perhaps setting the stage for more in-depth studies on the impacts of the tele phone, Aronson's qualitative work does not lead to a methodological prescription for teclinology assess ment. The video telephone, a communication device adding visual capabilities to the telephone, is highly developed technically but not widely diffused. How ever. "the technology is sufficiently mature that the technological limitations constraining usage, and hence impact, are discernible with a good degree of accuracy."10 In their technology assessment. Dickson and Bowers, rather than investigating current users, uses, and Impacts of the video telephone, consider a "super" video telephone of the future, the continuing development of related and competing technologies, and a social environment conducive to its widespread usage as a foundation for making informed specula tions about both its technological capabilities and its potential social impacts. Cable television has also received attention in the telecommunication literature. This is a communi- ' -\ronson, S.11.. The -sociology of the telephone (n. J Compara. Sociol. XII: lS3 - 167 (I97I). 19 Dickson and Bower*, op. cm . p. 6. Journal of the International Socieiy for Technology Assessment. Spring I9~h 53 MONS 085121 cation system whose use. except in a few cases, is restricted to amplifying and distributing television signal* where there is poor broadcast reception, there by improving the signal quality. Thus, like the video telephone, cable television is a highly developed technology that is not presently employed to the full extent of its capabilities. Robert Yin's study, "Cable Television: Applica tions for Municipal Services", is designed to help officials decide how 10 use the municipal channel mandated in 1972 by the FCC for 100 new urban cable systems, and to stimulate awareness of potential future uses and issues. The report deals not only with (Ire potential uses and impacts of a one-way channel, but also with the applications made possible by a two-way cable. His sources of baseline data include existing studies, plans for urban cable systems, and the operating experiences of WNYC-TV, the only municipal station currently operating in the United States. The case study of WNYC-TV includes the station's history, resources, programs, and audience penetration. Based on its strengths and shortcomings, Ytn is able to make certain projections: ways in which future pitfalls can be avoided, for example, or recommendations for desirable practices. The format of this report, like that used by Dick son and Bowers, may prove useful to investigators of other communication technologies. Further, many cable television and video telephone applications may be more effectively achieved through the use of other technologies: e.g,, two-way mobile radio may be adequate when only voice communication is re quired." In other words, a discussion of the poten tial uses of a communication system must consider not only the feasibility of such uses, but also the relative advantages of a given medium over others. Finally, one study fa survey of several major com panies by the managing editor of Communications, a trade journal) investigates the impacts of two-way radios on company operations, such as service de livery, and the problems accompanying fheir use. such as spectrum congestion. Although information was obtained relative to further desired technical capabilities, this study was not designed as a technol ogy assessment nor did it seek to determine whether alternative systems, such as the cellular system, would be viable.11 Problem-Initiated Studies Problem-initiated studies suggest ways in which a par ticular technology or technologies may contribute to relieving social problems. Yin and Lewis, again study mg cable television, use tlus approach to imestigaie its potential for delivering public services. The agenda of experiment suggested in iheir report is derived from case studies of the special problems ol %er\ke delivery in two locales, one an urban center and the other a suburban community on the outskirts ot i large city. The report combines two case studies that consider rfic problems ot public service delivery as seen jnd experienced by local government officials, ser vice providers, and users of those services. In this report we use the concreteness ot (he case study approach to draw out my! \Wusiu\e some of the difficulties and the opportunities ot applying new technologies to public ser vices. Thus, the researchers determine a specific service need and suggest a technological solution which they recognize to be only one of several possible alterna tives. They further realize that "even if the uuvhmlion is successful, it is the burden of reseatch to deter mine why success has been aeliieved before an appli cation can be transferred to another locale M Ihese are important considerations in looking at the poten tial deployment of the cellular system. Using much the same approach as Yin am) lewis, members of Peter Goldmark's New Rural Society Pro. ject tackle the problem of urban congestion and seek in part, a telecommunication solution lo overcome some of the barriers now preventing companies t-mo moving into less crowded areas. Here again, research based on existing communication technologies mi fact, several communication technologies in vary ing combinations) attempts to solve a particular problem And once again, the technologies under study arc fairly sophisticated from a technical standpoint, but not commonly used for those purposes envisaged bv the author. As part of an overall strategy to understand the process of organizational communications. Gold mark's team is attempting, through carefully con trolled laboratory experiments, "to determine those electronic communications systems wludi would sub stitute most satisfactorily for face-to-lace meetings between two individuals."15 Little research has been conducted in llus area. As Reid notes, "live human aspects of person-person telecommunications lure been curiously ignored. ... It is necessary to nuke the negative point that in all [the] huge body ot experimental social psychology research, the question " \ in, R.K. Cable television: ^pplicanons for municipal vc-rvitv*. p. .1.1 iH-l 140-NSk Hand. .May J97J). 