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1961 National Safety Congress Transactions VOL. 4 CEMENT, QUARRY and MINERAL AGGREGATES NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL 425 North Michigan Avenue Chicago 11, Illinois s CONTENTS CEMENT, QUARRY & MINERAL AGGREGATES SESSIONS Safety Aspects of Grounding Portable Tools............................ C. J. Maiousek 3 Ground Faults in Quarry Electrical Systems............ .................. H. P. Cassel 5 Hazards Caused by Improper Application of Knife Switches. .G. J. Reynolds 7 Falls During Bulk Materials Loading Operations................ James M. Christie 10 Belt Conveyor Hazards.................................................................. Leslie S. Voltz 13 Officers of the Cement, Quarry & Mineral Aggregates Section, 1961-62........ 18 Other Volumes in 1961 National Safety Congress Transactions............ Back Cover My discussion the why or how hazard, but in ti should have bee sonnet hazard. The National ' directed industri tion into safe an ever, there are c a bit of histori volt single pha grounded. This from the preven ning primarily There are other 110-volt systems, and cons of gi electrical system at this discussio We are concer systems powerin respects the addi increase the sho in one lead of the circuit and mean by this isthe human bodt circuit Normally a p touch a hot lint happens when a electric tool, whi to its metal fran are both ground of the circuit an Basically, the ered as a salt s thin insulated m dermis portion ' intensity of shoe that hands beet wounds are invt skin's larger resi current flows ret lution." The severity i the vital organs Cement, Quarry and Mineral Aggregates SAFETY ASPECTS OF GROUNDING PORTABLE TOOLS By E. J. MATOUSEK Mg^., General Engineering International Minerals & Chemicals Corp., Skokie, I1L My discussion will not be concerned with the why or how portable tools can become a hazard, but in the event they do, what steps should have been taken to prevent any per sonnel hazard. The National Electric and Fire Codes have directed industries and residential construc tion into safe and reasonable avenues. How ever, there are certain aspects that may need a bit of historical explanation. Most 110volt single phase systems have one line grounded. Tins grounding procedure grew from the prevention of fire caused by light ning primarily in residential construction. There are other valid reasons for grounding 110-volt systems, but to digress into the pros and cons of grounded versus ungrounded electrical systems, would be beyond the scope of this discussion. We are concerned with grounded electrical systems powering portable tools. In some respects the addition of the ground tends to increase the shock hazard because it brings in one lead of the two necessary to dose the tircuit and cause the shock. What I mean by this is--in order to cause a shock, "he human body must be inserted in the )rcuit Normally a person will not intentionally touch a hot line, but this is exactly what happens when a workman uses a portable electric tool, which has the hot line shorted to its metal frame. The system and the man are both grounded; the man becomes a part of the circuit and is subjected to a shock. Basically, the human body can be consid ered as a salt solution incapsulated with a thin insulated membrane which is the epi dermis portion of our skin. This is why intensity of shocks is increased, in the event that hands become moist or minor sldn wounds are involved. In other words, the skin's larger resistance breaks down and the current flows readily through the "saline so lution." The severity of the shock depends upon the vital organs that are affected, namely the heart and the brain. This is why shocks between arm and arm, or between arm and leg, are much more hazardous than between leg and leg, or let's say--hand and elbow of the same arm. Another aspect worth considering in this understanding of shocks is that normally, voluntary muscles operate from electrical impulses generated in the nervous system and usually respond to a frequency of about 50 cycles per second. Hence, contact with 6- cycle extraneous voltage causes a saturat ing signal that tends to lock the various muscles involved. This is why some shock victims cannot let go of a hot wire, but must fall away from it. This saturating effect blanks out normal signals; if this occurs in the vicinity of the heart or brain, artificial respiration is re quired to keep the oxygen entering the body until the paralyzing effect is dissipated and the normal functions of the body take over. With this brief resume of the physiology of the shock, and applying this understand ing to the elimination of a shock from a portable hand tool, it seems obvious that the solution is to prevent the man from becoming a part of the circuit. How is this done? One answer is to completely insulate all metal or current carrying exposed parts. The advent of plastics and the extension of its physical characteristics of strength and temperature resistance, makes this possible. I am sure that in the future the insulating technique will provide splutions for many portable tool problems. However, with the existing tools and appliances, winch have ex posed metal parts on their exterior, we must provide another answer. The best solution is to ground all metal exposed parts of an appliance with a sep arate conductor, thereby providing a low re sistance path for the stray ground current. Electricity, like humans, will take the path of least resistance. The ground wire protects the man, by taking him out of the ground return circuit The fuse will blow because 3 1961 National Safety Congress of the excessive ground current, and the - subjected to a high voltage test, approxi defective unit will be isolated mately 500 volts, to check deteriorating in- The ground wire has become almost stand snlation. It also tested for a short rircuit ard in industrial construction for the last in the motor armature. If the tool passed ten years. Generally the ground return cir these tests, the tool would then be subjected cuit is formed by a conduit system and re to run voltage and a run test, if the "on" ceptacles are provided which connect the switch of the tool was pressed. separate grid. Standardization of plugs and receptacles has been difficult to achieve, and even the solution now accepted does not necessarily solve all problems. Receptacles new in common use provide the ground con nection. A major problem is that many tools and appliances do not have three-conductor cords and cannot be used in some receptacles unless an adaptor plug is provided. Similarly, a tool with a three-conductor plug cannot be used in a shop which is equipped with the out of date two-prong receptacles. The ac cepted solution is by a plug and receptacle that is adaptable to both two and three plugs. If the tool <Joes not have a ground wire, it can he used, but the safety aspect of the three-wire receptacle would be lost Another feature of this tool checker was its built-in safety factor. In order to op erate the tool tester, the tool had to be pressed against a spring plate on the vertical portion of the rest panel on the tool checker. Pushing the tool against this panel, besides assuring a good ground connection, the tool frame operated a micro-switch directly be hind the panel to initiate the test procedure. If the tool was faulty, an audio and visual indication was provided and the test would not proceed to the point of applying voltage to the tool. Accessories for testing existing cords were also provided. This automatic tool checker has never been produced com mercially. although a unit that uses the same tests hut on a manual basis is bring mar In a sense, the ground wire in the three- keted. conductor cord Is your insurance policy for safety on portable tools with the metal ex posed parts. Tlie problem here however, is that one never knows when this insurance policy will expire. Ground wires break or become disconnected, and when this happens --and it happens all too frequently--the user The essentia! steps for safe operation of portable 110 voi: single phase electrical equipment can be summarized as follows: 1. Use a grounded power system with adequate ovcrcurrent protection for all feed ers. of the tool is cxjKtscd to a possible lethal 2. Maintain a good ground grid This shock. can be either a properly installed conduit This liappened to a construction worker system, or a supplementary ground wire net doing work for a major company some work. years back--even though they had a strict 3. Use standard three-wire receptacles grounding policy. As a result of this acci and make sure the ground wire is connected dent, a tool checker was devised to automati cally check electrical tools before they were issued. This device acted primarily as a "go--and no go" test for a storekeeper who issued tools. The checker automatically passed a high current through the ground wire and maintained this high current long to the ground grid. 4. Use three-wire cords for portable tools and appliances. 