Document pm8KKkXVemx3y8xRq4E7zM337

FILE NAME: Z/ZZZZ/ DATE: DOC#: / DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:ZZZZ/ _.i!1;~<~ th of the \ {Y:'@.j.~A~n.dsubsesttroys Matthew M. Sweton/c Former Director of EnvIronmental Analrs. Johns-Manv/ille Corporation It"s almost impossible to comprehend. but little more than a Quarter-century ago. asbestos was still referred to as the "magic mineral." The dozen or so major corporations that were malor asbestos miners and/or producers of asbestos-containing building materials. such as Johns-Manvi\lle. Cetrain-Teed. GAF. National Gypsum. and Raybestos-Manhattan. were rich. sassy. and riding high. Asbestos was used everywhere: in floor tile. in pipe, in brake linings, in a dozen different types of insulation, in acoustical tile. in house siding. It was in our homes, our schools. the places we worked, our cars and trUCKS, our planes, our ships ... everywhere. If there was a dark cloud on the horizon, it might be that housing starts were down or commercial construction was slowing. A handful of scientists in the U.S., Great Britain, and South Africa were starting to uncover some disturbing things about the consequences of inhaling too much asbestos fiber, but few were listening to their concerns. Overview Today that industry is dead. The major asbestos corporations have either been driven into bankruptcy by billions upon billions tfdollars In liabihty claims or have long since moved into other ventures, abandoning the use of asbestos altogether in most products. Once flourishing asbestos mines In Canada, the UnIted States, and southern Africa lie abandoned or are operating at a fractIOn of thcir previous output. Where it was once treasured, it is now dreaded. A multibilliondollar industry has ansen for the sole purpose of removing it from wherever it is found. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has evcn proposed banmng its use in any product. anywhr,rp in the lJnited SLates. but was rebuffed by the courts on a technicality. CRISIS RlSPOHS[ Death of the Asbestos Industry WWhh~att happened? What drove that once mighty industry into the dust? It's During a relatively short period of time from the mid-1960s through the ~I 19705, the "magic mineraIl' was exposed for what it really was - probably ~ most hazardous industrial material ever unleashed on an unsuspecting woYrlldd, know. I was there. or , The Right Place at the Right Time In June 19651I took a job as an assistant editor m the public relations departmenll of the Johns-Manville Corporation ,in New York City., The man who hired mne. William P. "Bill" Ralines, the bead of public relations., had recently jOOlDl:e:d me. from the Koppers Company In Pittsburgh. Like myself, he had done his under. graduate work at the University of Pittsburgh and had worked on the schhOO1l newspaper. 00 My job was not very demanding. I was the number two man on the company', monthly employee magazine. Mostly I traveled around the country from J-M pIlant to J-M Pplant,. taking pictures and Imnterviewing plant personnel for stories oonna: new product Ilimne or new plant addition. If nothing else, I got to know the company . pretty well: where asbestos was used, how it was handled, what products it was m and why, although it never occurred to me at the time how valuable that knowl- edge wass. to become In later years. In 1967 my boss was promoted to head of all J-M publications and I was given the editor's job on the employee magazine. Life was fme and uncomplicated. And then It happened. . History of the "Magic Mineral" In the .lIaate summer of 1968 I was called into the office of Jack Solon, who was RalmDes'ss boss and vice-presiiddeennt for advertising and public relations. Ramines's was there, .too. Solon saaiid~ he knew I had specialized in science journalism and he wondered Iif I would be imntecrested in leaving the magazine and joming him and RaliDnes to work on a new problem that had recently arisen ID the company. He asked m~ee whether I had ever read anythlmDg Imn the press about recent allegat;ions regarding the safety of asbestos. I said I thought I recalled seeing an article or two but slmOce Manvlille's name was not mentioned,, I d'iidn't payy muchh attenti.on to them. He assured me it was time to pay attention I left Solono's offICe with a new but ambiguous title, coordinator of special projects My first take on my new assliggnnmmeenn~t was to ,learn aliI could about the asbestos-health Issue I discovered a lonll and imnterestming story. To lJegin With. aslJestos is not synthetic; It IS a mmeral mmed from the earth, geneerraallllyy ffrroomm open-ppiittm'ines. There are three commeerrCcially valuab.le type, s of asbestos chrysotlle, which comes primarily from mImDes Imn Canada and a few, m 'to -""'" .~ T'.... 4 .--.-._-...- '.'-;P '!- now closed, ImD the Unoited States; and the two so-called amphibole varieties, crocldolite and amoslte. which are mostly found in the southern part of Aflrica. China alld the former Soviet Union also contain sizable deposits o01f asbestos, but they play little part in our tale. Some chrysotlle asbestos will be found wherever tbh8l'e are outcroppilngs of a form of rock called serpentine, but these are not commercially useable. These outcroppings can be [ound in almost every state Iin tbhe << '-- _~ _....I] U.S. Practically the entire northern half of Califorma rests on a bed of what is referred to as "crud grade" asbestos oare. WhIle totally unusable, it is the main reason why California cities such as San FranCISco and Sacramento have tbhe highest levels of asbestos in their drinking water of essentially anyplace in the world. Rain put it there by washing it out at the ground and mto the drinking water. Wind and erosion also release small but detectable Quantities of asbestos into the air. It has even been found in ice samlillies dating back thousands of years. It is everywhere. What made asbestos so valuable was ItSs ability to be separated into long Silky fibers that could be woven or wound into a Wide variety of products; and it is practically fireproof. The word asbestos, in fact, comes from the ancient Greek and means unquenchable," not because it wlJuldn't burn but because when used as wicks for oil lamps. It wouldn't go out or bl,rn down. To this day I keep a chuck of asbcstos ore on my desk. To illustrate Its a,tributes I pull a few fibers and hold them over a cigarette lighter Far tbhinner than a human h8a1lr, the fibers will glow brflight red mm the name, but not burn or be consumed. It is tbhe Ifmeness and near indestructibility of tbhe fibers that made asbestos so valuable, and, as it turned out., so lethal. The first indications that there migbht be something amiss with the "magic mineraIl" arose in the years prior to the First World War in Great Britain. In the late 1940s, reports. once agam from England, brgan