11 1 kMriim, I K. Husiness user* applmul radio's benefits cue service and frequency problems. Communications 9: 21> - J 2 <19741. " Lucas. W.A . and Yin. R . K ; Serving local need* witn leie communications. p. m (R-U4S-VU. Kind 1973). '* Ibid., p. 3. M Goldmark. P.C : The new rural socuffv. m Ijp<m m ,.,'m municaiton arts *S. p 14 (Cornell University, ifhjca i *-s> 54 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring I v MONS 035122 of communication by any media other than face-tolace has been virtually ignored."16 Several different problem-initiated research studies have been conducted in the area of radio dispatch systems. This technology is deployed and used on an extensive scale; by the early 1960's, spectrum chan nels allocated to users had become highly congested and the issue had become of central interest to Con gress and the FCC. Rather than looking at specific applications or diffu sion patterns of tins technology in order to find a solu tion. attempts to alleviate spectrum congestion have generally been made from an economic or technical perspective. One study by Crandell and Ward involves a market analysis to "measure the economic value of re duction in congestion; and technical alternatives such as channel-splitting and cellular systems, to augment efficiency in spectrum allocation."'1 But. as the researchers note, "measuring the direct costs of congestion from models of user behavior is very dif ficult and exceedingly expensive due to the diversity of land mobile use."'1 McCray, who deals with the issue as a case study in communication planning, finds that short-term orientation on the part of the FCC has led. for one tiling, to the lack of "credible market studies for future mobile telephone de mand."'9 Another technique to determine the pattern and amount of usage of the available spectrum involves setting up monitoring stations.20 While valuable for determining better utilization of spectrum, this tech nique provides little information about who is using the technology, for what purposes, and with what impacts: nor does it lend itself to projections regard ing demands wliich will be placed by future technol ogies and their users on the spectrum. Methods lor Collecting Baseline Data As there is neither a standard methodology for ana lyzing the impacts or uses of communication technol ogies presently in use or in the development stage, nor much available data on the users, uses, or impacts of in-place mobile communication technologies, this research is primarily of an exploratory nature. Using Keid. A : New direction* in telecommunications research, in \ report prepared for the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications, p. 19 (June 1971). '' Crandell. K.. and Ward, The land mobile study (sub stantive Undines), in Hrat annual report, p. 10 (MIT Research Program on Communications Policy. Cambridge. ManjchUM'iu, December 1974). '* Ibid.. p. II. '* McCray. L.. .Administrative planning and ils political contex t: The case ol h CC policy for land mobile radio in (he 900 MHr band, m lirst annual report, p. 14 (MIT Reseerch Pro gram on Communications Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts. December 19741. :0 Dayharsh. I.I.. ti al . A study of land mobile spectrum utilization. Parts A 4t 0 (Stanford Research Institute. Menlo Park. California. J uly 1969). observation and interviewing, we have been able to generate preliminary data on the deployment and uses of two mobile systems, paging systems and dis patch services, as well as develop some possible hy potheses about the deployment and potential uses of the cellular system. However, for generalizable find ings to be established, it is necessary to utilize survev research and rigorous sampling procedures. in Unobtrusive Measures. Webb et ai. suggest that any technique suffers from inherent weaknesses that can be corrected only by cross-checking with other techniques.21 In particular, a combination of case studies and survey research can be particularly useful. Case studies allow the assessor to examine subtle as pects of social processes and individual attitudes as well as explore the possible relationships between variables, but survey research allows us to distinguish between those characteristics of relationships which are unique to a particular case and those which are generalizable across cases. Both techniques of field work and survey research must, however, confront the problem of respondent bias, interviewer effect, and other interaction contingencies which can pro duce spurious results. There are, however, several advantages of using case studies and survey research together in the data gathering effort in technology assessment.22 In the design stage of survey research, case studies can be used to determine which organization or col lectivity will maximize the advantages of comparative research, and thus can be used to confirm the selec tion of cases (or related technologies) for inclusion in the survey. Case studies can also serve to sharpen the focus of the investigation by directing attention to particular relationships or problems which appear to be most important. By examining the attributes of a complex system tltrough qualitative fieldwork prior to survey, the precision of the survey instrument can be improved. Likewise, in terms of data collection, case studies provide information on ihe receptivity, tranie of re ference, and span of attention of respondents. Ac cording to Sieber, "Improvements in the question naire stemming from qualitative pretest information enhance rapport between interviewer and respondent, reduce nonreturns of mailed questionnaires or refu sals to be Interviewed, and generally ease die datacollection efforts of the research staff."23 At the analysis stage, case studies can aid in the development of a theoretical structure to guide the 11 Webb K.. Campbell. D T . Schwariiz, R.l) . and Sechrest. L Unobtrusive measure* (Rand McNally. Chicago 19661 " t he discussion of the use ol fieldwork jiiJ survey research is based on Sieber, S I) The integration of (ieldvsurk and survey methods. Amer, J, Socioi. 78(J)\ l US - I JS7 ( |0T,t ** Ibid., p. 1141. Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring 1976 55 MQNS 085123 survey analysis. An intensive on-site study of a social situation can produce substantially new research per spectives as well as call to mind relevant theoretical frameworks, Case studies can be used to validate sur vey results or at least increase plausibility by recourse to observations and informant interviews. Finally, fieldwork can also serve as a tool in interpreting sta tistical relationships; specifically, interview materials can be used in refining the condition between vari ables by suggesting relevant intervening variables. The following section presents a portion of the information and analysis derived from the fieldwork effort as an illustration of utilizing this type of analy sis in technology assessment. EXPLORING COMPETITIVE TECHNOLOGIES Paging Systems ami Dispatch Services Compared to the Cellular System24 Currently used mobile communication tecluiologies such as paging systems and dispatch services offer strong competition to the cellular system now under development.25 For example, paging systems facili tate many communication functions yet can be rent ed for as little as S20 month/unit. Because of the advanced state of integrated circuit technology, pagers can be compact, lightweight, and portable. Many paging systems are directly linked to tele phone lines with computer interfaces permitting direct-dial paging. A caller needs to know only the special access number and the page identification number for the page - in the form of either a 10 second voice message, a single tone, or a combination of tones or lighted lamps - to be directly transmitted via the telephone lines. In the case of non-voice paging, depending on what the signal has been deter- 14 An interview instrument was administered to 70 employes* in 24 commercial and public service organization*, of various tun and representing different functions, known to be users of mobile communication system*. The organizsnons living paging systems included a large medical school, a metropolitan teaching hospital, .m elevator manufacturer, a home fuel service firm, an ambulance service, a dairy. 