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FILE NAME: Doubt Science (DBTS) DATE: 2005 DOC#: DBTS015 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Bohme Journal Article from IJOEH - Maximizing Profit and Endangering Health: Corporate Strategies to Avoid Litigation and Regulation Maximizing Profit and Endangering Health: Corporate Strategies to Avoid Litigation and Regulation SUSANNA RANKIN BOHME, AM, JOHN ZORABEDIAN, DAVID S. EGILMAN, MD, MPH AoCbosrcpuorreattihoensfacatntdhaitntdhuesitrripersoduuscetsvaarreioduasngtaecrtoicuss otor tahned l2ea)stavroesidtricletgivael plioasbsiliibtlye froerguwlaotrokreyr eonrvicroonnsmumenetr; bdeleadrleyg.uTlahteoirryaeimnviisrotonmseecnutreanthdealveearsttlreegsatrlilcitaibvieliptyosfsoir deaths or injuries in order to maximize profit. They deaths or injuries. The ultimate goal of the strategy is profit maximiza wusoirnkgwscitihenattitsotsr,nescyisenacnedapduvbisliocryrebloatairodnss; pfrroofnetssgiroonuaplss,, tion, which companies achieve by ensuring favorable market and operating environments, The dissemina iinnfdluusetnryceosrcgiaennitzifaitcioannsd, pthoipnuklatarnokpsi,naionnd othf ethme reidskias otof tion of previously secret industry documents produced in toxic tort litigation has made it possible to thor tdheepierndpsroodnuccotsrruoprt spcrieonccees,sepsr.ofTitshecorsptroartaetgioyn, swathtihche oughly document the strategies employed by various tobacco, asbestos, beryllium, plastic, and chemical ceaxnpelneasernoffropmubtlhicishsetraalttehg.yPhuobwlictoheefafeltchtivperloyfbesusiilodnsaclis aconmd pianndiuess,trtyh-efuirnidneddusstcryienotrigsatsn.izIantitoenrns,alfrodnotcgurmouenptss, escniteifnicceaannddptuhbelipcuobpliicnihoenaltthh.atKpeyriowroirtdizs:esmbasosthmgeodioad; produced in such litigation provide evidence that the actions of industry have been both deliberate and binildituys,tlreyg;ael;thpiucbs,libcuosipniensiso;nl;aawdyveirsso;rpyucbolmicmreitltaeteios;nso;ccliua pational disease; environmental disease. malign. The success of these strategies over many years is apparent in their continued impact on standard set ting, limitation of tort liability, and delay and weaken ing of regulatory oversight. Utilizing these documents, INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH 2005;! 1:338-348 waceheiexvaemtihneesethgeoasolsm. e of the tactics corporations use to cthoartpohraavteiopnrotvheant dperloedteurcieosusoerffuecsetss omnahteerailatlhs in Ccaorrrpyoinragtioonust sfruocmh pthlaensse. inIndsutsetardie,sthdeoynwoot rakctclaolsoenley faces the threat of loss of revenue because of the danger involved. Such a threat may come frowmeqiuthallayttopronweyersf,uluspuuablllyicfrreolmatiogniasn(tPdRe)fecnosmepfainrmiess,. Sanevd health, regulators workers or concerned with protecting the consumers who have been injured publpeicroarlaPteRparonddulcaewrsfiormf dsahnagveerotauksegnoothdes.lTeahdesaetianicdliundgectohre or killed by the product or process, or scientists who are concerned with toxicity. Corporations generally have law firm of Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue (Jones, Day) and the PR companies Hill and Knowllon (H & K) and the best information about their own products, and are usually aware of the safety risks involved. Many corpo Burson-Marstellar. These firms have used similar tech niques and strategies for a number of their corporate rations decide to produce dangerous commodities regardless ofrisk, however, and must devise ways to pro clients. For example, when courting Brush Wellman, the major U.S. producer of beryllium, Hill and Knowlton tect their markets and profitability. Over the course of several decades, corporations and industries have assured the company that it had conducted campaigns "analogous to the beryllium situation," including: developed and refined scientific, legal, and public rela tions tactics to maintain their ability to make profits despite the dangers posed by their products. Viewed --"--saascbcehsatroisnaannddhfuedmearanlhreegalutlhation together, these tactics take the shape of a strategy that, although enacted differently by various industries and ----ldeiaodxiannadnpdupbulibclihcehaeltahlth --vinyl chloride and cancer"1 cstooropdoraastipoanrst, ohfatsheenmooudguhs coopmermanodnialoitfyattoleabset aunladregre Both PR and law firms perform duties for corpora pstrroapteogrytiiosnmoefancot rtpooaracthiioenvse itnwothme aUinnigtoeadlsS: t1a)tess.ecTuhree tions that go well beyond the general conception of what their work is. PR firms do not limit themselves to planning media outreach, but also contract scientific Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Susanna Rankin Bohme, 8 North Main Street, Suite 404, Attleboro, MA zsteundsi'egs,ropulapns"btrhoaatds-ubapspeodrtletghael isntdrautsetgryieso,rcpreroatdeu"cctitait 02703, U.SA.; e-mail: <susanna_bohme@egilman.com>. hand, and work to discredit scientists seen as oppos 338 ing the goals of the corporation. Law firms not only work on legal strategy, but may also contract scientific pstuubdliiecso, fffiociramlsu. late scientific defenses, and lobby utilTizhees atrinuummvbirearteofosfeccoornpdoarraytiaocnt-oPrRs tofircmar-rleygoaul tfikremy tactics, which have been largely successful in providing scientific alibis for dangerous products, by helping com panies avoid regulation and liability. The tactics include: 1. Conducting or hiring outside scientists to con duct research designed to show the "safety" of a partic ular process or product; generate controversy about its effects; and mount attacks on scientists and on scien ptirfoiccewsso.rk that shows the dangers of the product or 2. Organizing groups of industry-friendly "thirdparty" scientists to support industry's scientific posi tions in regulation-setting processes, the courtroom, aenntdifipcuabdlivcisoopryinbioona;rdtsh"es(SeAaBres)*frequently dubbed "sci 3. Creating and/or utilizing "front" groups, indus atrnycoerogaf nleizgaittiimonasc,yaannddth/ oinr ktotafnukrsthtoerporobvjeicdteivaens.appear ula4r.oUpitniliiozninsg and influencing the media to sway pop This is not a complete list, and a variety of other tactics may also be used to avoid regulation and liability. Cor porations may use bankruptcy protection, or restruc ture their businesses such that the riskiestjobs are con nduoct tleedgabllyywlioarbklee.rsFfoorrewxhaomspelien,juinrie"tsotlhliengc,o"rapomraantiuofnacis turer sends its chemical product to another company to have it processed, maintaining ownership of the prod uct, but not responsibility for protecting workers.1 Wthehislecitehnecseeopfraocctciucepsatdioonhaalvaensdeerinovuisrornammiefnictaaltiohneaslftohr, we do not consider them in detail here.f FUNDING SCIENTISTS rGelsoebaarlclhy, eaincdhuysetrayr. Tspheendmsosttrimllioonnesy iosfspdeonlltairns tohne United States, where $157 billion was spent on indus try-sponsored research of all kinds in 1997.3 It is unclear how much of the total is spent on health and *We refer to these groups as SABs throughout, whether or not they formally adopted this nomenclature. fA patient of one of the authors (DE) provides an example of the effect tolling can have on epidemiologic studies. The patient worked at Shintech in Brazoria County, Texas, along the Gulf Coast. Shintech was located across from a Dow plant. Pipes ran back and forth bteectwh eaenndthveintywlocphllaonritds,etrfaronmspoSrhtiinngtercahw tmoaDteorwia.l DfrEom's pDaotwientot,SwhihnoidnevvoellvoipnegdDgolwiobolraVstCoMma. , is not included in any epidemiologic study safety research, but we do know that industry far outspends government on health and safety research. While the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, the federally-funded agency charged with researching environmental health risks has an extra mural research budget of only $462 million, the Chron ticryle ospfHonigshoerreEddsutcuadtyiondorenceen1t0lyyreeaprsoratgeod tohfartis"kasn iinndjuusst one field...cost about `half that.4 Corporations rely on scientists and their research in a number of forums; an article or set of articles mini mizing the dangers of a product or process will be used to influence regulators, argue against liability in the courtroom, influence subsequent scientific research, and even sway popular opinion. Corporations also idnegpseannddocnouscritecnatsisetss. to testify in both regulatory hear The problem with corporate funding is that it can bias scientists in favor of those who pay the bill. Kjaergard and Als-Nielsen have shown that the conclusions gorforuepseawrcehreers"swighnoifirceacnetilvyedmfournedipnogsiftrivoem taowfoarr-dprothfiet reexspeearricmheernstawl itihnoteurtvceonmtipoent"ingthianntertehsets.c5oTnhcelusesifoingsureosf may reflect an unconscious bias in favor of sponsors reevseenawrchheenrsn. oMuonredutreopurbelsessuormeeisabrreosuegvhertatloobtheaerr otrnenthdes ienractoercpoorrrautep-tsipoonnosof rreesdusltcsi.ence that point toward delib M anufacturing Doubt One of the most common tactics used by corporations and law and PR firms is to contract scientists to pursue questions or analyze in such as way as to generate "con troversy"over whatwould otherwise be clear-cut health rriosnksm. eAnst,foSramfeetyr AasnsdistHanetalSthecDreatavridy oMfiEchnaeerlgsyhoafsEcnovni vpionicnitnsgolyutsthhoawtnth, e"dreosuebatrcihs othf feiirrmpsrsoudcuhcat.s"EMxpicohnaeenlst is regularly used to challenge regulation, not by pro vbiudtinbgysmolaidinetaviindienngc,e "tthhaattaepvridoednuccet oisr apmrobciegsusoiusss,afseo, regulatory action is unwarranted."6 theWirhpenrofdauccetdswoitrh epvroidceensscees,thasot msheowcsotrhpeordaatniognesrs oorf industries have relied on a strategy of creating scientific doubt by raising general questions about the types of evidence that can be relied on to show causation. For example, in his 1962 paper for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR), Alan Rodgman acknowl edged that the "amount of evidence accumulated to indict cigarette smoke as a health hazard is over wmheenltmisinsgc.anTth."e7Revoiddgemncaen cthheanllelnisgteindgsosmucehoafnthienwdiacyts cthaencienrd-cuisgtarryetdtei-sscmouonkteedprothpeoseitviiodne"n:ce for the "lung VOL 11/NO 4, OCT/DEC 2005 w ww.ljoeh.com Corporate Strategies 339 sshtaiptisbtiectawleesntutdwieosfaccatonrnsot(aprcorvieticciasumseo-afntdh-eeffeecptidreelmatiioonl oevgiyd)e, nmciec)e; amreetnaoptlamsiean a(nadcrhityipceisrpmlasoiaf tdhoe nboiotlobegciocmael acanndcenroouesxp(earimcreintitcailsemvidoenfcteheexisptsatthooslhoogwicthaetvaidneynccigea); rtieststeuesamtotkhee lceovnelsptirteuseenntt iins cciagracrientotegsemniocketo(ahcurmitaicnismlunogf the chemical evidence). The chemical and tobacco industries have stressed the appropriateness of a particular type of evidence according to which type of evidence seemed most favorable to them. Chemical companies in particular have stressed the unique importance of epidemiologic studies in establishing cause-effect relationships.8-9 In general, they claim that animal models, molecular understanding, and pathologic data cannot establish cause-effect relationships. According to the Chemical Industry Institute of Technology (CUT), a private, notfor-profit research organization created and funded by the chemical industry, industry-funded research has babeielintysuocfcaenssimfuallinevinidfelunecne:cing regulators on the accept Icnhe1m9i9c2alEs PcAauasdinmgitctaendcefor rinthleabfoirrsattotirmy eantihmatalssoamree ninoftlureenlecveadntthetoEhPuAmcahnanhgeeaoltfhatrtiistkusd.eC.1U0 T strongly The chemical industry's professed reliance on hthuamt asunchepdiadteamairoelodgififcicdualttatoisoblatraginelyandduaeretotimthee- afancdt rheasvoeulractee-nccoynspuemriiondgs, oafs20mtaony40tyoexaircss.