Document pKMX0XLN20z0JjpE4JLvKXr7

United States Environmental Protection Agency / Region 4 Risk Management Program Inspection Report Valero Memphis Refinery Memphis, Tennessee June 11-13, 2024 1.0 Introduction The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's efforts to reduce the likelihood and severity of chemical accidents include planning and legislative initiatives such as the National Contingency Plan, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), and the Accidental Release Prevention requirements under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), as amended in 1990. This report outlines an inspection of the Risk Management Program (RMP) as mandated by Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA. The focus of this inspection was to assess the RMP for the chemical distribution process at the Valero Memphis Refinery Facility located in Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee. This Facility was selected for inspection because it hadn't been inspected under the RMP within the last five years and is an agency priority due to of the use of hydrofluoric acid. The inspection, which was conducted on June 11-13, 2024, consisted of an examination of program documentation, as well as site reviews of various aspects of Facility operations. Personnel from the Facility participated throughout the inspection. Requested program documents were provided for further review off-site. This report will provide a background of the Facility and a listing of observations. 2.0 Background The Valero Memphis Refinery is approximately 145-miles east of Little Rock, Arkansas, and 220miles west of Nashville, Tennessee. The refinery has been upgraded since its acquisition in 2005, Valero has invested $245 million upgrading the Facility to a highly efficient Facility with crude oil being supplied primarily through the Capline Pipeline and by barge and an additional pipeline that runs directly to the Memphis airport. The refinery's crude oil capacity is 195,000 barrels per day. Refinery products including gasoline, diesel products, and jet fuel, are primarily sold in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Ireland markets on a wholesale basis. The Facility lists 285 full time employees in its most recent RMP submission. The oil refining process at the Facility is subject to the RMP requirements of 40 C.F.R. Part 68 and EPCRA Section 302. The Facility reported 15 covered processes subject to the requirements of EPA's RMP regulations in its most recent risk management plan submission, dated May 25, 2023, which are listed in Table 1, below. The Facility considers all 15 of these covered processes to be RMP Program 3 processes. Process ID 1000131404 1000131405 1000131406 1000131407 1000131408 1000131409 1000131410 1000131411 1000131412 1000131413 1000131414 1000131415 1000131416 1000131417 1000131418 Table 1. RMP Covered processes for the Facility Description Cryogenic Unit II Alkylation Unit Cryogenic Unit FCC Unit Gas Con DHDS Sat Gas Unit Tank Farm NHDS CCR Cat Gasoline Hydrocracker Hydrocracking Unit MSAT West Crude Unit East Crude Unit Chemical CAS Number 00-11-11 00-11-11 7664-39-3 00-11-11 00-11-11 00-11-11 00-11-11 00-11-11 00-11-11 00-11-11 00-11-11 00-11-11 00-11-11 00-11-11 00-11-11 00-11-11 Chemical Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Hydrogen fluoride/Hydrofluoric acid (conc 50% or greater) Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture Flammable Mixture The background specifics are summarized as follows in Table 2. TABLE 2: Inspection Information Summary Inspection Team Lead Inspector: Jordan Noles, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Inspector: Steven Ramirez, EPA Inspector: Justin Stark, EPA Inspector-in-Training: Callie Sotolongo, EPA Inspector: Brook McKowen, Eastern Research Group (ERG) Inspector: Amy Federoff, ERG Inspector: Liam Prendergast, ERG Date of Facility Visit: June 11-13, 2024 Page 2 of 11 Valero Memphis Refinery, Memphis, TN CAA 112 (r), Risk Management Program, Inspection Report Quantity (lb) 25,000 870,000 160,000 35,000 990,000 980,000 46,000 1,200,000 22,000,000 1,700,000 200,000 44,000 120,000 12,000 4,800 38,000 Facility Identification Name: Valero Memphis Refinery Street Address: 2385 Riverport Road City: Memphis County: Shelby EPA Facility ID No: 100000158107 Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) No: 199623414 Latitude: 35.085843 Longitude: -090.083385 State: Tennessee Name, address and phone of corporate parent company: Owner/Operator: Valero Energy Corporation Mailing Address: 2385 Riverport Road City: Memphis State: Tennessee Zip: 38109 Zip: 38109 Name, title, and email of person responsible for 40 C.F.R. Part 68 implementation: Name: Eric Brown Title: VP & GM Phone: (901) 775-5708 Email: Eric.brown@valero.com Name and title of emergency contact: Name: Pamela