3 natiKi1.1l chemical corporation, a medium-sized city police department, a neighborhood health center, a local television station, a county law department, and the mayor's office of a medium-sized U S. city. Organizations investigated about their use ol dispatch ser vice included; two large electric utility companies, a plumb ing company, a building materials manufacturer. a construen<m firm, a parks and recreation department, .in international oil company, a local fuel service delivery company, a large metropolitan government communication department, 3 tele' communications research and development firm specializing in health care delivery, a city public works department and a large city police department. Some of the following descriptions of mobile commum canon technologies are based on the STS group's interim report on telecommunications (Bowers. R-. mimeo, 44 pp., leh. 197M. mined to signify, the pagchulder m.iv respond calling the olfice, home. etc. from j ;ectnar viephone. Not surprisingly, many of the largest corporate pager users have expressed a strong desire m sec die development of more efficient, high-capacuv. digiial display paging systems for deployment in their service departments.26 One-way voice messages or printed paper tape output are now lechmcally feasible anj are within FCC rules. Research is also current]-, underway to reduce transmission time tor \nice mes sages to a fraction ot what it is now. i)ul is. imm .nC page every 10 -- 12 seconds to one page overs T ' seconds. This lopresents a reduction to tt.ms mission time and a corresponding 75 "' increase m system capacity. Typical users of pagers are persons whose w,<ik activity necessitates their being almust uonsijnth ,>n the move and at the same time readily available r,. receive information. Doctors, lawyers, cuntrucMtv police and other emergency personnel, real csi.uc salespersons, servicepersons. and many others ull mio this category. One hospital administrator suggested that `anyone who is Irequently being looked for. hut is nor usually by the same phone or a known phone number" has need of a paging unit. Certainly this type of description can tit persons in almost ever;, walk, of life, from priest to prostitute. Dispatch rcmces are two-way radio svsiems operating on VHF and UHF frequencies. All dispatch services in the organizations studied consisted >' several mobile units and one or more base unit-, operated by dispatchers. In general, ir was imind that most mobile radio systems except the smallest had the capacity for mobile-to-mobile transmission, though messages were generally transmitted through the dispatcher except in the case of an cnveigen\.> Direct communication between mobile units j$ well as between mobile and base units is constrained be cause their output power, antenna height, and re ceiver sensitivity are relatively low and because of the system overload incurred by scarce spectrum space These constraints have in part been alleviated by ilu* introduction of fixed repeated systems which eifec- tively extend the area of coverage of the central system. In dispatch services, the fixed and mobile units may use the same frequency. If more than <nc ire- quency is allocated, access m the simplest s\ stems involves informal methods, such as a manual search for the channel affording optimum communi cation. A simple dispatch system requires a relatively small capital investment However, there is a certain lack of privacy m cotnmum- ** An organization using more than ten mobile commum cation units constitutes what shall be referred to is j Urge organization 56 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring 1V MONS 085124 canon, and congestion in single-channel systems or the difficulty of channel-switching in multi-channel systems makes use by a large number o( people impractical. An element of privacy can be incorporat ed but this involves increased cost. Receivers and irammmeis can be ended so that only a specific icceiver will "ring'' when called by ihe dispatcher, mdrcjtmc dial a `'listen'' swncli should be activated to receive the message. Privacy is partial, however; the message can he hcuul on .my unit that happens to he activated to ``listen" on that channel. Ihe new cellular system offers potential solutions to problems associated with both dispatch services and paging systems as well us increased communi cation capabilities. In this system, a large service area is broken up into cells, wnb each cell operating m a manner similar to (hat of the multi-channel trunked system (MCTS). With MCTS. a central computer con trols access to the several channels and all users must request permission to transmit. Permission inay be requested by voice through a dispatcher or auto matically by pushing a button on the mobile unit. Trunking allows each caller to use one of many chan nels available, rather than having to wait for a desig nated channel to become free. The cells tn a cellular system may be from I to 20 odd miles in diameter, with rite transmitters in adjacent cells operating on different sets of fre quencies. The major purpose of this system is to increase mobile communication capacity within a given spectrum allocation. Short-range transmitters and small cell size permit re-use of allocated frequen cies. cells separated by a sufficient distance can use the same frequencies. Moreover, small cell sizes are compatible with the limited lunge and unfavorable propagation characteristics of the frequencies now being made available for mobile communications. in addition to the basic components of MCTS. a cellular system requires facilities for locating mobile units wrth a precision of one cell and for automat ically switching receiver/transmitter frequencies and transmitter stations as the mobile unit moves from cell to cell, The