appearm10g9 IDn the medical literature linkmg asbestos exposure to an elevaLUf'd rfisk of lung cancer among heavily exposed workers. prlmaflly in the Britlish asbestos textile industry, wbhere conditions were recognized to be particularly dusty. While efforts were undertaken to reduce exposures, It was not known how m\ICh asbestos was "too much." Health Problemsl In the United States and Canada, the industry was sufficiently alarmed by the reports cros~ing the Atlantic from England that It commiSSioned a study of lung cancer among the Quebec asbestos mmers. It was assumed - mcorrectly, as It later turned out - that asbestos mmecrs W( uld have the highest exposure of any group o01f' asbestos workers, IODcludmg the tHxtile workers. and tbhat if a problem were to be found, It would be found III tbhe :)ucbec mines. The study, which was 291 I CRISIS RlSPOHS[ completed In 1955, found only a handful of cases and concluded that was going on in England It wasn't happening here. Complacency was finally shattered iIn the early 1960s when reports started facing iIn many countries of an exceedingly rare cancer of the lining of the or the abdominal cavity. It was called mesothelioma. Not only was iIt beIng among asbestos workers, but It was also showing up in communities adjacent . asbestos mines and factories, and among the families of asbestos workers people whose only exposure to asbestos was the dust on the clothes worn from work. Most of the cases being reported were IDn Great Britain and Africa, but, unlike lung cancer, because there were no known causes of \toma other than asbestos exposure, It was difficult to Ignore. Too Little Too LLatel In the United States, additional dust control equipment of varying degrees sophlstlcatlon began to be Installed iIn plants from coast to coast. But was enough, and was it too late? The problem was, no one knew lor sure how mucll dust was too much, nor, In the United States at least. were there standards were enforceable in all plants and mines nationally even if someone did come with a safe exposure ilevel that everyone could agree upon. The baSIC law govern ing exposure to occupational hazards In the U.S. was at that time the Walsh Healey Public Contracts Act, which had been passed in the 1930s but applied only to those companies doing business with the U,S. government. Because there were no inspections nor record-keepmg procedures enforceable under the law, compliance was for all intents and purposes voluntary. The standards themselves were developed by an independent group calied the American Conference or . Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), which set and reVised standards tor a whole range of occupational hazards, inCclluding asbestos. ''------------~'> For many years. asbestos exposures had been measured IDn particles per cubic foot of air, which was more a reflection of the crude nature of the measurement equipment then available than It was of the conviction of the sCientific community that the volume of asbestos iInhaled by a worker was an appropriate gauge of iIts level of hazard. By the 1960s, iIn fact. most scientists had come to the conclusion that volume meant IliIttlile; it was the number and size of the mdivlduail asbestos F(Iibbers that a worker inhaled that was the true test of its danger. If a fiber was too long or too thick, it was incapable of penetrating into the deep recesses of the lung where it couild cause disease. In the same regard. if the fiber was too small, it would be either cleared by normal ilung cleansing mechanisms or else would be totalily encapsulated by certain types of lung celils to form a non-hazard phenomena called an "asbestos body." m2M2 Death of the Asbestos Industry General agreement existed as to the size o01f asbestos fliber that caused the prob- lem; no agreement eXIsted on was the number of filbers per cubic centimeter that should be the limit in factory air iIn order to prevent disease, Some said 12; some _ said 5; some said 2. It was this argument that roared through the late 19605 and early 1970s - and which to some extent persists to this day - but I am getting ahead of my story. While awareness was growing in American government and industry iIn the early 1960s that something needed to be done about the asbestos threat - and many things were being done iIn terms of improving factory conditions - iIt was not an Issue known to any except a handful of scientists, government officials and enlightened iIndustry leaders. Those in industry who were either unaware of the hazard or who chose to discount it, could ignore it with impunity because of the weaknesses of the Walsh-Heailey Act. Something or someone needed to come along to stir up the country. It was a someone. His name was Irvilng Selikoff. Dr. Irving Sellkoff was a chest physiCian who throughout the more public part of his career was head of the DiviSIOn of Environmental Medicme at the Mount Sinai Schooil of Medicine in New York and director of its Environmental Sciences Laboratory. In 1962 he began a decades-long study of the mortality of union workers in the asbestos insuilation industry in the New York City area. These were not workers who manufactured asbestos-containing insulations; instead they were the people who IDstailed asbestos iInsulation in New York area skyscrapers and schools and, when the insulation deteriorated and needed to be replaced, ripped It out. The First LargeSSccaale SSttudy The health experience of the asbestos insulation workers. as Dr. SeeHlikkof!f discovered, was disastrous. Their rates of asbestosis. lung cancer. and mesothelioma were higher than any other asbestos researcher had found among any other asbestos-exposed population anyplace iIn the world. Equally as important, it was the first large-scale study of an asbestos mdustry group in the United States that produced results similar to studies done in Great Britain and South Africa. It was no longer possible to say, It can't happen here. Dr. Sellikoff published his study of the insulation workers In the Journal of the American MedIcal ASSOCIation iIn the spring of 1964. The asbestos problem was starting to enter the limelight. The next four years witnessed IIlcreasing efforts from DOr Seilikoff and his associates at Mount Smai to locus American public attention on the plight of the insuilation workers, and by implication on workers throughout the asbestos Industry, both here and abroad While hiS studies produced no data that could help m the development 01 an appropriate numerical fIiber standard - ail he knew was the m l .. ,i CRISIS RfSPOHS[ diseases the union members died from and how long thlley had been workllll Industry - he nonetheless argued passionately to anyone who would listen thile existing standards were woefully inadequate. It was impossible to whether he was right or not since the existing standards - whether particles or fiObeOrrs - had never been monitored except in the most (ash ion, and for his own Imnsulation workers had never been measured at all. It was not that an environmental engineer could not enter an asbestos mine construction site and take a precise asbestos fiber count - many were - but tIIere was no way to compare these exposures with tbllose that decades ago when workers experienced the exposures tha t lhIad led to the diseases of the 1960s. Over dozens of years, gradual Improvements In in mines and plants, plus numerous changes in the compositIOn of asbestos products and in work practices for handling those products at tile site, had made it essentially Impossible to reconstruct the exposures of the [n sbllort, the only thing Dr. Selikoff had to offer the American public in the 1 was the woeful health experience of the msulation workers and a plea that thing be done about it. Proactive Health Efforts By the time [ became involved m the asbestos controversy in the late 19608, Johns-Manville had undergone a malor transformation as far the health hazards or ' asbestos were concerned As the largest of the world's asbestos companies, with both huge mines and numerous manufacturing facilities in North America, J-M had "gotten religion" big time. While not at all convinced that Dr. Seliikoffs Iinsulation worker mortality rates were applicable to all elements of the mIndustry, It had the money and manpower to both clean up all ItS operations to the limits of tech- OIcal feasibility and to launch itself. or instigate through its numerous trade associations, any number of health studlcs to determlmDe the extent o( the problems., Through thc Quebec Asbestos Mimng Association, a huge research project was imLtliaated and funded at McGill Unive~sity m Montreal to study the mortality of the Quebec asbestos miners. [t would not be a repeat of the mld-1950s study that (ound "no problem," but wouid Imnstead be as tblloorough and as probing an epidemiologICal study as any industry had ever funded against Iitself,. More importantly, it would be thbe first malaor asbestos study to try to identify not only the extent of disea~p in a segment of t.hhe asbestos mdustry. but also the levels of exposure that resulted In that disease. The fundamental strategy that J-M adopted to deal with the crisis involved conducting a Wide range o( both health and technical studies to determine the extent of the problem Within Its own operations and to develop the technologies neces- .) I1I1 ~ Death of the Asbestos Industry .18.rY to brmIng the situation under control. To assist the company in evaluating the , lrIlly astounding volume of studies beginning to appear in the medical literature on asbestos, it hired as a practically fuU-time consultant Dr. George W. Wright of we Medical Research Department at St. Luke's Hospital in Cleveland, who was himself a well-known asbestos researcher. It began a malor outreach program of assistanCe and cooperation to government and private scientists worldwide, including Dr. Selikoff. who were seeking remedies to the emerging problem. It established particularly close links with the asbestos industry in Great Britain, whllere the problem hbad reached the acute stage years earlier and where much o( the most valuable asbestos-health research was being conducted, a good deal o( It being funded or at a mInimum being cooperated in by thbe various English asbestos companies. It always stlruck me as unique to the Britisbh system thbat a spirit o( cooperation and loilnt purpose existed between the asbestc,s industry in the UK and Her Maiesty's Factory Inspectorate, the regulatory group charged with policing industrial health in policies in that country. It was a far cry from the adversarial Situation that would shortly develop in the United States with the establishment, both in 1970, of the EPA and thh.e Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). To manage the Issue, J-M established an mternal asbestos-health management Building a committee, chaired hy then-president C,int Burnett. It met at least monthly and Communications included Solon, representing public relations, and Dr. Wright as outSide medical consultant. Apart from the upper manag~ment committee, a separate public relia tlions committee was (ormed consistine of Solon, Raines, and myself Through Team Solon, and eventually on our own, Rame3 and I nad access to DOr. Wright and to J- M's two top environmental control experts, gd Fenner and Clirf Sheckler, for their assistance in developmg responses to questions raised in the media regard- mg either the health side of the issue Jr Manville's own efforts at bnnging the problem under control At the nonneeLtoOoo--ssuubbtle proddmg of our English industry cousins, who believed the communications side of the issue IDn thc U.S. was being mishandled If It was being hbandiled at all, J-M retamed the PR firm of Hill and Knowlton as outSide consultants. H&K. Wwhhich 11ad recently passed Carl Byoir and Associates to become the largest PR firm in Ihe world, had been on retamer to the British industry for 3 number o( .ears The account was placed In H&K's recently established Environmental Health Umt, the first diVISion in any PR firm dedicated solely to assisting clients I1I rcspondmg to health and safety Issues., Together with the H&K staff, It was OUlf job tlJ) bfrlnllll the communicatIOns Side of the problem under contro\l. 'm I I CRISIS RISPOHS[ It was a fundamental tenet of our approach that good science should dictate liec policy on health issues. It was therefore essential that policy makers. 8a8 as the general public. know what science told us. Suave Dr. Selikoff Essentially the only side of the issue being reported in the press at that time Dr. Sellkoffs. who hbad over the years developed excellent media reJla,atltolcnlnssblllil He had perfected the two essentials necessary to becoming an spokesperson for his cause: he always prOVIided interesting. frequently versial copy and he was always accessible. There was never any: "Let me that over and l'Il get back to you." He was always ready with an answer opinion. He understood deadlines and what constituted a "good" story. and always patient. never condescending. to reporters who were having understanding his Interpretation of the science. He perfected ailmost to an form a technique that I now refer to as the "white coat approach" Whenever appeared on television or was entertaining reporters at Mount Sinal. he failed to appear in a white lab coat. as if he had just emerged from examlinlD& paltlient or performing some experiment. While a standard technique today conveying scientific credibility. In the late t 960s It was new and fresh and faIiled to Impress. As his staff at Mount Sinai grew. he taught them his teecclh~nnll(qluueeiili so that in time he had an entire cadre of sSCCIientists at