Document r67y2D7x9w5889BeDzx1MezK7

IN THE UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT JOHNS-MANVILLE CORPORATION and JOHNS-MANVILLB SALES CORPORATION, Plaintiffs, V. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ____ 1 Civil No. 465-83C PRETRIAL STATEMENT OP THE UNITED STATBS VOLUMB III J. CHARLBS KRUSE Special Litigation Counsel ALBERT COHBN ROGER K. DAVIS ANTHONY C. ROTH JANET F. KATZ NANCY B. COLLINS SCOTT D. AUSTIN S. MICHAEL SCADRON JANE MAHONEY DAVID S. FISHBACK Trial Attorneys Torts Branch Civil Division March 10, 1987 RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney General Civil Division J. PATRICK GLYNN Director Torts Branch HAROLD J. ENGEL Deputy Director Torts Branch H. MICHAEL SEMLER Supervisory Trial Attorney Torts Branch, Civil Division U.S. Department of Justice Ben Franklin Station P. 0. Box 340 Washington, D.C. 20044 Telephone: (202) 724-6749 Attorneys for the United States GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Pfrq.3 I. INTRODUCTION.................................................. II. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES...................................................................... 1-2 III. ESTIMATE OP TRIAL TIMB......... ................................................ 1-8 IV. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT................................................. 1-9 II-l III-l IV-I V. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW..............................................IV-140 VI. LIST OF TRIAL WITNESSES.................................. .................... IV-152 VII. LIST OF EXHIBITS.........................................................................V-l VIII. CONCLUSION V-103 1-1 DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS volume i I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1-1 II. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES............... 1-2 III. ESTIMATE OF TRIAL TIME ................................................................. ..1-8 IV. PROPOSED FINDINGS Or FACT ...............................................................1-9 A. MANVILLB'S EXTENSIVE INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ASBESTOS-RELATED PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS WILL PRODUCE MORE THAN THREE-QUARTERS OF A BILLION DOLLARS IN INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT ........................................... 1-9 (1) Manville Has Been Sheltered From AsbestosRelated Personal Injury Claims For More Than Four Years While It Negotiated With Its Insurers ............................... ..1-14 (2) Manville Will Emerge From The Bankruptcy . Proceeding Free Of All Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Litigation ............................... 1-17 (3) Manville Has Already Received Substantial Reimbursement From Its Insurers For Payments Made To Asbestos Victims ....................................................1-20 (4) Manville's Insurers Will Pay Out More Than Three-Quarters Of A Billion Dollars In Connection With Manville's Liability To Asbestos Victims, Including The Test Claimants ....................................................................................... 1-25 (a) Manville's California Insurance Litigation............................... 1-25 (b) Manville's Insurance Settlements .................... ..1-36 B. THROUGHOUT WORLD WAR II MANVILLB AGGRESSIVELY SOLICITED SALES TO THE UNITED STATES AND REAPED HUGE PROFITS FROM THESE SALES AND BUILT UP TREMENDOUS RESERVES FOR "WAR CONTINGENCIES" ................................. 1-48 (1) At The Outset Of WWII Manville Had Been Manufacturing Asbestos-Containing Products For Seventy Years and Was The Giant Of The Industry ............... 1-48 - i- (2) Manville's Wartime Business Was Substantially The Same As Its Pre-War Peacetime Business And Manville Continued To Aggressively Market Its Asbestos-Containing Products .................................. 1-55 (a) Wartime Bconomic Controls Did Mot Preclude, But Rather Encouraged, Voluntary Formation 0 Defense Contracts Through Negotiation And Competitive Bidding ........................................... 1-55 (b) Manville's Manner Of Doing Business And Aggressive Sales Policy Did Not Change As A Result Of The Wartime Regulations .................................. ....................................1-74 (i) Manville Provided Its Salesmen With Financial Incentives To Sell As Much As They Could ........................................... 1-77 (ii) During World War II Manville Continued Its Promotion Program Through Advertisements And Sales Brochures ......................................... 1-96 (iii) During World War II, Manville Carefully Identified Its Competitors And Their Prices In Order To Be Able To Price Its Products And Win Competitively Bid Contracts ............................................................... 1-103 (iv) Manville Vigorously Attempted To Obtain Both The Contracts Offered By The United States And The Priority Orders Necessary To Fulfill These Contracts .....................................................1-104 (v) World War II Provided Manville Substantial Opportunities To Expand Its Markets ..............................................1-103 ii - (3) Manville's Wartime Prices Were Not Based On Any Navy Policy Of Self-Insurance Or Assumption Of Risk............................. .............................................................. 1-113 (a) Manville's Wartime Prices Depended Largely On The Prices Of Manville's Competitors And The Size Of The Customer ................... 1-114 (b) Manville's Wartime Prices Were Also Based On Manville's Evaluation Of "Any Hazard Involved In The Sale Of The Product Due To Factors Not Fully Known" ...................... 1-119 (c) Manville's Prices During World War II Were Equal To Or Greater Than Its Pre- War Prices For Almost Every Product ................1-121 (d) Manville Charged The United States Higher Prices Than It Charged Certain Other Customers ............................................... 1-124 (4) Manville Made Record Profits During World War II, which Bnabled It To . Create Massive Reserves For "War Contingencies" And Post-War Expansion .............................................................................. .....1-131 (a) Manville Made Record Sales And Profits During World War II ................................1-131 (b) From Its World War II Profits, Manville Created "Contingent War Reserves" To Cover Future Liabilities ............................... 1-153 (c) Manville Also Used Its High Wartime Profits To Bxpand Its Plants, Retire Its Preferred Stock And Create Reserve Funds For Later Expansion........................ 1-166 (d) Manville Utilized Its World War II Profits To Bxpand Its Business And To Dominate The Post-War Insulation Market ............................................................ 1-180 - iii C. THE METALS RESERVE COMPANY 'S PURCHASE, IMPORTATION, AND SALE OP AFRICAN ASBESTOS TO MANVXLLE BEGINNING IN MID-1943 ENSURED MANVILLE ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF FIBER AT REASONABLE PRICES ................ ............................................ 1-193 Volume II D. MANVILLE'S WWII CONTRACTS WITH THE NAVY AND THE MARITIME COMMISSION PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR RECOVERY IN THIS LITIGATION.......................................II-l (1) During WWII There Were No Navy Policies, No Discussions Between The Parties, And No Shared Understandings Which Could Reasonably Have Lead Manville To Believe That Its AsbestosRelated Losses Were Considered Costs Of Performance Which Would Be Borne By The United States.......................................................... II-l (a) Manvilie's Wartime Contracts Were Competitively-Bid FixedPrice Contracts........................................................II-l (i) During WWII Supplies Were Routinely Purchased By Informal Competitive Bidding.................. ....................................... 11-2 (ii) Throughout WWII The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Routinely Purchased Supplies Using Fixed-Priced Contracts......................... II-9 (iii) All of Manville's WWII Sales Of Asbestos-Containing Products Were Pursuant To FixedPrice Contracts......................................... 11-14 (b) Manville's WWII Contracts Contained No Express Term Indicating That The United States Would Treat Third-Party Tort Liability Losses As Reimbursable Costs Cf Performance...............................................................11-23 iv - (c) During WWII The Navy Had No Policy Of "Self-Insurance" or "Assumption Of Risk" Which Applied To Third-Party Personal Injury Liability Under Fixed-Price Supply Contracts.......................... 11-26 (i) Risk Of Loss Of Or Damage To Government-Owned Property .............11-34 (ii) Casualty Insurance ................................II-42 (2) There Was No Privity Of Contract Between Manville And The Maritime Commission During WWII With Regard To Most Asbestos-Containing Products And No Shared Understanding That Manville's Third-Party Tort Liability Would Be Borne By The Maritime Commission.... 11-67 (a) All Asbestos-Containing Insulation Materials Were Procured Directly By The Private Yards, Not By The The Maritime Commission ..................... 11-63 (b) The Maritime Commission Contracts Specifically Provided That The Shipyards Were Not Agents Of The United States .........................................................11-70 (c) The Contracts Used By The Maritime Commission During WWII Required That Contractors And Subcontractors Hold The Government Harmless From Liability For Injuries To Third Persons .............. ........................................................ 11-71 (3) Many Of The Contracts Relied On By Manville Do Not Relate To A Test Shipyard, Do Not Deal With A Product At Issue In This Litigation, Or Were Entered Prior To The . Date On Which Manville Alleges That The Navy Adopted The Relevant Policy of Self-Insurance ............................... 11-75 (a) Several Of The Contracts Identified By Manville Do Not Involve The Test Shipyards ........................................................11-75 (b) Several Of The Controls Identified By Manville Do Not Involve A Product At Issue In This Litigation ........................................ 11-77 -v- (c) Manville Could Not Be Entitled To Recovery Under Several Of The . Identified Contracts Because They Were Formed Before The Date On Which Manville Alleges That The United States Adopted Its Self Insurance Policy................................................. 11-80 (d) There Is No Evidence Connecting Many Of The Contracts Relied On By Manville To Test Shipyards, The Test Claimants Or The Products At Issue Here .....................11-82 (e) Manville Has Not Identified Any Relevant WW II Contracts Relating To Electric Cable Filler, Marine Tape Akoustikos Felt Or Ebony Asbestos ......... II-S4 E. NEITHER MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR SHIP SPECIFICATIONS PROVIDB ANY BASIS FOR MANVILLE'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES............................................................................................................. 11-85 1. The Asbestos Industry In General And Manville In Particular Played Dominant Roles In Shaping The Government's Specifications, Which Were Written To Permit Procurement Of The Industry's Existing Products....................................................................11-85 (a) Types And Purposes Of Procurement Specifications......................................................................11-85 (b) The General Specifications Process Prior To And Dpring World War II.............................11-87 (c) The Manville Products Alleged To Have Injured The Test Claimants And The Corresponding NavySpecifications.............................11-97 (i) Magnesia Pipe Covering, Block And Cement................................................................... 11-97 (ii) Superex Pipe Covering And Block................. 11-115 (iii) Superex Cement and No. 450 Cement.............11-131 (iv) Asbestos Cloth ......................................................11-133 (v) Firefelt .................................. 11-144 - vi - (vi) Amosite AsbestosFelt ...................................... 11-148 (vii) Akoustikos Felt ........................................... 11-153 (viii) Asbestos Millboard ................ 11-158 (ix) Other Products ................. ..................................11-164 (2) Nothing In The Government's Specifications Or Standards Prohibited Manville From Placing A Warning Label On Its Products Or Packaging.............. 11-167 (3) Marinite And Marine Sheathing, The Only Manville Asbestos-Containing Products Sold Directly To The Maritime Commission During WWII, Were Developed Solely By Manville In Order To Capture Large Segments Of The Maritime and Non-Maritime Markets............................................................................................ 11-169 (a) In The Barly 1930's Manville Was Attempting To Develop A Lightweight Marine Construction Material.................................. 11-169 (b) Following The Morro Castle Disaster Manville Redoubled Its Efforts To Create A Lightweight Marine - Construction Material .................................. ...11-172 (c) Even Before It Produced Marine Sheathing, Manville Was Marketing This Product To The Shipbuilding Industry .............................................................................. 11-176 (d) After It Had Developed Marine Sheathing, Manville Provided Samples To Outside Entities For Testing ................................................... 11-182 (e) Manville Developed Marinite In Its Own Research Facilities .......................................... 11-186 (f) Manville Aggressively Marketed Marinite To Private Shipyards And Other Private Customers ........................................................ 11-188 (4) The General Ship Specifications Relied On By Manville Do Not Establish That Asbestos Was Required Or Actually Used On The Ships At Issue In This Litigation ............................................. 11-199 (a) Navy Ship Design And Ship Specifications ............................. (b) Maritime Commission Ship Design And Ship Specifications ............................... 11-199 11-205 Volume III P. MANVILLB KNEW THAT SHIPYARD WORKERS WERE ENDANGERED BY BXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS DUST AND CONCEALED AND ' SUPPRESSED INFORMATION THAT COULD HAVE LED TO AMELIORATION OF THE HAZARD ................................. .111-1 (1) Manville, In Concert With The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Studied The Hazards of Asbestos Because Of Litigative Considerations, and Concealed The Extent of The Hazard................................................................................ Ill-l (2) Manville Bxtended Its Concealment Activities To Include A Conspiracy With RaybestosManhattan....................................................................................... HI-25 (3) Manville Recruits Other Industry Members To Join In Sponsorship of Research By The Saranac Lake Laboratory, But Acts To Suppress Results Of ThatResearch ....................................III-43 (4) Manville Knew That Shipyards Were At Risk From Asbestos .............................................................................. III-60 (5) Manville Knew That Shipyard Workers During World War II Were Being Endangered By Their Exposure To Asbestos .............................................................. III-68 (6) Manville Sales And Support Personnel Had Access To And Entered Navy And Private Shipyards During World War II.............................................III-76 (a) Fore River Shipyard......................................................III-76 (b) Consolidated Shipyard........ .................. III-83 (c) Philadelphia Naval Shipyard................................... III-85 (d) Boston Naval Shipyard ................................................. III-86 (e) Other Private and PublicShipyards ...................... III-87 (7) Manville Knew What Shipyard Working Conditions - viii - Were Like Because Its Contract And Technical Service Units Were Performing Insulation Work In Shipyards During World War II .......................III-9Q (a) Manville's Presence In Wartime Shipyards As Insulation Installer ........... .....III-90 (b) Manville's Presence As Installer Of Insulation At Consolidated Shipyard................ III-99 (c) Specific Evidence of Manville Knowledge Gained Through Contract and Technical Service Units ............................................................... III-101 (8) Manville Callously Disregarded Informing Workers About The Hazards of Asbestos: Specific Cases ............................................. ............... .....III-105 (a) The DeForest Incident ............................................. ITI-1G5 (b) The Roemer Incident ........................................... ...III-110 (9) Manville Continued To Conceal Its Knowledge . Of The Dangers Of Asbestos Throughout The Mid-War And Immediate Post-War Periods ...................Ill-Ill (a) Manville Cancer Cover-Up .................. ...III-lll (b) The Hemeon Report ........................................ III-123 (c) Further Manville Knowledge and Cover-Up Of Low Dose Risk ............................III-131 (d) Manville Did Not Know Of The Fl.eiatm-Pfinke, Report .......................................... 111-143 (10) Manville's Decision Not To Warn ................................... III-145 (11) Courts Reviewing Manville's Conduct Have Repeatedly Found Punitive Damages Appropriate ........................................................................ ...III-149 (12) The Espionage Act Did Not "Classify" Information Or Documents And Did Not Prohibit Disclosure Of Information To Manville ........................................ III-164 ix - G. THE NAVY AND MARITIME COMMISSION RESPONDED TO THE INCREDIBLB GROWTH IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SHIPYARD WORKING POPULATIONS DURING WORLD WAR II WITH AN UNPRECEDENTED SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM TO PROTECT SHIPYARD WORKERS .............................................................111-17 5 (1) Shipyard Safety And Health Programs At The Local Level ........................ ....III-177 (2) The Navy And Maritime Commission Provided Necessary Consultation To Private Shipyard Management On Health And Safety Matters ............... III-188 (3) The Navy And Maritime Commission Worked With The United States Public Health Service To Improve Health and Safety At Private Shipyards ............................................................ III-199 (4) The Navy and Maritime Commission Adopted A Cautionary Approach To Worker Exposure To Asbestos Despite Their Limited Knowledge Of The Hazards Of Asbestos And The Absence Of Bvidence That Shipyard Workers Were . Developing Asbestosis.................. ........................................ III-205 (a) Before The Minimum Requirements ..........................III-206 (b) Asbestos Under The Minimum Requirements ................................................................. .111-219 (c) The Fleischer-Drinker Study ................................. III-241 (5) It Was Unclear In The World War II Time Frame Whether The Dreessen Suggested Permissible Exposure Standard For Asbestos Was 5 Million Particles Per Cubic Foot Of Total Dust Or Asbestos Dust Or Whether The Suggested Standard Was At All Applicable To Shipyard Asbestos Exposures ............................................. ................. III-249 x Volume IV H. THE UNPRECEDENTED NAVY AND MARITIME COMMISSION HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAM TO PROTECT SHIPYARD WORKERS WAS IMPLEMENTED AT THE TEST SHIPYARDS DESPITE THEIR DRAMATIC EXPANSION AND DESPITE THB NATIONAL IMPERATIVE TO RAPIDLY PRODUCE SHIPS ...................................................................... IV-1 (1) Though The Number Of Persons Employed At The Boston And Philadelphia Navy Yards Quadrupled In Order To Satisfy The National Defense Need For Ships, The United States Navy Acted Reasonably To Protect Workers From Known Hazards ......................... IV-1 (a) The Boston Navy Yard .................................................... IV-1 (i) The Boston Navy Yard Expanded Rapidly During World War II ......................... IV-1 (ii) Between 1941 And 1945, The Boston Navy Yard Built 141 New Ships, Overhauled 3,260 Ships and Docked 1,820 Ships .......................IV-4 (iii) The Boston Navy Yard Responded With A State-Of-The-Art Industrial Hygiene Program........................IV-8 (iv) Manville Had Access Or Could Have Obtained Access To The Boston Navy Yard ................................... IV-15 (b) The Philadelphia Navy Yard........................................IV-17 (i) The Philadelphia Navy Yard Expanded Rapidly During World War II ............................................................ IV-17 (ii) The Philadelphia Navy Yard Built More Than 45 Navy Vessels Between 1940 and 1945 ......................IV-19 (iii) The Philadelphia Yard Had A State-Of-The-Art Industrial Hygiene Program ................................................ (iv) Manville Had Access Or Could Have Obtained Access To The Philadelphia Navy Yard ......................................IV-26 - xi - VI-19 (2) Like Navy Yards, While The Number Of Persons Working In Private Shipyards During World War II Increased Dramatically, The Private Shipyards Acted Reasonably To Protect The Shipyard Workers From Known Hazards ..............................IV-27 (a) The United States Did Not Take Control Of Private Shipyards During World War II ......................................................IV-27 (b) The Fore River Shipyard ...............................................IV-33 (i) Sven Before World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Was A Prominent Private Shipyard..................................................................... IV-33 ' (ii) During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Expanded Dramatically .................................. .... IV-35 (iii)During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Built A Total Of 128 Vessels ......................................IV-46 (iv) During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Invest igated The Then Known Risks Of Exposure To Asbestos And Took Steps To Assure That There Was No Asbestos Disease At The Fore River Shipyard .............................IV-52 (v) During World War II, Many People Including Manvilie's Salesmen Had Access To The Fore River Shipyard .............................................IV-69 (c) The Consolidated Shipyard ...........................................IV-79 (i) The Consolidated Shipyard Built Only Navy Ships ........................................ IV-79 (ii) A Manville Contract Unit Performed The Pipecovering Work At Consolidated Shipyard........................ IV-81 (iii) Consolidated Shipyard And A & M Took Reasonable Steps To Protect Workers From Hazards ........ IV--83 - xii - (iv) Manville Had Access To The Consolidated Shipyard DUr 1110 World War XX XV--86.e.eo.e.oo.eeeeee.e. I. MANVILLErS SETTLEMENTS WITH THE TEST CLAIMANTS ...................................................................................................IV-88 (1) Manville's Settlements With Boston Navy Yard Test Claimants .......................... .............................IV-88 (a) Chester Anderson......................... ................................IV-83 (b) Thomas Drinan...................... IV-90 (c) Rubin Shulman ............................................ IV-93 (d) Ewald Legee ......................................................................... IV-96 (e) John Roche ............................................ IV-99 (f) William Ogle .......................... IV-101 (g) John Herlihy........................... .IV-104 (2) Manville Settlements With Philadelphia Navy Yard Test Claimants...................................................... IV-106 (a) Walter J. Archey ............. IV-106 (b) Julius Rothman ............................. IV-111 (c) Victor C. Impriano .................... IV-115 (3) Manville's Settlements With Fore River Shipyard Test Claimants .......... IV-120 (a) Joseph Teta ........................................................................IV-120 (b) Phillip Houten ................................................................. IV-123 (4) Manville's Settlements With Consolidated Shipyard Test Claimants .......................................... IV-125 (a) James Clancy.................... IV-125 (b) W.D. Smith .......................................... IV-128 (c) Willis King........................................................................IV-131 - xiii - J. PRESENT KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASES......... .............. IV-133 R. DAMAGES .................... ...............................................................................IV-139 V. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OP LAW..........................................................IV-140 VI. TRIAL WITNESSES FOR THE UNITED STATES............................. ..IV-152 VII. LIST OP EXHIBITS......... ...............................................................................V-l VIII. CONCLUSION............................................................................................. V-103 - xiv - VOLUME III F. MANVILLE KNEW THAT SHIPYARD WORKERS WERE ENDANGERED BY EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS DUST AND CONCEALED AND SUPPRESSED INFORMATION THAT COULD HAVE LED TO AMELIORATION OF THE HAZARD (1) Manville, In Concert With The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Studied The Hazards Of Asbes tos Because Of Litigative Considerations, And Concealed The Extent Of The Hazard 3001. As far back as 1929, Manville possessed extensive knowledge of the hazards of asbestos, not only at relatively high exposure levels, but at lower levels to which "end-users" of their asbestos-containing products (i.e., insulation workers, pipe coverers, etc.) would typically be exposed. Indeed, Manville has admitted in previous litigation that it was a "sophisticated user and consumer of asbestos." Exhibit: , Manville Answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 151 in Palcerski. et al. v. Johns-Manville Coro.. et al. Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, No. L-40507-80 (Palcerski Interrogatory Answers). Witness: Barry Castleman. Ill 1 3002. As early as May 8, 1929, a lawsuit alleging asbestos-related injury to one of its employees, Anne Pierskowski, a plant textile worker, was filed. Exhibits; Chart, Summary of Claims Against Johns-Manville Manville Plant (undated); Complaint filed in Pierskowski v. Johns-Manville, (D.N.J.) (May 8, 1929); Amended Answer filed in Pierskowski v. JohnsManville (undated). Witness: William Rietze. 3003. Manville obtained its extensive knowledge of the hazards of asbestos, in large part, through its association with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("Metropolitan*), and, in particular. Metropolitan's Dr. Anthony J. Lanza. The principal point of contact for Dr. Lanza at Manville was, from the outset, Manville's outside counsel, Allen Wardwell of the New York law firm of Davis, Polk, Wardwell and Gardiner. The mere fact that Lanza's submissions were made to Manville's outside counsel, rather than to operational or safety or health personnel was indicative of Manville's principal concern with respect to the health hazard presented by exposure to asbestos: that of avoiding liability for injuries at the lowest possible cost. Lanza was well aware of early British studies of III - 2 asbestosis, and, on November 23, 1929, wrote to Wardwell enclosing a bibliography of such articles. Exhibit: Letter from A. Lanza to A. Wardwell (November 23, 1929) . 3004. In October and November of 1929, Metropolitan studied dust conditions at Manville's plant in Manville, New Jersey, which was built in 1912. The resulting unpublished report by Dr. Lanza noted at the outset that "dust diseases of the lungs develop very slowly, taking from five to fifteen and even twenty to twenty five years to become established", and that, therefore, the results of the study might not be meaningful in light of the relative youth of the facility. Dr. Lanza explained that, "[i]t is possible, therefore, that with the length of time this plant has been established, and with due consideration of the influence of turnover, the three conditions [amount of dust, amount of dangerous substance in the dust, and the length of exposure] may not have been present to a sufficient extent to cause in the workers the symptoms described in the British articles [which described asbestosis]." Exhibit: Dr. Anthony J. Insurance Co., Manville Plant (1930). Lanza and the Metropolitan Life Report of a Dust Study of the of the Johns-Manville Company, at 3 Ill 3 3005. In this unpublished study, Dr. Lanza recognized that a proper investigation should include studies of dust conditions,* "physical examinations of asbestos workers, correlated with known exposures to dust"; and pathological autopsy studies on "human objects and by animal experimentation." The physical examinations of the workers, however, which were to be performed by Metropolitan, were not done because "it was not feasible to conduct physical examinations at Manville." Exhibit: Dr. Anthony J. Lanza and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Report of a Dust Study of the Manville Plant of the Johns-Manville Company, at 3 (1930). 3006. The highest dust levels in the study were found in the Pipe Covering and Cement Department, where the work involved cutting asbestos material "to shape by means of circular and band saws." Although the Department was equipped with a partial exhaust system for removing dust, dust counts measured in the study ranged from 800,000 to 44,700,000 mppcf. Dr. Lanza concluded that of the many departments measured: "the greatest dust count was found in this department; counts made at the saw-slitting pipe covering machine and at the dry and wet refractory cement mixers are excessive." Dr. Lanza further noted that the "majority of workers appeared to be robust, but in the absence of physical examination and further correlation with III 4 length of employment, the conclusions drawn from those observations must be limited, as stated in the introductory portion of this report." Exhibit: Anthony J. Lanza and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Report of a Dust Study of the Manville Plant of the Johns-Manville Company, 25-27 (1930). at 3007. Although Lanza published a report in 1935, (see paragraph 3027, infra). based on his studies of asbestos facilities, he never publicly mentioned that the highest dust levels were found in the Pipe Covering and Cement Department. Significantly, the type of work done by workers in that department -- cutting and shaping of finished products following fabrication of the basic material -- was almost identical to that done by those in industry whose jobs involved the use of the products sold by Manville. Exhibit: Anthony J. Lanza and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Report of a Dust Study of the Manville Plant of the Johns-Manville Company, 25-27 (1930). at Witness: Barry Castleman. 3008. In 1929 and 1930, Dr. Frank Pedley of Metropolitan conducted a never to be published study of 141 III 5 workers at the Canadian Johns-Manville Company at Asbestos, Quebec, and 54 workers in the Thetford Mines in Thetford, Quebec. Pedley personally conducted examinations of 101 of the Asbestos workers, and found that "only 4 suffered from definite first stage pneumoconiosis" (or asbestosis), which he discounted as "doubtful" diagnoses; however, two of his colleagues examined a group of 40, generally older, workers from that location, and found that 14 of those workers suffered from asbestosis. In addition, Pedley's examination of the 54 Thetford workers (who generally were older and had been exposed to asbestos for longer periods) revealed that 24 had asbestosis. Pedley explicitly recognized that the higher incidence of asbestosis at Thetford should be attributed to the "different distribution with respect to age and length of service." Workers with evidence of asbestosis included not only those expected to be exposed to high levels of dust, but also those in categories such as watchman and pipe coverer. Exhibit: Frank Pedley, Report of the Physical Examinations and X-rav Examinations of Asbestos Workers in Asbestos and Thetford Mines. Quebec, at 12-13 (1930). 3009. Pedley concluded from his data "that asbestosis is not likely to develop with an exposure of less than 5 years, but that with exposure of more than 12 years there is a great possibility of it developing." However, III - 6 Pedley was puzzled by the fact that drillers with lower dust exposure had a higher incidence of asbestosis than mill workers with higher exposures; he hypothesized that drillers' exposure to granite dust "may or may not" be relevant. Finally, Pedley reported that "[conversation with physicians and mine managers in the asbestos regions indicated that no hazard to health was suspected in connection with work in the asbestos mining and milling industry," although "[i]n general it may be said that the hazard of pneumoconiosis in the asbestos mining and milling industry has been demonstrated". This study recognizing the hazard of asbestosis to workers exposed to asbestos was circulated throughout Metropolitan, Manville, and other studied companies, but was never published. Exhibit: Frank Pedley, Report of the Physical Examination and X-rav Examinations of Asbestos Workers in Asbestos and Thetford Mines. Quebec, at 13-15 (1930). 3010. Dr. Pedley did, however, publish two articles on asbestosis in 1930 in Industrial Hvcriene and The Canadian Medical Association Journal. Neither article reported the data in the unpublished study showing high levels of asbestosis and the fact that incidence appeared to sharply increase with long exposure. Indeed, the articles stated, contrary to his confidential findings, that no asbestosis cases had been found in Canada, and reported nothing about III - 7 the latency issues. While Pedley reported that "the general impression among miners is that the dust is not hazardous," he did not report that their rosy view was inaccurate. Exhibits: Frank Pedley, "Asbestosis" from Industrial Hygiene, at 576-577 (1930) ; Frank Pedley, "Asbestosis" from 22 Canadian Medical Association Journal. No. 2, at 253-254 (1930). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3011. On March 21, 1930, Manville's Sales Department completed a survey of the medical literature in connection with its sales efforts and possible concerns over dangers of their products. The unpublished Pedley study was not circulated within the Department. The Sales Department did, however, come across Pedley's published (albeit, inaccurate and misleading) articles, and relied upon them. This survey included abstracts from early British literature. Pedley himself cited early British literature. From these abstracts of British reports, it was clear to Manville that long-term exposure to asbestos could produce severe, fatal asbestosis. Exhibit: Excerpts from Various Medical Journals on Pulmonary Asbestosis by Market Analysis III - 8 Section of Manville's Sales Promotion Dept. (March 21, 1930). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3012. Thus, Manville was certainly aware of studies from Great Britain. Indeed, Manville has admitted in asbestos litigation that it kept up with all published literature in the field, and, in addition, Manville had an office in London dating back at least to 1928. Exhibits: Manville Answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 161 in Palcerski. et al. v. Johns-Manville Corp., et al.. Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, No. L-40507-80 (Palcerski Interrogatory Answers); ` . "London: J-M Sales Operation in London Covers All of Free Europe," from JM News Pictorial (March 1952). 3013. On March 17, 1930, Dr. E. R.. A. Merewether and C. W. Price published, for the British Government, a 34- page "Report on Effects of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs and Dust Suppression in the Asbestos Industry." The report recognized that exposure to asbestos dust was hazardous, and ' that the hazard was not limited to asbestos textiles, but also included non-textile products like "insulation materials and articles." Specifically, asbestos dust was found to be created "in large quantities" when asbestos was "manipulated, unmixed with other materials" in: III - 9 Insulation materials includeing] fiberized asbestos 'magnesia,' so-called containing about 15 per cent of fiberized asbestos and 85 per cent of magnesia, and other finely divided mixtures composed partly of fiberized asbestos, used as insulating cements or plasters; fiberized asbestos stiffened into thick sheets, like mats, for lining bulkheads; shaped sections and slabs, moulded from fiberized asbestos or mixtures containing it, or built up of corrugated asbestos paper so as to enclose air cells; mattresses, made of asbestos cloth and filled with fiberized asbestos, magnesia, or other filling. The report specifically recognized that similarly dangerous work took place outside factories, work "which involves use or manipulation of asbestos or products containing it," and that the "insulating of boilers, pipes, engines, and parts of ships is the most important." The Report also cautioned that the "protection afforded by respirators is only partial, and there is a real danger that the use of them may give a sense of false security." The Report went on to note that: In practice, the discomfort of constant wear, and difficulty in speech, etc., render workers very unwilling to use this form of protection for any length of time. Exhibit: E.R.A. Merewether and C.W. Price, Report on Effects of Asbestos Dust on the Lunas III 10 and Dust Suppression in the Asbestos Industry, at 17 and 19 (1930). 3014. In May and June 1930, Dr. Merewether published excerpts of the report in the Journal of Industrial Hygiene, under the title, "The Occurrence of Pulmonary Fibrosis and Other Pulmonary Affects in Asbestos Workers." In July of 1930, the United States Department of Labor published a short discussion of the Merewether/Price Report in a section entitled "Pulmonary Asbestosis" in the Monthly Labor Review. Exhibits: E.R.A. Merewether, "The Occurrence of Pulmonary Fibrosis and Other Pulmonary . Affects in Asbestos Workers", Journal of Industrial Hygiene. (May and June 1930) ; "Pulmonary Asbestosis," Monthly Labor Review. (July 1930). 3015. Dr. Lanza continued to provide Manville counsel Wardwell with information on asbestosis related to Manville's posture in New Jersey with regard to application of workers' compensation to asbestosis. On November 11, 1930, Lanza wrote to Wardwell passing on to him copies, of British laws on the subject. Exhibit: Letter from A. Lanza to A. Wardwell (with enclosure)(November 11, 1930). Ill 11 Witness: Barry Castleman. 3016. In March of 1931, Dr. Lanza submitted a report entitled Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust upon the Lunas of Asbestos Workers to Manville counsel Wardwell. Lanza stated in his cover letter that "[i]t is, of course, understood that this report is confidential and it will be given no publicity by us except with the consent of the firms concerned.'' Exhibit: ' Cover Letter with Enclosed Report, from A. Lanza to A. Wardwell (March 20, 1931). 3017. At the outset, Dr. Lanza noted that - "silicosis (and presumably asbestosis) develops very slowly, taking from five to fifteen and even twenty or twenty-five years to become established." He further noted that there: ...does not appear to be present, in places where asbestos is mined or fabricated in North America, the clearcut clinical picture which is so unescapable in communities with a true silicosis hazard....It might be thought that some of the asbestos plants are of too recent origin for the typical effects of a silicate dust to become manifest, but this theory would not apply to the older mines or to all of the fabricating plants. Ill 12 Exhibit: Cover Letter with Enclosed Report, from A. Lanza to A. Wardwell, at 3 (March 20, 1931). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3018. In discussing dustiness in plants, Lanza cautioned that "we are not justified in assuming that because asbestosis is a milder disease, clinically, than silicosis, the threshold of permissible dust counts is higher. Asbestosis is pathologically different from silicosis, and the experience so far does not warrant an attempt to define an arbitrary standard of dustiness." Exhibit: Cover Letter with Enclosed Report, from Lanza to Wardwell, at 11 (March 20, 1931). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3019. Dr. Lanza noted that while various extant measures "tended to reduce the dust ... they were only partially successful....[I]f it is expected to control dustiness in these plants, final reliance must rest upon properly constructed exhaust equipment." He viewed 75% effectiveness as, "[f]or all practical purposes... quite satisfactory." Ill 13 Exhibit: Cover Letter with Enclosed Report, from A. Lanza to A. Wardwell, at 11 (March 20, 1931) . 3020. Lanza's confidential study revealed that out of 126 factory workers studied, 67 had definite signs of asbestosis. Positive cases were found in all departments, and among all occupations, even those whose exposure to asbestos dust would be relatively low, such as foremen and repairmen. The study also revealed that the incidence of asbestosis increased with years of exposure and age, with the highest incidence by far among those with more than 15 years of exposure. Exhibit: Cover Letter with Enclosed Report, from A. Lanza to A. Wardwell, at 14-15 (March 20, 1931). 3021. Lanza additionally reported several cases of insurance disability claims as a result of asbestosis, and "one death due to uncomplicated asbestosis in an individual with many years employment in the industry". In this confidential study, Dr. Lanza concluded that "[p]rolonged exposure to asbestos dust causes a pulmonary fibrosis of a definite type distinct from silicosis;" it is possible for asbestosis to cause death; that it was "not practicable as yet to establish standards for the dust content of air and...it is possible that asbestos mav cause pneumoconiosis more readily than free silica:" and that the "amount of dust III - 14 in the air in the asbestos plants studied can be substantially reduced." Exhibit: Cover Letter with Enclosed Report, from A. Lanza to A. Wardwell, at 19-21 (March 20, 1931) (emphasis added). 3022. Dr. Lanza recommended that "the industry seriously face the problem of dust control in asbestos plants," that employees be examined physically "every year or certainly every two years" including chest X-rays, and that "the industry sponsor studies on known cases of asbestosis." Exhibit: Cover Letter with Enclosed Report, from A. Lanza to A. Wardwell, at 21 (March 20, 1931). 3023. On July 9, 1931, Dr. McConnell of Metropolitan sent to Manville counsel Wardwell a copy of the Metropolitan Life Canadian Report, with the Manville plant designated as Plant F. McConnell noted in his cover letter that "(tjhis report, like the report on the American plants, will be given no publicity by us except with the consent of the firms concerned." This Canadian report, which covered 156 mine and mill employees, noted at the outset that, although silica particles larger than 10 microns could not enter lung tissue, asbestos particles much larger than that had been found in English asbestos workers. The dust counts III 15 done, however, yielded at least 93% sub-10 micron readings. Of the 156 employees, 14% showed definite signs of asbestosis, with 31% of those with more then 15 years of exposure showing signs of asbestosis, and 56% over the age of 50 years showing signs of asbestosis. The report reached conclusions and made recommendations essentially identical to those in the March American plants report. Exhibit: Cover Letter with Enclosed Report, from W. McConnell to A. Wardwell, at 2, 12, and 13 (July 9, 1931). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3024. On July 15, 1931, Drs. Lanza and McConnell met with Manville executives Voorhees, Pond, Hughes, and Sager to discuss the Metropolitan Life reports. Dr. Lanza suggested that anyone showing signs of asbestosis "should be transferred to a location in the plant where the exposure is not so great." He further told the Manville executives that "asbestosis should be made compensable under the New Jersey [workers' compensation] law. He feels that this is the only protection which the industry has, and that permitting the disease to remain outside the compensable class lends encouragement to unethical lawyers and physicians to work up claims". Dr. McConnell informed the Manville executives III - 16 that even the most up-to-date pressure masks were inadequate to screen out the hazardous dust. Exhibit: Clifford Sager, Minutes of Meeting, at 2-3 (July 15, 1931). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3025. In 1932, a study was conducted, in cooperation with Metropolitan Life, of 1140 workers at Manville's plant located in Manville, New Jersey. Exhibit: "Physical Examinations at Manville Factory, Manville, New Jersey" (1932) . Witness: Barry Castleman. 3026. Dr. Lanza's unpublished 1932 Report on his study of the Manville, New Jersey, plant workers revealed that 327 of the 1140 workers evaluated -- 29% -- had signs of asbestosis. (The report labeled positive x-ray results for workers exposed to asbestos only at Manville "asbestosis", and called positive x-rays for those who had worked in dusty conditions before their Manville employment "pneumoconiosis"). Forty-three asbestosis cases were found in the Pipe Covering and Cement Departments: The report noted that those departments had the "highest percentage of III 17 asbestosis cases*. Additionally, the report showed asbestos disease among a broad range of workers, including many in jobs which Manville classified as having no exposure to dust, including two machinists (Case Nos. 110 and 321) , two steamfitters (Case Nos. 129 and 130), five packing and shipping department workers (Case Nos. 80, 88, 108, 172 and 183), a pipefitter (Case No. 312), a watchman (Case No. 319), a millwright (Case No. 324), a glove department worker (Case No. 185), and an outside laborer (Case No. 220). In addition, cases were found among those working in the departments where finished materials like firefelt, magnesia, or superex (materials containing only a minority percentage of asbestos) were cut and sawed (Case Nos. 25, 149, and 199 respectively). These findings, however. were never published. Exhibit: "Physical Examinations at Manville Factory, Manville, New Jersey" (1932) . Witness: Barry Castleman. 3027. In4eed, although in 1935 Lanza published a report purportedly based on his research studies in the field, he chose to omit any discussion whatsoever of this 1932 study. The findings from the 1932 study fully disclose III 18 that Manville was aware as early as 1932 that workers exposed to low doses of asbestos could get asbestosis. Exhibits: ''Physical Examinations at Manville Factory, Manville, New Jersey," (1932); Lanza, A.J., McConnell, W.J. and Fehnel, J.W., "The Effect of Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers," U.S. Public Health Report 50 (1935); also published at Journal of Industrial Hygiene 17 (1935) and Bulletin of Hygiene 10 (1935). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3028. Other documentary evidence shows that Manville was well aware of the hazard of even minimal exposure to dust containing asbestos. On December 30, 1932, W. B. Kelly, manager of the Redwood Factory, wrote to Vice President Williams and informed him that "[e]ffective November 1932 we required our milling machine operator to wear a respirator," and "[w]e are adopting the Lompoc system of supplying respirators to all employees who come in contact with anv degree of dust." (Lompoc was another Manville facility.) (emphasis added). Exhibit: Letter from W.B. Kelly to S. Williams (December 30, 1932). Ill - 19 3029. Meanwhile, Manville went to great lengths to assure that knowledge of the problem did not get out to the general populace, including its own workers. Manville's Board of Directors decided to settle asbestosis lawsuits brought against the corporation, and successfully insisted that the settlements include a written assurance from the attorney for the various plaintiffs that he would not directly or indirectly participate in the bringing of any new actions against Manville. Exhibits: Manville Board of Directors Minutes (April 24, 1933); Manville Board of Directors Minutes (June 25, 1933); Letter from Greenstone to G. Hobart (June 26, 1933); Letter from Greenstone to Minard (June 26, 1933). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3030. Notwithstanding the increasing instances of asbestos exposure causing disability among its employees, Manville held firm to a policy of not taking adequate precautions. For example, despite a report by the manager of its Redwood plant in 1932 that *[d]ue to the uncertainty of continued operation here we have not planned any new equipment for dust collection," Vice President Williams III - 20 apparently took no action to set the Redwood manager straight, or to make certain that full precautions were taken. Exhibit: Letter from W.B. Kelly to S. Williams (December 30, 1932). 3031. Similar behavior was exhibited with respect to Manville's Waukegan Plant, where, in 1933, a proposal to install dust collecting equipment was scaled back------by a decision of Manville's president and other top executives------ on the ground that "as the business develops, the remainder of the mill can be taken care of later on.* Thus, Manville determined that the profitability of the plant would determine the extent of the dust ventilation. Even Manville's Medical Director complained that he was "frustrated and puzzled by J-M's operating philosophy which relates environmental control development to a division's profit-and-loss statements: I am particularly distressed that systems to safeguard employee health and safety are not implemented until an operation is shown to be profitable." SXftWts: Memorandum from J. P. Kottcamp to S. Williams (December 22, 1933); Memorandum from D. C. Renton to S. Williams (January 13, 1933); Memorandum from S. Williams to J. P. Kottcamp. (January 13, 1933); III 21 Memorandum from S. Williams to J. P. Kottcamp (January 17, 1933); Memorandum from S. Williams to J. P. Kottcamp (March 31, 1933); Memorandum from Dr. P. Kotin to Fletcher (April l, 1976). 3032. In the summer of 1933, after the agreement was made to settle the asbestosis lawsuits, and the plaintiffs' attorney was neutralized (see paragraph 3029, supra), Dr. Lanza met with physicians at Manville's Waukegan plant. A verbatim transcription of his answers to their questions was prepared, and was forwarded by Vice President Williams to A. R. Fisher, manager of the Manvill'e, New Jersey, plant on August 29, 1933. Exhibit: "Questions Asked Dr. A. J. Lanza and His Answers Verbatim," forwarded by S. Williams to A. Fisher (August 29, 1933). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3033. In his discussion with the Waukegan physicians, Lanza stated that "[r]espirators are not satisfactory. It is possible to construct a respirator which will filter out fine dust, but it would offer so much resistance to respiration that it could not be worn continuously on an eight hour shift." While Dr. Lanza noted III 22 that such airline respirators were "on the market," he was fully aware that they cannot be worn except by a person who stands in one place as they have to be hooked up with a rubber tube to an air line. I doubt if they would be practical in a textile plant." Exhibit: "Questions Asked Dr. A. J. Lanza and His Answers Verbatim," forwarded by S. Williams to A. Fisher (August 29, 1933). 3034. Asked whether the workers should be warned of the hazard in breathing asbestos dust, Lanza responded that no such warnings should be given, "especially ... in view of the extraordinary legal situation" (presumably a reference to the recently settled asbestosis suits). Exhibit: "Questions Asked Dr. A. J. Lanza and His Answers Verbatim," forwarded by S. Williams to A. Fisher (August 29, 1933). 3035. Asked whether employees diagnosed as having asbestosis would be removed from areas that produce dust, Lanza responded that it would depend on a number of factors: If he is well along in years and shows no disability, it may be just as well to leave him alone. One of the difficulties and vexations in trying to deal with the problem of pneumoconiosis is that economic as well as production factors must be balanced against the medical factors. Ill - 23 Exhibit: "Questions Asked Dr. A. J. Lanza and His Answers Verbatim," forwarded by S. Williams to A. Fisher (August 29, 1933). 3036. Finally, Lanza confirmed a view that any exposure to dust should be avoided, if possible: "When everything possible has been done to [control the dust], it may then be necessary to isolate or confine the dusty processes so as to avoid needless exposure of other employees not concerned in these processes." Exhibit: "Questions Asked Dr. A. J. Lanza and His Answers Verbatim," forwarded by S. Williams to A. Fisher (August 29, 1933). 3037. Thus, Dr. Lanza, knowing the situation was dangerous, and so informing Manville's management, nevertheless recommended that the workers at risk not be so informed. Exhibit: "Questions Asked Dr. A. J. Lanza and His Answers Verbatim," forwarded by S. Williams to A. Fisher (August 29, 1933). 3038. In November of 1933, Dr. Lanza spoke on asbestos exposure to the Home Office Life Underwriters Association. In comments "printed for private circulation only," he discussed the findings of the 1929 Canadian and III 24 1931 American studies described supra. Dr. Lanza told those present that ''occasionally, asbestos cases die," and that "we don't know nearly enough about [the effect of asbestos] to try to formulate any dust count standards." He omitted . from his discussion, however, his discovery in 1932 that 29% of the Manville, New Jersey plant's workers had signs of asbestosis, and that the highest percentage of cases were found in departments where exposures were similar to those which would be encountered by end users of the products. Exhibits: A. J. Lanza, "Comments on Asbestos" from Proceedings of the Meeting of the Home Life Underwriters Association (for private circulation only)(November 1933) ; See paragraphs 3023 and 3026, supra. (2) Manville Extended Its Concealment Activities To Include A Conspiracy With Ravbestos-Manhattan 3039. On November 17, 1933, Sumner Simpson, President of Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., wrote to W. R. Seigle, President of Manville, suggesting joint action by members of the asbestos textile industry with regard to standardized methods of dust control. On November 28, 1933, Seigle, E. M. Voorhees, S. A. Williams, and Vandiver Brown of Manville met with Dr. Lanza to discuss this suggestion. Dr. Lanza stated that he would be interested in completing the studies begun earlier by Metropolitan Life, and III - 25 expanding them to include Manville plants at Waukegan, Gretna, Lousiana; Pittsburg, California; and Redwood City, California. He also said that the industry would be expected to bear some of the expenses of the study. Exhibit: Minutes of Meeting in W. R. Seigle's Office (November 28, 1933). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3040. Litigation concerns resulting from exposures to asbestos were vital in these 1933 discussions. It was suggested that "it might be helpful if Mr. Wardwell [Manville's corporate counsel] would communicate with Mr. Ecker [president of Metropolitan Life] about the time Dr. Lanza's report would be submitted to him, with the view of informing him of the importance to the industry and to Johns-Manville Corporation of the contemplated survey." And Voorhees offered that the dust studies to be done "would be helpful to us, if favorable, in the event we should ever be involved in litigation." Exhibit: Minutes of Meeting in W. R. Seigle's Office (November 28, 1933)-. Witness: Barry Castleman. Ill - 26 3041. On December 29, 1933, Raybestos-Manhattan President Sumner Simpson and Secretary M.F. Judd met at Manville's offices with Seigle, Voorhees, Williams, and Vandiver Brown. At this meeting, it was agreed to enlist the services of Metropolitan Life and Dr. Lanza to survey dust conditions at their respective facilities and that the "past policy of keeping this matter confidential is to be pursued and the question of publicity deferred until such time as the second report is available for our analysis." Exhibit: Minutes of Meeting in W. R. Seigle's Office (December 29, 1933). Witnesses: Barry Castleman; John Marsh; Richard Plotkin; Robert Sims; William Simpson; Irving Pedley. . 3042. The following week, on January 4, 1934, ' representatives of Manville and Raybestos-Manhattan (including Vandiver Brown) met with Dr. Lanza to formalize the research project. In this meeting, Dr. Lanza "pointed out that there was still a good deal to be learned on the III - 27 subject of asbestos dust including not only the harmful effects, if any, upon workers exposed to it but also as to the point at which the quantity of dust in the air became dangerous." Dr. Lanza also suggested that representatives of Metropolitan Life ''could specify the type of equipment that should be used* to eliminate dust. In response, A. R. Fisher of Manville stated that "it was quite likely that no individuals could be found who would know more on the particular subject of dust elimination or dust reduction under the conditions encountered in the asbestos industry than those employees of Johns-Manville and Raybestos who had, through a process of trial and error, devised certain equipment now being used and which it was thought was successfully coping with the problem." Exhibit: Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd, with Enclosed Minutes of January 4, 1934 Meeting (January 5, 1934) ; Witnesses: Barry Castleman; John Marsh; Richard Plotkin; Robert Sims; William Simpson; Irving Pedley. Ill - 28 3043. Much of the discussion at the January 4, 1934 meeting centered around how to frame the studies in terms of potential litigation. On April 11, 1934, Manville counsel Vandiver Brown wrote to Vice President Williams discussing Dr. Lanza's search for an assistant to take dust counts. Brown's report centered around the fact that "the person so engaged may probably be required at a later date to give testimony at trials as an expert." Indeed, the person selected -- one Otto Binder -- was hired and paid by Manville, which lent him to Metropolitan Life. Exhibits; Letter from Vandiver Brown to S. Williams (April 11, 1934) ; . Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd (March 11, 1936); Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd (May 14, 1936). Witnesses: Barry Castleman; Irving Pedley. 3044. The desire of Manville, Raybestos, and Metropolitan to secure research results which would benefit their posture in the event of litigation, rather than to determine objectively, and make available to others concerned (including the United States Government) the extent of the hazard posed by asbestos, was further established by the III - 29 events surrounding the pre-publication activities of Dr. Lanza, and Manville and Raybestos officials. See paragraphs 3045-3055, infra. 3045. On December 7, 1934, Dr. Lanza sent to Manville counsel Vandiver Brown the galley proof of a study entitled, "Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers." Although written in 1934, it reported only the studies made under the auspices of Metropolitan Life between 1929 and 1931. It omitted Dr. Lanza's earlier statements regarding high levels of dust in the pipe covering and cement departments, and the significant data showing high levels of asbestosis in Manville's Manville, New Jersey plant, particularly in the pipe covering and cement departments. Moreover, it did not in any way seek to utilize the findings of the comprehensive 1932 study which covered all the Manville, New Jersey, workers -- as opposed to the random sample studied earlier. Moreover, while the study left the impression in the introduction that the Canadian studies of mines and mills were included in the report, the data discussed was only from American fabricating plants. Though the earlier unpublished draft in 1931 suggested at Conclusion 6 that "it is possible that asbestos may cause pneumoconiosis more readily than free silica," this conclusion was omitted from the pre-publication galleys. Perhaps most significantly, III - 30 the pre-publication galleys omitted any mention -- made in the confidential studies described supra -- that there had been reported cases of death from asbestosis elsewhere. Exhibits; Letter from Vandiver Brown to Anthony Lanza (December 10, 1934) ; Lanza, A.J., McConnell, W.J. and Fehnel, J.W., "The Effect of Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers," U.S. Public Health Report 50 (1935); also published at Journal of Industrial Hygiene 17 (1935) and Bulletin of Hygiene 10 (1935). 3046. On December 10, 1934, Vandiver Brown wrote to Dr. Lanza making still further suggestions for revisions that would be favorable to the industry's litigative interests. In Lanza's 1932 report, he had stated that "[c]linically, from this study it appeared to be of a type milder than silicosis." He had omitted this passage from the draft sent to Brown. Brown stated that this language from "your original report presented an aspect of your survey that was favorable to the industry and we should like to see [it] returned." Brown also informed Lanza that he was sending the proof sheets to George Hobart (Manville's Newark counsel, who was instrumental in securing the settlements of the 1933 law suits) for his comments, and that he (Brown) would ask Raybestos if they wished to see the proofs prior to publication. Ill - 31 Exhibits: Letter from Vandiver Brown to Anthony Lanza (December 10, 1934) ; Lanza, A.J., McConnell, W.J. and Fehnel, J.w. , "The Effect of Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers," U.S. Public Health Report 50 (1935); also published at Journal of Industrial Hygiene 17 (1935) and Bulletin of Hygiene 10 (1935). 3047. On December 15, 1934, Hobart informed Vandiver Brown that he was very concerned with the statement in the draft that "[i]t might well be assumed that similar variables [to those yielding silicosis] would influence the occurrence of asbestosis." Hobart observed that "we have consistently urged that there is a substantial difference between silicosis and asbestosis -- both as to the clinical nature of the disease and as to the reasonable probability of its incidence." Also, Hobart noted: the probability that the New Jersey Commission will introduce a bill in the Legislature which opens in January of 1935; and if it is the policy of JohnsManville to oppose any bill that attempted to include asbestosis, as compensable, it would be very helpful to have an official report to show that there is a substantial difference between asbestosis and silicosis; and by the same token it would be troublesome if an official report should appear from which the conclusion might be drawn that there is very little if any difference between the two diseases. Ill 32 Exhibits;. Letter from George Hobart to Vandiver Brown (December 15, 1934) ; Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd (December 18, 1934). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. 3048. Hobart reminded Brown, in language strikingly similar to Manville's defense position in modern day asbestos litigation, that they had urged that asbestosis not be listed as a compensable disease because: it is only within a comparatively recent time that asbestosis has been recognized by the medical and scientific professions as a disease -- in fact oneof our principal defenses in actions against the company on the common law theory of negligence has been that the scientific and medical knowledge has been insufficient until a very recent period to place upon the owners of plants or factories the burden or duty of taking special precautions against the possible onset of the disease to their employees. Safaifrits: Letter from George Hobart to Vandiver Brown (December 15, 1934) ; Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd (December 18, 1934)7 Borel v. Fibreboard. 493 F.2d 1076, 1092 (5th Cir. 1973), cert, denied. 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Ill - 33 Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. 3049. On December 18, 1934, Brown forwarded copies of the proofs to M. F. Judd of Raybestos, along with his and Hobart's comments on it. Brown also informed Judd that "I was just talking to Dr. Lanza and I am inclined to believe he will accede to most of our requests by making appropriate provisions in the article.'1' Exhibit: Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. E. Judd (December 18, 1934). Witnesses: Barry Castleman; Irving Pedley. , 3050. On December 21, 1934, Brown forwarded Hobart's letter to Dr. Lanza, and expressed his "trust that you will give [Hobart's] comments and suggestions, as well as those mentioned in my letter of December 10th, your most serious consideration." Although Brown felt compelled to write that "no one in our organization is suggesting for a moment that you alter by one jot or tittle any scientific facts or inevitable conclusions revealed or justified by your preliminary survey," the context of the correspondence shows an effort to suppress any negative information. Brown concluded by stating that, "All we ask is that all of the III - 34 favorable aspects of the survey be included and that none of the unfavorable be unintentionally pictured in darker tones than the circumstances justify. I feel confident we can depend upon you and Dr. McConnell to give us this 'break' and mine and Mr. Hobart's suggestions are presented in this spirit." Exhibit: Letter from Vandiver Brown to Anthony J. Lanza (December 21, 1934). Witnesses: Barry Castleman; Irving Pedley. 3051. On December 24, 1934, Brown wrote to Judd apologizing for a chain of events which led to his returning the galley proofs, with comments, of Lanza's article prior to Raybestos having an opportunity to review it for comments. Noting that Manville's and Raybestos' interests were identical on this matter and that "Mr. Hobart and I together canvassed fairly thoroughly the points in the proof to which we could justifiably suggest additions, omissions or changes in phraseology that will be beneficial from the Industry viewpoint," he explained that time was of the essence because Lanza "had received word from Dr. Sayers in Washington that unless the proof were returned to them with suggested changes and corrections by Monday of this week it III 35 would be printed as it stood. It seems it is scheduled for inclusion in some governmental publication that will appear on December 28th." Exhibit: . Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd (December 24, 1934). Witnesses: Barry Castleman; Irving Pedley. 3052. On January 2, 1935, Judd responded to Brown, telling him that "[b]oth Mr. Simpson [president of Raybestos] and myself feel quite safe in leaving the approval of the report in your hands. I do think that Mr. Hobart made some excellent suggestions in his letter of Dec. 15, and hope that Dr. Lanza will give a lot of consideration to the comments." Exhibit: Letter from M. F. Judd to Vandiver Brown (January 2, 1935). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra 3053. On January 4, 1935, the Lanza Study, entitled "Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers," was published by the United States Public III - 36 Health Service. It incorporated the changes suggested by Manville's attorneys. Exhibit: Lanza, A.J., McConnell, W.J. and Fehnel, J.W., "The Effect of Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers," U.S. Public Health Report 50 (1935); also published at Journal of Industrial Hygiene 17' (1935) and Bulletin of Hygiene 10 (1935). 3054. The report noted that in "the insulating departments of plant A [a Manville plant], asbestos is but 5 percent of the total material used. In the molded brake lining and clutch division of plant D, asbestos comprises about 25 percent of the total material. The actual exposure to asbestos dust, therefore, is considerably less than is indicated in the [reported] dust counts." Yet, as shown elsewhere, Manville and Lanza were aware that workers in such "low dose" departments were showing signs of asbestosis. Exhibit: Lanza, A.J., McConnell, W.J. and Fehnel, J.W., "The Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers," U.S. Public Health Report. at 4 (1935). 3055. Although pages 9 and 10 of the published report indicated only three asbestosis-related disability claims, by 1935 Manville had compensated more than a dozen workers from its Manville, New Jersey, plant alone for III - 37 asbestosis. The report conspicuously omitted any mention that deaths had been caused by asbestosis. Indeed, the very next month, on February 19, 1935, S. A. Whiting, Assistant Chief Engineer of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, wrote to Lanza, noting that he and his colleagues were interested in the asbestos exposure issue, ''since we have some severe experiences from it including a number of death cases." Exhibits: Lanza, A.J., McConnell, W.J. and Fehnel, J.W., "The Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers," U.S. Public Health Report. at 9-10 (1935); Summary of Claims Against Johns-Manville Manville Plant (undated); ' Letter from S.A. Whiting to A.J. Lanza (February 19, 1935). Witnesses: Barry Castleman; William Reitze. 3056. Metropolitan Life continued to survey Manville facilities through 1936, including Manville's California plants in Redwood City, Pittsburg, Los Angeles, and Lompoc. Metropolitan Life's Medical Department noted in its 1936 Annual Report that several thousand X-rays of workers in those plants were sent to the home office and were read and interpreted. There is no evidence that any report was ever made on findings from those X-rays. Ill 38 Exhibit; W. J. McConnell, "Annual Report of the Industrial Health Section-1936" (1936). 3057. Even as Manville made some efforts to encourage the use of respirators (although Dr. Lanza had informed them earlier that none of the existing types were practical or provided adequate protection), it continued to seek to hide from its own workers the scope of the potential danger. For example, on August 21, 1935, Brown wrote to J. B. Davies, the manager of the industrial department of the Mine Safety Appliances Company, from whom Manville purchased respirators. He sought guidance from Davies as to how other companies had warned of "dangers involved" and had encouraged respirator use without "causing [employees] undue alarm or suggesting to [them] that [they] go out and hire a lawyer." Exhibit; Letter from Vandiver Brown to J. B. Davies (August 21, 1935). Witnesses; Barry Castleman; Irving Pedley. 3058. A principal vehicle for communicating information in the asbestos product industry in this period was Asbestos magazine. Founded in 1919, its stated "sole III - 39 purpose [was] to keep the asbestos industry advised of developments within it....Every man in your organization should be urged to read the Industry's magazine." Indeed, that is precisely what Manville urged its district and factory managers to do. As shown below. Asbestos sought to be a forum to discuss health problems arising from asbestos dust exposure and it was aware of British studies. But when it thought about publishing such articles, it checked first with Manville and Raybestos -- the two titans of the industry -- and was warned off. Exhibits: Asbestos Magazine, at 38 (January 1937) ; Asbestos Magazine, at 4-5 (November 1919); Asbestos Magazine, at 18-19 (October 1919). 3059. On September 25, 1935, A. S. Rossiter, editor of Asbestos, wrote to Sumner Simpson suggesting that the magazine do a feature on asbestosis and requesting his cooperation in such a feature: You may recall that we have written you on several occasions concerning the publishing of information, or discussions of, asbestosis and the work which has been, and is being done, to eliminate or at least reduce it. Always you have requested that for certain obvious reasons we publish nothing, and, naturally your wishes have been respected. Ill - 40 Possibly by this time, however, the reasons for your objection to publicity on this subject have been eliminated, and if so, we would like very much to review the whole matter in Asbestos. Our thought is that we could either prepare from data which we have in our files, or obtain from Mr. A. A. Godfrey of the Cape Asbestos Company, London, who is much interested in the subject, an article on the work done in England and then follow it with an article written by someone in your organization, as to the work done here. Exhibit; Letter from A. S. Rossiter to Sumner Simpson (September 25, 1935). Witnesses; See paragraph 3041, supra. 3060. Rossiter then suggested that some activities at one of Raybestos' plants might be featured, and requested "a photograph or two.* She concluded by saying: We await with much interest your reply. If there is no serious objection it would seem to be a most interesting subject for the pages of Asbestos and possibly a discussion of it in Asbestos along the right lines, would serve to combat some of the rather undesirable publicity given to it in current newspapers. Exhibit: Letter from A.S. Rossiter to S. Simpson (September 25, 1935). Ill - 41 Witnesses; See paragraph 3041, supra. 3061. Responses of Simpson and Vandiver Brown to Rossiter's suggestion, however, demonstrated that the last thing they wanted was a public airing of the problem. On October 1, 1935 -- almost immediately upon receipt of Rossiter's letter -- Simpson forwarded a copy to Brown, with the following comments; I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are, but at the same time, we cannot lose track of the fact that there have been a number of articles on asbestos dust control and asbestosis in the British trade magazines. The magazine Asbestos is in business to publish articles affecting the trade and they have been very decent about not re-printing the English articles. Exhibit; Letter from Sumner Simpson to Vandiver Brown (October 1, 1935). Witnesses; See paragraph 3041, supra. 3062. Vandiver Brown responded swiftly, writing to Simpson on October 3, 1935; I quite agree with you that our interests are best served by having asbestosis receive the minimum of publicity. Even if we should eventually decide to raise no objection to the III - 42 publication of an article on asbestosis in rAsbestos 1, I think we should warn the editors to use American data on the subject rather than English. Dr. Lanza has frequently remarked, to me personally and in some of his papers, that the clinical picture presented in North American localities where there is an asbestos dust hazard is considerably milder than that reported in England and South Africa. I believe the question raised by Miss Rossiter might well be considered at the committee meeting scheduled for next Tuesday, at which I understand both you and Mr. Judd will be present. The article proposed by Rossiter never came to pass. Exhibit: Letter from Vandiver Brown to Sumner Simpson (October 3, 1935). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra (3) Manville Recruits Other Industry Members To Join In Sponsorship Of Research By The Saranac Lake Laboratory, But Acts To Sup press Results Of That Research 3063. Although Manville's principal research regarding asbestos dust hazards in the late 1920s and 1930s ' was done through Metropolitan Life, beginning in 1925 Manville provided funds ''to sponsor animal research on the effects of asbestosis at the Saranac Laboratory of the Trudeau Foundation in upstate New York.* This was the III - 43 beginning of a thirty-year working relationship between Manville and Saranac to study the origin and effects of the asbestos health hazard. As facts below demonstrate, however, the relationship was one in which Manville (and later other members of the industry) wanted only to hear good news and went out of its way to suppress anything that might be indicative of bad news. Exhibits: Manville's Answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 133 in Palcerski. et al. v. Johns-Manville Coro., et al.. Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, No. L-40507-80 (Palcerski Interrogatory Answers); See paragraphs 3064-3081 and Section F(9) of this Volume, infra. . 3064. Manville and Raybestos continued to look to the future in terms of asbestosis and their potential legal liability. To that end, in 1936, Manville, Raybestos, and seven other asbestos product manufacturers formally employed Dr. Leroy Gardner of the Saranac Lake Laboratory to conduct studies, which would be used if useful to the industry. As Sumner Simpson explained on November 10, 1936, in soliciting Thermoid Rubber Company to join the research-funding consortium: As you no doubt know, Johns-Manville and ourselves have been doing considerable work, in conjunction with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., in the way of eliminating Asbestos Dust in our III - 44 factories, and we have made a very satisfactory job of it. We have not reached the point where we can eliminate a large part of the Dust, but as yet have no definite information as to what Asbestosis will lead into. They claim it leads to Tuberculosis, but we do not find this to be the case. Still, we cannot go into court and state definitely and specifically that it will not do so. We do know that Asbestos Fibres can, and do> get into the lungs, and may set up a Fibrosis condition, which, for want of a better name, some doctors have called Asbestosis. . . . Dr. Gardner's Laboratory charge is $5,000.00 per year, and any study should be based on a three year period, in order to get results that will stand up and be accepted by the medical fraternity, and, I believe, by the courts. I think the Compensation Laws in the various states will become more rigid in the next few years and, no doubt, Asbestos, on account of the advertising it has had lately, will become one of the Compensation cases, and we should have all the information we can possibly get to submit to the Compensation Commissions of the various states when the question of Asbestosis comes up. . . The idea of Mr. Brown and myself would be to have [several] Asbestos manufacturers [fund the studies], and then we could determine from time to time after the findings are made, whether we wish anv publication or not. My own idea is that it would be a good thing to distribute the information among the medical fraternity, providing it is of the right type and would not injure our companies, (emphasis added). The corollary, quite obviously, was that if the findings III - 45 hurt the companies' legal position, they would be suppressed. Exhibit: Letter from S. Simpson to Scluter (November 10, 1936). Witnesses: ' See paragraph 3041, supra. 3065. On November 20, 1936, the companies formally entered into a contract with Dr. Gardner; Manville and Raybestos took the lead, making the payments to Dr. Gardner and then afterward being reimbursed by the others. At that time, Vandiver Brown wrote to Gardner noting that: It is our -further understanding that the results obtained will be considered the property of those who are advancing the required funds, who will determine whether, to what extent-and in what manner they shall be made public, the manuscript of your study will be submitted to us for approval prior to publication. Exhibits: Contract between asbestos companies and Saranac Lake Laboratory (November 20, 1936) ; Letter from Vandiver Brown to Leroy Gardner (November 20, 1936) . Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. Ill - 46 3066. On December 4, 1936, Dr. Gardner wrote to Simpson acknowledging the first payment from Brown. He assured Simpson that *[w]e shall make every effort to proceed as rapidly as possible with this investigation, which I am sure can furnish results which will be of benefit to all of us.