-rBeylatthede tdimiseeatshees studies are completed, patent rights have expired and cchheemmiiccaalls ctoomprpoamnioetse. have new (possibly substitute) The tobacco industry, faced with epidemiologic evi dence showing a link between cancer and smoking, argued that greater weight should be placed on animal data and/or mechanistic understanding.7Occasionally, when chemicals or other toxins, such as benzene or arsenic, are found to cause cancer in man, but not in animals, the chemical industry scientists reverse their acarguusamtieonntsinanmda, nlikceanthneottobbeacecsotabcolimshpeadniuenst,ilarsgcuieenttihsatst pexroadctucmeepcohsaintiivsme aonfimcaalrcsitnuodgieenseasnisd. Aunpdpaerresntatlnyd, tthhee only "proof' that will satisfy the chemical or tobacco itnhdeuesxtrisietisngisesvuidbesntacnet.iation that lies one step beyond Science to Specification Science to specification is what we call the scientific work that is carried out with the express purpose of reaching a "conclusion" that supports a corporate or industry regulatory or litigation objective. This research may be conducted in in-house corporate labo ratories, nonprofit research institutes, or for-profit "science-for-hire"firms. For example, in the institute's own words, the chemical industry-funded CUT is valuable because it "generates data which supports industry ptoorsyitdioenmsaonndsr.i"s1k0 analysis to modulate federal regula The work of Dr. Dennis Paustenbach is illustrative of the problems that arise when research is conducted to specification. Dr. Paustenbach is president and founder of the private for-profit consulting firm ChemRisk, Inc., a "consulting firm providing state-of-the-art toxicology, industrial hygiene, epidemiology, and risk assessment services to organizations that confront public health, Hocecuppearftoiornmael dhesaimlthil,aransedrveincvesirfoonrmEexnptaolncehnatlIlnecn.gJes."11 Much of Paustenbach's research has been con ducted for corporate clients who are faced with liability fsouliltosw. Fs:or example, Exponent described its business as Echxepmoinceanl,t cosenrsvterus ctciloienn, tesneirngya, ugtoovmeorntimvee,nta, vhieaatilothn,, isnescutorrasncoef, thmeaencuofnaocmtuyri.nMg,antyecohfnooluorgyengaangdemotehnetsr warheosienictilaietendts bayntilcawipyaetres, oorr ainresuernangcaegedcoimn,palintiigeas, mtioenntovoerrsaenrvaiclleesg.1e2d failure of their products, equip engSiinmeielarrslyh,aCvehesmerRviesdk aadsvteercthisneiscathlaatdivtsis"osrcsietnotilsatws yaenrds itnorta,lal nadsppercotdsuocft leianbviliirtoynlmitiegnattailo,n,oicncculpuadtiinogna"Tl,ectohxniic cal strategy development, [providing scientific advice, [e]xpert testimony, [s]election and preparation of enxepnet'rst ewxiptneerstswesi,tn[easssseiss.t"aCncheeminRcisrkoscsl-aeixmasmtihnaitn:g oppo Awodrkistiisngouuirsheimngphcahsaisracotnericsotincduocftionugr olergigailnaslu,pfpieolrdt reessseenarticahl wcohmichpofinllesndtaitna greasposl.vTinhgisdwisopruktiessuisnuvaolllvyianng csuhepmpoicrat lt,oolritirgaadniotsloignicsaolmaegeonftst.hWe emhoasvtepupbrolivciidzeedd aconndecbormeapslteximmplaajnotrs,todxeivcetloorptmlaewntsaulittsoxiniccalnutdsi,nbgersyilli ldiuusmt,,dhieoxxaivna, lveanrtiocuhsropmesituicmid,ebse,naznednem, aansbyeosttohse,rbs.r1a1ke In the case of Paustenbach's research, "filling data gInasptse,a"dcoanf bmegeiannnipnrgowduitchinagqsuceisetnicoen taondspseeceikfiicnagtitohne. nenftPfaroumste1n9b9a8chtof2o0r0m3e.dHCe hree-mfoRrimskedinC1h9e8m7Rainskdimn omviedd-toit-ltaoteE2x0p0o3 and moved some of the Exponent operations to the newly formed ChemRisk. He is currently president of ChemRisk. 340 Bohme et al. w w w .ljoeh.com INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH most accurate possible answer, this research starts with the desired "conclusions." For example, in 1990 PPaeutrsotleenubmacIhnsdtietvueteloapnedd daespcrroipboedsailt faosrfotlhloewAs:merican pMocsaLlatroend/CevheelmopRaisnkailsteprlneaatsivede ctoanpcreorvpidoetetnhciys pesrtoi wmoauteldfolirkebeunszteoned.evIteliospoaursuucncdinecrst,taynedt isncgienthtiafitcAalPlyI icnomcopmelmlinegn,tsinttoegthraetestdatpeoosiftiNoonrsthtatCemareonlitntaoabneduasseda pboespsribelseenstperdintgobUoSarEdPfAoar nfduttuhree SatnaatelyosefsCathliaftorcnoiau.l1d3 The proposal goes on to explain some of their methods and indicates that comments from API member com pinatnoiefisnaanl dpuobtlhisehreAdPpIacpoenrss.ultants will be incorporated t.y.p.eEsPoAf alenudkOemSHiaAincotnhseidirerdeedvbeleonpzmeneenttoocf acuasnecaelrl pthoitsentacsykeisstitmoadteesvefolorpbeanszuecncei.nc.t., .cTohmepoeblljiencgtivpeosoif otifonletuhkaetmprieaseinntdsuecveiddenbycebthenatzAenMeLeixspthoesuornely(ttyapske n4.e1e)d. eAd imn eoertdinegr two idthiscDusrs. tRhiechmaordlecIurolanrsbawsiilsl fboer benzene-induced AML (task 4.2). DsueiltivaebrlaeblfeotrotphuebAlPicIabteinoznenientaFskufonrdcaem. DenratafltmanadnuAspcprliipetd, ITrooxnicsowlogilyl.bCeoinmcmorepnotsraftreodminttohea Tfiansakl dFoocrcuemeanntd. Dr. This work was published in the scientific literature, with out disclosure that the research had been conducted with a foregone conclusion and had been subject to editing by a task force of industry representatives.14,15 DrsT. hIeroAnsPIanredceWnotlnyg-f--untodeddevtewlooportehseerarccohnsthualtta,n"tws--as expected to provide scientific support for the lack of a lceuurkreemntiaocricsukptaotitohnealgeenxeproasluproepluimlaittisond,oenvoidtecnrceeattehaat significant risk to workers and proof that nonHexopdogskuirne'.s"lIynmtphhisomcaasecothueldAnPoIthbeeldcauultsiemdabtey ebdeintzoerinael fcroonmtrogl.oiTnghefyorhwaadrdthief trhigehyt dtiod pnroetvelnikteththeereinsteearricmh results.16 Science Laundromats Scoonmseutlitmanetss'cwoonrsku.ltFaonrtsexaarme pnlee,edDer.dCtroumlapunsedrevredotahsear consultant for the Asbestos Information Association pleogsaeldteatom raenddutceestiefixepdoasguareinssttOo S-HasAbersetgosulaintion1s9 pro 8 4 . 17 AWlamyonset B2e0rmyeaanrsrelacteeirv,edCraumcopntarancdt cfroo-mresethaerchEePrADtro. develop a mathematical model that would assess the risks of contracting cancer from various forms of asbestos. They concluded that chrysotile asbestos, the type that comprised more than 95% of the asbestos used in the United States, probably does not increase the risk of contracting mesothelioma--the cancer that aissbaeslmtoos.s1t8WunhiilfeortmhelyEPaAsshoacsinatoetdacwceitphtedexCprousmurpeantdo Bstaetrems atnh'astmaloldaeslbaenstdoswfhiibleerthtyepirescuarrreeneqt uoaflfliycialilkpeolylictoy cause cancer, asbestos companies have already used this psaanpdesroafslawthseuibtassfiislefdorbyasvkicintigmsc.o19urts to dismiss thou Asbestos companies that are defendants in Texas filed a legal motion to have the court adopt the Crump gmaotidoenl aisn ththeasttasntadtea,rdItofwcaasusoabtvioionufsorthaallt aDsbr.esCtorsumlitpi could not testify for the companies in a tort case before btheecauEsPeAhahdadhedteecsitdifeieddwfohratindtousdtroy swpiothnsohriss amndodheel wenotuisltd. Ithnustseahdav, ethdeisccormedpitaendiehsimhisreeldf aDsra.nLiamurpaarGtiraelesnc'is consulting company, Cambridge Environmental, which describes its litigation services as the design of "techni cal strategies for arguing the merits of the client's case and for addressing the likely counter-arguments. "20 theDvr.alGidriteyenofgCavreumtepst'simwoonryk.r2e2lDyirn.gGorneeannddidafnfiormt dinisg close that Crump and Berman had based their model on a discredited dose--response analysis that had been McrecaDtoednalbdy.23a"s25beTshtoes-MincdDuostnrayl-dfurnedseeadrcrhesheaadrchbeerenJ,diCs. credited byJ. C. McDonald himself because it used an unreliable method in attempting to address a much-dis cussed issue: whether environmental levels of asbestoscontaining dust (a variable percentage of which was asbestos fibers depending on the mining or milling process in question) could be used to determine levels of airborne asbestos fibers. In commenting on the reli eaqbiuliitvyaolefnhtisodfotsheises[tdimusatt]ese,xMpocsDuorenalledvsetlahteads, n"tohtebfiebeenr mesataybblieshiend.tAhevarielagbiloendoatfafsivueggfiebsetrtshapte, rinmQl.uItberecm, athiniss doubtful, however, whetherconversion to afiberequivalent can have much epidemiobgic validity" [emphasis added].23 While such laundering of data through a series of con sultant reports can't change scientific facts, it can influ encejudges, juries, regulatory agencies, and the press. Thc judge's subsequent opinion on Dr. Green's testimony was that "[h]er credibility was challenged by her belief that money paid to academics to produce learned treatises should not be disclosed, and by the fact that her one previously published treatise on the sub jpeacrttyoftoasabsebsetsotsos`glrietiwgaotiuotnotfhaetxwpeasrtnwoittndeisssclwosoerdk isnhethheatdredaotinsee.fHorear dteesrtsimoonntyhethaabtshuordn.e"2s1t people don't disclose conflicts ofinterest'bor VOL 11/NO 4, OCT/DEC 2005 w ww.ljoeh.com Corporate Strategies 341 Attacks on "Opposing" Scientists One of the most ethically troubling methods for con trolling the scientific debate is the efforts by companies to discredit, intimidate, or invoke scandal around opposing scientists. The orchestrated attacks on Dr. Irving Selikoff, the author of several early studies warn ing about the health effects of asbestos, are a prime example of companies'scare tactics and intimidation. denDyutrhinagt tahsebe1s9to6s0sc,athuseeadsbceasntocserinadmusotnrygcwoonrtkineurse.dPtRo and research activities focused on discrediting sSceileikntoiffFics fliinmdiitnagtiso.nTshoefPtRheprostfuedssieiosnaaclskpnoowinlteeddgetodthbey the authors, and sought to emphasize in the media that the studies were inconclusive. One PR response to Selikoff noted that his research was "based on limited reports relating to a relatively small group of workers wriahlos,iinnsctalulldainngds/oomr reewmhoivcehacovnartiaeitny oasfbinesstuolsa.t"i2o6n mate The asbestos companies did not stop with public attacks on Selikoffs science, however. Shortly after the landmark Mount Sinai conference on asbestos health effects (organized by Selikoff) in October 1964, the Asbestos Textile Institute (ATI) had their attorneys at Cadwalader, Wikersham & Taft send a letter to Selikoff accusing him of "unwise treatment of research data in pSuelbilkiocffdtihscautstshieonAsT."IThe letter concluded by warning utorgaev[os]idcparuotvioidnining tthhee dbiassciussfsoiornpoosfsitbhleysedaamctiavgitiinegs atonddimsciusslseatdhiensge nseuwbjsescttosriisesc.leTahr,eorifgchotutroses.tuBduytatnhde igmrapvliitcyitolyf tihnveosluvebdjecimt mpoasteterupaonnd tahneycwohnoseqexueernccieses tthhoeisrearcigtihotnss.a27very high degree of responsibility for Such a message, arriving from a law firm at the behest of an industry group, is best understood as a veiled threat to sue Selikoff or other scientists who publicly rdeissecaurscshe.d the asbestos hazards revealed by their undOetrhseurravsebiellsatnocse-manandutfraiecdtutroindgisccormedpiatnhiiems .pIunt NSeolvikeomff wbeorrr1ie9d65t,hOatwSeenlisk-oCfofsrnaicntigviFtiiebsewrgolauslsd h(OuCrtFs)alpese:rsonnel iOnugrDprr.eSseenlitkcooffnfcreormn icsrteoatfiinngd psorombelewmasy aonfpdreafvfeenctt- ibnigg sthalaens. hAeldpifruelctaanpdpIroaamchomnliyghsut gbgeemstionrge tdhaamt awge explore, at this time, all avenues open to us.28 Terheed OonCSFeslitkaoffffrethvaietwtheedy "bienltieelvliegdecnocuel"dtbheeyusheaddtogadtihs credit him and protect their sales.29 They discussed what they erroneously assumed to be his immigrant status and noted that he was licensed as a doctor in the mUneinttedwitShtaatefsorethigronucgohunatry".b"r3o0ad reciprocal arrange In February 1971, members of the ATI revisited the issue of the "dangerous" Selikoff.30After disregarding the likelihood of discrediting Selikoff through the wmiethdihciasl "ehsatlafb-tlirsuhthmse":nt, ATI resigned itself to dealing EDnr.vJi.roLn. mGeonotdaml aHnesapltehakCinogmams aittmeeemstbaeterdoftthhaet ADTr.I iSnedliuksotrfyf iiss gaoin"dgatnoghearvoeust"o lmeaarnn, haonwd tothceomasbbaetsthoiss tactics! .