5. Periodically check portable tools to be sure that your ground wire insurance is in force. enough to bum out any whiskers, if that If these steps arc followed, needless loss was all that was left of the ground wire. of life by electrocution from defective 110 After passing this test, the tool was then volt portable equipment will be prevented Well-planned equipment takes ment will be i the minimum r< Electric Code, large and smal ment, we have the installation grounding. The use of driven cquipmer lines and shovel at voltages of The fact that s the uncertainty in areas such we carefullj' ex tices in this arc: WHAT IS When one o power acridenta of die machine as a "ground 1 tact may be ca insulation anvwl be at the point cable, in the f machine, or in or generators a breakdown ma out warning. Whep such gi standing on th< frame of the i subjected to el< tensity from slij best insulation, manner, is sti breakdown the i cents control oi of the shock ha occur. WHAT SHC A good deal undertaken to di Cement, Quarry and Mineral Aggregates GROUND FAULTS IN QUARRY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS By H. P. CASSEL The Whitehall Cement Mfg. Co. Well-planned installation of electrical equipment takes for granted that such equip ment will be well grounded, at least to the minimum requirements of the National Electric Code. In the application of both large and small portable electrical equip ment, we have at times been negligent in the installation and maintenance of proper grounding. The use of large, portable, electrically driven equipment in quarries, such as drag lines and shovels, usually requires operation at voltages of from 2300 to 13,000 volts. The fact that such voltages are used, plus the uncertainty of obtaining good grounds in areas such as quarries, demands that we carefully examine our grounding prac tices in this area. WHAT IS A GROUND FAULT? When one of the main conductors of power accidentally touches the framework of the machine involved we speak of this as a "ground fault." This accidental con tact may be caused by the breakdown of insulation anywhere on the machine. It mav be at the point of entrance of the portable table, in the switches or wiring on the Jiachine, or in the windings of the motors or generators driving the machine. Such a breakdown may occur at anytime and with out warning. When such ground faults occur, personnel standing on the ground and touching the frame of the equipment involved may be subjected to electric shock ranging in in tensity from slight to fatal. Since even the best insulation, installed in the most expert manner, is still subjected to occasional breakdown the safety problem involved con cerns control of the intensity and duration of die shock hazard when such breakdowns occur. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SHOCK HAZARDt A good deal of investigation lias been undertaken to determine the limits of human reaction to electric shock. Due to the great variations in individuals and their varied reaction to shock, and to many other vari ables, the evidence of these studies is only generally conclusive. However, broad limits may be set which will apply to most cases and conditions. All investigations agree that the severity of any electric shock is a function of in tensify and duration. The intensity of the shock depends on the voltage encountered and the bodily re sistance of the individual in that portion of the body through which a particular electrical current may pass. Investigations in this area have set values ranging from 500 to 1000 ohms. The amount of current flowing through the body having such resistance will de pend on the potential or voltage encountered. The following is an indication of what probably will happen with varying amounts of current flowing through the body: 1. 1 milliampere--No sensation. 2. More than 5 ma.--Painful shock. 3. More than 10 ma.--Muscle contraction --25% of population will freeze to contact. 4. More than 15 ma.--5094 of population will freeze to contact. 5. More than 30 ma.--Breathing difficult --unconsciousness may occur. 6. 50-100 ma. Possible ventricular fibrilla tion of heart. 7. 100 ma.--2 amps.--Certain fibrillation of heart. With these results in mind die mining industry, some years ago, set 100 volts as the maximum allowable potential that should exist between the frame of a machine and the earth during a'ground fault. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN - GROUND FAULTS OCCURt Let us now examine what might happen when ground faults occur under various types of installations. 1961 National Safety Congress A. An ungrounded system: G. Another system makes use of a solidly With an ungrounded system, a single line ' may be the ground. There will be no inter ruption of service and unless special ground detection equipment is installed such a ground may go undetected indefinitely. A second ground fault in the frame of a shovel, for example, will cause a fault current to flow through the frame of the shovd, through the treads where they contact the earth and thence through the earth to the original fault The amount of current flow ing will be determined by the total im pedance of the system. Since a large part of the total impedance will consist of the grounded neutral in a Wye-connected distri bution system, with the point of transformer ground bring carried along with the power conductors to the frame of the shovel. With a ground fault, a large ground fault current will again flow, which should cause the protective relays to trip out the power circuit. However, during the time neces sary for these relays to operate, the frame of the shovel will probably be at a danger ous potential for a short period of time. D. Having looked at the previously de scribed system, it may be seen that a high degree of protection may be secured by: rather poor contact between the shovel treads and the earth, a large portion of the full line potential will appear between these two points. Any person standing on the ground and touching any part of the frame would be subjected to this poten tial. If the line potential would be 2300 volts and the body resistance taken as 500 ohms, almost 4 amperes could flow through the body, with almost certain fatal results. 1. Providing the lowest practical resist ance between the shovel frame and ground. 2. limiting the ground fault current to such a value, so that the voltage drop be tween the frame and ground will not exceed a voltage which is ordinarily considered dangerous. The mining industry has set this limit at 100 volts. 3. Disconnecting the power feeders when a ground fault occurs with as little delay as possible. B. Underground distribution system--with It is to secure these benefits that modern frame of machinery grounded. installations are using impedance or resist There has been some thought that the addition of a ground connection to the frame of die machine, running to a ground rod would eliminate hazards due to ground faults. Actually, such protection is far from adequate. With such a ground connection and a ground fault to the frame of the machine plus failure of another phase wire, ground fault current will flow through the machine, the ground connection, to earth and so to the fault. Since the total im pedance of this path has been reduced by the lowered resistance to earth of the ground rod, a larger ground fault current will flow than in the previous case. If the ground rod resistance path is in the order of 10 ohms (which seems to be a reasonable value to expect in most quarries) fault currents could be in the neighborhood of ance grounded neutral transformer distri bution systems. In the event of a ground fault, the ground fault current will flow from the transformer terminal through the main conductor to the shovel frame, return ing through the ground conductors to the neutral resistance and thence to the neu tral point of the transformer. Under these conditions the ground fault current is lim ited by the neutral resistor to such a value so that, under the ordinary conditions en countered in quarries, the voltage drop be tween shovel and ground would not exceed the safe limit of 100 volts. In addition to this, protective relaying is installed in the neutral of the transformer, that will immediately be responsive to ground fault currents and remove the entire feeder cir cuit from the system. 50 to 100 amperes, on a 2400 volt system, and thus a potential of from 500 to 1000 volts would appear between the machine frame and ground. Again assuming the body resistance to be in the order of 500 ohms, this would indicate between 1 and 2 amperes of current through the body, again a fatal dose. Summary Adequate protection of human life and health against electrical shock hazards can be provided. It will consist-of these features: 1. All electrical installations to be made with the highest degree of skill possible. 