* (emphasis added). Exhibit: Letter from L. Gardner to S. Simpson (December 4, 1936). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. 3067. Meanwhile, the Air Hygiene Foundation -- established by various industry associations in the early 1930s -- was reconstituting itself as a membership organization not of associations, but of individual companies. As described in a letter dated December 4, 1936, from Vandiver Brown to C. J. Stover of Asbestos Magazine, the Foundation would look into issues surrounding workers' compensation laws and issues of industry liability. Noteworthy was the presence of Dr. Lanza as chairman of the Foundation's Medical Committee. Brown asked Stover to publicize the Foundation in Asbestos. noting that "[a]lthough the Air Hygiene Foundation is approaching various problems relating to air hygiene from an unbiased viewpoint, it is nevertheless, the creature of industry and III - 47 is the one institution upon which employers can rely completely for a sympathetic appreciation of their viewpoint.* Stover promptly carried out Brown's request in a letter dated December 8, 1936, to members of the asbestos industry, leading off his appeal with the observation that "silicosis or asbestosis [he apparently viewed the two as synonymous] is a subject of considerable interest to this industry." He concluded that membership in the Air Hygiene Foundation would be beneficial because its officers and trustees were "a cross-section of the very finest American industries, insurance companies, chemists, attorneys and others interested in the prevention of silicosis and the protection of industries from unreasonable claims of workers." Exhibits: Letter from Vandiver Brown to C.J. Stover (December 4, 1936); Letter from A.S. Rossiter to S. Simpson (March 21 1939)? Letter from S. Simpson to A.S. Rossiter (March 22 1939). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. 3068. Meanwhile, Dr. Gardner was conducting his research at Saranac Lake Laboratory. On April 19, 1938, Dr Gardner sent J-M a copy of '"a summary of our experiments on III 48 asbestos is ... [t] rusting that you may not be too disappointed by the negative character of the results''. Enclosed were copies of the Second Progress Report of the Saranac studies on asbestosis, dated April 18, 1938. In that Report, Dr. Gardner preliminarily concluded, through experimentation, that it is the longer fibers rather than the small particles of asbestos dust which potentially constitute the greatest health hazard. That is, those animals exposed to extremely fine asbestos particles, even though the concentrations were 10 to 15 times greater than those animals exposed to asbestos fibers, had little or no fibrosis after a year's exposure. In contrast, those animals exposed to much lower concentrations of asbestos fibers had significant development of fibrosis after a year's exposure. Exhibits: Letter from L. Gardner to V. Brown (April 19, 1938) ; Second Progress Report on Experimental Asbestosis by the Saranac Laboratory (April 18, 1938). Witnesses: Barry Castleman; Irving Pedley. 3069. Most importantly, Gardner early on pinpointed those areas of the industry where workers are at greatest risk, i.e., in those departments "where fibrous types of III - 49 dust are generated." On page 9 of his report, Gardner states: Verification of the proposed mechanical hypothesis and the establishment of a relationship between the length of fiber and the irritating properties of asbestos would explain the hitherto mysterious distribution of asbestosis in various departments of this industry. In Thetford mills there seems to be little or no disease in spite of heavy atmospheric concentration of dust. Here the fibrous elements of the dust are largely very short and hence perhaps not irritating. In the English plants it has been stated that the process of "mattress beating" is productive of the greatest amount of asbestosis. This process could readily break many fibers longitudinally, liberating a dust rich in fragments short enough to be inhaled but long enough to be irritating. In the American factories the amount of disease is not always parallel to the atmospheric concentration of dust. More cases have developed after exposure to the "opening" machines and crushers. Since opening is a crushing operation it might produce the most effective length of fiber.* * * Until the hygienic . significance of fibre length has been established, all asbestos dust must still be considered hazardous. (emphasis supplied). Exhibits: Letter from Leroy Gardner to Vandiver Brown (April 19, 1938); Second Progress Report on Experimental Asbestosis by the Saranac Laboratory (April 18, 1938). Witnesses: Barry Castleman; III 50 Irving Pedley. 3070. In August 1938, the United States Public Health Service published a report, under the principal authorship of Waldemar C. Dreessen, entitled "A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry." The USPHS was requested by the State of North Carolina to do a study of asbestos textile plants in that state. The government's efforts to do a full-scale investigation were hampered by the fact that 15 months before the study began "approximately 150 workers in these textile factories [out of a total of 541] were replaced by workers with little or no previous asbestos exposure . . . Partly as a result of these personnel changes, the group of employees examined in this study had an unusually low average age. There was an abnormally large percentage of workers with less than 5 years' experience in the asbestos textile industry and an abnormally small percentage of persons who had worked 10 years or more in this industry." Examination of X-rays showed that 73 of 445 workers so examined showed signs of asbestosis, and that the incidence of asbestosis increased with amount and length of exposure. Due to an additional limitation inherent in the USPHS studies -- that in its cohorts based in asbestos textile factories "very few workmen are exposed for a long period of time to low concentrations of asbestos dust" -- Dreessen admitted that he could not make a definitive assessment as to what levels III - 51 of exposure might be safe. But he went on to say that "[bjecause of the importance of the problem, it seems to be desirable to use such data as are at hand to define tentative safe working conditions that may serve as standards for the guidance of factory managers and engineers until more complete data are available." Since he had found clear-cut asbestosis cases ''only in dust concentrations exceeding 5 million particles per cubic foot, and because they were not found at lower dust concentrations, 5 million particles per cubic foot may be regarded tentatively as the threshold value for asbestos-dust exposure until better data are available." Exhibit: Dreessen, W.C., Dalla Vale, J.M., Edwards, T.I. and Miller, J.W. , "A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry," Public Health Bulletin No. 241, published by the Public Health Service of the U.S. Treasury Department, at 2, 46, 89-91 (August 1938) (hereinafter, "Dreessen Report"). 3071. Manville was well aware at the time of the Dreessen Report that the 5 mppcf standard could not be relied upon because Manville had data superior to that possessed by Dreessen. As noted supra. the confidential Pedley and Lanza studies of the 1929-1934 era demonstrated clearly that the long-term low dose workers, whom Dreessen could not find, were getting asbestosis, and that they were getting it in settings like fabricating plants, where the III 52 percentage of asbestos in the measured dust was less than in the textile plants studied by Dreessen. Both Lanza (in 1931, 1932, and 1933) and Gardner (in 1938) had told Manville that no level of exposure to asbestos dust could be considered safe. These conclusions, likewise, had never been published. For his conclusions, Dreessen relied / in part, on Lanza's published work (p. 120 of the Dreessen Report), which omitted the crucial data and conclusions. Exhibits: Dreessen, W.C., Dalla Vale, J.M., Edwards, T.I. and Miller, J.W., "A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry," Public Health Bulletin No. 241, published by the Public Health Service of the U.S. Treasury Department, at 120 (August 1938) (hereinafter, "Dreessen Report"); Cover Letter with Enclosed Report from A. Lanza to A. Wardwell (March 20, 1931) ; "Physical Examinations at Manville Factory, Manville, New Jersey" (1932) ; Frank Pedley, Report of The Physical Examinations and X-rav Examinations of Asbestos Workers in Asbestos and Thetford Mines. Quebec (1930) ; Speech of Anthony Lanza to the Home Office Life Underwriters Association (November 1933) ; , Manville Revised Proposed Finding of Fact No. 809. 3072. On March 21, 1939, A. S. Rossiter of Asbestos sent the Dreessen report to Simpson. Simpson responded by first asking if he could send a copy of the article to Vandiver Brown, since "Mr. Brown and myself are the only III 53 ones in contact with the Saranac Laboratory, which is carrying on research work for the textile industry, to ascertain the effects of asbestos dust on the workmen." Simpson assured Rossiter that Saranac's "preliminary findings on asbestos dust were so good that we just cannot believe them, and they are being rechecked. Of course, as you know, preliminary reports are not worth very much except as an indication, and we will not have final reports from the Saranac Laboratory for about two years, as we went into a three year investigation." Simpson went on to say that: I think when we get through with our Saranac investigation, we will show that this paper is considerably distorted, although he does say at last that where the air can be kept down to five million microns, there is no danger, and I can tell you confidentially, but am not willing to make it public, that the air can be kept below five million microns, with proper controls, but I am not willing to start a controversy with my competitors. Simpson concluded by saying that when the Saranac report was complete, he would turn over his information on dust control to his competitors, inasmuch as the plants studied in the report "have no dust control at all that amounts to anything." Exhibits: Letter from A.S. Rossiter to S. Simpson (March 21, 1939) ; III 54 Letter from S. Simpson to A.S. Rossiter (March 22, 1939). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. 3073. The next day Rossiter responded to Simpson, stating that the "information you give as to your Saranac investigation is most interesting. Of course we understand that all this information on asbestosis is to be kept confidential and that nothing should be published about asbestosis in Asbestos at present." Exhibit: Letter from A.S. Rossiter to S. Simpson (March 23, . 1939) . Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. 3074. The November 19, 1938 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association published an article by Dr. Gardner entitled "Etiology of Pneumoconiosis." In this article, Dr. Gardner surveyed the medical literature relating to discussion of injury or disease caused by various types of dust, including asbestos. He stated that "today asbestosis is everywhere recognized as a second form of pneumoconiosis characterized by fibrosis. The disease can apparently be produced by the prolonged inhalation of any of the five different silicates known as asbestos." He III 55 referred to the "well recognized capacity of asbestos to produce fibrosis of the lungs," and stated that "[r]egardless of the mechanisms involved, all the experimental evidence tends to confirm the belief that fibrosis is to be expected . . . from those silicates which have a fibrous structure; i.e., asbestos." Exhibit: Dr. L. Gardner, "Etiology of Pneumoconiosis," Journal of the American Medical Association, at 2-3, 13, 26 (November 11, 1938). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3075. Manville counsel Vandiver Brown expressed his displeasure at this publication to Raybestos President Simpson. On May 3, 1939, Brown asked Simpson for his "thoughts" on whether Dr. Gardner's actions were "proper in view of" an exchange of letters between Brown and Gardner in November 1936. In that exchange, Brown had stated his understanding that "the results obtained" by Saranac in the asbestos research funded by the industry "will be considered the property of those" who funded it, and that the industry would "determine whether, to what extent and in what manner they shall be made public. In the event it is deemed desirable that the results be made public, the manuscript of your study will be submitted to us for approval prior to III - 56 publication." Gardner had agreed "that the results of these studies shall become the property of the contributors and that the manuscripts of any reports shall be submitted for approval of the contributors before publication." Exhibit: Letter from Vandiver Brown to Sumner Simpson (May 3, 1939). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. 3076. On the very next day Simpson responded to Brown, noting that he had not yet seen any of the published material to which Brown referred, and stating his belief that it was not "proper for Dr. Gardner to use any of the material regarding asbestosis without our consent, or without submitting the report to you for approval, and I am a little surprised that Dr. Gardner has done so. He is certainly not living up to his agreement of November, 1936." Simpson concluded by saying that the "reports may be so favorable to us that they would cause us no trouble, but they might be just the opposite, which could be very embarrassing." Exhibit: Letter from Sumner Simpson to Vandiver Brown (May 4, 1939). Ill - 57 Witnesses; See paragraph 3041, supra. 3077. This concern for security -- i.e., pre clearance of any reference to asbestos by Gardner -- never abated. On May 10, 1940, Brown wrote to Simpson again expressing his concern over a Gardner publication -- not pre-cleared -- that discussed asbestos. Exhibit: Letter from Vandiver Brown to Sumner Simpson (May 10, 1939). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. 3078. Manville maintained the same mania for secrecy in its internal communications. On June 28, 1940, Manville, New Jersey, Plant Manager Berget transmitted to Manville Vice President A. R. Fisher a medical summary of a physical reexamination of all the plant employees. His cover memorandum, which was labeled "TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY", stated: I believe this report is of the utmost importance and hope that it will be treated in the utmost confidence in the file in New York. After you have read it and discuss it with the interested parties at General Headquarters, if you care to do so, you might return it to us for our files, and it would then be available for call at any time. I really think it is a dangerous report to be III - 58 filed in New York unless someone personally keeps his eyes on it. Exhibit: Memorandum from J.E. Berget to A.R. Fisher (June 28, 1940). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3079. On November 3, 1941, Vandiver Brown wrote to Simpson relating a conversation he had with Rossiter of Asbestos magazine, on the subject of a book review in the magazine of a book entitled Pneumoconiosis. Brown had said that Manville and probably Raybestos would not object to the review, but that "there was considerable likelihood that a number of her subscribers would dislike an article on this subject in the trade magazine of the Asbestos Industry." Brown concluded his letter with his belief that Rossiter would "omit any review of the book in question." No such review was published in Asbestos. Exhibit: Letter from Vandiver Brown to Sumner Simpson (November 3, 1941). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. Ill 59 (4) Manville Knew That Shipyard Workers Were At Risk From Asbestos 3080. Meanwhile, Dr. Lanza continued to keep, abreast of these matters and was certainly aware, by 1939 at the latest, that installers of asbestos-containing products -- pipe insulators -- were at risk. On November 1, 1939, a student in the state of Washington requested information from him for a thesis. In describing his research, the student noted that "Dr. George Dowling of the Virginia Mason Clinic here in Seattle, told me of a number of cases [of lung disease] which he has treated which resulted from no more than handling asbestos while wrapping steam pipes with insulation material." Exhibit: Letter from Gustafsen to A. Lanza (November 1, 1939) . Witness: Barry Castleman. 3081. There exists significant additional evidence that demonstrates that Lanza was well aware that shipyard workers were at risk. On February 13, 1942, Manfred Bowditch, Director of the Division of Occupational Hygiene of the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industry (which had oversight responsibilities in shipyards) wrote to Lanza at Metropolitan Life seeking guidance because an examination III 60 of a pipe insulator with a 12-year work history at a private shipyard indicated asbestosis. Bowditch wanted to know if Lanza knew whether a man with this relatively low level of exposure to asbestos dust could have asbestosis. Lanza responded on February 16, 1942, indicating no surprise at all: I think it is possible that this man may have asbestosis. As you know, we find our cases of asbestosis in those who fabricate asbestos and not in those who mine it. We have found evidence of it in men who trim asbestos pipe moldings, shingles, and other material of this nature, with a power saw. Exhibit: Letter from M. Bowditch to A. Lanza (February 13, 1942)? Letter from A. Lanza to M. Bowditch (February 16, 1942. 3082. During the next month March, 1942 Lanza took a leave of absence from Metropolitan Life to take charge of the Division of Occupational Health in the Preventive Medicine Service of the Surgeon General's Office of the War Department. He returned to Metropolitan Life on January 1, 1945. Exhibit: "Annual Report of the Industrial Health Section," Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, at 10 (1945) . Ill - 61 3083. Notwithstanding his leave of absence, Dr. Lanza's role at Metropolitan Life as a consultant to the asbestos industry continued as before. On December 29, 1942, Simpson wrote to Lanza seeking assistance in another case. A former Raybestos employee, who had left "to take a very arduous position with the Navy Yard at Charleston," had been examined by a Dr. N. A. Smith and was expected to file a lawsuit. Dr. Smith (whom Simpson characterized as "a crank on the subject of Asbestosis") had told Raybestos that this person "has Asbestosis, from which he will die," and had informed the person that he had asbestosis. Chest x- rays had been taken earlier, which Simpson said gave "no indication of any condition due to his employment." Simpson concluded by saying that "inasmuch as this claim may wind up in the Courts, I am writing you with the hopes that you may be able to render us that assistance which has been so invaluable to us in the past." Exhibit: Letter from Sumner Simpson to A. Lanza'(December 29, 1942). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. 3084. During World War II, and since at least 1938, Manville had a system in place to study and evaluate each individual job in its industrial plants. Each job was III 62 actually observed in progress. Points, which related to salary, were awarded for working conditions defined as "conditions other than normal that will not be corrected." "Dusty" working conditions were defined as "when all mechanical equipment has been installed and it is still necessary to wear respirators." Because every job was evaluated, Manville knew the "dusty" and low exposure jobs and could correlate its asbestosis cases to the jobs and exposures. The evaluations also enabled Manville to compare plant jobs with similar shipyard jobs, such as sawing, sweeping, unloading products, and pipefitting. Manville saw operator's evaluation stated "magnesia and Superex dust, respirators used." These were the very products used extensively in the shipyards. Exhibits: Manville Job Evaluation, at 3 and 5 (February 3, 1938) ; Manville Job Evaluation Procedure (1942) ; In the Matter of Arbitration Between Johns- Manville Corporation and Federal Labor Union 21626, AFL, Case No. 111-667 D, The Award (September 14, 1946); ' Job Evaluation, Pack on Sealing Machine (May 25, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, Band Saw Operator (May 25, 1942); Job Evaluation, Combination Saw Operator (October 26, 1942); Job Evaluation, Special Segments-Equipment Operator (May 25, 1942) ; III - 63 Job Evaluation, Research Specialist (October 5, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, Sweeper (May 25, 1942). Witnesses: Nicholas Sfiscko; Albert Jung; Kenneth W. Smith; J. P. Woodard; Wilbur Ruff; Brandford Kelly; Joseph Goldfield. . 3085. It is clear that Manville recognized the hazard of exposure to dust generated by sawing 85% Magnesia and Superex. The 1942 Job Evaluation of the "Band Saw Operator" in the Magnesia department at Manville, New Jersey reflects Manville's clear understanding of the hazards associated with sawing asbestos products. His job entailed "Set up band saw to split block to desired thickness. Lay out blocks on saw table and pushes through saw." Under "surroundings," the evaluation found "Bad dust condition. Wears respirator and goggles most of the time." 20 points for "surroundings." Take-off operators at the band saw in the Magnesia department moved magnesia block to and from the saw, inspected and packed the finished product and removed scrap. Job surroundings, assigned 20 points, were classified as "Dust Respirator and goggles worn at times." Ill - 64 Between 1942 and 1948, Gang Saw operators in the magnesia department wore respirators. They were given 25 points for dusty job conditions. Exhibits: Job Evaluation, Pack on Sealing Machine (May 25, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, Band Saw Take-Off (December 7, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, Band Saw Operator (May 25, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, Gang Saw Operator (May 25, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, Gang Saw Take-Off (May 25, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, Combination Saw Operator (October 26, 1942); Job Evaluation, Special Segments-Equipment Operator (May 25, 1942) ; `Job Evaluation, Research Specialist (October 5, 1942? Job Evaluation, Sweeper (May 25, 1942). Witnesses: Nicholas Sfiscko; Albert Jung; Kenneth W. Smith; J. P. Woodard; Wilbur Ruff; Bradford Kelly; Joseph Goldfield. Ill 65 3086. During World War II, it is obvious that Manville was unable to control dust generated by its saws. In a memo dated February 11, 1948, from the Industral Engineering Department, Manville stated that "additional dust systems were installed on the gang saw to eliminate a bad dust condition which directly affect the two men assigned to the machine (one feed operator and one take off man). Six men refused to work in this area because of the dust condition. The Union filed a grievance because of the bad dust condition." Exhibit: Job Evaluation, Pack on Sealing Machine (May 25, 1942); Job Evaluation, Combination Saw Operator (October ' 26, 1942); . Job Evaluation, Special Segments-Equipment Operator (May 25, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, Research Specialist (October 5, 1942); Job Evaluation, Sweeper (May 25, 1942) . Witnesses: Nicholas Sfiscko; Albert Jung; Kenneth W. Smith; J. P. Woodard; Wilbur Ruff; Bradford Kelly; . Ill 66 Joseph Goldfield. 3087. Manville knew based upon performing these job evaluations that in its plants, especially in areas of sawing and drilling activities, it was very dusty and that the dust exceeded 5 mppcf. Exhibits: J-M document, Job Evaluation, at 3 and 5 (February 3, 1938) ; Manville Job Evaluation Procedure (1942); In the Matter of Arbitration Between JohnsManville Corporation and Federal Labor Union 21626, AFL, Case No. 111-667 D, The Award . (September 14, 1946) ; Job Evaluation, Pack on Sealing Machine (May 25, 1942); Job Evaluation, Special Segments-Equipment Operator (May 25, 1942); Job Evaluation, Research Specialist (October 5, 1942); Job Evaluation, Sweeper (May 25, 1942). Witnesses: Nicholas Sfiscko; Albert Jung; Kenneth W. Smith; J. P. Woodard; Wilbur Ruff; Bradford Kelly; Joseph Goldfield. Ill 67 3088. During World War II, Manville had an articulated policy of analyzing a hazard and balancing the expense of that hazard against the profit potential of the product. Manville President's Bulletin No. 19-362 dated January 30, 1942, under Item No. 9, states that an approved product proposal goes to the Sales Division representative "who is responsible for estimating the profit potential involved in the sale of the new or revised product and in deciding that this profit potential is sufficient to counter-balance anv hazard involved in the sale of the product." (emphasis supplied). To the extent, as Manville alleges, all of its business was with the Government, the policy applied to products sold to the United States and to the pricing and selling of the products. Exhibit: JM President's Bulletin No. 19-362 (January 30, 1942) . (5) Manville Knew That Shipyard Workers During World War II Were Being Endangered Bv Their Exposure To Asbestos. 3089. During and prior to World War II, Manville clearly knew of the risks to shipyard workers. Exhibit: Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's Third Set of Interrogatories, No. 17, Johns-Mahville v. United States, C.A. No. 4561, (N.D. Cal. February 5, 1985). Ill - 68 Witness; Barry Castleman. 3090. In addition to its unequaled knowledge concerning asbestos hazards elsewhere, top level Manville management during the war were of the belief that working conditions in World War II shipyards were particularly bad with respect to asbestos dust; Q. Was this perception that you mentioned that the shipyard conditions were bad, was that perception shared by either of the Mr. Browns or Dr. Smith or other people? A. [by Roger Hackney, Manville's witness and the Treasurer of Manville during the war] I can't answer for those other persons specifically but I believe it was a very common knowledge or common presumption in the company. Q. That JM Company had this perception that the working conditions in World War II shipyards were bad as concerns asbestos dust? A. Right. **** Q. Were there any other worksite conditions that you equated to the conditions in the shipbuilding? " A. No. The shipbuilding was a very large sector, a very important sector, and a big consumer of asbestos products, which probably not equalled by any of the others, III 69 and then it had environmental differences that would tend to make the effects worse in shipbuilding. Q. One of those environmental differences being the enclosed nature of the construction? A. Right. **** Q. My question was whatever the working conditions relative to asbestos fiber in the air might be in the shipping industry - in the ship construction industry - did you nevertheless think that the conditions were worse in the shipbuilding activity than they were in refinery, ordinance plant and utility construction? - Mr. Barr: Lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge. A. I believe that I myself thought that, rightly or wrongly. Witness: Roger Hackney. 3091. Moreover, Manville management believed that the health risk with respect to exposure to asbestos was even greater in the shipyards than in its own plants: Q. Did you perceive the potential for hazard due to exposure to asbestos fibers in the ship construction industry as being greater than the hazard based upon exposure to asbestos fibers in the JM plants where the asbestos-containing insulation materials were being constructed? Ill - 70 A. Well, I did, particularly after our dust reduction program had time to mature. - Witness: Roger Hackney. 3092. Not only did top level Manville management know the distinct hazard of injury to workers in shipyards, but it feared potential injury to Manville: A. It made me think shipyards were as customers, they were valuable, we couldn't turn them down even if we wanted to, but that they were a source of some potential injury, possible potential injury to Johns-Manville, that there wasn't anything I could do about it. Q. You saw them as a source of potential injury? A. Yes. Q. Of what nature? A. Well, causing a lot of people to be injured by a product that we were interested in and that being but not having anything we could do about it. We couldn't change the situation. **** Q. With respect to your perception as to the potential injury, from the use of asbestos-containing products, was that limited to the shipyard context? Mr. Kruse: Object as leading. Ill - 71 Q. Or did that include all other industrial contexts? A. I think I perceived a much clearer danger in shipyards than others. Witness: Roger Hackney. 3093. Because Manville knew that certain processes caused high levels of dust, that those processes were utilized in the shipyards, and that even temporary high levels of exposure were dangerous, Manville clearly understood that at least temporary high level exposures existed in the shipyards. For example, Manville knew that in the areas in its plants where band saws, gang saws, drills and other similar equipment were used, the dust levels were very high. Manville also knew that wherever its pipe insulation products were utilized, it was frequently necessary to saw or drill the product as a part of the installation process. Indeed, Manville had specific knowledge of such processes in the shipyards based upon the fact that its application units worked there (see Section F(7) of this Volume, infra^. In its own job evaluation reports, it noted that where there was Magnesia or Superex dust (products used extensively in shipyards), respirators were used. Clearly, this information provided Manville with unmistakable knowledge of the asbestos hazard in shipyards. Ill 72 Exhibits: Anthony J. Lanza and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, "Physical Examinations at Manville Factory, Manville, New Jersey" (1932); ,, J-M document, Job Evaluation, at 3 and 5 (February 3, 1938); Manville Job Evaluation Procedure (1942); In the Matter of Arbitration Between JohnsManville Corporation and Federal Labor Union 21626, AFL, Case No. 111-667 D, The Award (September 14, 1946); Job Evaluation, Pack on Sealing Machine (May 25, 1942); Job Evaluation, Band Saw Take-Off (December 7, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, BankSaw Operator (May 25, 1942); Job Evaluation, GangSaw Operator (May 25, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, GangSaw Take-Off (May 25, 1942); Job Evaluation, Combination Saw Operator (October 26, 1942); Job Evaluation, Special Segments-Equipment Operator (May 25, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, Research Specialist (October 5, 1942) ; Job Evaluation, Sweeper (May 25, 1942) ; Industrial Insulations, Manville Chart 1930 1967 (undated); Summary of Atmospheric Hygiene Studies--Manville Plant (August 31, 1980) ; Industrial Hygiene Program (undated). Ill - 73 Witnesses: Nicholas Sfiscko; Albert Jung; R.A. Stapleton. 3094. Manville also had actual knowlege of hazardous conditions in the shipyards because it knew that the working conditions required the use of respirators. Manville management also knew that it was difficult to get workers to wear respirators. Manville's own employees were encouraged, and in some situations ordered, to wear respirators, but management knew that compliance with the orders was not obtained. It was "hard to enforce the order." Q. And would it be a correct statement then that any idea of whether or not respirators were used by the workmen in ship construction would be beyond your area of knowledge? A. [Roger Hackney, JM executive during World War II] I knew that they were ordered to be used, but I had trouble enforcing that order. I knew that because I would hear of the remarks made by the operating people who had that as their responsibility. Witness: Roger Hackney. 3095. Because Manville knew that shipyard conditions required the utilization of respirators, it had III - 74 every reason to know that the conditions were at least as dusty as in the Manville plants where respirators were required, despite state of the art dust control equipment. Manville's attitude regarding respirators was expressed in writing in 1948: At best, respirators are a ''last resort" for protection and have been rather humorously described as "a muzzle-type ornament loosely pendant from the neck and used in dirty industries to distinguish the laborers from the office employees". However, when we had engineered the job to the best of our ability and toxic contamination still is present, respirators are a desirable and necessary means of protection. Exhibits: Letter from H. Jackson to Morrison (December 8, - 1948); Letter from E. Fenner to G. Wright (December 17, 1975) . Witness: Roger Hackney. 3096. Manville's researcher Dr. Leroy Gardner (discussed in detail in Sections F(3) and F(9) of this Volume), was also aware that there were problems in World War II shipyards. In a September 29, 1943 letter, he wrote that "among the various pneumoconioses, asbestosis ranks next to silicosis in industrial importance." Dr. Gardner further noted that "asbestosis is a definite disease entirely resulting in disability in advanced cases," and III - 75 that while "[m]ost of the cases have occurred in the fabricating plants [,... the] U.S. Navv has had a real problem from the use of asbestos in insulating marine boilers, electrical installations and other insulation work." Gardner and Manville failed, however, to offer any advice or assistance to the Navy. Exhibit: Letter from L. Gardner to Hektoen (September 29, 1943) (emphasis added). (6) Manville Sales And Support Personnel Had Access To And Entered Navv And Private Shipyards During World War II 3097. That Manville was well-aware of conditions with respect to use of. its products in shipyards during World War II is not surprising, because it had actual presence in shipyards during World War II. (a) Fore River Shipyard 3098. In 1938 and 1939, Manville salesman A. H. Maccabe visited the Fore River Shipyard about once a week. Once or twice a year, Norman Adams, another Manville salesman, accompanied A. H. Maccabe to the Fore River Shipyard. To gain admission to the Fore River Shipyard, Mr. Maccabe and Mr. Adams merely showed their Manville company identification, identified who they were there to see, and signed in on the visitors' log. They were then given a III - 76 visitors7 badge which allowed them access to the entire shipyard. Witness; Norman J. Adams. 3099. The United States Navy did not require the Fore River Shipyard to alter its pre-war security/access system either by increasing or decreasing its security measures. See paragraphs 3100 - 3108, infra. 3100. On April 25, 1939, Bethlehem Steel Company contracted with the United States to build two light cruisers at the Fore River Shipyard. These contracts do not mention plant security, plant protection nor plant access, thereby allowing the shipyard to decide issues of access. Though the cruisers built under the April 25, 1939 contracts were not completed and delivered to the Navy until January and February 1942, the contracts were not amended to mention plant security, plant protection or plant access. I Exhibits: Contract NOd-1124 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 25, 1939) ; Contract NOd-1125 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 1939) . 25, Ill - 77 3101. In July, September and December 1940, the Bethlehem Steel Company contracted with the United States to build four destroyers, six light cruisers, eight heavy cruisers and four aircraft carriers. Each of these contracts originally contained a "Special plant protection" clause which said: (d) In addition to the ordinary precautions heretofore adopted by the contractor for the guarding and protection of its plant and work, the contractor shall provide such additional watchmen and devices for the protection of its plant and property and the work in process for the Department against espionage, acts of war, and acts of enemy aliens as may be required by the Secretary of Navy. The additional costs thereof shall be treated as a change under this contract. On April 7, 1941, the Acting Secretary of the Navy modified the "Special plant protection clause" to read: (d) In addition to the ordinary precautions heretofore adopted by the Contractor for the guarding and protection of its plant and work, the Contractor shall provide, as may be required by the Secretary of the Navy, or the Chief of the Bureau of Ships as his duly authorized representative, such additional watchmen and devices for the protection of its plant and property and the work in process for the Department against espionage, acts of war, and acts of enemy aliens. The additional cost thereof shall be treated as a change under this contract. Ill - 78 The ships provided pursuant to these contracts were built at the Fore River Shipyard between May 1941 and October 1946. During that entire time, there is no evidence that the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of the Bureau of Ships as his duly authorized representative ever requested that the Fore River Shipyard put additional security measures in place to enhance shipyard protection or limit shipyard access. Exhibits; Contract NOd-1439 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July 1, 1940) ; Contract NOd-1440 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July 1, 1940) ; Contract NOd-1491 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940); Contract NOd-1493 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940); Contract NOd-1496 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940) ; Contract NOd-1632 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (December 16, 1940). 3102. On October 29, 1942, December 9, 1943 and October 1, 1944, the Bethlehem Steel Company contracted with the United States to build eighteen destroyer escorts, four destroyers and twenty-four landing ship tanks pursuant to III - 79 contract numbers Nobs-840, 1339 and 1417. Article 14 of the General Provisions of each contract provided: Article 14. Plant Protection.------- (a) The Contractor shall provide for its plant and the work in process under the contract such safeguards, including personnel, devices and equipment, as would constitute reasonable protection under peacetime conditions (in light of the size of the plant and the scope of its operations) against all hazards, including unauthorized entry, malicious mischief, theft, vandalism and fire. (b) In addition to the foregoing precautions, the Contractor shall provide such additional safeguards as may be required or approved by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships for the protection of its plant and the work in process under the contract against espionage, sabotage, and enemy action. The cost to the Contractor, as determined by the Special Board on Changes of the Navy Department, of all safeguards so required or approved shall, to the extent allocable to the contract [*], be reimbursed to the Contractor. Such cost shall not include any allowance on account of overhead expenses, except shop overhead charges incident to the construction or installation of such devices or . equipment. (c) Upon payment by the Department of the cost to the Contractor of any devices or equipment required or approved under paragraph (b) of this Article, title thereto shall vest in the Department, and the Contractor shall comply with the instruction of the Department respecting the identification and disposition thereof. No part or item of any such devices or equipment shall be or become a fixture by reason of affixation to any realty not owned by the United States. Ill - 80 [* - Contract Nobs-840 included the additional phrase "and not otherwise reimbursed to the Contractor" where the asterisk appears in the quote.] The ships provided pursuant to these contracts were built at the Fore River Shipyard between February 1943 and July 1944 and March 1945 and September 1946. During this entire time, there is no evidence that the Chief of the Bureau of Ships ever requested that the Fore River Shipyard put additional security measures in place to enhance shipyard protection or limit shipyard access. Exhibits: Contract Nobs-840 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October 29, 1942); Contract Nobs-1339 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October 1, 1943); Contract Nobs-1417 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (December 9, 1943). 3103. That the Navy did not require the Fore River Shipyard to increase its security measures is clear from the fact that the methods for obtaining access to the shipyard did not change during World War II. See paragraphs 3098 and 3104-3108, supra. 3104. Before and during World War II, Fore River security workers checked employee badges as the employees III - 81 entered the shipyard gates. Once inside the shipyard gates, there was no further security at the ships being constructed; i.e.. there was no security worker checking badges at the gangplanks to ships which were under construction. Witnesses: Joseph Teta; Harold Seacrist; David C. McArthur. 3105. During World War II, Fore River Shipyard workers saw "strangers" who were not Fore River Shipyard workers in the Fora River Shipyard and on board ships being built at the Fore River Shipyard. Witnesses: Harold Seacrist; David C. McArthur. 3106. A. H. Maccabe, the Manville salesman responsible for selling insulation products to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II, visited the Fore River Shipyard regularly. Witness: Charles 0. Garcelon. 3107. Before and during World War II, Charles 0. Garcelon, a Manville salesman, would visit the Fore River III - 82 Shipyard when Manville's regular salesman, A. H. Maccabe, was on vacation or otherwise unable to conduct the business with the Fore River Shipyard. Though he was not a regular visitor to the shipyard, Mr. Garcelon was allowed into the Fore River Shipyard upon showing his Manville company card. Witness: Charles 0. Garcelon. 3108. Throughout World War II, the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries (like Manville, a non- federal government entity) regularly visited the Fore River Shipyard about once a month. There is no evidence that any representative of the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries was ever denied access to the Fore River Shipyard. Witnesses: David C. McArthur; Irving Tabershaw. (b) Consolidated Shipyard 3109. In 1928, Asbestos & Magnesia Materials Company (hereinafter "A & M") became a Manville Technical Service Unit (see Section F(7), supra. In 1941, Manville asked A & M to bid on a contract to supply insulation III 83 materials and labor for naval vessels being built at the Consolidated Shipyard in Orange, Texas. Witness; John Dragisic. 3110. A & M won the contract to supply insulation materials and labor to the Consolidated Shipyard. Pursuant to the contract, A & M performed all of the pipe insulation work at the Consolidated Shipyard during World War II. Witnesses; John Dragisic; Walter L. Odenkirk. 3111. Access to the Consolidated Shipyard did not require any special clearance. The Consolidated Shipyard issued passes to yard workers which were checked at the gate. Once inside the shipyard, there were no restrictions except for the radar room. Witness; Walter L. Odenkirk. 3112. During World War II, Manville representatives would visit the Consolidated Shipyard and go aboard ship "from time to time." The ASM representative at the Consolidated Shipyard obtained a visitor's pass for the Manville salesman which allowed access to the entire III - 84 shipyard (except the radar room). Manville sent representatives to the Consolidated Shipyard to service the account and. to assist the A & M with product questions. Witness: Walter L. Odenkirk. (c) Philadelphia Naval Shipyard 3113. On November 17, 1939, the Captain of the Philadelphia Navy Yard issued a memorandum concerning Business Visitors' Passes for the calendar year 1940. The Captain of the Philadelphia Navy Yard stated that Business Visitors' Passes should not be requested for calendar year 1940 unless the company representative was required to enter the shipyard at least twice a week. Among those who met the requirement of being in the shipyard more than twice a week was J. F. Hemberger of Manville. Exhibit: Memorandum from the Captain of the Philadelphia Navy Yard to Heads of All Departments (November 17, 1939). , 3114. There is no evidence that the pre-war * security/access policies were changed during World War II or that any Philadelphia Naval Shipyard representative ever denied a Johns-Manville employee access to any part of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. Ill - 85 (d) Boston Naval Shipyard 3115. In 1938 and 1939, Manville salesman S. E. Hazard visited the Boston Naval Shipyard about once a week. Once or twice a year, Norman Adams would accompany S. E. Hazard to the Boston Naval Shipyard. To gain admission to the Boston Naval Shipyard, Mr. Hazard and Mr. Adams merely showed their Manville company identification, identified who they were there to see and signed in on the visitors' log. They were then given a visitor's badge which allowed them access to the entire shipyard. Witness; Norman J. Adams. 3116. Charles 0. Garcelon, the exclusive Johns- Manville salesman who sold insulation products at the Boston Navy Yard before, during and after World War II, frequently visited the Boston Naval Yard. To gain admission to the shipyapd-t_he merely showed his business card to the guard at the gpte and identified the person he was there to see. He was never prevented from seeing who he wanted to see and was never denied entry to the shipyard. Other asbestos manufacturers' representatives were also in the shipyard, at least for bid openings. Ill - 86 Witness: Charles 0. Garcelon. 3117. While Mr. Garcelon did not go aboard ships under construction or into the pipe- insulation shop, he was never told that he could not do so or restricted from doing so, and merely chose not to do so because he thought it was none of his business. Witness: Charles 0. Garcelon. (e) other Private and Public Shipyards 3118. Clyde Barnett, a member of Manville's Government Department during World War II, visited the Brooklyn Navy Yard and went aboard a ship under construction to investigate whether Manville had an insulation product that could properly insulate a particular section of irregularly shaped pipe aboard ship. V Clyde Barnett. . 3119. Other employees of Manville, including T.S. Nicely, James Clifford, Nelson Best, and A.W. Knight, entered various public and private shipyards during World War II. On occasion they went aboard ship and observed working conditions. Ill - 87 3121. Many asbestos product manufacturers, including Manville, had representatives visiting the shipyards. Mr. Crawford knows that other asbestos company manufacturers visited the same shipyards that he did because he read the representatives' names, the names of their employers, and their addresses in the visitors' log book when he signed in. Mr. Crawford specifically remembers seeing the name. "Johns-Manville" written down as identifying the employer of individuals whose names appeared in the visitors' log books. Witness: John B. Crawford. 3122. In 1944, the Union Asbestos & Rubber Company wrote to the Navy Regional Price Adjustment Board "in connection with renegotiation proceedings for the calendar year 1942." The letter firmly supports Mr. Crawford's recollection. In their letter, the Union Asbestos & Rubber Company noted that its sales engineers visited many shipyards and undertook "to teach and instruct various employees of these [ship]yards." The letter goes on to state that: The engineers of our Sales Department have cooperated wih the Navy Yards and also the private shipbuilding yards who are engaged in naval construction, in undertaking to teach and instruct the various employees of these yards in the III - 89 efficient and most modern method of applying our insulating materials. They have worked with the officials of the yards--the insulating superintendents and contractors--and the men who are actually applying the pipe covering, for the sole purpose of accomplishing quality and perfection in workmanship. Exhibit: Memorandum from Union Asbestos & Rubber Company to the Navy Regional Price Adjustment Board (1944). 3123. Mr. Crawford recalls that there were security measures taken at the shipyards, but that these measures in no way affected his ability to go aboard ship and observe insulation being installed. There is no evidence that other shipyards during World War II had "tighter" security than the shipyards which John Crawford visited. Witness: John B. Crawford. (7) Manville Knew What Shipyard Working Conditions Were Like Because Its Contract And Technical Service Units Were Performing Insulation Work In Shipyards During World War II (a) Manville's Presence In Wartime Shipyards As Insulation Installer 3124. In addition to its salesmen and support personnel being present in shipyards during World War II, Manville had a prominent presence in shipyards through its wholly-owned contract units, which applied Manville III - 90 asbestos-containing insulation products in at least four shipyards, and its closely affiliated "Technical Service Units" (hereinafter TSUs) (including one Manville subsidiary, Nicely & Co.), which applied Manville asbestos insulation products in 32 wartime shipyards. As stated by Manville in its 1943 internal publication: "J-M T.S.U.s on both coasts have done a great deal of the pipecovering for this [shipyard] conversion work, and current J-M jobs in New York Harbor alone approximate $200,000 applied." Indeed, Manville's TSUs applied pipe covering in 12 of the 23 conversion and repair yards Manville deemed "important" in 1943. Being right on the scene, Manville could not have avoided knowledge of shipyard asbestos working conditions. Exhibits: Manville Officers' Board Meeting-- Insulation (December 21, 1942) ; J-M Board of Directors Minutes (August 29, 1932); The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of Johns-Manville for Company Use Only, at 28-39 (October 1943) . 3125. Contract units had long been an integral part of the company's operation. Until the mid-1920s, Manville had relied essentially on units of its own Contract Department for asbestos installation. Subsequently, Manville utilized both its own internal personnel and TSUs to install its asbestos products. Manville's wartime TSUs III - 91 were essentially approved installation businesses with close ties to Manville. The TSUs bought and applied exclusively Manville insulation products. Indeed, according to a 1942 Insulation Officers' Board Meeting, the majority of Manville TSUs were created by former Manville employees who had operated Manville's own contract units, and the relationship between Manville and the TSUs was close, long and profitable. Exhibits? J-M Sales Catalog (1902); J-M Pipe and Boiler Insulation Catalogue No. 100 (1908); Question and Answers Book, Milwaukee Salesmen Convention (1912); Officers' Board Meeting, Insulation (December 21, 1942) ; History of the West Coast Insulation Industry (September 1960). Witnesses: John Dragisic; Walter Odenkirk. 3126. As of December 21, 1942, Manville had 12 wholly-owned insulating units and 54 insulating TSUs. Wholly-owned Manville units that applied insulation in shipyards during World War II were Globe Shipbuilding (Superior)? Dravo Corporation (Pittsburgh); Great Lakes III - 92 Engineering (Baton Rouge); and Great Lakes Engineering (Ashtabula). Exhibits; The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of Johns- Manville for Company Use Only, at 30-31 (October 1943); . Officers' Board Meeting--Insulation (December 21, 1942) ; Manville Board of Directors' Meeting Minutes (July 21, 1943); JM News Pictorial (April 15, 1942) . 3127. Manville also purchased insulation companies outright. It purchased three companies that installed asbestos insulation products: Aycock Corporation before August 29, 1932; Rankin-Dutney Corporation (stock) on June 1, 1932, and Nicely & Co. in 1933. Nicely & Co. did the pipe insulation work during World War II at the Penn Jersey Yard, Philadelphia, Pa. Exhibits: Manville Board of Directors' Meeting Minutes (August 29, 1932); Manville Acquisitions List (undated); The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Departments of JohnsManville for Company Use Only, at 30 (Figure 9a) (October 1943); Johns-Manville Approved Insulation Contractors List (January 1930T; III - 93 Johns-Manville Approved Insulation Contractors List (March 1930) ; Johns-Manville Approved Insulation Contractors List (March 1931). Witness: T.S. Nicely. 3128. Further evidence of Manville's own employees and subsidiary companies working in shipyards prior to and during World War II is evidenced by the fact that as early as the mid-1930s Manville procured workers' compensation/ employers' liability insurance policies from the Employers Liability Assurance Corporation (ELAC) which included endorsements establishing that the policies applied to work done at shipyards under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA). Similar policies were secured from the Texas Employers Insurance Association (TEIA). These LHWCA endorsements required payment of premiums for shipboard work much higher than those for non-shipboard work. These policies covered Manville's own employees, and employees of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, R. V. Aycock Corp., Rankin-Dutney Corp., and Nicely & Company. Exhibit?: . ELAC workers' compensation and employers liability policies, with endorsements (1936); ELAC workers' compensation and employers liability policies, with endorsements (1945); III - 94 TEIA workers' compensation and employers liability policies, with endorsements (1939) ; Approved Insulation Contractors List (June 1930); The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of Johns- Manville for Company Use Only, at 30-31 (October 1943). ' Witness: Howard Bush. 3129. The shipyards in which Manville's TSUs applied Johns-Manville asbestos-containing products during WWII pursuant to contracts awarded by the Navy and Maritime Commission include the yards mentioned below: . J-M TSUs Doing Applied Pipe Insu lation WorkShipyard Location Reid-Hayden Bethlehem-Fairfield Bethlehem Sparrows Point Lancaster Iron Southeastern Shipbuilding Baltimore Sparrow Pt Lancaster Savannah Thorsen New York East Coast Shipyards Bayonne Federal Shipbldg & DD Kearny General Ship & Engineering Boston, ' Mass. Thorsen B. George Lawley Neyosaut, N.Y. Nicely Penn-Jersey Shipbuilding Philadelphia, PA R.I. Pipecovering Walsh-Kaiser Providence, R.I. T. Seidenbach Avondale Marine East Wego III - 95 Marin Marine Engr. Bay Cities Asbestos Western Asbestos E.J. Bartells V.S. Jenkins Northwestern Asbestos Porter Asbestos & Magnesia Co. Higgins Industries New Orleans, LA Western Pipe & Steel San Pedro, CA Consolidated Steel Los Angeles Shipbuilding Wilmington, CA San Pedro, CA Permanente Metals Pollock-Stockton Pacific Ridge Co. Richmond, CA Stockton, CA Alemeda, CA Kaiser Co., Inc. Permanente Metals Bethlehem Steel Richmond, CA Richmond, CA San Franc. Alameda Kaiser Co., Inc. Kaiser Co., Inc. Oregon Shipbuilding Vancouver Swan Island Portland, OR Winslow Marine Seattle-Tacoma Shipbldg. Seattle Tacoma Buerger Post Co. Leothem D. Smith Manitomac Shipbuilding Manitomoc Sturgeon Bay Manitomoc New Jersey Shipbuilding Barber Consolidated Steel Corp. Weaver Shipbuilding Orange, TX Orange, TX Exhibit; The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of JohnsManville-For company Use Only, at 28-38 (October 1943) . Witnesses; John Dragisic; Walter Odenkirk. Ill - 96 3130. The close relationship between Manville and its TSUs is demonstrated by the terms of thecontracts between them. All TSUs had the same form of Purchase and Service agreements with Manville. The Purchase Agreement included, inter alia, the following terms: 1. The buyer purchased from Manville and maintained on hand at all times during the terms of the Agreement, a stock of materials sufficient to meet the normal demands required for a specific territory served by the buyer; 2. Manville agreed to protect the buyer against advances in prices of the materials on contracts entered into provided the buyer filed with Manville a list of contracts on which the buyer desired protection; 3. The buyer was not restrained or prohibited from selling the ' materials to any trade or class of trade. However, Manville recommended the buyer refrain from selling or offering materials for sale f.o.b., (that is, not applied or installed), to certain categories of purchasers; and 4. The buyer was in no way restrained from selling materials anywhere but it was understood that the support, influence and cooperation of Manville was available to the buyer only within the described territory. Exhibit: Officers' Board Meeting, Insulation, at 3-7 (December 21, 1942). Ill - 97 3131. Terms of the Service Agreement entered into between Manville and its Technical Services Units included, inter alia. the following: 1. The TSU agreed to employ skilled industrial insulation experts and insulation salesmen satisfactory to Manville; 2. Maintenance within the TSU/s employ of sufficient personnel for prompt and efficient performance, in strict compliance with Manville specifications and standards of all contracts obtained by the Service Unit for the application of the materials; 3. The TSU could write specifications for insulation projects and make . estimates and bids when requested by Manville; 4. The drafting of monthly reports from the TSU to Manville in a form satisfactory to Manville of all contracts for application of insulation whether awarded or lost and submission to Manville upon request of said records and files; and 5. Cooperation with the insulation engineers of Manville on engineering problems arising in connection with the sale and application of the materials. Exhibit: Officers' Board Meeting, Insulation, at 8-14 (December 21, 1942) . 3132. Manville helped its TSUs advertise, gave them sales literature to distribute, and published their names and locations in Manville literature as early as 1930. The III - 98 vast Manville advertising campaign for "experts in applied insulation" covered TSUs as well as Manville's own units. Manville solicited bids for its TSUs suggested they contact and supply.various shipyards, and gave them other assistance. Exhibits: Johns-Manville Approved Insulation Contractors List (January 1930); Johns-Manville Approved Insulation Contractors List (March 1930) ; Johns-Manville Approved Insulation Contractors List (March 1931) ; "Bosses of the BTU" advertisement, from Power Specialist (June-July 1945). Witnesses: John Dragisic; Walter Odenkirk. (b) Manville's Presence As Installer Of Insulation At Consolidated Shipyard 3133. A prime example of Manville's presence, through its TSUs, in shipyards during World War II is found at the Consolidated Shipyard in Orange, Texas, one of the "test shipyards." At Consolidated, Asbestos and Magnesia (A & M), a Manville TSU starting in approximately 1928, was awarded a contract in 1941 to supply the materials and labor for the insulation of 8 destroyer escorts. A & M performed III - 99 all the pipe insulation work at Consolidated during World War II and installed Manville asbestos-containing thermal insulation products. At the peak of the war, A & M had approximately 300 men working aboard ship and in fabricating shops, and approximately $3 million worth of work was performed by A & M at Consolidated during the War. Exhibit: The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of Johns-Manville for Company Use Only, (October 1943). Witnesses: . John Dragisic; Walter Odenkirk. . 3134. As noted in paragraph 3112, supra, the relationship between Manville and A & M during the war was that, if there was a problem with any of the products supplied by Manville for use by A & M at Consolidated, Manville would send someone over to Consolidated to service the account and assist A & M with product questions. This occurred on numerous occasions throughout the war, and, as a result, Manville representatives were at Consolidated and went aboard ship. Witness: Walter Odenkirk. Ill - 100 3135. In all likelihood, every Navy ship constructed at Consolidated during the relevant time period was insulated with Manville asbestos-containing products applied by A & M. Because of the presence of A & M and Manville at Consolidated, Manville not only was aware of which of its products were being used, who was applying them and how they were being applied, but it also knew what the working conditions were like aboard ship and in the fabricating shop. Exhibits: The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of JohnsManville for Company Use Only, (October 1943). Manville Revised Proposed Finding of Fact No. 751 (admission). . (c) Specific Evidence Of Manville Knowledge Gained Through Contract and Technical Service Units 3136. While it is patently obvious that with such a ubiquitous presence in shipyards during World War II, Manville had to know what working conditions were like with respect to asbestos exposure, there are specific incidents that illustrate some of the ways Manville's contract and technical service units provided it with unique information about the asbestos hazard presented to shipyard workers. For example, Manville knew in 1935 that one of its own III - 101 employees, Gustave J. Carlson, a pipecoverer and asbestos worker in Manville's contract insulation department, had filed an asbestos-related workers' compensation claim to which Manville was a party. Moreover, Manville knew a full two years earlier that Edward Dugan, an employee of Manville's subsdiary Aycock Corp., a distributor and contract applicator of Manville's insulation products, had instituted a workers' compensation claim against Aycock for an asbestos-related injury. In fact, the lawyer for Manville's insurance carrier handled the claim. Exhibits: . Manville's Answer to Interrogatory No. 457 (admission); Telegram from E.M. Voorhees to R.V. Aycock (November 9, 1933); Letter from Whitney to Schmidt (November 9, 1933); Letter from Whitney to Schmidt (November 13, 1933); Letter from Schmidt to Johnson & Higgins (November 19, 1933) ; ` Letter from Manager, Manville Claims Division to Manville Claims Dept., Kansas City (November 9, 1933) . 3137. John B. Jobe, a Manville salesman in the Los Angeles area during World War II, testified before the Department of Labor in 1972 that he remembered "in the early 1940's personally calling oi^.fabricators of asbestos III - 102 contained products to advise them of practices which would reduce or eliminate dust.* Exhibits; Statement of John B. Jobe before the United States Department of Labor (March 14, 1972). Witness: John B. Jobe. 3138. Another indication of Manville's knowledge of shipyard working conditions is the presence of V.S. Jenkins and Company at the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation in Seattle, Washington. Maritime Commission health and safety surveys (see Sections G(2) and G(4) of this. Volume, infra^ indicated that Seattle-Tacoma had one of the largest, if not the largest, asbestos exposure problems among wartime shipyards. V. S. Jenkins, a Manville TSU and member of the Associated Insulation Contractors of the Pacific Coast, was the subcontractor for pipe lagging and insulation at Seattle-Tacoma. The Yard was surveyed by health and safety consultants of the Maritime Commission initially from July 2-7, 1943. It was noted that efforts were being made to control the asbestos dust, but they were *not working out well*. Most of the dust from the band saw was escaping the exhaust system entirely. On the cutting table, wetting down procedures were often omitted and large accumulations of asbestos dust on the rafters resulted. The government III - 103 health and safety consultants made appropriate recommendations. The yard was resurveyed by the Maritime Commission January 11-13, 1944, but V. S. Jenkins was found not to be complying in a satisfactory manner with any of the asbestos-related recommendations made in the earlier survey. A subsequent re-survey of the yard (now under the name of Todd Pacific Shipyard) on July 12-20, 1945, again found that none of the recommendations for the handling of asbestos had been implemented. A Final Report dated September 24, 1945, indicated that *[n]o substantial progress was ever made on our detailed recommendations concerning ventilation or control of dust in the asbestos shop.* Exhibits: Survey of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corp.,' Seattle, Wash. (July 2-7, 1943); Re-Survey of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corp., Seattle, Wash. (January 11-13, 1944); Re-Survey of the Todd Pacific Shipyard (formerly Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corp.), Seattle, Wash. (July 12-20, 1945); Final Report for Todd Pacific Shipyard, Seattle, Wash. (September 24, 1945); The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Dept, of Johns-Manville for Company Use Only, at 27, 32, 35 (October 1943); See Sections G(2) and G(4) of this Volume, infra. Witness: James Morgan. Ill - 104 (8) Manville Callously Disregarded Informing Workers About The Hazards Of Asbestos: Specific Cases; 3139. As discussed in paragraph 3199, infra. Manville did not place warning labels on its asbestos products until 1964. During World War II, Manville, on at least two occasions, demonstrated that, even upon specific request from less knowledgeable persons, it had no intention of letting others know what it knew about the hazards of asbestos. (a) The DeForest Incident 3140. The background for an incident that fully demonstrates Manville's attitude toward providing workers with information about the hazards of asbestos begins in 1928, when the Association of Insulation Contractors of the Western States was formed. Many representatives of Manville and its TSUs were active participants of the Association. Exhibit: I960 Annual Report of Associated Insulation Contractors of the Western States (October 1960). 3141. On October 17, 1942, a portion of the Association split off to form the Associated Insulation Contractors of the Pacitic Coast with M. A. Clune of Bay III 105 Cities Asbestos, a Manville TSU, elected as first president. Two other members of the newly formed Association were the V. S. Jenkins Company (discussed in paragraph 3138, supra) and the Asbestos Covering and Supply Company, both Manville TSUs since the 1920s. Exhibit; ' I960 Annual Report of Associated Insulation Contractors of the Western States (October 1960) ; History of West Coast Insulation Industry Association (September 1960) ; The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of Johns-Manville-For Company Use Only, (October 1943).. 3142. On June 14, 1943, Elliott DeForest, who represented the Asbestos Covering and Supply Company and was also Secretary of the Northwest Magnesia Association, sent a letter to the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries objecting to proposed increased safety standards with respect to the use of asbestos-containing insulation products. Si&ibit: Letter of Elliott DeForest to J.W. Morgan (June 14, 1943). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. Ill - 106 a 3143. The Northwest Magnesia Association was made up of companies in the Pacific Northwest that performed asbestos insulation contracting work.. Its membership includes some Manville TSUs. Exhibits: / The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of Johns-Manville-For Company Use Only, (October 1943); History of West Coast Insulation Industry (September 1960). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. 3144. that: DeForest stated in his June 14, 1943 letter any dust which might occur in any of our operations during application of material in which asbestos might be used is not of any different character from the ordinary dust that is developed in thousands of occupations.... The relative quantity of asbestos in the materials that use the name 'asbestos' is quite small. As a matter of fact, magnesia is 85% of most of the pipe covering which is generally referred to as asbestos amongst those uninformed. Exhibit: Letter of Elliott DeForest to James W. Morgan (June 14, 1943). Ill 107 3145. DeForest further wrote that, in over 40 years of experience, "we have no knowledge of anyone who is even acquainted with the coined word "Asbestosis" much less ever having contracted the disease." DeForest asserted that there was no basis for fearing any such disease among pipe coverers and related workers in the State of Washington. Finally, DeForest noted that although the member companies generally employed proper ventilation and respiratory devices, "when it comes to installing our material in cramped quarters of war vessels, we have proven that it is of more value to consider safety in regard to giving a man proper vision and not allowing him to be encumbered with respirators, air hoses, hoods, etc." Exhibit; Letter from Elliott DeForest to James W. Morgan (June 14, 1943) (emphasis added). 3146. The DeForest letter was sent to Asbestos magazine, and the magazine's editor, A.S. Rossiter forwarded it to Sumner Simpson of Raybestos-Manhattan on June 18, 1943. Noting that there was nothing the magazine could do about it "under the cirumstances," Ms. Rossiter passed "it along to you thinking it might interest you generally, and perhaps you might like to contact Mr. DeForest on the subject. If you would prefer that the matter be handled thru us, we would be glad to write Mr. DeForest at your direction; otherwise you need not return the letter." Ill 108 Exhibit: Letter from A.S. Rossiter to Sumner Simpson (June 18, 1943). Witnesses: See paragraph 3041, supra. 3147. Simpson forwarded the Rossiter correspondence to Vandiver Brown, who responded on June 24, 1943. Brown's reaction was not to set DeForest and his colleagues in the Northwest Magnesia Association straight about the dangers of asbestos so well known to Manville. To the contrary, he coldly stated that "I am inclined to let Mr. DeForest learn J the facts of life and asbestosis from the State of ' Washington Department of Labor and Industries, and shall merely file this letter unless you feel strongly there is something I should do about it and so advise." There is no record of any further action by Simpson. Thus, Brown had before him information that shipyard workers were not wearing respirators while installing asbestos products and chose to do nothing. Exhibits: Letter from Elliot DeForest to James W. Morgan (June 14, 1943); Letter from A.S. Rossiter to S. Simpson (June 18, 1943); Letter from V. Brown to S. Simpson (June 24, 1943) . Ill 109 Witness: See paragraph 3041, supra. (b) The Roemer Incident 3148. In 1943, Vandiver Brown again displayed conduct indicative of Manville7s lack of concern for the health of asbestos workers. Charles Roemer, an attorney for UNARCO, an asbestos-products manufacturer smaller in size than Manville, arranged a meeting with Manville executives to obtain advice concerning the proper procedure for handling cases of asbestos-related lung problems among employees of UNARCO plants. Roemer informed Brown that UNARCO, after finding its employees 'had irregular chest x- rays, told the employees of the situation, and workers7 compensation claims were then filed. Brown told Roemer he believed UNARCO managers were "a bunch of fools,77 because it was more cost effective for the company to have the employees continue to work. Roemer displayed shock that Manville did not inform its workers they had asbestos- related diseases and asked, "Do you mean to tell me that you would let them work until they dropped dead?77 Brown responded, "Yes. We save a lot of money that way.77 Witness; Charles Roemer. Ill - 110 (9) Manville Continued To Conceal Its Knowledge Of The Dangers Of Asbestos Throughout The Mid-War And Immediate Post-War Periods ______________________ (a) Manville Cancer Cover-Up 3149. On February 24, 1943, Dr. Gardner advised Manville that "I have at last succeeded in analyzing most of our voluminous experimental data and assessing the results." He submitted a table of contents and an annotated outline of his findings with respect to asbestos as a health hazard. Dr. Gardner noted that the "question of cancer susceptibility now seems more significant than I had previously imagined." He also stated that "[t]he evidence is suggestive but not conclusive that asbestos may precipitate the development of cancer in susceptible individuals." Dr. Gardner also reported, under the heading of "Cancer of Lungs", that "[n]o experiments were particularly designed to elucidate this point but certain evidence suggests that asbestosis may actually favor development of tumors in susceptible species." Dr. Gardner noted that: Thus the incidence of lung cancer in the long fibre asbestos mice was over 16 times the average for mice inhaling other dust for comparable periods and over 3 times the maximum for any other group. *** III 111 These observations are suggestive but not conclusive evidence of a cancer stimulating action by asbestos dust, (emphasis in original) Exhibit; Letter from Dr. Leroy Gardner to Vandiver Brown, with attachment, at 1, 6-8, 10 (February 24, 1943) . Witness: Barry Castleman. 3150. Dr. Gardner advised Manville that the cancer evidence "would be better omitted from the present report", and welcomed any criticism that Manville or any of the other contributors cared to offer. Exhibit; _ Letter from Dr. Leroy Gardner to Vandiver Brown, with attachment (February 24, 1943). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3151. Later in 1943, Dr. Gardner expressed his concern about the causal connection between asbestos exposure and cancer to Dr. Hektoen, stating that "I have always felt that- asbestosis probably created no specific predisposition to pulmonary cancer. However, evidence to the contrary continues to accumulate." Ill - 112 Exhibit: Letter from Dr. Leroy Gardner to Dr. Hektoen (September 29, 1943) . 3152. Manville remained silent about Dr. Gardner's concern about asbestos causing cancer. Events right after World War II demonstrate Manville's entire approach to "bad news" regarding the hazards of asbestos. On April 8, 1946, Dr. Gardner forwarded to Manville a medical article on cancer and its relationship to occupation and environment, commenting that "[i]t is well known that asbestosis has been mentioned as one of the causes of pulmonary cancer." Dr. Gardner again referred Manville to the evidence connecting cancer and asbestosis which he had sent to Manville in February of 1943: There is one other phase of the subject, however, that I believe deserves consideration. In one of my reports to your group, I noted that there was an unusually high incidence of cancer of the lung in white mice which had been exposed to asbestos dust. This species of animal does not develop asbestosis, largely, I think, because of the air passages too small to permit inhaling of fibrous asbestos. Nevertheless, we did find over 80% of mice exposed to asbestos showing tumors of the lung, and only some 15% or 20% of those exposed to other dusts showed tumors of this nature. These findings represented a summary of all our experience with mice in asbestos dust. Ill - 113 Exhibit: Letter from Dr. Leroy Gardner to J.P. Woodard (April 8, 1946). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3153. After Dr. Gardner's death in October of 1946, Manville's consultant. Dr. Lanza of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, met with top level officers of Manville to discuss his recent trip to the Saranac Laboratory during which he had had access "to all the memoranda and notes left by the late Dr. Gardner." . Exhibit: Minutes of Meeting at Manville General Headquarters, at 1-2 (January 21, 1947). 3154. Dr. Lanza informed Manville at an executive meeting that Dr. Kenneth Lynch from the Medical School in Charleston, South Carolina would review Dr. Gardner's work on the asbestosis study and would prepare a written report. Dr. Lanza noted he would send all of Dr. Gardner's notes and memoranda to Dr. Lynch after "it is in shape" so that Dr. Lynch would not have to try to decipher Dr. Gardner's handwriting. Exhibit: Minutes of Meeting at Manville General Headquarters, at 1-2 (January 21, 1947). Ill 114 3155. A.R. Fisher, a Manville executive, remarked during the meeting "that the company has a definite job to do in Canada to offset the effects of a lot of propagandizing that has been done in relation to the harmful effects of asbestos dust, and he expressed the opinion that a report, if prepared by Dr. Lynch along the lines outlined, would be of material help to the company." Vandiver Brown then called attention to a stipulation in our arrangement with the Saranac Laboratory which provided that there would be no publication of the results of experiments without our consent. He said, if it does turn out to be the sort of report we would be glad to have published, he hoped Dr. Lynch would not include any objectionable material from our point of view, as, for example, any relation between asbestos dust and cancer, such as the reference which Dr. Gardner had made to this in his monograph. Exhibit: Minutes of Meeting at Manville General Headquarters, at 1-2 (January 21, 1947). 3156. Lanza then "assured" Brown that "any report prepared by Dr. Lynch would first be submitted to Johns- Manville before being published elsewhere." Exhibit: Minutes of Meeting at Manville General Headquarters, at 1-2 (January 21, 1947). Ill 115 a 3157. On November 12, 1946, Vandiver Brown wrote to Manfred Bowditch, then Field Director of Saranac Laboratory, concerning Dr. Gardner's asbestos dust experiments. Brown noted that several interim reports written by Dr. Gardner had been distributed to various members of the underwriting group. Brown, reiterating his always present concern about bad publicity, reminded Bowditch of the confidentiality agreement concerning not publishing the results of studies without approval from the contributors. Exhibit: Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. Bowditch (November 12, 1946). . 3158. On March 18, 1947, Bowditch wrote to Brown reminding him of the following findings from Dr. Gardner's studies: a. The distinction Dr. Gardner used in defining the type of asbestos material causing fibrosis was that between "fibrous and particulate asbestos dust", and not between long and short fibers; b. The key to causing fibrosis was that the fibers "must be long enough so that they cannot be completely surrounded by phagocytic cells"; and c. "81.8% of mice inhaling long fibre asbestos developed lung cancer, a figure sixteen times that of the average for other dusts. 13.6% of mice III - 116 inhaling short fibre asbestos developed lung cancer, a figure seven times the average for other dusts." Exhibit: Letter from M. Bowditch to Vandiver Brown (March 18, 1947). 3159. In response to the information about lung cancer, Brown wrote to Bowditch on March 21, 1947, stating that he did not recall "any such abnormal incidence of lung cancer in the experimental animals." Bowditch replied that the information regarding lung cancer in experimental animals was "taken from page 8 of an 'Outline of Proposed Monograph on Asbestosis' dated February, 1943, which was forwarded to you by Dr. Gardner on February 24, 1943, and acknowledged by you on March 1, 1943, with the comment that photostats were being made for distribution to the several interested companies." Exhibits: Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. Bowditch (March 21, 1947) ; Letter from M. Bowditch to Vandiver Brown (March 24, 1947). 3160. Dr. Lanza met again with Manville executives on August 6, 1947, to report on Dr. Lynch's work on the Gardner material and to advise that it could be presented as an entity in the Saranac report. Dr. Vorwald of Saranac III - 117 wrote saying that he "was reluctant to publish it because he is afraid that subsequent developments from Dr. Gardner's work might be at variance with the conclusions which Dr. Gardner arrived at in the report just put together." Exhibit: Minutes of Meeting at Manville General Headquarters (August 6, 1947). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3161. Dr. Vorwald, then the Director at Saranac, issued a report on January 31, 1948, compiling the findings of the earlier Gardner studies. The report noted that studies had been carried on by the Saranac Laboratory for many years "in an investigation of the cause, nature and development of asbestosis", with the first inhalation experiment having begun in 1928. Exhibit: Asbestosis, Experimental Studies, Johns-Manville Corporation, at 2, (January 31, 1948) . Report to the 4, 8, 31, 40-42 Witness: Barry Castleman. 3162. Dr. Vorwald's January 31 report concluded that (1) it is the longer asbestos fibers that produce asbestosis; (2) the concentration of long fibers needed to III 118 produce asbestosis is minimal compared with the overall dust concentration; (3) as the concentration of fibers is increased, the time needed to produce asbestosis is shortened; conversely, the lesser the concentration of long fibers, the greater the latency period for producing asbestosis, and (4) the asbestosis ceases to progress on discontinuing exposure to the dust. Exhibit: Asbestosis, Experimental Studies, Report to the Johns-Manville Corporation, at 2, 4, 8, 31, 40-42 (January 31, 1948). 3163. On December 14, 1948, Dr. Lanza wrote to Dr. Vorwald, advising that the "representatives of the underwriting companies" requested the following changes in the report "... which I do not think involves any material change in the report:" a. the elimination of all references to cancer or tumors, including any tables relating to this subject matter; b. an inclusion under "CONCLUSIONS" referring to the non-progressive character of the fibrosis produced by the asbestos; c. more specificity with regard to the size of the fibers and a number of fibers per cubic foot of air which can cause asbestosis; III - 119 d. Conclusion D. which states that fibrosis could be produced by asbestos dust containing only "an extremely small proportion of long fibers" was thought "too vague" and should be defined more specifically; e. language changes which emphasized those parts of the study favorable to the industry, while those parts unfavorable to the industry be either deleted or less definite words be substituted; and upon insertion of these revisions, the report be published as promptly as possible in the Journal of Industrial Hygiene, and that any report on human asbestosis "should be separate and not a part of this report." Exhibit: Letter from A. Lanza to Dr. Vorwald (December 14, 1948). 3164. On November 12, 1948, Vandiver Brown wrote to Mr. W. T. Kelly of American BrakeBlok in reference to the meeting of the "interested companies" to consider the Saranac report. "It was the unanimous opinion, however, that the reference to cancer and tumors should be deleted and this is a point we will insist upon for the following reasons ...." and that . . . "considerable number of other changes in the report will be suggested to Saranac." Mr. Brown told Mr. Kelly to return his copy "of this tentative III - 120 and confidential report." Brown further noted that "[e]veryone felt it would be most unwise to have any copies of the draft report outstanding if the final report is to be different in any substantial respect. The feeling of the representatives of the various companies was very emphatic on this point." . Exhibit: Letter from V. Brown to W. T. Kelly (November 12, 1948) . Witness: Barry Castleman. 3165. On December 6, 1948, Dr. Vorwald wrote to Dr. Lanza, advising of his intention to publish a second study regarding human asbestosis. With regard to publication of any study, Dr. Vorwald reassured Dr. Lanza, lest he "precipitate alarm, let me recall again our policy to submit the article for review before doing so." Exhibit: Letter from Dr. Vorwald to A. Lanza (December 6, . 1948) . Witness: ' Barry Castleman. 3166. The final revised draft of the Saranac studies, authored by Dr. Vorwald, was issued January 31, III - 121 1949. A comparison of that report with the first draft reveals that virtually all of the asbestos industry's requested changes, set forth in Dr. Lanza's December 14, 1948 letter to Dr. Vorwald, were incorporated in the report. No reference to cancer was made other than an infection/malignancy connection. The tables showing the high incidence of cancer in the experimental animals were deleted. Exhibits; Asbestosis, Report to the Johns-Manville Corporation (January 31, 1949) ; Asbestosis, Report to the Johns-Manville Corporation (January 31, 1948). 3167. Studies linking lung cancer with asbestos exposure came out at the same time as confidential surveys showing an increasing incidence of asbestosis in Manville's plants. In 1949 and 1950, Saranac proposed to Manville and the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association (hereinafter "QAMA") a review of x-ray data for evidence of the relationship of the inhalation of asbestos dust to pulmonary malignancy. The formal proposal to the QAMA included yet another confidentiality agreement "whereby the manuscript, prior to its publication, is submitted to the sponsoring company for its review and approval." III 122 Exhibits: Letter from Dr. Vorwald to Dr. K. Smith (October 15, 1949)? Letter from Dr. Vorwald to Dr. K. Smith (January 3, 1950); Proposal from Saranac to QAMA at p.ll (September 21, 1950). (b) The Hemeon Report 3168. In the face of mounting medical evidence and workers/ claims, which were publicly presenting "increasing proof that asbestos fibers do cause lung cancers," Manville and the industry instituted studies to present "counter propaganda" to the medical studies linking asbestos and cancer. . Exhibits: Letter from Dr. K. Smith to Lindell (January 28, 1950) ; Letter from J.P. Woodard to A.R.Fisher (October 10, 1950); Minutes of Organization Meeting of Asbestos Textile Institute (November 16, 1944) ; Minutes of Asbestos Textile Institute Board of Governors, at 3 (June 13, 1945); Minutes of Dust Control Committee at 2-3 (March 13, 1946); Minutes of Dust Control Committee (June 13, 1946) Tentative Plan, Industrial Hygiene Programme, Dr. Vestal (undated); III 123 Minutes of General Meeting (June 19, 1946) ; Minutes of Dust Control Committee' (September 5, 1946); Minutes of General Meeting (October 3, 1946); Minutes of General Meeting, at 2 (December 12, 1946); Notes of Air Hygiene Committee (February 5, 1947); Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for Asbestos Textile Institute at 1, 2-3, 19, 22 18, 1947); (June Memorandum on Plant of Johns-Manville Corporation, (July 11, 1947); 1946-47 Air Hygiene Committee Report (September 25,-1947); Minutes of General Meeting at 2 (September 25, 1947) ; Minutes and Recommendations of the Air Hygiene Committee at 3 (Nov. 19, 1947); Minutes of Air Hygiene Committee (June 1948). Witness; Barry Castleman. 3169. In 1944, Manville and several other companies organized a trade association called the Asbestos Textile Institute (hereinafter "ATI"). Manville was represented on the Board of Governors, and Manville officials attended meetings from 1944 through 1948. Exhibits; Minutes of Organization Meeting of ATI (November 16, 1944); III 124 3 Minutes of ATI Board of Governors, at 3 (June 13, 1945) ; Minutes of Dust Control Committee at 2-3 (March 13, 1946) ; Minutes of Dust Control Committee (June 13, 1946); Tentative Plan, Industrial Hygiene Programme, Dr. Vestal (undated); Minutes of General Meeting (June 19, 1946); Minutes of Dust Control Committee (September 5, 1946) ; Minutes of General Meeting (October 3, 1946); Minutes of General Meeting, at 2 (December 12, 1946) ; Notes of Air Hygiene Committee (February 5, 1947); Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for Asbestos Textile Institute at 1, 2-3, 19, 22 18, 1947); (June Memorandum on Plant of Johns-Manville Corporation, (July 11, 1947); 1946-47 Air Hygiene Committee Report (September 25, 1947); Minutes of General Meeting at 2 (September 25, 1947) ; Minutes and Recommendations of the Air Hygiene Committee at 3 (Nov. 19, 1947); Minutes of Air Hygiene Committee (June 1948) . Witness: Barry Castleman. 3170. In June of 1947, the Industrial Hygiene Foundation of America, Inc. (hereinafter "IHF") presented the ATI with the Report of its Preliminary Dust III - 125 Investigation which had been conducted in factories of ATI members. The report, prepared by Mr. W.C.L. Hemeon (Hemeon Report), the Head Engineer of I.H.F., presented an unfavorable picture of the health hazards and dust conditions in the factories and recommended a program of dust control and medical surveillance. Exhibits; Minutes of Organization Meeting of ATI (November 16, 1944); Minutes of ATI Board of Governors, at 3 (June 13, 1945); Minutes of Dust Control Committee at 2-3 (March 13, 1946); Minutes of Dust Control Committee (June 13, 1946); Tentative Plan, Industrial Hygiene Programme, Dr. Vestal (undated); Minutes of General Meeting (June 19, 1946); Minutes of Dust Control Committee (September 5, 1946); Minutes of General Meeting (October 3, 1946); Minutes of General Meeting, at 2 (December 12, 1946); Notes of Air Hygiene Committee (February 5, 1947) ; Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for Asbestos Textile Institute at 1, 2-3, 19, 22 18, 1947); (June Memorandum on Plant of Johns-Manville Corporation, (July 11, 1947); 1946-47 Air Hygiene Committee Report (September 25, 1947); III - 126 Minutes of General Meeting at 2 (September 25, 1947) ; Minutes and Recommendations of the Air Hygiene Committee at 3 (Nov. 19, 1947) ; Minutes of Air Hygiene Committee (June 1948). Witness; Barry Castleman. 3171. The Hemeon report discusses the need for physical examinations, the need for a comprehensive medical program and the need for dust control. Mr. Hemeon stated that the maximum permissible dustiness for asbestos was commonly taken to be 5 mppcf and that . . . "this represents good attainment in the dust control program. It is emphasized, however, that dust elimination to this extent does not positively insure that no asbestosis will develop in some workers after a long working life." Mr. Hemeon recommended further scientific study on dust and that these studies be "aimed to develop another yardstick, because it is suggested that when control below 5 mppcf is attained, present dust count methods may not properly measure the remaining hazards." Mr. Hemeon went on to state that "[t]he information available does not permit complete assurance that five million is thoroughly safe nor has information been developed permitting a better estimate of safe dustiness" (emphasis in original). Ill - 127 Exhibits: Minutes of Organization Meeting of ATI (November 16, 1944); Minutes of ATI Board of Governors, at 3 (June 13, 1945); Minutes of Dust Control Committee at 2-3 (March 13, 1946); Minutes of Dust Control Committee (June 13, 1946); Tentative Plan, Industrial Hygiene Programme, Dr. Vestal (undated); Minutes of General Meeting (June 19, 1946); Minutes of Dust Control Committee (September 5, 1946) ; Minutes of General Meeting (October 3, 1946); Minutes of General Meeting, at 2 (December 12, 1946) ; Notes of Air Hygiene Committee (February 5, 1947); Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for Asbestos Textile Institute at 1, 2-3, 19, 22 18, 1947); (June Memorandum on Plant of Johns-Manville Corporation, (July 11, 1947); 1946-47 Air Hygiene Committee Report (September 25, 1947); Minutes of General Meeting at 2 (September 25, 1947) ; Minutes and Recommendations of the Air Hygiene Committee at 3 (Nov. 19, 1947) ; Minutes of Air Hygiene Committee (June 1948). 3172. The IHF supplemented the report with a summary of the dust conditions in each plant. The IHF concluded that Manville's plant cases of asbestosis were III - 128 running at 20% annually due to heavy dust conditions, despite the fact "that large sums of money had been expended for dust control equipment." Exhibits: Minutes of Organization Meeting of ATI (November 16, 1944) ; Minutes of ATI Board of Governors, at 3 (June 13, 1945) ; Minutes of Dust Control Committee at 2-3 (March 13, 1946); Minutes of Dust Control Committee (June 13, 1946); Tentative Plan, Industrial Hygiene Programme, Dr. Vestal (undated); Minutes of General Meeting (June 19, 1946) ; Minutes of Dust Control Committee (September 5, 1946); Minutes of General Meeting (October 3, 1946); Minutes of General Meeting, at 2 (December 12, 1946) ; Notes of Air Hygiene Committee (February 5, 1947); Report of Preliminary Dust investigation for Asbestos Textile Institute at 1, 2-3, 19, 22 18, 1947); (June Memorandum on Plant of Johns-Manville Corporation, (July 11, 1947) ; 1946-47 Air Hygiene Committee Report (September 25, 1947); Minutes of General Meeting, at 2 (September 25, 1947) ; Minutes and Recommendations of the Air Hygiene Committee, at 3 (Nov. 19, 1947); Minutes of Air Hygiene Committee (June 1948). Ill 129 Witness: Barry Castleman. 3173. The confidential Hemeon report issued by the I.H.F. confirmed what Manville had known since the 1930s -- the so-called safe level of 5 mppcf was no guarantee of safety, and in fact asbestosis cases develop with exposure of less than 5 mppcf. Notwithstanding the hazards reported bv the study. Manville and the other members took no action to ever publish the report or act upon its recommendations. Exhibits: . Minutes of Organization Meeting of ATI (November 16, 1944); Minutes of ATI Board of Governors, at 3 (June 13, 1945) ; Minutes of Dust Control Committee at 2-3 (March 13, 1946); Minutes of Dust Control Committee (June 13, 1946) Tentative Plan, Industrial Hygiene Programme, Dr. Vestal (undated); Minutes of General Meeting (June 19, 1946); Minutes of Dust Control Committee (September 5, 1946) ; Minutes of General Meeting (October 3, 1946); Minutes of General Meeting, at 2 (December 12, 1946) ; Notes of Air Hygiene Committee (February 5, 1947) III 130 Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for Asbestos Textile Institute at 1, 2-3, 19, 22 18, 1947); (June. Memorandum on Plant of Johns-Manville Corporation, (July 11, 1947); 1946-47 Air Hygiene Committee Report (September 25, 1947); Minutes of General Meeting, at 2 (September 25, 1947) ; Minutes and Recommendations of the Air Hygiene Committee, at 3 (Nov. 19, 1947); Minutes of Air Hygiene Committee (June 1948). Witness; Barry Castleman. (c) Further Manville Knowledge And Cover-Up Of Low Dose Risk 3174. An example of Manville/s knowledge of the dangers of asbestosis during the World War II era for individuals exposed to "low" doses was its experience at its Redwood City, California, plant. At Redwood City, Manville was devoted solely to making 85% Magnesia and Superex for the Navy and Maritime Commission during World War II. Two cases of asbestosis found there are instructive. The first case involved Martin Chaves. Mr. Chaves worked as a canvasser from 1924 until September 1943. In that job, he would wrap magnesia around pipes -- i.e.. he was a pipe coverer, much like a pipe coverer aboard a vessel. As such he, too, performed his work in an enclosed room where there III 131 was much dust in the air. Chaves' doctor told him to stay out of dust in 1943, when he first noticed shortness of breath. Chaves advised management that year that his x-rays showed dust in his lung, and he asked for a watchman's job. Exhibits; Report of the Referee (George W. Lane, S.F.) (July 17, 1956); Letter from Drs. S. Farber and R. Wilson to. Dr. J.L. Barritt (October 28, 1956). Witness; Barry Castleman. 3175. Another demonstrative low dose World War II asbestosis case at Redwood City was John L. Leahy, a foreman. Mr. Leahy was first diagnosed as having asbestosis in 1942, although his 1938 x-rays indicated asbestosis. The significance of finding asbestosis in a case with such low exposures was fully appreciated by Dr. Gardner. Writing to Vandiver Brown on December 7, 1942, Dr. Gardner stated that he was "surprised that [the x-rays] should reveal evidence of asbestos-like reaction in view of the limited exposure. I am afraid that I cannot agree with Dr. Lanza and Dr. McConnell's interpretation as negative. Clearly, the films show definite abnormal shadows." Gardner advised Brown that other workers with similar limited exposure could be expected to have asbestosis; "As I indicated previously, one III - 132 would expect that other men in the same group, exposed similarly should also reveal evidence of change." Exhibits: Letter from L. Gardner to Vandiver Brown, (December 7, 1942); Letter from L. Gardner to I. Sabourin, at 3, 4 . (February 28, 1944). 3176. A February 28, 1944 letter from Dr. Gardner to Ivan Sabourin, Manville's Canadian Counsel, shows that long before World War II Manville was covertly monitoring the progressive asbestosis cases among workers exposed to asbestos, that Manville kept the data confidential. and that Manville was well aware of the hazard. A copy of this letter was sent to Vandiver Brown. Exhibits: # . Letter from L. Gardner to I. Sabourin, at 3, 4 (February 28, 1944); See paragraphs 3177-3178, infra. Witness: Barry Castleman. 3177. In his February 28, 1944 letter, Dr. Gardner traces the progressive severity of asbestosis cases of workers in a fabricating plant in the United States. The first survey was in 1930. The workers had been exposed to asbestos for three to eighteen years, and 40% of the workers III - 133 had definite x-ray evidence of asbestosis, with the severity of the disease being "well marked." Five years later the remaining workers were again examined and 62% of them were found to have asbestosis. Three or four years later the remaining workers were again examined and over 80% were found to have asbestosis. This was described by Dr. Gardner as "excessive amounts of severe asbestosis." The continuing examinations gave Saranac "a good opportunity to follow what might have developed." Exhibit; Letter from L. Gardner to I. Sabourin, at 3, 4 (February 28, 1944). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3178. Saranac and Manville knew that in the mines and mills in Quebec the "severity of the asbestos dust reaction is very much less than it is in the fabricating plants in the United States," but they failed to report that knowledge and instead continued to comment on the lack of cases in mines when asked about asbestosis. At no time during World War II did Manville share its extensive knowledge of cases and incidence of asbestosis with the United States. Ill 134 Exhibits: Letter from L. Gardner to I. Sabourin, at 3, 4 (February 28, 1944). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3179. In 1944, Dr. Arthur B. Steele, a Santa Barbara, California physician, informed an attorney for Manville that he had seen many pneumoconiosis patients since approximately 1932, and that he was becoming "more convinced that silicosis can be acquired from the dust in the Manville plant at Lompoc." He stated these patients would remark that the dust was so thick it looked like "snowstorms" and that one could not recognize a fellow workman. Exhibits: Letter from Dr. A. Steele to Attorney Muller at l, 5, 7 (November 17, 1944). 3180. Dr. Steele recommended (1) that the State Bureau of Industrial Hygiene investigate the plant and the dust hazard presented therein; and (2) that the dust hazard of the employees' homes also be similarly investigated. "This should be done in the name of Public Health". The "V- B" stamp indicated that Vandiver Brown had read the letter. Exhibit: Letter from Dr. A. Steele to Attorney Muller at l, 5, 7 (November 17, 1944) . Ill 135 Witnesses; Dr. Kenneth Smith; Irving Pedley; Barry Castleman. 3181. Dr. Kenneth W. Smith began working for Canadian Johns-Manville in 1944, and later became the Manville Corporate Medical Director. Witness: Dr. Kenneth Smith. 3182. Manville became aware of non-occupational exposure cases as early as 1945 when Smith and Dr. Stevenson, another Canadian Manville physician, visited Saranac Lake to review x-rays of Canadian Manville patients. Mr. J.P. Woodard. Manville Corporate Director of Industrial Relations, was present during discussions of some of these x-rays. Witness: Dr.; Kenneth Smith. 3183. Studies conducted of employees and non employees in Thetford and Asbestos by Metropolitan Life from 1944-47 show that Johns-Manville was aware not only of plant worker cases by 1945, but also of cases among families and community members. Ill - 136 Witnesses: Dr. Kenneth Smith; Barry Castleman. 3184. Dominic Bertogliat, a Manville employee for 21 years, and a superintendent at its large Waukegan, Illinois plant died in December of 1947 of an asbestosrelated disease. His widow advised Manville that the autopsy had revealed that the cause of death was asbestos infiltration. After discussion with Dr. Lanza, Bertogliat's x-rays and records were sent to Dr. Vorwald at Saranac Laboratory. On July 20, 1948 Dr. Vorwald advised Manville that Mr. Bertogliat had a case of "moderately advanced asbestosis", and that he was obliged to send a copy of his report to the doctor who performed the autopsy. Manville responded by saying: "it would be desirable for us if your report to Dr. Berdes could be delayed for a time. I could advise you when the appropriate steps have been taken at Waukegan." Several weeks later. Dr. Vorwald was advised that. Manville had settled the Bertogliat case. Only then did h*' provide his report to Dr. Berdes. Exhibits: Letter from Mrs. D. Bertogliat to Day (December 29, 1947); Letter from J.P. Woodard to Dr. Vorwald (January 14, 1948); Letter from H. Jackson to Dr. Vorwald (February 16, 1948); III - 137 Letter from Dr. Vorwald to H. Jackson (July 20, 1948) ; Letter from H. Jackson to Dr. Vorwald (July 28, 1948) ; Letter from H. Jackson to Dr. Vorwald (August 13, 1948); Letter from Dr. Vorwald to H. Jackson at 2 (August 19, 1948). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3185. A Manville Safety Engineer expressed concern with Mr. Bertogliat's results because of his "slight exposure." As you can readily understand, I am particularly concerned that the type of exposure to which Mr. Bertogliat was subjected should produce the evident results. To our way of thinking, although he had worked in the general area for a number of years, the degree of exposure was relatively slight.____That is,.. he wag suteiftfitsfl not tp a . concentrated exposure of anv particular the Process hut rather only to .general. gjaogRftegg-*1 s supplied) In zigipQnse to the Safety Engineer/s request for advice whether similar cases of asbestosis should be expected in others with low levels of exposure, Dr. Vorwald provided the answer long known and secretly held by Saranac Laboratory and top management of Manville "I can see no other III - 138 alternative than to anticipate others with similar exposure to be. similarly affected...* Exhibits: Letter from Mrs. D. Bertogliat to Day (December 29, 1947); Letter from J.P. Woodard to Dr. Vorwald (January 14, 1948); Letter from H. Jackson to Dr. Vorwald (February 16, 1948); Letter from Dr. Vorwald to H. Jackson (July 20, 1948) ; Letter from H. Jackson to Dr. Vorwald (July 28, 1948) ; Letter from H. Jackson to Dr. Vorwald (August 13, 1948) ; Letter from Dr. Vorwald to H. Jackson at 2 (August 19, 1948). 3186. Manville utilized the Saranac Laboratory to diagnose asbestos disease in its plant workers who were referred to Saranac from Manville's own plant physicians. The diagnoses were kept confidential. from Blinn to H. Jackson (April 24, 1948); Letter from Dr. Vorwald to H. Jackson (April 30, 1948yt Letter from H. Jackson to Dr. Vorwald (June 1, 1948). Witness: Barry Castleman. Ill - 139 3187. A September 12, 1949 memo entitled "Reports of Industrial Hygiene Cases Compiled at Manville Plant in 1932-1939, 1940 and 1947-1948, and Consolidated at G.H.Q.," analyzed cases of asbestosis and pneumoconiosis at one of Manville's many facilities.. Metropolitan Life had reported on this plant to the War Board through the New Jersey Department of Health in 1945, assuring the War Board that dust was under control and had been for many years. This report shows that Manville conducted a follow-up of its industrial hygiene cases, from which certain facts emerge: (a) The 327 1932 cases were restudied in 1939. Of the . original group, 96 had left and 231 remained as employees. There is no indication that any other workers beyond the original 1932 group were studied and no new cases were added. (b) In 1940 an apparently new report was generated. At that time, 165 cases were found, 44 of which had been,on the original 1932 list. It appears ^that' most of the 1932 list and 1939 list were skipped in the 1940 study. There is no reason to believe from these facts that any systematic study of employees was made in 1940, yet that report found 121 new cases in 1939. (c) Each year Manville artificially reduced the number of employees with pulmonary disease by not III - 140 counting separated, dead or "unavailable" employees. Exhibits: Confidential Memorandum, Reports of Industrial Hygiene Claims compiled at Manville Plant in 1932 1939, 1940, and 1947-1948, and Consolidated, at HQ (September 12, 1949); Letter from Kenneth Smith to Lowry (April 4, 1955). Witness: Barry Castleman. 3188. There is no evidence that Manville ever told its own employees, let alone the United States, of their pulmonary disease, whether diagnosed by a plant physician, HQ employees, Dr. Lanza or Saranac Laboratory. A September 1949 meeting with Manville employees with pulmonary disease reveals a practice of transferring certain individuals who showed signs of disease. Exhibits: Confidential memo from J.P. Woodward to M.F. Naylor (September 15, 1949); Confidential memo from H. Jackson (September 19, 1949) ; Letter from M.F. Naylor to J.P. Woodard (October 10, 1950). 3189. Manville's concealment of pulmonary disease processes from its employees is evidenced in M.F. Naylor's III - 141 October 10, 1950 letter to J.P. Woodard at Manville/s World Headquarters. Naylor informed Woodard that it was not his understanding that the 84 individuals with occupational disease would be x-rayed on an annual basis, but that he would do a routine x-ray every two years. Naylor wrote: "Dr. Pauly pointed out to me that the president of the union once said, 'I don't have to worry because they don't call me in for special films.'" Exhibit: Letter from M.F. Naylor to J.P. Woodward (October 10,- 1950) . 3190. It is evident that Manville had been keeping records regarding cases of pulmonary disease among its workers in at least one plant since 1932, and that by 1949 there were nearly 500 cases in that one plant. It is equa'lly clear that the cases were never reported in the literature, and that pains were taken (including denial of annual x-rays) to keep workers from learning of their conditions. Exhibits: Confidential memo, J.P. Woodard to M.F. Naylor (September 15, 1949); Confidential memo from H. Jackson (September 19, 1949)? Letter from M.F. Naylor to J.P. Woodard (October 10, 1950). Ill - 142 (d) Manville Did Not Know Of The Fleischer-Drinker Report 3191. In 1946, the government published the Fleischer-Drinker Report which concluded that "pipe covering [in shipyards] is not a dangerous occupation." Manville did not rely upon the Fleischer-Drinker Report at any time, least of all during the war years (which predated the report). Indeed, Manville has made the following admission in an interrogatory answer: JM is unable to ascertain when it first became aware of the Fleischer-Drinker Report; however, Hugh Jackson testified that he first became aware of the report in 1952. JM was generally aware of medical literature as it was published, so it assumes that it became aware of the report contemporaneously with its publication. JM personnel then responsible for keeping current with medical literature are now deceased. JM is presently unaware of any documents expressly documenting or reflecting the exact date of such awareness. Exhibits: J-M Annual Reports (1938 through 1948); J-M Reports to Stockholders (1938 through 1948) ; W.E. Fleischer, F.J. Viles, Jr., R.L. Gade and P. Drinker, A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels. 28 Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology 9, 16 (January 1946); Answer of JM to Interrogatory No. 46 in JohnsManville v. United States. (N.D. Cal.), No. C-814561-RFP; III - 143 See Section F(4) of this Volume, infra. Witnesses: Dr. Kenneth W. Smith; Barry Castleman. 3192. Dr. Kenneth W. Smith, Medical Director of Manville, has testified that he never saw the Fleischer- Drinker Report until 1976: Q. Are you familiar with report known as Fleischer and Drinker, specifically the health survey of pipe covering operations in constructing naval vessels published in the Canadian Journal of Industrial Hygiene in 1945 or '46? A. I was aware of the publication. Q. When were you first made aware of it? ' A. Yesterday. Q. Had you ever seen the article prior to April 20, 1976? A. Never. Exhibits: W.E. Fleischer, F.J. Viles, Jr., R.L. Gade and P. Drinker, A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels. 28 Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology 9 (January 1946); Answer of JM to Interrogatory No. 46 propounded by U.S. in Johns-Manville Corporation v. United States. (N.D. Cal.), No. C-81-4561-RFP; See Section F(4) of this Volume, infra. Ill - 144 Witness: Dr. Kenneth W. Smith. (10) Manville's Decision Not to Warn 3193. In light of Manville's continuous efforts to suppress disclosure of information concerning the hazards of asbestos, it is not surprising that for decades Manville failed to warn both its own employees and the users of its products of the hazards of asbestos dust exposure. Indeed, since the mid-1930's, Manville was confronted with the idea of posting warning signs in its plants and warning labels on its products. Exhibit: Letter from S.A. Williams to A.R. Fisher, enclosing "Questions Asked Dr. A.J. Lanza Answers Verbatim" (August 29, 1935). and His 3194. During the 1930's, Manville experienced difficulty in controlling the dust at their Manville and Waukegan plants. In 1935, Dr. Lanza responded to questioning by Manville's local physician at Waukegan with respect to the advisability of making Manville's employees aware that asbestos dust is hazardous to their health. Lanza stated that in light of the "extraordinary legal situation... a general statement that the company is taking steps to control the amount of dust in the air for general III 145 health purposes" should be made if anything is said at all. Exhibit: Letter from S.A. Williams to A.R. Fisher enclosing "Questions Asked Dr. A.J. Lanza and His Answers Verbatim" (August 29, 1935). 3195. Beginning in 1952, Manville began placing warning labels on its calcined and flux calcined diatomaceous earth product ("Celite Products") due to the hazard of silicosis. Manville was then the leading producer of "Celite" products. This decision was one of the safeguards Manville agreed upon following a bitter strike at its Celite plant in Lompoc, California over health issues related to excessive dust levels at the plant. Exhibit: Memorandum from E.M. Fenner to G.W. Wright, M.D. (February 5, 1975). Witnesses: Dr. Kenneth W. Smith; Barry Castleman. 3196. In the early 1950's, Dr. Smith, then Manville's Medical Director, and Hugh Jackson, Director of Manville's Industrial Hygiene Program, strongly recommended placing warning labels on Manville's asbestos products. Witnesses: Dr. Kenneth W. Smith; III 146 Hugh Jackson. 3197. Indeed by 1952, Manville was well aware that asbestos was a far greater hazard than diatomaceous earth or "Celite". Witness: Roger Hackney. 3198. However, Manville management rejected the use of warning labels on asbestos products for economic reasons. Manville decided that use of warning labels would cause it to lose customers and would trigger an avalanche of workers' compensation claims and liability lawsuits. Manville also rejected a 1952 recommendation from Arthur Fisk of Manville's legal department that Manville use a warning label on its bags containing asbestos fibre. Exhibits: Letter from Arthur L. Fisk, Jr. to Dr. Anthony J. Lanza (February 20, 1952); Letter from Anthony J. Lanza to Arthur L. Fisk, Jr. (March 5, 1952). Witness: Dr. Kenneth W. Smith. 3199. Manville did ^not use warning labels on any of its asbestos-containing products until October 1964 and did not use a warning label in connection with its Superex III - 147 products (which contained a combination of diatomaceous earth and asbestos) until 1966. Exhibits: Memorandum from E.M. Fenner to G.W. Wright, M.D. (February 5, 1975); Answers to Interrogatories of the United States in Johns-Manville v. United States of America C-81-4561-RFP, (N.D. Cal.) 3200. However, Manville management's negative attitude toward providing warning labels did not change: Even after 1964, it was Manville's policy to scrape off existing warning labels when the products were exported and subject to less stringent foreign labeling laws. For example, warning labels were sanded off of Manville's Superex and Thermobestos products shipped into Canada. because there were no labeling laws in Canada. Manville did not begin to place warning labels on its asbestos fiber shipped to Canada until 1969. Exhibits: Memorandum from W.E. Hodgson to S. Lane (January 14, 1965); Telegram from W.E. Hodgson to S. Lane (January 14, 1965); ' Letter from E.H. Jensen to E.C. Lindstrom (January 25, ,1965); Letter from A. Pocius to W.H. Hodgson (January 29, 1965); Letter from E.C. Lindstrom to C.H. Jensen (January 29, 1965); III 148 Letter from C.H. Hodgson to A. Pocius (Febuary 1, 1965) ; Letter from V.C. Lindsay to E.C. Lindstrom (February 2, 1965) ; Telegram from C.H. Jensen to E.C. Lindstrom (February 8, 1965) ; Letter from C.H. Jensen to E.C. Lindstrom (February 9, 1965) ; Telegram from C.H. Jensen to E.C. Lindstrom (February 16, 1965) ; Telegram from E.C. Lindstrom to C.H. Jensen (February 16, 1965); Letter from E.C.. Lindstrom to C.H. Jensen (February 16, 1965) . Witness; Augustus Pocius. (11) Courts Reviewing Manville's Conduct Have Repeatedly Found Punitive Damages Appropriate 3201. This Court is not the first to review Manville's knowledge and concealment of the hazards of asbestos. When juries and courts have been presented with evidence similar to that contained in Sections F(l-10) of this Volume, supra (and in most, if not all, cases only a portion of this evidence), the verdict has been overwhelming: Manville's complete disregard for the health and safety of shipyard and other workers mandates that punitive damages be assessed. Ill 149 3202. James R. Fischer, an asbestos worker who worked for Asbestos, Ltd. from 1938 through the end of 1942, and for an additional four month period in 1945, filed a lawsuit against, among others, Manville, to recover for pulmonary disease suffered as a result of prolonged exposure to asbestos. The sole issue on which the trial was based was the defendants' failure to warn of health hazards related to exposure to asbestos. The jury awarded $91,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. Eighty percent of the compensatory and punitive damages were assessed against Manville. Mr. Fischer was never given any cautionary warning or instructions in the safe handling of asbestos by Manville. ' Exhibit: Fischer v. Johns-Manville Coro.. 193 N.J. Super. . 113, 115-116 (1984). 3203. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision. The Appellate Court noted the following with respect to the issue and supporting evidence in the case: [T]he essential controversy [is] whether these defendants did in fact have knowledge of the hazards of asbestos during the time of plaintiff's exposure some 45 years ago. Plaintiffs based their punitive damage claim on the contention that defendants knew of these hazards as early as the 1930's and had made a conscious business decision to withhold this information from the III - 150 public. They claimed that defendants, with full knowledge of the risks, deliberately chose not to give those warnings to users of the product which might have enabled them to obtain protection from prolonged exposure. This conduct, plaintiffs alleged, constituted an outrageous and flagrant disregard of the substantial health risks to which defendants subjected the public and justified the imposition of punitive damages. The jury evidently agreed. Our review of the record satisfies us that there was substantial proof adduced to support these factual contentions and the jury's acceptance of them. Exhibit; Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp.. 193 N.J. Super. 113, 117 (1984). 3204. Manville, in its answers to interrogatories, which were read to the jury, admitted that; [t]he corporation became aware of the relationship between asbestos and the disease known as asbestosis among workers involved in mining, milling, and manufacturing operations and exposed to high levels of virtually 100% raw asbestos fibers over long periods of time by the early 1930s. The corporation has followed and become aware of the general state of the medical art relative to asbestos and its relationship to disease processes, if any. Exhibit: Fischer v. Johns-Manville Coro.. 193 N.J. Super. 113, 117-118 (1984). Ill 151 3205. Noting that the "proofs" against Manville were overwhelming, the Appellate Court stated that punitive damages are allowable in "exceptional and egregious instances," and that the "standard of egregiousness usually implies 'that there has been a deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm and reckless indifference to consequences'." The Appellate Court also noted "that Johns-Manville is a giant business concern with a long history of a immense profitability which at least in some part was achieved, and unnecessarily so, at the expense of the health of thousands of asbestos workers." Exhibit: Fischer v. Johns-Manville. 193 N.J. Super 113, 120, 128 (1984). 3206. stating: The Appellate Court in Fischer concluded by We have no doubt, however, that plaintiffs' proof justified the jury's evident conclusion that irrespective of whatever remedial efforts may have been taken by the asbestos industry years later, both defendants, during the period of plaintiff's exposure, [1938 1942, and 1945] acted knowingly and deliberately in subjecting him as an asbestos worker to serious health hazards with utter and reckless disregard of his safety and well-being. It is indeed appalling to us that JohnsManville had so much information on the hazards to asbestos workers as early as the mid-1930's and that it not only failed to use that information to protect these workers but, more III 152 egregiously, it also attempted to withhold this information from the public. It is also clear that even though Johns-Manville may have taken some remedial steps decades ago to protect its own employees, it apparently did nothing to warn and protect those who, like plaintiff, were employed by Johns-Manville customers engaged in the manufacture and fabrication of asbestos products.... The jury here was justified in concluding that both defendants, fully appreciating the extent and gravity of the risks, nevertheless made a conscious and cold-blooded business decision, in utter and flagrant disregard of the rights of others, to take no protective or remedial action. Exhibit: Fischer v. Johns-Manville Coro.. 193 N.J. Super. 113, 120, 128, 130-131, 132 (1984). 3207. Manville appealed the Fischer case to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division, including the award of punitive damages. Exhibit: Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp.. 512 A.2d 466, 469, 470 (N.J. 1986). 3208. In its decision, the Supreme Court discussed the type of conduct that will warrant an award of punitive damages:. The conduct must be 'wantonly reckless or malicious. There must be an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an "evil-minded act or an act III 153 accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of the rights of another." "...[T]he requirement may be satisfied upon a showing that there has been a deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm and reckless indifference to consequencesHowever one describes the conduct that will justify punitive damages, one thing is clear: "the key to the right to punitive damages is the wrongfulness of the intentional act." Exhibit: Fischer v. Johns-Manvilie Coro.. 512 A.2d 466, 472 (1986) (citations omitted). 3209. In finding that Manville's conduct satisfied this standard, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated as follows: We cannot imagine that the conduct proven in this case would have been viewed as any less egregious in the 1940's, when the exposure commenced, than it is today. In this connection we share the Appellate Division's reaction to defendant's 'knowingly and deliberately *** subjecting [James Fischer] as an asbestos worker to serious health hazards with utter and reckless disregard of his safety and well-being.' (citation omitted) It is indeed appalling to us that JohnsManville had so much information on the hazards to asbestos workers as early as the mid-1930's and that it not only failed to use that information to protect these workers but, more egregiously, that it also attempted to withhold this information from the public. Ill 154 Exhibit; Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp. 517 A.2d 466, 476 (1986) . 3210.The Supreme Court concluded that the various types of evidence in the case: fully justified the Appellate Division's appraisal of the "proofs respecting Johns-Manville" as "indeed [,..] overwhelming." . . . "In particular, the evidence supports a finding that JohnsManville knew of the dangers created by its product. Not only did it fail to warn users of the serious health hazards associated with exposure to asbestos, it actually took affirmative steps to conceal this information from the public. These actions fully warranted the jury's imposition of punitive damages. Exhibit: Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp.. 512 A.2d 466, 481 (1986). 3211. The dissenting opinion argued that the standard for imposing punitive damages should be higher than the standard recognized by the majority, but noted that the conduct of Manville met both the test recognized by the majority and the higher standard urged by the dissent: I am also in accord with the Court's view that the manufacturer's conduct here would meet its test of "utter and reckless disregard of (the user's] safety and well-being," [...],or my own view of the test as involving "a conscious and outrageous indifference to the risks of marketing, manufacturing, or producing its product." [...]I find in the conduct a conscious indifference to the worker's well-being. Ill 155 Exhibits; Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp.. 512 A.2d 466, 482 (N.J. 1986). 3212. Manville was also held liable for compensatory and punitive damages to a former shipyard worker because its asbestos products did not contain a label warning of the dangers associated with asbestos exposure. Exhibit: Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Coro.. 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 54 U.S.L.W. 3867 (1986). 3213. The issue before the Fifth Circuit was "whether reasonable jurors could have concluded that the defendants' [including Manville] behavior was so malicious or grossly indifferent as to warrant punitive damages under Mississippi law." The Appellate Court held that "the jury had an adequate basis for concluding that the defendants had shown gross disregard for Jackson's rights and that Jackson was therefore entitled to punitive damages." Exhibit: Jackson v. Johns-Manville 394, 408 (5th Cir. 1986), U.S.L.W. 3867 (1986). Sales cert, Corp.. 781 denied. 54 F.2d 3214. The Fifth Circuit reviewed some of the III - 156 evidence that warranted the jury's imposition of punitive damages: One court, apparently having viewed evidence similar to that in the record of this case, concluded that '...there is voluminous evidence that the asbestos industries have known for decades of the dangers involved in the use of asbestos products.' Johns-Many i H e Sales Corn, v. Janssens. 463 So.2d 242, 249 n.5 (Fla. App. 1984). review denied. 467 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1985). JM apparently had a policy of not telling its workers whom company officials knew to have asbestosis that they in fact had asbestosis. Perhaps this was deemed by the jury to have been a policy that was recklessly indifferent. See, e.g., 49 R at 417, 582; See also. Deposition of Wilbur Ruff. The jury might also have concluded that the asbestos companies practice of directing their doctors not to participate in programs devoted to learning the association between asibestos and lung-related disease reflected malicious behavior or reckless indifference to the rights of those workers who would be around asbestos. See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Nicholas Demy, 51 Record at 1137? See generally. 50 Record at 800-16. Finally, the Sumner Simpson papers, one of which consisted of a letter from the President of Raybestos to the Legal Director of JM suggesting that "the less said about asbestos the better off we are," might have been regarded by the jury as reckless, indifferent, or even malicious behavior. (Or perhaps the jury was more outraged by the response to this letter from the Legal Director of JM. He wrote; "I quite agree that our interests are best served by having asbestosis receive the minimum amount of publicity.") III 157 Exhibit: Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.. 781 F.2d 394, 404 n.12 (5th Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 54 U.S.L.W. 3867 (1986). . 3215. Edward Janssens served on board ships with the Navy between 1942 and 1951. In 1978, he learned he was suffering from asbestosis and brought suit against Manville. A jury found Manville liable for causing Mr. Janssens' asbestosis and awarded compensatory damages and $750,000 punitive damages. Exhibit: Johns-Manville Sales Coro, v. 242, 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); So.2d 999 (Fla. 1985). Janssens. 463 So. 2d review denied, 467 3216. Manville appealed the punitive damage award and the First District Court of Appeals found that: ...[ljegal basis for punitive damages is established in products liability cases where the manufacturer is shown to have knowledge that its product is inherently dangerous to persons or property and that its continued use is likely to cause injury or death, but nevertheless continues to market the product without making feasible modifications to eliminate the danger or make adequate disclosure and warning of such danger... Especially is this so when the evidence is susceptible to the inference th^t the manufacturer not only refused to warn for the user's protection, but intentionally took steps to coverup the known danger in order to protect continued marketing of the product for its own economic advantage. Ill 158 The evidence in this case, considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs below, is sufficient to establish that Johns-Manville had knowledge, at least from the decade of the 1930s, that prolonged exposure to asbestos dust and fibers would cause the chronic lung disease commonly known as asbestosis. In the early 1900s, it was known that asbestos could cause lung disease, a report thereof having been published in 1907. Additional reports in subsequent years caused JohnsManville to begin, in 1929, its own research into the relationship between asbestos and lung disease. Exhibit; Johns-Manville Sales Coro, v. Janssens. 463 So.2d 242, 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); review denied. 467 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1985) (footnote and citations omitted). 3217. The Court of Appeals also noted.that the correspondence between Vandiver Brown and Sumner Simpson in the 1930's confirmed that the respective companies believed that their interests were "best served by having asbestosis receive the minimum of publicity," and that they accordingly used their influence to avoid publication in trade magazines of studies showing the adverse experiences in England and South Africa with the asbestos dust hazard. Exhibit; * Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. 242, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); So.2d 999 (Fla. 1985); Janssens. 463 So.2d review denied, 467 3218. The Court of Appeals also discussed the: III 159 evidence in the record that JohnsManville persisted until the 1960s in suppressing information that asbestos dust and fibers would cause asbestosis. One witness, the late Dr. Kenneth Smith, who testified by depostion, served as Johns-Manville's Medical Director from 1944 to 1966, and one of his reports dated in the 1940 s indicated that JohnsManville had a policy of not telling employees about the results of X-rays that showed they were suffering from asbestos is, so that they "can live and work in peace and the company can benefit by [their] many years of experience." Exhibit; Johns-Manville Sales Coro, v. Janssens. 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); review denied. 999 (Fla. 1985) ,* 463 So.2d 467 So.2d 3219. The Court of Appeals noted that Dr. Smith testified through deposition that he had discussed the serious dangers of exposure to asbestos fibers with officers and legal counsel of the company in the 1940s and 1950s, saying to them, "we know that we are producing disease in the employees who manufacture these'products, and there is no question in my mind that disease is being produced in non-JM employees who may use certain of these products." As stated by the Court; Without detailing all the evidence, we conclude the jury could find that JohnsManville knew asbestos was causing asbestosis in employees working in its plants and in persons using its asbestos products during 1942 through 1951, the period of Mr. Janssens' exposure, and III 160 that Johns-Manville not only failed to warn, but deliberately and persistently refused to disclose or disseminate warnings of any danger during that period and for many years thereafter. The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that Johns-Manville7s conduct amounted to a wanton disregard for the health and safety of persons using its asbestos products and evinced a reckless indifference to the potential consequences of its deliberate business decision not to warn the users of its products to take some measures of protection from the potentially harmful effects of prolonged exposure to excessive amounts of asbestos dust and fibers. Exhibit: Johns-Manville Sales Coro, v. 242, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) ; So.2d 999 (Fla. 1985). Janssens. 463 So.2d review denied. 467 3220. The Court of Appeals further stated that, Johns-Manville learned of the high probability of danger to thousands of persons manufacturing and using asbestos products over a period of years and, despite such knowledge, made conscious decisions at the executive level not to disclose the presence of this danger nor to alert affected individuals to the potential harm that could result from such exposure over a long period of time. Johns-Manville7s conduct in this case is a far cry from the single incident of negligence in White Construction and is clearly of a character evincing a reckless disregard for human life or the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effect, which supports a finding by the jury of a conscious indifference to consequences, wantonness, recklessness, and a grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of members of the public. Ill 161 Exhibit: Johns-Manville Sales Corn, v. Janssens. 463 So.2d 242, 263-4 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); review denied. 467 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1985). 3221. After the Court of Appeals affirmed the punitive damage award, Johns-Manville filed a petition for review with the Florida Supreme Court which was denied. Exhibit: Johns-Manville Sales Coro, v. Janssens. 467 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1985). . 3222. Edward Moran, who for over 30 years installed insulation products made by Manville, died of lung cancer at age 61.. His estate sued Johns-Manville, and a jury awarded compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The Appellate Court affipned the award of punitive damages. "We find Moran's evidence of known or knowable risks to insulation workers to be ample. By deposition testimony, the late Dr. Kenneth Smith, a former Medical Director at JM, testified that he was aware of the 'association' between lung cancer and inhalation of asbestos fibers in the late 1940's? ..." . Exhibit: Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Coro.. 691 F.2d 811, 813-14 (6th Cir. 1982); III 162 3223. In a law suit captioned Neal v. Carev Canadian Mines. Ltd., a number of workers, most of whom began their employment between 1926 and 1947, sued a number of companies, including Manville. After trial, a jury found Manville liable for compensatory damages, and additionally liable for punitive damages because of its "outrageous conduct". Exhibit: Neal v. Carev Canadian Mines. 548 F.Supp. 357, 365-367 (E.D.Pa. 1982). 3224. The Court denied Manville's post-trial motions, stating as follows: Nevertheless, the Court holds that there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury from which a reasonable jury could find that the conduct of Manville amounted to outrageous conduct which would support a punitive damages award on behalf of each plaintiff. Testimony indicating that Johns-Manville continually failed to warn users of hazards associated with the inhalation of asbestos fibers, despite overwhelming knowledge of those hazards by high ranking corporate officials, was presented ..." The aforementioned testimony sufficiently establishes that high-ranking corporate officials were fully aware of the dangers of asbestos exposure during the mid-1940's and through the early 1960's and that they continually refused to act despite their ready knowledge of these dangers. Such testimony sufficiently supports an award of punitive damages against JohnsManville since a reasonable jury could find by virtue of this evidence that Johns-Manville engaged in outrageous III - 163 conduct by exhibiting a reckless indifference to the health and wellbeing of plaintiffs." Exhibit: .. Neal v. Carev Canadian Mines. 548 F.Supp. 357, 375-76 (E.D. Pa. 1982). (12) The Espionage Act Did Not "Classify" Information Or Documents And Did Not Prohibit Disclosure Of Infor mation To Manville a. General Application of the Espionage Act 3225. The Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C. 31 et sec.. did not prohibit the disclosure of information relating to national defense unless the person disclosing the information acted with the intent to injure the United States. Therefore, the Espionage Act did not generally prohibit the disclosure of information about shipyard conditions. Exhibits: 50 U.S.C. 31-34 (1940); Gorin v. United States. 312 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1941). 3226. The Espionage Act did not provide for "classification" of documents. Therefore, placing a reference to the Espionage Act on a document did not make it classified but merely provided "handling instructions." Ill - 164 Witness: Barbara Vaughan. 3227. Reports of Maritime Commission shipyard surveys, discussed in Sections G(2) and G(4) of this Volume, infra, were not "classified" as "secret,* "confidential" or "restricted". witness: Barbara Vaughan. 3228. Indeed, Maritime Commission shipyard survey reports were "fairly readily available" as of the date of their issue notwithstanding their reference to the Espionage Act. Witness: Barbara Vaughan. 3229. The disclosure of information obtained by Maritime Commission health and safety consultants occurred on a regular basis, since the consultants regularly sent survey reports to shipyard management and occasionally discussed the purpose of their work and appropriate recommendations with the foremen of shipyard shops and subcontractors. Witnesses: James F. Morgan; III 165 Kenneth W. Nelson; See Sections F(2) and F(4) of this volume; infra. 3230. Documents citing the Espionage Act were available to persons with legitimate interests upon request. Witness; Barbara Vaughan. 3231. There is no evidence that, between 1939 and 1947, the United States denied any Manville request for access to any document on the basis of the Espionage Act or any other reason. There specifically is no evidence that, between 1939 and 1947, the United States denied a Manville request to review Maritime Commission shipyard surveys, including the December 1944 Bath Iron Works Survey.' See Section G(4) of this Volume, infra. b. The Espionage Act As Incorporated Into Naw Ship Contracts 3232. At least until December 1940, the "General Provisions" attached to Navy ship contracts referenced the predecessor statute to the Act of March 28, 1940 in the "Confidential Papers" found at point 3(a). The "Confidential Papers" clause stated: (a) The plans and specifications contain information of a character that cannot be made public without detriment to the Governments interests, and they III - 166 are to be treated as confidential by the parties to this contract. The plans and specifications for the vessel/vessels come within the scope covered by "An Act to Punish Acts of interference- with the Foreign Relations, the Neutrality, and the Foreign Commerce of the United States, and for Other Purposes," approved June 15, 1917 (50 U.S.C. 31 32). It is the purpose of this contract to prohibit the contractor from divulging any information whatsoever concerning the vessel/vessels to unauthorized person, and particularly to those not citizens of the United States, including the divulging of any characteristic data upon which the machinery of the vessel/vessels or other appurtenances are to be designed for the purpose of obtaining plans or technical information in connection with detail . design from any foreign source. Attention is also invited by the Department to the provisions of the Act of January 12, 1938 (50 U.S.C. 45), as supplemented by Executive Order 8381, dated March 22, 1940, prohibiting the making of photographs, sketches, or maps of vital military and naval defensive installations and equipment. Exhibits: Contract NOd-1124 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 25, 1939) ; Contract NOd-1125 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 1939)7 25, Contract NOd-1439 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July 1, 1940)7 Contract N0d-1440 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July l, 1940)7 Contract NOd-1491 between the United States of III - 167 America and the Bethlehem Steel Company September 9 / 1940); Contract NOd-1493 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940); Contract NOd-1496 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940); Contract NOd-1632 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (December 16, 1940). 3233. The language contained in point 3(a) of the General Provisions of Contracts NOd-1124-1125, 1439-1440, 1491, 1493, 1496 and 1632 does not mention working conditions and refers rather to "plans and specifications." Therefore, it is clear that these contracts did not prohibit the disclosure of information about working conditions under which the ship was built. Exhibits: Contract NOd-1124 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 25, 1939); Contract NOd-1125 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 1939); . 25, Contract NOd-1439 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July 1, 1940); * Contract N0d-1440 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July 1, 1940) ; Contract NOd-1491 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company September 9, 1940); III - 168 Contract NOd-1493 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940); Contract NOd-1496 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940); Contract NOd-1632 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (December 16, 1940). 3234. At least one of the ships built at the Fore River Shipyard pursuant to Contracts NOd-1124-1125, 1439 1440, 1491, 1493, 1496 and 1632 was under construction between July 1939 and September 1945. Nothing in the Navy contracts covering these ships prevented the disclosure of information about the ''working conditions" related to these ships. Therefore, at anytime during World War II, Manville could have obtained information at the Fore River Shipyard about the "working conditions" related to these ships. Exhibit: Ships Built - Ouincv Yard, at 21-26 (undated); Contract NOd-1124 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 25, 1939); Contract NOd-1125 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 1939) ; 25, Contract NOd-1439 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July 1, 1940) ; Contract N0d-1440 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July 1, 1940) ; III 169 Contract NOd-1491 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company September 9, 1940); Contract NOd-1493 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940) ; Contract NOd-1496 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940) ; Contract NOd-1632 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (December 16, 1940). 3235. At least after February 2, 1943, Article 11 of Navy General Provisions referenced the Act approved March 28, 1940 and provided: DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION. -- (a) The work contracted for hereunder related to and is connected with the war effort. No information relating to such work shall be communicated, transmitted or disclosed to any person not entitled to receive it, and the Contractor shall be responsible for safeguarding matters within its control which are classified by the Department as "Secret,* "Confidential," or "Restricted." (b) Information contained in the plans and specification forming a part of the contract may be disclosed (i) to the officers, agents or employees of the Contractor, but only to the extent that such disclosure is essential to the performance of the contract and subject to any restrictions which may be imposed on such disclosure by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships or the naval inspector charged with the duty of inspecting the work and materials covered by the contract (hereinafter called the "Naval Inspector") and (ii) to officers, agents or employees of corporations, III - 170 partnerships or persons undertaking the performance of subcontracts or purchase orders made or placed under the contract if the Chief of the Bureau of Ships or the Naval Inspector shall consent thereto. (c) Disclosure of information relating to the work contracted for hereunder to any person not entitled to receive it, or failure to safeguard all matters within the Contractor's control and identified by the Department as "Secret,* "Confidential," or "Restricted," may subject the Contractor, its agents, employees and subcontractors to criminal liability under the laws of the United States, including the Act approved June 15, 1917, as amended by.the Act approved March 28, 1940 (50 U.S. Code (1940 ed.) secs. 31 to 42), and the provisions of an Act approved January 12, 1938 (50 U.S. Code (1940 ed.) secs. 45 to 45d), as supplemented by Executive Order No. 8381 dated March 22, 1940. Exhibits: . . Contract N0bs-840 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October 29, 1942); Contract NObs-1339 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October 1, 1943) ; Contract NObs-1417 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (December 9, 1943). 3236. The language of Article 11 of Contracts NObs- 840, 1339 and 1417 does not mention "working conditions." "(I]nformation relating to the work contracted for hereunder" does not encompass "working conditions" but rather refers to "plans and specifications." Therefore, it III 171 is clear that Contracts NObs-840, 1339 and 1417 do not prohibit disclosure of the working conditions under which the ship was built. Exhibits: Contract NObs-840 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October 29, 1942); Contract NObs-1339 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October 1, 1943); Contract NObs-1417 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (December 9, 1943). 3237. At least one of the ships built at the Fore River Shipyard pursuant to Contracts NObs-840, 1339 and 1417 was under construction between February 1943 and July 1944 and between March 1945 and September 1946. Nothing in the Navy contracts covering these ships prevented the disclosure of information about "working conditions" related to these ships. Therefore, between February 1943 and July 1944 and between March 1945 and September 1946, Manville could have obtained information at the Fore River Shipyard about the "working conditions" related to these ships. Exhibits: Ships Built - Ouincv Yard, at 21-26 (undated); Contract NObs-840 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October 29, 1942); III - 172 Contract NObs-1339 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October 1, 1943); Contract NObs-1417 between the United States of America and the-Bethlehem Steel Company (December 9, 1943). 3238. Further evidence that the Navy contract clauses set forth at paragraphs 3232 and 3235, supra, did not prohibit disclosure of information about working conditions exists from the fact that the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries routinely visited the Fore River Shipyard for the specific purpose of learning about the working conditions. Indeed, during World War II, the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries visited the Fore River Shipyard approximately once a month to assure compliance with the Waish-Healy Public Contracts Act, to promote plant safety programs and to review "working conditions". There is no evidence that the Navy or the Fore River Shipyard ever used the Navy contract clauses set forth at paragraph 3232 and 3235 to bar the Massachusetts Depart ment of Labor and Industries from observing and reporting on Fore River Shipyard conditions. Witnesses: David C. McArthur; Irving Tabershaw. Ill 173 Exhibits; *A Plan of Informal Cooperation between the U. S. Department of Labor and the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries for Promoting and Enforcing Safety and Health Standards in War Production Plants* (November 10, 1942). 3239. There is no evidence that information concerning working conditions was ever withheld from Manville during World War II pursuant to either point 3(a) or Article 11 of any Navy contract. 3240. There is no evidence that any official of the United States or any shipyard official during World War II ever denied a Manville request for information about or access to shipyard working conditions based upon either point 3(a) or Article 11 of any Navy contract. 3241. There is no evidence that the Chief of the Bureau of Ships or a Naval Inspector ever refused consent for Manville to receive the information contained in ship plans or specifications. 3242. There is no evidence that either the use of asbestos-containing products in shipyards or the conditions under which asbestos-containing products were used in shipyards was ever classified information. Ill - 174 G. THE NAVY AND MARITIME COMMISSION RESPONDED TO THE INCREDIBLE GROWTH IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SHIPYARD WORKING POPULATIONS DURING WORLD WAR II WITH AN UNPRECEDENTED SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM TO PROTECT SHIPYARD WORKERS 3243. . In April of 1933, there were 49,000 shipyard workers employed in the United States. By June 1940, at the beginning of the Defense Program, the shipyard population had increased to 168,000 and by December of 1941 it stood at 556,000. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, employment skyrocketed, reaching its peak in December 1943 when 1,723,000 workers were employed in shipyards. Private shipyard growth reached its peak employment in November 1943 with nearly 1,400,000 workers, while the peak for United States Navy yards occurred in July of 1943 with 333,000 employees. Exhibits: . United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wartime Employment. Production and Conditions of Work in Shipyards. Bulletin No. 824, 1 (May 10, 1945); Richard J. Tracy, Maritime Commission, Shipyard's Safety Program in the Post War Period (Oct. 18, 1945). 3244. The first ten occupations in order of their numerical importance at private shipyards during World War II were as follows: welders (15.3%), ship fitters (11.0%), machinists (8.1%), pipe fitters (7.2%), electricians (6.6%), carpenters (6.1%), laborers (5.5%), burners (3.8%), painters III 175 (3.1%), and sheet-metal workers (3.0%). Pipe coverers constituted only 0.2% of the shipyard work force. Exhibit: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wartime Employment. Production, and Conditions of Work in Shipyards. Bulletin No. 824, 24 (May 10, 1945). 3245. The nature of the work involved in the shipbuilding industry combined with this incredible growth presented an enormous health and safety problem: Ship construction is an industry with many hazards, for extremely heavy materials are lifted and placed; much moving and climbing about on heights and in narrow spaces is necessary; the processing of steel sends off fumes and sparks and splinters of metal, and the tools themselves are either heavy or hot. The danger of accidents and of respiratory diseases was increased many times when the shipyard labor force was swelled by the inexperienced. Exhibit: Frederic C. Lane, Ships For Victory at 447 (1951). 3246. As stated by the Chairman of the Maritime Commission in 1944: Allowing for separations, military and otherwise, we estimate conservatively that more than two and a half million workers were enlisted, trained and put to work in Navy and Maritime yards [between December 1941 and December 1943]. This influx into our shipyard cities represents one of the greatest labor migrations in the history of this III - 176 country. The job of organizing to protect the health and safety of this army, untrained and for the most part green to construction work, was staggering-------especially when only a handful of experienced safety and medical men was available. Exhibit: Rear Admiral E.S. Land, Chairman, United States Maritime Commission, Remarks at National Shipyard Safety Award Dinner at Statler Hotel (June 8, 1944.) (1) Shipyard Safety And Health Programs At The Local Level 3247. Due in primary part to the increased hazards from the increasing number of civil employees, Acting Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, on February 24, 1941, notified all Commanding Officers, Shore Establishments, that a decision had been made to expand the present safety and industrial health organizations ashore. Exhibit: Memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy to Commandants and Commanding Officers, Shore Establishments (February 24, 1941). 3248. The expanded industrial hygiene program at * Naval shipyards during World War II concerned itself with both industrial accidents and occupational diseases. However, industrial accidents were felt to "constitute a far more serious problem than occupational disease." Safety concerns at shipyards included eye injuries caused by III 177 failure to use impact or anti-flash goggles or welding screens; hack injuries from lifting with back bent; inadequate help, or failure to use the proper equipment; hand injuries from failure to use equipment properly or use gloves; foot injuries from failing to wear safety shoes; accidents from unguarded hatches, holes, pits, etc. ; defective staging; unsafe use of ladders or staging; general poor housekeeping; unsafe condition of hammers; improper use of hammers or chisels; lack of ventilation for welders; defective cables for electric welding equipment; defective gas welding or cutting equipment; objects placed insecurely on staging or stockpiles so as to risk falling on personnel; defective or unsafe use of machinery; defective or unguarded abrasive wheels; defective or unsafe use of cranes; standing under or near suspended hoods; and defective pads, rings, and clamps. These matters were primarily within the province of the Safety Department. Exhibits: ' Proposed Plan for an Industrial Hygiene Program at the Navy Yard, New York, New York, (August 1, 1941); Safety Review. Vol. 2, No. 5 (May 1945) ; Minimum Requirements for Safety and Industrial Health in Contract Shipyards (1943). Witnesses: . - Dr. Leonard J. Goldwater; Frederick J. Viles; III - 178 Kenneth M. Nelson; James F. Morgan; Ernani Storlazzi; Victor Kindsvatter. 3249. The prevention and control of occupational disease at Navy shipyards was primarily under the jurisdiction of the shipyard Medical Department and the industrial hygienists within the Department. Industrial health administration at World War II Navy shipyards included pre-employment physical examinations, periodic physical examinations, physical examination of employees for retirement, diagnosis, treatment and disposition of industrial injuries and occupational diseases, administration of compensation cases, liaison work between the medical and safety departments, inspections of plant sanitation, and industrial hygiene surveys, including medical and engineering surveys. Exhibit: Ernest W. Brown, M.D., "Industrial Hygiene and the Navy in National Defense", War Medicine. Vol. 1 at 5-6 (1941). 3250. The numerous occupational disease problems faced by shipyards during the war years are indicated by a survey performed by Dr. Leonard J. Goldwater of the Brooklyn Navy Yard on February 19, 1943. Dr. Goldwater considered III 179 the following potential occupational disease hazards to be "of significance" at the Brooklyn Navy Yard: benzol, carbon tetrachloride, metallic mercury, caustic soda, cresol, various paints, lacquers, and driers, leaking or ruptured drums and containers, abrasive wheels, cutting oils, testing materials such as' cables, various cements, thinners, varnishes, welding electrodes, acetylene, hydrogen and other compressed gases, burns and eye injuries (flashes), welding fumes, fibrous glass, asbestos, solder, rubber cements, excessive heat, lead, dermatitis, chlorinated naphthalenes and diphenyls, abrasive compounds, acids, refrigerant gases, adhesives, exotic woods, paint removers', xylol fumes, fire and gas proofing compounds, insecticides, silica, parting compound, lime, magnesium, manganese, and zinc. A more complete list including less significant shipyard hazards was also included iri the report. Exhibit: Industrial Hygiene Survey, Navy Yard, New York, New York (February 19, 1943) . Witness: Dr. Leonard J. Goldwater. 3251. Dr. Goldwater noted in his survey that electric arc welding was by far the greatest shipyard occupational health problem at the New York Navy Shipyard: III 180 The health hazards associated with electric arc welding far overshadow any other occupational health problem at this Yard. Burns and eye injuries (flashes) constitute a major part of the accidents and the inhalation of welding fumes is by far the greatest cause of occupational illness. As will be shown later, welding fumes affect not only the shipfitters and welders, but also many other trades and constitute the outstanding cause of occupational disease morbidity. Closely related is the hazard created by acetylene cutting and burning. Exhibit: . Industrial Hygiene Survey, Navy Yard, New York, New York, at 1-2 (February 19, 1943). Witness: Dr. Leonard J. Goldwater. 3252. In December of 1944, T. R. Meyer, Comdr., (MC), USNR, sent to the Chief of BUMED a report of inspection of the industrial hygiene activities of the Mare Island, Puget Sound, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Charleston, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Boston and Washington, D.C. Navy Yards The surveys involved interviews of numerous Yard employees and detailed inspections of the program of each Industrial Health Unit. An important finding common to all of the Yards was that "[periodic examination of civilian workers exposed to potential hazards [is] being made according to Navy Department directives." Shipyard populations and III 181 industrial hygiene matters discussed in the report for some of the Navy Yards inspected are discussed below. Exhibit: Memorandum from T.R. Meyer, Comdr, (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (with enclosures) at 1-3 (December 18, 1944). 3253. At the Boston Navy Yard, the civilian population increased from 12,000 in 1940 to 46,000 in 1944. An industrial hygiene laboratory was maintained during the war. Shop and ship industrial health inspections and surveys were performed either at the initiative of the Industrial Health Officer or upon the request of the Safety Engineer or Shop Supervisors. The Industrial Health Officer made use of Yard newspapers to disseminate material on Health Education and had a program of lectures to shop masters, supervisors, and leading men on matters of Industrial Health. A ventilation crew to distribute and maintain local exhaust blowers for use aboard ship was maintained at the Yard. Exhibit: Memorandum from T.R. Meyer, Comdr, (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery at 8-9 (December 18, 1944). Witness: Frederick J. Viles. Ill 182 3254. At the Brooklyn Navy Yard, the total yard population had increased from approximately 15,800 in 1940 to 66,600 by late 1944. The Brooklyn Navy Yard had an industrial hygiene program under the supervision of three medical officers, two of whom were trained in industrial hygiene. Industrial hygiene surveys and inspections were performed during the war. A Health Education program was implemented through lectures, literature, posters and newspaper articles. In April of 1943, a chest x-ray survey was instituted resulting in 67,328 x-rays being taken, including periodic x-rays as set forth by existing Navy directives. Ventilation activities were carried out by the Industrial Hygiene Unit and representatives, of the Safety Officer in coordination with the Shop Superintendent and the Public Works Officer. The work load at the Medical Department at Brooklyn was extremely large. For example, 11,813 industrial cases were treated during the month of October 1944. Exhibit: Memorandum from T.R. Meyer, Comdr, (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery at 10-13 (December 18, 1944). Witness: Dr. Leonard Goldwater. Ill 183 3255. At the Charleston Navy Yard, the civilian population had increased from 5,800 in 1940 to 23,300 in 1944. Shop and ship inspections were performed by two H-(S) Officers, and inspections and surveys were made of all shops within the Yard where potential health hazards might be encountered. Personnel of the industrial hygiene unit offered lectures on Industrial Health to shop masters and supervisors. Ventilation and field studies were performed by the Industrial Hygiene Unit, and shipboard distribution and maintenance of blowers was under the supervision of the Sheetmetal Foreman in charge of each ship under construction. Exhibit: Memorandum from T.R. Meyer, Comdr, (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery at 14-16 (December 18, 1944). 3256. At the Norfolk Navy Yard, the civilian population increased from 14,400 in 1940 to 37,280 in 1944. The industrial hygiene unit consisted of a Commander and Lt. Commander of the Medical Corps, an industrial hygienist, an HC Officer, a nurse, three hospital corpsmen, and eight hospital corps Waves. The industrial hygienist performed shop and ship surveys. Arrangements had been made with the municipal and state health departments to coordinate an x- ray program of employees. Exhibit: III 184 Memorandum from T.R. Meyer, Comdr, (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery at 17-19 (December 18, 1944). 