[s.ic.]WthheenAmasekreicdanif MsoemdeictahlinAgsscoocuialdtiobne [dtoonceontthrroul Disra. Sgerliiekvoafnf]ceDcr.oGmomoidttmeeanofexthpereAssMedAdbouutbwt.aTshveerrey pdrifefsiscuurlet toongetthiet tMo oauctn.tTShionuaighStch[soioc]l tohfaMt peedrihcainpes might be effective. Incredibly, the attacks on Selikoff did not end with his death. Thirteen years after he died, a British histo rian and asbestos industry litigation consultant pub lished a 30-page article claiming that Selikoff had fraudulently presented himself as a medical doctor bdeecgareuese.31-h32eThhaisd aaslsleergteiodnlywnaesvuenrtroubet,aibnuedt thaemheisdtiocrayl jloisuhrnaapl htohtaotgpraupbhlisohfedSetlhikisofffaslsmeheodoicdalredfeugsreede,toanpdu bit had to be published elsewhere.33 occAunrroetdhejrusetxaamfepwleyienarsthaegoo,ccautpBartoiownnalUhneivaletrhsitfyieilnd Providence, Rhode Island. After Dr. David Kern, an associate professor at Brown, published findings of lung disease among workers at a nearby textile plant, the owner of the plant, who was a member of the board of directors of Kern's hospital, sought retribution.34 Brown and the hospitaljointly terminated his position. SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARDS (SABs) Another technique used by PR firms, large law firms, atinfidc tahdevicsoomrypbaoniaersdsth"etyoraedpdreressesntaispatortiecsutalabrlisihssu"sec.iAenll too often SABs are not truly independent advisors, but rreastehaerrchg,rosuppeaskofforsciinednutissttrsy winhtoerepsutsbliasth refagvuolaratobrlye nheesasreinsgisnantodrtinlittihgeatipornessl,awasnudits.tesFtiofyr aesxaemxppleer,t wthiet tobacco companies established the Center for Tobacco RcoemsepaarcnhiesSceisetnatbifliicshAeddvitshoeryBBeroyalrldiumandIntdhuestbreyrySlcliiuemn tific Advisory Committee. An SAB can pose as an impartial, authorized scientific body while in fact fur- 342 Bohme ef al. www.IJoeh.com INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH thering industry goals of generating favorable science and public opinion and avoiding liability.35'36 U.S. Gypsum/Hill and Knowlton SAB In the early 1980s, at the behest of asbestos product manufacturer U.S. Gypsum Corporation (USG), Hill and Knowlton (H&K) developed communication strategies for the express purpose of derailing litigation by public schools seeking damages for asbestos removal, discouraging future litigation, and shifting public attitudes about asbestos and individual asbestos companies. H&K recommended that U.S. Gypsum form a coalition with other asbestos companies to face the threat together. The formation of a scientific advi sory board was key to the overall strategy.37H&K exec utives proposed tbe formation of a "third-party panel of independent experts to be availablefor testimony, commentary Han&dKtescahwnitchael snuepepdorftoirnsuacphproapnri"aitnedmepareknetdseannt"dpfoarnuemlst.o" rbaupiilddlycrbeediinbgilidtyisfcorerdaitceodm: pany and industry that were n[Aen] stsbeosftonsucmleaanr uefnaecrtguyrearsf,ewliykeearsinadguos,thryaveprloitptloe, iinf adneyp,ecnreddeinbtilietyx.pEevrtisd,enince taadndduecmedwbiythrecthoegniczoemd, p(Tanhyis'skoiwndn, ocfanbascigkninifgicacnotulyldheailsgohteshnocrereduipbilitthye. wcoanvveirnincgedscrehmooolvabloaisrdthme emmobsterefwfihcoienmt aoyr naoptprboe priate action.) In addition, the SAB would voice an opinion on asbestos dangers that would support the industry's icnotnetrreosvtserasynddemspaiitneteavinidethneceaopfpeasabraesntcoes hoafrma ss.cientific o[Tfh]heealtshcihenaztiafircdsepvoidseendcbeystuhpepseorptriondgutchtes iaslalemgbatiigoun tohuesleassn,dhcoawn tbhee isnctieernpcreetiesdredaidffewreilnl thwavaeys.a Nmeavjeorr iemvipdaecntcoenapvpeerdaricsttso. Abendo,ntshiedeporefpthoendpleariannticfefs.o(fTthhee gthorvoewrnnmaelnlt, itpsrewsuemigahbtlybeahdinisdintteoretasltedrempaortvya,l haosf asbestos in schools.) While many other SABs kept industry funding secret, finuntdhiinsgcafoser, aHs&upKpothseodulgyhitndtheaptenddisecnlotspinagneilndwuosutrldy iinndiutssterlyf:be a positive public relations move for the t[hOejnpeubnloictabpleercreesputlitonof othfecaosrbpeosrtaotsiocnosntrsohvuenrnsyinigs tihnedierpseoncdiaelnrteospf,otnhseibiinlidtuiesst.ryAcpoaunldel,gofuanldoendgbwy,aybuint ameliorating that perception. Ainsdmusetnriteiosnceodo, ptheeraptianngelisnhotuhled bcoeafluitniodne.d Abynadll tthhee ictoiaslpitrioovnidshinogulfdunmdainkge,acpounbclluicsisotnasteamnednrtetchoamt wmheinle odcatciuornshaerree.enFtiirrsetl,yPtahrotsiceipoafttihnegpcaonmelp.a(nTiweso csahvoeualtds msaraiklye, dthisetiirngpuoissihtiothnecirlePaorsaittiotnhefrooumtsaent,ybaurtrivneedceast pbyanthele pmaunsetl. bSeecobnadla,ntcoebde--trmuelymibnedrespesnhdoeunltd, tbhee ianncdlucdoendcewrnhsoaibnouthtethpeaisstsumea.)y have had questions The SAB was meant to influence public opinion on a wvaoruieltdyboefusleevdelass, aacnedntietsrpi"eincedefpoer nHd&eKnt'"s ccaomncplauigsino.ns Othnaet iitmrpevoiretwantthueseEoPfAthpirsoptoancoell cuosuedldibneatrorirveiqnugeastt bcoonthclulesgioanlsa,nTdhpisu,btlhicenreclaotuioldnsbestriantceogriepso.ra. t.ed. [iAn]ton icnodueldpehnedlpendtefpleacntealt,telniktieonthawe ayprforopmosaefdfecctoeadlictioomn, ptoanpiaens.elTmecehmnbicearls,qfuoersetixoanms,peletc..A, ncdo,uladnsbweerrsefweorrueldd phaavrteytshoautrmceus.ch. .m.oMreemcrbeedrisbioliftythceompainngelfrsohmoutlhdirbdebaveaailvaabilleabtloe stcohuonodl ebrotaarkdes,teocnhnriecqauleasst.siTgnhemyesnhtoeu.gld., raevvaiielawbloeftoEPthAepmroetdoicaoal,nedtcf.orFiontahlleyr, ftohreuymssh(osupledecbhe platforms, etc.) as appropriate. Other SABs In 1976, H&K developed similar techniques for the rCidheemmicoanloMmaenrufparcotduurecresrAs sgsroocuiaptio(nVC(CMM-PAV)Cvi)n.3y8lHch&loK told the VCM-PVC producers group that they needed "third-party experts" to respond to adverse press cover acgaueseodfbvyinvyinlylcchhlolorirdideewexoprkoesrusre:whose cancers were Aopsiancgastehiirndp-poainrtty, tehxispuenrtdserwlihnoeswthilel ncoeemdefoforrdwevaerdl aadnddithioenlpal ctlhairrifdy-piasrstuyescaansdtihdeaytesdefvoerlotph.isWkeinndeeodf froorlef,uatunrderreeqfeureesntecde. the membership provide these In 1989, H&Kmade similar recommendations to Brush WtheelUlmnainteIdncS.t,attehse1:major manufacturer of beryllium in Tachaidrde-mpiaartyansdciienndtuifsitcryi,nNeAnSgAinefoerrinexgamexpplee,rtsshforuolmd btieonesnlmistaetdertioalrse.vTiehwethteesBtimruosnhiaWlselolmf atnhepsuebloiuctrseidlae aexnpderltisbesrhaolluyldrebfeerceansct eads aifnorawllarsdupinpoarwt hmitaetepraiaplesr, such as brochures and video scripts. The review of VOL 11/NO 4, OCT/DEC 2005 w ww.ljoeh.com Corporate Strategies 343 sthiveelymvaeterirfiyaltbhye isncdieenpteifnicdeinnctlsucsiieonntsistisnwtihlleppeursbuliac relations materials. vTihdeeseobthjeircdti-vpeartiynfeoxrpmearttsiomn aythaaltsoisbesuupspeodrttioveproof BgrreussshioWnaelllhmeaarniningsawvearreiettoy omfefdoiramrse,psruecsehnatastaivtecso.n While SABs can certainly produce legitimate science, athnedyinhadvuestbryeegnrouuspesdtobyputhtetshee agnoadlsoothfelirmciotirnpgorreagtiuolnas rtieosneaarcnhd. avoiding liability ahead of genuine scientific FRONT GROUPS, INDUSTRY ORGANIZATIONS, AND THINK TANKS Front Groups Like their use of SABs, the corporate strategists also use fthroenirt sgcrioeunpces.toInprtohveiidr estaranteagpypemaeramnocetoofUl.eSg.itGimyapcsyumto, H&KPR consultants explained how the formation of an industry-wide coalition or front group would allow USG to share resources with other companies and counter mthaetipounblsiocuarlcleegaantidonmseodfia"arcetsivpiosntss."e Smeervcihnagnaissmanfoirnftohre industry, the front group "could also act to deflect atten ftiroonmatwhaeypfrreosms aanffdecatcetdivcisotminpdaunsitersy,"craintidcs"."ta37ke the heat shiIpno1f9W84., Rth. eGarasbcee,stfoosrcmoemdpaanfireosn, tugnrdoeurpthpearlaedaodxeri cally named the "Safe Buildings Alliance" (SBA). The SBA downplayed asbestos hazards to discourage schools and other private and public entities from removing asbestos and suing the companies for r"eDmuoevtaol tohrerfeipnaainrcciaolstasn. dAocpoeurrattliaotnearldceotnetrrmolintehdattthhaet [asbestos manufacturers] exercise over the SBA, the S[eBmApishamseirselaydtdheedal]te,3r9egoofthe [asbestos manufacturers] ,.." utilIinzeatdhdeitmioend,iaHt&oKinsftlaufefnicnetepnudbeldic toopiunsieonth, eanSdBAswatoy a range of government and regulatory bodies, school bsiooanradlss,, alnabdoerveunni"oinntse,rnmael"diacuadlieanncdessc(eiemnptilfoicyepesro) f,4e0s The front group was to: gCoovnetraninmpernotablleemntittoiesscfhrooomlsy. iPerledvinegnttoEPuAnioornoptrheesr esuxrteenadndmapnrdesastueretofrionmspeoctthfeorr cMonosntiotukeontecie(santdo iontghesrubbsrtaanndcensa)mtoe i[nacslbuedsetocso-cmonmtaeirnciinagl]bufiirledpinrgoso.f Mtheinimmiazteertihale ncounmtabienrinogf cases where removal of asbestos becomes the Popretivoenntopfrcohdouiccet.liability suits. Ptarlelveevnelts,otrhmatitwigoautledlaeguitshloartiiozne,gaotvaelrlngmoevnetranlmsuenb seindcyotuorasgcihnogoalsdofoprtiroenmoofvtahleorfemmoavtearliaolps,tiothne.reby aSuigdniiefniccaenstlyofenthhaencheeaulnthderrsistaknsdainssgoocifaatelldtawrgiteht irnetmelolvigaelnotfatshseessmmaetnertiaolf iinssuqeusesatfifoenc;tinegncooputrioagnes for dealing with presence of material.40 Wfrohnilte gthroeuSpBsAhwaavseanbeienndudstersyi-grnuendortgoanriezsaetmiobnl,eotrheearl f"ogrraasustroonootsm"oorugsacniitziazteinosn'sgtrhoautpasp. pear to be run by and focFuoserdexoanmoprglea,ntihzeinPgRsuficrhmfrBounrtsgorno-uMpas.rsTtehlilserte(cBhMni)qhuaes, which is an attempt to put the moral power of citizens' icsaomftpeanigrnesfetrorwedortok pasro"Amsottriontguprfr'iv(patheocnoyrpgroarsast)e. iTnotebraetsttlse, athneaeirffoofrtlsegoiftigmeancuyinfoer"agcraosmsrpoaontsy"'sggrooualpss,,BaMndhatos pforormviedde gmraonuyps"garraessfrroaoutdsu"leonrtg,ainnizathtieonsse.nsUentfhoarttunthaetelcyo,mtphaensye organizes and