2. Neutral point of Wye-connected trans 6 formers to be which will lim 50 amperes or I 3. Ground cc to be carried and terminated chine involved. 4. Relaying tral of the trai the faulted circi 5. Ground a HAZARI The United 5 had several set several years tl quate knife-typ< on stalled motoi the greatest sin dents in the com; Many of the applied in the rices ahead of in that the kru the lightest tyl be visual discon or dosed only interrupt energi jective is the ell entirely where switch.is requir out conveniently is too far awa breaker should 1 The purpose c uallv open the after the power starter for the and the starter by means of a fore, after the callv, it should 1 dose the knife on the circcit at In one case th when inching tin Cement, Quarry and Mineral Aggregates '.formers to be pounded through a resistor jwhich will limit ground fault currents to 50 amperes or less. 3. Ground connections from this resistor to be carried through the portable cable and terminated on the frame of the ma chine involved. 4. Relaying to be installed in the neu tral of the transformer which will remove the faulted circuit from the source of supply. 5. Ground connections, cables and rods to be periodically tested to insure the lowest possible resistance in the ground circuit. To accomplish this may add somewhat to the cost of installations. It will cer tainly require some effort, time and money to maintain in working order, but unless we agree to do the job to the best of onr knowledge and ability, we cannot say we have done everything in onr power to make our plants a safe place in which to work. HAZARDS CAUSED BY IMPROPER APPLICATION OF KNIFE SWITCHES By G. J. REYNOLDS Tech. Mgr., United States Gypsum Co., Chicago The United States Gypsum Company has had several serious accidents in the past several years through the closing of inade quate knife-type so-called "safety" switches on stalled motors or short circuits. Tins is the greatest single cause of electrical acci dents in the company. Many of the knife switches have been applied in the past as safety lockout de rices ahead of motors. The hazard exists in that the knife switches are usually of \be lightest type available as intended to k visual disconnect only and to be opened or closed only with the power off, not to interrupt energized circuits. Our main ob jective is the elimination of the knife switch entirely where possible, where a lockout switch.is required. If it cannot be locked out conveniently because the main breaker is too far away, a safety lockout circuit breaker should be added for this purpose. The purpose of this switch is only to vis ually open the circuit for safety reasons after the power is off. The reduced voltage starter for the motor is at the lower right and the starter stops and starts the motor by means of a push-button above. There fore, after the motor is stopped, theoreti cally, it should be perfectly safe to open or dose the knifeswitch as there is no load on the drcnit at that time. In one case the starter contacts had fused when inching the motor bnt the knife switch was safely pulled without damage. Later when it was dosed on a starting load, be cause essentially the starter contacts were fused shut, the switch was closed on a load which the switch (fid sot have capacity to take and the switch exploded. A maintenance mechanic had been as signed the job of servicing the rollers of the White Raymond mill. He serviced them by positioning them manually in line with a port in the ride of the housing and had completed four of the five rollers in tins manner. He experienced difficulty in getting the fifth roller into position for servicing. He pointed this out to another mechanic who was walking through this area. The latter said he would "inch" the motor for him. The first mechanic removed his lode on the safety switch and then returned to the Raymond Mill so that he could observe the positioning of the rollers. He signalled to the second mechanic when he was ready. At the signal, the second mechanic dosed the safety switch, pressed the starter button momentarily and only long enongh to allow the fifth roller to turn into position. This would have meant that the mill made only one fifth of a revolution before the operator released the starter button. The first mechanic states that the null made no more than a fifth of a revolution and that the fifth roller stopped in the 7 f 1961 National Safety Congress position desired. He signalled to the second of dectridty so therefore a dead short dr- mechanic that the job had been accomplished cuit occurred which in turn ionized the rest hnd the latter then opened the safety switch of the air in the box and created the gaseous and left the scene. The first mechanic then' explosion. The cover flew off cutting the placed his lock on the safety snitch and . man's face badly and causing burns to the returned to his job of servicing the last face, arms, throat and so forth. roller. A similar situation occurred at our North u. After he completed servicing this last roller he wished to determine if the rollers were functioning properly. At this point a Kansas City plant July 29, 1959. A short time prior to the aeddent, the motor driving the duplex stock pump on the liner beater third mechanic was walking through the kicked out. The process of restarting the area and he asked him to start the mill so machine was explained to the injured by that he could observe the roller revolutions. the maintenance foreman as follows; open The first mechanic removed his lock from the switch to the motor controller (440 the safety switch and then positioned himself volts), reset the overload trip on the con again in front of the milt port. On the troller, dose the switch and restart the latter's signal the third mechanic proceeded motor. to close the safety switch. In the same enclosure there was also an Immediately on closing the switch on the stalled load, an arc was created and the switch exploded. The cover flew open strik ing the injured on the chin. He thus sustained a deep laceration in addition to burns of the face, throat and right arm. Following the injury an examination of the starter was made. All three contact points of the starter were in contact with the points of the running side. One of the contact points was fused in that position. The first mechanic (the person senic ing the rollers) states that neither the safety switch nor controls were touched between the time that the second mechanic "inched" the motor and the time that the injured at tempted to close the safety switch. other larger knife switch which controlled the power supply to the liner breaker beater motor control. The motor kicked out again and the injured proceeded to put the motoF back into operation. He opened the door on the switch endosure, grasped the handle on the pump switch and pulled it open. At that time there was a violent dectrical explosion in the endosure From the local reports it was assumed that the injured's hand or forearm got dose enough to the conductors to draw an arc and start the ionization process to set off the short'dreuit explosion. Injuries sustained were temporary blind ness (of which he soon recovered) first and deep second degree burns involving the right arm, right side of the thorax and the right In reviewing the injury, an analysis was side of the abdomen. There also was a made to determine what could or what could small area of burn over the right scapular not have happened during the "inching" pro area.* His shirt caught fire, which was re cedure. If no one touched the controls after sponsible for many of the burns, and which be left them, it can be assumed that the could have been worse, had it not been for starter contact was left in a fused running a fellow employee who ripped his burning position with the contacts fused after the shirt off him. second mechanic had completed the inching procedure The irony of the entire aeddent is that a knife switch replacement program had The electrical explosion that occurred at been previously set up and rdigiously fol the time of the accident was caused by the lowed throughout several years. The switch following. The switch did not have snap- that blew up was the last in the plant and action or arc chutes and the handle mech had been scheduled for replacement in the anism was so worn that the blades in dosed very' near future. position hardy tea sed the energized contacts, A similar situation to those in Philadel thus drawing an are. The arc ionized a phia and Kansas City occurred May 19, pocket of gas about this contact point and 1961, in a sand and gravel plant at Bdiwood, this pocket soon spread to envdop a second I1L, where a knife switch blew up burning contact. Ionized gas is a perfect conductor the man's left hand badly. 