3257. At the Portsmouth Navy Yard, the civilian population of the yard had increased from 4,183 in 1940 to 20,129 in 1944. The close proximity of the Naval Hospital made it unneccessary to have x-ray facilities at the Yard. The Industrial Hygiene program at Portsmouth included shop surveys, the control and elimination of industrial health hazards, ventilation control, medical examination of workers exposed to potential health hazards, and optometric services. The industrial hygiene surveys and inspections included chemical atmospheric analyses for air contaminants in many yard shops and ships under construction or repair. Lectures to shop supervisors by members of the Industrial Health Unit and Industrial Health articles published in the Yard newspaper were used for the dissemination of health education. Ventilation aboard ship was not considered a great problem at Portsmouth because of the types of ships under construction and repair, but the Industrial Health Unit and the Safety Department nonetheless made ventilation surveys of shops. Exhibit: Memorandum from T.R. Meyer, Comdr, (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery at 20-22 (December 18, 1944). Ill 185 3258. At the Philadelphia Navy yard and adjacent Naval Aircraft Factory, the civilian population had risen from 19,000 to 53,000 over the time period from November 1939 through November 1944. The Industrial Health Unit was led by two Medical Officers and three industrial hygienists, and an industrial hygiene laboratory was utilized. Industrial hygiene surveys were made of plants, shop and ships upon request, and, in addition, over-all surveys were made. Most of the requests for industrial hygiene surveys concerned the control of industrial hazardous dusts, fumes, and solvent vapors. Ventilation problems throughout the yard were referred to the Industrial Health Officer for investigation and the necessary recommendations. Exhibit: Memorandum from T.R. Meyer, Comdr, (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery at 23-25 (December 18, 1944). 3259. At the Mare Island Navy Yard, total Yard civilian population increased from approximately 6,300 in 1939 to approximately 36,000 in November of 1944. The industrial hygiene laboratory was ideally located and the space provided adequate. The. Industrial Health Officer had been carrying on shop and plant inspections. X-ray facilities were available and utilized, and lectures to shop supervisors on the subject on Industrial Health, talks to restaurant workers on sanitation, and Yard newspaper III 186 articles were the routine approaches to health education utilized. The close cooperation between the Industrial Hygiene Unit and the Safety Program was regarded as an "outstanding accomplishment." A ventilation crew to supervise ventilation aboard ship was maintained by the Industrial Department. Exhibit: Memorandum from T.R. Meyer, Comdr, (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery at 26-29 (December 18, 1944). 3260. Potential private shipyard health and safety problems were similar to the Navy Yards. The industrial injury rate at private shipyards during the war was considered excellent as compared to the manufacturing industry. "Though shipbuilding is in several aspects more hazardous than most other industries and has, besides, undergone tremendous expansion and reorganization during the war, the injury frequency rate in private shipyards for the first 10 months [of 1944] was lower than in 33 manufacturing industries out of a total of 89 for which data are reported." Improvement was noticeable-------lost time injuries decreased from 35.4 lost time injuries per million man hours worked in January 1943 to 25.4 in December 1943, 24.5 in March 1944, and 20.4 in October 1944. Ill 187 Exhibits: United States Bureau of Employment. Production, Shipyards. Bulletin No. Labor Statistics, Wartime and Conditions of Work In 824, at 50 (May 10, 1945) ; Richard J. Tracy, Maritime Commission, Shipyard's Safety Programs in the Post War Period (October 18, 1945); Rear Admiral E.S. Land, Chairman, United States Maritime Commission, Remarks at National Shipyard Safety Award Dinner (June 8, 1944). (2) The Navy And Maritime Commission Provided Necessary Consultation To Private Shipyard Management On Health And Safety Matters 3261. Both before and during World War II, private shipyard management had primary responsibility for health and safety in private shipyards. Punishment to individuals for failure to comply with applicable health and safety standards was the duty of the private contractor. Exhibits: Stenographers' Minutes, Meeting In Regard To Minimum Reguirements For Industrial Health And Safety In Shipyards at 9-10, 242 (December 7, 1942) ; United States Maritime Commission, Emergency Ship Construction Division Office Order No. 12 (July 7, 1941) . 3262. By 1942, the Navy and Maritime Commission had become concerned about the high lost time accident record of private shipyards, which was significantly higher than the accident record for Navy shipyards. Ill - 188 Exhibits: Richard J. Tracy, Maritime Commission, Shipyard's Safety Programs in the Post War Period (October 18, 1945); John M. Roche, "Joint United States Navy Department - Maritime Commission Safety and Health Program", 7:3 Personnel Administration 20 (November 1944); ' United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wartime Employment. Production, and Conditions of Work in Shipyards. No. 824, 24 (May 10, 1945) ; Memorandum from J.J. Bloomfield to J.G. Townsend (July 30, 1942). 3263. Accordingly, the Navy and Maritime Commission embarked upon a program of aiding contract shipyards by providing professional consultation in health and safety matters. The government's involvement at no time, however, altered the contract shipyard's primary responsibility for health and safety. .As stated by John Roche of the National Safety Council, and consultant to the Maritime Commission, with regard to enforcement of violations of safety and health rules at private shipyards: We are not going to follow up with the punishment of anyone for violation of these rules. The safety engineer's job is to lay down- the company's policy to a man as soon as he starts. From then on, he continues to train that man in safety, and it is his job to so train the man that he is willing to obey the safety rules. If you want to punish them, that is your [the private shipyard's] job, and not the Maritime Commission's job. Ill 189 Exhibit: Stenographers' Minutes, Meeting In Regard To Minimum Requirement For Industrial Health And Safety In Shipyards, at 242 (December 7, 1942). 3264. The government's efforts to aid wartime private shipyard health and safety programs began in earnest in June of 1942, when the Maritime Commission approved a recommendation to attempt to obtain the services of the National Safety Council and Professor Philip Drinker of the Department of Industrial Hygiene of the Harvard University School of Public Health to perform surveys of industrial health and safety conditions at private shipyards. Dr. Drinker accepted the Maritime Commission's offer stating that: . I do not care what the financial arrangements are if you can make it possible for me to come out about even ... [ujnder present conditions I neither want nor expect the usual peace-time consultant's fee. I feel I am qualified to do what you want done and it would give me a great deal of satisfaction to do it. Exhibits: Minutes of the U.S. Maritime Commission, 22246-47 (June 18, 1942); Minutes of the U.S. Maritime Commission, 22404-05 (July 7, 1942). 3265. The Maritime Commission approved Dr. Ill 190 Drinker's appointment as a consultant on July 7, 1942, awarding him travel expenses and a per diem allowance. Exhibit: Minutes of the U.S. Maritime Commission, 22404-05 (July 7, 1942) . 3266. During the summer and fall of 1942, Dr. Drinker and Mr. John Roche of the National Safety Council headed a team that surveyed 20 private shipyards. The surveys were sponsored jointly by the Navy and the Maritime Commission. Exhibits: Dr. Philip Drinker, Talk Before The Maritime Commission (October 20, 1942) ; John M. Roche, "Joint United States Navy Department- Maritime Commission Safety and Health Program", 7:3 Personnel Administration 20 (November 1944). Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. 3267. On October 20, 1942, Dr. Drinker gave a talk to the Maritime Commission announcing the results of the surveys. Dr. Drinker's discussion covered many of the elements the survey team reviewed including the set-ups of the medical staffs, facilities for female workers, air raid precautions, cooperative hospital plans, turnover and III 191 overtime work, accident record keeping, safety department personnel staffing, insurance, physical examinations, asbestos, respirators, ventilation, safety goggles, spray painting, solvent labeling, safety stores (accessibility of safety equipment), metal fume fever from galvanized iron, lead poisoning, open air sandblasting (silicosis), salvage programs, cafeteria food and service, general housekeeping and sanitation, rats, sewage, water supply, mosquitoes, safety shoes, and hard hats. Exhibit: Dr. Philip Drinker, Talk Before Maritime Commission (October 20, 1942). Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. 3268. On November 5, 1942, the Navy Director of Shore Establishments and the Director, Division of Shipyard Labor Relations, U.S. Maritime Commission, sent letters to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the Commissioner, U.S. Maritime Commission, noting the completion of the joint Navy-Maritime Commission survey of industrial health and hygiene conditions and that Dr. Drinker and Mr. Roche were working on proposed minimum standards to be observed with respect to industrial health and safety. It was proposed, and approval was requested, that, for the purpose of III - 192 obtaining full cooperation and endorsement by industry, a conference be held in Chicago for endorsement of the minimum standards. Exhibit: Navy Dept, and Maritime Commission Joint Memorandum from C.W. Fisher and D.S. Ring to R.A. Bard and H.L. Vickery (November 5, 1942). 3269. On December 7 and 8, 1942, the Maritime Commission and Navy sponsored a conference in Chicago attended by representatives of contract shipyards on Atlantic, Pacific, Great Lakes, and Gulf Coasts, the Navy and Maritime Commission, major labor organizations, and insurance companies covering the compensation risks in non Navy shipyards to discuss and formulate minimum requirements for industrial health and safety in contract shipyards. Exhibits: Stenographers' Minutes, Meeting in Regard to Minimum Reouirements for Industrial Health and Safety in Shipyards. Chicago, 111. (December 7-8, 1942) ; John M. Roche, "Joint United States Navy Department-Maritime Commission Safety and Health Program", 7:3 Personnel Administration 20, 21-22 (November 1944). Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. Ill - 193 3270. At the conclusion of the conference, the delegates unanimously recommended adoption of the minimum requirements for the guidance of contract shipyards in accident prevention and industrial health work. Exhibit: John M. Roche, "Joint United States Navy Department-Maritime Commission Safety and Health Program", 7:3 Personnel Administration 20, 22 (November 1944). Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. 3271. The "Minimum Requirements For Safety And Industrial Health In Contract Shipyards" (hereinafter "Minimum Requirements") were approved by the United States Navy on January 20, 1943 and by the Maritime Commission on February 9, 1943. The Minimum Requirements set forth minimum safety and health standards and provided notice that the Navy Department and the Maritime Commission would expect from the contract shipyard "full and complete compliance with the minimum standards." Exhibits: "Minimum Requirements for Safety and Health in Contract Shipyards", 12:4, Medicine. 259 (April 1943) ; Industrial Industrial John M. Roche, "Joint United States Navy Department-Maritime Commission Safety and Health III 194 Program", 7:3 Personnel Administration 20, 22 (November 1944). Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. 3272. The Minimum Requirements were originally made publicly available through the Government Printing Office and later were published in Industrial Medicine. Exhibits: Lester M. Petrie, Administrative and Working Relationships-------Between the Georgia Industrial Hygiene Service and The United States Maritime Commission, presented at the Transactions of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists at note 8 (May 24, 1943); "Minimum Requirements for Safety and Industrial Health in Contract Shipyards" 12:4, Industrial Medicine. 259 (April 1943). 3273. Both before and after the adoption of the Minimum Requirements, terms of the standard shipbuilding contracts placed responsibility for health and safety of private shipyard employees on the private shipyard. Specifically, contracts between the private shipyard and the Maritime Commission and Navy re'quired the contractor to comply with the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 41 U.S.C.35 (e), which required those engaged in government contracts to provide safe and healthful working conditions. Under Section 35 (e), "[t]he promise is made by the III 195 contractor to the government, not by the government to the contractor's employees." Exhibits: 41 U.S.C. 35 (e); Shuman v. United States. 765 F.2d 283, 290 (1st Cir. 1985); * Executive Order No. 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787, 6788 (1941). 3274. The Minimum Requirements did not alter the private shipyards' health and safety responsibility, but made available to the contractor the services of the Navy/ Maritime Commission's health and safety personnel for advisory consultation. As noted by John Roche on April 16, 1943: Letters are going out this week from the Maritime Commission to all resident engineers in Maritime contract shipyards making them responsible for safety and health conditions in the shipyards, and calling upon them for accepting responsibility for having recommendations submitted by the Regional Safety and Health Consultants . complied with. Exhibits: Letter from John Roche, Chief Safety Consultant, United States Maritime Commission, to T.J. Whelan, The Travelers Insurance Co. (April 16, 1943); "Minimum Requirements for Safety and Industrial Health in Contract Shipyards", 12:4, Industrial Medicine, 259 (April 1943) . Ill 196 3275. The Minimum Requirements contained references to numerous health and safety factors such as medical facilities, record keeping processes, physical examinations, air raid precautions, cafeteria and canteen inspections, water supply, sewerage, and waste disposal, salt tablets, respiratory protection, flashburns and foreign bodies in the eye, lead poisoning, solvent vapors, zinc fume fever, fiberglass, silicosis, asbestosis, dermatitis, ventilation, safety committees, goggles, safety inspections, arc welding, safety shoes, welding screens, burners, cranes (whirleys, hammerheads, bridge, etc.), general housekeeping, lighting, hand tools, lifting procedures, and machine guarding. Exhibit: "Minimum Requirements for Safety and Health in Contract Shipyards", 12:4, Medicine, 259 (April 1943) . Industrial Industrial 3276. After promulgation of the Minimum Requirements, the Maritime Commission, working with the Navy, continued to send survey teams to private shipyards performing Maritime Commission and Navy contract work to determine compliance with the Minimum Requirements. Under the leadership of Dr. Drinker and Mr. Roche, offices and personnel were established in four regional offices in Philadelphia, New Orleans, Oakland, and Chicago. The men assigned to the offices were: III 197 charged with the responsibility for assisting with Navy and Maritime contractors in putting [the] "Minimum Requirements" into effect... [they] act only in an advisory capacity and carry no authority to compel either Navy or Maritime contractors to comply with any of the provisions of the Minimum Requirements. Exhibit; John M. Roche, "Joint United States Navy Department-Maritime Commission Safety and Health Program", 7:3 Personnel Administration 20, 22 (November 1944). 3277. When deficiencies in health or safety were observed by members of the survey teams, they would relate their findings and recommendations orally to the shipyard management and either the Supervisor of Shipbuilding if a Navy contract yard was involved or the plant engineer if a Maritime Commission yard was being surveyed. Exnibit: Letter from D.S. Ring to C.W. Fleischer, Maritime Commission Regional Director of Construction (July 12, 1944). Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. 3278. On occasion, the Maritime Commission health and safety consultants would inspect the work site of subcontractors performing work for the private shipyard and, III 198 in the course of their inspection, would convey to the subcontractor information about the health or safety problem that was indicated and make recommendations as to how the hazard could better be contained. Exhibit: Industrial Health Survey of the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation, Portland, Oregon, 20 (September 3-4, 1942). at 18 Witness: James F. Morgan. (3) The Navy and Maritime Commission Worked With The United States Public Health Service to Improve Health and Safety at Private Shipyards 3279. In addition to providing valuable direct assistance, Dr. Drinker sought and obtained the assistance of the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) and various state health agencies working with the USPHS to supplement efforts to improve health and safety at private shipyards. 3280. On January 7, 1943, a conference was held in Brunswick, Georgia between Dr. Drinker, Dr. H.K. Sessions (working under Dr. Drinker), and representatives of the Georgia Department of Public Health. Arrangements were made for a joint Maritime Commission-Georgia Department of Public Health survey of all five Georgia shipyards. The joint III 199 surveys were accomplished, and reports and recommendations were submitted. Follow-up studies indicated that many of the recommendations were being followed. Exhibits: Lester M. Petrie, Administrative and Working Relationships-------Between the Georgia Industrial Hygiene Service and The United States Maritime Commission, presented at the Transactions of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists 8 (May 24, 1943); Division of Industrial Hygiene, National Institute of Health, United States Public Health Service, Industrial Hygiene. Vol.3, Nos. 5 & 6, at 2-3 (May-June 1943). 3281. On July 30, 1942, J.J. Bloomfield reported on a meeting held the previous day between representatives of the Maritime Commission and the USPHS concerning joint cooperation in private shipyard health and safety matters. Mr. Bloomfield reported that "our State personnel" had already conducted studies of the Mare Island Navy Yard in California, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company in Virginia (study performed by USPHS and Virginia Department of Health), the Wilmington shipyard in North Carolina, and the Bethlehem shipyard in Maryland. Exhibit: Memorandum from J.J. Bloomfield to J.G. Townsend (July 30, 1942) . Ill - 200 3282. On November 20, 1942, Daniel S. Ring, Director, Division of Shipyard Labor Relations, wrote a letter to Rear Admiral C. W. Fisher, Director of Shore Establishments, concerning a proposed survey to be undertaken by the USPHS on behalf of the Navy and the Maritime Commission. Dr. Ring indicated that the purpose of the survey was to ascertain to some degree of definiteness the effect of welding fumes upon the respiratory system of , welders. Exhibits: Letter from Daniel S. Ring, Director, Division of Shipyard Labor Relations, to C.W. Fisher, Director of Shore Establishments (November 20, 1942); Letter from Daniel S. Ring to Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General, USPHS (October 20, 1943) . 3283. In May of 1944, at the Transactions Of The Seventh Annual Meeting Of The National Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists. Waldemar C. Dreessen, M.D., USPHS, announced that the Navy, Maritime Commission, and Public Health Service had launched a shipyard study focusing on respiratory problems of shipyard workers. Plans called for an examination of 5,000 workers from six to eight different shipyards located in various parts of the country. Exhibit: Waldemar C. Dreessen, A Cooperative Shipyard Study-------Bv the Public Health Service and the Maritime Commission, presented at the Transactions of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the National III 201 Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (May 9, 1944). 3284. Between April and December of 1944, the United States Public Health Service, working in close cooperation, with the United States Maritime Commission and the United States Navy, surveyed seven Navy and Maritime Commission shipyards, including one of the "test shipyards" (Consolidated Steel). Focusing in on the respiratory problem of greatest concern in shipyards, the study dealt primarily with welders' exposure to iron fumes and dusts which were causing "shipyard cough," "welder's wheeze," "welder's bronchitis," and "metal fume." The findings from the environmental and clinical studies were reported in a publication entitled "Health of Arc Welders In Steel Ship Construction." Exhibits: . Health of Arc Welders In Steel Ship Construction. Public Health Bulletin No. 298 (1947) ; Minutes of Meeting of Labor-Management Committee at The New England Shipbuilding Corporation at 4 (December 1, 1944) ; Memorandum from John M. Roche and Dr. Philip Drinker to Daniel S. Ring (April 27, 1945)? Letter from Daniel S. Ring to Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General, USPHS (October 20, 194 3) . Witnesses: James F. Morgan? Kenneth W. Nelson; III 202 Lewis J. Cralley. 3285. At the same time, the Navy performed clinical and environmental studies for a survey on "The Effect of Burning and Welding Fumes, Gases and Vapors on U.S. Navy Yard Employees." A total of 4949 reports of chest x-rays of employees were analyzed, and each of the Navy shipyards was included in the study. The results were published in the January 1945 edition of "Safety Review." Exhibits: Memorandum from Ross T. Mclntire to Commander, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (May 24, 1944): Memorandum from James Forrestal to Commandants of U.S. Navy Yards (May 18, .1944); Division of Shore Personnel, Safety 1945) . Establishment Review. Vol.2 and Civilian - No.l (January Letter from Ross T. Mclntire to AstSecNav (SECP) with enclosure entitled Survey - The Effect of Burning and Welding Fumes. Gases, and Vapors on U.S. Navv Yard Employees (November 8, 1944); Letter from T.J. Consultant, U.S. 1945) ; Carter to Chief Health Maritime Commission (February 20, Letter from P. Drinker to D.S. Ring (March 7, 1945) ; Memorandum from B. Manovich for file (March 31, 1945). ` 3286. The Navy, Maritime Commission and USPHS also combined forces to perform special tuberculosis x-ray surveys of all workers at the Walsh-Kaiser Yard in III - 203 Providence, Rhode Island, the Bethlehem-Fairfield yard in Baltimore, Maryland and at Alabama Dry Dock and Repair Company in Mobile, Alabama, in cooperation with local tuberculosis leagues. Exhibit: Memorandum from J.M. Roche and Philip Drinker to D.S. Ring at 3 (April 27, 1945). 3287. On other occasions, the USPHS and state industrial hygiene departments entered private shipyards to solve isolated problems. For example, in late 1942, when numerous electricians at the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation developed rashes from stripping, a "complete investigation" was made by Dr. Louis Schwartz of the USPHS and the local state industrial hygiene department. In addition, the USPHS provided assistance in the training program for Navy industrial hygienists. Exhibits: Industrial Health and Safety Survey Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation, 23 1943) ; of Seattle(July 2-7, Memorandum from Philip Drinker to Bureau of Ships (January 8, 1944).' Witness: ' - James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. Ill 204 3288. Because the World War II average rate of industrial injuries per man-hour at private shipyards, even after implementation of the Minimum Requirements, greatly exceeded the rate for public shipyards, the services of the USPHS were far more necessary at private shipyards. For example, in 1943 the accident rate at United States Navy Yards was 15.2 (accidents per million man-hours worked) as compared to 31.2 for all private shipyards, and, for the first 10 months of 1944, the rate at Navy Yards ranged from 11.2 to 15.2 while the average rate for private shipyards was 23.8. Exhibit; United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wartime Employment. Production, and Conditions of Work in Shipyards. Bulletin No. 824, 49-50 (May 10, 1945). (4) The Navy And Maritime Commission Adopted A Cautionary Approach To Worker Exposure To Asbestos Despite Their Limited Knowledge Of The Hazards Of Asbestos And The Absence Of Evidence That Shipyard Workers Were Developing Asbestosis 3289. Before, during, and after World War II, the Navy and Maritime Commission lacked critical information about the hazards of exposure to asbestos and, more specifically, about the extent to which, if at all, shipyard workers were at risk of developing asbestosis. The Navy and Maritime Commission nonetheless aggressively sought to protect shipyard workers from excessive exposure to III - 205 asbestos, despite the non-existence of information indicating that shipyard workers were developing asbestosis. The Navy and Maritime Commission openly reported, published, and discussed their limited knowledge of the disease. See paragraphs 3290 to 3342, infra. (a) Before the Minimum Requirements 3290. The 1939 Annual Report of the Surgeon General, United States Navy, published by the Government Printing Office in 1941, included a submission from the New York Navy Yard stating that "asbestosis is an industrial disease of the lungs incident to the inhalation of asbestos dust for prolonged periods and is distinct from silicosis" and that "the development of the disease depends upon the concentration of the dust, the size of the dust particles, and the length of exposure." A medical survey of the 11 employees of the Pipe Covering and Insulating Shop, which included 6 employees with asbestos exposure histories of over 10 years, revealed no cases of asbestosis. Nonetheless, the New York Navy Yard advocated a cautious approach: [I]t was not considered that the negative findings precluded the future development of asbestosis by continued exposure to present occupational conditions. The following recommendation made jointly by the medical officer of the Yard and the safety engineer was approved: Install III - 206 exhaust blower over work table in the Pipe Covering and Insulator Shop to remove asbestos dust at the source as a protective measure against the hazard of asbestosis. ' Exhibit: Annual Report Of the Surgeon General. U.S. Navy, concerning Statistics of Diseases and Injuries in' the United States Navv for the Calender Year 1939 (G.P.O. 1941). 3291. At the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Air Hygiene Foundation of America (hereinafter Air Hygiene Foundation) on November 13, 1940, Captain Ernest W. Brown, MC, USN, presented a paper, later published in War Medicine, entitled "Industrial Hygiene and the Navy in National Defense." Captain Brown related in his paper that "asbestosis ... is a potential occupational disease hazard due to inhalation of asbestos dust among workers engaged in the manufacture of asbestos insulating covers for flanges, valves and high temperature steam turbines." He indicated that he had conducted the above-mentioned New York Navy Yard survey of insulators that revealed no cases of asbestosis and related further that similar findings had been reported from two other shipyards. Captain Brown added that New York Navy Yard existing controls for asbestos exposure included moistening the product and use of localized exhaust ventilation over the work area and that "[a] respirator is worn during the dustiest aspect of the process." Ill 207 Exhibit: Ernest W. Brown, Industrial Hygiene and the Navy in National Defense, presented at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Air Hygiene Foundation of America, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pa., Nov. 13, 1940, War Medicine, at 3, 11-12 (Jan. 1941). 3292. Manville was a member of the Air Hygiene Foundation at this time, and two consultants to Manville, Drs. Anthony Lanza and Leroy Gardner, presented papers at the same meeting in which Captain Brown presented his paper. Exhibits: Fifth Annual Meeting of the Air Hygiene Foundation of America, Pittsburgh, Pa., at 17, 26 and 77 (November 13, 1940); Letter from Vandiver Brown, General Attorney to C.J. Stover (December 4, 1936); Letter from C.J. Stover to members of the asbestos industry (December 8, 1936); Letter from Vandiver Brown to H.B. Meller (January 4, 1940); See Sections F(l)-F(4) and F(9) of the Volume, supra. 3293. In January 1941, the Division of Publications, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, published the "United States Naval Medical Bulletin." The Bulletin, abstracting from Captain Brown's Air Hygiene Foundation paper, noted that asbestosis was considered a potential occupational health hazard in Navy yards for workers involved in "the manufacture of asbestos covers for flanges, valves, etc." The Bulletin also noted that medical controls III - 208 consisted of annual chest x-rays, and the asbestos product was moistened, exhaust ventilation was installed over the work area, and a respirator was worn. Exhibit: Navy Dept., Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, United States Naval Medical Bulletin 321, 324 (January 1941). 3294. On December 16, 1940, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shore Establishment Division) sent a letter to the Charleston Navy Yard concerning the dangers from "amosite" and forwarded a "self-explanatory" American Medical Association paper by Kenneth M. Lynch. The Assistant Secretary's letter stated that, with the use of respirators and pre-employment and periodic medical examinations, the Charleston Navy Yard could be assured "that the men working with this material are perfectly safe." Exhibit: Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shore Establishment Division) to Commandant, U.S. Navy Yard, Charleston, S.C. (December 16, 1940). 3295. In the Annual Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. Navy, for 1940, the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard noted that, along with numerous other industrial medicine duties, it had instructed its medical officer to conduct periodic examinations of asbestos workers. Ill - 209 Exhibit: Annual Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. Navy, to the Secretary of the Navy Concerning Statistics of Diseases and Injuries in the United States Navy for the Calender Year 1940, at 14 (1942). 3296. After 40 letters sent to experienced medical men in an effort to interest them in Navy commissions proved unsuccessful, the Navy decided to train young officers interested in industrial medicine at the schools of hygiene and public health at Columbia and Harvard Universities. Exhibit: Memorandum from Lt. Cmdr. E.H. Cushing to Adm. R.T. Mclntire (February 19, 1941); Harvard School of Public Health, Industrial Hygiene Laboratory. Special Class (April 27 - July 31, 1942); Schedule and Curriculum at Columbia University, undated, re Course for Navv Officers from Thursday, May 1, 1941 through Tuesday, July 1, 1941. Witnesses: Dr. Leon J. Goldwater; James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson; Victor H. Kindsvatter; Ernani D. Storlazzi; Daniel Bessmer. Ill 210 3297. The industrial hygiene course taught at Columbia lasted from May 1 through July 1 of 1941, with the last three weeks of July used for field work and factory surveys. An identical course was taught at Columbia for Navy industrial hygienists in the spring of 1942. Exhibit; Schedule and Curriculum at Columbia University, Course for Navv Officers from Thursday, May 1, 1941 through Tuesday, July 1, 1941 (undated). Witness: ' Daniel J. Bessmer. 3298. The subjects of "'Silicosis and Asbestosis" were taught jointly at Columbia on one day. The majority of the day's lecture concerned the more prevalent of the two diseases, silicosis. The teachers of the course were Dr. Leroy Gardner of Saranac Lake Laboratories and Dr. Anthony J. Lanza of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Both men were consultants to the Manville Corporation during this period of time. Accordingly, any information learned by the Navy students at Columbia was information previously known to Manville, Exhibits: Schedule and Curriculum at Columbia University, Course for Navv Officers from Thursday, May 1, 1941 through Tuesday, July 1, 1941 (undated); Letter from Leroy U. Gardner to Vandiver Brown (April 19, 1938); III - 211 Minutes of Meeting at Johns-Manville General Headquarters (January 21, 1947) ; See Sections F(l)-F(4) and F(-9) of this Volume, supra. Witness: Daniel J. Bessmer. 3299. At Columbia, the Navy industrial hygienists were taught that individuals exposed to excessive concentrations of asbestos dust for 40 hours a week over an extended period of time were at risk of developing asbestosis. Witness: Daniel J. Bessmer. 3300. The Harvard industrial hygiene course was taught from April 27 through July 31 of 1942. Only a very small portion of the course concerned asbestos exposure and asbestosis. Three widely known published articles were discussed at the course concerning asbestosis: An article by Anthony J. Lanza entitled "Silicosis and Asbestosis," a publication of the USPHS by Waldemar C. Dreessen, et al. entitled "A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry," and a British article by E.R.A. Mereweather and C.W. Price entitled "Occurrence of Pulmonary Fibrosis and Other Pulmonary Affections In Asbestos Workers." All three studies dealt specifically with asbestos plant workers and III 212 were publications widely known and circulated in the medical and industrial hygiene communities. No studies of occurrence of asbestosis or asbestos-related diseases in shipyard working populations were discussed at the Harvard course. Indeed, as of 1942, no such studies had been performed or published. Exhibits: Dreessen, W.C., Dalla Vale, J.M., Edwards, T.I., and Miller, J.W., "A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry," Public Health Service Bulletin No. 241. United States Public Health Service, Treasury Department (1938)? Lanza, A.J., McConnell, W.J. and Fehnel, J.W., "The Effect of Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers," U.S. Public Health Report 50 (1935) ; also published at Journal of Industrial Hygiene 17 (1935) and Bulletin of Hygiene 10 (1935) ; . Merewether, E.R.A. and Price, C.W., "Occurrence of Pulmonary Fibrosis and Other Pulmonary Affections in Asbestos Workers", Report On the Effects of Asbestos Dust On the Lunas and Dust Suppression in the Asbestos Industry. (London 1930)? Harvard School of Public Health, Industrial Hygiene Laboratory. Special Class, (April 27 July 31, 1942). - 'Witnesses: . James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson.' * 3301. The head of the Harvard course was Dr. Phillip Drinker, and Dr. Drinker was the primary instructor for that portion of the course that concerned asbestosis. Ill 213 Consistent with the Columbia course. Dr. Drinker taught the students that individuals exposed to excessive concentrations of asbestos dust for 40 hours a week over an extended period of time were at risk of developing asbestosis. Witnesses: James F. Morgan? Kenneth W. Nelson. 3302. At the Harvard course. Dr. Drinker taught nothing inconsistent with the following belief he expressed in a report he helped write in 1945, later published in the Journal Of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology and known as the Fleischer-Drinker report: There are no established figures for permissible or safe dustiness in pipe covering operations. [Dreessen et al.] in their study of asbestosis in the asbestos textile industry suggested 5 million particles of total dust by impinger as a threshold for that industry. We should like to point out that the asbestos textile and asbestos pipe covering industries differ widely in their dust exposures. In textile plants workers usually continue at specific jobs with fairly constant dust exposures for some years, whereas the pipe coverer may rotate bewtween shop and ship and from small to large ship compartments with a wide variation in dust exposure. Ill 214 Exhibit: W.E. Fleischer, F.J. Viles, R.L. Gade and P. Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels", 28 Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology 9 (January 1946). Witness: James F. Morgan. 3303. After the 1942 Harvard course was completed, Dr. Drinker requested four of the class members, along with two Navy physicians, to constitute the team that was to investigate the working conditions at the 20 private shipyards. Among the many safety and health hazards the team looked into was the potential hazard of excessive asbestos exposure to pipe coverers and insulators. No asbestos dust counts were taken during the surveys. Any time a potential hazard was observed during a survey, the potential hazard was recorded. Exhibits: Dr. Philip Drinker, Talk Before Maritime Commission (October 20, 1942) ; John M. Roche, "Joint United States Navy Department-Maritime Commission Safety and Health Program", 7:3 Personnel Administration 20, 20-21 (November 1944) ; See paragraphs 3266 to 3267, supra. Witnesses: James F. Morgan; III - 215 Kenneth W. Nelson. 3304. In at least 7 of the 20 yards surveyed, the pipe covering and insulating work was performed either by Manville itself or by one of Manville's contract units. By contract, Manville had obligated its contract units to "cooperate with the insulation engineers of Manville on engineering problems arising in connection with the sale and application of the materials," make monthly reports to Manville "of all contracts for the application of insulation... and all specifications, estimates, bids, records and files on such work either secured or lost," and "hold Johns-Manville harmless from any loss, claim or damage arising out of the application of the Materials." Exhibits: . Dr. Philip Drinker, Talk Before Maritime Commission (October 20, 1942) ; The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of JohnsManville for Company Use Only, at 27-31, 33-35, and 38-39 (October 1943) ; Insulation. Johns-Manville Officers' Board Meeting at 11-15 and 16-21, quotes from pages 19-20 (December 21, 1942) ; See Section F(7) of this Volume, supra. Witness: John Dragisic. III - 216 3305. In many of the yards surveyed, there was no mention of any problem with the way asbestos products were being handled. However, a potential problem with asbestos exposure was noted at a Manville contract unit yard. Exhibits: Industrial Health Survey of the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp., Mobile, Ala. (August 13-15, 1942); Industrial Hygiene Survey of Southeastern Shipbuilding Corp.., Savannah, Ga. (August 26, 1942) ; 20-21 & Industrial Health Survey of the Los Angeles Shipbuilding And Dry Dock Co., August 24-26, 1942) ; . Industrial Health Survey of the Electric Boat Co., Groton, Conn. (September 24-25, 1942) ; Industrial Health Survey of the BaltimoreFairfield Shipyard, Inc., Baltimore, Md. (September 24-25, 1942); Industrial Health Survey of the North Carolina Shipbuilding Co., Wilmington, N.C. (October 1-3, 1942) ; Industrial Health Survey of the Tampa Shipbuilding Co., Inc., Tampa, Fla. (October 5-6 & 8, 1942); Industrial Health Survey of the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation, Portland, Oregon, (September 3-4, 1942); 18-20 The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of JohnsManville for Company use only, at 27-31 (October 1943). 3306. Specifically, the pipe covering and insulating work for the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation was performed by Bartells, a major Manville contract unit that III - 217 also did the insulating work during World War II for Kaiser Corporation shipyards at Vancouver and Swen Island. At Oregon Shipbuilding, the Navy survey disclosed that the worker operating the rotary power hand cutter did not wear a respirator; asbestos dust had accumulated on the light cables near the table where the hand cutter was operated; and the Bartells' employees did not utilize the exhaust hoods over their work benches. Consultation between the Navy/Maritime Commission survey team and the Bartells' employees revealed that all (including the foreman) were unaware lung damage could result "to persons exposed to an excessive amount [of asbestos dust] over a period of time." Exhibits: Industrial Health Survey of the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation, Portland, Oregon, (September 3-4, 1942); 18-20 The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of JohnsManville for Company use only, at 27-31 (October 1943). 3307. Ensign Kenneth W. Nelson, USNR, who had a major responsibility for the industrial hygiene portion of the 20 shipyard surveys, spoke at the Chicago Minimum Requirements conference in December of 1942 (discussed at paragraphs 3268-3270, supra) about, among other things, asbestosis. Ensign Nelson noted that "[a]s far as dust in shipyards is concerned, it is not a widespread problem" and "[a]sbestosis.... is a disease which will not appear, III 218 perhaps, until a year or more of exposure to asbestos dust." Asbestos was mentioned in only 2 of the 338 pages of the minutes of the Chicago conference. Exhibit: Stenographers' Minutes, Meeting in Regard to Minimum Reouirements for Industrial Health and Safety in Shipyards. Chicago, 111. at 105-106, (December 7-8, 1942). ill Witness: Kenneth W. Nelson. (b) Asbestos Under the Minimum Reguirements 3308. The Minimum Requirements contained a section pertaining to permissible exposures to asbestos. Ensign Nelson participated in the drafting of this section, and Dr. Drinker helped edit the section. Though the Navy knew that, for a high exposure, heavy concentration asbestos factory environment, Dreessen had suggested an individual could safely be exposed to asbestos dust levels under 5 million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40 hour week for an extended period of time, the Minimum Requirements did not reference any permissible level or duration of asbestos exposure. Ill - 219 Exhibit: "Minimum Requirements for Safety and Industrial Health in Contract Shipyards" 12:4, Industrial Medicine. 12:4, 259, 266-267 (April 1943). Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Kenneth W, Nelson. 3309. Ensign Nelson and James Morgan were two of the Navy/Maritime Commission health consultants who performed surveys after the adoption of the Minimum Requirements. Throughout World War II, neither knew nor had ever heard of a case of a shipyard worker developing asbestosis. Nevertheless, in their surveys, Messrs. Nelson and Morgan, as well as the other health consultants, looked for discrepancies in asbestos controls as set forth in the cautious approach of the Minimum Requirements and relayed to private shipyard management any findings of non-compliance along with the appropriate recommendations. Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. 3310. Despite this cautious approach, of the multitude of post-Minimum Requirements shipyard surveys performed by the Navy/Maritime Commission health consultants, the vast majority did not reveal any health or III 220 safety problems associated with the manner in which asbestos products were being used. Exhibits; Ventilation Survey of the Todd-Bath and South Portland Shipyards (November 14, 1942) ; Industrial Health Survey of the Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Chester, Pa. (January 8-9 & 11, 1943) ; Industrial Health Survey of McCloskey and Co., Tampa, Fla. (January 23-25, 1943)? Industrial Health Survey of the St. Johns River Shipbuilding Corp., Jacksonville, Fla. (January 25-26, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Brunswick Marine Construction Corp. (South Yard), Brunswick, Ga. (January 27-28, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Southeastern Shipbuilding Corp., Savannah, Ga. (January 29-30, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the MacEvoy Shipbuilding Corp., Savannah, Gd. (February 1943)? , 1, Industrial Health Survey of the Savannah Machine and Foundry Co., Savannah, Ga. (February 2, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Charleston Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Charleston, S.C. (February 4, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the General Ship and Engine Works, East Boston, Mass. (February 19-20, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Co. (Fore River Yard), Quincy, Mass. (February 23 25, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Consolidated Corp., Wilmington Shipyard, Wilmington, Cal. (February 22-March 2, 1943); Steel III - 221 Industrial Health Survey of the Brunswick Marine Construction Co. (North Yard), Brunswick, Ga. (March 3-4, 1943) ; Industrial Health Survey of the Gibbs Gas Co. of Florida, Jacksonville, Fla. (March 1943) ; Engine 8-9, Industrial Hygiene Survey of the Los Angeles Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Corp., San Pedro, Cal. (March 8-13, 1943) ; Industrial Hygiene Survey of the Western Pipe and Steel Corp. of California, San Pedro Shipbuilding Division (March 18-20, 1943) ; Industrial Health Survey of the East Coast Shipyards, Inc., Bayonne, N.J. (March 24, 1943); Industrial Safety Survey of the Houston Shipbuilding Corp, Houston, Tex. (March 23-30, 1943) ; Industrial Health Survey of the Houston Shipbuilding Corp., Houston, Tex. (March April 11-18, 1943); 23-31, Industrial Safety Resurvey of the New England Shipbuilding Corp., South Portland, Me. (April 8, 1943); 5 Industrial Health Survey of the Bath Iron Works, Bath, Me. (April 9-10, 1943); Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Richmond Shipyard Number One and Prefabrication Plant, Richmond, Cal. (April 7-14, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Walsh-Kaiser Co., Providence, R.I. (April 12-13, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Richmond Shipyard Number Three, Richmond, Cal. (April 14-19, 1943) ; Industrial Health and Safety Survey Shipyard Number Two, Richmond, Cal. 1943); of Richmond (May 9-13, Industrial Health Survey of the American Car and Foundry Co., Wilmington, Del. (May 18, 1943); III - 222 Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of the General Engineering and Dry Dock Co., Alameda and San Francisco, Cal. (May 24-26, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Sun Shipbuilding Co., Chester, Pa. (June 3, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the North Carolina Shipbuilding Co., Wilmington, N.C. (June 6-8, 1943); Industrial Health Resurvey of the St. Johns River Shipbuilding Co., Jacksonville, Fla. (June 9, 1943); Industrial Health Resurvey of the Tampa Shipbuilding Corp., Tampa, Fla. (June 10, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of McCloskey and Co., Tampa, Fla. (June 11, 1943); Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Moore Dry Dock Co. (East and West Yards), Oakland, Cal. (June 11-15, 1943); Industrial Health and Washington Shipyards, 1943); Safety Survey of Lake Houghton, Wash. (June 11-16, . Industrial Health Survey of the Pusey & Jones Corp., Wilmington, Del. (June 17-18, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of McCloskey and Co. Builders, San Jacinto Shipyards, Houston, Tex. (June 16-20, 1943); Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Everett Pacific Co., Seattle, Wash. (June 21-26, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the MacEvoy Shipbuilding Corp., Savannah, Ga. (June 26, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Cramp Shipbuilding Co., Philadelphia, Penn. (June 28-30, 1943); Industrial Health Resurvey of the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp., Mobile, Ala. (July 7-8, 1943) ; 16, Industrial Safety Survey of the Higgins Industries, Inc., Shipbuilding Division, New Orleans, La. (July 1-17, 1943); III - 223 Industrial Health Shipbuilding Co., 1943); Survey of the Jacksonville, St. Johns River Fla. (July 18-20, Industrial Health Survey of the Consolidated Shipbuilding Corp., Morris Heights, N.Y. (July 29, 1943); ' 28 Industrial Health and Safety Survey of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corp., Tacoma, Wash. (July 22-31, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the McCloskey and Co. Builders, Tampa, Fla. (July 30-August 3, 1943); Industrial Safety Survey of Henry B. Nevins, Inc. City Island, New York City (August 6, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of J.A. Jones Construction Co., Wainwright Yard, Panama City, Fla. (August 1-7, 1943); Industrial Safety Resurvey of the New England Shipbuilding Corpl, South Portland, Me. (August 10 & 15, 1943); 8 Industrial Safety Resurvey of the McCloskey and Co. Builders, San Jacinto Shipyard, Houston, Tex. (August 17-19, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Chester, Penn. (August 18, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Dravo Corp., Wilmington, Del. (August 20, 1943) ; Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Moore Dock Co.- East and West Yards, Oakland, Cal. (August 20-29, 1943); Dry Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Kaiser Co. Vancouver, Wash. (September 1-10, 1943) ; Supplemental Industrial Health Survey of the Charleston Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Charleston, S.C. (September 16, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Greenport Basin and Construction Co., Greenport, N.Y. (September 22, 1943); III - 224 Industrial Health Resurvey of the Canulette Shipbuilding Co. (September 25, 1943); Industrial Hygiene Resurvey of the Higgins Industries, Inc., Shipbuilding Division, New Orleans, La. (September 25, 1943); Industrial Health Resurvey of the St. Johns River Shipbuilding Co. (August 24-September 28-29, 1943);- ' Industrial Health Resurvey of the McCloskey and Co. Builders, Hooker's Point Yard, Tampa, Fla. (September 30, 1943); Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Kaiser Co., Portland, Ore. (October 15-19, 1943) ; Industrial Health .Survey of Brown Shipbuilding Co., Houston, Tex. (September 14-17, November 2-3, 1943); Industrial Safety Resurvey of Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Port Newerk, N.J. (November 1-3, 1943) ; Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Marinship Corp., Sausalito, Cal. (November 15-25, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the W.A. Robinson Co., Ipswich, Mass. (December 13-14, 1943); Accident Prevention Survey of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corp., Tacoma, Wash. (1944); Industrial Health Survey of the Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., Pascagoula, Miss. (December 17-23, 1943 and January 4-7, 1944); Industrial Health Survey of the MacEvoy Shipbuilding Corp., Savannah, Ga. (January 1944)? 5, Industrial Health and Safety Shipbuilders, Harbor Island, (January 13-14, 1944) ; Survey of Associated Seattle, Wash. Industrial Health and Safety Survey of the Lake Union Dry Dock and Machine Works, Seattle, Wash. (January 16, 1944); III 225 Industrial Health Survey of the Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Corp., Mobile, Ala. (December 29 30, 1943 and January 12-19, 1944); - Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Everett Pacific Co., Everett, Wash. (January 19-20, 1944); Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Winslow Marine Railway and Dry Dock Co., Inc. (January 27, 1944); 24 Industrial Hygiene Resurvey St. Shipbuilding Co., Jacksonville, 29, 1944); Johns River Fla. (January 28 Industrial Health Survey of George D. Auckner Co., Jacksonville, Fla. (January 31, 1944); Industrial Health Survey of Bellingham Iron Works, Marine Division, Bellingham, Wash. (February 7-8, 1944) ; . Industrial Health Resurvey of the Gibbs Gas Engine Co., Jacksonville, Fla. (February 8-10, 1944); - Industrial Hygiene Resurvey of Avondale Marine Ways, Inc., Westwego, La. (February 11, 1944); Industrial Hygiene Resurvey of the Houston Shipbuilding Co., Houston, Tex. (February 25-29, 1944) ; Industrial Health and Safety Survey, Kaiser Cargo Inc., Richmond Number four, Richmond, Cal. (February 29 and March 6-8, 1944); Industrial Hygiene Survey of Brown Shipbuilding Co., Houston, Tex. (February 29-March 1, 1944); Health and Safety Survey of Brown Shipbuilding Co., Houston, Tex. (February 29-March 1, 1944); Industrial Hygiene Resurvey of Consolidated Steel Corp., Orange, Tex. (March 3-4, 1944); Industrial Health Survey of the Consolidated Steel Corp., Shipbuilding Division, Orange, Tex. (March 7-8, 1944); Industrial Hygiene Survey of the Tampa Shipbuilding Co., Tampa, Fla. (March 9-11, 1944); III 226 Industrial Health Resurvey of McCloskey and Co. Builders, Hooker's Point Yard, Tampa, Fla. (March 13, 1944); Industrial Health Survey of the Miami Shipbuilding Corp., Miami, Fla. (March 14, 1944); Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem steel Co., Baltimore Yard, Baltimore, Md. (March 13, 15, 16 and 21, 1944); Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of Richmond Shipyard No. 1, Richmond, Cal. (March 27-31, 1944) ; Industrial Health Survey of J.A. Jones Construction Co., Wainwright Yard, Panama City, Fla. (April 4-5, 1944); Safety And Industrial Health Resurvey of Missouri Valley Bridge and Iron Co., Evansville, Ind. (April 5-6, 1944); Industrial Health Resurvey of the Concrete Ship Constructors, National City, Cal. (April 11, 1944) ; Safety and Industrial Health Resurvey of Froemming Bros., Milwaukee, Wis. (April 11-12, 1944); Industrial Health Resurvey of Kaiser Co., Inc., Richmond Shipyard No. 3, Richmond, Cal. (April 17 19, 1944); Resurvey of Jeffersonville Boat and Machine Co., Jeffersonville, Ind. (April 4, 24-25, 1944); Industrial Health Resurvey of Permanente Metals Corp. Prefabrication Plant (April 5 & 27, 1944); Resurvey of Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., Superior, Wis. (May 3, 1944); Industrial Hygiene Resurvey of Higgins Industries, Inc., City Park Plant, New Orleans, La. (April 24 and May 6, 1944) ; Safety and Industrial Resurvey of Globe Shipbuilding Co., Superior, Wis. (May 6, 1944); Resurvey of Zenith Dredge Co., Duluth, Minn. (May 6, 1944); III - 227 Report on Safety of Shipyards, New York Shipbuilding Corp., Camden, N.J. (May 11-12, 1944)? Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of Moore Dock Co., Oakland, Cal. (April 28, May 1,4,6 & 1944) ; Dry 15, Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of United Engineering Co., Alameda, Cal. (May 18-19, 22, 1944); Industrial Safety Survey of Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Newport News, (May 20,22-25, 1944) ; Va. Resurvey of Leathern D. Smith Shipbuilding Co., Sturgeon Bay, Wis. (May 24, 1944); Resurvey of Cargill, Inc. Shipbuilding Division, Savage, Minn. (June 16, 1944); Industrial Safety Survey of Todd Shipyard Corp., Brooklyn, N.Y. (July 3-6, 1944) ; Reply to Industrial Health Resurvey at New England Shipbuilding Corp., South Portland, Me. (July 19 21, 26-27, 1944); Industrial Health Resurvey of the Bath Iron Works, Bath, Me. (September 20-23, 1944); Health and Safety Survey of Bethlehem Steel, Shipbuilding Division, San Francisco, Cal. (November 27-December 2, 1944); Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Hurley Marine Works, Oakland, Cal. (December 18-21, 27, 30, 1944, January 3-4, 1945); Industrial Safety Survey of the Maryland Dry Dock Co., Baltimore, Md. (January 15-16, 1945); Industrial Health Survey of Bethlehem-Sparrows Point, Inc., Sparrows Point, Md. (January 31, February 1-2, 1945); Industrial Safety Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding Division, Baltimore, Md. (February 1-4, 1945); III 228 Industrial Health Resurvey of the Consolidated Shipbuilding Corp., Morris Heights, N.Y. (February 7-8, 1945); Industrial Health Resurvey of Higgins Industries, Inc., New Orleans, La. (January 31, February l, 6, 7, 9, 12, 1945); Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of Oregon Shipbuilding Corp. (February 21-26, 1945) ; Industrial Health Survey of Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding Division, Hoboken, N.J. (February 28, March 1-2, 1945); Industrial Health Survey of New York Shipbuilding Corp., Camden, N.J. (March 21-24, 27, 1945); Industrial Safety Survey of Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding Division, 56th Street Yard, Brooklyn, N.Y. (March 28 and April 3, 1945); Industrial Health Survey of Food Machinery, Inc., Lakeland, Fla. (April 20, 1945) ; Industrial Safety Survey of Bethlehem Steel Co., East Boston Yards, Boston, Mass. (May 1-2, 1945); Industrial Safety Resurvey of George Lawley & Sons Corp., Boston, Mass. (May 3, 1945); Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of the Consolidated Steel Corp.,' Ltd., Wilmington, Cal. (May 3-8, 1945); Industrial Commission 1945) ; Safety Survey of U.S. Maritime Warehouse, Reading, Penn. (May 9, Industrial Safety Resurvey of Savannah Machine and Foundry Co., Shipbuilding Division, Savannah, Ga. (May 18, 19 and 22, 1945); Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding Division, San Pedro, Cal. (May 18-23, 1945); Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of the Concrete Ship Constructors, National City, Cal. (May 25-28, 1945); III 229 Industrial Safety Resurvey of North Carolina Shipbuilding Co., Wilmington, N.C. (May 30-31, June 1-2, 1945); Industrial Health Resurvey of General Ship and Iron Works, East Boston, Mass. (June 8, 1945); Industrial Health Resurvey of Tampa Shipbuilding Corp., Tampa, Fla. (June 10, 1945); Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Basalt Rock Shipbuilding Division, Napa, Cal. (June 14-18, 1945); Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of the Curtola Co. Marine Ways, Oakland, Cal. (June 30, 1945); 28 Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of Western Pipe and Steel Co., South San Francisco, Cal. (July 2-4, 1945) ; Industrial Safety and Health Resurvey of Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Corp., Repair Division, Mobile, Ala. (July 10-11, 1945) ; Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of Bellingham Iron Works, Marine Division, Bellingham, Wash. (July 18 and August 6-7, 194 5) ; Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of Lake Washington Shipyards, Houghton, Wash. (July 27-29, 1945) ; Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of Winslow Marine Railway and Shipbuilding Co., Seattle, Wash. (July 3 0-August 1, 1945) ; Industrial Health and Safety Resurvey of Everett Pacific Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Everett, Wash. (August 2-5, 1945) ; Industrial Safety Resurvey of Bethlehem-Hingham Shipyard, Inc., Hingham, Mass. (November 22-25, 1945). . 3311. Indeed, the Navy/Maritime Commission health consultants observed pipe coverers and insulators wearing respirators to protect themselves from asbestos exposure III - 230 both during shop work and during shipboard work. Pipe coverers and insulators were also observed utilizing other asbestos precautions such as local exhaust ventilation and wetting down of the asbestos product. Witness: James F. Morgan. 3312. When observing asbestos operations, the Navy/Maritime Commission health consultants wore respirators when necessary both to protect themselves and to set a good example for shipyard workers. Mr. Morgan recalls occasions when he wore his respirator aboard ship to observe insulators performing work and observed both insulators and other workers near the insulators, including electricians, wearing respirators. Witness: James F. Morgan. 3313. No dust counts were taken to determine the level of dust to which the insulators were being exposed. This precludes the possibility of obtaining a reasonable measure of a World War II worker's exposure to asbestos. As noted by Ensign Nelson: Q: Did you then have any way of knowing whether or not workers that you observed were exposed above the 5 million particle per cubic foot standard on a time-weighted basis? Ill - 231 A: We did not have any way of knowing because we had no means of sampling or counting during our travels and for a fact, it would have been impossible to have assessed the exposure of every worker working with asbestos in any shipyard because manpower was short with the war on and one would have had to sample incessantly to get anv reasonable estimate of the total exposure of these asbestos-exposed workers Industrial hygiene was a new idea in those days. There weren't very many of us. Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson; Carl Mangold. 3314. The most significant potential asbestos health problem observed during the surveys after promulgation of the Minimum Requirements was at a private shipyard where a Manville contract unit was performing the insulating work. Exhibits: Survey of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation, Seattle, Washington at 25 (July 1943) ; 2-7, Resurvey of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation, Seattle, Washington at 6 (January 13, 1944); 11 Resurvey of the Todd Pacific Shipyard (formerly Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation), Seattle Washington at 5 (July 12-20, 1945); III 232 Final Report for Todd Pacific Shipyard, Seattle, Washington at 6 (September 24, 1945); The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of JohnsManville for Company use only, at 27, 32, 35 (October 1943); See paragraph 3138, supra. Witness: James F. Morgan. 3315. At the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation in Seattle, Washington, V.s. Jenkins and Company, a Manville contract unit, was the subcontractor for pipe lagging and insulation. The yard was surveyed from July 2-7, 1943. Efforts were being made to control the asbestos dust, but they were "not working out well." Most of the dust from the band saw was escaping the exhaust system entirely. On the cutting table, wetting down procedures were often omitted and large accumulations of asbestos dust on the rafters resulted. This yard was resurveyed from January 11-13, 1944, but V.S. Jenkins was not complying with any of the asbestos-related recommendations made in the earlier survey in a satisfactory manner. A subsequent resurvey of the same shipyard (now under the name of Todd Pacific Shipyard) on July 12-20, 1945 again found that none of the recommendations for asbestos had been implemented. A Final Report dated September 24, 1945 indicated that "[n]o substantial progress was ever made III - 233 on our detailed recommendations concerning ventilation or control of dust in the asbestos shop." The Final Report further notes that, because the labor agreement at the shipyard prohibited physical examinations, no such examinations were made. Exhibits; Survey of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation, Seattle, Washington at 26 (July 1943) ; 2-7, Resurvey of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation, Seattle, Washington at 6 (January 13, 1944); 11 Resurvey of the Todd Pacific Shipyard (formerly Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation), Seattle, Washington at 5 (July 12-20, 1945) ; Final Report for Todd Pacific Shipyard, Seattle, Washington at 2 (September 24, 1945); The Marine Industry, compiled by the Power Products and Industrial Department of JohnsManville for Company use only, at 27, 32, 35 (October'1943). Witness: James F. Morgan. 3316. There is no evidence that at any time during World War II Manville provided the Navy/Maritime Commission with any information concerning the health hazards of asbestos or recommendations for using asbestos products in shipyards in a safe manner. Ill - 234 Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. 3317. On at least one occasion, when the Navy/Maritime Commission health and safety consultants received information from a manufacturer about the health hazards related to its products (fiberglass), the consultants' response was to circulate the information to medical departments of the shipyards. Had Johns-Manville supplied information to the Navy/Maritime Commission about the health hazards of its products, a similar procedure likely would have taken place. Exhibit: Letter from John M. Roche to the Chief Health Consultant (April 21, 1943). 3318. By the spring of 1943, the Navy had decided that other forms of anti-sweat materials could not hold up under the stress of Naval warfare and in April ordered that water repellent amosite asbestos be used on cold water piping. However, at the New York Shipbuilding Corporation, Camden, New Jersey, the dusty conditions caused by use of the water repellent amosite were determined to be a health hazard and, pursuant to a May 15, 1943 Medical Report, use of the product was discontinued. Ill - 235 Exhibit: Memorandum from A.H. Mills to Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Camden, New Jersey (September 1943) . 13, 3319. The manufacturer of the water repellent amosite product, the Union Asbestos and Rubber Company, being aware of the potential health problem, experimented with its product in an attempt to reduce "the dust nuisance in handling this material," and initially, Dr. G. M. Clarke of the New York Shipbuilding Corporation reported on September 15, 1943 that dust counts taken of the water repellent asbestos material were "below the standard set for which the use of a respirator is required" and that, accordingly, "we can assume that the use of this material under these conditions is not a health hazard." Exhibits: Inter-Office Correspondence from G.M. Clarke, M.D. to A.H. Mills (September 15, 1943); Letter from Union Asbestos & Rubber Company to R.G. Chubbuck (April 9, 1943); Memorandum from A.H. Mills to Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Camden, New Jersey (September 1943). 18, 3320. Unfortunately, however, the water repellent amosite could not satisfactorily be wet down in a manner similar to the method used at New York Shipbuilding for wetting down high temperature pipe insulation amosite. With the use of a clay additive to reduce dust, dust counts were III 236 recorded to be 5 to 6 million particles per cubic foot. At this level of dust, the Navy concluded that, because of the policy of rotation of workers, it was doubtful that "any cases of asbestosis will develop." Nevertheless, respirator use was considered advisable for "operators," even though it was acknowledged that "[t]he men do not like to wear respirators for the usual reasons plus the fact that they are on piece work and they say the respirator gets in their way and slows them down." Exhibit; Memorandum from Dr. H.K. Sessions to Dr. Philip Drinker (January 12, 1944). 3321. At Mare Island Naval Shipyard, safety rules were adopted in an effort to protect employees from over exposure to asbestos. The September 1, 1944 Mare Island "Safety Rules" contain a rule that employees "wear dust type respirators for chipping red lead, handling Amosite and glass wool, insulating materials... and for other dusty processes where adequate exhaust or ventilation cannot be secured." A chest x-ray machine "for the discovery of silicosis, tuberculosis, asbestosis, and all respiratory infections" was among the first of the laboratory equipment installed at Mare Island once the Industrial Hygiene Laboratory was established shortly after April of 1941. Ill - 237 Exhibits: Mare Island Naval Shipyard Safety Rules (September 1, 1944) ; Mare Island Naval including History 30, 1944). Shipyard internal of Safety Office, memorandum, at 4 (November 3322. In December of 1944, all of the pipe coverers at the New England Shipbuilding Corporation were x-rayed and "not one case of Asbestosis [was] found to exist." A recent survey of the Yard by Dr. Drinker and Lt. Com. Walter C. Fleischer, MC, USNR, Health Consultant, had disclosed that workers were reluctant to wear respirators. Exhibit: Minutes of Meeting of Labor-Management Committee at The New England Shipbuilding Corporation at 4 6 (December 1, 1944). & 3323. On December 19, 1944, W. C. Dreessen, Surgeon, USPHS, and Lt. Comdr. Fleischer performed an investigation of asbestosis from amosite pipe covering at Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine. The investigation was requested by Dr. Drinker after reports of concern among pipe coverer shop crews that amosite was causing some respiratory trouble. A survey of the asbestos shop revealed that local exhaust ventilation had recently been installed on the band saw removing some of the dust arising during the cutting of pipe insulation and that respirators were being worn by several workers using the small rotary saws. Ill - 238 Exhibit: W.C. Dreessen and W.E. Fleischer, Report on Investigation of Asbestosis from Amosite Pipe Covering at Bath Iron Works, at 1-3 (December 1944) . 19, 3324. Though 120 workers were said to be engaged in handling asbestos in the pipe coverers' shop at Bath Iron Works, only the 38 employees presumed to have had the heaviest exposure to asbestos (a minimum of two years) had their x-rays taken. Twenty-six workers had negative x-rays, 6 workers had chest films with minimal changes not sufficient for a diagnosis of asbestosis, 4 workers had x- ray changes consistent with asbestosis, and the 2 workers with the longest exposures (5 and 10 years) were felt to clearly have asbestosis. It was considered significant that those workers with the heaviest exposures, such as operators of the band saw and small rotary power driven saws, were found to have the most marked x-ray findings. None of the 38 workers had more than minimal physical findings or symptoms upon physical examination. Exhibit: W.C. Dreessen and W.E. Fleischer, Report on Investigation of Asbestosis from Amosite Pipe Covering at Bath Iron Works, at 1-3 (December 1944). ' 19, 3325. On January 31, 1945, Dr. Drinker sent to BUMED the study performed by Drs. Dreessen and Fleischer of III 239 Bath Iron Works along with a petrographic analysis performed by Drinker's colleague Charles R. Williams and dust studies of Bath performed by a representative of the American Mutual Insurance Company. Drinker stated that he met with the manufacturers of the asbestos materials used at Bath, and the manufacturers stated they would get out a brief statement of precautions which should be taken in light of their own experience and that they would inform their competitors that they had been asked by Drinker to do so. Exhibit: Letter from Philip Drinker to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (January 31, 1945). ^ 3326. On March 8, 1945, Ross T. Mclntire, Chief of BUMED, sent a letter to BuShips regarding recent surveys concerning asbestosis. Dr. Mclntire stated that repeated observations by personnel of the Yard Safety and Industrial Health Departments indicate that the exposures of civilian employees in the United States Navy yards to asbestos "do not form an occupational health problem as alleged." Dr. Mclntire further.noted that reports of chest x-rays made on employees engaged in handling, processing and applying asbestos to pipes at the Bostdn and Bremerton Navy Yards do not indicate any diseases of the lungs from exposure to asbestos. Ill - 240 Exhibit; Memorandum from Ross T. Mclntire to BuShips (March 8, 1945). (c) The Fleischer-Drinker Study 3327. Dr. Drinker noted in his January 31, 1945 letter to BUMED that the evidence at Bath indicated "a fairly serious dust risk" and recommended that a further study be performed to determine whether the Bath experience would be repeated at other yards. Drinker specifically noted it would be very desirable that two Navy yards and two Navy contract yards be included in the survey. Exhibit: Letter from Philip Drinker to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (January 31, 1945). 3328. On September 21, 1945, Dr. Drinker forwarded to the Bureau of Ships two copies of a working draft of a study on asbestosis that he performed entitled "Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels." Dr. Drinker's cover letter highlighted the findings of the study: ... As you will note from the data and conclusions, only 3 men out of 1074 showed any lung changes. All three had worked over twenty years at the trade. In our opinion this work as found in our Navy yards is most unlikely to cause ill health and we believe it would be well III 241 to publish a revision of this report in an appropriate medical journal. Exhibit: Letter from Dr. Philip Drinker to Bureau of Ships (September 21, 1945). . 3329. On October 8, 1945, the Bureau of Ships responded that it would approve the publishing of Drinker's report. BuShips requested that the names and identities of the shipyards be deleted. Exhibit: Memorandum from Chief of Bureau of Ships to Dr. Philip Drinker (October 8, 1985). 3330. The report was eventually published in January of 1946 in the Journal Of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology, and is the report, noted at paragraph 3302, supra, that is commonly referred to as the Fleischer-Drinker report. While the names of the shipyards, as suggested by the Bureau of Ships, are deleted from the published Fleischer-Drinker report, reference back to the working draft readily identifies the shipyards involved and the data applicable to the shipyards surveyed. Exhibit: W.E. Fleischer, F.J. Viles, R.L. Gade and P. Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels", 28 Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology 9 (January 1946); III 242 . Draft of Fleischer-Drinker Report, contained as enclosure of letter from Dr. Philip Drinker to Bureau of Ships (September 21, 1945). 3331. At the Boston Naval Shipyard 48 pipe coverers were x-rayed and no cases of minimal, moderate, or advanced asbestosis were found. Exhibit: Draft of Fleischer-Drinker Report, at 24. 3332. At the Brooklyn Naval Shipyard, 662 pipe coverers were x-rayed and no cases of minimal, moderate, or advanced asbestosis were found. Exhibit: . Draft of Fleischer-Drinker Report, at 24. 3333. At the Fore River Shipyard, 168 pipe coverers were x-rayed and two cases of moderate asbestosis were found. The two men involved had been pipe coverers at Fore River for 22 years and 30 years, respectively. Exhibit: Draft of Fleischer-Drinker Report, at 22, 24. 3334. At the New York Shipbuilding Corporation, 196 pipe coverers were x-rayed and one case of advanced asbestosis was found. The one man found to have asbestosis had worked for 23 years in the asbestos industry before coming to work at the shipyard. Ill - 243 Exhibit: Draft of Fleischer-Drinker Report, at 22, 24. 3335. The Fleischer-Drinker report reflects dust samples showing relatively high /'total dust" counts, but low asbestos dust counts that averaged from 0.23 to 2.6 mppcf for shop work and 0.02 to 2.8 mppcf for shipboard work. The discrepancy between total dust counts and asbestos dust counts is dramatically demonstrated by the average shipboard counts of 142.0 mppcf total dust as opposed to 0.02 mppcf for asbestos dust at Boston Naval Shipyard. Thus, according to Mr. Morgan, the level of asbestos dust measured at Boston Naval Shipyard aboard ship was approximately the level of asbestos dust an individual is exposed to while walking down the street in Washington, D.C. in 1987. Exhibit: Draft of Fleischer-Drinker Report, at 20. Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Carl Mangold. 3336. The working draft of the Fleischer-Drinker report also contained various references to environmental data from the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard supplied by Dr. James Fuller of Portsmouth, who was not working with the III 244 Fleischer-Drinker team. The draft did not, however, include Portsmouth in the x-ray table for "incidence of asbestosis among pipe coverers," because x-rays of the Portsmouth pipe coverers were not taken, despite efforts by Fuller and Walter Fleischer to have the Portsmouth, employees x-rayed. Because of the absence of x-rays of the Portsmouth workers, the published Fleischer-Drinker report contained no references to that shipyard. Exhibits: Draft of Fleischer-Drinker Report, at 18-2.1, 24; W.E. Fleischer, F.J. Viles, R.L. Gade and P. Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels", 28 Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology 9 (January 1946); . Report from James E. Fuller to The Yard Medical Officer (July 31, 1945); Letter from Walter E. Fleischer to George A. Eckert (August 3, 1945); Letter from James E. Fuller to Walter E. Fleischer (August 6, 1945). 3337. The Fleischer-Drinker study, like Captain Brown/s study at the New York Navy Yard, the study at New England Shipbuilding Corporation, the study at Bath, the studies at Boston and Puget Sound Naval Shipyards and Fuller's study at Portsmouth, all involved environmental data applicable to asbestos exposures of pipe coverers and insulators. Similarly, all x-rays taken during the studies were solely of pipe coverers and insulators. Ill - 245 Exhibits: W.E. Fleischer, F.J. Viles, R.L. Gade and P. Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels," 28 Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology 9 (January 1946); Report from James E. Fuller to The Yard Medical Officer (July 31, 1945); W.C. Dreessen and W.E. Fleischer, Report on Investigation of Asbestosis from Amosite Pipe Covering at Bath Iron Works (December 19, 1944); Minutes of Meeting of Labor-Management Committee at The New England Shipbuilding Corporation at 4 6 (December 1, 1944) ; & Ernest W. Brown, Industrial Hygiene and the Navy in National Defense, presented at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Air Hygiene Foundation of America, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pa., Nov. 13, 1940, War Medicine (January 1941); See paragraphs 3291-3293, 3322-3326, and 3331 3336, supra. 3338. The Navy and Maritime Commission were unaware during the World War II time frame that exposure to asbestos could cause mesothelioma. Exhibit; Manville Revised Pretrial Statement Par. 808 (admission). Witnesses; Dr. Hans Weill; James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. Ill 246 3339. The Navy and Maritime Commission were unaware during the World War II time frame that exposure to asbestos could cause bronchogenic or any other type of cancer. Exhibit; Manville Revised Pretrial Statement Par. 808 (admission) . Witnesses: Dr. Hans Weill; James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. 3340. The Navy and Maritime Commission were unaware during the World War II time frame that an individual who terminates exposure to asbestos without having developed asbestosis could later develop asbestosis (the latency concept). Witnesses; Dr. Hans Weill; James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. 3 341. The Navy and Maritime Commission were unaware in the World War II time frame that individuals exposed to asbestos at levels below the suggested limit of 5 mppcf set forth in the 1938 Dreessen report for a 40 hour work week III - 247 for an extended period of time were at risk of developing asbestosis. Exhibits: Dreessen, W.C., Dalla Vale, J.M., Edwards, T.I., and Miller, J.W., "A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry," Public Health Service Bulletin No. 241. United States Public Health Service, Treasury Department (1938); Manville Revised Pretrial Statement Par. 809 (admission). witnesses: Carl Mangold; Dr. Hans Weill; Daniel Bessmer; James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. 3342. There is insufficient evidence to establish that any of the test claimants were exposed above the Dreessen suggested level of 5 mppcf for a 40 hour week over an extended period of time. S2StyJ?,jts: Carl Mangold; James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson. 3343. The Navy and Maritime Commission were of the belief that the time weighted nature of the Dreessen III - 248 suggested standard applied without regard to maximum allowable concentrations for a short period of time. For example, the Navy and Maritime Commission believed during World War II that an exposure to asbestos dust of 100 mppcf for two hours followed by no exposure to asbestos for 38 hours was equal to being exposed for 40 hours at the level of 5 mppcf. Witness: Kenneth W. Nelson. (5) It Was Unclear In The World War II Time Frame Whether The Dreessen Suggested Permissible Exposure Standard For Asbestos Was 5 Million Particles Per Cubic Foot Of Total Dust Or Asbestos Dust Or Whether The Suggested Standard Was At All Applicable To Shipyard Asbestos Exposures 3344. The suggested guidelines for permissible asbestos exposures was derived from Dreessen's 1938 study of textile workers. The dust samples taken by Dreessen to develop his suggested guideline contained very heavy concentrations of asbestos dust. Exhibit: Dreessen, W.C., Dalla Vale, J.M., Edwards, T.I., and Miller, J.W., "X Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry," Public Health Service Bulletin No. 241. United States Public Health Service, Treasury Department (1938). Witness: Dr. Han Weill. Ill - 249 3345. It is unclear from the Dreessen article whether the suggested guideline for the level of permissible exposure involved levels of "asbestos dust" or "total dust." In noting that asbestosis did not appear to occur where asbestos textile workers were exposed below 5 million particles per cubic foot over a 40 hour week, the article at one point uses the term "total dust" and at another point refers to "asbestos dust." Exhibit: Dreessen, W.C., Dalla Vale, J.M., Edwards, T.I., and Miller, J.W., "A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry," Public Health Service Bulletin No. 241. United States Public Health Service, Treasury Department, at 59, 89-91 (1938). Witness: Dr. Hans Weill. 