component technologies necessary for a wideband cellular system include large-capaciiy computers and associated software for signal switching, microwave or laser transmitters and re ceivers for links to cells or increased wired system capacity for these links; and high-reliability mobile transceivers. These technologies are rapidly being im proved at this time. The major advantage of the cellular system is its very large potential capacity; it could ultimately accommodate millions of users. The capacity is not only proportional to the number of channels assigned, but also inversely proportional to cell size. As cell size is reduced, the number of cells in a given service area is expanded, thus increasing frequency re-use. Additional advantages aie idanvcly secure pri vacy and virtually unlimited effective range The cellular system is the oniv wjv Wui imlv widespread mobile communications can be achieved m the foreseeable future. Spectrum available m Hie lower frequency ranges is limited and a seems unlikely that mobile units operating at higher fre quencies (above ^00 MHz) can be built ji reasonable costs. Utilization and Diffusion of Mobile Communication Systems in Organizations Organizations imu.illy acquired dispatch services jnd paging systems to assign and reassign personnel m (he field, to locale and deploy equipment, to handle emergencies, and to decrease response time to dispers ed consumers and clients.r Dispatch services, in all cases, were utilized he freld-oriemed. service delcvery organizations, ur dmstuns of organizations. Two-way mobile radius were diffused throughout the smaller, basically >inglefuncuon organizations with the head of the firm using ihe system most frequently, This person, usual ly highly mobile, could be contacted when super vision and/or supplies were needed, or when j decision-making situation or emergency arose which his/her employees felt they could trot handle, or pre ferred not to handle, without receiving higher level approval. At the same tune, the head nf the Him could contact his/her employees wherever they were to monitor ur redirect their efforts. In the larger organizations, dispatch services were used primarily by field operatives: e g., park police, delivery-persons, servicepersons. and utility held crews. Higher level personnel have little if anv infor mation that has to be immediately or dtrectlv com municated to them, alleviating the need for upward diffusion of the mobile system to these levels. In ad dition, field operatives can contact middle-level tech nical and administrative personnel at headquarters when they have a question or problem. Further, the communication needs of higher level personnel differ from those in (he field-service sectors m that they are more proprietory, more stationary, less routine, and of longer duration. For this reason, loo. a specifically mobile system is less useful io them.18 '' ll should be noted ihm in every of Donation studied. a was at the organization's own initiative that the system insulted; they did nol acquire n as a result of marketing efforts by producers. Kach organization sought out a pro ducer or distributor to install the mobile communication >ys H-m und then actively participated >n its design lo insure that it fulfilled (he organization's needs. Thu indicates that [here was a mobile communication "gap" iht the owners/mina gers believed would be Hlled by installing * mobile commentcation system. " Similarly, the characteristics of the users of paging syv terns varied with the size of (he organization under study In smaller organizations, the users were typically the owners Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring 19 7p 57 MQNS 085125 A denture Oil fusion pattern took place within the larger organizations. The first held units to have j dispatch system installed were the ones that handled emergencies; next were those units which handled laiily routine jobs like held construction and installa tion. followed by those units charged with specific (unctions, like field inspections, where operations uiher closely followed a predtMonnmeJ work schedule. In general, die more non-routine u field operative's i.i'k, the more likely he,she wjs to have access to a mobile svstem in ns fir si stages of intro duction. Tor example, m the case of one of the large elec tric uiilny companies, die transmission lines scivice division was the fust to icccive dispatch service. Vim division handles c.xticmcly dangerous and lum-mudnc assignments where speed and efficiency Jie of utmost importance m insmmg contmuiiy of service. The elec tric service division, winch handles customer com plaints. was (lien equipped with a mobile system. While their task is jlso dangerous and non-routine, the consequences of a slower response time arc not usually as jdverse as disruption of transmission line service. I he gas service division, with the more rou tine functions, leceivcd the system next This thioe stage diffusion process also took place m the parks department. The park police, who handled emergencies, were the fust to have radios installed, second came staff supervisors who tiaveied from park to park inspecting facilities and dealing with park jttendam problems, and third came the maintenance persons whose activities tended to be more programmed and routine. In large organizations, the dispatch system was never expanded beyond the sectors involved with field service to the public. Likewise, in most organiza tions with paging systems, (here has been little diffu sion of the system beyond field departments ot divi sions; an adequate number of pagers were rented to meet the perceived mobile communication needs of the divisions and (here diffusion of the system typi cally eudcd.,v Social and Orgumz.uuotul Impacts Although low ofojm/auoiuhdvtf uiulciiakcn a i i o evaluation, a preliminary assessment ,.| ,..me .1 |,. social and economic unpjcis of titsijlluii; a m.-m.,cmumumcarion sysieincjtt be made. hrnnnnuc hnput I'i There was general consensus am mm cxc-mmcs .n-.l adniinisliators that then "rgamzaiiont were ii.oji saving money and providing better -service t,* ^11c:i ^ or customers as a result of installing j m.-hde .m mimical urn system. They nude rote ret we m ,1c, i . in tiansponaiioii costs m terms ot ti.uel umc ,ij mileage tm field workers. One far sic cit\ pui'Si. department mtdeitook j study which showed :!..1: theii dispatch system produced '.iiiiC' i 'S.ib It,employee, and an elevjtni in.uiuf.ic,..nc! tinuted that their paging svstem saved S.og,|,\ ,,-; viceperson in telephone calls. Despite the alleged lucrejsos m etMcicikv i. - ,. from unproved comiminicaiion ,jpjhilu\. .rc.i;n/|. lions neither developed new- cersicOs imi i:,,. . their service areas. Those using pauers did u,<.' --m'ii. ! tlteir service aicas because the tauge ot then e.'1 lully covered their potential area of upeutiuns M > over, many of ihe org.inizauons using dispjkh vices, such js the parks department and iho .m <-. films. Itave legally prescribed service .neas I t ni/aiions not having delimited service jte.o mobile communication system permitted i : i intensive servicing of the existing .nea mo,c f. demand for ihe service had generally iven i than ihe organization's ability to supply u ei(i.:cn!.