Jackson Title: HSE director Phone: (901) 947-8405 Email: Pam.jackson@valero.com Name and titles of stationary source personnel involved in site inspection (accompanied site tours, provided documents and explanations): Name Taryn Thomas Greg Swearingen Garrett Lewis Karen Drewery Kerkove Michael Holt Jeremy Gross James Bowen Title Valero Safety Valero Environmental Phone (901) 774-3100 (901) 947-8348 Email taryn.thomas@valero.com greg.swearingen@valero.com Valero Technical training Supervisor technical training (210) 748-5430 Garrett.lewis@valero.com (901) 947-8543 Karen.drewery@valero.com FCC Superintendent Manager Routine Maintenance Manager Maintenance Planning (901) 947-8543 (901) 775-8841 (901) 947-8420 Michael.holt@valero.com Jeremy.gross@valero.com James.bowen@valero.com Page 3 of 11 Valero Memphis Refinery, Memphis, TN CAA 112 (r), Risk Management Program, Inspection Report Nick Fazzio Randell Beasley Shane Marton George Harmon Melissa Thompson Grant Parker James Griggs Felix Dornier Jeff Peterson Eric Brown Chris Soper Barbara Keeler Victor Torres Cameron Ellis Trevor Blanchard Willie Bishop Lucas Marion Pamela Jackson David Reed Chris Harrison Leo Stawford Mitchell Blave Steve Brewer Emergency Service Superintendent Operation Excellence Staff Control Systems Engineer USW PSM representative Staff Process Safety Engineer Manager Planning/Economics HR Director Technical Service Director Operations Director VP & GM Maintenance Director Manager Refinery Process Safety Complex Manager Unit Superintendent Complex Manager USW Heath and Safety Rep USW Top Rep Valero HSE Director Valero Reliability Valero Superintendent USW Local President Complex Manager Valero Environmental (901) 484-8380 Nick.fazzio@valero.com (901) 775-5772 (901) 775-5783 N/A (901) 775-8876 (985) 445-6580 (901)775-5746 (901) 775-5712 (901) 359-6168 (901) 775-5708 (901) 947-8396 (901) 947-8437 Randell.beasley@valero.com Shane.morton@valero.com George.harmon@valero.com Melissa.thompson@valero.com Grant.parker@valero.com James.griggs@valero.com Felix.dornier@valero.com Jeff.peterson@valero.com Eric.brown@valero.com Chris.soper@valero.com Barbara.keeler@valero.com (901) 947-8396 (901) 947-8344 (901) 775-5947 (901) 488-4123 (901) 592-8385 (901) 947-8405 (901) 947-8555 (901) 917-8413 (901) 493-8344 (901) 775-5727 (901) 947-8360 Victor.torres@valero.com Cameron.ellis@valero.com Trevor.blanchard@valero.com Willie.bishop@valero.com Lucas.marion@valero.com Pam.jackson@valero.com David.reed2@valero.com chrisharrison@valero.com Lstanford1984@yahoo.com Mitchell.blave@valero.com steve.brewer@valero.com Note: This is not a union facility. Date of initial submission: August 19, 1999 (as Williams Refining LLC) Date of most recent submissions: May 25, 2023 3.0 Observations The inspection of the Valero Memphis Refinery evaluated various sections of the RMP regulations (40 C.F.R. Part 68, Program Level 3) and the inspection checklist included in "Guidance for Conducting Risk Management Programs Inspections under Clean Air Act Section 112(r)." The inspection began with an opening discussion of Facility operations. The discussion was followed by a tour of the Facility's chemical distribution process area. EPA inspectors then requested paperwork associated with the Facility's Risk Management Plan (RMP). The documents were reviewed by EPA inspectors on-site and provided for review off-site. An Page 4 of 11 Valero Memphis Refinery, Memphis, TN CAA 112 (r), Risk Management Program, Inspection Report inspection out-brief was conducted where EPA inspectors described their observations. Observations from the RMP inspection at the Valero Memphis, Facility are discussed below: 1. 40 C.F.R. 68.15(c) requires that when responsibility for implementing individual requirements of this part is assigned to persons other than the person identified under paragraph (b) of this section, the names or positions of these people shall be documented and the lines of authority defined through an organization chart or similar document. The Facility provided an organizational chart to show the personnel responsible for each element of the Facility's RMP compliance program in response to the pre-inspection information request provided by EPA on May 10, 2024. Facility personnel stated that the organizational chart was created specifically for the purpose of the inspection and was not kept as a record before receiving the request by the EPA inspection team. This indicates that the Facility had not historically documented the persons responsible for implementing individual RMP element requirements for the RMP covered processes present at the Facility. Additionally, the organizational chart listed job titles that did not match the actual job titles for the individuals responsible for the RMP elements at the Facility. For example, the organizational chart lists the job title of `Director of Central Maintenance' as one of the responsible persons for implementing Mechanical Integrity. During the on-site portion of the inspection, Facility personnel clarified that the accurate job title for the person responsible for the Facility's Mechanical Integrity program was the `Technical Service Director'. 