3346. At least as late as 1959, Manville was representing to its customers that the proper manner in which to measure the threshold limit value for permissible exposures to asbestos was based on an "asbestos dust" standard. In 1959, Manville's Medical Director, Dr. Kenneth Smith, wrote to the Detroit Edison Company and explained to them that, since they were using a 10% asbestos product, the proper threshold limit value was 50 million particles per cubic foot. According to Dr. Smith, the threshold limit III 250 value was directly increased as the concentration of asbestos decreased. Exhibit: Letter from Dr. Kenneth Smith to the Detroit Edison Company (February 19, 1959). 3347. . During the World War II time frame, it was believed by the Navy and Maritime Commission that the concentration or percentage of asbestos in the dust to which a worker was exposed was a factor that affected how injurious that exposure was. The higher the concentration of asbestos in the dust, the more potentially hazardous the exposure. This belief is also held today throughout the industrial hygiene and medical communities. Exhibits: W.E. Fleischer, F.J. Viles, R.L. Gade and P. Drinker, *A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels," 28 Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology 9 (January 1946); Report from James E. Fuller to The Yard Medical Officer (July 31, 1945). Witnesses: James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson; Frederick J. Viles; Dr. Hans Weill; Dr. Joseph Ross; III - 251 Carl Mangold. 3348. For example, with respect to the World War II time frame, both the Fleischer-Drinker report and James Fuller's Portsmouth Naval Shipyard July 31, 1945 environmental data study involved the taking of a total dust count and an asbestos dust count. Exhibits; W.E. Fleischer, F.J. Viles, R.L. Gade and P. Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in constructing Naval Vessels", 28 Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology 9 (January 1946); ` Report from James E. Fuller to The Yard Medical Officer (July 31, 1945). Witnesses; Dr. Hans Weill; Carl Mangold. 3349. The Fleischer-Drinker report itself, as discussed supra. specifically points out that Dreessen's studjr of a textile factory, that a shipyard worker's sporadic exposure to asbestos differs significantly from the constant dust exposures of the textile worker, and that, while Dreessen suggested a 5 mppcf standard "for that industry,..." "[t]here are no established figures for permissible or safe dustiness in pipe covering operations." Ill - 252 SXbib.its: W.E. Fleischer, F.J. Viles, R.L. Gade and P. Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels", 28 Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology 9 (January 1946) ; See paragraph 3301, supra. Witnesses; Dr. Hans Weill; Carl Mangold; Frederick J. Viles. 3350. Surveys in 1944 and 1946 surveys for asbestos dust at the Philadelphia Asbestos Company performed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Health, demonstrate that the concentration of asbestos in a dust sample was considered in utilizing the Dreessen suggested standard. In the Philadelphia Asbestos Company surveys, it was noted that the material used in the plant contained 85 percent asbestos. The surveyors then made the assumption that the., dust created bv the manufacturing operation was SfRie same. as the parent material, took the fi<BiHfl^peasured through the dust studies for the concentration of total dust, and multiplied the figure by .85 to determine the "asbestos dust" concentration. The final figure was then compared with the "toxic limit for asbestos dust of 5 million particles per cubic foot of air as suggested by the United States Public Health Service." Ill - 253 Exhifei&s: Report of Engineering Study of Asbestos Dust Hazard. Philadelphia Asbestos Company, Norristown, Pennsylvania,. at 1, 4-5 (November 15, 1944); Letter from Dr. Joseph Shilen to Philadelphia Asbestos Company (May 24, 194.6); Report of Dust Survey. Philadelphia Asbestos Company, Norristown, Pennsylvania (May 15-16, 1946). . Witness: Carl Mangold. 3351. Moreover, as recently as December 31, 1965, an interpretation of the 5 mppcf standard to mean asbestos dust instead of total dust was set forth by Irving J. Selikoff, J. Churg, and E. C. Hammond in their article "The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers In The United States," wherein the authors cited the Fleischer- Drinker study for the principle that "generally counts tor asbestos fibers have been within the five mppcf M.?.C. of the A.C.G.I>H. [American Conference of Governmental istsj." Sahib I.J. Selikoff, J. Churg, and E.C. Hammond, "The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers in The United States," Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, at 142 (December 31, 1965). Ill - 254 Witnesses; Dr. Hans Weill; Carl Mangold. Ill - 255 UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT JOHNS-MANVILLE CORPORATION and JOHNS-MANVILLE SALES CORPORATION, Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA, Defendant. ,______________________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil No ) ) ) ) __________________i 465-83C PRETRIAL STATEMENT OP THE UNITED STATES VOLUME IV J. CHARLES KRUSE Special Litigation Counsel ALBERT. ROGERK1 ANTHONY JANET F. NANCY B. SCOTT D. S. MICHAEL SCADRON JANE MAHONEY DAVID S. PISHBACK Trial Attorneys Torts Branch Civil Division March 10, 1987 RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney General Civil Division J. PATRICK GLYNN Director Torts Branch HAROLD J* ENGEL Deputy Director Torts Branch H. MICHAEL SEMLER Supervisory Trial Attorney Torts Branch, Civil Division U.S. Department of Justice Ben Pranklin Station P. 0. Box 340 Washington, D.C. 20044 Telephone: (202) 724-6749 Attorneys for the United States GENERAL TABLB OF CONTENTS P3<33 I. INTRODUCTION......... ....................................................................... I -1 II. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES....................................................................1-2 III. ESTIMATE OF TRIAL TIME............................................................ 1-8 IV. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT.................................................... 1-9 II-I III-I IV-1 V. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW...............................................IV-140 VI. LIST OF TRIAL WITNESSES............................... IV-152 VII. LIST OF EXHIBITS........................................................................ V-l VIII. CONCLUSION................................................................................... V-103 DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS Volume I I. INTRODUCTION......................... ................................................................1-1 II. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES .............................................................................1-2 III. ESTIMATE OF TRIAL TINE..................................................................... 1-8 IV. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT.... ..................................................... 1-9 A. MANVILLB'S EXTENSIVE INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ASBESTOS-RBLATED PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS WILL PRODUCE MORE THAN THREE-QUARTERS OF A BILLION DOLLARS IN INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT........................................ 1-9 (1) Nanville Has Been Sheltered From AsbestosRelated Personal Injury Claims For More Than Four Years While It Negotiated With Its Insurers ................................................................................ 1-14 (2) Manville Will Emerge From The Bankruptcy Proceeding Free Of All Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Litigation ............................................... 1-17 (3) Manville Has Already Received Substantial Reimbursement From Its Insurers For Payments Made To Asbestos Victims ............... 1-20 (4) Manville'8 Insurers Will Pay Out More Than Three-Quarters Of A Billion Dollars In Connection With Manville's Liability To Asbestos Victims, Including The Test Claimants ................................................................. 1-25 (a) Manville's California Insurance Litigation ........ 1-25 (b) Manville'sInsurance Settlements ........................... 1-35 B. THROUGHOUT WORLD WARII MANVILLE AGGRESSIVELY SOLICITED SALES TO THE UNITED STATES AND RBAPBD HUGE PROFITS FROM THESE SALES AND BUILT UP TREMENDOUS RESERVES FOR "WAR CONTINGENCIES" ....................................................................................... 1-48 (1) At The Outset Of WWII Manville Had Been Manufacturing Asbestos-Containing Products For Seventy Years and Was The Giant Of The Industry .......................................................... 1-48 i (2) Manvilie's Wactlme Business Was Substantially The Same As Its Pre-War Peacetime Business And Manville Continued To Aggressively Market Its Asbestos-Containing Products ..................................1-55 (a) Wartime Economic Controls Did Not Preclude, But Rather Encouraged, Voluntary Formation Of Defense Contracts Through Negotiation And Competitive Bidding ..........................................1-55 (b) Manville's Manner Of Doing Business And Aggressive Sales Policy Did Not Change As A Result Of The Wartime Regulations........................... ........................................ 1-74 (i) Manville Provided Its Salesmen With Financial Incentives To Sell As Much As They Could ............................................ 1-77 (ii) During World War II Manville Continued Its Promotion Program Through Advertisements And Sales Brochures ......................................... 1-96 (iii) During World War II, Manville Carefully Identified Its Competitors And Their Prices In Order To Be Able To Price Its Products And Win Competitively Bid Contracts ................................................................1-103 (iv) Manville Vigorously Attempted To Obtain Both The Contracts Offered By The United States And The Priority Orders Necessary To Fulfill These Contracts .................................................... 1-104 (v) World War II Provided Manville Substantial Opportunities To Expand Its Markets ............................................. 1-103 ii (3) Manville's Wartime Prices Were Not Based On Any Navy Policy Of Self-Insurance Or Assumption Of Risk............................................................................................1-113 (a) Manville's Wartime Prices Depended Largely On The Prices Of Manville's Competitors And The Size Of The Customer .............................................................................. 1-114 (b) Manville's Wartime Prices Were Also Based On Manville's Evaluation Of "Any Hazard Involved In The Sale Of The Product Due To Factors Not Fully Known" ............................................ 1-119 (c) Manville's Prices During World War II Were Equal To Or Greater Than Its Pre War Prices For Almost Every Product ..................1-121 (d) Manville Charged The United States Higher Prices Than It Charged Certain Other Customers ............................. 1-124 (4) Manville Made Record Profits During World War II, which Enabled It To Create Massive Reserves For "War Contingencies" And Post-War Expansion ........................................................................................1-131 (a) Manville Made Record Sales And Profits During WorldWar II ............. 1-131 (b) From Its World War II Profits, Manville Created "Contingent War Reserves" To Cover Future Liabilities ..........................................................................1-153 (c) Manville Also Used Its High Wartime Profits To Expand Its Plants, Retire Its Preferred Stock And Create Reserve Funds For Later Expansion ........................ 1-166 (d) Manville Utilized Its World War II Profits To Bxpand Its Business And To Dominate The Post-War Insulation Market ............................................................ 1-180 iii C. THE METALS RESERVE COMPANY 'S PURCHASE, IMPORTATION, AND SALE OP AFRICAN ASBESTOS TO MANVILLE BEGINNING IN MID-1943 ENSURED MANVILLE ADEQUATB SUPPLIES OF FIBER AT REASONABLE PRICES .......................................................... YfllwnS II MANVILLE'S WWII CONTRACTS WITH THE NAVY AND THB MARITIME COMMISSION PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR RECOVERY IN THIS LITIGATION.................................... (1) During WWII There Were No Navy Policies, No Discussions Between The Parties, And No Shared Understandings Which Could Reasonably Have Lead Manville To Believe That Its AsbestosRelated Losses Were Considered Costs Of Performance Which Would Be Borne By The United States................................................................................ (a) Manville's Wartime Contracts Were Competitively-Bid Fixed- Price Contracts.................................................. (i) During WWII Supplies Were Routinely Purchased By Informal Competitive Bidding...................................................... (ii) Throughout WWII The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Routinely Purchased Supplies Using Fixed-Priced Contracts..................... (iii) All of Manville's WWII Sales Of Asbestos-Containing Products Were Pursuant To Fixed- Price Contracts.................................... (b) Manville's WWII Contracts Contained No Express Term Indicating That The United States Would Treat Third-Party Tort Liability Losses As Reimbursable Costs Of Performance........................................................... iv (c) During WWII The Navy Had No Policy Of "Self-Insurance" or "Assumption Of Risk" Which Applied To Third-Party Personal Injury Liability Under Fixed-Price Supply Contracts.......................... 11-26 (i) Risk Of Los8 Of Or Damage To Government-Owned Property .............11-34 (ii) Casualty Insurance ................................... 11-42 (2) There Was No Privity Of Contract Between Manville And The Maritime Commission During WWII With Regard To Most Asbestos-Containing Products And No Shared Understanding That Manville's Third-Party Tort Liability Would Be Borne By The Maritime Commission.... 11-67 (a) All Asbestos-Containing Insulation Materials Were Procured Directly By The Private Yards, Not By The The Maritime Commission .................................. 11-63 (b) The Maritime Commission Contracts Specifically Provided That The Shipyards Were Not Agents Of The United States .................. ..................................... 11-70 (c) The Contracts Used By The Maritime Commission During WWII Required That Contractors And Subcontractors Hold The Government Harmless From Liability For Injuries To Third Persons ......................................................................11-71 (3) Many Of The Contracts Relied On By Manville Do Not Relate To A Test Shipyard, Do Not Deal With A Product At Issue In This Litigation, Or Were Entered Prior To The Date On Which Manville Alleges That The Navy Adopted The Relevant Policy of Self-Insurance ...................................................................11-75 (a) Several Of The Contracts Identified By Manville Do Not Involve The Test Shipyards ....................................................... 11-75 (b) Several Of The Controls Identified By Manville Do Not Involve A Product At Issue In This Litigation ................................................................ 11-77 -v- (c) Manville Could Not Be Entitled To Recovery Under Several Of The Identified Contracts Because They Were Formed Before The Date On Which Manville Alleges That The United States Adopted Its Self Insurance Policy ........... ........................ 11-80 (d) There Is No Evidence Connecting Many Of The Contracts Relied On By Manville To Test Shipyards, The Test Claimants Or The Products At Issue Here .................... 11-82 (e) Manville Has Not Identified Any Relevant WW II Contracts Relating To Electric Cable Filler, Marine Tape Akoustikos Felt Or Ebony Asbestos ......... 11-84 E. NEITHER MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR SHIP SPECIFICATIONS PROVIDE ANY BASIS FOR MANVILLE'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES............................................................................. ............ ................. 11-85 1. The Asbestos Industry In General And Manville In Particular Played Dominant Roles In Shaping The Government's Specifications, Which Were Written To Permit Procurement Of The Industry's Existing Products........................................................................11-85 (a) Types And Purposes Of Procurement Specifications................................................................. 11-85 (b) The General Specifications Process Prior To And During World War II........................... .11-87 (c) The Manville Products Alleged To Have Injured The Test Claimants And The Corresponding NavySpecifications.......................... 11-97 (i) Magnesia Pipe Covering, Block And Cement.............................. ... ...............................11-97 (ii) Super ex Pipe CoveringAnd Block................... 11-115 (iii) Superex Cement andNo.450 Cement................11-121 (iv) Asbestos Cloth ................................................ 11-138 (v) Firefelt .................................................... 11-144 vi - (vi) Amosite AsbestosFelt ....................................... 11-143 (vii) Akoustikos Felt ..............................................11-153 (viii) Asbestos Millboard ............................................11-153 (ix) Other Products ................. 11-164 (2) Nothing In The Government's Specifications Or Standards Prohibited Manville From Placing A Warning Label On Its Products Or Packaging..............11-167 (3) Marinite And Marine Sheathing, The Only Manville Asbestos-Containing Products Sold Directly To The Maritime Commission During WWII, Were Developed Solely By Manville In Order To Capture Large Segments Of The Maritime and Non-Maritime Markets........................................................................................... 11-169 (a) In The Early 1930's Manville Was Attempting To Develop A Lightweight Marine Construction Material..................................11-169 (b) Following The Morro Castle Disaster Manville Redoubled Its Efforts To Create A Lightweight Marine Construction Material ............................................... 11-172 (c) Even Before It Produced Marine Sheathing, Manville Was Marketing This Product To The Shipbuilding Industry .......................................... 11-176 (d) After It Had Developed Marine Sheathing, Manville Provided Samples To Outside Entities For Testing ...................................................11-132 (e) Manville Developed Marinite In Its Own Research Facilities .......................................... 11-186 (f) Manville Aggressively Marketed Marinite To Private Shipyards And Other Private Customers ............................................ 11-188 (4) The General Ship Specifications Relied On By Manville Do Not Establish That Asbestos Was Required Or Actually Used On The Ships At Issue In This Litigation ..................................................... 11-199 (a) Navy Ship Design And Ship vii Specifications ................................................................11-199 (b) Maritime Commission Ship Design And Ship Specifications ..................................................... 11-205 Volume III P. MANVILLE KNEW THAT SHIPYARD WORKERS WERE ENDANGERED BY EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS DUST AND CONCEALED AND SUPPRESSED INFORMATION THAT COULD HAVE LED TO AMELIORATION OF THE HAZARD .............................................................. III-l (1) Manville, In Concert With The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Studied The Hazards . of Asbestos Because Of Litigative Considerations, and Concealed The Extent of The Hazard...........................................................................'..III-l (2) Manville Extended Its Concealment Activities To Include A Conspiracy With RaybestosManhattan ................................................... III-25 (3) Manville Recruits Other Industry Members To Join In Sponsorship of Research By The Saranac Lake Laboratory, But Acts To Suppress Results Of ThatResearch ....................................III-43 (4) Manville Knew That Shipyards Were At Risk From Asbestos ..............................................................................III-60 (5) Manville Knew That Shipyard Workers During World War II Were Being Endangered By Their Exposure To Asbestos .............................................................. Hi-68 (6) Manville Sales And Support Personnel Had Access To And Entered Navy And Private Shipyards During World War II.................... III-76 (a) Fore River Shipyard ..................................................... III-76 (b) Consolidated Shipyard.................................................III-83 (c) Philadelphia Naval Shipyard ................................... III-85 (d) Boston Naval Shipyard.................... III-86 (e) Other Private and PublicShipyards ...................... III-87 (7) Manville Knew What Shipyard Working Conditions viii Were Like Because Its Contract And Technical Service Units Were Performing Insulation Work In Shipyards During World War II ................III-90 (a) Manville's Presence In Wartime Shipyards As Insulation Installer ............. ...m-90 (b) Manville's Presence As Installer Of Insulation At Consolidated Shipyard................. III-99 (c) Specific Evidence of Manville Knowledge Gained Through Contract and Technical Service Units ............. III-101 (8) Manville Callously Disregarded Informing Workers About The Hazards of Asbestos: Specific Cases ...................................................... ................. III-105 (a) The DePorest Incident .................... ...III-1G5 (b) The Roemer Incident ............. III-110 (9) Manville Continued To Conceal Its Knowledge Of The Dangers Of Asbestos Throughout The Mid-War And Immediate Post-War Periods ................... III-lll (a) Manville Cancer Cover-Up ............................... ....III-lll (b) The Hemeon Report .......................... III-123 (c) Further Manville Knowledge and Cover-Up Of Low Dose Risk ............................ III-131 (d) Manville Did Mot Know Of The Flftialm-prinket Report ..........................................III-143 (10) Manville's Decision Mot To Warn ................................... III-145 (11) Courts Reviewing Manville's Conduct Have Repeatedly Found Punitive Damages Appropriate ............... III-149 (12) The Espionage Act Did Mot "Classify" Information Or Documents And Did Not Prohibit Disclosure Of Information To Manville ................................... III-164 - ix - G. THE NAVY AND MARITIME COMMISSION RESPONDED TO THE INCREDIBLE GROWTH IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SHIPYARD WORKING POPULATIONS DURING WORLD WAR II WITH AN UNPRECEDENTED SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM TO PROTECT SHIPYARD WORKERS ............................................................ 111-17 5 (1) Shipyard Safety And Health Programs At The Local Level ................................................................III-177 (2) The Navy And Maritime Commission Provided Necessary Consultation To Private Shipyard Management On Health And Safety Matters ..................................................................... .111-188 (3) The Navy And Maritime Commission Worked With The United States Public Health Service To Improve Health and Safety At Private Shipyards ............................................................III-199 (4) The Navy and Maritime Commission Adopted A Cautionary Approach To Worker Exposure To Asbestos Despite Their Limited Knowledge Of The Hazards Of Asbestos And The Absence Of Bvidence That Shipyard Workers Were Developing Asbestosis......... ................................................ III-205 (a) Before The Minimum Requirements ........................ III-206 (b) Asbestos Under The Minimum Requirements ................................... III-219 (c) The Fleischer-Drinker Study .................................III-241 (5) It Was Unclear In The World War II Time Frame Whether The Dreessen Suggested Permissible Bxposure Standard For Asbestos Was 5 Million Particles Per Cubic Foot Of Total Dust Or Asbestos Dust Or whether The Suggested Standard Was At All Applicable To Shipyard Asbestos Exposures ............................................................. .111-249 x Volume IV H. THE UNPRECEDENTED NAVY AND MARITIME COMMISSION HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAM TO PROTECT SHIPYARD WORKERS WAS IMPLEMENTED AT THE TEST SHIPYARDS DESPITE THEIR DRAMATIC EXPANSION AND DESPITE THE NATIONAL IMPERATIVE TO RAPIDLY PRODUCE SHIPS ................................................... ................ IV-1 (1) Though The Number Of Persons Employed At The Boston And Philadelphia Navy Yards Quadrupled In Order To Satisfy The National Defense Need For Ships, The United States Navy Acted Reasonably To Protect Workers From Known Hazards .........................IV-1 (a) The Boston Navy Yard....................................................IV-1 (i) The Boston Navy Yard Expanded Rapidly During World War II ......................... IV-1 (ii) Between 1941 And 1945, The Boston Navy Yard Built 141 New Ships, Overhauled 3,260 Ships and Docked 1,820 Ships .......................IV-4 (iii) The Boston Navy Yard Responded With A State-Of-The-Art Industrial Hygiene Program ........................... IV-8 (iv) Manville Had Access Or Could Have Obtained Access To The Boston Navy Yard................................... IV-15 (b) The Philadelphia Navy Yard ........................................IV-17 (i) The Philadelphia Navy Yard Expanded Rapidly During World War II ..................................................... IV-17 (ii) The Philadelphia Navy Yard Built More Than 45 Navy Vessels Between 1940 and 1945 .....................IV-19 (iii) The Philadelphia Yard Had A State-Of-The-Art Industrial Hygiene Program...................................................................... VI-19 (iv) Manville Had Access Or Could Have Obtained Access To The Philadelphia Navy Yard ......................................IV-26 - xi - (2) Like Navy Yards, While The Number Of Persons Working In Private Shipyards During World War II Increased Dramatically, The Private Shipyards Acted Reasonably To Protect The Shipyard Workers From Known Hazards ............................. IV-27 (a) The United States Did Not Take Control Of Private Shipyards During World War II ...................................................... IV-27 (b) The Fore River Shipyard.................... IV-33 (i) Even Before World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Was A Prominent Private Shipyard .....................................................................IV-33 (ii) During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Bxpanded Dramatically ........................................IV-35 (iii)During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Built A Total Of 128 Vessels ..................................... IV-46 (iv) During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Invest igated The Then Known Risks Of Exposure To Asbestos And Took Steps To Assure That There Was No Asbestos Disease At The Fore River Shipyard.........................IV-52 (v) During World War II, Many People Including Manvilie's Salesmen Had Access To The Fore River Shipyard ............................................ IV-69 (c) The Consolidated Shipyard .......................................... IV-79 (i) The Consolidated Shipyard Built Only Navy Ships ........................................IV-79 (ii) A Manville Contract Unit Performed The Pipecovering Work At Consolidated Shipyard........................IV-81 (iii) Consolidated Shipyard And A & M Took Reasonable Steps To Protect Workers From Hazards ................. IV-83 xii (iv) Manville Had Access To The Consolidated Shipyard During World WarII ...............................................IV-86 I. MANVILLB'S SETTLEMENTS WITH THE TEST CLAIMANTS .................................................................................... IV-88 (1) Manville's Settlements With Boston Navy Yard Test Claimants .,.................................................. IV-88 (a) Chester Anderson ..............................................................IV-88 (b) Thomas Drinan ....................................................................IV-90 (c) Rubin Shulman .............................................................. ..IV-93 (d) Ewald Legee .......................................................... ......... .IV-96 (e) John Roche ........................................................................... IV-99 (f) William Ogle................................................................ IV-101 (g) John Herlihy.....................................................................IV-104 (2) Manville Settlements With Philadelphia Navy Yard Test Claimants....................................................IV-106 (a) Walter J. Archey ................. ..IV-106 (b) Julius Rothman ...................... IV-111 (c) Victor C. Impriano ....................................................... IV-115 (3) Manville'8 Settlements With Fore River Shipyard Test Claimants ..................................................... IV-120 (a) Joseph Teta ............... IV-120 (b) Phillip Houten ................................................................ IV-123 (4) Manville's Settlements With Consolidated Shipyard Test Claimants ............................................... IV-125 (a) James Clancy..................................................................... IV-125 (b) W.D. Smith............... IV-128 (c) Willis King................. IV-131 - xiii - J. PRESENT KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASBS ................................................................................................... IV-133 K. DAMAGES ........................................................................................ IV-139 V. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW......................................................... IV-140 VI. TRIAL WITNESSES FORTHE UNITED STATES ..................................IV-152 VII. LIST OF EXHIBITS .....................................................................................................................................V-l VIII. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................V-103 - xiv VOLUME IV H. THE UNPRECEDENTED NAVY AND MARITIME COMMISSION HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAM TO PROTECT SHIPYARD WORKERS WAS IMPLEMENTED AT THE TEST SHIPYARDS DESPITE THEIR DRAMATIC EXPANSION AND DESPITE THE NATIONAL IMPERATIVE TO RAPIDLY PRODUCE SHIPS (1) Though The Number Of Persons Employed At The Boston And Philadelphia Navy Yards Quadrupled In Order To Satisfy The National Defense Need For Ships, The United States Navy Acted Reasonably To Protect Workers From Known Hazards (a) lbs..,Boston Navy Shipyard (i) The Boston Navy Yard Expanded Rapidly Purina World War II 4001. The number of civilian employees working at the Boston Navy Yard increased over 1,700% between January 1938 and December 1944. In January, 1938, the Boston Navy Yard employed 2,802 civilian employees. By the time President Roosevelt declared a limited national emergency on September 8, 1939, Boston Navy Yard civilian employment had risen to approximately 5,500 civilians. Just over two years later, there were over 25,000 civilians employed at the Boston Navy Yard. By mid-1943, the Boston Navy Yard employed over 50,000 civilian employees. During 1943, the Boston Navy Yard averaged 47,000 civilian employees. IV - l Exhibits: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. II & III, at 13, 26-28; United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol. VIII (First Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. Ill, at 1-7. 4002. Due to the national emergency, the Boston Navy Yard was placed on three 8-hour shifts January 1, 1942, just 24 days after the Declaration of War. Bxhibits: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 27; United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol. VIII (First Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. Ill, at 2. 4003. The dramatic increase in employment at the Boston Navy Yard was accompanied by a vast expansion of facilities. Between 1938-1941, the United States spent over $26 million for construction of new facilities at the Boston Navy Yard. For example, expansion of Boston Navy Yard facilities at Charleston included construction of a new pier, an exentension or rehabilitation of five other piers, an extension of the Structural Shop, an addition to the Machine Shop, improvement and expansion of the Power Plant, and an addition to the Shipfitters Shop. Extensive construction of new facilities was also accomplished at the Boston Navy Yard facilities at South Boston Dry Dock. The North, South, Bast and West Jetties were built and IV - 2 improvements and additions to a number of shops and an expansion of the power plant were completed. Exhibit: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 13. 4004. The United States' Declaration of War in December 1941 further expedited the construction of facilities at the Boston Navy Yard. Between 1941-1945, the United States spent an additional $25 million to further develop the waterfront and to expand facilities at the dry docks in South Boston, the Chelsea Annex and the U.S. Naval Fuel Annex at East Boston. Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 26. 4005. Before the end of the war, employment at the Boston Navy Yard started to decline. By early 1944, the number of employees at the Boston Navy Yard had declined to 40,138. gahibit: United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol. VIII (First Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. IV, at 25. 4006. Length of employment at public shipyards during World War II was very short. For every one hundred IV - 3 persons employed in public shipyards in 1943, 44.8 employees left their employment at the shipyard during the year. During 1944, the figure rose to 56.8 persons per 100 employees. Therefore, during 1943 and 1944, more than half the people who worked in public ship yards left their employment at the shipyard. Bxhibit: United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, Wartime Bmplovment. Production and Conditions of Work in Shipyards. Bulletin No. 824, p.15. 4007. If the 1943 average were applied to the employees at the Boston Navy Yard in mid-1943, it would indicate that approximately 22,400 persons left their employment at the Boston Navy Yard during 1943. See, paragraphs ____ and _____, suora. (ii) Between 1941 and 1945, The Boston Navy Yard Built 141 New Ships, Overhauled 3,260 Shins And Docked 1.820 4008. In 1942, the Boston Navy Yard built and repaired various Navy vessels. S, at paragraphs 4009 to 4011. infra. 4009. For example, on April 16, 1942, the Boston Navy Yard was awarded a contract to construct 150 tank IV - 4 lighters which had been ordered for the Army-Navy Munitions Board by the Bureau of Ships. Bziy-fr il Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 17. 4010. The Boston Navy Yard was not just a shipbuilder, it was a huge "jobber" as well. In the four months between January 1, 1942 and May 1, 1942, the Boston Navy Yard overhauled and repaired 340 vessels. An average overhaul took eleven days and all work was done on a rush basis in order to get the ships back to their stations in the shortest practicable time. BzhifrU: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 17. 4011. The Boston Navy Yard repaired a total of 553 vessels in 1942, including work on battle damage, operating overhaul and alterations. In addition to these 553 vessels, the Boston Navy Yard worked on 251 vessels of various classes which were at the yard for very short periods for voyage repairs. Exhibit: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 18. IV - 5 4012. During 1943, the Boston Navy Shipyard increased the rate at which it produced and repaired ships. See, paragraphs 4013 - 4014, infra. 4013. New construction at the Boston Navy Yard peaked in 1943. Eleven destroyers, forty-six destroyer escorts (more than any other Navy or private shipyard) and three LST's were completed during this period. Exhibit: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 20-21. 4014. In 1943, the Boston Navy Yard also repaired 887 ships. Over three-quarters of these ships had received repairs of battle damage or were at the yard for operating overhaul and alterations. Exhibit: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 20-21. 4015. The Boston Navy Yard accomplished this work with a monthly average for the year of over 47,000 employees. . Exhibit: United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol. VIII (First Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. III. IV - 6 4016? The Boston Navy Yard continued its high production during 1944. During 1944, the Boston Navy Yard repaired 1,136 ships of various types, including repairing battle damage and performing operating overhaul, alterations, and outfitting. Also, as of December, 1944, 58 destroyer escorts had been completed by the Boston Navy Yard since the "DE" (destroyer escort) program started twenty months earlier. On the-'average, the Boston Navy Yard delivered approximately three escorts per month during 1944. Exhibit: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 24-25. 4017. Due to the variable nature of the repair and conversion work and changes in the priorities of the Navy Department, the Boston Navy Yard was required in 1944 to constantly change its schedules and reshuffle its manpower while still devoting its full energy and resources to meeting the demands of the fleet. Exhibit: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 25. 4018. During 1943-1944, 57.9% of the Boston Navy Yard workers were utilized for new construction, 33.7% for ship repair, and 8.4% toward manufacturing operations. IV - 7 Exhibits: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 20-21; United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol. VIII (First Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. III. 4019. Between 1941 and 1945, the Boston Navy Yard constructed 141 new ships, overhauled 3,260 ships and docked 1,820 ships. In addition, the Bath Iron Works and Fore River Shipyard delivered 65 new ships to the Boston Navy Yard for commissioning. Exhibit: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 25. 4020. The Boston Navy Yard built no Maritime Commission ships between 1939 and 1947. Exhibit: Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938 1957, Ch. Ill, at 25. (iii) The Boston Navy Yard Industrial Hygiene Program Was Very Good__ 4021. The wartime expansion of the Boston Navy Yard required re-organization of its health and safety program. On July 8, 1943, the Personnel Relations Division was organized to facilitate dealing with turnover and increased work load. The Personnel Relations Division was organized IV - 8 into five major sections: Labor Relations, Employment, Training, Employee Services, and Safety. Bxhibit: United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol. VIII (First Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. III., at 4, 8. 4022. The Safety Section of the Personnel Relations Department had jurisdiction over "all the work of prevention of industrial and occupational accidents, and, in conjunction with the Medical Officer, the prevention of industrial illness or occupational disease." This was to be accomplished by (1) engineering and inspection; (2) education; and (3) enforcement. Exhibit: United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol. VIII (first Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. III., at 24. 4023. The primary focus of the safety program at the Boston Navy Yard was on accident prevention. For example, the purpose of engineering and inspection was to eliminate every possible unsafe physical condition and remove the hazard before it resulted in accident or injury. The safety program identified as unsafe such physical conditions as "inadequately guarded machinery; hazardous arrangements of material or processes; unsafe loading; handling or piling; poor housekeeping; unsafe stagings; IV - 9 ladders; etc... ." It also identified as unsafe practices which included failure to wear personnel protective equipm ent or failure to follow established rules or procedures. Exhibit: United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol VIII (First Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. III., at 24. 4024. Safety education focused exclusively on accident prevention. The education of employees included the establishment of Safety Committees of employees to discuss accidents and their possible remedies. Exhibit: United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol. VIII (First Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. III., at 25. 4025. The efficiency of the Boston Navy Yard's accident prevention program was measured in terms of "the Lost Time Accident Frequency Rate", i.e.. an accident where the injured person was unable to return to his regular duty on the shift following the one on which he was injured. The Lost Time Accident Frequency rate for Boston Navy Yard was lower than the average rate for all shipyards, both government-owned and private. exhibit: United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol. VIII (First Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. III., at 26. IV - 10 4026. In addition to its safety program, the Boston Navy Yard had a Medical Division during World War II. The Medical Division maintained a Main Dispensary, a South Boston Dispensary, a labor board and four first-aid stations. Exhibit: Memorandum from T.R. Meyer (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities (Boston Navy Yard), at 1, December 18, 1944. 4027. While the large turnover and reduced number of medical officers made it difficult to maintain medical services on a specialty basis during World War II, the Boston Navy Yard recognized and maintained industrial hygiene as a specialty. Exhibits; United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol. VIII (First Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. III., at 24; Proceedings of the Meeting of East Coast Shipyard Physicians at Philadelphia, September 1-3, 1943. Memorandum from T.R. Meyer, (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities (Boston Navy Yard), at 1, December 18, 1944. Witness: Frederick Viles. IV - 11 4028. Within the Medical'Division, an Industrial Hygiene Unit attempted to prevent occupational disease hazards through technical and engineering work including the chemical analysis of gases, vapors, fumes and dust. By 1944, the Industrial Hygiene Unit had a laboratory and other facilities and a staff which included a Medical Officer, an Industrial Hygienist and a Pharmacist's Mate. EikiJlii: Memorandum from T.R. Meyer (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities (Boston Navy Yard), at 1-2, December 18, 1944. 4029. At the Boston Navy Yard, industrial hygieni sts and industrial health officers from the Medical Division made health inspections and surveys of shops and ships during World War II. B*hiJ2i: Memorandum from T.R. Meyer (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities (Boston Navy Yard), at 1, December 18, 1944 4030. During World War II, the Industrial Hygiene Unit at the Boston Navy Yard considered the hazard of silicosis a much greater hazard that the hazard posed by asbestos dust. In dealing with dust-related hazards, the Industrial Hygiene Unit at the Boston Navy Yard used ventilation where needed, including where sandblasting, IV - 12 welding, painting and foundry work was occurring. The Boston Navy Yard during World War II maintained a ventila tion crew to distribute and maintain the local exhaust blowers used aboard ship. Exhibita: United States Naval Administration, World War II, Vol. VIII (First Naval District), part I. The Navy Yard Boston, Ch. III., at 24; Proceedings of the Meeting of East Coast Shipyard Physicians at Philadelphia, September 1-3, 1943; Memorandum from T.R. Meyer (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities (Boston Navy Yard), at 1, December 18, 1944. Witness: Federick Viles. 4031. While the safety office was separate from the Industrial Hygiene Unit, excellent cooperation existed between the two offices. The use, care, and sterilization of protective equipment was supervised by the safety officer, who was to obtain advice from the Industrial Health Officer on matters such as sterilization techniques and proper types of equipment to be used on particular jobs. exhibit: Memorandum from T.R. Meyer (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities (Boston Navy Yard), at 2, December 18, 1944. IV - 13 4032. In light of the many known serious hazards existing at the Boston Navy Yard during World War II, the potential hazards posed by asbestos products were not as yet known and fully appreciated by the yard personnel. However, notwithstanding the difficulties caused by the rapid expansion of the yard, the Boston Navy Yard promptly responded whenever the effects of a hazard caused by a material were fully appreciated. For example, in 1943, the yard commandant proposed to the Bureau of Ships that, due to the hazard posed by cork insulation and cork cement used for the insulation of refrigerant piping, standard amosite sectional pipe covering be used as a substitute. Thus, had Manville warned it about the hazards of its products, the Boston Navy Yard would have taken remedial action with respect to the use and handling of asbestos. Exhibit: Memorandum from Commandant, Navy Yard, Boston to Bureau of Ships, January 20, 1943. Witness: Frederick Viles. 4033. In July 1945, a Health Report including an asbestosis survey, was conducted at the request of the Boston Navy Yard's safety office because of the realization of "the possibility of asbestosis occurring among insulation IV - 14 workers." However, the x-ray examinations of 47 employees conducted as part of the health survey revealed no evidence of asbestosis. The report concluded that the dust concen trations in the shops, with the exception of cement mixing and grinding of used asbestos, "fell within the normal safe limits." The report recommended that the dust from the grinding and cement mixing operations be brought under control by a system of ventilation. Bxhibit: Monthly Industrial Health Report of the U.S. Navy Yard, Boston for the Month of July, 1945. 4034. There is no evidence that, during World War II, there was ever a reported case of asbestos-related disease at the Boston Navy Yard. 4035. There is insufficient evidence to establish that abestos dust levels (whether an "asbestos dust" or a "total dust" measurement) at the Boston Navy Yard were over five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40- hour work week for an extended period of time. See. Section G.4 and G.5 of Volume III, supra. (iv) Manville Had Access or Could Have Obtained Access to the Boston Navy Yard 4036. There is no evidence that access to the Boston Navy Shipyard during World War II was any more IV - 15 restricted than the west coast Navy Yards which were visited frequently by representatives of the various asbestos manufacturers, including Manville. Indeed, it was the practice at the Boston Navy Yard for insulation manufac turers to provide the services through their representatives and to instruct the workmen in installing thermal insulation products. Bxhibit: Memorandum from Bureau of Ships to Commandant, Navy Yard, Boston, April 10, 1941; Letter from Walton of Boston Navy Yard to Acme Steel Company, February 17, 1941. Witless: John B. Crawford. 4037. In 1938 and 1939, Manville salesman S.E. Hazard visited the Boston Navy Yard about once a week. Once or twice a year, Norman Adams would accompany S.E. Hazard to the Boston Navy Yard. To gain admission to the Boston Navy Yard, Mr. Hazard and Mr. Adams merely showed their Manville company identification, identified whom they were there to see and signed the visitor's log. They were then given a visitors' badge which allowed them access to the entire shipyard. IV - 16 witness? Norman Adams. 4038. Charles 0. Garcelon, the exclusive Manville salesman who sold insulation products at the Boston Navy Yard during World War II, frequently visited the Boston Navy Yard. To gain admission to the shipyard, he merely showed his business card to the guard at the gate and identified the person he was there to see. He was never prevented from seeing whom he wanted to see and never denied entry to the shipyard. Other asbestos manufacturers' representatives were also in the shipyard, at least for bid openings. Witness: Charles 0. Garcelon. 4039. While Mr. Garcelon did not go aboard ships under construction or into the pipe insulation shop, he was never told that he could not do so or restricted from doing so. He merely chose not to do so because he thought it was none of his business. WltHCBB? Charles 0. Garcelon. (b) The Philadelphia Naw Yard (i) The Philadelphia Navy Yard Expanded Rapidly Puri5S World War II__ , IV - 17 4040. In November of 1939, 19,000 civilian employees worked at the Philadelphia Navy Yard and the adjacent Naval Aircraft Factory. By November of 1944, the civilian employee population at the Philadelphia Navy Yard had risen to 53,000. Bxhibit: Memorandum Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities, Comdr, (MC) U.S.N.R., to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, at 22-25, (December 18, 1944). 4041. During 1943, for every 100 employees working in a public shipyard, 44.8 employees terminated their employment at the public shipyard. In 1944, the figure rose to 56.8 persons per 100 employees. Therefore, in 1943 and 1944, more than half the employees working in a public shipyard terminated their employment. Exhibit: United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, Wartime,Employment. Production and Conditions of Work in Shipyards. Bulletin No, 824, p. 15. 4042. If the 1944 average were applied to the shipyard population at the Philadelphia Navy Yard during November 1944, it would indicate that approximately 2,508 persons left their employment at the Philadelphia Navy Yard during November 1944 alone. IV - 18 Exhibiti United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, Wartime Employment. Production and Conditions of Work in Shipyards. Bulletin No, 824, p. 15. (ii) The Philadelphia Navy Yard Built More Than 45 Navy Vessels Between 1940 and 1945 4043. From 1940 through 1945, more than 45 ships were built at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. These ships included destroyers, destroyer escorts and LST's. BxMb.U: Listing of Ships Built at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. 4044. The Philadelphia Navy Yard built no Maritime Commission ships between 1939 and 1947. Exhibit: Listing of Ships Built at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. (iii) The Phildelphia Yard Had A Very Good Industrial Hygiene Program 4045. The Medical Division at the Philadelphia Navy Yard during World War II was run by a Yard Medical Officer. Equipment and housing facilities for the Medical Division were considered adequate. IV - 19 Memorandum Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities, Comdr, (MC) U.S.N.R., to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, at 22-25 (December 18, 1944). 4046. Industrial Hygiene, along with Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat, and X-Ray, were the specialties recognized at the Philadelphia Navy Yard during World War II. Bxhibit: Memorandum Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities, Comdr, (MC) U.S.N.R., to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, at 22-25 (December 18, 1944). 4047. Early in World War II, Dr. Victor Kindsvatter was one of four or five industrial hygiene officers assigned to Philadelphia Navy Yard. Dr. Kindsvatter was at the Yard only from July 9, 1942 to December 30, 1942. SiL: Dr. Victor Kindsvatter. 4048. Dr. Kindsvatter, during his five-month duty at Philadelphia Navy Yard during World War II, focused on air-borne silica in the foundry. Dr. Victor Kindsvatter. 4049. Dr. Kindsvatter had no contact with pipe IV - 20 covering operations while he was at the Philadelphia Navy Shipyard during World War II. WAMBB: Dr. Victor Kindsvatter. 4050. The Navy authorized the issue o government- furnished protective clothing at the Philadelphia Navy Yard during World War II. The authorized equipment included "protective breathing apparatus for sandblasters, welders, paintsprayers, when working in confined spaces, and other occupations where necessary". Exhibit: Industrial Department Safety Order No. 17, Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Penn. (May 1, 1940). 4051. Dr. Kindsvatter visited Shop 56 at the Philadelphia Navy Yard while he was there during World War II and saw workers using respirators. Witness: Dr. Victor Kindsvatter. 4052. Edward Downey, a pipefitter/mechanic and pipefitter/progressman at Philadelphia Navy Yard during World War II, never wore a respirator at Philadelphia Navy Yard during World War II, but Mr. Downey states that h would have been given one if he had asked for one. IV - 21 Witness: Edward Downey. 4053. Edward Downey knew none of the underlying test claimants from Philadelphia Navy Yard. Witness: Edward Downey. 4054. Edward Downey, while he was at the Philadelphia Navy Yard during World War II, was never in the pipecoverers' area of Shop 56. Witness: Edward Downey. 4055. The medical program for civilian employees at the Philadelphia Navy Yard during World War II included pre employment blood tests and chest x-rays. A tuberculosis survey program was conducted by the Philadelphia Tuberculosis Association in conjunction with the Yard Officer. Bzhibi.t: Memorandum Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities, Comdr, (MC) U.S.N.R., to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, at 22-25 (December 18, 1944). 4056. During World War II, the Industrial Health Unit at the Philadelphia Navy Yard consisted of two medical IV - 22 officers, three industrial hygienists, one entomologist and one pharmacy worker. Exhibit: Memorandum Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities, Comdr, (MC) U.S.N.R., to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, at 22-25 (December 18, 1944). 4057. Plant, shop and ship inspections were made upon request of Navy Yard or District facilities. Industrial health surveys were, for the most part, concerned with the control of industrial hazardous dusts, fumes and solvent vapors. BslubU: Memorandum Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities, Comdr, (MC) U.S.N.R., to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, at 22-25 (December 18, 1944). 4058. When the Philadelphia Navy Yard perceived a hazard, it acted. On October 23, 1942, a chest survey for tuberculosis was begun of all Navy Yard employees. The program was initiated by the Yard Medical Officer and was handled jointly by the Philadelphia Tuberculosis and Health Association in connection with the Industrial Health Department of the Dispensary under the Yard Medical Officer. Bxhibit: Annual Sanitary Report, Dispensary, Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Penn. (May 1, 1940). IV - 23 4059. In 1944, the Phildelphia Navy Yard perceived a potential hazard associated with vermiculite dust. Lieutenant L.F. Andrews of the Philadelphia Navy Yard wrote to Universal Zonolite Insulation Company asking for information concerning any possible health hazards resulting from inhalation of vermiculite dust while spraying vermiculite anti-sweat coating in confined spaces aboard ship. The vice-president of Universal Zonolite Insulation Company told Lieutenant Andrews that vermiculite dust was not a serious health hazard and that it had never, to the company's knowledge, caused silicosis nor any other type of respiratory irritation. BshibU: Letter from Thomas H. Coulter to Lieutenant L.F. Andrews (August 10, 1944). 4060. In May of 1944, a meeting of industrial hygienists from Navy yards and stations in the continental United States was held at the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. Because a hazard from welding and burning fumes, gases and vapors had been perceived at some or all of the yards, plans were outlined for a survey of the effect of welding and burning fumes, gases and vapors on civilian employees in U.S. Navy yards. The study was to include a complete physical examination, chest x-ray, urinalysis and IV - 24 serology to be done on each employee in the sample of 5,COO men. gshibit; Memorandum from T.J. Carter, Captain (MC), U.S.N. to Vice Admiral Ross T. Mclntire (MC), U.S.N. at pp. 2-3 (May 16, 1944). 4061. There is no evidence that, during World War II, there was ever-..a reported case of asbestos-related disease at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. 4062. There is insufficient evidence to establish that asbestos dust levels (whether an "asbestos dust" or a "total dust" measurement) at the Philadelphia Navy Yard were over five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time. Sfifi Section G.4 and G.5 of Volume III, suroa. 4063. The actual survey for the effects on employees of welding and burning in Navy shipyards, including the Philadelphia Navy Yard, was performed during July and August of 1944, and concluded that 96.2% of those tested were within normal limits. exhibit: Memorandum from T.J. Carter, Captain (MC), U.S.N. to Vice Admiral Ross T. Mclntire (MC), U.S.N. at pp. 2-3 (May 16, 1944). IV - 25 (iv) Manville Had Access or Could Have Obtained Access to the Philadelphia Navv Yard 4064. On November 17, 1939, the Captain of the Philadelphia Navy Yard issued a memorandum concerning Business Visitors' Passes for the calendar year 1940. The Captain of the Philadelphia Navy Yard stated that Business Visitors' Passes should not be requested for calendar year 1940 unless the company representative was required to enter the shipyard at least twice a week. Among those who met the requirement of being in the shipyard at least twice a week was J.F. Hemberger of Manville. Exhibit: November 17, 1939, Memo from the Captain of the Philadelphia Naval Yard to Heads of All Departments. 4065. There is no evidence that the pre-war security/access policies in effect at the Philadelphia Navy Yard were changed during World War II or that any Philadelphia Navy Yard representatives ever denied a Manville employee access to any part of the Philadelphia Navy Yard. 4066. There is no evidence that access to the Philadelphia Navy Yard during World War II was any more restricted than the west coast shipyards which were visited IV - 26 frequently by representatives of various asbestos product manufacturers, includinq Manville. witness: John B. Crawford. (2) Like Navy Yards, While The Number Of Persons Working In Private Shipyards During World War II Increased Dramatically, The Private Shipyards Acted Reasonably To Protect The Shipyard Workers From Known Hazards (a) The United States Did Not Take Control of Private Shipyards During World War II 4067. During World War II, ships were constructed in either public Navy shipyards or private shipyards. Navy ships were built in both Navy Yards or private shipyards, while Maritime Commission ships were built only in private shipyards. BziufrUs: Navy Dept., Bureau of Ships, An Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships. Vol. II, at 255; Maritime Administration, Permanent Survey of Completed Contracts 1936 - 1983. 4068. Even though the Navy and the Maritime Commission owned the land and the facilities of many private shipyards, the government did not control or take over the private corporations that operated the shipyards and built IV - 27 the ships. The contract between the private corporation and the Navy or the Maritime Commission contained the mutually agreed upon provisions for building the ships. Provisions for the inspection of material and workmanship and the methods for resolving any disputes arising from that inspection were included in both Navy and Maritime Commission contracts. Exhibits: Contract for the Construction of a Single Screw, Cargo Vessel Hull 162 between the U.S. Maritime Commission and Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. (November 28, 1938); Contract for the Construction of Four 220-Foot Minesweepers between the U.S. and Savannah Machine and Foundry Co. (August 3, 1943); Navy Dept., Bureau of Ships, An Administrative History of the Bureau of Shins During World War II. Vol. II at 262. 4069. The contracts for shipbuilding during World War II did not contain any more requirements for control than did previous or subsequent peace-time contracts. Shipbuilding contracts before, during and after the war had almost identical provisions including approval of subcontracts, recordkeeping, nondisclosure of information about the work under the contract, and compliance with the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act of 1936. IV - 28 Exhibits: Contract for the Construction of Emergency Cargo Ships between the Maritime Commission and Oregon Shipbuilding Corp. (May 1, 1941); Contract for the Construction of a Single Screw, Cargo Vessel Hull 162 between the U.S. Maritime Commission and Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. (November 28, 1938); Contract for the Construction of Four 220Foot Minesweepers between the U.S. and Savannah Machine and Foundry Co. (August 3, 1943); Contract NObs-2665 between the Navy Dept, and Bath Iron Works for Destroyers (August 3, 1948). 4070. The Supervisor of Shipbuilding ("SupShip") was responsible for assuring compliance with Navy contracts for ships being built in private shipyards. Each SupShip office had the commissioned officer who acted as the representative of the Navy at various shipyards and as an intermediary between the contractors and the Navy Department. The mission of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding during World War II was "[t]o get complete, well-built ships delivered as rapidly as possible at a reasonable and fair price." Exhibit: Navy Dept., Bureau of Ships, An Administrative History of the of Ships, voi. in at 257. 4071. The role of the SupShip was more than mere technical assistance with plans and specifications. It was IV - 29 also to "advise and aid" contractors so as to assure compliance with contracts. Although SupShip was to be cost conscious, any control over expenditure of government funds was to be maintained "in cooperation with the contractors and the Navy Cost Inspector, and without unduly interfering with management". SupShip's role did not include supervision of or enforcement of health and safety measures. Bahibi-ta: Navy Dept., Bureau of Ships, An Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships. Vol. Ill at 257; See. Sections G.2. and G.4. of Vol. Ill, supra. 4072. In contrast to the public shipyards which were run by Navy personnel subject to direct orders of the Commandant of the Navy yard, the duties of the Maritime Commission in private shipyards under its jurisdiction was controlled by the terms of the shipbuilding contract. Although there were inspectors in all the shipyards, their purpose was to maintain compliance with the contract and provide on-the-spot approval to expedite the shipbuilding process. For subsidized standard ships. Admiral Land of the Maritime Commission told the American Export Lines (which operated the eight C-3E cargo ships built at the Fore River Shipyard) that the "Commission's policy was to retain only supervisory control over the inspection and approval of plans" and "to remain in the background." IV - 30 Sshifrit? Purer, Administration of the Navy Department During World War II -- (1959); Letter, G.S. Land to American Export Lines (April 26, 1938). 4073. The Maritime Commission inspectors had no authority to make any changes during construction of a ship that affected the design or the cost of the ship. Any such changes had to be handled between the contractor and the Commission since such changes would constitute changes to the contract. The instructions to inspectors provided that "[qjuesiions of policy which may arise between representatives of the contractor and the Commission will be studiously avoided and contractor advised to refer such matters to the Chief of the Ship Construction Section". Bxhibitt U.S. Maritime Commission, Regional Office of Construction, Bast Coast, Philadelphia, Pa., General Instructions to Inspectors, at 6, 7 (Dec. 1, 1942). 4074. Any change in management sought by the Maritime Commission had to be done under the terms of the contract. Just as in peacetime, the Maritime Commission had no arbitrary right to change management and had to use either the default/termination clauses or economic negotiation. While the Maritime Commission could condemn the shipyard itself, it could not requisition personnel to IV - 31 replace a shipyard's management removed for inadequate job performance. Exhibit: F. Lane, Ships for Victory 493-4 (1951). witness: Joseph Barnes. 4075. Even the wartime emergency did not change the fact that the Maritime Commission was contracting with private corporations. As stated in a history of the Maritime Commission during this period: For the success of its shipbuilding program the Commission relied less on the staff it placed in the yards to supervise the contracts than on the executives of the shipbuilding companies. Enlisting managerial talent had been considered by Admiral Land the central problem in launching the program. In shaping the contracts a primary aim was to obtain a maximum exercise of managerial initiative and ability. Although the Commission sent out auditors and engineers to check fraud and inefficiency, the CQiMBiasiQiLjraB ,not. trying to give commands to the executives or workmen of the shipbuilding industry,___It had no power to do so. and even if it had the power it could not have told the shipbuilders in detail what to do. (Emphasis added). IV - 32 Sxbifr.Lt: P. Lane, Ships for Victory 136-7 (1951). 4076. The Navy and the Maritime Commission control over private shipyards was limited by the terms of the contracts with the shipbuilders and by the obvious counterproductive effect of interfering too much with the management of a shipyard. Exhibits: Lane, Ships for Victory (1951) at 487; Navy Depart., Bureau of Ships, An Administrative History of the U.S. Navy Purina World War II. Vol. II, Part III at 258 (1957). (b) The Fore River Shipyard (i) Even Before World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Was A Prominent Private Shipyard__ _ 4077. The Fore River Engine Company establishedthe shipyard at Quincy Point on the Fore River in 1901. Between 1901 and 1913, the Fore River Engine Company built ships for the Navy and for private companies. Exhibit: A History of Shipbuilding at Fore River, at 9-14, 1975. 4078. In 1913, the Fore River Bngine Company sold the Fore River Shipyard to the Bethlehem Steel Corporation IV - 33 which continued the Pore River Engine's Company practice of building ships for both the Navy and private companies. In the quarter century between 1913 and 1938, the Fore River Shipyard delivered more than 145 ships to the United States Navy and more than 100 ships to private customers. The ships delivered during this period ranged from battleships to trawlers. Bahikils: Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 27-62; A History of Shipbuilding at Fore River, at 14-22, 1945. 4079. By 1938, the Fore River Shipyard was one of the largest private shipyards in the United States and one of only 24 private yards in the United States capable of building ships weighing 2,000 gross tons or more. Prior to the start of World War II in Burope, the Fore River Shipyard had seven major ways and two piers and was capable of building ships as large as battleships, but it employed only a few thousand people. Exhibits: SupShip, Wartime History, at 2; Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers. The Shipbuilding Business in the United States. 161 (F.G. Fassett, Jr. ed.) (1948), 4080. By the late 1930's, the Bethlehem Steel IV - 34 Company had a health and safety program in place at the Fore River Shipyard. Exhibits: See, paragraph 4116, infra. Witness: David C. McArthur. (ii) During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Expanded Dramatically 4081. As a result of the World War II need for ships, the Bethlehem Steel Company significantly expanded its facilities at the Fore River Shipyard. See, paragraphs 4082-4086, infra. 4082. On September 9, 1940, the Bethlehem Steel Company and the United States of America entered Contract No. NOd-1534 entitled "Supplemental Contract for the Acquisition and Installation of Special Additional Plant Equipment and Facilities Required to Bxpedite the National Defense Program" ("the facilities contract"). Bxhibit: Contract No. NOd-1534 between the Bethlehem Steel Company and the United States of America (September 9, 1940). 4083. Pursuant to the facilities contract, Bethlehem Steel Company agreed to "promptly erect, furnish IV - 35 and/or install the buildings, utilities, facilities, and appurtenances thereto, identified in Exhibit I * * " The Department of the Navy agreed to pay "[t]he true cost" of the items listed in Exhibit I to the facilities contract. Initially, Exhibit I provided "for the acquisition and installation of special additional plant equipment and facilities at an estimated cost of $13,427,500.00." However, on January 18, 1941, the Navy and Bethlehem Steel Company agreed to amend Exhibit I to include additional items which raised the estimated cost of the facilities contract to $17,507,500. Exhibit I was amended again on September 8, 1941 to provide for the addition of more items at a total estimated cost of $18,468,000. Exhibits; Contract No. NOd-1534 between the Bethlehem Steel Company and the United States of America (September 9, 1940); Letter from James Forrestal, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to the Bethlehem Steel Company (January 18, 1941); Letter from James Porrestal, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 8, 1941). 4084. As finally amended, Exhibit I to the facilities contract between the Bethlehem Steel Company and the United States provided that the Bethlehem Steel Company would obtain a specified list of things including: IV - 36 two new ship ways; one new wet basin; one fitting out pier; turret building and facilities; turret armor erection area; welding lean-to facilities and welding equipment; sheet metal shop facilities; electric shop facilities; plate yard and pickling facilities; transportation and weight' handling facilities; extension of the machine shop; extension of the pipe shop; extension of the paint shop; additional tool room area; rigging loft and outside machinists building; storage area; light storage warehouse; heavy storage warehouse; buildings; office building; lunch room facilities; first aid and hospital building; additional parking area; two 40 ton locomotive crane; nine 25 ton locomotive cranes; one 25 ton crane; four 5 ton cranes. Bafrifclfc; Exhibit I (Revised September 8, 1941) to Contract NOd 1534 between the Bethlehem Steel Company and the United States of America (September 9, 1940). 4085. The facilities contract provided that the United States would receive "all right, title and interest in and to" each item "when and as partial payments shall be made under this contract for any part of the Facilities." The facilities contract also provided that, when the facilities were "no longer necessary for the purpose of the national defense", the Bethlehem Steel Company would have the option of purchasing the facilities owned by the United IV - 37 States at an agreed price or requiring the United States tc remove or demolish the facilities. The United States never assumed management responsibility over the facilities it paid to erect. Exhibit: Exhibit I (Revised September 8, 1941) to Contract N0d-1534 between the Bethlehem Steel Company and the United States of America (September 9, 1940). 4086. Therefore, by the end of World War II, the Fore River Shipyard had twelve shipways, three piers and one or two wet basins giving it the capability of building any ship, including the largest World War II aircraft carriers. Exhibits; SupShip, Wartime History, at 2; Industrial Health ReSurvev of the Bethlehem Steel Company Shipbuilding Division (Fore River Shipyard). at 2 (May 23, 24 and 25, 1945)? Anthony F. Sarcone & Lawrence S. Rines, A History of Shipbuilding at Fore River, at 23; Quincy Yard, at 22. 4087. The physical expansion of the Fore River Shipyard in the year preceding the United States' entry into World War II was accompanied by a rapid and vast increase in the number of persons employed at the Fore River Shipyard. For example, in May 1940, the Fore River Shipyard employed about 6,000 workers. By December 7, 1941, the Fore River Shipyard employed approximately 17,000 persons. IV - 38 exhibits: SupShip, Wartime History, at 1; A History of Shipbuilding at Pore River, at 22. 4088. During World War II, the number of persons employed at the Fore River Shipyard continued to increase. In 1943, the Fore River Shipyard employed approximately 31,600 persons. ExhiMi: Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard), at 2 (February 23, 25 and 25, 1943). 4089. During World War II, the Fore River Shipyard's labor force changed rapidly. For example, in May 1943, Fore River Shipyard managers estimated that employee turnover was approximately 50%. Bach day, the Fore River Shipyard hired approximately 100 to 150 mechanics with a year or less experience in a trade. If the Fore River Shipyard hired five days a week during May 1943, the Fore River Shipyard would have hired between 2,200 and 3,300 mechanics during that month alone. Exhibits: Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard), at 2 (February 23, 24 and 25, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel IV - 39 Company (Fore River YardK at 2 (May 23, 24 and 25, 1943). 4090. In February 1943, in order to process all of these new hires, the Fore River Shipyard had two doctors working full-time giving pre-employment physicals to all candidates for employment. In addition, all new employees were given a yard introduction or "orientation" course which consisted of a brief explanation of the yard functions, yard geography, and personnel. Following this general orientation of new employees, the leading man in each department discussed the occupational hazards with each new employee and each new employee was given a general safety rules booklet and safety code applicable to his particular department. Ezkibits: Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel CsmoahV (?.Q.Le-Rl.YfeL..y.a.r<3), at 3, 6 and 9 (February 23 and 25, 1943); SupShip, Wartime History, enclosure at 1; Industrial Safety Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company Fore River Yard, at 6 (May 11 and 12, 1943). 4091. The labor turnover at the Fore River Shipyard was not unusual for a World War II shipyard. According to the United States Department of Labor, during World War II American private shipyards experienced the following turnover rates per 100 employees: IV - 4Q YEAR ACCESSIONS SEPARATIONS 1940 103.5 66.7 1941 166.5 75.5 1942 186.7 106.4 1943 132.7 119.3 1944 93.0 114.2. More specifically, the United States Department of Labor reported that Atlantic Coast private shipyards experienced the following turnover rates per 100 employees: year ACCESSIONS SjBP&RATIQNS 1943 103.4 89.9 1944 62.0 86.9. Exhibit? U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wartime Employment. Production and Condition of Work in Shipyards. Bulletin No. 824, at 8-11. 4092. Applying the Department of Labor's yearly turnover averages for private shipyards to employment figures at the Fore River Shipyard, the following information would result. In 1940, when the Fore River Shipyard employed approximately 6,000 employees, the Fore River Shipyard would have hired 6,210 new employees during the year to replace the 4,002 employees who left. In 1941, when the Fore River Shipyard employed approximately 17,000 IV - 41 employees, the Pore River Shipyard would have hired 28,305 new employees to replace the 12,835 employees who left. Applying the Department of Labor's yearly turnover averages for Atlantic Coast shipyards to employment at the Fore River Shipyard, the following information would result. In 1943, when the Fore River Shipyard employed 31,600 employees, the Fore River Shipyard would have hired 32,674 new employees to replace the 28,377 employees who left. In May 1943 alone, if Fore River Shipyard management had been correct in its turnover estimate, the Fore River shipyard would have needed to hire at least 1,317 new employees. See paragraphs 4087-4091, supra. 4093. Fore River Shipyard test claimant Joseph Teta provides a good example of the "fluidity" of World War II shipyard employment. Joseph Teta worked as a welder at the Fore River Shipyard from March 1942 to February 1944. When he started as a welder at the Fore River Shipyard in March 1942, Joseph Teta did not "expect to make a career of being a welder at Fore River" and did not expect to be at the Fore River Shipyard for even ten years. Instead, Joseph Teta expected only to work in the shipyard until the war emergency was over. In fact, he worked in shipyards less than three years during World War II. Exhibitt Boston Naval Shipyard job application (1944). IV - 42 Witness: Joseph Teta. 4094. While employed at the Fore River Shipyard, test claimant Joseph Teta did not work more than eight hours a day (even though management would have liked him to work overtime) and did not work more than five to six days a week. Witness: Joseph Teta. 4095. By the time that Joseph Teta left the Fore River Shipyard, Sunday work was rare. In January 1944, the Navy and the Maritime Commission instructed private shipyards to keep Sunday work to a minimum. BathifrU: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wartime Bmplovment. Production and Condition of Work in Shipyards. Bulletin No. 824, at 8-11. 4096. The number of persons working for the Navy SupShip office at Quincy, Massachusetts increased as the work being done at the Fore River Shipyard increased. In May 1940, the Navy SupShip staff at the Fore River Shipyard was composed of 12 officers and 93 civilians and covered only the Fore River Shipyard which then had almost 6,000 IV - 43 employees. By late 1943, the SupShip staff at Quincy Massachusetts had grown to 91 officers and 603 civilians. The Quincy SupShip staff oversaw the Fore River Shipyard, the Bethlehem Hingham Shipyard, the "Lawley plant" and several "small craft yards" which together employed more than 60,000 workers. Exhibits; SupShip, Wartime History, at 1 and 5; SupShip, Historical Program, pp. 1-2, enclosures 2 and 3. 4097. Prior to the end of World War II, the number of persons employed at the Fore River Shipyard declined. A year after peaking at 31,6000 employees, the Fore River Shipyard employed approximately 21,000 employees on November 21, 1944. Six months later in May 1945, the Fore River Shipyard employed 20,235 persons and had only a skeleton crew working on Sunday. Exhibits: Industrial Safety Re-Survev of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation Qulncv Yard, at 2 (November 21, 1944); Industry Health Re-Survev of the Bethlehem Steel Company Shipbuilding (Fore River Yard), at 2 (May 23, 24 and 25, 1945). 