\ before the system was installed. In short, became he range of their system was adequate >u Iwa.i'O 'Iks had to operate within legally delimited service organizations used tlte efficiencies doming i; -m mobile comimmication systems 10 expand ihe num ber of customers they could service within an .nea deliver more services, or to deliver the came '-.`iuv? more expeditiously. KiJ.'or managers of the companies, while in the larger organi zations, the users were at the supervisory and Held worker levels. Ueflcvting managerial utilization. (Here was a cerium degree of status associated with being assigned a pager in the smaller organizations. In larger organizations, the technology vsji perceived much more as a communication ' i*ol". much like a telephone. Hence, many of the individual paging units in the organizations studied were not considered to be die properly" or a single employee, bui instead, were shared by a number ot' users. Thus, individuals may or may not have pagers on a given day depending, to a large extent, on Ihetr and their co-workers' workload. '* (he exceptions to tins generalization m our sample of organizations were the medical school, the teaching hospital, and the chemical manufacturing firm where, alter the first department acquired paging amis, other departments began to demand that they 100 receive pagers. This may partly be explained by the staius associated with the pagers, that is. as .1 symbol of departmental importance, but it is equally likely Coordination and Control Improvements in service appeared to result trom die oigam/aiion's ability to assign and reassign men .uul matenul in a more efficient way with a mobile os tein, For example, a numbei uf supeivisors sp-ose i lli.it there was a real perceived need lor the p.igcrs -m the p in of Ihe other departments. The pattern of JiMusmn m die. three organizations was. however, quite similar to iliji not,-a in ihe study of two way radio users, the -s-irm w is m-i mlrodueed <n those depart nierils which hanJIcd frequent emergencies. It was nexi acquired by those which lunJIcJ occasioiial emergencies, hut whose mission primanh entailed mote touuue work. Vinally, ihe system spread v> >Wpn\ merits where jobs were quite routine: in these units puets are more of a convenience or status y mbol than a , nal , - m nuinicjtion necessity f>8 Journal oj the Inienmnona!Sorierr for Fi'chnology AssasMimu. Spring / V MGNS 0B51Z6 dupatch services as providing them with direct links to ihtfir men. enabling them to utilize field personnel as ilieir "eyes. ears, and hands''. Smaller firms also used the mubile system to centralize technical advice by keeping specialists ai the home base, thus increas ing their productivity This type of situation was not lounJ m die I at get organizations where field opeia- nvos, for the most pan. were (uglily skilled craftsmen .md lounicvtncii who li.nl Imle or no need to ask for technical advice only for parts, equipment, and loc.iiion.il nilornumm. . Hie predominant type of hcadquaiicrs-tu-fiold transmissions <approximately /5lr) wore locaiional. l-.vcn field-loheadquartors transmissions for assis tance and technical advice, though more frequent m die smaller organizations studied, did not occur as often as locational transmissions when die uses m small and large organizations were considered togedi- ei. Locational transmissions, in addition, tended to be insiilutumjlizcd. especially in the latgct uigaui/.a- lions. In many cases, field personnel were responsible for calling in when they arrived at a job sue. when they completed the assignment, and at specific time intervals. Such locational transmissions allowed field personnel to complete a larger number of jobs during the day: from die organizations* perspective, there was less "wasted lime" in deploying and coordinating personnel. |-or example, personnel m the electric service divi. sum used their mobile radio to obtain information instead of returning to headquarters or attempting to find a regular telephone. Working through (he dis patcher. the supervisor informed them where the power line was located, its path, whose homes were being fed electricity, which other personnel were working on the line. etc. Similarly, as a result of in troducing pagers, emergency crews of the elevator manufacturing concern were able to maintain direct contact with headquarters. The firm was also able to icspond mure quickly 10 emergency calls for elevator repairs because crews in die field could be contacted directly for reassignment. 1 he case of television news crews provides an intetcsiing example of the effects of mobile systems. At one tune, all communication between the news room and camera crews in die field look place via two-way. cji-insulled radios. Many "spot" news stones were therefore missed because a news crew covering a story could not be contacted for reassign- mem. Since the additional introduction of pagers, better and mure complete coverage of news events could be provided. creased as a result of using pagers. 1'liJt respondents were favorably disposed to using die system may be explained by three factors J0 First. few workers had to use the system during non-working lumis, borne paged was considered as part of their |ub. Second, because pager users all held some position of respon sibility (e.g., doctors) or felt tlui their work was important (o.g.. elevator rep.mmen, linemen, tele vision cameramen), they believed dial the mobile -os tein helped them to respond to jssienments. emergen cy and routine, moio effectively. Third, the -osiem reduced enors and unnecessary tups thus increasing winkers' confidence m thou ability to handle deci sions and problem siin.ioons because they had more rapid contact with their supervisors. Indeed, workers and supervisors/manageis agreed that Jtspakh -ei vices provided both gieater control over and eteater support of field personnel.,u hi fact, ic'-pondctih found it difficult to separate those two activities, many actually slating that support and coniiol go hand in hand. It is further the case that, while worker-, c >uM accomplish tasks mote efficiently due to substantially reduced response lime, the actual structure ol their jobs was nol markedly changed. In fact, the alterations that did occur were in job structure were viewed js being in a positive direction - towards increased