pays for their operation. They are not othrgroaungich, csietlifz-ednetoerrmcoinnisnugmoerrgaacntiizvaistmio.ns that are created SmOokneersn'oAtollriiaonucsee(xNaSmAp)l,edoefvAelsotproedtubrfyisBMtheoNn abteiohnaallf otifonPhoinlipsmMookrirnigs.4i1n TphuebliNcSpAlascoesugahs tantoinpforritnrgayemreegnut loaf basic U.S. freedoms. Backed by millions of dollars of ctoabmapcaciog-nins,dusesttryupmoanteoyl,l-BfrMeerannumnebwers,pappaeidr acdavnevratisssienrgs and telemarketers, and published newsletters.42 By 1995 the NSA claimed a membership of 3 million, even though it received less than 1% of its funding from members' dues and was headed by BM's vice presi dent.42 Some people were counted as members whether or not they paid dues, and at least some were given cigarette lighters in exchange for signing up. In an attempt to build their membership rolls, the NSA gcoronusipdearesdmderamftbienrgs.P42hiWliphiMleortrhise egmrpoluopyeecslaiinmtoedthiet wheaanrtde,d itnote"renmalpomweemr"ossmroekfelerscteadndamcaykneictahleicrovnociecrens about this strategy, stating: "We don't want to `empower' them to the point that they'll quit."42 groSuepvserhaalveobtheeern ceixteadmbpyleEsthoicfalBCMo-ngseunmeerar,teadBfrritoisnht gorfocuoprpdoervatoitoends.t4o3Texhpeosesiningcltuhdeee:nvironmental records dBiraitnislhogCgoinlugminbtieareFsotsre43st Alliance, a front for Cana Wmeonrltd (BWuBsiCneSsDs ),Coaunnciinl tefornr aStiuosntaailnabbilge Develop business RorigoaEnaizrathtioSnu,mamcciutsiend1o9f9h2i4j3acking the agenda at the 344 Bohme et al. www .ijoeh.com INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH  Californians for Realistic Vehicle Standards, a front for the auto industry, opposing pollution regulation44 Coalition for Clean and Renewable Energy, set up to uinngdperromjeincet ionpQpouseibtieocn45to a controversial dam-build Ftroarlieasnt tPimrobteecrtiinodnusStroyc4i3ety, lobbying for the Aus Industry Organizations and Trade Groups: The Asbestos Information Association Example Industry organizations have served as a vehicle for cor porations within one industry to develop a common scientific agenda to allay public and government con cerns about the dangers of their products. Industry loorbgbaynirzeagtiuolnastoarryeaagnenecfifeisc.ieFnotrweaxyafmorplceo, rtphoeraAtisobnesstotos Iinndfoursmtrya,tiloend Abyssaoccioantisoonrt(iAumIA)o,ffomramneydasbbyetshtoesacsobmesptoas nceiesssfiunllcyluwdeiankgeJnoehdnsO-MSHanAvialnledaEnPdAUrengiounlatCioanrbsi.de, suc AIAIn, i1n9a73s,pMeeacththetowtShwe ettroandiec,atshseonciathtieondiarnecdtoprroosfptehce tive members, reviewed the problems faced by the industry and AIA's response. He reviewed the "bad news"that "twenty-five thousand workers exposed to the industries asbestos containing products and five thou sand of their own manufacturing workers have died or will eventually die of asbestos-related disease" but con trasted this with "the good news" that, ". . . Despite all athpepenareegdatiivnethaertipcrleesss oonverasthbeesptoass-thheaallft-hdotzheant yheaarvse, very few people have been paying attention."46 thinMkr.itSiswaetgoanuigceeoxfptlhaeineefdfecthtieveinmespsaoctf tohfe tthoetaAl iInAdu"sI try involvement in this most crucial matter that of ethleevienndumsatriyn proesqiutiiorenmweanstascicnepttheed t[oOtaSlHlyAb]ysOtaSnHdAardosn, ntoitnaellyofrethjeecteeledveonn, oanbloyuot nfieft.yTpheercsetnrutgognleaitsefnatrh,fraonmd over. We must not only continue but indeed expand ootuhrearcctihvaitniegsesa,nSdwtheteovnaicriocruesdairteeadstohfecAoInAcelornb.b"yAinmgofnogr changes in the OSHA-required product label, includ itnhgat tNheIOrSeHmohvaadl roefcothmemweonrddesd."4c6ancer" and "danger" Think Tanks: The Mercatus CenterExample While not necessarily formed as part of any particular acnodrploiarbaitliiotyn,'sa onruimndbuesrtroyf'srisgthrat-tweginygtothliinmkittarengkus lsahtiaorne pthoersaetegofualnsdwinitgh acnodrpionrtaetleleacctutoarls.cTaphietairl gmeankeerotuhsemcora penocwienrgfullafwomrcaekeirns.swAayninugmpbuebr lioc fowpienlli-oknnoawnnd itnhfinluk tanks, including Cato, Heritage, and Mercatus, pauttbelmicpht etaolthboretghullaimtioitnsc.orporate liability and curb The think tanks can be very effective at limiting reg ulation. The Mercatus Center is housed at George Mtriaesso(naUpnriivvaetresliytyhbeuldt fcuhnedmedicaplricmoamriplyanbyy)K47oTchheInWduasll StreetJournalcalled Mercatus "the most important think tank you've never heard of'and reported that: bMueilrdcaatucsasaenaalgyasitnssstormegeutilmateisonc.o..nt.o[rTthtehye]mcsreiltviceiszetod EoPnAe EdPiAdnr'utletatkoereindtuoceascucrofuacnet othzoatnecbleeacraeursesktihees wotohuelrdMinecrcreaatuses stchheolraartsebolafstsekdina cdaifnfceerre.nLt EatPeAr,rtuwleo wonoudlidesienlcerneagsineessu, rafragcueinogzothnaet iint wsaosmbeadcibtieecsa.uTsehiist vtiemnetiothnebyedniedfints't osafymaonryethsminogga.4b7out the cancer-pre MeIrnca2tu0s0c1r,ittihciezefdirs4t4yreeagruloatfiothnse. TBhusehBaudshmaindimstirnaitsitorna, tion selected 60% of those regulations for elimination or modification. In contrast, the National Association of Manufacturers failed to get tire administration to abide any of its recommendations for regulatory "reform."47 Think tanks can also exert constant pressure on the media and provide a steady stream of "experts"on eco nomic, health, and environmental issues. A recent survey of think-tank citations in the print and elec tronic media, conducted by Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), found that 50% of all press citations itannk2s0.0O4nlwye1re6%toofcmonesdeiravactiitvaetioonsr qcueontteedr-rpirgohgtretshsiinvke or center-left think tanks; the remaining 33% citing centrist think tanks such as the Brookings Institution.48 UTILIZING AND INFLUENCING THE MEDIA Companies and their PR firms use the popular media to influence public opinion regarding the safety of their products. A broad media campaign reproduces manip sutlraatteedgyscisiemnceeanint tao pinofpluuelanrcefotrhmeaptu. bSluicc,hleagbisrloaatodr-sb,arseegd utolahtoorlsd, caonrdpoproatteinotnisalajcucrooursn,tawbhloe ihnoltdoritmacmtieonnsse. power H&K openly discussed the importance ofjuries and laid out a strategy to influence them, citing the poten tial adverse effect ofjury verdicts on the financial com mthuenciotympaanndy,stoorckohthoeldrearssb.eAstnoys cleogmapl adneiceiss,iocnosuladg"atirnigst lgiceirtya adboomuitnotheeffseucitts,"caannd bausblibtilgeautiponinctoonttihneuensa,ti"pounabl mcoemdpiaa,n"ylaesadaipnugrvteoyo"rneogfawtihvaet icsopnospeuqluaernlyceths ofuogrhtthtoe be extremely hazardous material."37 tudTehseabPoRutcaosnbseustlotasn, tssurpepcoorgtendizbedy athgartowpionpgublaordyattoif VOL 11/NO 4, OCT/DEC 2005 www.ijoeh.com Corporate Strategies 345 medical evidence linking asbestos to lung disease in workers and end users of asbestos products, would have a direct relationship tojury attitudes. To avert losses in court and on Wall Street, the company, and the indus try as a whole, would have to discredit the science btheehiirnddeatdhleylcaowmsmuiotsd,itayn.3d7 alter public attitudes about oCrorCpoovreartaegPeR Masquerading as Independent Opinion In order to reach potential jurors, who are unlikely to read scientific publications, corporations have devel oped programs to restrict and coordinate the flow of health information to the media.37 H&K's asbestos media strategy relied on securing interviews of and plac ing bylined articles by experts "sympathetic to the com pany's point of view." H&K consultants referred to this as "capturing `share of mind'" on the national level.37 One tactic used by companies is to sponsor ghost written editorials that advance industry positions with out acknowledging their source. As noted above, the asbestos industry used the Safe Buildings Alliance in the 1980s as a conduit for planting favorable ideas in nneiqwuseso.uFtloertse.xOamthpelre,inthdeustotrbiaecschoaivneduussetrdy ssiemcrielatlrytpeacihd a sportswriter to write a biased article, which was pub lWisahleldStirneetTJrouuermnaalglaaztienreeaxnpdostehde NthaistioenpailsEodnqe,uiarenrd. Tthhee writer eventually went to work at a PR firm.49 expMosoerde areUcennivtleyr,sitytheof ATuesxtains-AAumstienricparno-Sfetastseosrmaonf nuclear engineering for submitting a letter he did not write in support of the nuclear lobby. The professor confessed to the newspaper that he had merely signed his name to a letter penned by a PR man from a Wash ington firm hired by the Nuclear Energy Institute.50 The reporter had searched databases for similar arti cles, and found several editorials with nearly the exact osathmeer nlaenwgsupaagpee,rsu.5n0der different authors, in several vidPeRo fniremwssharevleeaaslseos,deovreloVpNeRdsa. nTehwesteechvnisiquaule upsriensgs irnelteeansdees,d wtohiincfhluaerneceopftuebnlicsapteelrlciteep-dtioownsnlboyadaapbpleea, rianrge ntoewbse macetduiaal.nIenwfsascet,gmmeanntys VprNoRdsuhceavdebybetehne bshrooawdncabsyt bsorouracdecsa.sPt nRetfwiromrksspwroitdhuocuet dtihsoculossaunrdesoof fthVeiNrRinsdeuvsetrryy year, many tout new pharmaceutical products.51 Investment in the Media With $2 billion tobacco industry hsapsenmt aadnencuiaglalyretotens tahdevemrtoissitnhge,avtihley advertised product in the United States. While the advertisements themselves sought to shore up the market by reassuring smokers that cigarettes were glamorous and with images implying that cigarettes are safe, the industry's advertising dollars made the media natural economic allies.40'52 A secret memo prepared by tobacco defense lawyers assessed the efficacy of athdevseertpisrionggradmolsla,rs"T, thhreouingdhusatrsytubdoiethd cionevrecsetmd ethnet opfriintst emnelidsitaedtothaevmoieddicaovs esruapgpeoortfinanotip-psmosoitkiionng tostoprrioepsoasnedd restrictions on print advertising."49 (CMHA&)K eamnpdlotyheedCshiemmiliacralteMchanniuqfuaecstutroersdeAfsesnodciavtiinoynl chloride after scientists found that the chemical-used in the formulation of consumer products such as hairspray and plastics--was carcinogenic. The PR tech niques identified in a 1976 memorandum to an indus try group signal the industry's desire to use the media to allay public concerns about vinyl chloride and cancer. The CMA and H&K retained the services a number of eminent television and radio journalists to train their personnel in methods to field "volatile"ques tions from "adversary broadcast and media people."38 This type of professional advice calls into question the conflicts of interest ofjournalists who are paid by ttihveeliyn,deussptercieiaslltyhewyhmenigfhetebsepcaaildletdou"phoignht-opcroofvieler"ojbojuecr nalists can reach $100,000.53 For example, Philip Morris USA paid Deborah Norville, a CBS TV anchor, to mock a TVshow at a Philip Morris convention.54Five ytoebaarscclaotetra,xsehsethcaot-hcoosntetadinaendewfascmtuaaglaezrinroersseagbmoeuntttohne effects of cigarette taxes on smuggling, and promi nently featured (without disclosure) an interview with aturpearisdCcoounnscuillt.a54nt to the Canadian Tobacco Manufac One highly-paid speaker, ABC'sJohn Stossel,1 a co manecnhtoirn/c2o0r0r0escpaollnedde"nTthfeoFr o"o2d0/Y2o0u,"Epart,o"dwuhciecdh ma issereg- ported research on organic foods.66 In an apparent conflict of