4098. Fore River Shipyard test claimant Phillip Houten alleged in his complaint against Manville and other asbestos product manufacturers that he had worked at the IV - 44 Pore River Shipyard from May to September 1945. If this information is accurate, Phillip Houten would have joined the Pore River Shipyard work force as it was decreasing at the end of World War II. Bxhibit: Complaint, Houten v. Johns-Manville Corporation. et al.. at 2. 4099. By the end of World War II, the Fore River Shipyard employment had declined to 18,952 persons. Exhibit: SupShip, Historical Program, at 2. 4100. Following the end of World War II, the number of persons employed at the Fore River Shipyard declined rapidly. Within four months of the end of World War II, the Fore River Shipyard employed 15,851 persons. On July 1, 1946, the Fore River Shipyard employed 9,906 persons. By January 1, 1947, the Fore River Shipyard employed 4,507 persons. B&hibUs: SupShip, Historical Program, enclosure 4; Quarterly Summary, enclosure D. 4101. The number of persons employed by Navy SupShip at Quincy, Massachusetts also declined rapidly at the end of the war. From nearly 700 employees in late 1943, IV - 45 the Navy SupShip staff at QUinOy, Massachusetts had been reduced to 67 officers, 21 enlisted men and 474 civilians by September 1, 1945. By October 1, 1946, the Navy SupShip staff at Quincy, Massachusetts numbered only 14 Navy personnel and 174 civilians. exhibits: SupShip, Wartime History, at 1 and 5; SupShip, Historical Program, at 1-2, enclosures 2 and 3. 4102. Therefore, beginning before the United States entered World War II and continuing after it entered World War II, the Fore River Shipyard greatly expanded. Its workforce increased more than 500% between 1940 and 1945. See, paragraphs 4087-4088, supra. (iii) During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Built A Total of 128 Vessels 4103. The rate at which the Fore River Shipyard delivered ships also increased during World War II. The rate at which the Fore River Shipyard delivered ships between 1939 and 1947 was approximately 14.2 vessels per year. This rate was more than 39% higher than the rate at which it had delivered vessels in the 26 years that the Bethlehem Steel Corporation had operated the Fore River Shipyard (including during World War I) before 1939. IV - 46 BahlbUe: Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 10-64. 4104. Between Januaty 1939 and January 1947, the Fore River Shipyard delivered 128 vessels. Exhibit: Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 10-28. 4105. Of these 128 vessels, the Fore River Shipyard built 104 ships for the United States Navy: 6 aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 12 destroyers, 12 destroyer escorts, 6 destroyer transports, 19 heavy cruisers, 8 light cruisers, and 46 landing ship tanks. These ships were delivered to the Navy in 1940, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945 and 1946. Exhibit: Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 10-28. 4106. Test claimant Joseph Teta worked mostly on aircraft carriers but might "very briefly" have worked on destroyers. During the time that Joseph Teta worked at the Fore River Shipyard, sixty-seven vessels were at one time or another under construction in the Fore River Shipyard. Only four of these sixty-seven ships were aircraft carriers and only six of the sixty-seven ships were destroyers. Joseph Teta did not work on any ships other than these vessels. IV - 47 Exhibit; . Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 11-14, 16-24. Witness: Joseph Teta. 4107. In his complaint against Manville and other asbestos product manufacturers, Phillip Houten stated that he worked at the Fore River Shipyard between May and September 1945. Between May and September 1945 seventeen ships were under construction in the shipyard: one aircraft carrier, eleven heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and four destroyers. Phillip Houten did not work on any ships other than these vessels while at the Fore River Shipyard. SsIubitBi Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 14-15, 17-18 and 23; Complaint, Phillip Houten v. Johns-Manyilie CfliBfl.catloru e.t al. 4108. Sixteen of the 128 ships built at the Fore River Shipyard between 1939 and 1947 were built for private companies without any United States involvement in their construction. The Fore River Shipyard delivered three passenger and cargo ships to the Panama Railroad Company in 1939. In 1941, the Fore River Shipyard delivered three tankers to the Petroleum Shipping Company and delivered four trawlers to R. O'Brien and Company. In 1941 and 1942, the IV - 48 Fore River Shipyard delivered six tankers to the Sinclair Refining Company. Bxhibit: Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 24-28. 4109. Bight of the 128 ships built at the Fore River Shipyard between 1939 and 1947 were C-3B cargo ships built for the American Bxport Company. The Fore River Shipyard delivered two of these C-3E cargo ships in 1939 and five of the C-3E cargo ships in 1940. The Fore River Shipyard delivered the final American Export Company C-3E cargo ship on January 23, 1942. Each of these American Export Company C-3E cargo ships was built under a three- party contract involving the American Export Company, the Bethlehem Steel Shipbuilding Company and the Maritime Commission. Exhibits: Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 25-27; United States Maritime Commission Completed Conuactg* at 2 and 4. 4110. Since Joseph Teta did not begin working at the Foe* River Shipyard until March 1942 and since the Fore River Shipyard delivered the last American Bxport Company C3-E cargo ship on January 23, 1942, Mr. Teta did not work on any private ship built pursuant to a contract involving the United States Maritime Commission. 17 - 49 Navy Insurance Division 2033-36,2050, 2051,2057,2059 Charles Stockton will testify regarding Navy contracting during World War II............................. ffrnanl-P-..-g.t,g,r.U*Si Will testify about the government's industrial hygiene program and about working conditions in the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and the Boston Naval Shipyard...................................................... 2033,2057,2068 3248,3296 Simon Strauss will testify regarding the sale of raw asbestos by the Metals Reserve Company........................................................................ .............. 281,282,290,291, 294-97,301-04, 306,308,310-12 Irvino Tabershaw will testify regarding industrial hygiene at the Bethlehem Steel (Fore River) Shipyard........................... JflUPh Tftft*. Jr. will testify about working conditions at the Bethlehem Steel (Fore River) Shipyard and the Boston Naval Shipyard, his asbestos-related disease and his claims against Johns-Manvilie....................................... 3108,3238,4121, 4123,4125-31, 4155 3104,4106,4110, 4112,4113,4142, 4151,4363,4364 Mortimer R. Thompson will testify regarding Navy contracts............................. ................................................ 2068 Burton Tower will testify about the design and construction of cargo vessels by the Maritime Commission and-the development, specification and testing of asbestoscont*inin$ materials by the Navy and Maritime Comodyieioit...................................................................................... 125,146 Russell Townsend will testify regarding the Navy Insurance Division............... ..................... ................... 2033-36,2050, 2051,2057,2059, 4184 Barbara Vauchan will testify regarding the Espionage Act.............................................................................. 3226-28,3230 Frederick J. Vilas will testify regarding the Navy's World War II Industrial Hygiene program including the program at Boston Naval Shipyard.................................................... .............. 3248,3253*3347, 3349,4027,4030, 4032,4118,4131, 4135,4450 John Vogel will testify regarding the Navy Insurance Division....................................................... 2033-36,2050, 2051,2057,2059 Richard B. Von Wald will testify about the California insurance litigation and Manville's filings and statements in bankruptcy..................... 2*7,11-29,31-35 37,43-46,4859*4456 Thomas J. Walsh 1/ will testify regarding the working conditions at the Bethlehem Steel (Fore River) Shipyard and his claims against Manville.............................................. ...................... 4112,4134 Dr. Hans Weill will testify as an expert witness regarding the medical aspects of asbestos exposure................................................................ 3338-41,3344, 3345,3347-49, 3351-53 Donald Winoerter will testify to the development of Manville's asbestoscontaining thermal insulation products............... 2349 David Minton will testify to the insurance coverage held by Manville during the 1930's and 1940's................................ ....................................... 39,46,47 Sidney Wolf will testify as an expert regarding Manville profits* pricing* reserves and financial conditions................................................................ 190,197,198,201 06,208-12,225, 238*246,248,249 251,258 J.P. Woodard will testify regarding Manville knowledge of the hazard of asbestos* working conditions and job evaluations................................ 3084-87 Chttrltt.ffQQdmif Will testify regarding Navy and government contracting..................... 2068 JOHNS-MANVILLE CORPORATION and JOHNS-MANVILLE SALES CORPORATION, Plaintiffs, V. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) _____ 1 Civil No 465-83C PRETRIAL STATBMBNT OP THE UN]*43* STATBS VOLUMB V J. CHARLES KRUSE Special Litigation Counsel ALBERT COHEN ROGER K. DAVIS ANTHONY C. ROTH JANET P. KATZ NANCY B. COLLINS SCOTT D. AUSTIN S. MICHAEL SCADRON JANE MAHONEY DAVID S. FISHBACK Trial Attorneys Torts Branch Civil Division March 10, 1987 RICHARD K. HILLARD Assistant Attorney General Civil Division J. PATRICK GLYNN Director Torts Branch HAROLD J. ENGEL Deputy Director Torts Branch H. MICHAEL SEMLER Supervisory Trial Attorney Torts Branch, Civil Division U.S. Department of Justice Ben Franklin Station P. 0. Box 340 Washington, D.C. 20044 Telephones (202) 724-6749 Attorneys for the United States GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 1-1 II. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES............................................................................ 1-2 III. ESTIMATE OP TRIAL TIME........................................!....................1-8 IV. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT........................................................... 1-9 . II-l III-l IV-1 V. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONSOF LAW......................................................IV-140 VI. LIST OF TRIAL WITNESSES.............................................................IV-152 VII. LIST OF EXHIBITS..................................... ........... ............................. V-l VIII. CONCLUSION......................................................................................... V-103 DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................1-1 II. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES ................................................................................... 1-2 III. ESTIMATE OF TRIAL TIME ..........................................................................1-8 IV. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT............................ ...................................... 1-9 A. MANVILLB'S BXTENSIVE INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ASBESTOS-RBLATED PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS WILL PRODUCE MORE THAN THREE-QUARTERS OF A BILLION DOLLARS IN INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT ............................................. 1-9 (1) Manville Has Been Sheltered From AsbestosRelated Personal Injury Claims For More Than Four Years While It Negotiated With Its Insurers ............................................................................ ....1-14 (2) Manville Will Emerge From The Bankruptcy Proceeding Free Of All Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Litigation .................................................... 1-17 (3) Manville Has Already Received Substantial Reimbursement From Its Insurers For Payments Made To Asbestos Victims .......................................................... 1-20 (4) Manville's Insurers Will Pay Out More Than Three-Quarters Of A Billion Dollars In Connection With Manville's Liability To Asbestos Victims, Including The Test Claimants ............................................................... 1-25 (a) Manville's California Insurance Litigation ..................................................... 1-25 (b) Manville's InsuranceSettlements ...............................1-36 B. THROUGHOUT WORLD WAR II MANVILLEAGGRESSIVELY SOLICITED SALES TO THE UNITED STATES AND REAPED HUGE PROFITS FROM THESE SALES AND BUILT UP TREMENDOUS RESBRVES FOR "WAR CONTINGENCIES" .................................... 1-48 (1) At The Outset Of WWII Manville Had Been Manufacturing Asbestos-Containing Products For Seventy Years and Was The Giant Of The Industry ....................................................................................... 1-48 - i- (2) Manville's Wartime Business Was Substantially The Same As Its Pre-War Peacetime Business And Manville Continued To Aggressively Market Its Asbestos-Containing Products .................................1-55 (a) Wartime Economic Controls Did Not Preclude, But Rather Encouraged, Voluntary Formation Of Defense Contracts Through Negotiation And Competitive Bidding ................................................ 1-55 (b) Manville's Manner Of Doing Business And Aggressive Sales Policy Did Not Change As A Result Of The Wartime Regulations ............ 1-74 (i) Manville Provided Its Salesmen With Financial Incentives To Sell As Much As They Could.................................. 1-77 (ii) During World War II Manville Continued Its Promotion Program Through Advertisements And Sales Brochures .......... ............................... .1-96 (iii) During World War II, Manville Carefully Identified Its Competitors And Their Prices In Order To Be Able To Pr*ce Its Products And Win Competitively Bid Contracts ................................................................ ..1-103 (iv) Manville Vigorously Attempted To Obtain Both The Contracts Offered By The United States And The Priority Orders Necessary To Fulfill These Contracts ..................................... ...................1-104 (v) World War II Provided Manville Substantial Opportunities To Expand Its Markets ................................................. 1-103 ii (3) Manvilie's Wartime Prices Were Not Based On Any Navy Policy Of Self-Insurance Or Assumption. Of Risk................................................................................................... 1-113 (a) Manville's Wartime Prices Depended Largely On The Prices Of Manville's Competitors And The Size Of The Customer .....................................................................................1-114 (b) Manville's Wartime Prices Were Also Based On Manville's Evaluation Of "Any Hazard Involved In The Sale Of The Product Due To Factors Not Fully Known" ..................... 1-119 (c) Manville's Prices During World War II Were Equal To Or Greater Than Its Pre War Prices For AlmostEvery Product ........................ 1-121 (d) Manville Charged The United States Higher Prices Than It Charged Certain OtherCustomers ..................................................... 1-124 (4) Manville Made Record Profits During World War II, which Enabled It To Create Massive Reserves For "War Contingencies" And Post-War Expansion ................................................................................................. 1-131 (a) Manville Made Record Sales And Profits During World WarII .......................................... 1-131 (b) From Its World War II Profits, Manville Created "Contingent War Reserves" To Cover Future Liabilities ..................... 1-153 (c) Manville Also Used Its High Wartime Profits To Expand Its Plants, Retire Its Preferred Stock And Create Reserve Funds For Later Expansion .......................... 1-166 (d) Manville Utilized Its World War II Profits To Expand Its Business And To Dominate The Post-War Insulation Market ................... 1-180 iii C. THE METALS RESERVB COMPANY'S PURCHASE, IMPORTATION, AND SALE OP AFRICAN ASBESTOS TO MANVILLB BEGINNING IN MID-1943 ENSURED MANVILLB ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OP FIBER AT REASONABLE PRICES .................................................................. 1-193 Volume II D. MANVILLB'S WWII CONTRACTS WITH THE NAVY AND THE MARITIMB COMMISSION PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR RECOVERY IN THIS LITIGATION.......................................... II-l (1) During WWII There Were No Navy Policies, No Discussions Between The Parties, And No Shared Understandings Which Could Reasonably Have Lead Manville To Believe That Its AsbestosRelated Losses Were Considered Costs Of Performance Which Would Be Borne By The United States.................................................................. .......................... II-l (a) Manville's Wartime Contracts Were Competitively-rBid FixedPrice Contracts....................................... II-l (i) During WWII Supplies Were Routinely Purchased By Informal Competitive . Bidding............ .. ..................................................II-2 (ii) Throughout WWII The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Routinely Purchased Supplies Using .Fixed-Priced Contracts........................... II-9 (iii) All of Manville's WWII Sales Of Asbestos-Containing Products Were Pursuant To FixedPrice Contracts............................................. 11-14 (b) Manville'8 WWII Contracts Contained No Express Term Indicating That The United States Would Treat Third-Party Tort Liability Losses As Reimbursable Costs Of Performance............................... .................................... 11-23 iv (c) During WWII The Navy Had No Policy Of "Self-Insurance" or "Assumption Of Risk" Which Applied To Third-Party Personal Injury Liability Under Fixed-Price Supply Contracts.............................11-26 (i) Risk Of Loss Of Or Damage To Government-Owned Property .............. 11-34 (ii) Casualty Insurance ..................................... 11-42 (2) There Was No Privity Of Contract Between Manville And The Maritime Commission During WWII With Regard To Most Asbestos-Containing Products And No Shared Understanding That Manville's Third-Party Tort Liability Would Be Borne By The Maritime Commission.... 11-67 (a) All Asbestos-Containing Insulation Materials were Procured Directly - By The Private Yards, Not By The The Maritime Commission .........................................11-63 (b) The Maritime CommissionContracts Specifically Provided That The Shipyards Were Not Agents Of The . United States ....*.....................................................11-70 (c) The Contracts Used By The Maritime Commission During WWII Required . That Contractors And Subcontractors Hold The Government Harmless From Liability For Injuries To Third Persons .......................................... .................................. 11-71 (3) Many Of The Contracts Relied On By Manville Do Not Relate To A Test Shipyard, Do Not Deal With A Product At Issue In This Litigation, Or Were Entered Prior To The Date On Which Manville Alleges That The Navy Adopted The Relevant Policy of Self-Insurance ............................................................... 11-75 (a) Several Of The Contracts Identified By Manville Do Not Involve The Test Shipyards .............................................................11-75 (b) Several Of The Controls Identified By Manville Do Not Involve A Product At Issue In This Litigation ...................................................................... 11-77 -v- (c) Manville Could Not Be Entitled To Recovery Under Several Of The Identified Contracts Because They Were Formed Before The Date On which Manville Alleges That The United States Adopted Its Self Insurance Policy .................................................... 11-80 (d) There Is No Evidence Connecting Many Of The Contracts Relied On By Manville To Test Shipyards, The Test Claimants Or The Products At Issue Here ...................... 11-82 (e) Manville Has Not Identified Any Relevant WW II Contracts Relating To Electric Cable Filler, Marine Tape Akoustikos Felt Or Ebony Asbestos .......... 11-84 E. NEITHER MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR SHIP SPECIFICATIONS PROVIDE ANY BASIS FOR MANVILLE'S CLAIMS AGAINST THB UNITED STATES......................................... 11-85 1. The Asbestos Industry In General And Manville In Particular Played Dominant . Roles In Shaping The Government's Specifications, which Were Written To Permit Procurement Of The Industry's Existing Products.......... ............................................................11-85 (a) Types And Purposes Of Procurement Specifications................................ ....... ..................................11-85 (b) The General Specifications Process Prior To And During World War II................. 11-87 (c) The Manville Products Alleged To Have Injured The Test Claimants And The Corresponding NavySpecifications............................... 11-97 (i) Magnesia Pipe Covering, Block And Cement............................................................. .....11-97 (ii) Superex Pipe Covering And Block...................11-115 (iii) Superex Cement and No. 450 Cement..............11-131 (iv) Asbestos Cloth .......................................................... 11-138 (v) Firefelt ......................................................................... 11-144 - vi (vi). Amosite AsbestosFelt ........................................... 11-143 (vii) Akoustikos Felt ............................... 11-153 (viii) Asbestos Millboard ......................................... ...11-158 (ix) Other Products ..........................................................11-164 (2) Nothing In The Government's Specifications Or Standards Prohibited Manville From Placing A Warning Label On Its Products Or Packaging............... 11-167 (3) Marinite And Marine Sheathing, The Only Manville Asbestos-Containing Products Sold Directly To The Maritime Commission During WWII, Were Developed Solely By Manville In Order To Capture Large Segments Of The Maritime and Non-Maritime Markets........................ ....................... .................................................. 11-169 (a) In The Early 1930's Manville Was Attempting To Develop A Lightweight Marine Construction Material..................................... 11-169 (b) Following The Morro Castle Disaster Manville Redoubled Its Efforts To Create A Lightweight Marine Construction Material ..................................... ...11-172 (c) Even Before It Produced Marine Sheathing, Manville Was Marketing This Product TO The Shipbuilding Industry ................................................... 11-176 (d) After It Had Developed Marine Sheathing, Manville Provided Samples To Outside Entities For Testing ........................................................11-132 (e) Manville Developed Marinite In Its Own Research Facilities ............ 11-186 (f) Manville Aggressively Marketed Marinite To Private Shipyards And Other Private Customers .................................................................................. 11-188 (4) The General Ship Specifications Relied On By Manville Do Not Establish That Asbestos Was Required Or Actually Used On The Ships At Issue In This Litigation ....................................... 11-199 (a) Navy Ship Design And Ship vii Specifications ......................................................................11-199 (b) Maritime Commission Ship Design And ' Ship Specifications ..........................................................11-205 Volume III F. MANVILLE KNEW THAT SHIPYARD WORKERS WERE ENDANGERED BY EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS DUST AND CONCEALED AND SUPPRESSED INFORMATION THAT COULD HAVE LED TO AMELIORATION OF THE HAZARD ....................................................................III-l (1) Manville, In Concert With The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Studied The Hazards of Asbestos Because Of Litigative Considerations, and Concealed The Extent of The Hazard ....................................................................................... III-l (2) Manville Extended Its Concealment Activities To Include A Conspiracy With RaybestosManhattan .............................................................................................. III-25 (3) Manville Recruits Other Industry Members To Join In Sponsorship of Research By The Saranac Lake Laboratory, But Acts To Suppress Results OfThat Research ....................................HI-43 (4) Manville Knew That Shipyards Were At Risk From Asbestos ........................................................................... ...III-60 (5) Manville Knew That Shipyard Workers During World War II Were Being Endangered By Their Exposure To Asbestos ........................................................ III-68 (6) Manville Sales And Support Personnel Had Access To And Entered Navy And Private Shipyards During World War II................. ............................III-76 (a) Fore River Shipyard .......................................................... III-76 (b) Consolidated Shipyard..................................................... III-83 (c) Philadelphia Naval Shipyard...................................... III-85 (d) Boston Naval Shipyard ..................................................... III-86 (e) Other Private and PublicShipyards ........................ III-87 (7) Manville Knew What Shipyard Working Conditions - viii - Were Like Because Its Contract And Technical Service Units Were Performing Insulation Work In Shipyards During World War II .........................III-90 (a) Manville's Presence In Wartime Shipyards As Insulation Installer ....................... III-90 (b) Manville's Presence As Installer Of Insulation At Consolidated Shipyard ..................III-99 (c) Specific Evidence of Manville Knowledge Gained Through Contract and Technical Service Units ...................................................................... III-1Q1 (8) Manville Callously Disregarded Informing Workers About The Hazards of Asbestos: Specific Cases ............................................................................... III-1G5 (a) The DeForest Incident ........................... '.................... III-105 (b) The Roemer Incident ...................................................... III-110 (9) Manville Continued To Conceal Its Knowledge Of The Dangers Of Asbestos Throughout The . Mid-War And Immediate Post-WarPeriods .........................Ill-Ill (a) Manville Cancer Cover-Up ........................................... III-lll (b) The Hemeon Report ................. III-123 (c) Further Manville Knowledge , and Cover-Up Of Low Dose Risk..............................III-131 (d) Manville Did Not Know Of The Fleisher-Drinker Report ..............................................III-143 (10) Manville's Decision Not To Warn ...................................... HI-145 (11) Courts Reviewing Manville's Conduct Have Repeatedly Found Punitive Damages Appropriate ................................................... III-149 (12) The Espionage Act Did Not "Classify" Information Or Documents And Did Not Prohibit Disclosure Of Information To Manville ....................................... .111-164 - ix - G. THE NAVY AND MARITIME COMMISSION RESPONDED TO THE INCREDIBLE GROWTH IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SHIPYARD WORKING POPULATIONS DURING WORLD WAR II WITH AN UNPRECEDENTED SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM TO PROTECT SHIPYARD WORKERS ..................................................................111-17 5 (1) Shipyard Safety And Health Programs At The Local Level ............................................ ...... ................ 111-17 7 (2) The Navy And Maritime Commission Provided Necessary Consultation To Private Shipyard Management On Health And Safety Matters ............................................ ................................. III-183 (3) The Navy And Maritime Commission Worked With The United States Public Health Service To Improve Health and Safety At Private Shipyards ............................................................... III-199 (4) The Navy and Maritime Commission Adopted A Cautionary Approach To Worker Exposure To Asbestos Despite Their Limited Knowledge Of The Hazards Of Asbestos And The Absence Of Bvidence That Shipyard Workers Were Developing Asbestosis..................................... .......................... II1-205 (a) Before The MinimumRequirements ............................ III-206 (b) Asbestos Under The Minimum Requirements ................... III-219 (c) The Fleischer-Drinker Study .................................. .111-241 (5) It Was Unclear In The World War II Time Frame whether The Dreessen Suggested Permissible Exposure Standard For Asbestos Was 5 Million Particles Per Cubic Foot Of Total Dust Or Asbestos Dust Or Whether The Suggested Standard Was At All Applicable To Shipyard Asbestos Exposures ..................................................................... 111-249 -x Volume IV H. THE UNPRECEDENTED NAVY AND MARITIME COMMISSION HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAM TO PROTECT SHIPYARD WORKERS WAS IMPLEMENTED AT THE TEST SHIPYARDS DESPITE THEIR DRAMATIC EXPANSION AND DESPITE THE NATIONAL IMPERATIVE TO RAPIDLY PRODUCE SHIPS ............................................................................IV-1 (1) Though The Number Of Persons Employed At The Boston And Philadelphia Navy Yards Quadrupled In Order To Satisfy The National Defense Need For Ships, The United States Navy Acted Reasonably To Protect Workers From Known Hazards ........................... IV-1 (a) The Boston Navy Yard........................................................ IV-1 (i) The Boston Navy Yard Expanded Rapidly During World War II ........................... IV-1 (ii) Between 1941 And 1945, The Boston Navy Yard Built 141 New Ships, Overhauled 3,260 Ships and Docked 1,820 Ships ............... ........IV-4 (iii) The Boston Navy Yard Responded With A State-Of-The-Art Industrial Hygiene Program ..............................IV-8 (iv) Manville Had Access Or Could Have Obtained Access To The Boston Navy Yard.....................................IV-15 (b) The Philadelphia Navy Yard .......................................... IV-17 (i) The Philadelphia Navy Yard Expanded Rapidly During World War II ..................................... ...........................IV-17 (ii) The Philadelphia Navy Yard Built More Than 45 Navy .. Vessels Between 1940 and 1945 ........................IV-19 (iii) The Philadelphia Yard Had A State-Of-The-Art Industrial Hygiene Program ...................... Vi-19 (iv) Manville Had Access Or Could Have Obtained Access To The Philadelphia Navy Yard ..........................................IV-26 xi - (2) Like Navy Yards, While The Number Of Persons Working In Private Shipyards During World War II Increased . Dramatically, The Private Shipyards Acted Reasonably To Protect The Shipyard Workers From Known Hazards ................................ IV-27 (a) The United States Did Not Take Control Of Private Shipyards During World War II ...................... ....................................IV-21 (b) The Fore River Shipyard ................................................. IV-33 (i) Even Before World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Was A Prominent Private Shipyard................................................ IV-33 (ii) During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Expanded Dramatically ............................. IV-35 (iii) During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Built A Total Of 128 Vessels .........................................IV-46 (iv) During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Invest igated The Then Known Risks Of Exposure To Asbestos And Took Steps To Assure That There Was No Asbestos Disease At The Fore River Shipyard..............................IV-52 (v) During World War II, Many People Including Manvilie's Salesmen Had Access To The Fore River Shipyard ................................................ IV-69 (c) The Consolidated Shipyard ............................................. IV-79 (i) The Consolidated Shipyard Built Only Navy Ships ........................................... IV-79 (ii) A Manville Contract Unit Performed The Pipecovering Work At Consolidated Shipyard.......................... IV-81 (iii) Consolidated Shipyard And A & M Took Reasonable Steps To Protect Workers From Hazards .....................IV-83 - xii - (iv) Manville Had Access To The Consolidated Shipyard During WorldWar II ....................................................................IV-86 MANVILLE'S SETTLEMENTS WITH THE TEST CLAIMANTS .............................................................................................................................................. IV-88 (1) Manville's Settlements With Boston Navy Yard Test Claimants ......................................................... IV-88 (a) Chester Anderson .................................................................IV-83 (b) Thomas Drinan ..........................................................................IV-90 (c) Rubin Shulman........................... .............. ...............................IV-93 (d) Ewald Legee .............................................................................. IV-95 (e) John Roche............ ................................................................... IV-99 (f) William Ogle ....................................................... IV-101 (g) John Herlihy........................................................................... IV-104 (2) Manville Settlements With Philadelphia Navy Yard Test Claimants............................................................IV-106 (a) Walter J. Archey ................................ IV-106 (b) Julius Rothman .......................... IV-111 (c) Victor C. Impriano .............................................................IV-115 (3) Manville's Settlements With Pore River Shipyard Test Claimants ............................................................ IV-120 (a) Joseph Teta ..............................................................................IV-120 (b) Phillip Houten ...................................................................... IV-123 (4) Manville's Settlements With Consolidated Shipyard Test Claimants ......................................................... .IV-125 (a) James Clancy........................................................................... IV-125 (b) W.D. Smith .................................. IV-128 (c) Willis King ..............................................................................IV-131 - xiii - J. PRESENT KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASES .................................................................................................... IV-133 R. DAMAGES ......................... IV-139 V. PROPOSEDCONCLUSIONS OF LAW........................... .................................... IV-140 VI. - TRIAL WITNESSES FOR THE UNITED STATES.......... .........................IV-152 VII. LIST OF EXHIBITS .......................... V-l VIII. CONCLUSION............................................................................................... . .V-l03 - xiv - vil,___LIST OF EXHIBITS Letter from G. Erhard, H.W. Johns Manufacturing Co. to P. Hichborn, Dept.of Construction and Repair, U.S.. Navy (April 6, 1898) Letter from G. Erhard, H.W. Johns Manufacturing Co. to P. Hichborn, Dept, of Construction and Repair, U.S. Navy (April 13, 1898) Navy Specification 32-M-l, Asbestos Millboard (May 31, 1910) Navy Specification for Magnesia Insulating Covering or lagging material, 32-L-l (July 15, 1910) Memorandum from Navy Yard (Cleborne) Norfolk, Va to Commandant (October 5, 1910) Letter from L. Hooge, The Philip Carey Co. to T. Pyne, U.S.N. Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (May 19, 1911) Letter from Bhret Magnesia Mfg. Co. to Navy Department Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (June 9, 1911) Memorandum from Chief of Navy Department, Bureau of Steam Engineering to Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (July 25, 1911) V- 1 Navy Specification 32-F--1, Asbestos Felting (December 5, 1912) Question and Answers Book, Milwaukee Salesmen Convention (1912) Letter from Bureau of Steam Engineering to Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (March 7, 1913) Navy Specification 32-M-la (July 25, 1913) Navy Specification 32-L-la Magnesia Insulating Covering or Lagging Material (September 2, 1913) Letter from President and General Manager of Keasbey & Mattison Co. to Capt. Kaemmerlying Bureau of Steam Engineering, Navy Report (October 8, 1913) Letter from Vice President of Ehret Magnesia Manufacturing Company to Capt. Kaemmerling, U.S.N. Bureau of Steam Engineering (October 29, 1913) Navy Specification 32-L-lb, Magnesia Insulating Covering or Logging Material (March 2, 1914) Catalog of J-M Insulation (1916) Letter from H.W. Johns-Manville Co. to Bureau of Construction and Repair (June 1, 1917) V- 2 Report from E.E.Williams to Inspector of Engineering Material (October 24, 1917) Letter from M.T. Mattison, Keasbey & Mattison Co. to Captain Bartlett (November 9, 1917) Report from E.E. Williams to Inspector of Engineering Material with attached Proposed Specification of Philip Carey Co. for asbestos millboard (November 10, 1917) The Magnesia Association of America, "85% Magnesia" and Heat-Insulation (1917) Catalog of Johns-Manville Insulation Materials, "More Horsepower from America's Coal Pile" (1917) . Letter from H.W. Johns-Manville to the Hill Division of the Emergency Fleet Corporation (May 14, 1918) Letter from R. Mattison, Keasbey & Mattison Co. to Capt. Bartlett, U.S.N. (May 17, 1918) Memorandum from F. Bartlett, Inspector of Engineering Material, U.S.N. to Bureau of Steam Engineering (May 20, 1918) Memorandum from Chief, Bureau of Steam Engineering to Inspector of Engineering Material (May 22, 1918) V3 Letter from J.E. Meek, H.W. Johns-Manville Co. to Lt. Cmdr. H. G. Knox, Construction Corp., Portsmouth, Va. (December 19, 1918) Navy Specification 32-L-lc, Magnesia Covering or Lagging Material (1918) Insulating Letter from J.E. Meek, H.W. Johns-Manville Co. to Lt. Cmdr. H.G. Knox, Construction Corps. (February 19, 1919) Letter from Taylor, Bureau of Construction and Repair to Commandants and Industrial Managers, et al. (March 10, 1919) Memorandum from J.E. Manville Co. to G.K. (May 24, 1919) Meek, H.W. Bradfield Johns- Letter'from R.G. Denig to Bureau of Steam Engineering (June 13, 1919) Memorandum from Inspector of Engineering material to Bureau of Steam Engineering (June 17, 1919) Letter from C.W. Farly to J. Meek, JohnsManville (June 19, 1919) Letter from C.J. Stover to Capt. F.W. Bartlett (July 1, 1919) Letter from F.W. Bartlett to Bureau of Steam Engineering (July 2, 1919) V4 Letter from Eugene Dowling to R.G. Denig (July 14, 1919) Memorandum from Head of Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Bureau of Steam Engineering (October 9, 1919) Two-minute Talks on "85% magnesia", Asbestos Magazine (September 1919) Asbestos Magazine (October 1919) Asbestos Magazine (November 1919) Asbestos Magazine (December 1919) Millboard Product Information Catalogue (February 15, 1920) "Pipe and Boiler Covering Up to Date" Asbestos Magazine (June 1920) Letter from C.J. Stover to H.T. Winston (August 5, 1920) Letter from H.T. Winston to Bureau of Engineering (August 6, 1920) "U.S. Navy Department to Test Compressed Sheet Packing" (September 1921) V- 5 Navy Specification 32-L-ld magnesia insulating covering or lagging material (January 3, 1922) Navy Specification 32-M-lc (April 1, 1922) Navy Specification 32-M-lb (May 1, 1922) Memorandum from Edwin Denby, Secretary of the Navy to Capt. Bennett, U.S. Navy (May 18, 1922) Letter from Celite Products Co. to Navy Department, Bureau of Supplies & Accounts (June 5, 1923) Johns-Manville Bulletin No. 64996 (Juno 10, 1923) Letter from Celite Products Co. to Navy Department Bureau of Engineering (February 8, 1924) Letter from Engineering Experiment Station to Norristown Magnesia and Asbestos Co. (February 12, 1924) Letter from Johns-Manville to Navy Department to Bureau of Engineering (March 8, 1924) Johns-Manville Bulletin No. 6589 (March 20, 1924) V-6 Letter from Philip Carey Co to Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering (May 16,1924) Letter from Bureau of Engineering to Officer-in-Charge, Naval Engineering Experiment Station (May 27, 1924) Letter from Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering to Plant Rubber & Asbestos Works (June 21, 1924) Letter from Mr. Bradfield, Johns-Manville, Inc. to Bureau of Engineering (August 9, 1924) Letter from Keasbey & Mattiaon Co. to Navy Dept., Bureau of Engineering (November 5, 1924) Letter from Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering to Keasbey & Mattison Co. (November 13, 1924) Letter from Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering to Keasbey & Mattison Co. (November 20, 1924) Letter from Plant Rubber & Asbestos Works to Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering (December 29, 1924) Letter from Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering to Plant Rubber and Asbestos Works (January 10, 1925) Johns-Manville Bulletin No. 6669 (February 7, 1925) V-7 Navy Specification 32-M-2 (March 2, 1925) Memorandum from Officer-in-Charge, Experiment Engineering Station to Bureau of Engineering (December 3, 1925) Johns-Manville Engineering Report No. 21-910 (1925) Johns-Manville Engineering Report No. 892 (1925) Navy Specification 32-M-ld (February 1, 1926) Letter from Bureau of Engineering to Celite Products Co. (July 22, 1926) Letter from Bureau of Engineering to Armstrong Cork & Insulating Co., Johns-Manville Co., Inc. and Keasbey & Mattison Co. (July 22, 1926) . Letter from Keasbey & Mattison Co. Department, Bureau of Engineering (August 3, 1926) to Navy Letter from Johns-Manville to Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering (August 6, 1926) Letter from Armstrong Cork & Insulation Company to Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering (August 6, 1926) V-8 Letter from Armstrong Cork & Insulation Co. to Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering (August 12, 1926) Johns-Manville Bulletin No. 6885 (September 9, 1926) Letter from Celite Products Co. to Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering . (November 24, 1926) Navy Department Specification 32-P-3, Pipe-covering, Diatomaceous Earth, Molded (February 1, 1927) Navy Specifications, Insulation, High Temperature (Pipe covering, Blocks, and Cement) 32-P-3a (February 1, 1927) "The Asbestos Industry in 1876," Asbestos Magazine (March 1927) Navy Specification 32-M-lc (April 1, 1922) Letter from G.A. Nicol, Jr. Johns-Manville Corp. to Bureau of Engineering (April 7, 1928) Letter from G.A. Nicol, Jr. Johns-Manville Corporation to Bureau of Engineering (May 11, 1928) Memorandum from O.L. Cox, Bureau of Engineering to Officer in-Charge, Engineering Experiment Station (May 17, 1928) V-9 Engineering Experiment station Report No. 3390 (July 18, 1928) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1928) Navy Specification 32-M-2a (January 2, 1929) Pierskowski v. Johns-Manville Corn.. (D.N.J.) (Complaint of May 8, 1929 and Amended Answer) Memorandum from H.C. Dinger, Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Bureau of Engineering (May 29, 1929) Letter from Sales Manager of Ehret Magnesia Manufacturing Co. to Department of Navy (June 18, 1929) ' Memorandum from H.C. Dinger, Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Bureau of Engineering (June 28, 1929) Asbestos Magazine (November 1929) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1929) Excerpts from Various Medical Journals on Pulmonary Asbestosis by Market Analysis Section of Manville's Sales Promotion Dept. (March 21, 1930) V - 10 Lists of J-M Approved Insulation Contractors (March 1930, Jan. 1930, and March 1931) E.R.A. Merewether, "The Occurrence of Pulmonary Fibrosis and Other Pulmonary Affects in Asbestos Workers", Journal of Industrial Hygiene (May and June 1930) "Magnesia Association of America offers both a service and a commodity," Asbestos Magazine (June 1930) List of Johns-Manville Approved Insulation Contractors (June 1930) "Pulmonary Asbestosis," Monthly Labor Review (July 1930) Letter from A. Lanza to A. Wardwell (with enclosure) (November 11, 1930) The Organization and Procedure of Technical Committees in the Revision or Preparation of Federal Specifications (December 15, 1930) Merewether, E.R.A. and Price, C.W., "Occurrenceof Pulmonary Fibrosis and Other Pulmonary Affections In Asbestos Workers." Report On the Effects of Asbestos Dust On the Lunas and Dust Suppression in the Asbestos Industry (London 1930) Sweet's Catalogue (1930) V - 11 Anthony J. Lanza and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Report of a Dust Study of the Manville Plant of theJohns-Manville Company (1930) Prank Pedley, Report of the Physical Examination and X-rav Examinations of Asbestos Workers in Asbestos and Thetford Mines. Quebec (1930) Frank Pedley, "Asbestosis" from Industrial HYgi&ne (1930) Frank Pedley, "Asbestosis" from 22 Canadian Medical Association Journal No. 2 (1930) E.R.A. Merewether. and C.W. Price, Report on Effects of Asbestos Dust on the Lunas and Dust Suppression in the Asbestos Industry (1930) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1930) Johns-Manville Product Data Sheet, Asbestos Cloth Uses and Asbestos Clothing (January 1931) Cover Letter with Enclosed Report, from Lanza to Wardwell (March 20, 1931) Letter from Vice President, Philip Carey Co. to Federal Specifications Board (May 8, 1931) Superex Pipe Insulation - Sweet's Catalogue (June 1931) V - 12 Johns-Manville Product Data Sheet, J-M Asbestos Pipe Blanketa (June 1933) Cover Letter with Enclosed Report, from W. McConnell to A. Wardwell (July 9, 1931) Clifford Sager, Minutes of Meeting (July 15, 1931) Moody'8 Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1931) J-M Board of Directors Minutes (August 29, 1932) Letter from W.B. Kelly to S. Williams (December 30, 1932) J-M Selected Data Sheets giving commodity and application information (December 1932) Sweet's Catalogue (1932) Letter from Bureau of Engineering to JohnsManville Corp. (1932) "Physical Examinations at Manville Factory, Manville, New Jersey" (1932) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1932) V - 13 Memorandum from S. Williams to J. P. Kottcamp (January 13, 1933) Memorandum from D. C. Renton to S. Williams (January 13, 1933) Letter from H.F.D. Davis, Bureau of Engineering to Carolina Asbestos Co. (February 2, 1933) Letter from H.F.D. Davis, Bureau of Engineering to Southern Asbestos Co. (February 25, 1933) Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of the Navy to Commandants, Naval Yards and Naval Stations, si al (March 21, 1933) Memorandum from S'. Williams to J. P. Kottcamp (March 31, 1933) Manville Board of Directors Minutes (April 24, 1933) Navy Specification 32-C-ll, Cloth, Asbestos (May 1, 1933) Letters from Greenstone to G. Hobart and Minard (June 26, 1933) "Questions Asked Dr. A. J. Lanza and His Answers Verbatim," forwarded by S. Williams to A. Fisher (August 29, 1933) V - 14 Letter from Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering to Johns-Manville, Inc. (August 31, 1933) Memorandum from Bureau of Engineering to Director, Engineering Experiment Station (September 1, 1933) Letter from Bureau of Enginerring to Ehret Magnesia Mfg. Co. (September 13, 1933) Letter from Bureau of Engineering to Johns-Manville, Inc. (November 3, 1933) Telegram from Voorhees of Manville to Aycock of Aycock Corp. (November 9, 1933) Letter from Manager, Manville Claims Division to Manville Claims Dept., Kansas City (November 9, 1933) Letters from Whitney of Johson & Higgins to Schmidt of Manville (November 9, 1933 and November 13, 1933) Memorandum from Director of U.S. Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Bureau of Engineering (November 16, 1933) Letter from Schmidt of Manville to Johnson & Higgins (November 19, 1933) Letter to Philip Carey Co. (November 29, 1933) V - 15 A. J. Lanza, "Comments on Asbestos" from Proceedings of the Meeting of the Home Life Underwriters Association (for private circulation only)(November 1933) Lanza Speech to Home Office Life Underwriters Association (November 1933) Memorandum from J. P. Kottcamp to S. Williams (December 22, 1933) Minutes of Meeting in W. R. Seigle's Office (December 29, 1933) Moody'8 Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1933) Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. F. Mudd, with Enclosed Minutes of January 4, 1934 Meeting (January 5, 1934) Letter from Keasbey & Mattison Co. to Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering (January 24, 1934.) Letter from Navy Department, to Johns Manville, Inc. (February 9, 1934) Letter from C.R. Schneider to M.F. Tydings (February 28,1934) Letter from Vandiver Brown to Williams (April 11, 1934) V - 16 Letter from J.B. Cox, Naval Engineering Experiment Station to J.J. Reynolds, JohnsManville (September 20, 1934) Letter from R. Wild, Union Asbestos and Rubber Co. to Bureau of Engineering (October 29, 1934) Memorandum from Bureau of Engineering to Director, Engineering Experiment Station (November 1, 1934) Letter from J.J. Broshek, Bureau of Engineering to Union Asbestos and Rubber Co. (November 19,1934) Naval Engineering Experiment Station Report No. 6608 (September 5, 1934) Memorandum from J.J. Broshek, Bureau of Engineering to Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (September 8, 1934) Letter from R. Wild, Union Asbestos and Rubber Co. to Bureau of Engineering (September 8, 1934) New York Times, September 9, 1934 Johns-Manvilie. Sales Bulletin (October 8, 1934) Letter from R. Wild, Union Asbestos and Rubber Co. to Bureau of Engineering (November 20, 1934) V - 17 Memorandum from Director to Bureau of Engineering (November 26, 1934) Letter from Bureau of Engineering to Johns-Manville, Inc. (December 6, 1934) Letter from Vandiver Brown to Anthony Lanza (December 10, 1934) Letter from George Hobart to Vandiver Brown (December 15, 1934) Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd (December 18, 1934) Letter from Vandiver Brown to Anthony J. Lanza (December 21, 1934) Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd (December 24, 1934) Manuals of J-M service to industry No. 102 (circa 1934) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industry Securities (1934) Letter from M. F. Judd to Vandiver Brown (January 2, 1935) V - 18 Memorandum from J. Broshek, Bureau of Engineering to Roderder, Navy Department Specification Board (February 23, 1935) Navy Specification, Insulation, High Temperature: Blocks, Cement and Pipe Covering, 32-P-3b (March 1, 1935) Letter from J.M. Weaver, General Asbestos and Rubber Division of Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. to F.M. McGeary, Bureau of Engineering (March 29, 1935) Letter from R. Wild, Union Asbestos and Rubber Co. to Bureau of Engineering (April 12, 1935) Letter from President Keasbey and Mattison Co. to Bureau of Engineering (April 25, 1935) Letter from H.H. Crowell, Keasbey and Mattison Co. to Cmdr. R.N.S. Baker, Bureau of Construction and Repair (April 29, 1935) Letter from J.A. Taylor, Wallace and Gale Co. to Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (June 18, 1935) Letter from M.A. Norcross, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to Wallace and Gale Co. (June 19, 1935) V - 19 Letter from R.W. Paine, Bureau of Engineering to Wallace and Gale Co. (July 1, 1935) Memorandum from 0. Cox, Director U.S. Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Bureau of Engineering (August 2, 1935) Letter from Vandiver Brown to J. B. Davies (August 21, 1935). Letter from S.A. Williams to A.S. Fisher enclosing "Questions Asked Dr. A.J. Lanza and His Answers Verbatim." (August 29, 1935) List of Liscensed Materials Forming Part of License Under United States Letter Patent No. 1,972,500 Between Donald Tulloch, Jr. and Johns-Manvilie Corporation (September 1, 1935) Letter from Rossiter to Simpson (September 25, 1935) Letter from Sumner Simpson to Vandiver Brown (October 1, 1935) Letter from Vandiver Brown to Sumner Simpson (October 3, 1935) Report No. 6191 U.S. Naval Engineering Experiment Station (October 9, 1935) V - 20 Letter from H.S. Jeans, U.S.N. Bureau of Engineering, to H.S. Fitzgibbon & Co. Inc (October 24, 1935) Letter from H.J. Jeans, Bureau of Engineering, to Keasbey and Mattison Co. (October 24, 1935) Letter from H.S. Jeans, Bureau of Engineering, to Union Asbestos & Rubber Company (October 24, 1935) Letter from H.S. Jeans, U.S.N. Bureau of Engineering, to Johns-Manville Inc. (October 24, 1935) Letter from H.S. Jeans, U.S.N., to Anchor Packing Co. (October 24, 1935) Letter from Vice President of Union Asbestos & Rubber Co. to Bureau of Engineering (October 26, 1935) Letter from Keasbey & Mattison Co. Staff Engineer to Navy Dept., Bureau of Engineering (October 29,,1935) Letter from H.S. Jeans, Bureau of Engineering to Director, Engineering Experiment Station (November 1, 1935) Letter from H.S. Jeans, U.S.N., Bureau of Engineering to Keasbey & Mattison Co. (November 1, 1935) V - 21 Joint Letter from W.G. Dubose and H.G. Bowen to Director, Engineering Experiment Station (November 1, 1935) Letter from O.L. Cox, Director, U.S. Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Bureau of Engineering (November 26, 1935) Letter from Staff Engineer of Keasbey & Mattison Co. to Navy Department Bureau of Engineering (December 10, 1935) Letter from H.S. Jeans to Keasbey & Mattison (December 16, 1935) Letter from Bureau of Engineering to Keasbey 6 Mattison Co. (December 19, 1935) Lanza, A.J., McConnell, W.J. and Pehnel, J.W., "The Effect of Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers," U.S. Public Health Report 50 (1935)j also published at Journal of Industrial Hvoiene 17 (1935) and Bulletin of Hygiene 10 (1935) Memorandum from Bureau of Engineering to Secretary of the Navy (1935) Sweet's Catalogue, Section 10/8 (1935) Sweets Catalogue, Section 5-8 (1935) Lanza, A.J., McConnell, W.J. and Fehnel, J.W., "The Effect of Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers," U.S. Public Health Report (1935) V - 22 Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign -Industrial Securities (1935) ELAC policy, with endorsements (January 1936) BLAC policy, with endorsements (February 18, 1936) Memorandum from O.L. Cox, Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Bureau of Engineering (February 24, 1936) Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. F. Mudd (March 11, 1936) Memorandum from O.L. Cox, Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Bureau of Engineering (March 31, 1936) Letter from Vandiver Brown .to M. F. Mudd (May 14, 1936) Navy Specification 32-C-ll (INT), Cloth, Asbestos (June 20, 1936) Memorandum from the Department of the Navy, Judge Advocate General to Bureau of Engineering (July 3, 1936) Memo from G.B. Brown (July 20, 1936) V - 23 Engineering Experiment Station Report (July 27, 1936) Navy Specification 32-T-l, Tape, Insulating, Thermal (October 1, 1936) Tentative Specification #108 (October 10, 1936) Letter from Sumner Simpson to Scluter (November 10, 1936) Contract between asbestos companies and Saranac Lake Laboratory (November 20, 1936) Letter from Vandiver Brown to Leroy Gardner (November 20, 1936) Letter from Gardner to Simpson (December 4, 1936) Letter from Vandiver Brown to C.J. Stover (December 4, 1936) Letter from C.J. Stover to members of the asbestos industry, (December 8, 1936) Pocket Abstract of the J-M Sales Manual (December 1936) Merchant Marine Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 835, ch. 858, 49 Stat. 1985 (1936) V - 24 George G. Sharp, Fire Control For Passenger y&SSelfi (1936) ELAC workers' compensation and employers liability policy (1936), with endorsements BLAC policy, with endorsements (1936) w. J. McConnell, "Annual Report of the Industrial Health Section-1936" (1936). Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1936) Navy Specification 32-C-ll(a), Cloth, Asbestos (January 2, 1937) Memorandum from R.W. Bruner, Bureau of Engineering to Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (January 7, 1937) Asbestos Magazine (January 1937) Power Specialist (January-February 1937) Bureau of Engineering Specification, Insulation, High Temperature, Blocks and Pipe-Covering, 32-P-3 (INT) (March 1, 1937) V - 25 Bureau of Engineering Specification 32-F-3(INT), Pelt, Insulating, Asbestos (March 1, 1937) Marine Engineering and Shipping Review (March 1937) Marine Engineering and Shipping Review (April 1937) Letter from Johns-Manvilie Sales Corporation to Bureau of Construction and Repair (May 8, 1937) Johns-Manville Report No. 14-76 (May 25, 1937) Johns-Manville Product Data Sheet, Asbestos Blankets (August 1937) Navy Specification 32-C-ll(INT), Cloth and Strands, Asbestos (September 1, 1937) Johns-Manville Report No. 20-374 (October 23, 1937) Johns-Manville Inspection & Control Department Report No. C-26133 (November 4, 1937) Johns-Manville Sales Brochure IN 65 (November 1937) V - 26 Johna-Manville Materials for Marine Service "Insulation in Marine Service" "Boiler and Engine Room Materials" (November-December 1937) Navy Specification 32C14, Cement, Insulation, High Temperature (December 1, 1937) JohnB-Manville Materials for Marine Service Boiler and Engine Room Materials (December 1937) S. Rep. No. 184, 75th Cong. 1st Sess., "Morro Castle' and 'Mohawk' Investigations" (1937) Fire Tests On The Steamship 'Nantasket' Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers Transactions, vol. 45 (1937) Prospectus 1QQ.Q00 Johns-Manville Corporation Common Stock (February 15, 1937) Moody'8 Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1937) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (January 31, 1938) Navy Specification, Insulation, High Temperature, Blocks and Pipe-covering, 32-P-3C (January 3, 1938) V - 27 Bureau of Construction and Repair Specification SPS-1089, Blankets, Acoustic (February 1, 1938) J-M document, Job Evaluation (February 3, 1938) Letter from U.S. Maritime Commission to Evan Rinehart (February 23, 1938) Johns-Manville Report 79 Years of Service to Industry (February 1938) Memorandum from Bureau of Construction and Repair to the Commandant, New York (March 8, 1938) Second Progress Report on Experimental Asbestosis by the Saranac Laboratory (April 18, 1938). Letter from Leroy U. Gardner to Vandiver Brown (April 19, 1938) Asbestos Magazine (April, 1938) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (May 16, 1938) Letter from Evan Rinehart to U.S. Maritime Commission (June 15, 1938) V - 28 Letter from H.C. Sheppard to Evan Rinehart (June 30, 1938) Navy Specification 32-C-ll(b), Cloth and Strands, Asbestos (July 1, 1938) Letter from Evan Rinehart to U.S. Maritime Commission (July 13, 1938) Memo from Bvan Rinehart to G.B. Brown (July 5, 1938) Bureau of Construction and Repair Specification 59-B-4 (INT), Blankets, Acoustic (August 15, 1938) Dreessen, et al., "A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry," Public Health Bulletin No. 241, published by the Public Health Service of the U.S. Treasurey Department (August 1938) Specification for the Construction of a Single Screw Passenger and Cargo Vessel Design C-3 (September 1938) Power Products, J-M Asbestos Sheet Millboard (September 1938) Navy Specification 3211(INT), Cloth and Strands, Asbestos (October 1, 1938) V - 29 Macinito Manufacturing Specification (October 31, 1938) Johns-Manville Development of Marine Sheathing and Mar inite (November 15, 1938) Johns-Manville, Laboratory Reports on Marinite (November 15, 1938) Johns-Manville Report No. 28-496 (November 18, 1938) Dr. L. Gardner, "Etiology of Pneumoconiosis," Journal of the American Medical Association (November 19,1938). Johns-Manville, Sales Bulletin (November 28, 1938) Contract for the Construction of 8 Single Screw, Cargo Vessel Hull No. 162 between the U.S. Maritime Commission and Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. (November 28, 1938) . Contract for the Construction of a Single Screw, Cargo Vessel Hull No. 162 (Design C-3 Cargo Vessel) (November 29, 1938) J-M Inspection and Control Department, Report No. C-64334 (December 10, 1938) V - 30 Minutes of the Meeting of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors (December 19, 1938) Bureau of Construction and Repair Specification 59-B-4 (INT), Blankets, Sound Absorbing (December 20, 1938) Johns-Manville, Sales Bulletin IN-1771 (December 1938) Johns-Manville, Sales Bulletin IN-1772 (December 1938) Johns-Manville Sales Bulletin IN-1773 (December 1938) Sweet's Catalogue Section 10/55 (1938) Howard L. Vickery, Effects of New Safety Regulations in Senate Report No. 184 on the Design of Merchant Ships, Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers Transactions, vol. 46 (1938) TEIA policy, with endorsements (1938) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1938) Executive Order No. 8629, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compl.) V - 31 Executive Order No. 8875, 3 C.F.R. 993-995 (1938-1943 Compl.) Executive Order 9138, 3 C.F.R. 1144 (1938-1943 Compl.) Executive Order No. 9024, 3 C.F.R. 1079-1080 (1938-1943 Compl.) J-M Annual Reports (1938 through 1948) Morning Newspaper Release "Johns-Manvilie to Start New Factory At Billerica Soon" (January 4, 1939) Memorandum from Bureau of Construction and Repair to New York Navy Yard (January 5, 1939) Bureau of Engineering Specification, Insulation, High-Temperatute, Blocks and Pipe-Covering, 32-P-3 (INT) (January 15, 1939) Navy Specification 32-F-3, Felt, Insulating, Asbestos (March 1, 1939) Marinite Manufacturing Specification (March 10, 1939) Letter from Rossiter to Sumner Simpson (March 21, 1939) V - 32 Letter from Sumner Simpson to Rossiter (March 22, 1939) Letter from Rossiter to Simpson (March 23, 1939) . J-M Inspection and Control Department, Report No. C-65452 (March 30, 1939) Navy Specification 32-C-14a, Insulation, High-Temperature (April 1, 1939) Cement, Contract NOd-1124 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 25, 1939) Contract NOd-1125 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 25, 1939) Letter from Vandiver Brown to Sumner Simpson (May 3, 1939) Letter from Sumner Simpson to Vandiver Brown (May 4, 1939) Johns-Manville Inspection & Control Department Report No. C-66860 (July 27, 1939) V 33 Contract for the Construction of a Single Screw Combination Passenger and Cargo Vessel Hull No. 386 between the U.S. Maritime Commission and Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. (September 29, 1939) Johns-Manville, Stockholders* News (October 1939) Sales Brochure IN 62 (October 1939) Sales Brochure IN 63 (October 1939) Sales Brochure IN 64 (October 1939) Johns-Manville Stockholders* News (October 1939) Navy Specification, Insulation, High Temperature: Blocks and Pipe Covering 32-P-3d (November 1, 1939) Navy Specification 3211(c), Cloth and Strands, Asbestos (November 1, 1939) Letter from Gustafsen to A. Lanza (November 1, 1939) Memo from the Captain of the Philadelphia Navy Yard to Heads of All Departments (November 17, 1939) V - 34 Meeting of the Board of Directors of JohnsManville Corporation (December 18, 1939) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1939) Letter from Vandiver Brown to H.B. Meller (January 4, 1940) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (January 15, 1940) Letter from manager Asbestos Dept., H.W. Johns-Manville Co. to Chief Construction USN (January 23, 1940) Johns-Manville, Sales Bulletin (January 25, 1940) 1940 Annual Report To Stockholders, (March 10, 1940) Memorandum from Director, U.S. Naval Engineering Experimental Station to Bureau of Ships (March 13, 1940) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (March 22, 1940) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (March 25, 1940) V - 35 Letter from Johns-Manvilie Sales Corp. to Supply Officer, Boston Navy Yard (March 29, 1940) "Fireproof Materials for Better Ship Construction", Pacific Marine Review (March 1940) J-M Inspection and Control Department, Report C-70006 (April 5, 1940) Industrial Department Safety Order No. 17, Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Penn. (May 1, 1940) Letter from B. Rinehart, Johns-Manville Sales Corp. to E.L. Lasier, U.S. Maritime Commission (May 17, 1940) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (May 22, 1940) "Marinite Bulkheads", Pacific Marine Review (May 1940) General Specifications for Machinery, Bureau of Engineering, Subsection S39-1 - Heat Insulation and Lagging for Piping and Machinery (June 1, 1940) General Specifications for Machinery of Vessels at S39-l-b (June 1, 1940) V - 36 Memorandum from Bureau of Engineering and Bureau of Construction and Repair to Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (June S, 1940) Memorandum from Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance to Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (June 18, 1940) Memorandum from Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to Chief of the Bureau of Ships (June 26, 1940) Memorandum from J.E. Berget to A.R. Pisher (June 28, 1940) Memorandum from Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks to Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (June 1940) Contract NOd-1439 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July 1, 1940) Contract NOd-1440 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July 1, 1940) Interim Specification 32-M-l (INT) (July 1, 1940) Memorandum from Bureau of Ships to Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (July 10, 1940) Memo from Dr. Elkina to Manfred Bowditch (July 22, 1940) V - 37 Memorandum from Stock Division to Purchase Division (August 6, 1940) J-M Sales Bulletin announcing L-W Suoerex. New 1500 High Temperature Insulation (August 21, 1940) A Johns-Manville Sales Brochure IN-64 J-M Marine Joiner Materials (August 1940) Contract No. NOd-1512 for the Construction of Twelve Destroyers Nos. DD569 to DD 580, Inclusive, between U.S. and Consolidated Steel Corp. at Orange, Tex. (September 9, 1940) Contract No. NOd-1534 between the Bethlehem Steel Company and the United States of America (September 9, 1940) Contract NOd-1491 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940) Contract NOd-1496 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company; (September 9, 1940) Contract NOd-1493 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company; (September 9, 1940) Exhibit I (Revised September 8, 1941) to Contract NOd-1534 between the Bethlehem Steel Company and the United States of America (September 9, 1940) V 38 General Specifications for Building Vessels of the United States Navy, Bureau of Ships, Sec. A-l-a (September 16, 1940) "Maximum Safety-Quiet-Comfort on the S.S. America with J-M Marine Materials", Pacific Marine Review (September 1940) Navy Specification 32-P-3e, Insulation, High-Temperature Blocks and Pipe-Covering, 1940) (October 1, Navy Specification 32-C-ll(INT), Cloth and Strands, Asbestos (October 1, 1940) Executive order No. 8572 (October 21, 1940) Letter from Bureau of Engineering to Johns-Manvilie Sales Corp. (October 29, 1940) Letter from Johns-Manville to Navy Department, Bureau of Ships (October 29, 1940) James Lynch of the Production Division of the National Defense Advisory Commission, address delivered before the Manufacturers' Association of Connecticut (October 31, 1940) Annual Meeting of Meeting of the Air Hygiene Foundation of America, In Pittsburgh, Penn. (November 13,1940) Memorandum from Ross, Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Bureau of Ships (November 15, 1940) V - 39 Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (November 18, 1940) Letter from J.F. Nicholas, Keasbey and Mattison Co. to Bureau of Engineering (November 25, 1940) ASBESTOS Magazine (November 1940) "How Army and Navy Cooperate on Standards for Purchasing," Industrial Standardization and Commercial Standards Monthly (November 1940) Letter from Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to the General Accounting Office Audit Division (December 3, 1940) Letter from California Vermiculite Corp. toBureau of Supplies and Accounts (December 7, 1940) National Defense Advisory Commission Memorandum,Price Stabilization Division, Legal Section, (December 9, 1940) Memo from Mr. Hemson to Mr. Bowditch (December 12, 1940) Executive Order No. 8612 (December 15, 1940) Contract NOd-1632 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (December 16, 1940) V - 40 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shore Establishment Division) to Commandant, U.S. Navy Yard, Charleston, (December 16, 1940) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1940) Act of June 28, 1940, Pub. L. No. 671, Ch. 440, 54 Stat. 676 (1940) Johns-Manville ALL COMMODITIES s ALL DEPTS Detailed Sales Report (1940) Executive Order No. 8572, 5 Fed. Reg. 4122 (1940) Uniform Procedures for Handling of Priorities, 32 C.F.R. S 919 (Supp. 1940) Executive Order No. 8612, 5 Fed. Reg. 5143 (1940) 1 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Ch. 720, S 9, 54 Stat. 885, 892 (1940) Act of October 10, 1940, Ch. 836, 54 Stat. 1090 (1940) Act of June 28, 1940, Pub. L. No. 671, Ch. 440, 54 Stat. 676 2 (1940) Uniform Procedures for Handling of Priorities. 32 C.F.R. S 919 (Supp. 1940) V - 41 Memorandum from Bureau of Ships to Naval Engineering Experiment Station (January 15, 1941) J-M Research Laboratories Report No. 14-190 (January 15, 1941) Letter from the Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Keasbey and Mattison Co. (January 30, 1941) Ernest W. Brown, Industrial Hygiene and.the_ Navv in National Defense, presented at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Air Hygiene Foundation of America, Inc., Pittsburgh, Penn., November 13, 1940, War Medicine (January 1941) Navy Dept., Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, United States Naval Medical Bulletin (January 1941) "Here's why more than 100 ships now have fireproof MARINITS BULKHEADS", Pacific Marine Review (January 1941) Memorandum, Bureau of Ships to All Commandants of Naval Districts less Sixteenth Naval District and All Superintendents of Shipbuilding (February 1, 1941) Letter from Ehret Magnesia Mfg. Co. to Navy Department, Bureau of Supplies & Accounts (February 7, 1941) Memorandum from Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to Chief of the Bureau of Ships (February 13, 1941) V - 42 Letter from Walton of Boston Navy Yard to Acme Steel Company (February 17, 1941) Memorandum from Lt. Cmdr. E.H. Cushing to Adm. R.T. Mclntire (February 19, 1941) Memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy to Commandants and Commanding Officers, Shore Establishments (February 24, 1941) Letter from Navy Department, Bureau of Supplies & Accounts to Ehret Magnesia Mfg. Co. (February 27, 1941) Letter from the Bureau of Ships to California Vermiculite Corp. (February 27, 1941) Bureau of Ships Ad Interim Specification 32-P-7 (INT) (March 15, 1941) Minutes of the Johns-Manvilie's Board of Directors Meeting (March 17, 1941) "Fireproof Materials for Better Ship Construction", Pacific Marine Review (March 1941) Memorandum from Bureau of Ships to Commandant, Navy Yard, Boston (April 10, 1941) V - 43 Memorandum from Director, U.S. Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Inspector of Naval Material, New York, New York (April 22, 1941) Navy Specification 32-M-le (May 1, 1941) U.S.M.C., Contract for the Construction of Emergency Cargo Ships, Contract No. MCC-ESF-595 (May 1, 1941) Contract for the Construction of Emergency Cargo Ships between the Maritime Commission and Oregon Shipbuilding Corp. (May 1, 1941) Naval Communications Service Message from U.S. Naval Engineering Experimental Station to Inspector of Naval Material, Johns-Manville, New Jersey (May 6, 1941) Draft of Interim Specification 59-B-4 (May 15, 1941) Minutes of the Johns-Manville's Board of Directors Meeting (May 19, 1941) Memorandum from Director, U.S. Naval Engineering Experiment Section to Inspector of Naval Material, New York, New York (May 27, 1941) Act of May 31, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-89, 55 Stat.236 V 44 EES Test Report No. 13-4876 (June 6, 1941) Bureau of Ships Ad Interim Specification, Pipe Covering, High Temperature, Insulation 32-P-3 (INT) (June 15, 1941) ASBESTOS Magazine (June 1941) United States Maritime Commission, Emergency Ship Construction Division Office Order No. 12 (July 7, 1941) Office of Production Management, General Preference Order P-7, Copy 33, executed by Johns-Manville Sales Corporation (July 15, 1941) Letter from J.A. O'Brien, Johns-Manville Sales Corporation to J.W. Haslan, Babcock & Wilcox Co (July 16, 1941) Proposed Plan for an Industrial Hygiene Program at the Navy Yard, New York, New York (August 1, 1941) Bureau of Ships Ad Interim Specification 32-1-3 (INT) Insulation, Thermal, Block (August 1, 1941) Minutes of Johns-Manville's Board of Directors Meeting (August 20, 1941) Letter, Gibbs & Cox to Rogers Company (August 30, 1941) V 45 Office of Production Management, Priorities Regulation No. 1, 6 Fed. Reg. 4489 (Aug. 30, 1941) Navy Specification 32-F-l(INT), Felt, Asbestos, Roll (September 1, 1941) Letter from James Forrestal, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 8, 1941) Johns-Manville Research Laboratories Report No. 14-225 (September 15, 1941) Memo entitled "Order and Billing Procedure Section M-30 - Handling Orders Under the Government Priority System" (September 26, 1941) Navy Specification 32-P-7 Pipe Covering, Magnesia (October 1, 1941) Navy Specification 32-C-14b, Cement, Insulation, High-Temperature (October 1, 1941) BBS Test Report No. 13-5915 (October 16, 1941) Letter from Vandiver Brown to Sumner Simpson (November 3, 1941) Contract between California Shipbuilding Corp. and Plant Rubber and Asbestos Works for installation of insulation, (November 4, 1941) V - 46 Memorandum to files from Helen L. Van Tuyl (November 19, 1941) Navy Specification 32-C-ll(INT), Cloth, Strands and Tape, Asbestos (December 15, 1941) Letter from R.A. Greenbow, Johns-Manville Sales Corp. to Bureau of Ships (December 17, 1941) Letter from P. S. Grierson, Sr. to TaylorSeidenbach, Inc. (December 18, 1941) Letter from The Chief of Bureau of Ships to the Commandant, Navy Yard, New York, N.Y. (December 19, 1941) Executive Order No. 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787, 6788 (1941) 6 Fed. Reg. 6680, 6681 (1941) (issued Dec. 23, 1941)(Amendment of Priorities Regulation No. 1) (codified with erroneous omissions at 32 C.F.R. S 944.1-944.21 (1941Supp.) Johns-Manville Sales Brochure IN-64 J-M Marine Joiner Materials (December 1941) Moody'8 Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1941) V - 47 Johns-Manville ALL COMMODITIES : ALL DEPTS Detailed Sales Report(1941) Memorandum submitted to the House Committee on Naval Affairs by Priorities Division, Office of Production Management, Hearing on H.R. 4534, House of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs 1005 (1941) H.R. Rep. No. 460, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1941) Copy 26, General Preference Order No. P-7 Priorities Regulation No. 1, 6 Fed. Reg. 4489 (1941) 6 Fed. Reg. 6796 (1941) Ernest W. Brown, M.D., "Industrial And The Navy In National Defense," Medicine, Vol. 1 (1941) Hygiene War Annual Report Of the Surgeon General.U.S. Naw. concerning Statistics of Diseases and Injuries in the United States Navy for the Calender Year 1939 (G.P.O. 1941) Schedule and Curriculum at Columbia University, Course for Naw Officers from Thursday, May 1, 1941 through Tuesday, July 1, 1941 (1941) V - 48 Executive Order No. 8629, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compl.). See also. 32 C.F.R. S 900 (1941) (organization and duties of OPM) Bureau of Ships ad Interim Specification 59-B-4 (INT), Blankets, Sound-Absorbing (January 2, 1942) President's Bulletin No. 19-358 Priorities and Allocations (January 6, 1942) Helen L. Van Tuyl Memo (January 9, 1942) Johns-Manvilie Sales Bulletin 65-154 Priority and Allocation (January 13, 1942) Johns-Manville Sales Bulletin 61.3-347 "Priorities-Insulation Materials" (January 29, 1942) Johns-Manville President's Bulletin no. 19-362 Ptasa4ui.,ftfl- fQi.AdQPUng Processes And New Or revised Products (January 30, 1942) Johns-Manville Sales Brochure IN-60 Marinite for Industrial Uses (January 1942) 1941 Annual Report To Stockholders (February 6, 1942) V - 49 Notes (February 11,12,1942) Letter from Manfred Bowditch to Anthony J.Lanza (February 13, 1942) Memo from Manfred Bowditch to Mr. Hemson (February 15, 1942) Letter from Anthony J. Lanza to Manfred Bowditch (February 16, 1942) Letter from Manfred Bowditch to Frederic Manley (February 17, 1942) Note on February 17, 1942 letter from Manfred Bowditch to Frederic N. Manley (February 24, 1942) THE YEAR 1*9*4*1: Annual Report to Johns-Manvilie Jobholders From Lewis H. Brown, President (February 25, 1942) Letter from Philip Drinker to the Surgeon General of the Navy (February 28,1942) Johns-Manville Stockholders' News (April 1942) J-M News Pictorial (April 15, 1942) V - 50 Memorandum to George Kogel from Mark Rosenfelt (April 16, 1942) Harvard School of Public Health, Industrial Hygiene Laboratory, Special Class (April 27 July 31, 1941) 7 Fed. Reg. 3311 (1942) (Amendment 2 of Priorities Regulation No. 1) (issued May 1, 1942) (adding certain foreign governments to the list of countries whose contracts were covered) Act of May 2, 1941, ch. 84, 2(a), 55 Stat. 148-150 (1941), extended by Joint Resolution of June 16, 1942, ch. 416, 56 Stat.370 (1942) Minutes of the Johns-Manville's Board of Directors Meeting (May 8, 1942) 7 Fed. Reg. 3428 (May 8, 1942) (Amendment 3 to Priorities Regulation No. 1) (issued June 12, 1942) Job Evaluation, Sweeper (May 25, 1942) Job Evaluation, Special Segments-Bquipment Operator (May 25, 1942) Job Evaluation, Band Saw Operator (May 25, 1942) Job Evaluation, Pack on Sealing Machine (May 25, 1942) V - 51 Job Evaluation, Gang Saw Take-Off (May 25, 1942) Johns-Manville Research Laboratories Report No. 14-262 (June 3, 1942) Letter of Elliot Deforest (June 14, 1942) Navy Specification 32-C-14(INT), Cement, Insulation, High-temperature (June 15, 1942) Minutes of the U.S. Maritime Commission, 224246-47 (June 18, 1942) Minutes of Officers* Board Meeting, J-M's Government Service Unit (June 22, 1942) "A Guidebook to War Business", Business Week (June 27, 1942) Minutes of the U.S. Maritime Commission, 22404-05 (July 7, 1942) Memorandum from J.J. Bloomfield to J.G. Townsend (July 30, 1942) Bureau of Ships Ad Interim Specification 32-P-8 (INT) Pipe Covering, Thermal Insulation (August 1, 1942) V - 52 7 Fed. Reg. 6256 (1942) (Amendment No. 4 to Priorities Regulation No. 1) (issued August 10, 1942) Industrial Health Survey of the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp., Mobile, Ala. (August 13-15, 1942) Memorandum from Director, U.S. Naval Engineering Bxperiment Station to Inspector of Naval Material, San Francisco, Cal. (August 15, 1942) Letter from Thurman Marshall, Assistant Attorney General to Honorable Leon Henderson (August 20, 1942) Industrial Hygiene Survey of Southeastern Shipbuilding Corp.,Savannah, Ga. (August 20-21 & 26,1942) Industrial Health Survey of the Los Angeles Shipbuilding And Dry Dock Co. (August 24-26, 1942) Letter from leon Henderson, Administrator of the Office of Price Administration, to Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney General, (August 31, 1942) Navy Specification 32-C-ll(INT), Cloth, Strands, and Tape, Asbestos (August 1942) Johns-Manvilie Sales Brochure IN-64 J-M Marine Joiner Materials (August 1942) V - 53 Industrial Health Survey of the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation, Portland, Ore. (September 3-4, 1942) Johns-Manville Report No. C-77195 (September 11,1942) Letter from Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney General, to Leon Henderson, Administrator of the Office of Price Administration (September 21, 1942) Helen L. Van Tuyl Memo (September 23, 1942) Helen L. Van Tuyl Memo (September 24, 1942) Industrial Health Survey of the Electric Boat Co., Groton, Conn. (September 24-25, 1942) Industrial Health Survey of the Baltimore-Pairfield Shipyard, Inc., Baltimore, Md. (September 24-25, 1942) Letter from Leon Henderson, Administrator of the Office of Price Administration to Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney General (September 29, 1942) Industrial Health Survey of the North Carolina Shipbuilding Co., Wilmington, N.C. (October 1-3, 1942) Job Evaluation, Research Specialist (October 5, 1942) V - 54 Industrial Health Survey of the Tampa Shipbuilding Co., Inc., Tampa, Fla. (October 5-6 & 8, 1942) Act of October 16, 1941 ch. 445, S 1, 55 Stat. 742 Dr. Philip Drinker, Talk Before the Maritime Commission (October 20, 1942) Minutes of the Meeting of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors (October 21, 1942) Johns-Manville Report C-77453 (October 21, 1942) Asbestos Textiles Industry Advisory Committee, WPB, Summary of Meeting (October 22, 1942) Job Evaluation, Combination Saw Operator (October 26, 1942) Contract Noba-840 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October 29, 1942) War Production Board, Procurement Directive No. 2, 7 Fed. Reg. 8179 (October 1942) V - 55 Navy Specification 32-M-lf (November 1, 1942) Helen L. Van Tuyl Memo (November 2, 1942) Navy Specification 32C14d, Cement, Insulation High-Temperature (November 2, 1942) Memo from Dr. Morris to Manfred Boditch (November 16, 1942) Letter from Daniel S. Ring, Director, Division of Shipyard Labor Relations, to C.w. Fisher, Director of Shore Establishments (November 20, 1942) Memorandum from Helen L. Van Tuyl to files (November 21, 1942) Navy Dept, and Maritime Commission Joint Memorandum from C.W. Fisher and D.S. Ring to R.A. Bard and H.L. Vickery (November 1942) U.S. Maritime Commission, Regional Office of Construction, Bast Coast, Philadelphia, Penn., General Instructions to Inspectors (December 1, 1942) Letter from L. Gardner to Vandiver Brown (December 7, 1942) Job Evaluation, Band Saw Take-Off (December 7, 1942) V - 56 Stenographers' Minutes, Meeting in Regard to Minimum Reouirements for Industrial Health and Safety in Shipyards. Chicago, 111. (December 7-8, 1942) Notes on November 24, 1942 memo from Manfred Bowditch to Dr. Morris (December 15, 1942) Question and Answers Book, 1912 Milwaukee Salesmen Convention Officers' Board Meeting, Insulation (December 21, 1942) H.A. Kieselbach, Insulation, report to Johns Manville Officers Board (December 21, 1942) Memorandum from Dr. Philip Drinker to Commissioner Carmody (December 22, 1942) Letter from Sumner Simpson to A. Lanza (December 29, 1942) Johns-Manville Sales Brochure IN-64 J-M Marine Joiner Materials (December 1942) Johns-Manville Sales Brochure IN-65 Methods Adaptable to Erection of J-M Marine Joiner Materials (December 1942) Progress Report Johns-Manville Corporation for the Year (1942) V - 57 Progress Report Power Products & Industrial Department for the Year (1942) Progress Report Building Materials & General Department for the Year (1942) Progress Report Government Department for the Year (1942) Bmergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 29, S 201 Office of Price Administration, General Maximum Price Regulation. 