treedoin and flexibility. Many of the users were able to maintain less rigid schedules since they could be con tacted if they were needed. Additionally, several of the organizations allowed employees to conduct per sonal errands during slack working hours since they could be in constant communication via the paging system. Possibilities for Adoption of the Cellular System Higher level personnel responsible for the acquisition of the mobile communication system in then organi zation geneially expressed .1 great deal of satisfaction with it. They indicated that dispatch services and paging systems provided a convenient and adequate communication link for employees who were mobile While their perception may have been colored by j recession-induced outlook, they constdeted few of the innovative features of the cellular system, such is privacy, two-way capacity, virtually unlimited mini- 10 A few of (he doctors, who are sometimes paged j* often as 80 10 1J0 limes a day. did express some negative leelmts aboul the number of pages they received, but tlses were quick to add (hat (hey could not get along without the ... Job Structure and Worker Satisfaction: Ihc overall response of workers to having to use a mobile communication system was favorable. None of them felt dial they were working more, though >cverjl commented that their productivity had in 11 Perhaps as important, especially for non-professionals such as plumbers, the svsfem provided them with a wav m transfer some responsibility for field-related technical and deployment decisions back lo (tie supervisors. Fhiv transfer ence >( responsibility seemed to provide supervisors with the feeling that they had greater control over the subordinates activities and subordinates with greater feelings ol support Journal o) the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring l v "r> M0N5 085127 ber of users, anti extended range, as either desirable or necessary.32 The two-way capacity of the cellular system was viewed as unnecessary by pager users since they usually have ready access to fixed tele phones if they work in an office. Further, page acknowledgment capacity is increasingly being used. Of course, dispatch service has two-way capaciiy, although lime limits are imposed on conversations. Higher level personnel in only two organizations were interested in the privacy feature of (he new sys tem. One police official indicated that in public emer gency situations or stake-outs, privacy would be desir able but that, in general, it would be relatively unim portant. The manager of the national chemical cor[mutton also expressed some interest in the privacy aspect of the system when a situation involved danger to the public and there was concern about possible p3mc. In some instances, privacy was definitely not desired.33 In fact, a number of dispatch users stated that the '`openness" of the system was valuable since each field operative could hear his co-worker's radio transmissions and sometimes be of assistance. Like wise. except for dispatch users facing spectrum limita tions. the cellular system's unlimited user capacity scented to hold little interest for higher level person nel since they thought of their current system as being virtually limitless; however, the improved quality of transmission would be an attractive feature for some dispatch users because they experienced occasional interference and frequency overload. Several features of the cellular system were actual ly objectionable to many respondents. For example, paging system users were concerned about the size of the portable units in the cellular system. Employees could carry pagers on their belts or in their pockets anything larger than this might be an effort to carry. Further, a person can either respond immediately or at some later time when he/she is paged. The new system would require that the response be given immediately. This could cause etiquette problems for executives in a meeting or in other constraining situa tions. As one person put it, "You'd be looking for a closet wherever you were so that you could answer your phone." Another objectionable feature of the " Cost factors seemed to strongly afreet respondents' bias against tha cellular system: with the exception of respondents in one tart* national corporation, none of the owners or manager* expressed appreciable interest in the cellular system unless the cost could be brought down to approximately the current cost of pagers or radio systems. In fact, a number of respondents commented that they would be uninterested in deploying new communication equipment unless it could be clearly shown that it would save a substantial amount of money. 11 It was noted lhat during some civil disturbances, if is desirable to have some police broadcasts overheard since (he knowledge that police are on the way will frequently cause a "mob" to begin to disperse. Additionally, it was indicated that officers arc able to "watch-out" for one another if their radio contacts are heard by a number of other officers. proposed system can be termed "use imperative' that is. several executives felt that if vu luJ i|u system, you would feel obligated to use it in order to justify its expense. In short, higher level personnel did not view rite cellular system as an attractive replacement for their present mobile systems. Only the unlimited number of users and. to a lesser extent, the privacy of com munication characteristics were viewed as positive considerations IfcNTAi'lVfc CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH Even at this exploratory, fieldwork stage of the inves tigation, important clues concerning the pmenu.il uses and impacts of emerging mobile communication technologies have been uncovered by studying tv pcs of users and patterns of use of existing mobile , >nmunicatiun systems. It can be tentatively asserted, for example, ihjt organizations presently using dispatch services .md paging systems in their field operations are not a likely source of demand for the cellular system. \ s\ew market will therefore have to be developed. Such a demand for the cellular system may appear in white-collar service organizations at higher levels m the managerial and professional hierarchy than where mobile systems are presently being used. Higher level personnel may have privacy/proprietary and status needs which would be well served by the cellular svstem. A second potential clientele is made up of selfemployed or independent professionals (doctors, lawyers, real estate salespersons, engineers, architects) - both those presently using paging systems or the conventional mobile car telephone, as well as (hose who do not now have a mobile communication -os tein. A third potential user group consists of organi/jlions engaged in police, emergency, and other disaster related activities. Despite the assertion itiai the openness of communications in existing mobile systems is considered an advantage, the need f><r private or secure communications is nevertheless or j( least equal importance in this area and may well be persuasive in adopting ihe cellular system in >ijunction with current mobile systems.JJ Finally, ihe mushrooming market for citizcns-band radio suggests an enormous potential demand on the part of average citizens for mobile communication capacity in per sonal and recreational (as well as quasi-busmessi uses. s* Tha New York Telephone Company's lower Manhattan switching building fire in early IV7$ provides an example ->t the importance of a high capacity mobile telephone siem js at least a back-up to the existing fixed line network In ilus instance, conventional mobile telephones were provided to police, fire, ambulance and other emergency organization* m order to maintain at least some communication upacty during this "disaster". 