2. 40 C.F.R. 68.10(a)(3) requires the owner or operator of a stationary source that has more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a process, as determined under 68.115, to comply with the requirements of this part no later than the latest of the following dates: (3) The date on which a regulated substance is first present above a threshold quantity in a process. Based on documentation reviewed to-date and information gathered from Facility personnel during the on-site inspection, the RMP covered processes at the Facility appear to exclude all piping and vessels after the header for the flare gas recovery process. Specifically, the piping and vessels that exist between the flare gas recovery header and the flaring system(s) and the flammables substances present therein are not considered as part of either the existing universe of the Facility's RMP covered processes or as a separate "flare gas system" covered process. As such, the Facility may not be adequately including the flare gas system as an individual covered process, or as part of an existing set of covered process(es), pursuant to the following: Section 40 C.F.R. 68.3 states, "[Process] means any activity involving a regulated substance including any use, storage, manufacturing, handling, or on-site movement of such substances, or combination of Page 5 of 11 Valero Memphis Refinery, Memphis, TN CAA 112 (r), Risk Management Program, Inspection Report these activities. For the purposes of this definition, any group of vessels that are interconnected, or separate vessels that are located such that a regulated substance could be involved in a potential release, shall be considered a single process." Section 1.4 of General RMP Guidance - Chapter 1: General Applicability states, "Y[y]ou must also consider equipment, piping, hoses, or other interconnections that do not carry or contain the regulated substance, but that are important for accidental release prevention. Equipment or connections which contain utility services, process cooling water, steam, electricity, or other non-regulated substances may be considered part of a process if such equipment could cause a regulated substance release or interfere with mitigating the consequences of an accidental release." 3. 40 C.F.R. 68.42(a) requires the owner or operator to include in the five-year accident history all accidental releases from covered processes that resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage on site, or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage. The Facility provided release estimate information that documented a release of liquid hydrocarbons that occurred between 02/14/2021 through 02/19/2021 from the North and South flare units in 2021 that resulted in offsite environmental damage. The Facility determined that the release event was initiated due to prolonged freezing temperatures that caused, "significant pipe and instrumentation freezing and subsequent unit trips/depressurizing to the flare system." The Facility staff stated that the release resulted in liquid hydrocarbons falling from the South flare onto the ice covering and the shoreline of the adjacent Nonconnah Creek that required subsequent clean-up action. The release of liquid hydrocarbons to the adjacent creek resulted in offsite environmental damage, therefore, making this event reportable in the five-year accident history section of the RMP. To date, the Facility staff had not reported this release to their five-year accident history within their RMP submission. 4. 40 C.F.R. 68.65(d)(1)(ii) requires the Information pertaining to the equipment in the process shall include piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs); During the Facility walkthrough Inspectors identified discrepancies between P&IDs(based on those included in the listing provided and process equipment found in the field). Specifically, inspectors identified the following discrepancies: P&ID No. 1006-d-2320 revision 41 (Acid Regeneration) for the HF bottoms line [2"HF-06442-AU1 (2" HC)] coming off of the acid regenerator (06-10-007), a pressure gage was observed in the field on a " hand valve that was not present in the P&ID (See Photographs Page 6 of 11 Valero Memphis Refinery, Memphis, TN CAA 112 (r), Risk Management Program, Inspection Report No. VALERO-MM-EPA-RMP-004956 - CBI and VALERO-MM-EPA-RMP004957 - CBI). P&ID No. 1006-d-2120 revision 38 (Acid Loading Station) for the fresh acid loading line (2" P-06T0020-AT1), a 2" flange was observed between the check valve and the " hand