7 Fed. Reg. 3153 (1942) Office of Price Adminstration. Supplementary Regulation No. 4 to General Price Regulation, 7 Fed. Reg. 3724 (1942) Office of Price Adminstration, Procedural Regulation No. 6, Office of Price Administration 7 Fed. Reg. 5087 (1942) Title III, Second War Powers Act, ch. 199, 301, 56 Stat. 176 (1942) 7 Fed.Reg. 8179 (1942) Second War Powers Act, 1942, ch. 199, Title VI, SS 6-1, 602, 56 Stat. 181 (1942) 7 Fed. Reg. 223, 2094, 9878, 10574 (1942) V - 58 7 Fed. Reg. 4832 (1942) (Amendment 3 to Priorities Regulation No. 1) Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Navv Shipment Marking Handbook (1st ed. 1942) Annual Report of the Suroeon General. U.S. Naw,__to the Secretary of the Navv Concerning Statistical diseases, and injuries in the United States Navy for the, Caldender Year 1940 (1942) Tax returns of Chester Anderson dated 1942, 1943 and 1945 Executive Order No. 9024, 7 Fed. Reg. 329 (1942) (1938-1943 Compl.) 7 Fed. Reg. 223 (1942) 7 Fed. Reg. 2094 (1942) 7 Fed. Reg. 9878 (1942) 7 Fed. Reg. 10574 (1942) 7 Fed. Reg. 436, 1630 (1942) 8 Fed. Reg. 13889 (1942) V - 59 7 Fed. Reg. 2472 (1942) 7 Fed. Reg. 10444 (1942) Blsenbast, History of the Johns-Manvilie Celite DlalomaflaouB Silica Industry of Lompoc. California from 1893 to 19.42 (1942) TEIA policy, with endorsements (1942) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1942) Johns-Manville ALL COMMODITIES : ALL DEPTS - Detailed Sales Report (1942) 7 Fed. Reg. 436, 1630 (1942) 8 Fed. Reg. 13889 (1942) Johns-Manvilie Report Mo. C-77904 (January 8, 1943) Memorandum from Commandant, Navy Yard, Boston to Bureau of Ships (January 20, 1943) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (January 20, 1943) V - 60 Letter from Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to Johns-Manville Products Corporation (January 25, 1943) Johns-Manville Sales Brochure IN-67 structural Insulation Recommendations (January 1943) Navy Specification 32-F-lb, Felt, Asbestos, Roll (February 1, 1943) 1942 Annual Report To Stockholders (February 2, 1943) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (February 14, 1943) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (February 16, 1943) Memorandum from Director, U.S. Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Inspector of Naval Material, Chicago, 111.(February 18, 1943) Industrial Hygiene Survey, Navy Yard, New York, N.Y. (February 19, 1943) Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard) (February 23, 24 and 25, 1943) Letter from Leroy Gardner to Vandiver Brown, with 15 page attachment (February 24, 1943) V -61 Memorandum from Commandant, Philadelphia Navy Yard to Inspector of Naval Material, Vernon, Cal. (March 16, 1943) Memorandum for file from K.P. Webster, U.S. Navy Yard, Boston (April 3, 1943) Letter from Union Asbestos & Rubber Company to R.6. Chubbuck (April 9, 1943) Letter from John Roche, Chief Safety Consultant, United States Maritime Commission, to T.J. Whelan, The Travelers Insurance Co. (April 16, 1943) Minutes of the Johns-Manvilie Board of Directors Meeting (April 21, 1943) Letter from Ruberoid Co. Mfg. Insulation Division to Chief Bngineer, U.S. Maritime Commission (April 27, 1943) Johns-Manville Inspection and Control Dept. No. C-78705 (April 27, 1943) "Minimum Requirements for Safety and Industrial Health in Contract Shipyards," Industrial Medicine (April 1943) Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard) (May 11, 1943) V - 62 Lester M. Petrie, Administrative and Working Relationships Between the Georgia Industrial Hygiene Service and The United States Maritime Commission, presented at the Transactions of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the National Conference of GovernmentalIndustrial Hygienists (May 24, 1943) Memorandum from Chief of the Bureau of Ships to Director, Engineering Experiment Station (May 28, 1943) Johns-Manville Sales Brochure IN-66 Marine Acoustical Materials ad Structural Insulation (May 1943) Division of Industrial Hygiene, National Institute of Health, United States Public Health Service, Industrial Hygiene Vol.3, Nos. 5 & 6 (May-June 1943) "Deep in Texas", Ihfl, P<?w$g Specialist (May-June 1943) Letter from Brown to Simpson (June 2, 1943) Letter from Ruberoid Co. Mfg. Insulation Division to Chief Engineer, U.S. Maritime Commission (June 6, 1943), Industrial Hygiene Report of the Consolidated Steel Corp. of Texas, Orange, Tex. (June 9 - 11, 1943) V - 63 New York Navy Yard Material Laboratory Report No. 4290-11 on Johns-Manville's AKOUSTIKOS FELT Sound Absorbing Blanket for compliance with BuShips Specification 59-B-4 (INT) of January 2, 1942 (June 14, 1943) Investigation of the Progress, of the War Bffort: Hearing Before the House Committee on Naval Affairs. 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 535, 546 (Statement of Lewis H. Brown, President, Johns'-Manville Corporation, New York City (June 14, 1943) Letter from Elliot DeForest to Washington State Department of Labor and Industry (June 14, 1943) Memorandum from Helen L. Van Tuyl to Julian Litlan (June 18, 1943) Letter of A. S. Rossiter to S. Simpson (June 18, 1943) Letter of V. Brown to S. Simpson (June 24, 1943) Marinite Manufacturing Specification (June 25, 1943) Industrial Health and Safety Survey of Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation (July 2-7, 1943) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (July 21, 1943) V - 64 Letter from S.P. Curtic, Johns-Manville Corporation to Office of Naval Procurement (August 16, 1943) Contract for the Construction of Pour 220-Foot Minesweepers between the U.S. and Savannah Machine and Foundry Co. (August 3, 1943) Marinite Manufacturing Specification (August 19, 1943) Proceedings of the Meeting of East Coast Shipyard Physicians at Philadelphia (September 1, 1943) Contract between U.S. Maritime Commission and Western Pipe and Steel Company for Construction of Six C-3 Vessels (September 2, 1943) Minutes of the Meeting of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors (September 14, 1943) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (September 15, 1943) Inter-Office Correspondence from G.M. Clarke, M.D. to A.H. Mills (September 15, 1943) Letter from Bureau of Ships to Johns-Manville (September 16, 1943) V - 65 Memorandum from A.H. Mills to of Shipbuilding, Camden, N.J. (September 18, 1943) Supervisor Letter from J. Clifford, Government Dept., Johns-Manvilie, to Navy Dept., Bureau of Ships (September 22, 1943) Letter from Leroy Gardner to Dr. Hektoen (September 29, 1943) Navy Specification 32-C-ll(INT), Cloth, Strands, and Tape, Asbestos (October 1, 1943) Contract Nobs-1339 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October 1, 1943) Letter from Clyde Barnett, Johns-Manvilie to J.M. CcCleverty, Seattle Office, Johns-Manville (October 5, 1943) Contract between Richmond Shipyard Number One of Permanente Metals Corp. and Dutton Asbestos & Supply (October 15, 1943) Letter from Daniel S. Ring to Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General, USPHS (October 20, 1943) General Specifications for Building Vessels of the United States Navy at A-l-b (November 15, 1943) V - 66 Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (November 28, 1943) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (December 1, 1943) Contract Nobs-1417 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (December 9, 1943) Treasury Dept., Federal Procurement,A Manual for the Information of Federal Purchasing Officers (1943) Annual Sanitary Report, Dispensary, Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Penn. (1943) TBIA policy, with endorsements (1943) Johns-Manville ALL COMMODITIES : ALL DEPTS Detailed Sales Report (1943) Johns-Manville Power Products and Industrial Department, The Marine Industry (1943) Progress Report Sales Promotion Department for the Year 1943 V - 67 Progress Report Johns-Manvilie Corporation for the Year 1943 Progress Report Power Products & Industrial Department for the Year 1943 Progress Report Building Materials & General Department for the Year 1943 Progress Report Government Department for the Year 1943 Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1943) Johns-Manvilie Power Products and Industrial Department, The Marine Industry (1943) 8 Fed. Reg. 5581 (1943) Conservation Order M-283, WPB, 8 Fed. Reg. 1790 (1943) 8 Fed. Reg. 1790, 13900, 13906 (1943) Memorandum from Philip Drinker to Bureau of Ships (January 8, 1944) Resurvey of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation, Seattle, Wash. (January 11-13, 1944) V - 68 Memorandum from Dr. H. K. Sessions to Dr. Philip Drinker (January 12 1944) 1943 Annual Report To Stockholders, (February 3, 1944) Minutes of the Johns-Manville's Board of Directors Meeting (February 16, 1944) Letter from Owens-Corning to Bureau of Ships (February 22, 1944) Letter from L. Gardner to I. Sabourin, (February 28, 1944) ASBESTOS Magazine (February 1944) Minutes of the Johns-Manville's Board of Directors Meeting (March 15, 1944) Memorandum from Bureau of Ships to Director, Engineering Experiment Station (April 4, 1944) Letter from Vice President of the Philip Carey Mfg. Co. to Bureau of Ships, U.S. Navy Department (April 12, 1944) Minutes of the Johns-Manville's Board of Directors Meeting (April 19, 1944) V - 69 Memorandum from Chief of Accounts, BuShips, to Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Orange, Tex. (April 20, 1944) Waldemar C. Dreessen, A Cooperative Shipyard Study- Bv the Public Health Service and the , Maritime Commission, presented at the Transactions of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (May 9, 1944) Minutes of the Johns-Manvilie's Board of Directors Meeting (May 12, 1944) Memorandum from T.J. Carter, Captain (MC), U.S.N. to Vice Admiral Ross T. Mclntire (MC), U.S.N. (May 16, 1944) Memorandum from James Forrestal to Commandants of U.S. Navy Yards (May 18, 1944) Memorandum from Ross T. Mclntire to Commander, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (May 24, 1944) Navy Specification 32-P-8 Pipe Covering, Thermal Insulation (June 1, 1944) Rear Admiral B.S. Land, Chairman, United States Maritime Commission, remarks at National Shipyard Safety Award Dinner at Statler Hotel (June 8, 1944) Subcontract between Oregon Shipbuilding Corp. and B.J. Bartells Co. (June 15, 1944) V - 70 u.s.n. Bureau, of ships Csnfliltana GQYSining Teats in Naval Laboraties (July 1, 1944) Letter from D.S. Ring to C.W. Flesher, Maritime Commission Regional Director of Construction (July 12, 1944) Office of Production Management, General Preference Order P-7, Copy 26, executed by Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (July 15, 1944) ASBESTOS Magazine (July 1944) Letter from Thomas H. Coulter to Lieutenant L.F. Andrews (August 10, 1944) U.S. Maritime Commission Contract with Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard for 44 VC 2-5-AP2 (Victory) (August 10, 1944) Memorandum from Director, U.S. Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Bureau of Ships (August 24, 1944) Memorandum from Director, U.S. Naval Engineering Experiment Station to Bureau of Ships (August 1944) Mare Island Naval Shipyard Safety Survey (September 1, 1944) Letter from C. Frederick Sales Engineer, Keasbey & Mattison Co. to Navy Department Bureau of Ships (September 11, 1944) V - 71 J-M Inspection and Control Department, Report No. C-82797 (September 11, 1944) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (September 20, 1944) Minerals and Metals Advisory Committee, WPB, Meeting 50 (September 25, 1944) Navy Specification 32-C-ll(d), Cloth, Strands, and Tape, Asbestos (November 1, 1944) Letter from Ross T. Mclntire to AstSecNav (SECP) with enclosure entitled "Survey The Effect of Burning and Welding Fumes, Gases, and Vapors on U.S. Navy Yard Employees." (November 8, 1944) Philadelphia Asbestos Company, Norristown, Penn., Report of Engineering Study of Asbestos Dust Hazard (November 15, 1944) Letter from Dr. A. Steele to Muller (November 17, 1944) Industrial Safety Resurvey of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation Quincy Yard (November 21, 1944) Letter from Clyde Barnett to J.F. Adams (November 29, 1944) Mare Island Naval Shipyard internal memorandum, including "History of Safety Office (November 30, 1944) V -72 John M. Roche, "Joint United States Navy Department- Maritime Commission Safety and Health Program," 7:3 Personnel Administration (November 1944) Minutes of Meeting of Labor-Management Committee at The New Bngland Shipbuilding Corporation (December 1, 1944) Memorandum from T.R. Meyer, (MC), USNR to Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Report of Inspection of Industrial Hygiene Activities (Introductory and General Comments) (December 18, 1944) W.C. Dreessen and W.B. Fleischer, Report on Investigation of Asbestosis from Amosite Pipe Covering at Bath Iron Works (December 19, 1944) Union Asbestos and Rubber Co., Unarco History, presented to Navy Regional Price Adjustment Board (circal944) Boston Naval Shipyard Job Application (1944) TBIA policy, with endorsements (1944) Johns-Manville ALL COMMODITIES : ALL DBPTS Detailed Sales Report(1944) 9 Fed. Reg. 13287 (1944) V - 73 9 Fed. Reg. 1109, 14428 (1944) Union A8beatos and Rubber company, Financial statements and supporting documentation or the year ended December 31, 1943, submitted to the War Production Board (1944) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1944) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (January 17, 1945) Letter from Philip Drinker to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (January 31, 1945) Letter from Mgr., Insulation Division, The Ruberoid Co. to F. McGeary, Bureau of Ships (January 31, 1945) 1944 Annual Report To Stockholders, (January 31, 1945) Letter from Chief of Bureau of Ships to J. High, The Ruberoid Co. (February 15, 1945) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (February 21, 1945) Letter from BuShips (768) to the Supervisor of Shipbuilding at Quincy Mass. (February 24, 1945) V - 74 Letter from Mgr. Insulation Division, the Rubberoid Co. to A. MacGee, Navy Department Bureau of Ships (February 28, 1945) Letter from Marion A. Roberts to BuShips (768) (March 6, 1945) Memorandum from Ross T. Mclntire to BuShips. (March 8, 1945) Letter from R. K. Jones to Dr. Philip Drinker (March 14, 1945) Johns-Manville Report No. C-84312-A (March 23, 1945) Navy Procurement Directive issued April 3, 1944, Navv Procurement Directives (Oct. 1945) Letter from Bureau of Ships to the Ruberoid Co. (April 12, 1945) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (April 18, 1945) Memorandum from John M. Roche and Dr. Philip Drinker to Daniel S. Ring (April 27, 1945) United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wartime Bmplovment. Production and Conditions of Work in Shipyards. Bulletin No. 824, (May 10, 1945) V - 75 Minutes of the Johns-Manvilie Board of Directors Meeting (May 16, 1945) Industrial Health ReSurvey of the Bethlehem Steel Company Shipbuilding Division (Fore River Shipyard) (May 23, 24 and 25 1945) United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wartime Employment* Production and Conditions of Hork_in Shipyards. Bulletin No. 824 (May 1945) Safety Review, Vol. 2, No. 5 (May 1945) "Bosses of the BTU" advertisement, from Power Specialist (June-July 1945) Minutes of Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (June 13, 1945) Minutes of ATI Board of Governors, (June 13, 1945) BLAC policy, with endorsements (July 1, 1945) Resurvey of the Todd Pacific Shipyard (formerly Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation), Seattle, Wash. (July 12-20, 1945) Minutes of the Johns-Manvilie's Board of Directors Meeting (July 17, 1945) V - 76 Report from James E. Fuller to The Yard Medical Officer (July 31, 1945) Navy Department, Bureau of Ships, Organization of the Design and Construction Branches of the Shipbuilding Division (rev. July 1945) Monthly Industrial Health Report of the U.S. Navy Yard, Boston (July, 1945) Letter from Walter E. Fleischer to George A. Eckert (August 3, 1945) Letter from James E. Fuller to Walter E. Fleischer (August 6, 1945) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (August 15, 1945) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (September 19, 1945) Letter from Phillip Drinker to Admiral Mills of the Bureau of Ships (September 21, 1945) Letter from Dr. Philip Drinker to Bureau of Ships, with Draft of Fleisher-Drinker as enclosure (September 21, 1945) P.W. Haas, Jr., U.S. Naval Engineering Experiment Station Test of Asbestos Finishing Cement Insulation, various brands submitted bv various manufacturers (September 21, 1945) V -77 Final Report for Todd Pacific Shipyard, Seattle, Wash. (September 24, 1945) H.G. Chalkley, History of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding. U.S.N.. Orange, Tex. (October 1, 1945) Letter from Mr. Radford, U.S.N. Bureau of Engineering, to Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (October 4, 1945) Letter from Mr. Radford, U.S.N. Bureau of Engineering to Eagle Picher Sales Co. (October 4, 1945) Letter from Mr. Radford, U.S.N., Bureau of Engineering to Reasbey & Mattison Co. (October 4, 1945) Memorandum from Chief of Bureau of Ships to Dr. Philip Drinker (October 8, 1945) Navy Specification 32-F-3a, Felt, Insulating, Asbestos (October 15, 1945) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (October 17, 1945) Richard J. 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Reg. 10179 (1945) V - 79 WPB, "War Production in 1944," a Report by the Chairman (1945) American Bmployers Insurance Company, with endorsements (1945) Lewis H. Brown, Y=P-SLY Aft .ButOPe -- Ita Effect on JM (1945) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities at 2130 (1945) Johns-Manville ALL COMMODITIES : ALL DEPTS Detailed Sales Report (1945) TEIA policy, with endorsements (1945) Civilian Production Administration, Alphabetic Listing of Major War Supply Contracts. Cumulative. June 1940 through September 1945. Vol. 2 D-J Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (January 16, 1946) W.B. Fleischer, F.J. Viles, R.L. Gade and P. Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels, 28 Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology (January 1946) ELAC policy, with endorsements (February 18, 1946) V - 80 Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (February 20, 1946) Minutes of Dust Control Comm. (March 13, 1946) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (March 20, 1946) asbestos Magazine (March 1946) Navy Dept. Spec. 32-C-14h, Cement, Insulation, High-Temperature (April 1, 1946) Letter from Leroy Gardner to Woodard (April 8, 1946) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (April 17, 1946) 1945 Annual Report To Stockholders, (May 6, 1946) Philadelphia Asbestos Company, Norristown, Penn. Report of Dust Survey (May 15-16, 1946) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (May 15, 1946) Asbestos Company (May 24, 1946) V - 81 Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (June 11, 1946) Minutes of Dust Control Comm. (June 13, 1946) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (June 19, 1946) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (July 17, 1946) Ad in The Power Specialist (July-August 1946) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (August 21, 1946) Navy Specification 32-C-lb for Cement, Insulation, Asbestos, Finishing (September 3, 1946) Minutes of Dust Control Comm. (September 5, 1946) Minutes of the Johns-Manville Board of Directors Meeting (September 18, 1946) Chairman of the Board's Bulletin No. 1 (September 18, 1946) Minutes of General meeting (October 3, 1946) V - 82 Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. Bowditch (November 12, 1946) Minutes of General meeting (December 12, 1946) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1946) TBIA policy with endorsements (1946) American Employers Insurance Company, with endorsements (1946) Minutes of Meeting at J-M General Headquarters, (January 21, 1947) Notes of Air Hygiene Comm. (February 5, 1947) Letter from M. Bowditch to Vandiver Brown (March 18, 1947) Letter from Vandiver Brown to M. Bowditch (March 21, 1947) Letter from M. Bowditch to Vandiver Brown (March 24, 1947) "Still Does the Best Job," Asbestos Magazine (Spring 1947) V - 83 Bureau of Ships Manual, Chap. 39,Thermal Insulation (April 1, 1947) Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for Asbestos Textile Institute (June 18, 1947) Memorandum on Plant of Johns-Manville Corporation, (July 11, 1947) 1946-47 Air Hygiene Committee Report (September 25, 1947) Minutes of General Meeting (September 25, 1947) Minutes and Recommendations of the Air Hygiene Committee (Nov. 19, 1947) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1947) Hsalth- of Aic.HtlflaM.Ia. Steel.Ship Constcuotion> Public Health Bulletin No. 298 (1947) TBIA policy, with endorsements (1947) Asbestosis, Report to the Johns Manville Company (January 31, 1948) Minutes of Air Hygiene Committee (June 1948) V - 84 Travelers Policy, with endorsements (July 1, 1948) Contract NObs-2665 between the Navy Dept, and Bath Iron Works for Destroyers (August 3, 1948) Letter from V. Brown to W.T. Kelly (November 12, 1948) Letter from Dr. Vorwald to A. Lanza (December 6, 1948) Letter from Jackson to Morrison (December 8, 1948) Letter from A. Lanza to Dr. Vorwald (December 14, 1948) TSIA policy endorsements (1948) R. B. Anderson, "United States Maritime Commission Procedure" The Shipbuilding BuBineaa in the United States (1948) The Shinbuildino Business in the. United States. (F.G. Passett, Jr. ed.) (Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers 1948) V - 85 H.G. Smith and L.C. Brown, "Ship Statistics" in The Shipbuilding Business in the United States (1948) Bruce Catton, The War Lords of Washington -- The Inside..Story of Big Business. Versus the People in World War II (1948) R. B. Anderson, "United States Maritime Commission Procedure" The Shipbuilding Business in the United States (1948) Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign - Industrial Securities (1948) Asbestosis. Experimental Studies, Report to the Johns Manville Corporation, (January 31, 1949) Letter from Dr. Vorwald to Dr. K. Smith (October 15, 1949) TBIA policy with endorsements (1949) Travelers Policy with endorsements (1949) G. Fischer, A Statistical Svnpa.sv. Qt Shipbuilding Under the Maritime Commission Baring Jite.cl4 Ml II (1949) Blectric Mutual Insurance Policy, with endorsements (1949) V - 86 Letter from Dr. Vorwald to Dr. K. Smith (January 3, 1950) Letter from Smith to Lindell (January 28, 1950) Proposal from Saranac to QAMA (September 21, 1950) Letter from J.P. Woodard to Fisher (October 10, 1950) Amendment-1 to Military Specification for Tape, Insulating, Thermal MIL-T-15349 (Ships) (November 15, 1950) Electric Mutual Insurance Policy, with endorsements (1950) MiSpecMC 2861, Cement, Insulation, HighTemperature (August 23, 1951) Frederic C. Lane, Ships For Victory (1951) Letter from Arthur L. Fisk,Jr. to Dr. A. J. Lanza' (February 20, 1952) London: J-M Sales Operation in London Covers All of Free Europe, from JM News Pic (March 1952) V - 87 Navy Dept., Bureau of Ships, An Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships During World War II (1952) A.D. Tocter, Product. Histories. Textiles. Asbestos Plant (November 23, 1955) J.C. Rademaker, History of Magnesia Type Insulations (January 16, 1956) Cummins, A Century of Service With Johns- Ma.ny.Ule (1958) Purer, Administration of the Navy Department Purine World War II (1958) Robert P. Lanzillotti, "Pricing Objectives in Large Companies", American Economic Review (1958) Letter from Dr. Kenneth Smith to Detroit Bdison Company (February 19, 1959) History of the West Coast Insulation Indus^r* (September 1960) Annual Report of Associated Insulation CoalLas,t.QB of the.,.Western,,States (i960) Johns-Manville, Marinite History (1962) Administrator of General Services, Guide to Specifications and Standards at the Federal Sflvflsamaat (July 1963) V - 88 W. Marr, "Asbestos Exposure During Naval Vessel Overhaul," American Industrial Hygiene Association.Journal. Vol. 26, No. 3 (May-June 1964) Telegram from W.E. Hodgson to S. Lane (January 14, 1965) Letter from B.H. Jensen to B.C. Lindstrom (January 25, 1965) Letter from A. Pocius to W.H. Hodgson (January 29, 1965) Letter from B.C. Lindstrom to C.H. Jensen (January 29, 1965) Letter from C.H. Hodgson to A. Pocius (February 1, 1965) Letter from V.C. Lindsay to B.C. Lindstron (February 2, 1965) Telegram from C.H. Jensen to B.C. Lindstrom (February 8, 1965) Letter from C.H. Jensen to E.C. Lindstrom (February 9, 1965) Telegram from C.H. Jensen to E.C. Lindstrom (February 16, 1965) V - 89 Letter from E.C. Lindstrom to C.H. Jensen (February 16, 1965) I.J. Selikoff, J. Churg, and E.C. Hammond, "The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation United States," Annals of the New York Academy Workers in The of Sciences (December 31, 1965) Industrial Insulations, Manville, Chart, (1930-1967) j.A. Bettes, Jr., "The History of the Asbestos Textile Industry in the United States", Asbestos (August 1970) John Jobe Statement (March 14, 1972) Certificate of Death, issued in Milton, Massachusetts (July 31, 1972) R.L. Murphy, E.A. Gaensler, et al., Exposure to Asbestos: Gas Exchange in Ship Pipe Coverers and Controls, Arch. Industrial Health. Vol 25, (Oct. 1972) "Low Travelers Policy effective with endorsements effective (July 1, 1947) to (July 1, 1973) Borel v. Fibreboard. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert, denied. 419 U.S. 869 (1974) V -90 Memorandum from E.M. Fenner to G.W. Wright, M.D. (February 5, 1975) Letter from Fenner to Wright (December 17, 1975) Anthony F. Sarcone & Lawrence S, Rines, A History of Shipbuilding at Fore River (1975) Memorandum from Dr. P. Kotin to Fletcher (April 1, 1976) E. S. Dillon, L. Hoffman & D. Roseman, Forty Years of Ship Designs Under the Merchant Marine Act. 1936-1976 The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (reprint 1976) Department of Defense, Standardization Program Analysis, Ch. Ill "Policies and Procedures for Standardization Documents" (June 30, 1978) Letter from the Travelers Insurance Company to Larry Carr, Esquire (August 23, 1978) Preger, L., Arai, D., Kotin, P., Weill, Werchick, J., Asbestos-Related Disease. (1978) H., Haight, Dickson Bill to the Travelers Insurance Company (March 22, 1979) Letter from Allan Rodman to Johns-Manville Corporation with attachment (March 23, 1979) V -91 Haight, Dickson Bill to the Travelers (September 29, 1979) Haight, Dickson Bill to the Travekers (December 14, 1979) Drinan Answers to Interrogatories in In Re Asbestos Cases, CA # 79-2408 (D.S.C.) (February 1, 1980) Haight, Dickson Bill to the Travelers (March 31, 1930) Hospital Report by Dr. F. C. Christopher (April 23, 1980) Voucher (July 10, 1980) Plaintiff's Answers to Interrrogatories, Kina v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. et al. Civil Action No. TY-79-62-CA (E.D. Tex.) (August 8, 1980) Summary of Atmospheric Hygiene Studies--Manville Plant (August 31, 1980) Release by Gladys R. Ogle (October 9, 1980) Release by John Herlihy (October 14, 1930) Release (December 3, 1980) V 92 Release (December 3, . 1980) Answers and Interrogatories in Leaee v. Johns-Manville. SOC51185 (Sup. Ct. Cl.) (April 3, 1981) Impriano Release (April, 1981) Release by John Roche (July 23, 1981) Release and Indemnity Agreement by Rubin Shulman in Shulman v. Johns-Manville (November 12, 1981) Release by Edward Legee (November 15, 1981) Complaint in Roche v. Ravbestos-Manhattan. (July 6, 1982) Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's First Amended Counterclaim, Paragraph No. 137 (March 2, 1984), admitting Paragraph No. 137 of the First Amended Counterclaim (March 30, 1983) Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's First Ammended Counterclaim, Paragraph No. 137 (March 2, 1984), admitting Paragraph No. 137 of the First ammended Counterclaim (March 30, 1983) Manville's Application for Approval of its Insurance Settlement Agreement with Travelers Indemnity Company, Home Insurance Company and Certain Syndicates at Lloyds, London, V -93 Manville's Application for Approval of its Insurance Settlement Agreement with Travelers Indemnity Company, Home Insurance Company and Certain Syndicates at Lloyds, London, (August 2, 1984) Minutes of Organization Meeting of ATI (November 16, 1984) U.S. Patent 345, 843 Hanmore, H.M. (to Keasbey Mattison) (July 20, 1886) as cited in Castleman, Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects (1984) final Statement of the Johns-Manville (January 15, 1985) Claims and Parties Defenses of Trial Transcript, Vol. 38, California Insurance Litigation, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072, Opening Statement of Nelson Barry, Counsel for Commercial Union (May 10, 1985) Trial Transcripts, Vols. 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, California Insurance Litigation, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072 (May 10 - May 23, 1985) Special Verdict Forms for Use in Phase I of Trial of Johns-Manville Reliance and Commercial Union (May 30, 1985) Trial Transcript, Vol. 77, at 8833, V - 94 California Insurance Litigation, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072 (October 7, 1985) Trial Exhibits Nos. 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259 and 730 from Phase I of JohnsManville v. Reliance and Commercial Union, California Insurance Litigation, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072 (1985) Trial Exhibit Nos. 776 and 777, California Insurance Litigation, Johns-Manville v. Reliance and Commercial Union, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072 (1985) P. Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct (1985) Shuman v. United States. 765 F.2d 283, 290 1st Cir. (1985) Fortune (April 28, 1986) First Amended Disclosure Statement, (August 22, 1986), In re JohnsManville Corporation, et al.. No. 82 B 11656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) First Amended Disclosure Statement, Second Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization and Related Documents (August 26, 1986) , Exhibit III-A, Annual Report Incorporating Form 10-K for 1985, In re Johns-Manville Corporation, et al.. No. 82 B 11656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) V - 95 Application For An Order Granting Substantive Consolidation of the Debtors' Chapter 11 Cases, (August 26, 1986), In re Johns-Manville Corporation, et al. No. 82 B 11656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) Form 10-Q, Quarterly Report filed by Manville Corporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (September 30, 1986) Manville's Application for Approval of Agreement with Insurance Companies and (October 27, 1986) Settlement Brokers Manville's Application for Approval of Settlement Agreements with Insurance Companies and Brokers, Appendix A (October 27, 1986) Appendix B to Manville's Application for Approval of Settlement Agreements with Insurance Companies and Brokers (October 27, 1986) Affidavit of Richard B. Von Wald (November 10, 1986) in Support of Manville's Application for Approval of Settlement Agreements with Insurance Companies and Brokers (October 27, 1986) Settlement Agreements filed as Exhibits Nos. 41-188, Appendix A, Affidavit of Richard B. Von Wald (November 10, 1986) V - 96 Manville Memorandum on the Issues Involved in the California Insurance Litigation (November 10, 1986) Order Approving Manville's Application for Approval of Settlements with Insurance Companies and Brokers (November 19, 1986) Manville/s Application for Approval of its Insurance Settlement Agreement with Columbia and Continental (December 11, 1986) Manville's Application for Approval of its Insurance Settlement Agreement with Columbia and Continental ("CNA") (December 15, 1986) Determination of Confirmation Issues, In re Johns-Manville, et al.. No. 82 B (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (December 18, 1986) 11656 Order Confirming Debtors' Second Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization, In re Johns-Manville Corporation, et al. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (December 22, 1986) Letter from Nancy E. Stead to H. Michael Semler (January 22, 1987) Letter from Nancy E. Stead to H. Michael Semler (February 10, 1987) Letter from Richard M. Sandman to Anthony C. Roth (February 25, 1987) V - 97 Answers to Interrogatories of the United States in Johns-Manville v. United States of America (N.D. Cal.) (John Robinson Case) 41 U.S.C. 35 (e) Manville Revised Pretrial Statement Par. 808 (admission) Asbestos-containing Industrial Thermal Insulation and Asbestos-containing shipyard products (undated) Navy Specification, Insulation, (Pipecovering, Blocks and Cement), 32-P-3a (Undated) High Temperature J.J. Hayes, Jr., Corporate Marketing Services, and Marketing Manville (Undated) History Sales Johns-Manville Product Brochure, Suoerex Block Insulation (undated) Letter from Lt. Cmdr. H.G. Knox, Construction Corps, to Johns-Manville Co. (Undated) ' Letter from Lt. Cmdr. Johns-Manville Co. (Undated) Sheppard, Corp of Engineers to H.w. V - 98 Asbestos Containing Industrial Thermal Insulation and Asbestos Containing Shipyard Products (undated) Complaint, Houten v. Johns-Manville Corporation, et al. Summons in Civil Action, Houten v. Johns-Manville, et al. Boston Naval Shipyard Historical Review, 1938-1957 Listing of Ships Built at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard Complaint of Walter J. Archey and Jeannette L. Archey, Superior Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division, Civil Action No. 7860-78 Archey Complaint Johns-Manville Third Party Complaint Johns-Manvilie's Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories in Archey Case John-Manville's Answers to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories in Archey Case Release and settlement of claim--------Archey Case Complaint of Julius Rothman in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles No. C 246976 V - 99 Rothman Complaint Amended Complaint of Victor C. Impriano, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County No. 516 (109) Case No. 13 Amended Complaint on Trespass and Assumpsit of Victor C. Impriano Settlement sheet on Plaintiff: Impriano Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories of Fibreboard Corp., Clancy v. Fibreboard Coro., et al. Civil Action No. B-80-504-CA (E.D. Tex.) Death certificate of- James Clancy Complaint, Smith v. Johns-Manville Sales Corn.. et al. , Civil Action No. B-79-452-CA, ( E.D. Tex.) Release, Kina v. Johns-Manville Sales Corn., et al.. Civil Action No. TY-79-62-CA (8. - Maritime Administration, Permanent Survey of Completed Contracts 1936 - 1983(undated) V - 100 NavShips, Ship Contracts Awarded 1 January 1934 - 1 July 1955 Private U. S. Naval Shipyards and Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories of Fibreboard Corp., Clancv v. Fibreboard Coro.. et al. Civil Action No. B-80-504-CA (E.D. Tex.) Judgment, Smith v. Johns-Manville Sales Coro.. et al.. Civil Action No. B-79-452-CA, (E.D. Tex.) Manville Answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 151 in Palcerski. et al. v. Johns-Manville corp.. et al. Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, No. L-40507-80 (Palcerski Interrogatory Answers) Chart, Summary of Claims Against JohnsManville--------Manville Plant (undated) Amended Answer filed in Pierskowski v. Johns-Manville (undated) Manville Answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 161 in Palcerski. et al. v. Johns-Manville Corp.. et al., Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, No. L-40507-80 (Palcerski Interrogatory Answers) % ' Manville Answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 133 in Palcerski. et al. v. Johns-Manville Corn.. et al.. Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, No. L-40507-80 (Palcerski Interrogatory Answers) Manville Proposed Finding of Fact No. 809 V - 101 Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's Third Set of Interrogatories, No. 17 J-M document, Job Evaluation Procedure J-M document. The Award Letter from Union Asbestos & Rubber Company to the Navy Regional Price Adjustment Board (undated) Manville Answer to Interrogatory No. 457 in this case Manville's Finding of Fact No. 751 Tentative Plan, Industrial Hygiene Program, Dr. Vestal (undated) V - 102 VIII. CONCLUSION The United States requests the Court to adopt the foregoing Proposed Findings of Fact after trial. On the basis of these findings, the United States will be entitled to judgment on all remaining claims. DATED: March 10. 1987 J. CHARLES KRUSE Special Litigation Counsel ALBERT COHEN ROGER X. DAVIS ANTHONY C. ROTH JANET F. KATZ NANCY B. COLLINS SCOTT D. AU8TIN 8. MICHAEL SCADRON JANE MAHONEY DAVID S. FISHBACK Trial Attorneys Torts Branch Civile Division Respectfully submitted, RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney Civil Division General J. PATRICX GLYNN Director Torts Branch, Civil Division HAROLD J. ENGEL Deputy Director Torts Branch, Civil Division // l! -- H. MICHAEL SEMLER Supervisory Trial Attorney Torts Branch, Civil Division U.S. Department of Justice Ben Franklin Station P.Q. Box 340 Washington, D.C. 20044 Telephone: (202) 724-6749 Attorneys for the* United States V - 103 IN THE UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT JOHNS-MANVILLE CORPORATION and JOHNS-MANVILLE SALES CORPORATION Plaintiffs v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ____ ) Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 456-83C CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On March 10, 1987 I caused a copy of the foregoing Pretrial Statement of the United States to be hand carried to the following attorney of record at the following address: Harvey 6. Sherzer, Esquire Howrey & Simon 1730 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006-4793 ( I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on _____________________ H. MICHAEL SEMLER i Exhibits: 1944 Boston Naval Shipyard Job Application; Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 25-27. Witness: Joseph Teta. 4111. In his complaint against Manville and other asbestos product manufacturers, Fore River test claimant Phillip Houten stated that he worked at the Fore River Shipyard from May to September 1945. If this information is accurate, Phillip Houten could not have worked on any ship built pursuant to a contract involving the United States Maritime Commission because he did not start working at the Fore River Shipyard until May 1945 and the Fore River Shipyard delivered the last American Export Company C3-E cargo ship on January 23, 1942. Exhibits: Complaint, Houten v.Johns-Manville Corporation, et al.. at 2; Ships. Built Quincy Yard, at 25-27. 4112. All of the ship work at the Fore River Shipyard between 1939 and 1947 was new construction; no repair or conversion work was performed at the Fore River Shipyard between 1939 and 1947. IV - 50 2iui: Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 10-28. Witnesses: Joseph Teta; Thomas J. Walsh. 4113. Since the Fore River Shipyard did no repair or conversion work between 1939 and 1947, Joseph Teta worked only on new construction and was never exposed to a "ripout". Sshihil'Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 10-28. witness: Joseph Teta. 4114. Since the Fore River Shipyard did not do any repair or conversion work between 1939 and 1947, Phillip Houten could not have worked on anything but new construction during the period his complaint states he worked at the Fore River Shipyard. S2&ifei.: Ships Built Quincv Yard, at 10-28; complaint, phUUn Hovten v. Johns-ManviUe Corporation. IV - 51 4115. In their work at the Fore River Shipyard during World War II, neither test claimant Joseph Teta nor test claimant Phillip Houten worked directly with any asbestos-containing products. Exhibits; See paragraphs 4110-4111, supra. (iv) During World War II, The Fore River Shipyard Investigated The Then Known Risks Of Exposure To Asbestos And Took Steps To Assure That There Was No Asbestos Disease At The Fore River Shipyard 4116. From the beginning of World War II, the Fore River Shipyard had a plant safety and health program. The quality of the Fore River Shipyard health and safety program was recognized by persons beyond the Bethlehem Steel Company. For example, in February 1942, Philip Drinker of the Harvard School of Public Health wrote to the Surgeon General of the Navy and said: The importance of the Fore River plant, of the Bethlehem Steel Company, to our fighting forces is, of course, known to all. It [also] happens to have an experienced and capable medical organization. Bxhibit: Letter from Philip Drinker to the Surgeon General of the Navy (February 28, 1942). IV - 52 Witness: David C. McArthur. 4117. Like all other aspects of the Fore River Shipyard, the health and safety program expanded during World War II. The Fore River Shipyard's health facilities expanded when the United States pursuant to the facilities contract between the Bethlehem Steel Company and the United States of America paid for the erection of first aid and hospital buildings at a cost of $30,000. exhibit! Contract NOd-1534 between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940). 4118. When employment at the Fore River Shipyard reached its peak in 1943, the medical staff of the Fore River Shipyard was caring from more than 31,000 workers. In February 1943, the staff and facilities of the Fore River Shipyard medical program consisted of a well-equipped dispensary, three well-equipped sub-dispensaries, two ambulances, a plant surgeon with a staff of 12 doctors, 13 nurses, 17 first aid men, 1 physical therapist, 1 X-ray technician, and 11 clerks. By February 1943, the medical staff of the Fore River Shipyard was making between 24,000 and 25,000 treatments each month of which approximately 7,000 were for new injuries. Most treatments involved IV - 53 trauma injuries. Half of the new trauma injuries were eye injuries with the remaining trauma injuries distributed among strains, sprains, laceration, abrasions and contusions. Not surprisingly, the major concern of the health and safety personnel of the Fore River Shipyard was trauma induced injuries, especially injuries caused by "staging" accidents. The February 23, 24 and 25, 1943 "Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard)" noted that "[industrial illness is not very common." Exhibit: Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard), at 3-4 and 6 (February 23, 24 and 25, 1943). Wi-taeaaes: David C. McArthur; James F. Morgan; Frederick J. Viles; Kenneth W. Nelson. 4119. The Navy personnel working for SupShip at Quincy, Massachusetts did not have primary responsibility for health or safety conditions and did not inspect the Fore River Shipyard for health or safety hazards. Instead, the Navy personnel of SupShip at Quincy Massachusetts inspected the work itself and performed a quality control function IV - 54 while primacy responsibility for health and safety at the Fore River Shipyard was with the Bethlehem Steel Company. Exhibit: See Sections G(2) and G(4) of Vol. Ill, supra. witnesses: David C. McArthur; Joseph J. Mullen. 4120. Notwithstanding the fact that the overwhelming number of occupational injuries at the Fore River Shipyard during World War II were related to trauma- related injuries and notwithstanding the fact that no confirmed case of asbestos-related disease was found at the Fore River Shipyard prior to 1945, the Fore River Shipyard was extremely responsive to the potential threat of any occupational disease, including asbestosis. Sflfi, paragraph 4122-4141, infia. 4121. On July 16, 1940, Joseph Mullen, the Safety Director of the Fore River Shipyard, asked Dr. Blkins of the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries (MDLI) "how serious the hazards from handling asbestos insulation might be." Dr. Elkins stated that he knew of no cases of asbestosis arising from the handling of asbestos-containing insulation products. IV - 55 Exhibit: Memo from Dr. Elkins to Manfred Bowditch (July 22, 1940). Witness: Irving Tabershaw. 4122. Before February 1942, there were no suspected cases of asbestos-related illness among Fore River Shipyard workers. However, on February 11, 1942, Dr. Frederick N. Manley, the Fore River Shipyard plant surgeon, received a report that a Fore River Shipyard worker "employed applying molded asbestos pipe covering since 1938, prev. same employment Active Service 7-8 years, complains of disfuora etc., simulating silicosis. Xray rsicl by Dr. Altman, Quincy, indicates fibrosis both lungs. Symptoms, incl. disfuora, appear to be clearing up since off job." Exhibit: Notes (February 11, 1942/February 12, 1942). 4123. The facts related in paragraph 4120 were the basis for the first suspected case of asbestos-related illness at the Fore River Shipyard. Dr. Manley of the Fore River Shipyard immediately contacted the MDLI. By February 13, 1942, Dr. Manley had contacted Manfred Bowditch, director of the Division of Occupational Hygiene of the MDLI, to report a suspected asbestosis case in a Fore River Shipyard molded pipe insulator. IV - 56 Exhibits: Letter from Manfred Bowditch to Anthony J.Lanza (February 13, 1942); Memo from Manfred Bowditch to Mr. Hemson (February 15,1942). Witness: Irving Tabeshaw. 4124. When contacted by Dr. Manley of the Fore River Shipyard, the MDLI had never heard of cases of suspected asbestosis among shipyard workers. Mr. Bowditch of the MDLI so informed Dr. Manley. However, the MDLI looked into the matter further. On February 13, 1942, Manfred Bowditch of MDLI wrote to Dr. Anthony J. Lanza, Assistant Medical Director of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a known expert in occupational diseases. Mr. Bowditch informed Dr. Lanza that a suspected asbestosis case had been reported in a shipyard worker who had installed asbestos-containing pipe covering for 12 years. Since a thorough search of MDLI files had produced no references to asbestosis among shipyard workers, Mr. Bowditch asked Dr. Lanza if he knew of "any records of asbestosis in men engaged in this particular type of work." Exhibit? Letter from Manfred Bowditch to Anthony J. Lanza (February 13, 1942). IV - 57 4125. On February 16, 1942, Dr. Anthony J. Lanza of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, responded to Manfred Bowditch's February 13, 1942 letter. Dr. Lanza stated that nI think it is possible that this man may have asbestosis. As you know, we find our cases of asbestosis in those who fabricate asbestos and not in those who mine it. We have found evidence of it in men who trim asbestos pipe moldings, shingles, and other material of this nature, with a power saw." However, Dr. Lanza questioned the accuracy of the x- ray reading since a "competent roentgenologist" will "read a lot of pathology in the film of an average healthy chests" and suggested having the man's chest x-ray read by Homer Sampson. The Quincy doctor apparently misdiagnosed asbestosis in the Fore River Shipyard worker since his condition improved once he was away from his work. Exhibit; Letter from Anthony J. Lanza to Manfred Bowditch (February 16, 1942). Witness: Irving Tabershaw. 4126. On February 17, 1942, Manfred Bowditch wrote to Dr. Manley and enclosed a "brief item on asbestosis" which had been brought to his attention and which indicated that asbestosis among shipyard insulators was "recognized as IV - 58 possible." The "brief item" was an excerpt from "Industrial Hygiene and the Navy in National Defense" by Captain Ernest W. Brown and reprinted in War Medicine, vol. 1, p. 12 (1941). Exhibit: Letter from Manfred Bowditch to Frederic Manley (February 17, 1942). Witness: Irving Tabershaw. 4127. In 1941, Captain Ernest W. Brown had concluded in his article "Industrial Hygiene and the Navy in National Defense" that asbestosis "is a potential occupational] disease hazard due to inhalation of asbestos dust among workers engaged in the manufacture of asbestos insulating covers for flanges, valves and high temperature steam turbines." However, Captain Brown found as cases of asbestosis among New York Navy Yard pipe insulation shop workers who had worked as long as seventeen years. Captain Brown noted that the pipe insulation shop workers at the New York Navy Yard moistened the material, used localized exhaust ventilation and wore respirators during the dustiest aspects of the process. Captain Brown reported similar findings of && cases of asbestosis from two other unidentified shipyards. IV - 59 Exhibits: Captain Ernest W. Brown, "Industrial Hygiene and the Navy in National Defense", reprinted in War Medicine, vol. 1, p. 12 (1941); Letter from Manfred Bowditch to Frederic Manley (February 17, 1942); See Section G(4) of Vol. Ill, supra. Witness: Irving Tabershaw. 4128. When informed of the possibility of asbestos- related illness among shipyard pipe insulation shopworkers, Dr. Manley immediately investigated further. On February 24, 1942, Dr. Manley told Mr. Bowditch of MDLI that the Fore River Shipyard was "[p]lanning to make [a] survey of their pipe coverers, with x-ray." Exhibit: Note on February 17,1942 letter from Manfred Bowditch to Frederic N. Manley (February 24, 1942). Witness: Irving TaberBhaw. 4129. Dr. Manley did conduct an investigation to determine if there were any cases of asbestos-related illness among Fore River Shipyard workers. His investigation found no cases of asbestos-related disease among Fore River Shipyard workers. As Dr. J. Moriarty of IV - 60 Dr. Manley's staff told Dr. Morris of MDLI on November 12, 1942, "No further cases [of asbestosis] have occurred in the men handling [asbestos-containing pipe covering]" even though "[t]here has been no change in the type of work done, but less asbestos is being used and fiber glass is being substituted for it." Exhibit; Memo from Dr. Morris to Manfred Bowditch (December 15, 1942). wiAnsafi; Irving Tabershaw. 4130. On December 15, 1942, Manfred Bowditch noted that Dr. Frederic Manley was "satisfied [that the suspected case of asbestosis was] not asbestosis, in view of improvement; etc., * * *." exhibit: Notes on November 24, 1942 memo from Manfred Bowditch to Dr. Morris (December 15, 1942). Hi&PflflB: Irving Tabershaw. 4131. Despite the fact that Dr. Manley's survey had revealed no cases of asbestos-related illness in the Fore River Shipyard and despite the fact that there were literally hundreds of trauma-related injuries to be treated IV - 61 each day, the Fore River Shipyard implemented a program whereby "workers on asbestos [would] have routine chest xrays every six months." By February 1943, the Fore River Shipyard conducted "[p]eriodic examinations of those working in occupations potentially hazardous to themselves and others * * *. Special examinations [were] conducted in the individual case as indicated." In Nay 1943, the Fore River Shipyard began giving chest x-rays to all workers "directly exposed to silica." Exhibits: Nemo from Dr. Morris to Manfred Bowditch (November 16, 1942); Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard), at 5 (February 23, 24 and 25, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard), at 2 (May 11, 1943). Witnesses: Irving Tabershaw; James F. Morgan; Kenneth W. Nelson; Frederick J. Viles. 4132. Following the awareness of the potential but as yet unsubstantiated risk of asbestos-related disease among shipyard pipe insulation shopworkers the "ventilation program of the yard ha[d] been revised and enlarged * * * [with] a blower foreman * * * [who was] assisted by a IV - 62 ventilation crew of 86 men." The ventilation crew had at its disposal 13 deck blowers, 397 Coppus blowers, 880 HiVenter blowers, 6 Mine blowers and 4 Sawyer blowers. This was a major increase from December 1940 when the Fore River Shipyard was commended for "[a] special crew of 25 to 30 men (2 shifts) [who] have no other duties than to transport, arrange and service the exhaust equipment for welders, an admirable arrangement." Exhibits: Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard), at 20 (February 23, 24 and 25,1943); Memo from Mr. Hemson to Mr. Bowditch (December 12, 1940). 4133. In May 1945, a United States Maritime Commission inspector concluded that the "ventilation provided [in] working areas aboard ship and in the [Fore River] Yard [was] satisfactory." At that time, even though the Fore River Shipyard work force was much smaller than in February 1943, the Fore River Shipyard had 691 200x Hi- Ventor blowers, 346 Coppus blowers, 6 Sawyer Master blowers and 9 490E Hi-Ventor blowers. Bxhibit: Industrial Health Re-Survev of the Bethlehem Steel Company Shipbuilding Division (Fore River Yard), at 9 (May 23, 24 and 25,1943). IV - 63 4134. Throughout World War Tl, the Fore River Shipyard had respirators available for workers to wear. The respirators could be checked out from the central tool room of the Fore River Shipyard. Whether workers actually wore a respirator was a matter of personal choice. In February 1943, the Fore River Shipyard had four types of respirators available in its central tool room: metal fume respirators, dust respirators, air line respirators and chemical cartridge respirators. The May 1945 "Industrial Health Re Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company Shipbuilding Division (Fore River)" reported that the Fore River Shipyard had "37 air line respirators, 214 American Optical R1000 respirators (approved for pneumoconiosis and nuisance dusts) and 4,088 Mine Safety Appliance Comfo respirators * * * [which could] be equipped with filters approved for toxic dusts or used with metal fume filters for toxic dust." Bxhibits: Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard), at 10-11 (February 23, 24 and 25); Industrial Health Re-survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company Shipbuilding Division (Fore River Yard^. at 8-9 (May 23, 24 and 25, 1945). Witnesses: Thomas J. Walsh; David C. McArthur. IV - 64 4135. During 1943, 1944 and 1945, the United States Maritime Commission conducted health or safety surveys at the Fore River Shipyard on five occasions. One of the items which the Maritime Commission officers looked for were violations of the Minimum Requirements concerning asbestos. In only one of the surveys is asbestos mentioned. On May 23, 24 and 25, 1945, Lieutenants Viles and Sade conducted a health re-survey of the Fore River Shipyard and reported that: Scrap pieces of 85% magnesia and Superex pipe sections are ground up for cement once or twice a year for periods of about a week. The grinder is located in a small room and is so constructed that the hopper is loaded in the adjoining room where the bags of scrap material are stored. The material averages about 30% of Superex scrap. One man operates the grinder. He wears an approved respirator when he is in the room with the grinder but not while he is loading the hopper. It is recommended that this workman wear his respirator while he is loading the scrap as well as when he is in the room with the grinder. Bxhibits: Industrial Health Re-Survev of the Bethlehem Steel CamaaBY Shipbuilding.Division (Fore Rive* Yard), at 4 (May 23, 24 and 25, 1945); Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard). (February 23, 24 and 25, 1943; Industrial Health Survey of the Bethlehem Steel Company (Fore River Yard). (May 11, 1943); InduatEial Health SmygY of. the. BethlefrOT* Steel Company (Fore River Yard). (May 11 and 12, 1943); Report of Industrial Safety Re-Survev of the Bethlehem Steel Company Quincv Yard. (November 21 and 22, 1944). IV - 65 Frederick J. Viles. 4136. Between the end of 1942 and 1945, no cases of asbestos-related disease were reported or diagnosed at the Fore River Shipyard. 4137. In 1945, the United States Maritime Commission surveyed the Fore River Shipyard for asbestos- related illnesses among pipe coverers. The survey, which was suggested by Philip Drinker, was conducted with the consent of the Bethlehem Steel Company and the Fore River Shipyard. Exhibits: Letter from BuShips (768) to the Supervisor of Shipbuilding at Quincy, Massachusetts (February 24, 1945); Letter from Marion A. Roberts to BuShips (768) (March 6, 1945); Letter from R. K. Jones to Dr. Philip Drinker (March 14, 1945). 4138. On September 21, 1945, Dr. Philip Drinker submitted his Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels (the Drinker study) to Admiral Mills of the Bureau of Ships. Exhibits: Letter from Phillip Drinker to Admiral Mills of the Bureau of Ships (September 21, 1945); IV - 66 Sfifi Section G(4)(c) of Vol. Ill, S21EJL&. 4139. In his survey of the Fore River Shipyard, Philip Drinker reviewed the x-rays of the eight men who worked in the Fore River Shipyard pipe covering shop and the 160 men who worked as pipe coverers on board ships constructed at the Fore River Shipyard. Of the 168 Fore River Shipyard workers examined, only two showed any evidence of asbestosis. Both men found to have asbestos is had moderate cases and had worked as pipe coverers for more than twenty years. Among the 159 Fore River Shipyard pipe coverers who had worked in the pipe covering industry for less than eleven years, the Drinker study found ng cases of asbestosis. Among the Fore River Shipyard workers who had worked as pipe covers for more than ten years, only 22% were diagnosed as having any sign of asbestosis. Bxhibit: A Health Study of Pipe Covering Operations in CongtmsUhq flaval Vessels* at l, is, 24, and 25. 4140. The Drinker study concluded that the "incidence of asbestosis found was low - 0.29% (3 cases out of 1074 x-rayed). Since each of these 3 men had worked at asbestos pipe covering in shipyards for more than 20 years, it may be concluded that such pipe covering is not a dangerous occupation." IV - 67 Exhibit: A Health Study of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels, at 26. 4141. As shown by the number of pipe coverers working at Pore River in 1945 (i.e.. 168 surveyed by Philip Drinker), pipe coverers constituted a very small percentage of a shipyard work population. At the peak of private shipyard employment in 1943, pipe coverers constituted only .2% of the private shipyard work force. Exhibits: A Health Study of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels, at 1, 15, 24, and 25; United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wartime Bmplovment, Production and Conditions of Work in Shipyards. Bulletin No. 824, at 24 (May 1945). 4142. Pipe coverers did not work on a ship during all phases of its construction and did not work throughout a ship. As a result, there were many times when workers from other trades did not work in the vicinity of a pipe coverer. For example, for a boilermaking working at the Fore River Shipyard during World War II, there were times that no pipe coverers were working around him and there were never pipe coverer8 in the boiler shop. Moreover, pipe coverers would not be present during the early boiler construction stages. Likewise, for a welder working at the Fore River Shipyard IV - 68 during World War II, there were many times when no pipe coverers were working in the same area. During World War II, pipe coverers would not work right on top of welders because it would have been harmful to the pipe coverers' eyes and the pipes welded had to cool and be inspected before they were covered with insulation. Witnesses; Harold Seacrist; Joseph Teta; Joseph Mullen. 4143. There is insufficient evidence to establish that asbestos dust levels (whether an "asbestos dust" or a "total dust" measurement) at the Fore River Shipyard were over five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time. See Section G(4) and G(5) of Vol. Ill, supra. (v) During World War II, Many People Including Manville's Salesmen Had Access To the Fore River Shipyard 4144. During World War II, many people had access to the Fore River Shipyard and to the ships under construction in the Fore River Shipyard. There is no evidence that the Fore River Shipyard materially changed its access requirements during World War II and there is no evidence that the Navy ever used its contract authority to IV - 69 increase security at the Pore River Shipyard or to limit access to the Fore River Shipyard or the ships under construction at the Fore River Shipyard. Sfifl paragraphs 4147-4149, infra: Sfl& F(6)(a) of Vol. Ill, supra. 4145. In 1938 and 1939, Manville salesman A. H. Maccabe visited the Fore River Shipyard about once a week. Once or twice a year, Norman Adams would accompany Mr. Maccabe to the Fore River Shipyard. To gain admission to the Fore River Shipyard, Mr. Maccabe and Mr. Adams merely showed their Manville company identification, identified who they were there to see and signed in on the visitors' log. They were then given a visitors' badge which allowed them access to the entire shipyard. Witness: Norman J. Adams. 4146. The United States Navy did not require the Fore River Shipyard to alter its pre-war security/access system either by increasing or decreasing its security measures. Sflft paragraphs 4147-4154, infra. 4147. On April 25, 1939, Bethlehem Steel Company contracted with the United States of America to build two light cruisers at the Fore River Shipyard. These contracts IV - 70 do not mention plant security, plant protection or- plant access. Therefore, the shipyard could decide all issues of access and security. Although the cruisers built under the April 25, 1939 contracts were not completed and delivered to the Navy until January and February 1942, the contracts were not amended to mention plant security, plant protection or plant access. Exhibits: Contract NOd-1124 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 25, 1939? Contract NOd-1125 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (April 25, 1939). 4148. In July, September and December 1940, the Bethlehem Steel Company contracted with the United States of America to build four destroyers, six light cruisers, eight heavy cruisers and four aircraft carriers. Each of these contracts originally contained a "Special plant protection" clause which said: (d) In addition to the ordinary precautions heretofore adopted by the contractor for the guarding and protection of its plant and work, the contractor shall provide such additional watchmen and devices for the protection of its plant and property and the work in process for the Department against espionage, acts of war, and acts of enemy aliens as may be required by the Secretary of Navy. The additional costs thereof shall be treated as a change under this contract. On April 7, 1941, the Acting Secretary of the Navy modified the "Special plant protection clause" to read: IV - 71 (d) In addition to the ordinary precautions heretofore adopted by the Contractor for the guarding and protection of its plant and work, the Contractor shall provide, as may be required by the Secretary of the Navy, or the Chief of the Bureau of Ships as his duly authorized representative, such additional watchmen and devices for the protection of its plant and property and the work in process for the Department against espionage, acts of war, and acts of enemy aliens. The additional cost thereof shall be treated as a change under this contract. The ships provided pursuant., to these contracts were built at the Fore River Shipyard between May 1941 and October 1946. During that entire time, there is no evidence that the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of the Bureau of Ships ever requested that the Fore River Shipyard increase security measures to enhance shipyard protection or limit shipyard access. BxhibitS: Contract NOd-1439 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July 1, 1940); Contract N0d-1440 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (July 1, 1940); Contract NOd-1491 Between the United States of Ameclea and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940); Contract NOd-1493 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940); Contract NOd-1496 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (September 9, 1940); Contract NOd-1632 Between the United States of IV - 72 America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (December 16, 1940). 4149. On October 29, 1942, October 1, 1944 and December 9, 1943, the Bethlehem Steel Company contracted with the United States of America to build eighteen destroyer escorts, four destroyers and twenty-four landing ship tanks pursuant to contract numbers Nobs-840, 1339 and 1417. Article 14 of the General Provisions of each contract provided: Article 14. Plant Protection. -- (a) The Contractor shall provide for its plant and the work in process under the contract such safeguards, including personnel, devices and equipment, as would constitute reasonable protection under peacetime conditions (in light of the size of the plant and the scope of its operations) against all hazards, including unauthorized entry, malicious mischief, theft, vandalism and fire. (b) In addition to the foregoing precautions, the Contractor shall provide such additional safeguards as may be required or approved by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships for the protection of its plant and the work in process under the contract against espionage, sabotage, and enemy action. The cost to the Contractor, as determined by the Special Board on Changes of the Navy Department, of all safeguards so required or approved shall, to the extent allocable to the contract[*], be reimbursed to the Contractor. Such cost shall not include any allowance on account of overhead expenses, except shop overhead charges incident to the construction or installation of such devices or equipment. (c) Upon payment by the Department of the cost to the Contractor of any devices or equipment required or approved under paragraph (b) of this Article, title thereto shall vest in the Department, and the Contractor shall comply with the instruction of the Department respecting the identification and disposition thereof. No part ' IV - 73 or item of any such devices or equipment shall be or become a fixture by reason of affixation to any realty not owned by the United States. [* - Contract Nobs-840 included the additional phrase "and not otherwise reimbursed to the Contractor".] The ships provided pursuant to these contracts were built at the Fore River Shipyard between February 1943 and July 1944 and March 1945 and September 1946. During this entire time, there is no evidence that the Chief of the Bureau of Ships ever requested that the Fore River Shipyard increase security measures to enhance shipyard protection or limit shipyard access. Exhibit: Contract Nobs-840 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October 29, 1942); Contract Nobs-1339 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (October If 1943); Contract Nobs-1417 Between the United States of America and the Bethlehem Steel Company (December 9, 1943). 4150. That the Navy did not require the Fore River Shipyard to increase its security measures during World War II is clear from the fact that methods for obtaining access to the shipyard did not change during World War II. See paragraph 4145, sapia, and paragraphs 4151-4154, infra. IV - 74 4151. Before and during World War II, Fore River Shipyard security workers checked employee badges as the employees entered the shipyard through several gates. Once inside the shipyard gates, there was no further security at the ships being constructed; i.e.. there was no secur ity worker checking badges at the gangplanks of ships which were under construction. Witnesses: Joseph Teta; Harold Seacrist; David C. McArthur. 4152. During World War II, Fore River Shipyard workers saw persons other than shipyard workers in the Fore River Shipyard and on board ships being built at the Fore River Shipyard. Witnesses; Harold Seacrist; David C. McArthur. 4153. Before and during World War II, Charles 0. Garcelon, a Manville salesman, would visit the Fore River Shipyard when Manville's regular salesman, A. H. Maccabe, was on vacation or otherwise unable to conduct the business with the Fore River Shipyard. Though he was not a regular visitor to the shipyard, Charlie 0. Garcelon was allowed IV - 75 into the Pore River Shipyard upon showing his Manville company card. Witness; Charles 0. Garcelon. 4154. A. H. Maccabe, the Manville salesman responsible for selling insulation products to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II, visited in the Fore River Shipyard regularly. witness : Charles 0. Garcelon. 4155. Throughout World War II, the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries visited the Fore River Shipyard about once a month. There is no evidence that any representative of the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries was ever denied access to the Fore River Shipyard. Witnesses: David C. McArthur; Irving Tabershaw. IV - 76 (iv) Thece Is No Evidence That The Following Johns-Manville Asbestos-Containing Products Were Used At The Fore River Shipyard During World War II 4156. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold asbestos cloth to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4157. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold asbestos tape to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4158. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold #450 Cement for Navy to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4159. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold Superex Cement for Navy to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4160. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold 85% Magnesia Cement to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4161. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold Firefelt or Roll Firefelt to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4162. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold IV - 77 Amosite Asbestos Felt to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4163. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold Electric Cable Filler to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4164. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold Marine Tape to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4165. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold #102 Special Navy Asbestos Millboard to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4166. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold Akoustikos Felt to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4167. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold Ebony Asbestos to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4168. There is no evidence that Manville ever sold Compressed Sheet Packing to the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. IV - 78 (c) The Consolidated Shipyard (i) The Consolidated Shipyard Built Only Navy Ships 4169. Between 1940 and 1946, 245 ships were built at the Consolidated Steel Corporation Shipbuilding Division (Consolidated Shipyard) in Orange, Texas. Bxhibit: NavShips, Ship Contracts Awarded 1 January 1934 1 July 1955 Private and U. S. Naval Shipyards, at 91-94; History of the Office of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, U.S.N., Orange, Texas (October 1, 1945). 4170. All of the ships built at the Consolidated Shipyard were for the Navy. The first keel was laid at the Consolidated Shipyard on May 14, 1941 pursuant to Contract No. NOd-1512 for 12 destroyers. The last ship under this contract was delivered July 31, 1943. Exhibits: NavShips, Ship Contracts Awarded 1 January 1934-1 July 1955 Private and U. S. Naval Shipyards, at 91-94; H.6. Chalkley, History of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding. U.S.N. at 3 (October 1, 1945); Contract No. NOd-1512 for the Construction of Twelve Destroyers Nos. DD569 to DD 580, Inclusive, between United States and Consolidated Steel Corporation at Orange, Texas (September 9, 1940). IV - 79 4171. The Consolidated Shipyard built another thirteen destroyers under Contract No. NObs-1111 between January and December 30, 1945. Under Contract No. NObs- 1994, seven of these destroyers were built between January and December, 1946. Exhibitst NavShips, Ship Contracts Awarded 1 January 1934 1 July 1955 Private and U. S. Naval Shipyards, at 91-94. 4172. Under Contract Nos. NObs-378, 334, and 844, the Consolidated Shipyard built 93 destroyer escorts. The first ship built pursuant to this contract was delivered on October 12, 1943 and the last ship built pursuant to this contract was delivered on November 11, 1943. Exhibit: NavShips, Ship Contracts Awarded 1 January 1934 1 July 1955 Private and U. S. Naval Shipyards, at 91-94. 4173. Pursuant to Contract Nos. NObs-203 and 1411 awarded on October 24, 1942 and December 11, 1943 respec tively, the Consolidated Shipyard built 151-foot landing craft which required no asbestos-containing insulation. Under Contract No. NObs-203, the Consolidated Shipyard delivered the first vessel of 36 on November 12, 1942 and the last vessel on February 15, 1943. Under Contract No. NObs-1411, the Consolidated Shipyard delivered the first IV - 80 vessel of 70 on March 18, 1944 and the last vessel on June 15, 1944. Exhibit: NavShips, Ship Contracts Awarded 1 January 1934 1 July 1955 Private and U. S. Naval Shipyards, at 91-94. 4174. The Consolidated Shipyard also converted nine destroyer escorts into'high speed transports under Contract No. NObs-1791. Exhibit: NavShips, Ship Contracts Awarded 1 January 1934 1 July 1955 Private and U. S. Naval Shipyards, at 91-94. 4175. The Consolidated Shipyard built no ships pursuant to three-party Maritime Commission contracts. (ii) A Manville Contract Unit Performed The Pipe Covering Work At The Consolidated Shipyard 4176. Asbestos and Magnesia Materials Company (A & M) did all the piping insulation at the Consolidated Shipyard during World War II. In 1942, Manville asked A & M to bid on the contract to supply materials and labor for insulation of Naval vessels being built at the Consolidated Shipyard. At that time, A & M was a technical service unit for Manville. A technical service unit is a Manvilie- approved insulating contractor and distributor. Unless they IV - 81 could not obtain needed products from Manviller ASM used Manville products almost exclusively. Witness: John Dragisic. 4177. All of the contracts between A & M and the Consolidated Shipyard were lump-sum or fixed-price contracts. As such, cost overruns had to be absorbed by A & M. Witness: John Dragisic. 4178. The bid price of A & M included labor, materials, insurance, taxes, overhead and profit. All of A & M's insurance was placed through United States Fidelity and Guaranty. This included worker's compensation, public liability, property damage and any other insurance required by the job. Obviously, A & M never had any understanding with the Consolidated Shipyard or the United States that either would insure or indemnify A & M since A & M never contracted with the United States during World War II. Witness: John Dragisic. 4179. A & M purchased all its insulation materials directly from various manufacturers and did not receive IV - 82 insulation materials either through the Navy or the Consoli dated Shipyard. When insulation materials were purchased from Manville, A & M placed a blanket order with Manville. The blanket order gave Manville an idea of the amount and types of insulation products desired and allowed it to do factory scheduling. When A & M placed the blanket order with Manville, it assigned to Manville the priority rating it had received. Witness: John Dragisic. iii) Consolidated Shipyard and A & M Took Reasonable Steps To Protect Workers Prom Hazards_________ 4180. The Consolidated Shipyard provided for medical care at the shipyard through its workers' compensation carrier. In 1944, medical personnel at the Consolidated Shipyard included a Medical Director, six physicians, 11 nurses and six clerks. Bshibit: Industrial Health Survey of the Consolidated Steel Corporation. Ltd. Shipbuilding Division Oranoe. Xazafi., at 1-3 (March 7 and 8, 1944). 4181. As with the Fore River Shipyard, industrial accidents were the most immediate concern of the medical personnel. In December 1943,^here were 4,440 industrial accidents at the Consolidated Shipyard and the medical IV - 83 personnel made 9,680 treatments. In December 1944, there were 4,401 industrial accidents at the Consolidated Shipyard and the medical staff made 10,069 treatments. Exhibit: Industrial Health Survey of the Consolidated Steel Corporation. Ltd. Shipbuilding Division Prance. Texas. at 6 (March 7 and 8, 1944). 4182. In 1943, the Consolidated Shipyard had over 2,000 respirators which could be checked out at one of its tool rooms. Of these respirators, 35 were air line respirators and 100 had "N.S.A. Dustofoe Respirator filters." In addition to the shipyard's respirators, A & M also provided respirators for their employees throughout World War II. A & M employees often would not wear them but employees in the fabricating shops did wear dust masks. Industrial Hygiene Report of the Consolidated Steel Corporation of Texas. Prance. Texas, at 9 (June 9, 10 and 11, 1943). Witness: Walter Odenkirk. 