60 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring lvm6 HONS 035128 It is in this instance of ` the technology as a toy '' that there is the potential for massive penetration ot the cellular system. Future research will continue to focus on existing forms of mobile communications ( radio dispatch ser vice. paging systems, the conventional mobile car tele phone, and citizens-band radios) but in a more rigorous .nul m-depih manner. Survey questionnaires will be mailed to a sample of users and matched non users of these technologies in order to derive a signif icant and reliable data base about usage patterns and social impacts of these technologies. Through Jiuly tic induction, some statements about possible impacts of the cellulai system will be derived. This information will be utilized by the other researchers in the com ponent investigations as well as by the technology assessment group as j whole m developing impact chains and policy recommendations. Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment, Spring 197b o! MONS 085129 Coates' Corner THE YOSSARIAN this column is pleased to announce the establishment of a new annual award, the Yossarian. for that act of creative or pciUmumg art. tn or out of bureaucratic organizations, which displays most effectively the vital innerdynamics of large organizations. The Yossarian will be awarded annually m midJuly. It will consist of a large eagle, carved from a block of ice. The recipient will receive the award by surface mail. Nominations must be in hand bv July 13th. ' A current contender for the 1976 Yossarian is a recent Hollywood film. "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest". This can be seen as a tale of the difficulty management faces in the operation of a lunatic asy lum. Nominations for the 1976 award may be pre liminarily submitted (in triplicate) to this column in a self-addressed, stamped envelope, marked return to sender. LONG-RANGE TRENDS A STARTER SET One of die major difficulties associated with any technology assessment is the matter of state-ofsociety assumptions and possible discontinuities, shifts and changes in and among them. The implica tions of continuity and change in those trends for the physical, biological and social technologies and the related public policy, is a central matter in future planning. Without wishing to suggest here in detail how one might begin to utilize long-range trends. 1 offer some sixty long-range (tends as a starter towards beginning to understand and systematically consider the implications of trends with regard to any tech nology. Any specific large-scale problem in technolo gy should be analysed and evaluated against this trends background. 7 Cultural homogenization - the growth of j national society 8 Growth of permanent military establishment 9 Mobility a personal b physical c occupational d job 10 International affairs and national security a* a major societal factoi Technology Trends 1! The centrality and increasing dominance of tech nology in the economy and society 12 Integration of the national economy 13 Integration of the national with the imemjn-m.il economy 14 The growth of research and development .u j factor in economy 15 High technological turnover rate 16 The development of mass media in telecommuni cations and printing 17 An awareness of the finitude of resources Trends in Labor Force and Work 18 Specialization 19 Growth of the service sector 20 Relative decline of primary and secondary em ployment 21 Growth of information industries, movement toward an information society 22 Expansion of credentialism 23 Women, blacks, and other minority groups enter ing into the labor force 24 Early retirement 25 Unionism 26 Growth of pensions and pension funds 27 Movement toward second careers and midlife change in career 28 Decline of the work ethic General Long-Term Societal Trends 1 Economic prosperity and affluence 2 Expanding education throughout society 3 Rise of knowledge industries and a knowledge- dependent society 4 Relative decline in common knowledge of the physical world 5 Urbanization/Metropolitanization 6 Rise of the middle class society Trends in Values and Concerns 29 General sltift in societal values 30 Diversity as a growing, explicit value i 1 Decline of traditional authority 32 The growth of anti-authoritarian movements 33 Increasing aspirations and expectations of success 34 Growth of tourism, vacationing and travel 35 General expectations of high level of medical care Journal ofthe International Sodetv for Technology Assessment. Spring IQ't5 T 1ST4 International Socterv for Tvilmvlogy Assessment. (v'as/imxrou. O.C. MONS 065X30 36 General expectations of high level of social service 37 The growth of consumerism 38 Growth of physical culture and personal health movements 39 Civil rights, civil liberties expansion for Blacks. Chicunos. gays, and other minoniies 40 Growth of women's liberation movement Family Trends 41 Decline in birth rates 43 Shifts in rates of family formation, marriage, divorce and living styles 43 The growth of leisure 44 The growth of the do-it-yourself movement 45 Improved nutrition with the consequent declines m the age of menarche 46 Protracted adolescence 47 Decline in the number and significance of rites of passage, birth, death, marriage, etc. 48 isolation of children from the world of adult concern 49 The acculturation of children by other children 50 The growth of a large aged population 51 The replacement of the extended family by the nuclear family and other living arrangements Institutional Trends 52 The institutionalization of problems. This is the tendency to spawn new institutions and new in stitutional mechanisms for dealing with what were in the past personal, private, or non-govern mental responsibilities 53 Bureaucratization of public