hIiS dIisposal who were aiI8ft' adept in media relations. And he possessed thliat most critical of all assets: since he had no apparent "cause" other than the health of asbestos InOdduusstry workers around the world. he was exceeedImngly credIible - a sort of Wailter Cronkite of tbhe SCIientIfIiC community. It was a tough act to handle. Two things he did always drove us crazy. He always referred to the insulation workers as "asbestos workers," which was nearly always reported as meaning people who worked in asbestos mines and mills. whIich they. of course. did not. In later years. when J-M was InOvvoollvved in a joint program at Moum Sinai to develop new methodologies for reddUucClOIng the asbestos exposure of the Insulation workers. he was continually urged to change the misleading terminology when rcferring to the InsulatIon workers. He promIised many times to do so. but never did. I believe It served his purposes better to continue using a term that implies he represented the Interests of a far larger segment of the industry than he ..,... actually did and that the problem was universal in the asbestos industry, which "" It was not. "t'" The other thImDg he dIid that gave us nts was his inSIistence on extrapolating the health experIence of the insulatIion workers. whIich was admIittedly terrIible. to any and all asbestos workers everywhere. regardless of their level of exposure. As the 2H6 Death of the Asbestos Industry Dumber of workers grew who were discovered to have had some. often trivial. elQlOsure to asbestos in theIr worldng lifetime. the number of deaths he predicted Crew by leaps and bounds. To be fair. he would preface each calculation with the words: "If our numbers are correct. we can predict...... but the disclaimer was sel dom if ever picked up by the media. nor was Its import understood. Even when he tried to clarifty for the media what he meant. It was often ignored In favor of the more dramatic. For example. in late 1972, CBS News contacted me for a response to a statement Dr. Sehkoff had made at a congressional hear Ing. This was at a time when controversy raged over the fate of workers In VU.S. shipyards during World War 1II1. some of whom had substantial exposure to asbestos Insulatlions used aboard navy ships. The reporter SaBIld Dr. Selikoff had predicted that 2 million former shipyard workers would die of asbestos-related diseases before the end of the century. I explained that he had misunderstood what was said. Since ODr. Selikoff had made the same prediction many times. I was able to Quote him almost verbatim: "If our numbers are correct. of the 2 mil lIon workers employed In U.S. shIipyards during the Second World War. 40 percent will die of asbestos-related diseases before the end of the century: I put him In contact with Dr. SeeUllkkoff. who confirmed to the reporter that he had gotten the prediction wrong. Relieved. I then proceeded to explain to the reporter why we considered the predictIOn totally off basceo. That evening. towards the end of the broadcast. Wailter Cronkite solemnly Intoned. -Noted asbestos researcher Irving J. Sellkoff today predicted that 2 millIon American shipyard workers would die of asbestos-related dIisease before the end of the century. A spokesman for the asbestos industry said the number was too hIigh." The next moronImDg I called the reporter at CBS back to complain about the spot. Hadn't they talked to Dr. Selikofr? Hadn't he told them they had It wrong? He answered yes to both questIOns but saIid. "We used what we thought he saIid at the hearing because it made a better story." We contInued on track with our efforts. We developed and dIistributed a series of medIia background papers on the varIOus aspects of the asbestos Issue. Of partic ular concern was mesothelioma. because It was the only asbestos-related dlis ease known to occur outSIide of the industrial setting. If socalled "nelighborhood" and "household" cases were showing up with Increasing frequency In Great BriltaImD and South Africa. how soon would it, be before they began occurrIng here. and with what level of public outcry? Science-Based Communications Fortunately. the SCIientifIiC eVIidence was mounting that nearly all cases of mesothelIoma could be traced to exposure to eIither of the two amphlibole varI- 297 I' i 1 ". i ! ...: , ,. CRISIS RlSPOHSf ( - --J> ~. -------- eties of asbestos - crocidollte and amosite - or to mixtures of either ot and chrysotile. but essentially never to chrysotiIe alone. At J-M's huge pl$Dt plex in Manville, New Jersey. some 50 cases of mesothelioma would be by the mid-1970s, with all but one occurring among workers in the cement pipe plant, where In the 1940s and 1950s cro<:ldolite and chrysotile been commonly mixed together with pitch forks on the plant nOooor before made into pipe. Amoslte was also heavily used 1m0 the manufacture of the types msulatlOns used by the workers studied by Dr. Selikoff. In fact, the common of wrap insulation used for many applications was called an "amoslte blanket.- Asbestos COrlcerns continue today, as workers in protective gear wash down bUildings in New York City after a pipeline blast contaminated the area with asbestos. All our efforts to communicate this new sCientific evidence on mesothelioma were opposed strenuously in the media by Dr. Sellkoff and his associates at Mount Sinai. He discounted the new research and asserted that we were trying to whitewash chrysotlle, which was the mamstay of J- M's product line and the only type of asbestos mined by the company. He conveniently forgot or chose to ignore the fact that when faced with the same eVidence, the British - whose approaches he normally admired - began moving rapidly toward settmg stricter standards on crocidolite and amosite than on chrysotile alld would eventually end up bannmg both varieties. To Dr. Sellkofr. asbestos was asbestos. and he would accept no eVidence that contradicted that view. m Death of the Asbestos Industry BY late 1968 ManviIlle and Dr. Sell\kmof' were In close, almost daily, contact. While we continued to fight it out in the media over many issues, there was one on wblch we could both agree: the insulation workers had a borrible health record and something needed to be done to address their working conditions. J-M agreed 10 fund an effort at Mount Smal that came to be called the Industrial Insulation Health Research Program (llHRP). Its primary purpose was to develop environmental control practices for reducing the asbestos exposure of the insulation workers to safe levels. Aboard of directors was created to oversee the project. It Included government health officials, J-M's vice-presidents of manufacturmg and R&D, Dr. Wright, Dr Selikoff, and a number of others. J-M bought Mount Sinai a state of the art electron microscope Hnd assigned a top-notch Industrial hygiemst to work. in