interest, Stossel is also a for-hire speaker cthlireonutsghinctlhuedeAhgurnicdurletudrsalofSApgeraikbeurssineNsestwcoomrkp, anwiheos.s5e7 For the segment, Stossel argued that organic produce mduacye,inwfaitcht bAeBmCo'sretedsatnsgsehroowusintghainnccroenavseendtiolenvaellsproof EHsechaelrsicohima acoinlitabiancetedritahaint tohregatnesicts sfporuonudts naondpelestttiucicdee. residue in either the conventional or the organic pro duce, thereby removing a key reason for buying organic food.56But according to the scientists that ABC hired, they had never tested any of the produce for pes ticides, only for bacteria. During the broadcast, Stossel commented that "it's logical to worry about pesticide IThe media watch group Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting $(F1AmIRil)lioesntiamnnatueadllyin.551998 that StosseFs combined income exceeded 346 Bohme et al. w ww .ijoeh.com INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH residues, but in our tests, we found none on either organic or regular produce." The testimony of both rthesaetadricdhenrostienxdiiscta.5t6es that Stossel was referring to tests Whether or not high fees for speaking engagements ginaftliuoenntcoe r`pepreosretinntgt,hjeounrenwasliwstisthhaivneteagrpirtoyfaenssdiodneacleonbcyli, avoiding real or perceived conflicts of interest."5 According to the code of ethics of the Radio- Television News Directors Association, electronic journalists "should operate as trustees of the public, seek the truth, report it fairly and with integrity and independence, and stand accountable for their actions."58Journalists should not "accept gifts, favors, or compensation from those who might seek to influence coverage."58 These speaker fees certainly violate these ethical standards. C O N C LU S IO N The strategy developed by corporations working in lciomnictienrgt wbioththlalwiabainlidtyPaRnfdirmresguhlaastiboene. nTsoudcacyesisnfulthine United States, the federal agencies charged with pro tecting occupational and environmental health are underpowered and underfunded, and the current Bush administration is continuing the deregulatory policies of Bush predecessors George H. W. Bush and Ronald Reagan. A similar deregulatory trend is under wayworldwide with the globalization of the "free trade" orthodoxy. The resulting corporate profit comes at a great cost: the health and lives of everyday citizens. torWs, iathtoruuet wviagticlahndtogovperressisg,hctitbizyengoavnedrnumnieonnt preagrtuiclai rpeasteioanrc,ha, nindduunstirvyerwsailll ceothnitcianluestatonduasredsthfisorstrsactieegnytiftioc maximize profits while minimizing health protections. othWeres saudgogpetststohmatecoofntcheernteadctihcesadltehscprriobfeedsshioenreals(wanitdh the exclusion of poor-quality science designed to result irnathaeprrethdaenterumndineermd ionuetcpoumbeli)c, bhueatluths.e Sthceiemntitsotsprmotuesctt form more effective linkages with unions and authentic grassroots community organizations. We must write genuine editorials and articles for the lay press. And we must testify at Congressional and regulatory hearings aenitdheirnastoaxsiccatlpoertl olirtiagsataiomn.urAdesrhwarepapbolna.de can serve References 1. PHriellsiadnedntKPnlaonwnltionng.aPnudbAlicdmRienliasttiroantisonP,laBnr.uJsahmWeselGlmulainckC, oVripcoe ration. February 21, 1989. 2. PGoolilcdyf:arNbatWur.e,KLeapwo,naen: daScoacsieetys.tu1d9y7.8;E8:n3v9i-r4o7n.mental Law and 3. ROergseaanriczhatioanndfodreEvecloonpommeicntCeox-oppeenrdaittiuonre ainnd iDndevuesltoryp--m eLnets. d19p7e7n/1s9s98e. nOErCecDh,e2rc0h00e. et dveloppement dans l'industrie: 4. cGautitoenrm. 2a0n05L;.51O:Acc1u5p. ational Hazards. Chronicle of Higher Edu 5. Kjaergard LL, Als-Nielsen B. Association between competing rinatnedreosmtsisaendd caluinthicoarls'trcioanlsclupsiuobnlsi:sheepdideimn iotlhoegicBaMl TstudByMTof 2002:325:249. J' 67.. MRoicdhgamelasnDA..DTohuebstmisotkhienigr parnoddhuecat.ltShcipAromb.le2m00s5--;2a92cr:9it6ic-1al01a.nd 8. oEbgjielmctiavne DapSp,raKiismal.J.50P4r8o2v2in82g3-c2a8u4s6a.ti9o-n1:2-t1h9e62u.se and abuse of mdeemdiicoalol gainstd'ssccireintitqifuice eovifdethnecejiundsiicdiealthientceorpurretrtoaotimon--aonf etphie Daubertruling. Food and Drug LawJournal. 2003;58. 9. Jboahnn. sPoenstSCRo. nStorlovli.n1g9p8r3o;6b.lems with termiticides including Durs- 10. Value of CUT, Unpublished Corporate Document. 2005. 11. JCuhneem2R7i,s2k0.05C.hemRisk. <http.y/www.chemrisk,com/>. 2005 12. fEilxinpgo.nJeunnt.e 2E6x,p2o0n0e5n. t Annual Report 2003. Form 10K SEC 13. CPaaunscteernPboactehncDy.FRacetvoirsefdorPBroenpzoesnael .tAoPDI.eJvuelylo5p, 1a9n90A.lternative 14. aPsasuesstsemnebnatc,h19D7J2,-1B9a9ss2:RimD,plPicriacteionPs. fBoernfzuetnueretorexgicuiltaytiaonnd. Erniswk iron Health Perspect. 1993;101 suppl 6:177-200. 15. Wsuirleliafmors PthRe, PPaliuosftielmnbcaochhoDrJt. R(1e9c3o6n-s1t9ru7c6t)iounsionfgbeMnoznentee Cexaprloo 16. CteacphineilqloueDs..JOTiolxiincodluEstnryvirfounndHineagltshtuAd.y20to03;c6o6n:6tr7a7d-7ic8t1.cancer 17. cClaruimmsp. HKo.usCtornumCph'rsonsilcidlee.sAuprsield29d, u2r0i0n5gAtDe;sAti1m. ony for the Adoscbkeestto. JsuIlnyfo9r,1m9a8t4io.n Association. Exhibit 237B OSHA H-033C 18. Berman DW, Crump K. Final draft: Technical Support Docu m93e4n5t.4-f0o6r. 2a00P3ro. tEoPcAo.l to Assess Asbestos-related Risk. EPA # 2109.. MCaimllebrrAid.gEe-Emnavilirroen:mCernutmalp.,CtaomDbrEidggilemEann.vJiruonnem2e0n,ta2l0L05it.igation Slietirgvaicteios.nC.hhttmtpx://2w00w5w.J.ucanme b2r3i,d2g0e0e5n.vironmental.com/services/ 21. Dtioanv;idMsounltiMD.iRster:icCt LauitsiegaNtioo.n2. J0u04n-e0339,6240.0I5n. Re Asbestos Litiga 22. iGgaretieonn.L.MDaeyp2o5si,ti2o0n0.5C. aIunsethNeoD. 2is0t0ri4c-t03C9o6u4r.tInofRHe:aArrsibsesCtoousnLtyit, Texas, 11th Judicial District. 23. PM. c8D, o15n5a-l9d.JBCi.oAlosgbiecsatloesifsfeicntschorfyassobteilsetoms;inperoscaeneddimnigllss.oBfoagwovosrkki 24. iEnggilcmoannfeDre,nFcee.hLneylonC,,FBraonhcme:eISARR.CESxcpioesnitnifgicthPeub"lmicyatthio"nosf, A19B7C3., mainnyitnhginigndbuusttrcyharynsdoMtilceG":ilal UcrnitiivqeurseitoyfcthhreysCotainleadstiuadnieass.bAesmtosT Ind Med. 2003;44:540-57. 25. EmgainlmufaanctDur,eBrsillminagnsuMfa.cAtubruesea odfefeepnidseemtoioalsobgeys:totsheliaabuitloitmy.oIbnitlJe 26. SOoclcounp FEJn. vIinrotenriHmeapltohs.it2i0o0n5;s1t1a:t3e6m0e-7n1t:. Environmental health aspects of asbestos. May 31,1966. 27. C2,a1d9w6a4l.ader, Winkersham & Taft. Letter to Dr. Selikoff. October 2289.. EGdrwanatrdLs. TFoHB. LrietttitnegrhtoamBrRil.ePyrLes.iNdeonvte,mPbitetsrb2u9r,g1h9C65o.rning Corp. 30. AATprIi.lM22e,et1i9n6g6m. inutes. February 4,1971. 31. mBaisrstrinipg mPWed. iIcravlidneggJroeehsn. JSHeliisktoMffeadnAdlltiheed Sstcria. n2g0e03c;5a8se:3-o3f3.the 32. BCharetmriipcaPl,. NDoe,p1o9si7t8io5n-B. HK0e2l.ly9-M-22o-o2r0e03P.aDinitstrCicotmCpoaunryt Bvsr.azDooriwa 33. ECgoiulnmtya,n2D3r,dTJwudeeicdiaaileDGis,trMicct,Culloch J, et al. P. W. J. Bartrip's 34. KatetarcnkDoGn .IrSveicnrgeJc.ySienlikSocfife.nAcme:JEIxnpdloMriendg. 2U0n0i4v;e4r6s:i1ty5,1-I5n.dustry and Government Relationships. March 19, 1999;June 24, 2005. 35. Jcohntetps,://Dtoaby,accRoedvoiscu&menPtosgoureg./laCnodrmpoarna/t3e75A7c5tihvtimty lxPr2o0j0e5c.t, 36. NPeetwerYsoonrkIT. iDmoews. Jaunnneou2,nc1e9s83p.rogram to allay fear on dioxin. VOL 11/NO 4, OCT/DEC 2005 w ww.ljoeh.com Corporate Strategies 347 3378.. VHCilMl a-nPdVCKnCoowmltomnu. nPircoagtiroanms rCecoommmmitetneedattoionthse.JVanCuMar-PyV1C,19P8r0o. ducers Group. Status Report of "Action Program" Activities. <1h9t7tp6:0/1/w15w_w0.0c4h_eBmAic0a0l1in9d3u9s.PtrDyaFr#chximvel=s.hotrtgp/s:/e/awrcwhw/p.dcfhse/vminicyal/l indu stryarchives.org/s e a rc h / default,asp?cmd=pdfhits&DocId= 852&Index=C%3a%5cProgram%20Files%5cdtSearch%5cUser =DhaitlaI+%a5ncdv+iknnyol&wHltoitnC>o.uJnatn=u5a&ryhi1ts5=,1l+937+6.cl+c3+6a9+&hc=38&req 39. IhneimReT: oSwcnhsohoipl AScshboeosltDosisLtriitcitg,aLtaiomnp;eStecrh-oSotrlDasibsturricgtSocfhLoaonlDcaissttreircMtaannd NMoarrthcehas1t7e,rn19S8c8h.ool District v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., et al 40. AHlillilaanncde KfonroSwalfteornB. Puirledliinmgisn.aJruynceap1a1b, i1li9t8ie4s. presentation for the 41. ASmmoekriecrasnAs lfloiarnNceone-xSpmosoekde;r'as Rreigphotrst Foonunthdeataiocnti.viTtihese oNfaPtihoinliapl Mphopr?riids=' #2157f>ro.Jnutngero2u2p,,2<0h05tt.p://www.no-smoke.org/document. 42. 2S0p0in2n].iJnugneou2t3,o2f00c5o.ntrol. Ethical Consumer 76 [April/May 4443.. PPRRWWaattcchh.. 43trhd Qquuaarrtteerr.. 21090917.. CCeenntteerr ffoorr MMeeddiiaa aanndd DDeemmooccrraaccyy.. 45. Public Relations Quarterly. 1998;43(2) [Summer]. 46. Meeting minutes of the Asbestos Textile Institute. <http://www. pewdfg>..oJrugn/ere2p3o, r2t0s0/5a.sbestos/documents/pdf/1973_ATI Full. 47. uDlaavtiiosnB..WInalWl SatsrheientgJtoounr,ntainl.yJuthlyin1k6,ta2n0k04w.ields big stick on reg 48. Dolny M. Right, center think tanks still most quoted. Extra! The 49. JMonaegsa,zDinaey,oRfFeAavIRis--&TPhoeguMee. dCiaoWrpoatrcahteGArcotuivpi.ty2P00ro5j;e1c8t[.31]:92988-.29. 50. AApdrlielr1W6,M20.0W4.ill shill for nukes. Austin American-Statesman 51. DPreimceoDcr.aPcyR. Watch. Second Quarter. 2005. Center for Media and 52. CHoilvtserP-uJ.pS. mReoakdeisncgre, eMnA: T; AheddTisrounth-Wbeeshleinyd, 1th9e96T. obacco Industry 5543.. LSoealodminognANu.thToorbitaicecs,oIwnca.rsW: tehbesfitiers.tJucanseua2l9ty, 2is00c5a.ndor. Fairness 55. GanrdeeAdccisurbaacdy irnepRoerptionrgti.ngF.aJirunlyes2s0a,1n9d94A.ccuracy in Reporting April 1, 1998. 56. AStcocsusrealcfyabirnicRaetepdordtaintag.oAnuogrugastni1c,s2,0r0es0e.archers say. Fairness and 5578.. ACogdriecuoltfurEalthSicpseaaknedrs NPreotwfeosrskio. nWalebCsoitned.Juucnt,eR2a9d, i2o0-0T5e.levision News Directors Association. September 14, 2000. 