8 i il In this case was actuated byswitch had beet! compressor had man went to sfc the "safety" kni started on low j the compressor a knife switch, quate for the j< hand. The above se: manly a single now leads us lias a great nur in a single cubic In our Bostoi aeddent in Juro sion of such a finished his chi waiting for the standing appro: the panel with c Suddenly upc arc was eviden knife switch lot ing the air and sion. The dooi and the man ' awav was totall; The Chief Ele had just left th explosion and ' find the man v totally envdopi the big man tl man to put out t The effect oi eluded: 1. Forty-five 2. Several sh 3. Partial los 4. Disfiguren 5. Total 85 d 6. Direct cos cal only). The correctio is to replace panels with n panels of adequ type that U. S, their extra safe "lock-out" han Cement, Quarry and Mineral Aggregates la this case a compressor motor starter Was actuated by the pressure switch as toggle switch had been bypassed as bad order. The compressor had been down and when the man went to start the compressor, he closed the "safety" knife switch and the compressor started on low pressure. Essentially he started the compressor motor across the line with a knife switch. The knife switch was inade quate for the job and exploded in the man's hand. The above series of accidents concern pri marily a single isolated knife switch. This now leads us to occasions where a plant lias a great number of fused knife switches in a single cubical. In our Boston plant we had a very serious accident in June 28, 1959, due to the explo sion of such a panel. The electrician had finished his checking and was standing by waiting for the plant to start up. He was standing approximately two feet in front of the panel with dosed doors. Suddenly upon start up of the plant an arc was evidently drawn from one of the knife switch loose contact points, thus ioniz ing the dr and causing short circuit explo sion. The doors blew open with the force and the man who was standing two feet away was totally enveloped in gaseous flames. The Chief Electrician, Rocco Abbruzzese, had just left the scene and upon hearing the explosion and the man's scream, rushed to find the man with his dothing on Are and jotally enveloped in flames. Rocco, being the big man that he is. "bear-hugged" the man to put out the flames. The effect of the injury to the man in cluded: 1. Forty-five days in the hospital. 2. Several skin grafting operations. 3. Partial loss of use of left arm. 4. Disfigurement of left arm. 5. Total 85 days loss to work. 6. Direct oast to company, $4,000 (medi cal only). Circuit Breaker. Each circuit breaker has its own individual lock-out device to which a workman may attach his lock so as to provide the safety lockout function formerly served by the knife switches we have just discussed. Now that we have emphasized the neces sity for correction, the question that I am sure that each of you managers is asking himself is "How should a corrective pro gram be set up to diminate or alleviate the above type of hazard?" Perhaps the sim plest formula is to explain the way we suc cessfully attacked the problem at the United States Gypsum Co. Our first step was to classify the type switches and their respective hazards as per the excerpt of the classification as shown in the U. S. Gypsum Co., Operating Divi sion, Information Bulletin #604, "Electrical Safety Lockout Switches" as follows: Hake a survey and hazard classification as per the following: Group I. Extremely hazardous and should be replaced at once The foltowjng characteristics are lacking: 1. Underrated as to HP requirement per manufacturers recommendation. 2. No raring or snap action for closing or opening knife blades. 3. No arc chutes. 4. Non-interlocked cover. Group II. Hazardous but safe if proper pre cautions are observed The switches are fully rated but lack one or more of the above safety features such as 2. 3 or 4. These switches should be clearly la beled as hazardous and personnel notified to not operate them while switch Is energized. These should be scheduled for future re placement on planned maintenance basis over a period of possibly several years. Group III. Safe and suitable for operation These switches are fully rated and have all the safety features listed in above. The switches of this group would be continued in operation during duration of their life ex pectancy. Necessary steps should be taken to replace Group I knife switches with adequate molded case circuit breakers with safety "lockout" handle as promptly as possible. A planned maintenance schedule should be set up for replacement of the Group II switches. The correction to the above type accident is to replace the fuse knife switch type panels with molded case circuit breaker pands of adequate interrupting capadty. The type that U. S. Gypsum prefers because of their extra safety feature of a rotary safety "lock-out" handle, is the Federal Padfic We secondly had to develop a cost of the total company program. A typical plant was selected and its correction costs multiplied by- the number of plants known to have similar conditions. This amount approxi mated $200,000 installed cost for the com pany correction program. 9 f 1961 National Safety Congress With the co-operation of oar safety di rector, Mr. E. C. Beuthin, the program teas reviewed with management and their support and approval for future appropria tions was obtained. Our next step was to disseminate the in formation to our 60 plants in die field through channels that would set up authority for execution and to assume the responsi bility for compliance. This was handled through our operation managers, through their production managers and plant works managers. The seven-page Information Bulletin #604, referred to above, was compiled to cover 'classification, survey and alternate methods of making correction and was issued to all plants as an operating bulletin for execution. Completion of each separate plant project, in accordance with the above, is being fol lowed up by the production managers. FALLS DURING BULK MATERIALS LOADING OPERATIONS By JAMES M- CHRISTIE Safety Engineer, Portland Cement Assm, Chicago My paper is directed to a problem in open hatches on the trailer--with the re our industries that is certainly not new. sultant possibility of suffocation. As a matter of fact, in my research I ran This happened to a worker loading finely across an accident report describing a fatal divided material--he tripped while on top ity in this same type of situation bade in of a rail car and fell into a loaded sec 1920--just a few years before I was giv tion of the car. For a brief interval he ing any thought to safety work. The title was completely submerged in the material. of my paper, "Falls During Bulk Materials Fortunately, quick action on the part of Loading Operations," is intended to be spe another employee saved his life. ) cific to a current problem. And I believe it accomplishes this. However, as I stated, tins problem is not new. It is merely be ing brought to our attention most recently, because of an increased usage of trucks Or--another case--this time on a truck. The employee stepped into the opening on top of truck with one leg--suffering severe bruise in groin. for bulk hauling of our products. And, Now the fall to a lower level. Basically naturally there have been many injuries --from the top of the rail car or truck sustained by our employees. trailer to the ground--distances ranging from 10 feet to 15 feet Would you condone a I wish to sell my point with a few case situation in which an employee regularly histories. The case of the fatality I men works on an irregular surface near an tioned earlier involved a fall from atop unguarded dropoff of 15 feet? There is a rail car. A 15-foot fall, the approximate much condonement of such work practices height of a rail car, is certainly a potential in our industries. It appears that the think fatality whenever it may occur. ing has been something like, this--railroad Essentially, our problem involves falls to a lower level--whether loading into truck trailers or rail cars. However, it is not necessarily limited to this. One injury that I learned of involved an operator loading men and truck drivers do it why can't we? Does tins sound familiar? Or, the safety equipment creates more iiazards than it alleviates--hogwash. I'm sure you have all heard these excuses many times. a trailer with bulk lime--he tripped and In plants where these and.similar excuses fell on top of trailer and fractured three have been allowed to prevail, we know of ribs on his right side. But this accident many injuries resulting from the fails that did not exhaust all the possibilities for in occurred. An interesting sidelight is the jury. He could have fallen into one of the fact that in almost all cases, after an in 10 jury bas occu to prevent fur someone has be These are tb juries sustaine* ing: . A bulk car fell to the gro he was