residence With the Mount Smai staff. Communications support was to tie provided by Hill and Knowlton with Carl Thompson, an H&K executive vlcepresident and head of the firm's E:nvlfonmental Health Unit, which handled the JM account, tlecomlng the defect head of PR for the IlHRP. From a communications standpoint ;he JOInt effort worked flOe. The venture was launChed with considerable public fanfare with a press conference at Mount Sinal - DOr Sellkoff turned the media out III droves - and lots of smiles. handshakes. and pledges of eternal coo\leration. Thompson wrote and produced the program's periodiC newsletter, sent out press releases on various program accomplishments, and even ghostwrote an article for Dr. Selikoff for an occupational hygiene lIOoUurnalI. Clearly, ManVvlille's image was enhanced by its involvement in the IlHRP effort, but it cont nued to be the only asbestos company in the U.S. speaking out in defense of the Industry when it came under attack That was soon to change. For years H&K had been urgmg thaL J-M set up a trade association in the United States to handle the communications aspects of the asbestos issue. The firm's London office had set up such a group, called the Asbestos Information CounCil, for the British asbestos mdustry, ald H&K argued that a U.S. counterpart would prOVide the same two maior benefits to Manville. First, by establishing an umbrella group to handle communications. It would reduce J-M's own individual media exposure; and second, it would create a voice that would speak for the entire U S industry and not just fOl' one company. The reasomng was persuasive. an,l m late 1970, a meeting of seven or eight ot the major U.S. astlestos compallies was convened in J-M's headquarters. Manville was Viewed With some suspicion by the mdustry because of its close association with Dr. Sellkoff. whom they totally distrusted m tnhe llHRP program, 299 Industry Umbrella Ope,," l' I ~ \ ,.- \' . ~'., ~ h,: '~H:~,W' l :ilt'iil r ~nlsls RlSPOHH in: \vtH'l) llh~. PIVSttlCnl of Htrw \\\\....''{{HH''lldd Ss lldd""''ssnn''\\~~.. ((,;hf<..,lOF C0Inp;}th u}\ cd a htf PCf'ff, H1(;\' :~~}Tte ib)ol)kkmm ~~~,S~KseK(eia Wf" itntl wntt~ H SfKW ;H'f;~;lnHmwl\ \\1!wh ~ \\,)UH} g~v~~ th<'Ht~tt wetcnmeo utF g~~{~$t,~. liZ' gw :.~) DDuunnCcDn.nuaamm the preSseennttatIOn and to layout mIn no uncertain terms the seriousness of the r lems facing the Industry. I sat in on the meeting and wwaa~;''s~~pr-i;d"tOtiiscover . ,. that many of the par'ticipants considered many of Dr. Selikofrs charges so outra-. geous that they had discounted them entirely. Many seemed unaware of the research commIng out of the U.K. and South Africa that indicated the health threat was far wider In scope that they had been lead to believe. Agreement as reached., after much diSSCcUusSsSioion., to form a trade association came to be called the Asbestos Information Assoclation/INorth America (AlNNA),. " with J-M providing both staff and fundmIng for the first year of operation. If., at the end of that time., the member compames found the Association was prOovViiddiing a useful service., a mechanism would be developed for sharing the costs on an e,.qnIU1IIltQa~'b''le''"'-':; basis. Rames became defect executive director with me as chief of staff. Clearly,. at least to me. the deciding factor In Inducing those in the room to join up was OouUrf . warning that the two new regulatory agencies created by Congress that yyeeara_r- . OSHA and EPA - were both eyemg asbestos as their first problem to tackle. The responsibilities of the AINNA would go far beyond normal puubbHlic relations., at ". least as it was commonly practiced in 1971. The operative word in the name of the . Association was "information." The Association would not just deal with the media.. but would create a technical information arm to advise Industry members on the appropriate ways to control asbestos exposures ID the workplace; a regulatory Information arm to work With government agenCcies on the development of reasonable workplace and environmental standards. and. In the future,. a legal arm 1to0 assist the industry as a whole m defending Itself agamst liability claims. The latter WOUld. In time. swallow the entire trade assoCIatIOn,. but Imn 1971., the liability iIssue did not even show up on the screen and would not do so for years to come Risk Comes H()me We had all been dreading the mevltable discovery of the first "neighborhood" or ,. '"'>< ,", '} '\ "household" case of messootthheehlioma in the UnDtltteed States. When iIt did happen,. the \ "tv'V -t "" \ ...... \ shock was incredible because it had truly occurred mID our own hoouusseehhOold. The <"t ,~\ 1';'.\ vVicicttiimm was the wWiiffee of Cliff Sheckler. who was one of J-M's two top iInndduussttrial ," /"" .' " .. ,~ \ " ilyglene officers and a member of tile E;nvlronmemntai COntrOl Committee of thile AWNA Since the ShheeCcklers had never ltived close to any Manvil\le plant during ...,, \'" hiS long career With the company., it was a true huusehold case; she had devel- oped the disease from inhaling"' the asbestos dust he brought home on hiS clothes from work. More than any other development. the death of Shheecckklleerr'S's wife forced ~ 300 , Death of the Asbestos Industry the entire iIndustry to face up to the realities of the asbestos threat., something It had seemed reluctant to do previously. Ed Fenner,. the other top J-M industrial hygiene olficer and., like Sheckiler., a member of the Associatlion's environmental committee. would himself die from mesothelioma in 1984. Both men had spent their early years at J-M as plant engineers., at a time when dust controls In Industry plants and mills were rudimentary., If they existed at all. J /'(. .~ j _ ,,;. ~ 4\ :t r""' / ' - ,-'J~",:,: ~'~ '-" As a matter of principle and good public relations., the ASssSoOcCiaiatitoionn steadfastly maintained that asbestos should not be used for "inappropriate purposes- and that any use of asbestos In its "freec" form should be controlled to reduce employee and general public exposure to the extent technically feasible. ~ (I)'~./\,'" l't-.' \. .".