valve that was present on the P&ID but was not observed in the field (See Photographs No. VALERO-MM-EPA-RMP-004970 - CBI and VALERO-MM-EPA-RMP004971 - CBI). P&ID No. 1006-d-2110 revision 12 (Acid Storage Tank) for the line to/from the acid storage tank (4" P-10712-BA5H): A 6" flange between HV937b and HV937a was observed on the P&ID but not in the field (See Photograph No. VALERO-MM-EPA-RMP-004959 - CBI). A 6" flange between HV937a and the Acid storage tank (06-10-023) was present on the P&ID but not observed in the field (See Photograph No. VALERO-MM-EPARMP-004959 - CBI). A pressure gauge observed off of a 1" valve coming off of a 6" valve from the acid storage tank bottom was present in the field but not present in the P&ID (See Photographs No. VALERO-MM-EPA-RMP-004962 - CBI and VALERO-MM-EPA-RMP-004963 - CBI). P&ID No. 1026-d-2050 revision 30 (NHDS #2 Reactor) A pressure indicator coming off a " line from the 3" FL-006092-AA2A (NI) line was observed in the field but not present in the P&ID (See Photographs No. VALERO-MM-EPA-RMP-004986 - CBI and VALEROMM-EPA-RMP-004987 - CBI). A pressure indicator coming off a " valve from the 14" reactor effluent was present in the P&ID but not observed in the field (See Photograph No. VALERO-MM-EPA-RMP004985 - CBI). 5. 40 C.F.R. 68.65(d)(2)-(3) requires the owner or operator to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. For existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards, or practices that are no longer in general use, the owner or operator shall determine and document that the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner. Due to the presence of hydrofluoric acid (HF acid) in the alkylation processes at the Valero Memphis Refinery, the Facility should be operating and maintaining the HF Alkylation Unit in accordance with applicable recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP), specifically American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice (API RP) 751, Safe Operation of Page 7 of 11 Valero Memphis Refinery, Memphis, TN CAA 112 (r), Risk Management Program, Inspection Report Hydrofluoric Acid Alkylation Units (Fifth Edition, August 2021). The Facility documented that the two most recent API RP 751 audits were completed on 12/10/2019 and 4/19/2023. The dates of the two most recent API RP 751 audits are separated by a period greater than three (3) years. The time elapsed between the two most recent API RP 751 audits is inconsistent with the requirements of API RP 751, specifically: Section 4.2.2 of API RP 751 (2021) states, "Each operating unit shall be audited at least every 3 years." 6. 40 C.F.R. 68.67(c)(2) requires the process hazard analysis to address the identification of any previous incident which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences. The Facility completed their most recent FCC Unit (PHA) in August 2022, about four years after an incident involving the FCC Unit at the BP Husky Refinery in Superior, Wisconsin occurred on April 26, 2018. The Valero Memphis August 2022 PHA includes a list of reviewed internal incidents but does not reference any related external incidents reported at other refineries. The HAZOP-style worksheets consider multiple "no flow", "less flow", "more pressure", "less pressure" scenarios that may cause flow reversal or reduced differential pressure between the reactor and catalyst regenerator and lists closing the slide valve as the primary safeguard in addition to shutting down the reactor and/or catalyst regenerator. Public information regarding the BP Husky Refinery explosion was released by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) in August 2018 and December 2018 as part of the CSB's ongoing investigation. The factual update released by the CSB in August 2018 describes the details of the incident and identified equipment and instrumentation issues that lead to the explosion. The factual update released by the CSB in December 2018 compared the FCC unit explosion at the BP Husky Refinery in Superior, Wisconsin to the February 2015 explosion at the ExxonMobil Refinery in Torrance, California that occurred in the electrostatic precipitator of the FCC unit. The December 2018 CSB report also summarized post-incident actions taken by the Torrance Refinery where they "Evaluated and established parameters, limits, and associated equipment to ensure an appropriate steam-induced pressure barrier for FCC Emergency Shutdown and Safe Park procedures." The Valero Memphis August 2022 PHA does not consider CSB recommendations associated with past similar incidents that have occurred in FCC units such as implementing a steam-induced pressure barrier. The lack of information included in the PHA indicates that the Facility has not fully addressed previous incidents within the refining industry which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences at the Valero Memphis Facility. 