and private institu tions 54 Growth of big government 55 Growth of big business 56 Growth of multi-national corporations 57 Growth of future studies and forecasting and the institutionalization of foresight mechanisms and long-range planning 58 Growth of public participation in public institu tion and private institution decision-making 59 The growing demands for accountability and the expenditure of public resources 60 Growth of demands for social responsibility If one were studying a particular technology, there would presumably be subsidiary trends peculiar to the technology or the institution or the public or private frame in which it is imbedded. For example, tliere would be special long-range trends in the chemi cal industry, in the manufacturing and selling of auto mobiles, in health care delivery, and in local government. It would be a good start to use this list to see how many directly transfer to a particular area. Trends to bureaucracy, credentialism, participation and telecommunications, for example, permeate all sectors. Backing aw3y from these trends, which I call middle level long-range trends, one might also want to keep in mind the more general long-term mu/tt-phase trends identified by Herman Kahn and others. The author welcomes comments and suggestions foi other specific long-ierm trends that might be ad ded or utilized in the expansion or extension of this list. WORLD PRIORITIES: CANDIDATES FOR PROBLEM FOCUSED TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS Boris Pregel, Harold Lasswell. and Jolin Me Hale edited Volume 26 of the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (227 pp., September J97S). on the general subject of "Environment and Society in Transition: World Priorities". The report is an excel lent introduction to many of the problems affecting the world. It is written from authoritative and credi ble perspectives by people of the calibre of the edi tors. By the nature of the case it has much to recommend it as a mine for problem-originated tech nology assessment topics. In the limited space avail able. without doing justice to any of the authors, consider the topics covered. "A Survey of the World Priorities", by John McHale. follows his now tradi tionally line systematic exposition of complex issues. It gives an excellent sense of collective thinking on world priorities. Other articles deal with the quality of life, alternative futures, energy, world monetary order, policy selection, economic growth, education, science and technical information, foud population, violence, and other subjects. THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A VIEW FROM MOUNT OLYMPUS In 1973, John D. Rockefeller 3rd published a book. "The Second American Revolution - Some Personal Observations". It is an interesting digest and sum mary of much of what has been said by others about the generally unsatisfactory state of the Republic. However, this book enjoys singular interest, com prising as it does the deliberations of a man of signifi cant corporate and industrial responsibility in the United States. Some indication of the scope of "The Second American Revolution" is given by the titles of the first seven chapters, which deal with currents of change. Blacks, youth, values, conflicts, new values, and the crucial role of the moderates. The second section of the book, on critical areas, covers in nine chapters such topics as the self renewal of organizations, humanistic capitalism, corporate re Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring IV (i.l HONS 085131 sponsibility. ilia role of government, the giving soci ety. a learning society, a planning society, and the politics of humanism. The book ends with a personal view expressing optimism and the author's interpreta tion of the concepts "private initiative" and "quality of life". The style is gracious, conversational, tenta tive and unpretentious. The book is available from the publishers. Harper and Row, for S1.50. ILLICH VS. ENERGY In the mass of data, information and propaganda being disseminated on the worldwide energy situa tion, it is unusual to find someone with a truly fresh perspective on the matter. In (his regard. Ivan lllich's book, "Energy and Equity" (Harper & Row, New York 1975) is provocative and radical in getting to the roots of the issue. It is the energy equivalent of his famous "Deschooling Society". A sampler of lllich's thinking: he points out that there are two common approaches to dealing with the energy situation. One is to address the supply side of the problem, looking for new methods, means, and resources to meet growing energy demands. The sec ond approach is to look for means of conservation, reducing both waste and demand. Illich points out that very little effort has been made to deal with the issue from an organizational perspective, such as put ting those responsible for energy programs in .i posilion of being conservative with energy. Tjkmg tins concept and applying it to the American situation, it would be an interesting problem to turn to the Ener gy Research and Development Administration or the Federal Energy Administration and make it a condi tion for employment in the organization that one engage actively in an energy accounting and conserva tion program. For example, one could imagine a year ly energy balance and running inventory of energy consumption struck for each employee and his fami ly. This could add a new reality to the energy issues in the lives of those responsible for dealing with them, Consider the results if one were to provide some kind of incentive or reward lor each IO1' or 5 '' decrement in annual consumpiion that could ensue Bringing tire realities of a problem home to the bu reaucrats is one of the central problems facing e\er\ major national and world issue. Illich has some keen thuughts on this question. O'NEILL'S LAW As you all know, the great anonymous Murphy pro claimed the fundamental law of human activity that "if anything can go wrong, it will". We have learned recently via Kenneth Boulding of the more powerful O'Neill's Law. "Muiphy was an optimist". 04 Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment. Spring 19 76 MONS 085132 Information for Authors All manuscripts (with the exception of review papers) are submitted with the understanding that they are not under consideration for publication elsewhere or that (hey have not been published previously. If a paper has been prepared for presentation at a meet ing, this information should be noted on the manu script. Accepted manuscripts become the property of the journal. Preparation of Papers Manuscripts are to be submitted In triplicate, double spaced. Authors should aim for a clear, concise style in (he presentation of all material. 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