\\. f' ". Cc..1I,, C~..lIiijI-,II(( ,I For decades., the steel girders of high-rise bUIildings in most American cities were Three Asbestos ,I fireproofed by a process called" asbestos spraying: Raw asbestos fiber was Curiosities mixed with water in a tank and shot out of a nozzle at the girders from a far as 20 feet away. Despite the presence of water In the concoction. the process was noto- riously dusty. In order to contain the dust within the construction site. tarpaulins were generally hung from the outSide of the floor being sprayed. At this time In New York City., a number of high-rise buildilngs.linncclluudmg the World Trade Center. were under construction. On windy days,. the tarpaulins would frequently bUuCckKllee,. particularly on the higher floors. allowing a shower of dried asbestos spray to cascade down on the heads of pedestrtians below. DOr Sclikoff's people at Mount Sinai claimed that asbestos spraying was the cause of the "asbestos bodies- being routinely found at autopsy in the lungs of New Yorkers not occupationally exposed to asbestos and predicted an epidemic of asbestos-related disease in the general public. The head of the local asbestos sprayers trade group came to us for assistance. We studied his data and the precautions bemg taken to control the dust., and put it on the agenda for the next full meeting of the AssociiaattIiOon. It was not an economic consideration for mliOllilnng members of the AlA smce the volume of asbestos used for spray applications was IDflmntlteslmal. The diSCUSSIOn therefore centecred solely on whether It was a controllable use of asbestos,. and. If It wasn't,. what should we do about It During a break ID the meeting. [ strolled over to a nearby window and looked out. The meeting was belmOg held in thee. EngIneers Club., which. was on 40th SSttrr'e'eeeLt Iin New York City oovveerrlOloOoKking Bryant Park. Across the park. on 42nd Street,. the W.R. Grace buildlmOg was under construction. r'rom a tarpaulined floor abouuLt 10 ssLtoories up., a Virtual snow shower of sprayed asbestos was slowly drifting down to the street below It was a Visual demonstration of the public relaLions nightmare that we would be facmg Irf we lent our supppoorrLt to the asbestos 381 I CRISIS RlSPpnNS8[ sprayers. I called everyone to the window "That," I said. pointIng across street. "IS why we have to take a walk on those peoopplele,": We quietly Informed DI'. Sellkoff. the city of New York. and the EPA - which was also looking Into ~ asbestos sprayin - that while we wouldn't attack the practice and grounds. nCeIither would we defend it. The practice was shortly banned by the cllY and later by the EPA nationally. With our concurrence. Sometimes the problems that came noating In over the transom were just plain weird. In late 1971 I received a phone call from Dr Selikoff. He had a problem that he hoped I could help him with. He said tbis was one we could both agree needed fixing. The Ssiittuuation he descrIbed was so preposterous even I had trouble believing any businessperson anywhere could be so ignorant of the evidence regarding the health risks 01 aSsbbestos, or so callous he didn't care. The situation was this. Import duties on fmished asbestos products imported Iinto the United States were essentially zero. On the otber hand, the duties on clothing manufactured abroad were quite stiff. An Italian businessperson thought he had found a clever way to beat the customs folks at their own game. He produced thousands of ladles winter coats using a small amount of asbestos fiber in their manufacture and then tried to Import them into the United States as "asbestos products" rather than as clothing. The coats were not even woven, but were a pressed melton. a type of materIal similar to that used ID navy pea coats., Dr., Selikoff told me you could actually release free asbestos fibers from the coats USIng a small clothes brush. He wanted me to talk to the importer, who had contacted Dr. Sehilkoff for his assistance mID convincIing customs offlclais that the coats were safe., Dr., Selikoff said that he had tried reasoning with the importer. but that he refused to understand the serIiOouussness of the problem. and was mtent on forcing the issue With customs. Perhaps, he said, he would believe it if somebody from the asbestos industry backed up hiS concerns. I offered to meet with the importer, and Dr Seehillkeooflf promised, in return, not to go to the media with the story until I had a chance to sit down With the Importer and explain the hopeless-, ness of hiS pOSitIOn I met With the importer a few days later. He couldn't see what the problem was. Women don't brush their coats every day, he argued, and besides, the amount ot asbestos in the coats was very small, only enough to meet the customs service's definnIIttIiOon of an asbestos product., As a fellow businessperson, he hoped I would understand that If the coats were declared unsafe, he couldn't sell them anywhere, let alone in the UODIlcted States, and would loose hiS entire mvestment i patiently explained that while the actual risk might be very small, the AlA con.. sidered what he had done a totally inappropriate use of asbestos and that we m m Death of the Asbestos Industry n would never support him. He left delecteQ, saying he would have to think over his options. I reported on the meetmg to DOr., 3elikoff. who thanked me for my efforts. but said that he would now have to take IT,atters into his own hands., Sure enough. withIn a couple of days, the New York medIia was swamped With stories on the hazardous "asbestos coats" frnm Italy,. The demonstration Dr. Selikoff cooked up for the media was a masterful piece of theater. He put one of the coats on a female mannequin in an enclosed laboratory at Mount Sinai, and while he lectured the assembled press corps on the hazards of asbestos. two of hiS staff. dressed in moon suits, eventually brushed fibers from the coat into plastic baggles, which they then sealed. as if they (ontamed some horribly radioactive substance, and took away for analYSIS. It was very effective and very photogenic, The importer. of course. never got his coats Into the United States. I thought we had dodged yet another stupid bullet. but rumors about "asbestos coats" and otnlier types of asbestos clothing bemg cn tbe market kept poppmg up here and there for years, each of which required a couple of phone cans or a letter to set the record straight. In the early fall we learned of yet another Idiocy. Small, five-pound sacks of raw asbestos fiber were bemg purchased by ~ome schools and YWCAs to be used as an ImDexpensive modeling compound to construct puppets or sculpt heads. We checked a number of hardware stores in various cities and, sure enough. the stuff was available almost everywberc. Besides writing the distrIbutors that we were able to identify, mIn November we sent a precautionary letter on the subject to nearly 5.000 teachers associations, hobby and craft pJblications, state boards of education. boy and girl scout councils. YMCAs and ThCAs urging that "the use of asbestos for hOobby purposes be eliminated Immediately." We reccelived many thank-you letters back. Most indicated they weren't aware that inhaling asbestos fibllers could be a serious health hazard. That gap in their ,lducation was soon to be filled. " \ !(J.1, J "-;';'1 '11 " '., 0\.", 'r' )t ~ , l .1 1 ..... '" ,', , '/ " f~~ ~I,' / ' I ,t} ," I: . t .,,' , 11< I'./ " , ..\ ' J ~ ~ .r ~ - : . J J<. ',J' ,~ /'" \ ;_'~ (..".. 