pullini denly. He frac of lost balanci from a rail ca tures, bruises of these are s consequences ar On truck tr where the truck loading point on the truck, lost balance--th --the loader si he tried to jun low* to avoid a l These case all inclusive in accidents. They of solving the risk of over-si me say it in ti working in kx posed to injur is to prevent t the people in p around them. By way of e The Portland C certain safety use to guide tl them "model sa one that is spe> in part, '"A sa attached, adjust worn by each protected perch a lower surface I might add t and all the oth mum requiremi cement industry to expand these to certain wor We believe this both the "tying fence around" s Directly, if a Cement, Quarry and Mineral Aggregates .jury has occurred, some action is taken car or truck he is working cat an unpro jto prevent further injuries. But only after tected perch--more than 5 feet above a someone has been injured. lower surface, and needs the protection of These are the case histories of some in juries sustained in falls during bulk load ing: A bulk car loader lost his balance and fell to the ground when a hatch door that he was pulling open released quite sud denly. He fractured his heel. Another case of lost inlance and a fall to the ground a safety belt and line: On the other hand, if a fence is built around his work lo cation, his chances of falling to a lower surface are negligible. So, I say again, "Tie him in place," or "build a fence around him." Now, gentlemen, I would like to show some specific examples illustrating the two points I have mentioned. from a rail car resulted in multiple frac 1. Man on car with belt and line attached tures, bruises and brain concussion--both to horizontal overhead cable. of these are similar at the start but the Yon will recall that I told you of a consequences are vastly different case involving a loader who fell into a On trade trailers, I learned of a case hatchway and was momentarily submerged where the track driver drove away from the in lime. This picture involves the same type loading point while the loader was still situation. Except, this man was using the on the trade. And yet another case of belt and fine shown and only went into lost balance--this time from a trade trailer the hatchway to around his knees. There --the loader suffered a broken arm when is quite a difference in the potential con he tried to jump to a platform 8 feet be sequences of these two similar cases. low to avoid a faff. In attempting to apply the principle of These case histories certainly are not "tying the man in place" you will encounter all inclusive in either number or types of some physical difficulties at your loading accidents. They do lead us in the direction points. It amounts to answering the ques of solving the problem, however. At the tion, "What can we tie the man to?" With risk of over-amplifying this problem, let a roof overhead, a cable can be extended me say it in this manner. We have people horizontally over the length of the loading working in locations where they are ex area. As in this case, the life line can posed to injuries from falling: Our job be permanently attached to the horizontal is to prevent these falls--How? By tying cable. Also, a ring attached to the top of the people in place or by building a fence the life line allows your bulk loader, to around them. work the entire length of the car or track ) By way of explanation, my organization. trailer. The Portland Cement Assn, has established 2. Silos or buildings on both sides of certain safety precepts that our members loading area. use to guide their safety efforts. We call them "model safe operating practices." The one that is specific to this situation states, in part, '"A safety belt and line properly attached, adjusted and anchored shall be worn by each person working on an un protected perch more than five feet above a lower surface." If yon don't.hare a root or structure over your loading area, yon may have struc tures on either side, as shown in this slide. Here you will note the cables extended over and across the loading area that support the cables extending the length of the load ing area. To these, then, the life lines are attached. Please note that these life lines I might add that this model safe practice, are pulled up and tied off. This is to allow and all the others, is intended as a mini- for the 22-foot vertical clearance require mum requirement for job safety in the ments over the top of the rails. cement industry. Our members find need to expand these and to make them specific to certain work locations and situations. We believe this model safe practice covers both the "tying in place" or "building a fence around" situations. 3. Pole installed as upright support for one comer of cable arrangement. This is intended to show the extent to which one plant has gone to provide a place to tie the bulk loader to his job. They didn't have adequate overhead structure or Directly, if a man is on top of a rail buildings on both sides of the loading area, 11 ) 1961 National Safety Congress so they installed this post as the comer support for their cable. Again, note the life line pulled out of the way for rail movement 4. Boom pivoted from side of silo for truck loading. One plant has solved the problem of what to tie to by installing a boom on the side of their silo. The boom is pivoted at the silo and is actually a monorail. The life line is attached to a carriage on the monorail and the user can safely traverse the entire length of the boom. 5. Platform over truck loading point. This platform is designed to virtually eliminate fall hazards during bulk loading. It illustrates the point of building a fence around the work location. At this plant, the loader never goes onto the truck trailer. However, the problem is not completely eliminated because someone (in this case the truck driver) must open and close the hatch covers. This practice appears to be quite common around the cement industry. The employer of this worker needs to attend to his protection. 6. HandroUed xevlkuay alongside silos. This is an illustration of the fencing principle as used in loading aggregate from silos. The discharge chutes can be lowered into position and the flow of materials controlled from this liandrailed walkway. 7. Pivoted walktvay to get out to truck. Tiiis situation does not fit neatly into either of the categories 1 lave tried to establish. However, it does involve need for both fencing and tying the loader. The platform on which this employee is standing is hinged and counterweighted to keep it out of the way when a truck trailer (or railroad car) is being spotted. Then it is used as the access to the truck or car. It has handrails; however, once an employee goes beyond these he lacks protection. So, this represents a situation in which both tying and fencing may lw applicable. 8. Suspended handrails at a truck bulk loading point. An example of applying the "fencing" principle to a truck bulk loading situation shows the slanted grating leading to the trailer, then the handrail that extends around the working area. An additional safety innovation, is evi dent in the stairs and catwalk that arc used for access to points where maintenance work will take place. I think you will agree . that a great deal of thought has been given to these work situations. 9. A situation that is not common oil over the country. On a trip into Xew York State I saw a type of rail car that I had never seen before. It is called a bottle car and con sists of 4 or 5 large metal containers on flat bed rail car. There are no ladders up the sides of the "bottles," and no catwalk from one "bottle" to another. As a partial solution to the problem of how to position a man for loading these cars, one plant in stalled hinged grating alongside the load ing area. These are kept in a raised po sition until a car is spotted. Then the platform is lowered. and it offers a con venient working surface for the loader. I might add, .that this arrangement could be improved by installing a cable overhead for use with a safety belt and life line. There is one other mechanical device re garding bulk loading that I want to dis cuss. In many of the examples above, you will recall that the bulk loader had to climb up the ladder on the rail car or truck and then hook up his safety belt 'to the life line. This allows for exposure to falls during the dimb up and down the ladder, and momentarily' while he is not hooked up to the life line. I don't want to be accused of adver tising a commercial product and I don't have any' stock in this company, but I do want to tell you about a product that is being used in some cement plants. It amounts to a life line that is mounted on an auto matic reel. The reel contains 16 feet of steel cable that extends or retracts auto matically with the normal movement of the user. Then, should he lose his balance and start