348 Bohme et al. w ww.ijoeh.com INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH Special Issue Corporate Corruption of Science Guest Editors David S. Egilman, MD, MPH, and Susanna Rankin B ohm e, AM Over a Barrel: Corporate Corruption of Science and Its Effects on Workers and the Environment DAVID S. EGILM AN, MD, MPH, SUSANNA RANKIN BOHME, AM OAoflttehnouvgiehwoecdcauspiastoiolanteadl aannddeunnviiqrounemfaeilnutraelsdoisfesacsieesnacree, the government, or industry to protect the best interest more serious problems in the developing world, the worldwide toll of occupational illness, injury, and death soyfsttheme poufblcico,rpthoeryataerepriniofraitcyt asnettoiuntgc,odmeeciosifoanpmeravkasinivge, is large. Environmental health-related illnesses and deaths add to the toll. When occupational and environ panolditiicnafll,ueecnocne.omTihci,s rseygsutelamtopryroadnudceisdedoilsoegasicealbencoarumses mental health stories make the headlines of the popular press, however, observers are often left with impression phreiaolrtihtizaendvaelnuveisroonfmwenetaallthwealln-bdeipnrgo.fSitcioenvceer ihsuamkaeny that the offending corporation is a "bad apple" in an otherwise healthy barrel.2^ As the articles in this issue pmaarntipouf ltahtiisonsyosfteemvi;dtehnecree, disataa,saunbdstaannatliyaslist,raudltiitmioanteolyf show, there are simply too many bad apples to blame the problem on individual products, scientists, or even adtebsiogtnhemd atotemriaalinatnadinidfeaovloorgaibclaelcloevnedlist.iTonhsisfiosrsuinedoufsfetrrys examples of how corporations influence science, shows corporations. The problem is with the barrel. In other words, the current economic and political system (both othcecuepfafeticotsnatlhahteainltfhl,ueanncde phraosviodnesenevviidroenncmeenotfala asnyds in the United states and in the global context) privileges corporate actors and actually provides incentives for the otecmcuicpaptrioobnlaelmh.eaKlethy;weonrdvs'i,rcoonrmpoenratatel;hsecailetnhc.e; industry; ptiroond.ucTtihoins omf ientjaupryhoarnidcadlisebaasrereral thperrotdhuacneists pdriseevaesne nboecrmausseprpioolriittiiczael,veacluoensoomfiwc,eareltghualantdorpyr,oafnitdoivdeerohlougmicaanl INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH 2005;11:331-337 health and environmental well-being.5 ccupational and environmental diseases are Aswe have argued elsewhere,6'7to the extent that sci ence is carried out by and for corporations, it becomes often viewed as isolated and unique failures of science, the government, or industry to protect subject to the corporate logic of profit maximization. Milton Friedman's 1970 directive, that "the [only] social the best interest of the public. reveals that far from being an However, anomaly, aocccluospeartiloonrdoeaekslspcorinbseisbiflaitiyrlyoafccbuursaitneelyssthies sttaondinacrdretahsaet ditrsivepsromfiotss"t and environmental diseases are an outcome of a perva sive system of corporate priority setting, decision corporate behavior today.8The corporation is an entity whose main purpose is to generate profit for its stock m20a0k2i,nag,toatnaldoifn1fl3u9enmciell.ioInn wthoerkUernsisteudffeSrteadte"s5a5l0o0nfeatianl holders.910The imperative to reduce costs means keep ing wages low, minimizing investment in environmen- work injuries, 4.4 million nonfatal injuries . . . 294,500 illnesses . . . [and] estimates suggest that occupational statalltye-,frainenddlfyailtiencghntooloimgipelse,mreesnitst"ivngolurengtaurlya"tiosanfebtyy atnhde disease deaths exceed 55,000 per year."1 With even health standards. In the global economy, the mandate Address correspondence and reprint requests to; David S. utonemnadxiinmgizerapcreoftiot lethades bcootrtpoomra,"tiownhseirnetotraansseneamtiionngalyl Egilman, MD, 8 North Main Street, Suite 404, Attleboro, MA 02703, U.SA.; telephone: (508) 226-5091; e-mail: <degiIman@egilman.com>, pcoatripoonraaltiaonnds esnhvoiprofonrmtehnetanlastitaonndsawrditsh.11the lowest occu 331 Science is important to corporations, public health professionals, and the public. It is the yardstick for measuring the health risks of corporate products and processes, and is depended upon by politicians, con sumers, and workers to make decisions about what is a reasonable" risk to citizens, to themselves, to the envi ronment, and to society at large. Corporations have much at stake when the safety of their products is put to scientific test, and spend hundreds of billions on rreesseeaarrcchh taekaecshplayceeairn wa voarlrdiewtyidoef.^formInadtsusatnryd-vfuennudeesd, iennccleu-dfoinr-ghiurenifviermrssititehsa,tccoornpdouractterelsaebaorrcahtofroiersc,oarnpdorasctieclients. In the United Kingdom, corporations funded 250 million (US$375 million) ofuniversity research in 2001.13 In the United States, home to many of the world s largest corporations and dominant science journals, private commercial funding of university research has expanded drastically over the past decades. This binding grew from $264 million in 1980 to $2 billion in 2001, making U.S. universities more dependent on private commercial funding than ever btreofuobreli.n14g Tbehceauesxet,eanst tohfe caortripcolersatien-ftuhnisdeisdsusecideenmceonis strate, history shows a substantial tradition of manipu ldaetsioignneodftoemviadienntacein, fadvaotara, blaencdonadniatiloysniss,fourlitnimduastteryly, at both material and ideological levels. The articles included in this issue provide both exam panleds tahnedeaffneacltyssitshaotfihnoflwuecnocrepohraastioonnseninvfirluoennmceenstcaileanncde eocclceucptiactioonnea,linhetaelrtmh.s Tohf escogproeu, pcopnutebnlits,haendd hdeisrceipilsinaen. We have included pieces by historians and sociologists as well as toxicologists and epidemiologists, on the grounds that an in-depth understanding of the impact forfocmoraponruamtebienrteorfedstifofenresnctiepnecrespreecqtiuvierse.s* iWnvheislteigmataionny of the articles focus on one particular chemical, process, or corporation, taken together, they provide detailed and often startling evidence of a systemic problem. ApCproonatcrihbuttoor SOkicpcSuppiatztieor,nainl haisndpapEern,v"iAroSnymsteenmtaicl Health," describes this system as one in which "corpo rate power and its effects [are] endemic features of ngraatitoinngalglsoobcailoeocrodnero.m" Sicpistyzestreimsscoanncdertnheedrwapitihdluynidneter standing what he calls an "underlying structure of harm in order to more effectively organize popular *Many of the contributors, including one of the editors (DE) have served as expert witnesses in litigation. This is not a coinci dence, as many of the articles in this issue would have been impossi ble to verifywithout access to corporate documents accessed through the legal discovery process. One of the major advantages of tort liti ignattoiotnheisptuhbaltiict disoomnaeino.f the few ways to bring corporate documents movements for social and economic change. He describes several important features of the system that produces disease and environmental damage, includ ing an unsustainable emphasis on growth, the failure of pbouwsineresosf ccoormpopreattiitoionns,. and the social and political is tOhenefaocft tthheatmcoosrtpiomraptoiortnasnt"laasrpgeeclytsiSgnpiotzreersaodcdiarlesasneds ethnevmir,onomr eshnitfatlingcocsotss,ts tcohigeoflvyertnhmroeungtsh, neexitgehrbnoalrisz,inogr workers. As economist Robert Monks has put it, a cor pcaonramtioakne"toetnhdesr tpoeobpelempoarey tphreofbitiallbslefotroittsheimepxatcetntonit society."10For example, when a company emits air and water pollution, it externalizes the cost of that pollu tion and its attendant health and environmental dam saigceks, boentfooricneddivtiodupaalys faonrdclgeoavneurpn,moernptasywfhoor dmamayaggeest in indirect ways (such as fisherpeople who must buy fish because the stream they caught from no longer contains fish). If a company can avoid paying these true costs of the manufacture and use of its products, its profits are enhanced and it has an economic advantage over its more socially responsible or regulated com petitors. Since these costs are often large (for example, when applied, such costs have driven many companies into bankruptcy), they provide large incentives for cporomcpesasnioers btoy amvoovidintghetmhembytionftlhueendceivneglothpeinrgeg(uolratpoerry haps more accurately the underdeveloping) world.18'16 forWbyhitlheeexctoerrpnoarlaittiieosn,arseomcoesttismtehsathaurme annotheaaccltohudnoteeds appear on the corporate balance sheet. When it does, however, it generally appears appear a cold number, devoid of any value but the economic. Calculations of the "value of a life" are often made at least partly aanccionrddiivnigdutaoltpheerswoang.e1s7'tphp-aewt w.ewoMuilrdaIhnavtoerbteJaeWnjefaorrneexdamby_ pie, economic damages are in large part based on wage lboess"--woarjtahn"itloesrsktihllaend abyCbEeOnzkeinllee-dintdhuecesadmilelnwesasyw. Touhlids ilodgeinctoLpaewrarteenscoenHth. eSgulmobmaelrlse,vethl eans wtehlel; WHaorrvldarBd aPnrkes's chief economist, famously argued in 1991 that "[T]he WofotrhldeBdainrtky[sinhdouusldtr]iebse teonctohueraLgDinCgsM[OleRssEdmevigerlaotpioend countries] "because, among other reasons, Tpohlelumtioenasudreepmenendtssoonf tthhee cfoosrtesgoofnheeeaaltrhniinmgpsafirroinmg viniecwreaasgedivmenorabmidoituynatnodfmheoartlathlityim. Fpraoimrintghispoploluintitoonf wshhoiuchldwbilel bdeontheeincotuhnetrcyouwnitthrythweitlhowtheestlwowageesst.1c8ost, Aside from encouraging the unequal distribution ofrisk, the dependence on calculation of the value of the life encourages poor environmental and occupational health 332 Egllman, Bohme WWW.ijoeh.com INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH policies across the board. A text by leading U.S. econo mists points out that "virtually every regulation by EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] and OSHA [Occu pational Safety and Health Administration] fails a bene fit-cost test"using the value-of-life formula.17*-678In other words, if the monetary value of life were the only yard stick used to determine the use of safety precautions, even fewer protective regulations would be enacted. Finally, since the usual penalty for inflicting environ mofetnhtealiannjudr/eodr tohcrcouupgahtiothnealpdaiysemaesentisotfhceo"mrepsetintsuatitoorny" fines rather than criminal penalties or confiscatory fines, the costs never approach the economic advantage that accrues to companies that perpetrate these injuries and often completely escape liability. In other words, it can be cheaper to use old, unsafe equipment, kill a worker, and pay OSHA fines (if any) than to install safety equipment to begin with. This is particularly true btoedcaayusoenita mpraoytebcetivleestsecphrnoofiltoagbyleotroprsopceensds X(anddolplarors idnuvceestntoheinsjuamriees aomr odeuantthsoftomboenecoyminpeanspartoefdit)-etahrannintgo vaneyntfuurteur(ewciothmtpheenseaxtpioenctacotisotn). Tthhaits pprroofbiltesmwiilsl leitxecraeleldy acroemdpiosucnoudnedtebdyttohe`fparcetstehnatt vfuatluuree" coormtpheensaamtioonunctosotsf mcoomnpeyentshaattioifnincvoesst.t1e7d'!1-3to2-d34ay will accrue to the estimated The corporate practices of externalization of occu pational and environmental cost, assigning monetary values to life, and discounting are countered by social standards for health and safety, embodied in national or international regulation and/or worker and con sumer movements. To counter or prevent regulation manadximcitiizzeenprmofoitv,emcoernptosraatniodnsmaaicntitvaeilny tehnegiragaebiilnitythtoe maffaekcitnigngofsopcuiballicstoanpdinairodns., Sacnidenicseoifsteanpouwseedrfbuyl tionodluisn try in hopes of influencing public and regulatory uaccct.epAtsantchee oafrtaicpleasrtiincutlhairsinisdsuusetrsyh,opwr,ocwehsse,nosrcpiernocde functions as a tool to affect public opinion or labor or veanlvuier-ofnremeeanrteanl areogfulnaetuiotnra,litindqoueirsy,nobut tfuisncstuiobjnecatstoa influence by the corporate goal of profit maximiza tion. In any case, corporations use several strategies fnaovtooranblyleintothtehepmro,dbuucttiaolnsooifnsctiheenticfoicmsmtuudnieiscathtiaotnaoref those studies to audiences that are important in public decision making, such as lawmakers and juries. While sthuechsccioemntimfiucnpircoactieosns piseorfstee,nint iostathkoeuygphatrot foafsthpearctoorf pduocratitoenusoef socfiescniceencaen.dCtohrepocoramtemsutrnaitceagtiieosninoftshceiepnrcoe acroensiindteerrliinnkaedc,riatincdal aerveabluoatthioenxotrfemtheelycoimrppoorarttaenctotro ruption of science. CORPORATE STRATEGIES FOR THE PRODUCTION O F SCIEN CE By the "production"of science, we mean the processes involved in posing questions and making hypotheses, planning and carrying out studies, drawing conclusions from data, reviewing and analyzing other