1 As predicted, by late 1971 the newly created regulatory agencies of EPA and OSHA were in hot pursuit of th(: asbestos Imndustry. Fueled by incessant poundmg from Mount Sinai and organized labor, OSHA on December 7 issued an Emergency Temporary Standard reducing permissible asbestos exposure levels in the workplace from 12 to 5 fibers per cubic centimeter of ail', with a proposed further reduction to 2 fibers If the medical evidence supported It. Under the statue that created OSHA, the agency would have to come up With a permanent standard within six months. At arounj the same time. the EPA announced Its intention to hold a series of public hea'mgs across the United States for the purpose of developmg an ambient air standard on asbestos to plr'otect the general public from the threat of asbestos-related disease. Our plate was filling up fast., m EPA Hearings: Cakewallk CRISIS R[SPOHS[ To complicate matters, Joohhnnss--MMaannvvUille was In the midst of moving its corporate headquarters from New York City to Denver. I had already announced my deeCcIision not to go West with tile company and would therefore be without a job iiDll early 1972. Ralines had already left to loin Union Pacific as pubhlic relations director, so I was left alone to handle the affairs of the trade association as It was entering iIts most trying period. In late December I was asked to fly to Bulfalo, New York, to meet with AI Fay of National Gypsum, who was then president of the AINNA, to discuss my taking over the reins as executive director, which I agreed to do, effective January 1. The E:PA hearings were physilcaliygrueling, but from aPPR standpomt they were I piece of cake. The media was obsessed With the occupational health aspects 01 the asbestos issue, but had not yet latched onto the environmental implications, Media coverage of the first hearings, held in New York, was zero. The Manvlille folks held center stage but Since the industry had already turned its back on the sprayed asbestos people there was little controversy to attract attention. The next hearings were held m Los Angeles a week later. The AssocciiaattJlon was tile primary testilfier and the only opposition came from a local chapter of the Sierra Club, which tried desperately to build a case that the asbestos industry was damaging the CaJ[[[ffoornia environment. It didn't make a lot of sense since the entire northern half of the state was a bed of low-grade asbestos aore. Clearly, the environmental community was waking up to the asbestos issue, but it would be a lone time before they understood it sufflcientiy to present a coherent case for mcreased environmental controls. FoHowlng the Los Angeles hearings, I flew to London to consult With our English colleagues over breakfast" on the EPA proposals. I left that same evening reassured tllat our position on the environmental asbestos standards was scientifically sound. The flmOal hearmgs held that same week in E:ast St. LoUIS were a total no-show. Not a single indivIidual or organization appeared to testify. The whole thing was over in 20 minutes and I flew home for a much-needed rest The real fight, the OSHA hearings, was comlOg up shortly OSHA Hearings: Throu,h the Wringer Nothing 10 the PR textbooks helped us prepare for the OSHA public hearings that began in February 1972 In the Labor Department auditorium on Constitution Avenue in Washington, D..Ce. We were, as they say, maKmg It up as we went along. The strategy was Simple: J-M would address the health issue and the Association would discuss economic Impact and the speCific changes wec wanted in the proposed standards. Tactically. we set up an AINNA Information Center In a suite in the Madison Hotel, a few blocks from where the hearlOgs were bemg held. From 304 D," In' ~ ,'" o'ff'.h"<"A.,,b,,,"..I . ' there we stood ready to issue press releases; develop industry testlimony; prepare summaries for the media of the day's proceedings; arrange for media interviews with industry witnesses; and, in general, establish ourselves as a sciieennttififiCic resource center for disseminating material from the medical and tecllnicallliterature supporting the industry's position. It alli worked reasonably well and the tactics we developed as a matter of logICal necessity have since become standard for handling hearings of a controversiall1ealtll-related nature. The real fireworks, however, occurred in the hearing room itself, where representatives of J-M and the asbestos industry shot it out toe-to-toe with the Mount Sinai crowd and their top guns m organized labor. What those hearings taught me was that, from a media relations standpoint, nothing the PR professional can do to position such a proceeding as a logical discussion of the Issues will ever compete against the sheer drama of two proponents of opposing positions rippmg each other's guts out in a public forum. Unfortunately, J. Corbett McDonald, M.D., the doctor from McGGiiIlIl University who had been chief investigator In the huge industry-sponsored study of the Quebec asbestos mining industry. was ill-prepared for the personal abuse he was to take from Dr. Selikorfrfs associates. They questioned not only his data, but hiS veracity, and Indeed Implied that hl1e was nothing less than a paid lackey of the asbestos industry. His only problem was that he had produced evidence that the asbestos mmers Iin Quebec were not dymg at the same rate as DOr Seilkoffs insulaatuJon workers, and that their exposure lIad to be excecedilnllgly heavy for any disease to shOW up at all\.' WithhOout directly saying so, he was casting doubt on Dr. Sehkorrs fundamental proposition that the mortality experience of the insulation workers was renective of conditions throughout the asbestos industry. If the asbestos miners were an exceptiOn to the Selikoff rule, then perhaps otller segments of the industry were exempt as well. Dr. Wright, who had the audacity to calli for stricter standards on crocldolite and amosiLC - the types of asbestos most closely hImnked With mesothelioma - than on chrysottlle, receIved the same type of abuse. DOr Wright, however, conducted himself With greater composure and gave as well as he took. A fundamental prinCiple of criSIS puhlic relations rooted itself In my brain' I would never agalmO. If [ had anyLhlli1;: to say about it. allow a client or a representative of a client to enter Ilnlto such a situation without extensive confrontational commUnIcations trainm10g9. It would be unnffaaJlr to the client and WOUld, IOnddeed. be destrllctive of his or her position. I have never wailvered In that conviction and have, In fact, refused to work With clients who declined such training. m ,.