a rapid extension of the cable, a lock ing mechanism in the reel stops the move ment in about one foot. To use this device in a bulk loading situation for example, you still need a cable extended horizontally over the load ing area. Then, the reel containing the ex tendable and retractable life line, should be attached to the horizontal cable. It will slide on the horizontal cable allowing free 12 dom of movet car or truck tr The life lint ing the loader; on or off a r to possible qu< plain that 1 dc have been mad by plant peopl 250-pound weig worked properl Falls during can result in They have haj happen again provide work tial is either t Safety My remarks management of do not have act vention prograr panies who do to make them < attitudes of c safety engineer judge our prog: of legalistic m results on our s sonal injuries. The tragedy > that we do fcno' do know the ess cal and electric tion, to elimina ployees. We t specific rules an hammered (and for some emplo management ant tion of belt coir Some of die you angry and wouldn't care if me out the door convince some Cement, Quarry and Mineral Aggregates .dom of movement the length of the rail /car or truck trailer. The life line will allow tor safety dur ing the loaders vertical movements getting on or off a rail car or truck. In answer to possible questions, I would like to ex plain that I do not know of any tests that have been made on this device--other then by plant people--one plant has dropped a 250-pound weight and the locking mechanism worked properly. Falls during bulk loading of materials can result in serious, even fatal injuries. They have happened in the past and will happen again unless we exert efforts to provide work situations where fall poten tial is either eliminated or drastically re duced. And, this won't be an easy task. You are all familiar with the resistance one encounters when attempting to institute any new safety practices or equipment You may expect such resistance regarding fall protection--both from management, super vision, and employees. However, there are many plants in which the employees are protected from falls and they are still pro ducing efficiently. I'm sure you realize that I have not cov ered every conceivable situation--I'm cer tainly not knowledgeable about all of them. I do hope, though, that I have been able to stimulate you to review your bulk load ing situations with an eye towards reduc ing fall potential and eliminating these in jury sources. BELT CONVEYOR HAZARDS By LESLIE S. VOLTZ Safety Engineer, Consumers Dhr, Vulcan Materials Co, Chicago, IIL My remarks are pointed primarily to the management of the smaller companies who do not have actively organized accident pre vention programs, and to the larger com panies who do have such programs but fail to make them effective because of the poor attitudes of operating personnel. As a Jafetv engineer I cannot be honest if I -judge our progress as an industry by a code of legalistic moralism. I must judge the results on our success in preventing all per sonal injuries. The tragedy of belt conveyor accidents is that we do know how to prevent them. We do know the essential rules, on the mechani cal and electrical devices and their opera tion, to eliminate such hazards to our em ployees. We do know the necessity of specific rules and regulations which must be hammered (and this can be taken literally for some employees) into the minds of our management and men concerning the opera tion of belt conveyors. Some of the things I say here may make you angry and I hope they do--In fact I wouldn't care if you got so mad you pushed me out the door--If in so doing I could only convince some of you of your lack of an intelligent approach to belt conveyor safety. Possibly many of you have stood by a belt conveyor and watched it roll along quietly with its load, the occasional click of the splices passing over the idlers being the only sound you heard. It doesn't make a lot of noise to pnt fear in your mind and seems so innocent as it travels along at 350 to 450 feet per minute. This very charac teristic makes it fascinating and seemingly harmless. In fact, I have often thought of this type conveyor in the same manner as a person might think of the waves that roll in so quietly and peacefully at a beach. Yet we know in many cases beneath all this serene beauty there is a deadly undertow. You may be only a few feet from danger . . . and so it is with a belt conveyor. You may be only a few indies from a serious personal injury. The following should never let you forget one basic rule of belt conveyor accident prevention, that is, provision for an effec tive "lock and tag" system. I have called this "Death Takes a Holiday." 13 1961 National Safety Congress A working foreman about my size and aholiday!" But why did it have to happen? age was instructed to repair the chute at The plant had been provided with dagger the bottom of a 42-inch belt conveyor from tags. Only the previous week locks' had the screening building to the load out Inns. been received to institute lock-out systems. The conveyor was not running and accord -The employee had three separate places to ing to the man's statement, he pulled the tag out; lock-out; or both tag and lock the emergency cord to make it inoperative. He power to this conveyor, as follows: then proceeded to get on the belt and start the repairs. 1. At the emergency switch at the head pulley of the conveyor. All head and tail pulleys should be guarded, but the wing type tail pulley is a particularly dangerous type; however it did not contribute to this accident A general view up the conveyor from the tail pulley 2. On the control panel at the load out bins. 3. The circuit breaker for the unit under the load out bins. shows the emergency cord. This is die long However, none of the tags were placed trip our man will have to take--220 feet at any of these points. Who, then, was to the head pulley at a belt speed of 400 feet per minute. A view of skirt plates at the chute to be repaired would show the emergency cord on the left which the foreman said he responsible? Yon can each answer these questions for yourself and your own opera tion. 1. Had the employee been instructed personally on the use of these tags? pulled at this point The employee was standing between the angle supporting the 2:. Had management and supervision in sisted every single time on the use of skirt plate and the conveyor cover when die tag out system? the belt was started from the control cen ter at the load out Inns. He was knocked down by the cover and started up the conveyor head first As he was traveling about seven feet per second, he could not pull the emergency cord. A two hundred foot walk on the part of the employee would have insured lus secur ity. Yes, Death took a holiday but don't depend on it! Good management cannot afford to gamble with such odds. If you are interested in seeing an excel He was flattened by the j-inch belting, lent film on lock out systems get "Lock and used to shape the material on the belt be Tag." See the June 1961 issue of National fore it comes to the weighing device. The Safety News for the source for this film. \ clearance from the bottom of the J^-inch The next series lists some of the hazards I angle supporting this is 21 indies and it is encountered in the process of repairs, or as only 11 indies from the trough of the belt the result of repairs or maintenance. Please to the crown of the belting. review your own operation as these are Again, he entered the conveyor covering given. to continue his journey. His last view of 1. Guard not replaced following repairs. daylight was at the weighing device; where once1 more he went under cover. Study, at this point, "death teas Us companion." 2. Ladders incorrectly placed or used. 3 Conveyor walk-ways with openings, no toe boards and absent or missing cleats. The At the chute to the screen, where the em latter are a necessity where frost, or freez ployee went over the head pulley and into ing water can accumulate. the chute, there was only a 12-inch clear ance. He was able to get out by himself and walk from the tower with some as sistance. Examination at the hospital did not disclose any fractured bones or serious lacerations. His body, however, was so 4. Falling Hazards--Man trap, material left on stairs or platforms. 5. Pinch bar left on walk-way. 6. Removal of bearing race with 8 lb. sledge hammer. severely bruised all over that he was dis 7. Compressed gas cylinder--unsupported abled for 22 days. oxygen tank No one can deny that this man was 8. Tools in bad condition--mushroomed blessed and that "Death" did indeed, "take chisel. Note oxygen tank in background. 