scientists' work, and so on. This is essentially the day-to-day work of toxicologists, epidemiologists, physicians, and basic sticoinenstimstasy(minofllueecnuclaer sbciioelnotgifisicts parnodduoctthieorns)w. hCeonrptohreay run their own development or toxicology laboratories, or when they pay universities or private firms to carry out research for them. This influence can be seen in subtle or overt ways. Sometimes, reasonable, honest, wanildl fuconmd,puettileinzet,socirednetipstesncdaonndtihffeers,ciaenndcectohraptoirsamtioonres favorable to their products, often because it seems the manodstA"rlse-aNsoeinlsaobnle"ettoatlh.2e0mfo. uKnjadertghaartdoafndscAielns-tNistesilsceonn19 vdeuncttiionngs,ratnhdoosme iwzeitdhcclionripcaolratrtiealsfuonfdtihnegrawpeeureticsiignntiefri cantly more likely to favor the intervention than researchers without such funding. As Sheldon Krimsky has shown, universities and university scientists are increasingly involved in venture capital enterprises based on scientific research and development, leaving both institution and individual with deep conflicts of interest.21Sometimes, deeply embedded beliefs about a material's or an industry's safety leads to scientific bsciaiosu.2s2lyOutsheefratuilmtyess,citehnocuegtho, csrcaifetnatirsatstioanndaleotfhoerras mcoinn imuPmerhleavpesl othfeheeaalstihesatnwdaeynvtoirodnomwnenptlaayl ptrhoetecnteigoantsi.ve health impact of a dangerous substance is to simply fail etoxapmupblleis,hJosctkudMiecsCtohllaotchd,eminohnisstr"aMteinitnhgatanimdpMacetn. dFaocr ity, or How to Keep a Toxic Product in the Market fpalialceed, toshopwusblihsohwththeeir Cdaantaadtihanat asshboewstoeds iQnduuesbteryc asbestos miners incurred high rates of asbestosis and other health problems. In fact, Canadian asbestos com panies publicly claimed for decades that Canadian miners did not suffer from asbestosis. It is the indus try's careful "management of medical knowledge," wueridteussMe ocCf aosllboecshto, st.h"at "has been the key to the contin Phyllis Mullenix's "Fluoride Poisoning: A Puzzle with Hidden Pieces,"shows how the fluoride industry, work ing in concert with the U.S.-funded Manhattan Project, ibmopthressusipopnretshsaetdflaunodridaeltewreasd ssatfuedaiensdtobemneafiincitaali.nTthhee studies she reviews have never been publicly discussed wbeeflol raes, arnedveoaflfienrgimsuppoprrteasnstiodnataoofnreflsueoarricdhe. toMxuicllietyniaxs focuses on three key sets of data on occupational haz ards of inhalation of fluoride particulate or gas, show- VOL 11/NO 4, OCT/DEC 2005 www.ijoeh.com Introduction 333 ing how three studies were either suppressed or manip ulated to suit the needs of the industry. For example, she details how a study published in the Journal of the American Dental Association "haphazardly" assigned workers to control or exposed groups regardless of actual exposure, and blamed worker tooth condition on individual oral hygiene rather than fluoride expo sure. The studies Mullenix discusses were never consid etiroendalinextphoesuersetatboligsahsmeoeunst oorf paarsttiacnudlaatredffluoorriodcecuapnad fbluutorrienseu,ltainllgowininrgesepxipraatnodryedaninddluysmtrpiahl nuosedeofdfisluoordriedres and dental problems for exposed workers. straWtehgiilees MfocrCtuhlelomchanainpdulMatiuolnlenoifxscoifefnerceexwaimthpinlespaorf ticular industries, these strategies are in fact used again and again to manufacture a clean bill of health for haz ardous products. Valerio Gennaro and Lorenzo Tomatis s Business Bias: or How Epidemiologic Studies May Underestimate or Fail to Detect Increased Risks of Cancer and Other Diseases" describes a number of sutsreattehgaiet ws iclloraplomraotset-ifnuvnadrieadbleypliedaedmtioolnoeggiactisvteudreiessulctsa.n" Tathioenaoufthaodrisluptrioenseenftfe1c5t bsytractoemgipesa,riinngclauldl iwnogr:ktehrse wcirteh aenxpousneedxwpoitshedunceoxnptorsoeldgwroorukpersin; sfateilaidngotfo ccoonmtproalrifnogr othneehseuabltshtayn-wceo;raknerdeffafielcint;gctoonsbiudieldrining eaxdpeqousuartee tfoololonwly wupithpleorniogdlsatwenhceynpestruioddysin. g diseases (such as cancer) Abuse of Epidemiology: Automobile Manufacturers EMgainlmufaanctaunred aBDilleinfegnss,eparogvaiidnests Aasbcelsotsoesr Lloiaobkilitayt,"thbey research of epidemiologists associated with and funded by the manufacturers of asbestos-containing brakes. Thahvise upsieedcetoesxhpolwornesotdoinelyvathriaotubsramkeethmoedcsharneiscesa'recxhperos sures to asbestos are "safe,"but that, as is often the case in manipulated research, such exposures actually irsedouthceerwthieseriksnkoowfncotontcraauctsien.g the disease the exposure CORPORATE STRATEGIES FOR THE COM M UNICATION O F SCIEN CE fIonrocrdoreprofroartescipernocfeittomhaxeilmp ieznastuiorne,aitfamvoursatblienfclluimenactee public opinion. Corporate science is often undertaken with an essentially political purpose: to minimize regu laantdiojnurayndmienmflbueernsc. e the beliefs of workers, consumers, Regulation at the national level is often the main obstacle to the externalization of corporate profits. pTohsee roefgwulaasttoerysaafeplyp,arliamtuist wcaonrkreerqeuxirpeosinudreussttroy ttooxidniss, and ensure that consumer products are safe, among other things. In the United States, there has been a movement against regulation since at least the mid1970s. Business interests have successfully argued that regulation costsjobs, stunts innovation, and harms the economy. Using targeted campaign contributions, focused lobbying, and other tactics, U.S. corporations Dexueerttocotnhseideecroanbolme iincfalunednpcoeloitnicathleporewgeurlaotfotrhyepUroncietsesd. oSntatoetsh, etrhicsouunntdreiers-retogudloatliioknewpisuet.s enormous pressure William Kovarik provides an example of how cor rupt industry science can influence regulation in his Ethyl-leaded Gasoline: How a Classic Occupational Disease Became an International Public Health Disas ter." Despite early-20th-century debates over the safety foufellsea(deethdangoasl)o,lilneaedainnddutshtrey kcnaopwtaliendsgweeroef aabllteertnoaptievre suade regulators that not only was lead necessary as an anti-knock fuel, but it was safe for the public. Kovarik shows how in the 1920s, corporations such as Ethyl Cor poration and General Motors worked to silence the voices of public health officials concerns about lead risks, and hired Dr. Robert Kehoe of the Kettering Lab horeaatlothryr,iwskh.oHaergfuoelldowthsatthleeaddedbiadtenootnpolesaedatrheraolupguhbltioc tthhee 1U9n7i0tsedphSatsaet-eosuitnofthleeadweadkegaosoflitnhee, wemhiicsshiobnesgasntainn dsoamrdespoafrttshoefCthleeawnoArlidr Atocdtayo.f 1970 and continues in is gAivceunrirnenCtaerxoalminpelSenoyfdceorr'spoprieactee,in`TflhueenDceirtoynWscoirekncoef Promoting `Recycling' of America's Sewage Sludge," which shows how industry pressure at one U.S. regula tory agency, the United States Environmental Protec tion Agency, has resulted in a policy of using toxic municipal sewage sludge containing human and indus trial waste as crop fertilizer. The commitment to this policy over more than 30 years has resulted in corrupt science, attacks on policy opponents, and adverse human health reactions, including at least three deaths. Jennifer Sass's and Peter Infante's commentaries on recent butadiene regulation at the U.S. EPAand the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration i(nOflSuHeAnc)edreemguolnasttiroant,e athned ttehcehnsiuqcuceesssinodfustthroyseusetesctho niques in the U.S. regulatory sphere. Sass, in her "Indus ctriynoEgfefnoirctistytooWf e1a,3k-eBnuEtaPdAie'sneC,"lassshiofwicsatipornobolfemthse wCiatrh industry influence on butadiene scientific panels at both the EPA and the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). At EPA, an industry-heavy science advi sory board (SAB) persuaded the EPA to base its estimate of butadiene cancer potency on a weak study that lacked ienxdpiovisduurael elxepvoelssu,readnadta,cwoausnlitkeedly toonlhyavedemaitshcslassfirfoiemd leukemia, not living leukemia cases. At IARC, a vote to classify 1,3-butadiene as a human carcinogen was 334 Egilman, Bohme w w w .ijoeh.com . INT J OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH reversed in an extraordinary second vote that reclassi fied the chemical as a "probable human carcinogen." Peter Infante, in "Safeguarding Scientific Evaluations by Governmental Agencies: Case Study of OSHA and the 1,3-Butadiene Classification,"shows how a similar reclas sification took place at OSHA, where, despite clear evi ddeunecetoofweloervkapteladcreatebseonfzelynme pheoxhpeomsuarteo,potiheetic acgaenncceyr declined to pass a more stringent standard on its own, but rather arranged for industry and labor representa tives to come to an agreement on the standard. While industry agreed to the OSHA-suggested standard, indus try representatives also convinced the agency to down grade the classification of butadiene to a "probable human carcinogen"rather than a "human carcinogen." The end result was a classification based on negotiation rather than science; and one that could wrongly assuage workers fears and negatively affect workers applying for comOpnenasnatiionntefronraltyiomnpahlohleevmela,tofpreoei-ettriacdceanacgerr.eements negotiated through the World Trade Organization s(tWruTcOtu)r,abl ilaadtejruasltmagernetempreongtsrasmucsh iamspNoAseFdTAo, nanmd athnye IdnetveerlnoaptiinognaclouMnotrnieestabryy tFhuenWd o(rIlMd FB)anhkavaendsoomfteetnimthees militated against national labor and environmental reg ulation. Free-trade agreements can also mean that national health, safety, and environmental regulations characterized as restrictive of trade cam open national governments to expensive suits under agreements such as NAFTA or GATT, which can have a chilling effect on regulation in general.23 The current export-oriented development model has also meant that there is immense pressure on nations to deregulate; multina tional corporations (MNCs) have their pick of nations in which to invest or manufacture, and can choose the nation with the least restrictive rules. A weaker regula tory environment often translates into expanded profit dmaarrdgsino,fbliuvtinhgafsonropteboepelen iancmcoomstpcaansieesd.11byErriiksianRgossteann thal s contribution to this issue shows how MNCs may also use international agreements to undercut national hreegaultlhattioolnl.ofDpeessptiictiedetuhsee idnoCcuemnteranltAedmeorciccau,ptahteiopneasl ticide industry has been able to insert language into drafts of both the Central American Customs Union (CACU) and the Central American Free Trade Agree maceronsts (CthAeFTiAst)hmthuast. wIofulCdA"FhTaArmaonndizet"hepesCtiAciCdUe laawres menaadcetemd,earencinegnltessstr.ong legislation in Nicaragua will be porWathioilnesthinetreergesutleadtoirny dapepfeanradtiunsgisthaekesayfetatyrgoert fhoeraclothr faulmneuscsholfatrhgeeirr pgrrooduupcto, finpdeuosptrley aolsfothweorskasfetotycoonfvtihnecier jpurroydumctesm. bTehriss.gFroour pwionrckleurdse, stwheorrkeelrast,ivceonssaufemtyeros,f atnhde porrordeumcatinisinimg pinoratajonbt,inthme awkaignegtdheecyiswioilnlsacacbeoputtfotarktihneg job, and whether they will organize and make demands of the company. Consumers, who can be either individ uals or companies, may refuse to buy a