7. 40 C.F.R. 68.67(c)(5) requires the process hazard analysis to address stationary source siting, including the placement of processes, equipment, and buildings within the facility, and hazards posed by proximate stationary sources, and accidental release consequences posed by proximity to the public and public receptors. Page 8 of 11 Valero Memphis Refinery, Memphis, TN CAA 112 (r), Risk Management Program, Inspection Report  During the winter of 2021, the Facility experienced a freeze event that resulted in a Facility-wide shut down and a release of liquid hydrocarbons from the flare. Since then, a PHA revalidation was completed in 2022 for the FCC Unit and in 2023 for the HF Alkylation Unit and the NHT Unit. Within the PHAs provided, the Facility identified a global node which is set, "to address issues that affect the entire unit." All of the PHAs provided by the Facility to the EPA Inspection Team occurred after the major freeze event in 2021; however, none of the PHAs completed since 2021 address risks posed by potential environmental risks and do not incorporate stationary source siting considerations within the global node. 8. 40 C.F.R. 68.69(a)(3)(iii) requires the owner or operator to consider safety and health considerations: Control measures to be taken if physical contact or airborne exposure occurs. Valero's operating procedures do not include text defining the control measures to be taken if physical contact or airborne exposure occurs where Valero personnel may interact with HF acid in the alkylation unit. For example, in the operating procedure titled, 06-0804 Sampling HF Acid using Swagelok Sample Station - Level 2, there are identified safety and environmental precautions that list out the required personal protective equipment (PPE) and describe the hazards of HF acid but do not provide instruction for personnel if exposure to HF acid occurs. As such, the Facility's operating procedures do not provide sufficient information for Facility personnel regarding the control measures that personnel should take if physical contact and/or airborne exposure occurs. 9. 40 C.F.R. 68.73(d)(1)-(2) requires the owner or operator to perform inspections and tests on process equipment. Inspection and testing procedures shall follow recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. Due to the presence of HF acid in the alkylation processes at the Valero Memphis Refinery, the Facility should follow inspection and testing requirements described by API RP 751, Safe Operation of Hydrofluoric Acid Alkylation Units (Fifth Edition, August 2021). The Facility relies on a Rapid Acid Transfer System (RATS) to respond to a HF acid release or emergency in the alkylation unit. During the inspection, Facility staff acknowledged that they have tested instrumentation logic and functionality of individual equipment but have not activated the RATS with HF acid for testing. The Facility provided operating procedures for 06-0419 RATS Test Activation and 06-0421 RATS Component Testing Requirements that describe testing the RATS and individual pieces of equipment throughout the RATS. The Facility has procedures for testing the HF acid RATS but has not completed testing of the HF acid RATS to ensure that it directs the HF acid into a separate vessel within 15 minutes as required in API RP 751 (2021), specifically: Page 9 of 11 Valero Memphis Refinery, Memphis, TN CAA 112 (r), Risk Management Program, Inspection Report  Section 9.6.3 of API RP 751 (2021) states, "For a system to be considered RATS, the total duration from when a leak is first detected to when the HF acid inventory is secured in a separate vessel(s) should not be more than 15 minutes. The duration should include: 1) the time required to notice that an HF leak has occurred, 2) the time required to decide to activate the system, 3) the time required to activate the system, 4) the time for all the valves to move to proper position once the system is activated, 5) the time required to transfer the HF to a secure location, 6) the time for the system to recognize that the de-inventory process is complete, 7) the time to close the valves to isolate the inventory." Page 10 of 11 Valero Memphis Refinery, Memphis, TN CAA 112 (r), Risk Management Program, Inspection Report Inspection Report, Prepared by: CALLIE Digitally signed by CALLIE SOTOLONGO Date: 2025.03.28 07:39:17 SO_T_O__L_O__N__G__O___-_04_'0_0_' __________ Callie Sotolongo, Inspector South Air Enforcement Section U.S. EPA Region 4 Approved by: TODD Digitally signed by TODD GROENDYKE GROENDYKE Date: 2025.03.27 13:59:32 -04'00' __________________________________________ Todd Groendyke, Section Chief South Air Enforcement Section U.S. EPA Region 4 Page 11 of 11 Valero Memphis Refinery, Memphis, TN CAA 112 (r), Risk Management Program, Inspection Report