14 9. Unguarde sence of cleat: 10. Unguarc to speed reduce 11. Unguard 12. Incomplc 13. Unguard 14. Unguard 15. Overheat Saves a Life." A quarry r cleaning the ti on the tight si cord) where th between the < wa!L He was shovel and th: back onto the trougbling idle dent, and a v skirt plates. T caught betwee idler, pulling tt under the belt held part of the ana, and preve The employee's "It seemed to found, although and three hour time as load as veyor was stop unlaced one of tween cme of t lessen the pain, of the shoe ant as a sort of to blood. When i plovees I faintc pitaL" The report o follows: "He was trea the left forcan the tendons, mi veins. He had : left arm. In or the skin grafting by the doctor a this area three : was taken and proximately 75 i covered, leaving was composed a Cement, Quarry and Mineral Aggregates 9. Unguarded platforms, openings, ab sence of cleats, etc. 10. Unguarded flexible couplings, motor to speed reducers. 11. Unguarded conveyor drives. 12. Incomplete guarding. 13. Unguarded back stop. 14. Unguarded wing type tail pulley. 15. Overhead dangers. "A Safety Hat Saves a Life." A quarry mill employee, age 29, was cleaning the tunnel floor under a 42' belt on the tight side, (opposite the emergency cord) where there was an 18-inch clearance between the conveyor structure and the walL He was using a long handled scoop shove! and throwing the spilled material bade onto the top run of the belt. A trougfaling idler was involved in the acci dent, and a vertical angle supported the skirt plates. The handle of the shovel was caught between the operating belt and idler, pulling the left arm and shovel blade under the belt. The throat of the shovel held part of the weight off of the employee's arm, and prevented the idler from turning. The employee's statement was as follows: "It seemed to me an eternity before I was found, although I think it was between two and three hours. I hollered from time to time as loud as I could whenever the con veyor was stopped and on one occasion I unlaced one of my shoes and wedged it beyteen one of the rollers in an attempt to issen the pain. I also took a shoelace out of the shoe and wound it around my arm as a sort of tourniquet to stop the loss of blood. When released by my fellow em ployees I fainted and woke up in the hos pital." ' The report of medical treatment was as follows: "He was treated for 3rd degree burns of the left forearm and hand. This involved the tendons, muscles, nerves, arteries and veins: He had multiple debridement of the left arm. In order to prepare the arm for the skin grafting, his right thigh was chosen by the doctor as the donor rite, and from this area three strips of split thickness skin was taken and placed on the defects. Ap proximately 75 per cent of the forearm was covered, leaving the other 25 per cent which was composed of dying and exposed flexor tendons in the area of the wrist Iodoform gauze was packed into the wound and ex tended proximally down between the radius and ulna in the lower third of the forearm. Vaseline pressure dressings were applied followed by fluff dressings." He was discharged from the hospital 103 days later, but bad to report to the hospital three times a week as an out patient for further debridement of the skin and con ditioning of the skin graft The donor site dressing was changed after two weeks and revealed this wound to be completely healed with no particular difficulty! The only thing remaining is the volar area of the wrist in which remains some of the fibers of the deep flexor tendon which should be saved to give him a pinching mechanism of the thumb and index finger. Therefore, it was im possible to graft over these areas. Enclosure had to be achieved by secondary intention. After 46 more days, the man was sent to a sanitarium for physical therapy treatment to help reconstruct the function of what remains of the power in his left hand. Seven and one half mouths after the ac cident the employee was re-examined and it was reported that the wounds were healed except for two small areas on the volar as pect of the wrist "His fingers reveal very little, if any, active motion and almost no passive motion. He does have 25s of active flexion of the distal phalanges of the thumb and 15' of active flexion of the proximal phalanges of tile thumb. He has a loss of sensation com patible with injury to both the median and ulnar nerves. This hand and forearm, in my opinion, represents a 100 per cent dis ability because of the marked stiffness of the joints of the fingers. I believe there is little hope of obtaining active motion by further tendon surgery. If it were possible, by continued physiotherapy, to obtain some passive motion, there would then be some chance for further surgery. The gap in the median nerve is so great that nothing short of nerve graft would be of any value. "It would be my impression that other the total disability should be accepted, or to con tinue with a trial of physiotherapy and splinting to try to mobilize the small joints of the hand. If these small joints can be mobilized, one would then have to plan a large pedicle abdominal flap to replace the scarred tissues on the volar aspect of the 15 1961 National Safety Congress forearm, wrist and hand. Following this it might be possible to continue flexor tendongrafting" After careful study of these medical re ports it was derided further treatment would not benefit this man and he agreed on the settlement of his disability as indicated by the doctor as 100 per cent loss of use of the left amt This man was given the best med ical attention possible, however his injury was so severe that although his arm was saved, it was practically useless. The final cost of this injury' was as follows: stand in the correct direction with a ball peen hammer. To make this correction it was not neces sary for the foreman to leave the walk way. When the superintendent arrived at the con trol, as per agreement with his foreman he instructed the operator to start the crusher and bdL Four or five truck loads of stone had been dumped when these units were shut down from another control center. The attendant was advised that a man had fallen from the belt--another mysterious, but fatal, belt conveyor accident Hospitals and Sanitariums.......... 3.776 Medical Care .............................. 1,193 Temporary Compensation .......... 2,116 Permanent Disability (100%) left arm .............. 10.810 Payment into Special State Fund................................ 200 This is an example of the unbelievable hazards of belt conveyor operations. A con struction foreman with years of experience, who had erected this and many other con veyors on the same job--a superintendent who knew all the hazards but--someway, somehow, somewhere, a failure and death. TOTAL ................................... $18,095 Thus the case was closed ... a 29-yearold married man with one infant child and a useless left arm. Many questions may be asked about this accident but few of them can be answered. Only one conclusion is inevitable. Some where along the line there was a man, or management, failure. 1 regret I cannot give you the answers to many of the questions my remarks must have left -in vour minds, but through the years I have reached a few definite con clusions on accident prevention and the most important one ts this: "An organization whose management per sonnel are the most definitive disciplinarians generally have the best safety records and competitive costs." Regardless of the point of failure, the man has a 100 per cent disability in his left arm, with its attendant losses, for the rest of his life. The corporation settled Its legal responsibility for $18,095. Surely we in our industry can and must find a more humane and better way for both parties. A construction foreman and his super intendent were training a 60" belt conveyor before starting time at a new quarry mill. At the end of the previous day some ice bad accumulated on the return idlers, also on the bend and gravity take up pulleys. Be fore starting time they loosened the bolts on the bottom of the return idlers, next to the walk way, and hammered them in a position to move the belt to the opposite side. During tills time they also removed some ice from the pulleys and return idlers. When this was completed the superin tendent left the foreman on the conveyor walk way to adjust the return idlers after the belt was started, if the previous adjust ment made had been too great. This was to be done by tapping the bottom of the Safety and production records go almost hand in hand over a period of time. Often we who are dedicated to the problem of accident prevention fail to accomplish all we could, because management and super vision do not wholly accept the responsi bility vested in them for the moral, social, economic and contractual obligations to the employee. Officials of the United Mine Workers of America have often reminded me in griev ance cases that the direction of the working force is the contractual obligation of man agement. If you abrogate this right, the responsibility is wholly yours, without re course under our contract Many times, management and supervision abrogate their right to accident prevention compliance because they fail to enforce safety rules they themselves established, by looking the other way. This is the road to failure. I leave you to ponder on just four ques tions, as you return to your responsibilities after the National Safety Congress meet ings are concluded. 