- I CHRISIS RHlSPIIiNSl Compared to what the Manville folks endured, our testimony was like a walk In park. Fay discussed the potential economic impact of lowering the standards far and too fast, and I ran through the litany of changes we wanted made In proposed regulations: no lowering 01 the standard from five to two fiObeOrrs in than four years in order to give the industry time to install the necessary added controls; no warning labels on products where the asbestos was "locked in" WlUt cement, plastics, or other binders: and greater nexlbllity In the use of resplraton' to control dust exposure. There were few questions since we had submitted Oouur detailed recommendations earlier, and were only summarizing them now. We were followed to the witness table by organized labor represen tatives who supported an immediate lowering of the permissible exposure level to two flibers; some even suggested that it be reduced to zero six months after that. Curiously, Dr. Sellkoff personally never testified. I have always suspected that he did not want to subject himself to the hard questioning from industry doctors and scientists that might have occured. He preferred aVOiding situations where he was not totally m contra\. Dr. WIlham Nicholson, who WOUld, when Dr. Selikorl! retired, replace him as head of the Environmental Sciences Laboratory, was le!lt to carry the Mount Sinal banner alone. One additional aspect of the hearings needs to be addressed. We had learned a day or so before they began that one of the first people to testify would be a J-M employee who was dying of mesothelioma. It was, to my way of thmking, a blatant attempt to sensationalize what ought to be a sober presentation of facts and recommendations (the AFIJCIlO, Indeed, proved my POlllt by holding a press conference the first day of the hearings to showcase this individual to the media). I Instructed our legal council to see what he could do to prevent the man's appearance, which he did by publicly raising objections at a prehearing conference held to settle the ground rules for the hearings. It was a terrible mistake. I had WIith one Intemperate move created a groundswell of sympathy for the man and hiS condition, and had handed our opponents on a Silver platter an example of the Insensitivity of the asbestos industry toward those It was kll1ing, or so they pOosSitioned it I would never countenance anything like that again, and have counseled clIents ever Since that expressions of sympathy and concern for inlured parties arc a necessary component of any pOSItioning of a health and safety Issue. Established Compared to the turmOIl of the public hearflIng, the rest 01' the year was antlclit- Regulations mactlc. We contmued to pepper OSHA and the media With more facts and figures Favorable supportmg our pOSition, as did our opponents. When the permanent regulations .~ - . . . . . . . . . were published in the Federal Register in early June. OSHA had aecepted our ~3UG Death of the Asbestos Industry recommendations practically to tbhe letter, the most Important being that the twonber standard would not go into effect for another four years. It was,8s b!g"_~ln: We Issued a simple press release commendlEg OSHA for Its actions and assuring the public that the standards were sufficiently strict to protect the health of asbestos workers everywhere. We declined any broadcast Interviews on the grounds that only OSHA could answer questions as to how and why the standards came out the way they did. Dr. Selikoff!, on the other hand, was evel ywhere, screaming that the agency had condemned another 50,000 asbestos workers to a premature death by delaymg the Imposition of the two-fliber standard The AFIJCIO took OSHA to court in an effort to overturn the standards. It was I believe, the only time that organized labor sued OSHA over a health standard; in all other Instances, it was the affected Industry that claimed It had been wronged. ,. ,I,,;:.l~rlr : . ../1/'-" c'- i. i- '(;. <- ) 1Y'-'~ ..yvv I, I ~{ <~ (..~r;;1._18-.'., f2. v 0 ~;Z:.":', ; ~- r An~ i;:Cri j/1A_.{ r~Aftf~~ e/-..t'Y?//\~ I.,I.'~p By the spring of 11173, I was coming to the conclusion that the tasks I had set out to accomplIsh when I Ssiiggned on with the O\IAlNA were nearing completion. We had recently finished five new booklets and IaI couple of pamphlets on various aspects of the health issue; a five-booklet OSHA technical compliance manual was sched"uled for publication in midsummer; and an AIAIlNA manual for employees to help them understand the new OSHA regulations had been made available to the member companies for distrIbution to their own workforcec. Aftermath The industry itself seemed to be in fine shape. The organized labor challenge to the OSHA standards had been rejected by the court of appeals and It appeared uconmlikee.lTyhtehhaaELtPtAherereguwlaotuioldnsbehaadnylikemwoirSeecchoamlleenoguetsfatovothraeblsetatotusthequmo dfourstyryeasroswtoe ~I no lloonnggee~rjjlada'.to 'wwoo-"rrYri at;outttlce"-cO~IEiied ~i.tt::..__o0!.L.ai.!~~~~~~~QQSS..,.1.i!!!!~~~~UcU"c,_b_"b\_\II!!llddtt!!'~Ss'. -Even'"'tihe-media seemed to be getting bored with the asbestos"-health issue. I felt It was time to move on. I had done nothmIng except asbestos and health for the last five years and I craved new challe~ges and cxperflIences. I reSigned from the AlA in August t 973 anc! accepted a position with Hill and Knowlton. Because of my background with OSHA, one of my first assIgnments was to work with the plastics Imndustry, which had recently discoverer that a basic chemical, vmyl chloride, used 10 the manufacture of PVC plastic resin call sed a rare cancer of the liver called angiosarcoma. I had heard rumors that the Mount Smai team had been called in to help prepare organIzed labor's case for the OS HA hearmgs scheduled to begin in June 1974. so It did not totally surpme me when I ran Into 01' Nicholson In the cOorITrididoor at a hastily convened vinyl cltloride medical symposllIm m Washington, m ~RISIS RfSPONS[ ~ D C. "What are you doing here?" he asked. I smiled and replied. "The same thing you are: He walked into the crowded auditorium and took a seat next to Or. I Selikoff. who turned to me and waved. It was starting ail over again. Matthew M. SwetonIc Is currently semor vice-president and director of environmental operations at the E. Bruce HarrliSson Company. Before IOinmlng EBH In 1991. he was vice-president and director of H/JI and Knowlton's Division 0o1f Sclentmc. Technical. and Environmental Affairs (STEA). a poslillion he held since 1986. While at Hill and KnowllOn. Mr. SwelOmnIc handled crisis communicallons and environmental heallh problems for clients Imn the chemical. mining. plaStics. floaod. and cosmetICS mdustrlies. After graduating from Columbia University'S Graduate School of Journalism. he jomed the publIC relatIOns staff of the JohnsManvlJ/e Corporation. He was named director olfeennvvlimronnmmental aflfairs In 1971. Iin 1972. he became the first fuJll/--ttilmme executive director of the Asbesws Information Assoc/latlOn/North America. a trade association dealming with health and env/ironmental problems in the mdustry. :m