4183. The Consolidated Shipyard had a ventilation division organized as part of the welding department. The ventilators, as the persons who worked in this division were called, worked with all the crafts in the shipyards and took every opportunity to train the workmen in the correct usage IV - 84 of ventilation equipment. The ventilators made a constant tour of the hulls of ships under construction to assure that the necessary ventilation was in place before it was requested. The department had over 600 local exhaust fans and over 200 pieces of general ventilation equipment, mostly of the propeller type. Szhihin Industrial Hygiene Report of the Consolidated Steel Coro of Texas. Orange. Texas (June 9-11, 1943). 4184. The Consolidated Shipyard carried workers' compensation insurance and paid premiums based on the anticipated rate of injury and illness for the shipyard. At the end of 1943, the Consolidated Shipyard received a huge refund because compensable injuries and illness arising at the shipyard had not occurred as anticipated. Witness: Russell Townsend. 4185. The Maritime Commission conducted an Industrial Hygiene Survey at the Consolidated Shipyard in 1943 and an Industrial Health Survey in 1944. In neither report of these surveys did the inspectors identify any asbestosrelated hazard. IV - 85 Exhibits; Industrial Hygiene Report of the Consolidated Steel Com of Texas. Orange. Texas (June 9-11, 1943); Industrial Health Survey of the Consolidated Steel Corporation. Ltd. Shipbuilding Division Orange. Texas (March 7 and 8, 1944). 4186. The Consolidated Shipyard was also to be included in the survey of respiratory diseases done as part of the Joint Navy-Maritime Commission program for improvement of industrial safety and health in shipyards. Exhibit: Memorandum from Chief of Accounts, BuShips, to Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Orange, Tex. (April 20, 1944). 4187. There is no evidence that, during World War II, there was ever a reported case of asbestos-related disease at the Consolidated Shipyard. 4188. There is insufficient evidence to establish that asbestos dust levels (whether an "asbestos dust" or a "total dust" measurement) at the Consolidated Shipyard were over five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time. Sfifi Sections 6(4) and G(5) of Vol. Ill, supra. IV - 86 (iv) Manville Had Access To The Consolidated Shipyard During World War II 4189. If A & M had a question or a problem with any of the products supplied by Manville during World War II, Manville would send someone to the Consolidated Shipyard. While there, the Manville representative would go aboard the ships under construction. There were no restrictions on movement within the yard or aboard the ships except that special clearance was required to enter the radar room. Witnesses; John Dragisic; Walter Odenkirk. 4190. There is no evidence that access to the Consolidated Shipyard during World War II was any more restricted than access at the west coast shipyards which were visited frequently by representatives of various asbestos product manufacturers, including Manville. Exhibit: Sfifi Section F(6)(b) of Vol. Ill, supra. Witness: John B. Crawford. IV - 87 I. MANVILLE'S SETTLEMENTS WITH THE TEST CLAIMANTS (1) Manville's Settlements With Boston Navy Yard Test Claimants (a) Chester Anderson 4191. Between 1937 and 1941, Chester Anderson worked as a pipe coverer at the Fore River Shipyard and the Bath Iron Works Shipyard. Between 1941 and 1947, Mr. Anderson worked at the Boston Navy Yard as a pipe coverer (insulator). Mr. Anderson was exposed to asbestos fiber before World War II. Exhibit: Tax Returns of Chester Anderson dated 1942, 1943 and 1945. Witness: Chester Anderson. 4192. On July 10, 1980, Chester Anderson settled his claim against Manville for $3,000. fizbjybjLlL* Voucher (July 10, 1980). 4193. Prior to settling Chester Anderson's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville by fester Anderson. IV - 88 4194. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling Chester Anderson's claim. 4195. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with Chester Anderson. 4196. There is a reasonable probability that Chester Anderson's disease, if any, is not due to exposure to Manville asbestos-containing products. 4197. There is no evidence that Chester Anderson was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) over a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Boston Navy Yard. 4198. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by Chester Anderson. 4199. Manville has received full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Chester Anderson in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4200. Manville will receive full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to IV - 89 Chester Anderson in settlement of this claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4201. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Chester Anderson were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. 4202. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Chester Anderson resulted from willfull misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4203. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to Chester Anderson. 4204. Manville's settlement with Chester Anderson was unreasonable. (b) Thapas 4205. From 1942 to 1943, Thomas Drinan worked at the Boston Navy Yard as an apprentice boilermaker. As an apprentice boilermaker, Mr. Drinan worked on boilers both in the boiler shop and on board ships. Witness: Thomas Drinan. IV - 90 4206. After World War II, Thomas Drinan worked for approximately 30 years as an employee of the Boston Navy Yard (1952-1955, 1960-1973) and of the Charleston Navy Yard (1973-1986). Thomas Drinan was exposed to asbestos fibers after the end of World War II. gshifeli! Drinan Answers to Interrogatories in In Re Asbestos Cases. CA # 79-2408 (D.S.C.) February 1, 1980. Witness: Thomas Drinan. . 4207. On December 3, 1980, Mr. Drinan settled his claim against Manville for $45,000. Bahibit: Release by Thomas Drinan (December 3, 1980). Witness: Thomas Drinan. 4208. Prior to settling Thomas Drinan's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville by Thomas Drinan. 4209. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling Thomas Drinan's claim. IV - 91 4210. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with Thomas Drinan. 4211. There is a reasonable probability that Thomas Drinan's disease, if any, is not due to exposure to Manville asbestos-containing products. 4212. Thomas Drinan's asbestos-related illness, if any, was solely the result of his post-world War II asbestos exposure. 4213. There is no evidence that Thomas Drinan was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Boston Navy Yard during 1942 and 1943. 4214. Thomas Drinan's exposure to asbestos dust was intermittent and there were many times when he was not working with or in the vicinity of asbestos-containing products. 4215. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by Thomas Drinan. 4216. Manville has received full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid to Thomas IV - 92 Drinan in settlement o his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4217. Manville will receive full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Thomas Drinan in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4218. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Thomas Drinan were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. 4219. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Thomas Drinan resulted from willfull misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4220. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to Thomas Drinan. 4221. Manville's settlement with Thomas Drinan was unreasonable. (c) Rubin Shulman 4222. From 1942 to 1946, Rubin Shulman worked at the Boston Navy Yard as a pipe coverer. Witness: IV - 93 Rubin Shulman. 4223. After World War II, Rubin Shulman worked for approximately 22 years as a pipe coverer at the Brooklyn Navy Yard (1952-1965) and the Long Beach Navy Yard (1965 1973). Rubin Shulman was exposed to asbestos fibers after the end of World War II. Witness; Rubin Shulman. 4224. When Rubin Shulman worked as a pipe coverer at the Boston Navy Yard during World War II, ventilation was provided when he cut insulation. Witness; Rubin Shulman. 4225. On November 12, 1981, Rubin Shuman settled his claim against Manville for $2,500. gahlblt: Release and Indemnity Agreement by Rubin Shulman (November 12, 1981). 4226. Prior to settling Rubin Shulman's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville by Rubin Shulman. 4227. Manville did not give the United States an IV - 94 opportunity to participate in the process of settling Rubin Shulman's claim. 4228. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with Rubin Shulman. 4229. There is a reasonable probability that Rubin Shulman's disease, if any, is not due to exposure to Manville asbestos-containing products. 4230. Rubin Shulman's asbestos-related illness, if any, was solely the result of his post-World War II asbestos exposure. .- 4231. There is no evidence that Rubin Shulman was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Boston Navy Yard. 4232. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by Rubin Shulman. 4233. Manville has received full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Rubin Shulman in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. IV - 95 4234. Manville will receive full or partial insurance reimbursement of any moneys it paid out to Rubin Shulman in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. ^ 4235. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Rubin Shulman were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. 4236. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Rubin Shulman resulted from willfull misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4237. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to Rubin Shulman. 4238. Manville's settlement with Rubin Shulman was unreasonable. (d) Bwald Leaee 4239. From 1942 to 1945, Ewald Legee worked at the Boston Navy Yard as a marine mechanic. Exhibit! Answers and Interrogatories in Legee v.JohnsManville. SOC51185 (Sup. Ct. Cal.) (April 3, 1981). IV - 96 4240. From 1962 to 1975, Ewald Legee worked as a marine mechanic at the Long Beach Navy Yard. Mr. Legee was exposed to asbestos fibers after the end of World War II. SxhAb-U. : Answers and Interrogatories in Legee v.JohnsManville. SOC51185 (Sup. Ct. Cal.) (April 3, 1981). 4241. On November 15, 1981, Bwald Legee settled his claim against Manville for $30,000. Exhibit: Release by Edward Legee (November 15, 1981). 4242. Prior to settling Bwald Legee's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville by Ewald Legee. 4243. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling Ewald Legee's claim. 4244. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with Bwald Legee. 4245. There is a reasonable probability that Ewald Legee's disease, if any, is not due to exposure to Manville asbestos-containing products. IV - 97 4246. Ewald Legee's asbestos-related illness, if any, was solely the result of his post-World War II asbestos exposure. 4247. There is no evidence that Ewald Legee was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Boston Navy Yard. 4248. Ewald Legee's exposure to asbestos dust while working at the Boston Navy Yard was intermittent and there were many times when he was not working in the vicinity of asbestos-containing products. 4249. The United States paid Federal Employee Compensation Act benefits to Ewald Legee. 4250. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by Ewald Legee. 4251. Manville has received full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Ewald Legee in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4252. Manville will receive full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Ewald IV - 98 Legee in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4253. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Ewald Legee were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. 4254. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Ewald Legee resulted from willfull misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4255. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to Ewald Legee. 4256. Manville's settlement with Ewald Legee was unreasonable. (e) John Roche 4257. From 1939 to 1944, John Roche worked at the Boston Navy Yard as a sheetmetal worker. Bshibit: Complaint in Roche v. Ravbestos-Manhattan. (July 6, 1982). 4258. On July 23, 1981, Mr. Roche settled his claim against Manville for $6,000. IV - 99 Exhibit: Release by John Roche (July 23, 1981). 4259. Prior to settling John Roche's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville by John Roche. 4260. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling John Roche'8 claim. 4261. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with John Roche. 4262. There is a reasonable probability that John Roche's disease, if any, is not due to exposure to Manville asbestos-containing products. 4263. There is no evidence that John Roche was exposed to asbestos duBt levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Boston Navy Yard. 4264. John Roche's exposure to asbestos dust while working at the Boston Navy Yard was intermittent and there were many times when he was not working in the vicinity of asbestos-containing products. IV - 100 4265. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by John Roche. 4266. Manville has received full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to John Roche in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4267. Manville will receive full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to John Roche in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4268. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of John Roche were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. 4269. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of John Roche resulted from willfull misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4270. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to John Roche. 4271. Manville's settlement with John Roche was unreasonable. (f) William Ogle IV - 101 4272. William Ogle worked at the Boston Navy Yard from 1941 to 1945. Mr. Ogle died of mesothelioma in 1972. Exhibit: . Letter from Allan Rodman to Johns-Manville Corporation with attachment (March 23, 1979); Certificate of Death, issued in Milton, Massachusetts (July 31, 1972). 4273. On October 9, 1980, William Ogle's widow settled a claim (on behalf of William Ogle) against Manville for $6,000. Bxhibit: Release by Gladys Ogle (October 9, 1980). 4274. Prior to settling William Ogle's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville on behalf of William Ogle. 4275. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling William Ogle's claim. 4276. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville'8 settlement with William Ogle. 4277. There is a reasonable probability that IV - 102 William Ogle's disease, if any, was not due to exposure to Manville asbestos-containing products. 4278. There is no evidence that William Ogle was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Boston Navy Yard. 4279. William Ogle's exposure to asbestos dust, if any, while working at the Boston Navy Yard was intermittent and there were many times when he was not working in the vicinity of asbestos-containing products. 4280. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made on behalf of William Ogle. 4281. Manville has received full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Mrs. Ogle in settlement of the claim on behalf of William Ogle, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4282. Manville will receive full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Mrs. Ogle in settlement of the claim on behalf of William Ogle, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4283. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim on behalf of William Ogle were not losses IV - 103 arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. 4284. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim on behalf of William Ogle resulted from the willfull misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4285. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to William Ogle. 4286. Manville's settlement with William Ogle was unreasonable. (g) John Herlihv 4287. John Herlihy worked at the Boston Navy Yard from 1935 to 1940. 4288. On October 14, 1980, John Herlihy settled his claims against Manville for $5,000. Bahibit: Release by John Herlihy (October 14, 1980). 4289. Prior to settling John Herlihy's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville on behalf of John Herlihy. IV - 104 4290. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling John Herlihy's claim. 4291. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with John Herlihy. 4292. There is a reasonable probability that John Herlihy's disease, if any, is not due to exposure to Manville asbestos-containing products. 4293. There is no evidence that John Herlihy wa3 exposed to any asbestos dust while working at the Philadelphia Navy Yard and no evidence that John Herlihy was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Boston Navy Yard. 4294. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by John Herlihy. 4295. Manville has received full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to John Herlihy in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. IV - 105 4296. Manville will receive full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to John Herlihy in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4297. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of John Herlihy were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. 4298. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of John Herlihy resulted from the willfull misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4299. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to John Herlihy. 4300. Manville's settlement with John Herlihy was unreasonable. (2) Manville Settlements With Philadelphia Navy Yard Teat Claimants_______ ._______________________________ (a> waiter J... Atcfrev 4301. From 1941 to 1945, Walter J. Archey worked at the Philadelphia Navy Shipyard as a shipfitter. As a shipfitter, Mr. Archey assembled the steel parts of a ship such as bulkheads, decks, frames and partitions. IV - 106 exhibit: Walter J. Archey Deposition, at 5-6 (April 30, 1979). 4302. In 1978, Walter J. Archey filed a products liability complaint against Johns-Manville Sales Corporation and Johns-Manville Corporation in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division, seeking compensatory and punitive damages based upon theories of negligence, strict liability in tort, breach of warranty, willful and wanton misconduct and fraud. exhibit: Complaint in Walter J. Archev and Jeannette L. Archev v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.. Superior Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division, Civil Action No. 7860-78. 4303. In his complaint, Walter Archey named Manville as the sole defendant. Attorneys for Manville drafted a third-party complaint in order to join 14 other third-party manufacturer-defendants. Manville failed to pursue this third-party claim despite the fact that it knew that asbestos cases arising out of the Philadelphia Navy Yard traditionally implicated the other manufacturers named in Manville's unpursued third-party complaint in the Archey case. Exhibits: Archev Complaint; IV - 107 Johns-Manville Third Party Complaint? Johns-Manville's Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories in Archev Case. 4304. Manville's third-party complaint in the Archev case was mailed to Walter Archey's counsel on August 22, 1979. On September 13, 1979, its attorneys filed answers to"interrogatories identifying approximately 89 individuals who were employed at the Philadelphia Navy Yard and who had filed suit against Manville by that date. At least by September 13, 1978, Manville knew of at least 89 other pending lawsuits involving the Philadelphia Navy Yard. Manville knew that many of those lawsuits involved defendant manufacturers other than Manville and potential sources of information from co-workers at the Philadelphia Navy Yard who could testify to the identity of other asbestos- containing products used at the yard. exhibit? Johns-Manville's Answers to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories in Archev Case. 4305. On January 8, 1980, Walter Archey settled his claim against Manville for $70,000. Exhibit: Release and settlement of claim----- Archev (January 8, 1980). IV - 108 4306. Manville's settlement with Walter Archey was not reasonable in light of Manville's failure to pursue a third-party action against the other manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. 4307. Prior to settling Walter Archey's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claims brought against Manville by Walter Archey. 4308. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling Walter Archey's claim. 4309. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with Walter Archey. 4310. There is a reasonable probability that Walter Archey's disease, if any, is not due to exposure to Manville asbestos-containing products. 4311. There is no evidence that Walter Archey was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. . IV - 109 4312. Walter Archey'8 exposure to asbestos dust while working at the Philadelphia Navy Yard was intermittent and there were many times when he was not working in the vicinity of asbestos-containing products. 4313. The Travelers Insurance Company identified itself as the carrier for the insured, Johns-Manville - Corporation, in Walter Archey's case. Bah;frit: Letter from the Travelers Insurance Company to Larry Carr, Esquire (August 23, 1978). 4314. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by Walter Archey. 4315. Manville has received full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid to settle Walter Archey's claim, plus defense costs and other related expenses. 4316. Manville will receive full or partial insurance reimbursement for any moneys it paid to settle Walter Archey's claim, plus defense costs and other related expenses. 4317. The losses incurred by Manville in connection -with the claim by Walter Archey were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. IV - 110 4318. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim by Walter Archey resulted from willfull misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4319. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to Walter Archey. 4320. Manville1s settlement with Walter Archey was unreasonable. (b) Julius Rothman 4321. From 1941 to 1945, Julius Rothman worked at the Philadelphia Navy Yard as a pipefitter. 4322. After World War II, Mr. Rothman worked as a pipefitter at the Philadelphia Navy Yard from 1948 to 1961 and as a pipefitter at the Long Beach Navy Yard from 1961 1977. Mr. Rothman was exposed to asbestos fibers after the end of World War II. 4323. On July 7, 1978, Julius Rothman filed a complaint against Johns-Manville Products Corporation, Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corporation, J.P. Stevens Company, Phillip Carey Company, Pacor and Pittsburgh-Corning Corporation in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. IV - 111 Bxhibit Complaint in Rothman v. Johns-Manville Products Coro.. in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, No. C 246976. 4324. Julius Rothman's action was based upon theories of negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability in tort. The only work site implicated in the Complaint was Long Beach Navy Yard. Bxhibit: Rothman Complaint. 4325. The Travelers Insurance Company received bills for services rendered in the defense of the Rothman case from the law firm of Haight, Dickson, Brown and Bonesteel, on March 22, 1979, September 28, 1979, December 14, 1979 and March 31, 1980. Exhibits: Letter from Haight, Dickson, Brown and Bonesteel to the Travelers Insurance Company (March 22, 1979)? Letter from Haight, Dickson, Brown and Bonesteel to the Travelers Insurance Company (September 28, 1979)? Letter from Haight, Dickson, Brown and Bonesteel to the Travelers Insurance Company (December 14, 1979)? IV - 112 Letter from Haight, Dickson, Brown and Bonesteel to the Travelers Insurance Company (March 31, 1980). 4326. On April 23, 1982, Julius Rothman settled his claim against Manville for $2,500. Exhibit: Release by Julius Rothman (April 23, 1982). 4327. Prior to settling Julius Rothman's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville by Julius Rothman. 4328. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling Julius Rothman's claim. 4329. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with Julius Rothman. 4330. There is a reasonable probability that Julius Rothman's disease, if any, is not due to exposure to Manville asbestsos-containing products. 4331. Julius Rothman's asbestos-related illness, if any, was solely the result of his post-World War II asbestos exposure. IV - 113 4332. There is no evidence that Julius Rothman was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Philadelphia Navy Yard during World War II. 4333. Julius Rothman's exposure to asbestos dust while working at the Philadelphia Navy Yard was intermittent and there were many times when he was not working in the vicinity of asbestos-containing products. 4334. The United States paid Federal Employee Compensation Act benefits to Julius Rothman. 4335. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by Julius Rothman. That insurance coverage was with the Commercial Union and Travelers Insurance Company. Exhibits: Special Jury Verdict in the California Insurance Litigation; Von Wald Affidavit Bxhibit No. 201; Application for Approval of Insurance Settlement (October 27, 1986). 4336. Manville has received full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Julius Rothman in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. IV - 114 4337. Manville will receive full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Julius Rothman in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4338. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim by Julius Rothman were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. This is obviously so because Mr. Rothman did not base his claim against Johns-Manville on his exposure to asbestos fibers during his wartime employment at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. 4339. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Julius Rothman resulted from willfull misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4340. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to Julius Rothman. 4341. Manville's settlement with Julius Rothman was unreasonable. (c) Victor C. Impriano 4342. From 1942 to 1946, Victor Impriano worked at the Philadelphia Navy Yard as a pipefitter. Exhibit: IV - 115 Amended Complaint of Victor C. Impriano, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County No. 516 (109) Case No. 13. 4343. Prom 1950 to 1953 and 1959 to 1974, Victor Impriano worked at the Philadelphia Navy Yard as a pipefitter. Mr. Impriano was exposed to asbestos fiber after World War II. Exhibit: Amended Complaint of Victor C. Impriano, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County No. 516 (109) Case No. 13. 4344. In 1978, Victor Impriano filed a claim against Johns-Manvilie and 19 other manufacturers or suppliers of asbestos-containing products. On May 2, 1975, Mr. Impriano filed an amended complaint in trespass and assumpsit. Bxhibit: Amended Complaint on Trespass and Assumpsit of Victor C. Impriano. 4345. Victor Impriano's claim against the defendants was based upon negligence, willful misconduct, breach of warranty, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, misrepresentation and willful omissions of the defendants. Mr. Impriano sought compensatory and punitive damages. IV - 116 ' Exhibit: Impriano Complaint on Trespass and Assumpsit of Victor C. Impriano. 4346. In April 1981, Victor Impriano settled his claim against all defendants for the total amount of $200,000. Manville's base percentage of that settlement consisted of a contribution of $45,496.53 to the total settlement. The remaining settling defendants made their contributions to the settlement according to a form percentage chart. Exhibits: Settlement sheet on Plaintiff: Impriano; Release by Victor Impriano (April, 1981). 4347. Prior to settling Victor Impriano's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville by Victor Impriano. 4348. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling Victor Impriano's claim. 4349. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with Victor Impriano. 4350. There is a reasonable probability that Victor IV - 117 Impriano's disease, if any, is not due to exposure to Manville asbestsos-containing products. 4351. Victor C. Impriano's asbestos-related illness, if any, was solely the result of his post-World War II asbestos exposure. 4352. There is no evidence that Victor Impriano was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Philadelphia Navy Yard during World War II. 4353. Victor Impriano's exposure to asbestos dust while working at the Philadelphia Navy Yard was intermittent and there were many times when he was not working in the vicinity of asbestos-containing products. 4354. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by Victor Impriano. 4355. The United States paid Federal Employee Compensation Act Benefits to Victor Impriano. Bahibits: Special Jury Verdict in the California Insurance Litigation; Von Wald Affidavit Exhibit No. 201; Application for Approval of Insurance Settlement (October 27, 1986). IV - 118 4356. Manville failed to tender a defense of the Impriano claim to its insurance carriers. 4357. Manville has received full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Victor Impriano in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4358. Manville will receive full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Victor Impriano in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4359. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim by Victor Impriano were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. 4360. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Victor Impriano resulted from willful misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4361. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to Victor Impriano. 4362. Manville's settlement with Victor Impriano was unreasonable. IV - 119 (3) Manville's Settlements With Pore River Shipyard Test Claimants;__________________________________ (a) Joseph T^ta 4363. Prom March 1942 to February 1944, Joseph Teta worked at the Fore River Shipyard as a welder. During 1944, Joseph Teta also worked at the Boston Navy Yard as a welder. Exhibit: 1944 Boston Navy Yard job application. WUngflgi Joseph Teta. 4364. Joseph Teta worked only on new construction. Witness: Joseph Teta. 4365. Joseph Teta sued Manville and at least 18 other asbestos product manufacturers. Richard M. Sandman. 4366. On August 10, 1981, without deposing Joseph Teta or having him examined by another doctor, Manville settled with Mr. Teta for $1,500. IV - 120 Exhibits: Release by Joseph Teta (July 24, 1981); Check Voucher No, 362962 (August 10, 1981). 4367. In his settlements with 19 defendants, Joseph Teta received $46,350. BshifrUi Letter from Richard M. Sandman to Anthony C. Roth (February 25, 1987). Witness: Richard M. Sandman. 4368. Prior to settling Joseph Teta's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville by Joseph Teta. 4369. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling Joseph Teta'8 claim. 4370. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with Joseph Teta. 4371. There is a reasonable probability that Joseph Teta's disease, if any, is not due to exposure to Manville asbestos-containing products. IV - 121 4372. There is no evidence that Joseph Teta was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Pore River Shipyard or at the Boston Navy Yard during World War II. 4373. Joseph Teta's exposure to asbestos dust while working at the Fore River Shipyard and the Boston Navy Yard was intermittent and there were many times when he was not working in the vicinity of asbestos-containing products. 4374. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by Joseph Teta. 4375. Manville has received full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Joseph Teta in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4376. Manville will receive full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Joseph Teta in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4377. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim by Joseph Teta were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. IV - 122 4378. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Joseph Teta resulted from willfull misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4379. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to Joseph Teta. 4380. Manville's settlement with Joseph Teta was unreasonable. (b) Phillip Houten 4381. According to his complaint, Phillip Houten worked at the Fore River Shipyard from May to September 1945. During those four to five months, Mr. Houten was a "cleaner". Exhibit: Complaint, Houten v. Johns-Manville Corporation, et al.. at 2 (November 1, 1979). 4382. Phillip Houten filed a complaint against Manville and other manufacturers of asbestos-containing products on November 1, 1979. Summons in Civil Action, Houten v. Johns-Manville. et al.. at 2-4 (November 1, 1979). IV - 123 4383. Phillip Houten, an attorney, subsequently withdrew his complaint against Manville. Witness: Lillian Levine. 4384. Manville never paid a settlement or judgment on Phillip Houten's claim. 4385. There is a reasonable probability that Phillip Houten's disease, if any, is not due to exposure to Manville asbestos-containing products. 4386. There is no evidence that Phillip Houten was exposed to asbestos dust while employed at the Fore River Shipyard during World War II or that, if exposed to asbestos dust, he was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time- weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Fore River Shipyard during World War II. 4387. There is no evidence that Phillip Houten was exposed to asbestos dust at the Fore River Shipyard and no evidence that he was exposed to Manville products. 4388. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by Phillip Houten. IV - 124 4389. Manville has received full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it expended in connection with Phillip Houten's claim. 4390. Manville will receive full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it expended in connection with Phillip Houten's claim. 4391. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim by Phillip Houten were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. 4392. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Phillip Houten resulted from willful misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4393. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to Phillip Houten. (4) Manville's Settlements With Consolidated Shipyard Test Claimants, (a) James Clancv 4394. From 1942 to 1945, James Clancy worked at the Consolidated Shipyard as a outside machinist. Sahi.frn: IV - 125 Plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatories of Pibreboard Corporation, Clancv v. Fibreboard Corporation, et al.. Civil Action No. B-80-504-CA (E.D. Tex.). 4395. On July 20, 1980, James Clancy filed suit against Manville and other asbestos product manufacturers alleging strict liability claims. Exhibit! Complaint, Clancv v. Fibreboard Corporation, et al*. Civil Action No. B-80-504-CA (E.D. Tex.). 4396. On July 28, 1982, Iris Clancy (executrix for James Clancy's estate) settled the claim against Manville for $47,000. A judgment was entered on August 25, 1982. exhibit: Release and Judgment, Clancv v. Fibreboard Corporation, et al.. Civil Action No. B-80-504-CA (B.D. Tex.). 4397. Prior to settling James Clancy's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville by James Clancy. 4398. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling James Clancy's claim. 4399. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with James Clancy. IV - 126 4400. There is no evidence that James Clancy was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Consolidated Shipyard during World War II. 4401. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by James Clancy. 4402. Manville has received full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to James Clancy in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4403. Manville will receive full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to James Clancy in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4404. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim by James Clancy were not losses arising out of performance of Manville'8 wartime contracts with the United States. 4405. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of James Clancy resulted from willful misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. IV - 127 4406. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to James Clancy. 4407. Manville's settlement with James Clancy was unreasonable. (b) W.Pt Smith 4408. Between 1942 and 1944, W.D. Smith worked at the Consolidated Shipyard as an electrician. Witnesst W.D. Smith. 4409. From 1946 to 1951, W.D. Smith was exposed to asbestos fibers from asbestos paper while making neon signs. W; W.D. Smith. 4410. On June 20, 1979, W.D. Smith filed suit against Manville and other asbestos product manufacturers alleging strict liability, negligence, gross negligence and breach of warrant. SahibUi Complaint, Smith v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, et al.. Civil Action No. B-79-452-CA, (E.D. Tex.). IV - 128 4411. On May 19, 1981, W.D. Smith settled his suit with Manville and three other asbestos product manufacturers for a total of $115,000. Manville's share of that total settlement figure was $39,100. Exhibit; Judgment, Smith v. Johns-Manyilie Sales Corporation, et al.. Civil Action No. B-79-452-CA, (E.D. Tex.). 4412. Prior to settling W.D. Smith's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville by W.D. Smith. 4413. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling w.D. Smith's claim. 4414. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with W.D. Smith. 4415. There is no evidence that W.D. Smith was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Consolidated Shipyard during World War II. 4416. W.D. Smith's asbestos-related illness, if IV - 129 any, was solely the result of his post-World War II asbestos exposure. 4417. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by W.D. Smith. 4418. Manville has received full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to W.D. Smith in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4419. Manville will receive full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to W.D. Smith in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4420. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim by W.D. Smith were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. 4421. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of W.D. Smith resulted from willfull misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4422. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to W.D. Smith. IV - 130 4423. Manville's settlement with W.D. Smith was unreasonable. (c) Willis Kina 4424. From 1942 to 1946, Willis King worked at the Consolidated Shipyard as a pipefitter. 4425. Willis King smoked a pack of cigarettes a day from approximately 1934 to 1974 and developed emphysema. Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories, Kino v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, et al.. Civil Action No. TY-79-62-CA (E.D. Tex.) (correction August 8, 1980). 4426. On February 20, 1979, Willis King filed suit against Manville and other asbestos product manufacturers alleging strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty. Bxhibit: Plaintiff's Original Complaint, Kina v. JohnsManville Sales Corporation, et al.. Civil Action No. TY-79-62-CA (E.D. Tex.). 4427. On August 5, 1981, Willis King settled his claim against Manville for $22,963. Exhibit; IV - 131 Release, Kina v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation. et al.. Civil Action No. TY-79-62-CA (E.D. Tex.). 4428. Prior to settling Willis King's claim, Manville did not give the United States notice of the claim brought against Manville by Willis King. 4429. Manville did not give the United States an opportunity to participate in the process of settling Willis King's claim. 4430. The United States was not given an opportunity to and did not approve Manville's settlement with Willis King. 4431. There is no evidence that Willis King was exposed to asbestos dust levels above a time-weighted average of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for a 40-hour work week for an extended period of time while employed at the Consolidated Shipyard during World War II. 4432. Manville had insurance coverage for the claim made by Willis King. 4433. Manville has received full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Willis King in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. IV - 132 4434. Manville will receive full or partial reimbursement for any moneys it paid out to Willis King in settlement of his claim, plus costs of suit and related expenses. 4435. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim by Willis King were not losses arising out of performance of Manville's wartime contracts with the United States. 4436. The losses incurred by Manville in connection with the claim of Willis King resulted from willful misconduct and lack of good faith by Manville and its directors, officers and supervisory personnel. 4437. Manville was not actually or potentially liable to Willis King. 4438. Manville's settlement with Willis King was unreasonable. J. PRESENT KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASES 4439. Inhalation of asbestos fibers has been associated with three major diseases: asbestos is, lung cancer, and mesothelioma. Witness: Dr. Joseph C. Ross. IV - 133 4440. Asbestosis was the first understood asbestos related disease, and it is the most common. Witness: Dr. Joseph C. Ross. 4441. Asbestosis is defined as pulmonary fibrosis of the lung caused by the inhalation of asbestos fibers. WUhSgg: Dr. Joseph C. Ross. 4442. The most common symptom of asbestosis is shortness of breath. Witness: Dr. Joseph C. Ross. 4443. There are two thin membranes that surround the lungs called the pleura. Pleural plaques, pleural thickening, and pleural calcification, without pulmonary fibrosis, are signs of asbestos exposure, but do not indicate asbestosis. Bahiblt: Preger, L., Arai, D., Kotin, P., Weill, H., Werchick, J., Asbestos-Related Disease. 16 (1978). Witness; Dr. Joseph C. Ross. IV - 134 4444 Asbestosis is a latent disease. X-ray changes demonstrating asbestosis often appear from 10 to 40 years after the initial exposure to asbestos. The time period elapsed from the initial exposure to asbestos, the duration of the exposure to asbestos, the concentration of asbestos exposure, and the susceptibility of the individual are all factors that affect a person's likelihood of developing asbestosis. Witness: Dr. Joseph C. Ross. 4445. Asbestosis is a progressive disease. Thus, an individual who has asbestosis and is removed from further exposure to asbestos may nonetheless suffer an increase in the severity of the disease. witness: Dr. Joseph C. Ross. 4446. Asbestosis can develop after exposure to asbestos ceases. Accordingly, an individual who terminates his exposure to asbestos without asbestosis may nonetheless develop the disease many years later. Witness: Dr. Joseph C. Ross. IV - 135 4447. When an individual has developed asbestos is, any and all exposures of the individual to asbestos contributed either to the development or the level of severity of the disease. Witness: Dr. Joseph C. Ross. 4448. Asbestos exposure during ship overhaul and repair varies extensively resulting in an asbestos exposure situation that is different from exposure in mining and manufacturing operations. It is thus "impossible to determine the exposure of [a shipyard worker to asbestos] without spending hours in observation and sampling." As a result, at least as of 1964, "[t]he maximum allowable concentration [of asbestos] for pipe covering operations or for short duration massive exposures [was] unknown." BahibUs: W. Marr, "Asbestos Exposure During Naval Vessel Overhaul," American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal. Vol. 26, No. 3 (May-Jiine 1964)? W.E. Fleischer, F.J. Viles, R.L. Gade and P. Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels," 28 Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology 9, 13, 16 (January 1946). Carl Mangold. IV - 136 4449. It is known today that asbestos exposure significantly below the five mppcf standard for asbestos, as suggested by Dreessen, al.. in their study of asbestos is in the textile industry can cause, and has caused, individuals to develop asbestosis. Szhihil'- - R.L. Murphy, E.A. Gaensler, at &!, "Low Exposure to Asbestos: Gas Exchange in Ship Pipe Coverers and Controls, Arch. Industrial Health. Vol. 25, 253, 254 (October 1972). Witnesses: Dr. Joseph C. Ross; Carl Mangold; James F. Morgan; Dr. Leon J. Goldwater; Kenneth W. Nelson. 4450. Because of variances in light, other dust producing work being performed in the area, and non-asbestos dust being produced from asbestos products, it was not possible during World War II, nor would it be possible today, to look at a cloud of dust in a shipyard, and determine, without dust counts or petrograhic analysis, the concentrations of asbestos dust to which the employees in the immediate area were being exposed. Witnesses: IV - 137 James F. Morgan; Dr. Leon J. Goldwater; Kenneth W. Nelson; Carl Mangold; Frederick J. Viles. 4451. Asbestos-related pulmonary and bronchogenic asbestos cancer, like other other cancers, is the uncontrolled multiplication of cells. The likelihood of developing the disease varies with the time period since first exposure, the duration of the asbestos exposure, the concentration of the asbestos exposure, smoking history, and the susceptibility of the individual. The disease typically manifests itself 15 to 35 years after the first exposure to asbestos. Witness: Dr. Joseph C. Ross; Dr. Hans Weill. 4452. Mesothelioma is an invariably fatal cancer of the membrane that surrounds the chest cavity or the membrane that surrounds the abdominal cavity. It is a latent disease that has developed even in individuals with relatively short-term exposures to asbestos. Hi&: Dr. Joseph C. Ross; IV - 138 Dr. Hans Weill. 4453. During World War II, the unsophisticated nature of x-ray equipment and technology made it extremely difficult to diagnose asbestosis. Witnesses: Dr. Hans Weill; Carl Mangold. K. DAMAGES 4454. Manville's losses, if any, in connection with the claims of the 15 test claimants were not proximately caused by any breach of contract by the United States. Section I of this Volume, supra. 4455. Manville's losses, if any, in connection with the claims of the 15 test claimants were not foreseeable at the time the World War II contracts were entered. See Section I of this Volume, supra. 4456. Manville has or will receive full or partial insurance reimbursement for any losses incurred in connection with the claims of the 15 test claimants. Exhibits; See Section I of this Volume, fijiEii* IV - 139 Hitnsfijt Richard Von Wald; John McKinney; Joseph Gunn. V. PROPOSBD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A. IMPLIBD WARRANTY OF SPECIFICATIONS (1) Manville Lacks The Necessary Privity 1. Any warranty arising out of specifications extends only to the party in direct privity with the United States. In re All Maine Asbestos Litigation. 581 F. Supp. 903, 973 (D. Me. 1984). 2. Manville lacks the necessary privity because its wartime sales to private shipyards were to parties other than the United States. Breach of contract claims may be brought under the Tucker Act only by those with a direct contractual relationship with the United States. Merritt v. United States. 267 U.S. 388, 340 (1925). Subcontractors supplying material for use in government contracts ordinarily have no privity. Severin v. United States. 99 C. Cls. 435, 442 (1943), cert, denied. 332 U.S. 733 (1944); Putnam Mills Coro, v. United States. 202 Ct. Cl. 1,8, 479 F.2d 1334, 1337 (1973). IV - 140 3. A requirement for government approval of a subcontractor and the terms of the subcontract is not sufficient to establish privity. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. United States. 112 C. Cls. 563, 566, 81 F. Supp. 596, 598 (1949); Parker v. HEW. 478 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (M.D. Tenn.). Manville must prove that the United States manifested assent to direct liability to Manville when Manville provided products as a subcontractor. Johnson Controls. Inc, v. United States. 8 Cl. Ct. 359, 369 (1985). (2) Limitations on the Implied Warranty of Specifications 4. The theory of implied warranty of specifications, including a claim alleging safety defects, United States v. Spearin. 248 U.S. 132 (1918); Ordinance Research. Inc, v. United States. 609 F.2d 462 (Ct. Cl. 1979) is limited to circumstances where (1) the government had superior knowledge as to the risk associated with the product; (2) the manufacturer was left with no discretion in the design or content of the product; and (3) the manufacturer had little or no participation in the process by which the specifications were drafted or issued. See Bethlehem Coro. v. United States. 199 Ct. Cl. 247, 462 F.2d 1400 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Inlet Co.. Inc, v. United States. 164 BCA 1 4093. (a) The Implied Warranty Of Specifications Does Mot Apply Because Manville Had Superior IV - 141 Knowledge of the Risks Associated with the Use of Its Asbestos-Containino Products 5. The government will not be held liable on a theory of implied warranty of specifications where the manufacturer (1) assumes the risk of following a specification; or (2) unjustly relies on a defective specification. See Patten, Implied Warranty in Government Specifications. 31 Fed. B.J. 291, 308 (1972). 6. Even if the specifications at issue here had been defective, Manville assumed the risk because it knew of the safety problems. R.B.D.M. Corp. v. United States. 428 F.2d 1304, 1310 (Ct. Cl. 1970). 7. A manufacturer's superior knowledge of the risks inherent in following a specification will defeat its implied warranty claim where it knew or should have known of the risks yet failed to inform the government. Meverstein. Inc, v. United States. 137 F. Supp. 427, 430-31 (Ct. Cl. 1963). Since Manville knew of the risks inherent in the use of its asbestos containing products without warnings, but failed to inform the government, it unjustly relied on the government specifications. Id. 8. The Spearin doctrine does not apply where the contractor is a pioneer in the field and knows more than the government concerning the design, composition, manufacturing process, uses and dangers of the product. Litcom Division. Litton Systems. ASBCA No. 13413, 798-1 BCA 1 13,022 (1978). IV - 142 9. As a matter of law, manufacturers are held to the knowledge and skill of experts with respect to their own products, and have a legal duty to act affirmatively to keep abreast of scientific knowledge and advances. Kariala v. Johns-Manville Coro.. 523 F.2d 155, 158-59 (8th Cir. 1975); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co.. 493 F.2d 1070, 1Q89 (5th Cir.), gajLi. .flgnjg.d, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). See also Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp.. 193 N.J. Sup. 113, 472 A.2d 577 (A.D., 1984), aff'd. 103 N.J. 643, 512 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1986); Johns-Manville Corp. v. Janssens. 463 So.2d 242 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1984); Glover v. Johns-Manville. 525 F. Supp. 894, 904 (E.D. Va. 1979). (b) The Implied Warranty of Specifications Does Not Apply Because Manville, Not the Government, Designed the Manville Products 10. An implied warranty of specifications arises only where the specification leaves no discretion to the manufacturer with regard to the injury-causing aspect of the end product. , e.a.. Bethelem Corp. v. United States. 199 Ct. Cl. 247, 462 F.2d 1400 (Ct. Cl. 1972); J.L. Simmons Corp. v. United States. 412 F.2d 1360 (Ct. Cl. 1969); J. McBride & T. Touhey, 5 Government Contracts. 37, 120[1] at S 37-217 (1978). Because as Manville, itself, designed, IV - 143 ns i.upxiu watt-oU'CiY' Ui.- a^iei.i.i.iCa biUiis Cj.a-i.iu inuo . la.. 11. The implied warranty of specifications does not arise with respect to the asbestos products at issue because the government and Manville are in a simple vendor-vendee relationship, and the specifications merely reflect widely available commercial products. See. Inlet Co.. Inc.. 164 BCA 1 4093; Plas v. Ravmark Industries. Inc. (N.D. Ohio, May 3, 1983); Chaoin v. Johns-Manville. 502 P. Supp. 335 (S.D. Miss., 1980). 12. The implied warranty of specifications does not arise with respect to those specifications which are strictly performance specifications. Inlet Co.. Inc.. 1964 BCA 1 4093; J.L. Simmons Co. v. United States. 412 F.2d 1630 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Tefft v. A.C. & S.. Inc.. No. C84-154M (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 1984), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Rose v. A.C. & S.. 796 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1986). (c) The Implied Warranty Of Specifications Does Not Apply Because The Government Relied On Industry In General And Manville In Particular In Preparing The Specifications 13. Generally, the party who undertakes to prepare specifications is responsible for the corrections, adequacy and feasibility of the specification, Consolidated Diesel Electric Corp.. 67-2 BCA 1 6669. However, where the government in preparing the specifications relies on IV - 144 comments of the manufacturer and the manufacturer knows it is being consulted as an expert in its field, and knows also that the government employee responsible for drafting the specification is not an expert in that area, the warranty claim will fail. See Bethlehem Coro, v. United States. 462 F.2d 1400 (1972); J.A. Mauerer. Inc, v. United States. 485 F.2d 588 (Ct. Cl. 1973). 14. In this case, Manvilie's specification claim must fail because Manville played a guiding role in the evolution of each of the specifications at issue, and the government relied on Manville's expertise. Id. 3. The Requisite Mutual Assent Is Lacking To Establish Intent To Include ThirdPartv Liabilities As Costs of Performance 15. There is no legal basis for plaintiffs' claim that a "policy of self-insurance" for third-party personal injury liability or was constructively incorporated in Manville's wartime contracts. G.L. Christian and Associates v. United States. 160 Ct. Cl. 1, 312 F.2d 418, rehearing denied. 160 Ct. Cl. 58, 320 F.2d 345, cert, denied. 375 U.S. 954 (1963); Johns-Manvilie Corporation, et al. v. United States. Nos. 465-83C, 170-83C and 16-84C, slip op. at 23 (Cl. Ct. March 6, 1987). 16. Contractual liabilities can be imposed on the United States under the Tucker Act only where there is clear evidence of an intent of the United States to assent "to the IV - 145 term at issue." Tree Farm Development Corp. v. United States. 218 Ct. Cl. 308, 316-17, 585 F.2d 493, 4984 (1971). 17. To establish that third-party liabilities arising out of the use of Manville's products were considered reimbursable costs of performance, Manville must prove a mutuality of intent at the negotiating table. Johns- Manville v. United States. Nos. 465-83C, 170-83C and 16-84C, slip op. at 25. B. IMPLIED WARRANTY ARISING OUT OF DUTY TO DISCLOSE SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE 18. The duty to disclose information which is vital to the performance of the contract but not known to the contractor, Helene Curtis Industries. Inc, v. United States. 312 F.2d 774 (1963), arises only where the following four conditions are met: (1) a contractor undertakes to perform without vital knowledge of a fact that affects performance costs or duration, (2) the government was aware the contractor had no knowledge of and had no reason to obtain such information, (3) any contract specification supplied misled the contractor or did not put it on notice to inquire, and (4) the government failed to provide the relevant information. American Shipbuilding v. United States. 654 F.2d 75, 79 (1981). 19. The government's duty to disclose extends only to information affecting the cost or duration of the IV - 146 contractor's performance. Since the knowledge allegedly withheld by the United States -- facts concerning asbestos hazards and shipyard working conditions -- do not relate to Manville's performance of the contract, but to how Manville's products might be used after the contract had been fully performed, Manville's claim for breach of warranty must fail. B.q.. American Shipbuilding, supra; H-N. Bailev and Associates v. United States. 449 F.2d 376, 382 (1971). 20. The government's decision to restrict access to information on shipyard operations for reasons of national security was a sovereign act, and as such, cannot serve as the basis for an action in contract. B.q.. Horowitz v. United States. 267 U.S. 458 (1925); Tonv Downs Food Co. v. United States. 530 F.2d 367 (1970). 21. Manville's claim for implied warranty to disclose superior knowledge must fail because Manville, as "the largest supplier of asbestos and asbestos-containing products in the world," was presumptively knowledgeable about the hazards of its own products, and had an affirmative duty to seek out information on the hazards associated with shipyard use of its asbestos products. Borel v. Fibreboard. 493 F.2d 1076, 1084 (5th Cir. 1973), cert, denied. 419 U.S. 869 (1974). 22. Manville's superior knowledge claim must fail because the United States did not appreciate the true IV - 147 potential hazard posed by exposure to asbestos and because the United States had no reason to believe that Manville was either unaware of or would have no reason to obtain information concerning shipyard working conditions. American Shipbuilding v. United States. 654 F.2d 75 (1981). 23. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit involving a party to the prior litigation. United States v. Stauffer Chemical. Co.. 464 U.S. 165 (1984); United States v. Mendoza. 464 U.S. 154 (1984). 24. Johns-Manville is collaterally estopped from asserting that it did not know about the health hazards of its products during World War II, Johns-Manville Coro, v. Jansens. 463 So.2d 242, 250-51 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1984), or that it did not take affirmative steps to conceal this information from the public. Fischer v. Johns-Manville. 193 N.J. Sup. 113, 472 A.2d 577 (A.D., 1984), aff*d. 103 N.J. 643, 512 A.2d 466, 481 (N.J. 1986). C. REFORMATION 25. Reformation is an equitable remedy, the purpose of which is to correct a mutual error in the written expression of the parties agreement. See Johns-Manville v. USA. Nos. 465-83C, 170-83C, 16-84C (Ct. Ct., Mar. 6, 1987); citing IV - 148 American Employers, Inc.. Co. v. United States. No. 86-1243, (Fed. Cir., Feb. 11, 1987), slip opin. at 10. 26. A completed contract is eligible for reformation due to mistake of fact only if the following five conditions (among others) are met: (1) the mistake is mutual; (2) the mistake goes to the fundamental basis of the contract; (3) the mistake is one of hard fact and does not arise from the inherent inability to predict the future; (4) the contract does not put the risk of such a mistake on the party seeking reformation and the party against whom reformation is sought would have agreed to include the language now proposed if the correct facts had been known at the time of contracting; and (5) the party against whom reformation is sought received a benefit of the type anticipated under the contract as a result of the additional burden imposed by the mistake. 27. Manville's claim for reformation must fail because it has not shown that the parties discussed or agreed on ? provision relating to safety precautions adequate to protect shipyard workers from exposure to asbestos dust or any provision relating to any unforeseen consequences between exposure to asbestos dust and disease. 28. As the remedy of reformation is equitable in nature, the court may withhold it on grounds that traditionally justify courts of equity in denying relief. For instance, a party seeking reformation for mutual mistake IV - 149 cannot recover "if his fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing." Restatement (Second) of Contracts 157 (1981). Manville's manifest failure to disclose, and deliberate business decision not to disclose its knowlege of the hazards of asbestos-containing products, as previously adjudicated for the period in question, demands denial of any relief in reformation in this case. See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corn.. 193 N.J. Sup. 113, 472 A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1984), aff'd 103 N.J. 643, 512 A2d 466 (N.J. 1986) and Johns-Manville Corp. v. Janssens. 463 So.2d 242, 250-251 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1984), review denied 467 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1985). D. BQPITABLB ADJUSTMENT 29. Equitable Adjustment is a narrow remedy, available only when the United States changes a term of the contract and thereby changes the work to be performed, but does not breach the contract. Bruce Construction Coro, v. United States. 324 F.2d 516, 518 (1963). 30. As this Court has recognized, plaintiff must meet a rigid standard before a contract will be equitably adjusted. Increased costs must arise from "conditions differing materially from those indicated in the bid documents," and such conditions "must also be reasonably IV - 150 unforeseeable on the basis of all the information available to the contractor." Johns-Manville v. United States. 46583C, 170-83C, 16-84C, (Mar. 6, 1982), citing Maiove Enterprises v. United States. 3 Cl. Ct. 353, 357 (1983). 31. Plaintiff must show that the costs actually increased because of changes in requirements, Weiman v. United States. 230 Ct. Cl. 563, 573 (1982), and plaintiff must show increased costs were the direct and necessary result of the change. Johns-Manville v. USA. Supra, at 43, citing Paul Harderman. Inc, v. United States. 186 Ct. Cl. 743, 752 (1969). 32. Johns-Manville's claim for equitable adjustment must fail because, most fundamentally, Manville has not identified any change initiated by the United States to the work to be performed. At most, Manville incurred unanticipated losses as a result of performing exactly the work anticipated by the parties. 33. Further, Manville's claim for equitable adjustment must be denied because Manville has not shown that it has submitted, or justified its failure to submit its claim to the appropriate government agencies for the requisite administrative review. See United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co.. 328 U.S. 234, 240 (1946); United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons. Inc.. 384 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1966). 34. Finally, the losses Manville seeks to recover are far too remote for recovery under equitable adjustment. At IV - 151 most, the equitable adjustment allowable as a result of a change condition is "the difference between what it cost...[the contractor] to do the work and what it would have cost it if the unforeseen conditions had not been encountered." Paul Hardeman. Inc, v. United States. Supra. 186 Ct. Cl. at 751, quoting Kaiser Industries Corp. v. United States. 169 Ct. Cl. 310, 336, 340 F.2d 322, 337 (1965). In breach of contract actions this Court will not award damages for losses which are not both foreseeable and proximately caused. IV - 152 VI. TRIAL WITNESSES FOR THE UNITED STATES The following is a liet of witnesses the United States intends to call live or by deposition at trial. The witnesses with an asterisk ("*") next to their name were listed as witnesses for Manville in its Pretrial Statement and in some cases will be called primarily for rebuttal purposes. Those witnesses whose names are followed by a footnote f" l/w) are known to be deceased. A number of these witnesses are listed solely with regard to authentication of documents and will not be called if authenticity is not disputed. Paragraph?s) Norman J. Adams will testify regarding Manville's sales to the United States and the contracting process surrounding these sales..................................................................................... 130,131,156,157, 169,2070,3098, 3115,4037,4145 John Alfers will testify regarding the Navy's general specification process......................... 2232,2234-36 Chester Anderson will testify regarding his work at the Boston Naval Shipyard and his claims against Manville..................................... 4190 Mark Andrews will testify regarding negotiation of Navy contracts during World War II................................................................................... 2071 Walter J. Archey 1/ will testify regarding his work at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard................................................................................ Joseph Barnes will testify regarding Maritime Commission contracting during World War II.................................................................................. 2079,2083,2085, 2086,2088,2089, 4074 * Clyde Barnett will testify regarding Manville's sales to the United States, the contracting process and the terms of the contracts, and Manville's insurance and pricing of products........................................................ 8,125,127-130, 169-72,182, 2009,2014-22, 2069,2070,2081, 2082,3118, * Daniel Bessmer will testify regarding the Navy'8 industrial hygiene and training program.................................................. 3296-98,3299, 3341 Nelson Best will testify regarding access of asbestos manufacturers to shipyards.................. 3119 Leon Birnbaum will testify as an expert on Navy specifications........................................................... 2232,2239-36, 2254-56,2261, 2271,2278-81, 2285,2286,2288, 2289,2297,2300, 2311,2320,2322 David Britt will testify regarding recognizing and authenticating the signature of Vandiver Brown.......... ..................... .............. Howard Bush will testify regarding Manville's insurance coverage during the 1930's and 1940's................................................. 41,46,47,3128 VI - 154 Barry Castleman will testify as an expert witness regarding Manville's knowledge and concealment of the hazards of asbestos.................................................................................... . 3001,3007,3010, 3011,3015,3017, 3018,3023-27, 3029,3032,3039 43,3047-52,3055, 3057,3059-62, 3064-69,3072-80, 3083,3089,3143, 3146,3147,3149, 3150,3152,3160, 3161,3164,3165, 3168-70,3172-74, 3176-78,3180, 3183,3184,3186, 3187,3191,2195 Janes Clifford will testify regarding access of asbestos manufacturers to shipyards.......................................................................................... 3119 Edward Cook will testify regarding Navy cost accounting practices................................ .. 2068 * LflMl-g-j giftlies will testify regarding the United States Public Health Service study of welding hazards during World War II................................................................................................. 3284 * John B. Crawford will testify regarding the access of asbestos manufacturers to shipyards............................ 3120,3121,2133, 4036,4066,4190 * Edward Downey will testify regarding Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.............................. 4052-54 John Praoisic will testify regarding the sale of insulation products to Consolidated Steel Company Shipyard, at Orange, Texas.......................... ............................... 2060,3109,2110, 3125,3129,3132, 3133,3304,4176, 4177,4179,4189 * Thomas P. Drinan will testify regarding his employment at the Boston Naval Shipyard and his claim against Manville......................................................................... 4205-07 VI - 155 * Charles Garcelon will testify regarding Manvilie's sales to and competitive bidding and contracting with the United States; he will also testify to Manville's insurance and pricing of products....................................................................................... .. 106,113,116-23, 130,168,169, 172,173,2009, 2014,2018,2060, 2069,2070,3106, 3107,3116,3117, 4038,4039,4153, 4154 Gilbert Ginsburo will testify as an expert regarding Navy and government contracting................................................................................ .. 2011,2031,2033, 2039,2047,2068 Joseph Goldfield will testify reaardina Manville dust control, ventilation and dust studies.............................................................................. * Leon J. Goldwater will testify regarding the Navy's industrial hygiene program and the Brooklyn Naval Shipyard................................ .. 3248,3250,3251, 3254,3296 * Lincoln Gordon will testify reoardino the government's activities for mobili zation of industry for the defense effort............................................................................................ Joseph R. Gunn will testify as an expert regarding Manville's insurance settlements... .. 57-59,4456 * John Haas 1/ will testify reaardina the Navy's general specification process.................... VI - 156 * Roger Hackney will testify regarding Manville's World War II financial condition. sales, knowledge of asbestos hazards and insurance practices and pricing of Manville products..................................................... .................................... . 8,60,113,124, 126,127,141-45, 153,160-67,169, 175-77,179,180, 197-99,201-08, 213-25,227-34, 236-51,253-64, 267-72,274-77, 2069,2070,2072, 3090-92,3094, 3095,3197 * H. Struve Hensel will testify reoardino the Navy's contracting procedures and policies and Navy Insurance............................................ 108,2001,2002, 2011-13,2031, 2032,2037,2039, 2055,2057 * Victor C. Imnriano 1/ will testify regarding his asbestos-related disease claim and his work experience at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard........................................... * Hugh M. Jackson will testify regarding Manville's wartime operations.......... .......................... .. 7,8,3196 John Jobe will testifv reaardina sellino Manville products, calling on fabricators of asbestos products, and advising them regarding reducing dust.................................................... .. 3137 Albert Juno will testify reoardino Manville knowledge of asbestos hazards and Manville factory conditions................................ .. 3084-87,3093 Bradford Kellv will testify reoardino working conditions, plant operation and the absence of warnings from Manville management to employees.................................................... .. 3084-87 * W. John Kennev will testify reoardino the Navy's contracting procedures and policies and Navy insurance............................................................... .. 2011,2031,2036, 2039,2042-44, 2047,2052,2055- VI - 157 Harris Kearoner will testify regarding negotiation of Navy contracts during World War II.................................................................................. 2071 * Victor H. Kindsvatter will testify regarding the Navy's industrial hygiene program at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard from July 1942 to December 1942................. ................... 3248,3296,4047 49,4051 Lillian Levine will testify regarding Phillip Houten's claim against Manville........ 4383 Frederick G. Llonert will testify regarding Manville's access to information about shipyard conditions during World War II................. 3119 Paul Locke will testify about Manville's insurance policies and coverage prior to and during World War II........................................................ 40,46 Georoe Lockhart will testify regarding Navy contracting and insurance during World War II................................................................................... 2013,2033,2057, 2068 John Malloy will testify as an expert on Navy contracting procedures and procurement policy........................... ........................................ 2001,2002,2011, 2012,2023,2025 27,2031-33,2037, 2043-47,2056, 2059,2060,2068 Carl Mangold will testify as an expert witness regarding industrial hygiene practices.......................................................................................... . 3313,3335,3341, 3342,3347-51, 4448-50,4453 Jack Manning will testify about his employ- memt with Manville during World War II, including visits to shipyards.......................................... 3119 * Dennis H. Markusson will testify regarding claims handling procedures at Manville and the underlying settlements......................................................................... 11,14-18,23,27, 28,31,54,57,58 Robert Maronev will testify regarding negotiation of Navy contracts during VI - 158 World War II............................................................................... . 2071 John Marsh will testify reoardino the custody, location, possession and authenticity of the Sumner Simpson papers..... . 3041,3042,3047, 3048,3052,3059 62,3064-67,3072, 3073,3075-77, 3079,3083,3143, 3146,3147 David McArthur will testify regarding the working conditions at the Bethlehem (Fore River) Shipyard.......................................................... . 3104,3105,3108, 3238,4116,4118, 4119,4134,4151, 4152,4155 * Richard G. McClunc will testify reoardino the Navy's contracting procedures and policies during World War II...................... . 2011,2031,2036, 2039,2042-44, 2047,2055-57 Martin McConnel will testify regarding Manville'8 insurance coverage and settlements.................................................................................. . 57,58 C. Bouton McDouoal will testifv reoardino Navy contracting during World War II............... .. . 2001,2009,2011, 2013,2014,2033, 2057,2068 * John A. McKinney will testify regarding Manville'8 business operations, financial situation, corporate history, and asbestos litigation............................................................... . 1,2,6-20,60,4456 Willis McCook Miller will testify regarding Navy contracting during World War II...................... . 2013,2033,2068 * James >. Morgan will testify regarding the World War II shipyard industrial hygiene program............................................................................................ . 3138,3229,3248, 3266,3267,3269 71,3277,3273, 3284,3287,3296, 3300-03, 3308,3309,3311 16,3335,3338 42,3347,4113, 4131,4449,4450 VI - 159 Joseph Mullen will testify regarding health and safety at the Bethlehem (Fore River) Shipyard during World War II......................................... 4119,4142 John J. Nachtsheim will testify as an expert regarding ship specifications and design............... 2223,2224,2237 Robert R. Nathan will testify as an expert regarding World War II economic regulations and Manville pricing, profits and financial conditions....................................................................................... 107,174,177,197, 198,201-06,208 12,225,238,246-', 248,249,251,258 Kenneth W. Nelson will testify regarding the World War II shipyard industrial hygiene program...................... ................................................................. 3229,3248,3266, 3267,3269-71, 3277,3284,3287, 3296,3300,3301, 3303,3307-09, 3313,3316,3338 43,3347,4118, 4131,4449,4450 X.S fllfitly will testify regarding Nicely & Co. and its relationship to Manville... 3119,3127 Walter Odenkirh will testify regarding the sale and use of insulation products to Consolidated Shipbuilding in Orange, Texas..................................................................................... 2060,3110-12, 3119,3125,3129, 3132-34,4178, 4182,4189 Irvino J. Pedlev will testify regarding his identification of the signatures of Vandivet Brown, Lewis Brown and other Manville executives...................... .............................................................. 3041-43,3047-52 3057,3059-62, 3064-69,3072, 3073,3075-77, 3079,3083,3143, 3146,3147,3180 Richard Plothin will testify regarding the custody, location, possession and authenticity of the Sumner Simpson papers. 3041,3042,3047, 3048,3052,3059 62,3064-67,3072, 3073,3075-77, 3079,3083,3143, 3146,3147 &ftttttg,tUg-PQgjr\H will testify regarding Manville knowledge, marketing and labeling.... 3200 William Reitze will testify regarding Manville knowledge of asbestos hazards...................................... Ttrry A. Bing Will testify as an expert regarding Manville product development................. 3002,3055 2243,2247,2256, 2261,2270,2282, 2285,2290,2293, 2297,2300-02, 2304,2307,2309, 2317,2318,2327, 2328 will testify regarding Manville knowledge of asbestos hazards.................... .................. 3148 Dr. Joseph Ross will testify as an expert witness regarding the medical aspects of asbestos exposure.................................................................... 3347,4439,4440 47,4449,4451, 4452 Wilbur Ruff 1/ will testify regarding Manville knowledge of asbestos hazards..................................... 3084-87 Frank Sartore will testify regarding the Navy Insurance Division...................................................... 2033-36,2050, 2051,2057,2059 Richard Sandman will testify regarding Joseph Teta's settlements with Manville........................... 4365,4367 Clifford Scheckler 1/ will testify regarding Manville knowledge of the hazards of 3101 * Harold Seacriat will testify regarding working conditions at the Bethlehem Steel (Fore River) Shipyard and his claims against Manville............. 3104,3105,4142, 4151,4152 Nicholas Sfisko will testify regarding Manville knowledge of asbestos hazards and Manville factory conditions................................... 3084-87,3093 VI - 161 Harold Sheehan will testify regarding the Metals Reserve Company's purchase and sale of raw asbestos during World War II............................. 310-12 Rttbln.Be... Shttlffun will testify about working conditions at the Boston Naval Shipyard, his asbestos-related disease and his claims against Manville............................................ 4222-24 William Simpson will testify regarding the custody, location, possession and authenticity of the Sumner Simpson papers.......... ............................... 3041,3042,3047, 3048,3052,3059 62,3064-67,3073, 3075-77,3079, 3083,3143,3146, 3147 Robert Sima will testify regarding the custody, location, possession and authenticity of the Sumner Simpson papers............................................................. 3041,3042,3047, 3048,3052,3059 62,3064-67,3073, 3075-77,3079, 3083,3143,3146, 3147 Dr. Kenneth W. Smith 1/ will testify regarding Manville knowledge of the health effects of asbestos, its workmen's compensation claims and job evaluations..................................................... .. 3084-87,3180-83, 3191,3192,3195, 3196,3198 W-P. Saith will testify about working conditions at the Consolidated Steel Shipbuilding Company (Orange, Texas) Shipyard, his asbestos-related disease an&h&# claime against Johns-Manville.................... 4408,4409 R.A.Stapleton will testify regarding Manville knowledge of asbestos hazards and Manville factory conditions.................................................................. 3093 W. Thomas Stephens will testify regarding Manville's current business operations and financial situation ......................... .......................... 3,4,6 Paul Stickler will testify regarding the