16 1. Is your based or precepts: Z Do you and back rective n condition 3. Do you even min rective ai 1. Is your accident prevention program based on sound concepts and valid precepts? 2. Do you have the stamina, courage and backing personally to take cor rective measures to eliminate unsafe conditions in your operations? 3. Do you ever by-pass unsafe acts, even minor ones, without taking cor rective action at once--on the spot? Cement, Quarry and Mineral Aggregates 4. Are you willing to face tLe fact that the obligation to enforce accident prevention measures, if not fulfilled does result in accidents? As I intimated at the beginning, I did not accept the request made of me as an op portunity' to endear myself to you. I hope to leave with you something you will never forget If only a few remember, I have been greatly successful. 17 OFFICERS OF THE CEMENT, QUARRY AND MINERAL AGGREGATES SECTION NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL 1961-62 Chairman--Howard F. Johnston, Supv, Ind. Relations, Funkhouser Mills Div., Ruberoid Co., Hagerstown, Md. First Vive Chairman--Dorse O. Seiple, Jr., Safety Dir., The Standard Slag Co, Youngs town, Ohio Second Vice Chairman--Arvid Tiexsqx, Safety Dir., Material Service Corp., Lyons, I1L Secretary--J. R. Treadawav Safety, Dir., Vulcan Materials Ca, Birmingham, Ala. Newsletter Editor--Lyman E. Cunningham, Safety Dir., The Georgia Marble Ca, Tate, Ga. Program Committee Chairman--Dorse O. Seiple, Jr., Safety Dir., The Standard Slag Co., Youngstown, Ohio; Francis W. Bosh, Sr, Dir. Safety, M. J. Grove Lime Co., Frederick, Md.; Ivan F. LeGore, Safety Dir, Portland Cement Assn., Chicago, HL; Ralph M. Richie, Dir. of Safety and Community Relations, Medusa Portland Cement Co., Cleveland, Ohio Membership Committee Co-Chairman (West)--Leonard R. Fucker, Dir. of Safety, Pennanente Cement Co., Oakland, Calif.; Whitby J. Wise, Vice Pres.-Supv. of Safety & Personnel, Southwest Stone Co., Dallas, Tex. Co-Chairman (East)--R. R. Foley, Mgr.-Eng, The France Stone Co, Toledo, Ohio; Walter A. Dearth, Jr, Supv, Employee Relations, The General Crushed Stone Co, Easton, Pa.; Gilbert E. Archer, Sr, Safety Dir, The Marble Cliff Quarries Co, Columbus, Ohio Statistics and Contests Committee Chairman--John C. Machisak, Chief, Accident Analy sis Branch, U. S. Bureau of Mines, Washington, D. C; J. R. Boyd, Exec. Dir, Na tional Crushed Stone Assn, Washington, D. G; E. W. Bauman, Managing Dir.-Sec, National Slag Assn, Washington, D. C.; Vincent P. Ahearn, Jr, Asst to the Assoc. Managing Dir, National Sand & Gravel Assn, Washington, D. C.; Kenneth A. Gutschick. Mgr, Technical Service, National Lime Assn., Washington, D. C. Engineering Committee Chairman--Leslie S. Voltz, Safety Eng, Vulcan Materials Co, Consumers Co. Div, Chicago, I1L; ARvm Tiensox, Safety Dir, Material Service Corp, Lyons, III.; Derrell If. Cornell, Safety Eng, Portland Cement Assn, Chicago. I1L; Roy G. Stott, Mining Health and Safety Eng., U. S. Bureau of Mines, Washington, D. C; George J. Reynolds, Tech. Mgr.-Electrical, U. S. Gypsum Co, Chicago, 111.; E. C. Beuthix, Mgr, Safety, U. S. Gypsum Co, Chicago, 111. Visual Aids Committee Chairman--A. B. Hoftiezer, Vice Pres, Laverack & Haines, Inc, Buffalo, N. Y.; J. R. Theadaway, Safety Dir, Vulcan Materials Co, Birmingham, Ala.; William A. McCormick, Jr, Safety Supv, Keystone Div. of Dravo Corp, Pittsburgh, Pa. Off-the-Job Safety Committee Chairman--H. A. Edwall, Mgr.-Operations, General Port land Cement Co, Chicago, IIL; J. R. Theadaway, Safety Dir, Vulcan Materials Co, Birmingham, Ala. 18 Publicity Com Lime Assa Labor Relal Training Com Div. of U. Welfare, L of Training Lang Range 1 & Safety, i Personnel, ` Safety & V ing, Safety Dir.-Safety, Nominating Cc hah Cement Personal Prate New York Personnel, ' Mgr. of T WORSECK, I Members-at-La Rock Co, 1 Co, Buffalt cago, IIL; I Staff Represen Past General Publicity Committee Chairman--Kenneth A. Gtjtschjck, Mgr, Tech. Serf., National Lime Assn., Washington, D. G; "Kenneth Fuckeb, Safety Dir. and Eastern Div. Labor Relations Mgr., Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., Chicago, 111. 'Training Committee Chairman--*William A. Kipp, Dir.-Safety, Universal Atlas Cement Div. of U. S. Steel Corp, New York, N. Y.; *Paul J. Wokseck, Mgr., Safety and Welfare, Lehigh Portland Cement Co., Allentown, Pa.; *Howabd Riefenstahl, Mgr. of Training & Safety, Alpha Portland Cement Co, Easton, Pa. Long Range Planning Committee Chairman--*Howakd Riefenstahl, Mgr. of Training & Safety, Alpha Portland Cement Co., Easton, Pa.; *Feed E Stokch, Din, Safety & Personnel, The Whitehall Cement Mfg. Co., Cementon, Pa.; `Paul J. Wokseck, Mgr, Safety & Welfare, Lehigh Portland Cement Co., Allentown, Pa.; *Seymouk B. Flem ing, Safety Kr, New York Trap Rock Corp., West Nyack, N. Y.; *Wiluam A. Kipp, Dir.-Safety, Universal Atlas Cement.Div., U. S. Steel Corp., New York, N. Y. dominating Committee Chairman--PEbed E Storch, Dir, Safety & Personnel, The White hall Cement Mfg. Co, Cementon, Pa. Personal Protective Equipment Committee Chairman--*Seymoub B. Fleming, Safety Dir, New York Trap Rock Corp, West Nyack, N. Y.; *Fbed E Stokch, Dir, Safety and Personnel, The Whitehall Cement Mfg Co., Cementon, Pa.; *Ho\vaed Riefexstahl, Mgr. of Training and Safety, Alpha Portland Cement Co, Easton, Pa.; *Patjl J. Wokseck, Mgr, Safety and Welfare, Lehigh Portland Cement Co, Allentown, Pa. Members-at-Large--*T. W. Jokes, Vice Pres, in Charge of Production, New Haven Trap Rock Co, New Haven, Conn.; *M. G M. Pollard, Dir. of Safety, National Gypsum Co, Buffalo, N. Y.; E. G Bedthin, Mgr.-Safety, United States Gypsum Co, Chi cago, IE; Lloyd Yeager, Gen. Mgr, Gypsum Assn, Chicago, HL Staff Representative--Charles S. Wolfp, National Safety Council, Chicago, 111. Past General Chairman 19 {i \ Other Volumes in this (1961) Series Users of this volume will find much value in rhs companion volumes, which offer the complete record of the 49th National Safety Congress! Here is file list: Vol. No. i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Title Ho9 Copies General Seatons and Index to all Volumes.... Aero-space; Air Transport.................................... Automotive and Machine Shop; Power Press and Forging AS Cement, Quarry and Mineral Aggregates.... Chemical and Ferfiloer........................................ Civic Leadership; Church, Home, Woman, Youth, Farm.. .90 Coal Mining......................................................... Construction; Public Employee............................ Electrical Equipment............................................. Food and Beverage; Moat Peeling, Tanning and Leather Products; Trades and Sarvieas.................... .............. Glass and Ceramics; Rubber.............................. AS Industrial Subjects Sessions (ASSE).................. Labor ..................................................................... .............. A5 Marine................................................................... .............. A5 Metals ................................................................... .............. JUS Mining................................................................... Motor Transport; Transit...................................... .............. .90 Occupational Health Nursing............................... Petroleum ............................................................. Public Utilities......................................................... .............. A5 Pulp and Paper; Printing and Publishing............ .............. A5 Railroad ................................................................. School arid College............................................... .............. .90 Traffic ............................................. ..................... Wood Products; and Textile................................ .............. A5 Early Morning Sessions--lime Management**.. .............. A5 10 or more $ 35 35 35 35 35 30 35 35 35 55 35 30 35 35 35 35 30 35 35 35 35 35 30 35 55 55 Stock No. 02231--1 02231--2 02231--3 02231--4 02231--5 02231-6 02231--7 02231--8 02231--9 02231--10 02231--11 02231--12 02231--13 02231--14 02231--15 02231--16 02231--17 02231--18 02231--19 02231--20 02231--21 02231--22 02231--23 02231--24 02231-25 02231--26 COMPLETE SETS (26 Volumes)........................ .............. $1030 $1030 D22.lt All prices shown are subject to a 10 per cant discount to National Safety Council members. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL 425 NORTH MICHIGAN AVE. CHICAGO 11. ILL. 2M26202 Mr #.*.*. 022.31--1 20 -