product ifit per nceaitviveeds.asFuinnaslalyfe, jourritehse mhaovset dimanmgeernosues poofwseevrertaol ahlotelrd Ocobrvpioourasltyio, ntsheascecogurnotuapbsleovinerlpaepr,soannadl itnakjuerny tloawgestuhitesr. they include most of the public. Juries, consumers, and workers all come into contact with scientific research in various forms at various times. Workers may receive scientific information from employers in the form of warnings and training mate rials. Juries must consider scientific material in the course of debates over issues such as causation or the adequacy of product warnings. Individual consumers gmraoyuprse,cebiuvte mthaey leenacsot usnciteenrtiwfiacrniinnfgosrm(hatoimone oufsetrhsesoef pefefsetcictsideosf, fpoarretxicaumlaprlep),roordupcutrsp.osBefuuslilnyeisnsvecsotingsautme tehres roetcheeirvescwieanrtnifinicgsin, fmoarmnuaftaiocntufrreorms'svaefnetdyodrsa.ta sheets and howFeovremr, atnhyeijruroypimnieomnsbeorns, hceoanltshu-maenrsd, eannvdirwonomrkeenrst-, related matters are not formed through the considera tion of scientific data or materials per se, but rather through the myriad ways that information is received bedygteheamboinutthheeiraldthay-aton-ddayhalizfaer.dPseofrpolemreaceivvaeriketnyowolf sources. For corporations engaged in the production of harmful substances, using those sources to influence panudblpicroktencotwinlgedaggeaiinsstkleeygatlolomssaeisn. taining profitability The article, "Maximizing Profit and Endangering Health: Corporate Strategies to Avoid Litigation and Regulation,"by Bohme,John Zorabedian, and Egilman, aadnddrelessgeasl hfiormwscowroprokrattoioinnsflwueonrkcewbitohthpusbcliiecntriefliactiaonnds rpautbiolincsopainndionfiromf stheinirvholavzeardaounsupmrobdeurctosf. Tsheceocnodraproy oacuttoarsstrastuecghy dasestihgenemd etodima aaxnimd iszceiepnrtoisftist--th--irnoucgahrrmyiinng pimroizbilnegmsbocathusreedgbuylatthioenir panroddulecgtsalorliapbroildituycftoiornh. ealth MichaelJacobson's "Lifting the Veil of Secrecy from Industry Funding of Nonprofit Health Organizations" shows one way corporate entities spread their message of safety. Many trusted and well-known organizations, such as the American Heart Association, which are widelyperceived as providing or disseminating objective scientific information, are substantially supported by coorgrpanoirzaatetiognrso,upusn.ivJearcsoitbysornesesahrocwhs ihnoswtituptreosf,eshseioanltahl pchoararitteiesfu, nadnidngotmheary nboenlpimroiftietdgrooruipnsfltuheantcreedcebivyethceoirr corporate sponsors; and how some organizations that VOL 11/NO 4, OCT/DEC 2005 w ww.ljoeh.com Introduction 335 seem independent are in fact created and controlled by industry. We note that this corporate strategy extends to the international sphere: as Nicholas Ashford et al. have shown, the International Commission on Occupational Health, which bills itself as an "international non-gov ernmental professional society whose aims are to foster the scientific progress, knowledge and development of occupational health and safety in all its aspects," is in fact dominated by multinational corporate interests.24'25 ICOH has sought to strengthen its ties with interna tional bodies such as the ILO and the WHO in order to influence international health guidelines and policy, but has failed to be up front about the fact that most of its members represent the interests of industry. Corporate campaigns to influence public opinion may not address the health effects of a product or process per se, but may work to make that product or process seem indispensable to protect jobs, maintain asonciaadleqourateecosntaonmdaicrdgoofoldiv.inFgo,rorexacahmiepvlee, soRmaje Poathteelr, Robert Torres, and Peter Rosset's article, "Genetic Engineering in Agriculture and Corporate Engineer ing in Public Debate" shows how Monsanto has used a vtiacriideetys oafnsdtrathteegniesgetonectilcaaimllyt-hmaotditisfiperdodfouocdtss)(fairrset pneost oecnolynosamfeic, bgurot wbethn,efwichiialel taot bthoethsathmeeetnimvierofnomreecnlotsainndg critiques of these technologies as dangerous and envi ronmentally unsound. SOLUTIONS The problem posed by corporate corruption of science is a big one. But there are policy and scientific meas ures that can be taken to ensure a science that is more interested in protecting human and environmental health than in girding up the profit of multinationals. Many such suggestions are offered by contributors to thisWiessubee.lieve the problems of the corporate corrup tion of science must be addressed not only at the mate rcioarlpleovraelt,ebpuotwaterthneoiwdeoseloegmicsanl aletvuerlalasawnedll.bTenoemficainayl., The dubbing of economic neoliberalism as "free trade,"for example, sums up a whole set of benefits the economic model is supposed to provide (such unfet tered access to economic growth, a "level playing field" fsotartea,llaancdtosros,oann),ewschailpeeofbroscmurtihneg bthuerenaeugcartaicvye osofctihale, cultural, and economic aspects of the neoliberal pro gitryabmo,twh hwiicthhiinnifnadcitvhidausarlensuatlitoednsinanindcorenasreinggioinnaelqaunadl global levels.26'27In the face of the power of corporate wcaopriktaloinsmdetvoeldoepfiinnge aitsneelwf inwapyoosiftitvheintkeirnmgs,awboeumt tuhset role of the corporation in order to build lasting change in science and other arenas. There are, of course, many examples of citizens' groups, nongovernmental organizations, and even national governments that are challenging aspects of corporate hegemony. The worldwide movement to con tain corporate power and develop economic alternatives to the corporate-driven laissez-faire economy includes many health-focused groups that are doing important wrooortks toofiimll phreoavlteh,acacnedssfotorcheecaoltmhpcaanreie,sadtodrteasksetrheespsooncisail bility for the health problems their products can cause durTinhgismwaonrukfcaacntubree, fuusret,haenrdbduiislptoosnal.by a program for cultural and political change that has at its core the vision and practice of a scientific research that is ethi cal, well-conducted, and focused on the fostering of occupational and environmental health.+The goals of such a program would work to change the waywe think about corporate capitalism by: holding corporations and corporate-funded scien ctiostnsdauccctoinugntarebsleeafrocrhthoenqkueaylitayreoafsthineirowccourkp;ational and environmental health that are not being addedvreelosspeidngbyastabtruosaqdu-boassceidencceit;izen movement to foster scientifically-literate citizen action for health ier workplaces, communities, and natural environ bmueinldtsi;nganadglobal network to address shared occupa tional and environmental health harms from both an activist and a scientific perspective. This is an admittedly broad agenda that has as its goal the mobilization of a populace through the articulation of concerns about corporate-funded science and the presentation of alternatives in a manner that resonates with people's own concerns, interests, and issues. Occupational and environmental health offers an iedceoanlopmlaitcfoirnmeqfuriotimeswohnicah tnoataidodnraelssanwdidienrtesroncaiatiloannadl bthaesiss.erMioaunsyefpfeeoctpsleofeixllpheeraieltnhc.eTfhirosste- worhoseacroenhde-ahlatnhdy can be moved by an understanding that their health or the health of their children may be at risk. Health is greatly affected by social factors such as racism, income ignreoquupaslitayr,e aanlrdeadhyumoragnanriizgehdtso, raprooluitnidcizwedh.icGhroswomineg awareness of the social roots of ill health holds the potential to mobilize a diverse citizenry over shared tWhile some would argue that well-conducted science cannot focus on "fostering" anything other than an abstract truth, we dis agree. Public health is fostered by well-conducted science that addresses important public health questions; it does not require that science come up with predetermined results, only good results. Cur rently, many of the most important public health questions are not being asked by science, or their answers are meant to serve the inter ests of profit rather than health. 336 Egilman, Bohme w ww .ijoeh.com INT J OCCUR ENVIRON HEALTH concerns, and can contribute to an effective and uecnodneorsmtaicn,daanbdlepcorliittiiqcualesoyfsttehme.inequities of the social, This sort ofbroad agenda for change has been proven successful by the U.S. right wing, which, over the past BO years or more, has made a concentrated effort to bring U.S. citizens closer to its political ideals. Its success has been due to its ability to frame its agenda in terms that are compelling to everyday people. The right-wing agenda "makes sense" to many people, including those whom it does not materiallybenefit, because the righthas been so successful in influencing the terms of the debate, reaching a broad citizen base, and speaking in a language hthaaptpaepnpbeyalascctoidaenbt,robaudt wraasngraethoefrptheoepplero. dTuhcitsodfiadcnoont ctheinntkr.atIerdoneicfaflolyrt, ittos lcehaadnegres atrhee awwaayreNoofrtahndAmhaevreicafonls lowed the teachings ofVladimir Ilyich Lenin and the Ital ieafnforctowmasm, tuonaisltargpehielxotseonpth, eerxeAcuntteodnbioy thGera"mthsicnik.28tanTkhse" such as Cato, Heritage, and the Manhattan Institute.29 Those ofus concerned with occupational and environ mental health need to do the same thing. We must build the infrastructure required to develop and articulate a strong vision of a progressive, egalitarian, and people(rather than corporate-) centered science and politics. We need institutions and coalitions dedicated to the princi ples elaborated here. Parts of this work are already being done by various groups in the United States and world wide, but the importance of this program means it bdeesetarkveesn aonmobryeaccoonacleitniotrnatoefdefnovcuirso.nSmuecnhtaal,folcaubsorc,oaunldd public interest groups that already work in a similar vein, but we think it requires the formation of a new organiza ttihoonse(ogrroourpgsa'neizxapteiortnisse). tIhnatshwoortu,lwdebycanllefcoersstihtye dcrraewatioonn one or more "think tanks"dedicated to produce and pro mote the science, the hegemonic constructs, and the infrastructure needed to return science to the production of public and environmental health instead of private profits and human and environmental disease and decay. Different nations and regions clearly have different political, economic, and cultural realities, but similar efforts are certainly necessary in all parts of a world undergoing rapid global integration. National or regional organizations could work together on shared gaonadls,enavnidrocnomorednitnaaltehaecatlitohn iossnuethsetmhaatnyaroecceuspseantitoianlalyl lgulotiboanl;ienmniastsuiornes(apnesdticgildoebatlrawdaer,mapinpgli;caantidonl,abanodr tproafl ficking, for example). rupAtsiotnheofpascpieernscienisthnisotisosnuleyswhoidwe,stphreeacdo, rwpiotrhataeloconrg hoifsptoeroyp, lbeuatnisdathreeael nthvrieroant mtoetnhtethheeawltohrladnodvwere.llS-ubcehinga pcoronbscleiemntdioeusesrpvuebslaicchoenaclethrteredsreeasrpchoenrsse. on the part of References 1. aSncdhudlitseeaPsAe..JCOhacrcaucpteErinzvinirgonthMe ebdu.r2d0e0n5;o4f7:o6c0c7u-2p2a.tional injury 2. lBifaer.stNoewwDY,oBrkeTrgimmeasn. JLa,nAuatrTye8x,a2s0F0o3.undry, an indifference to 3. NBaerwstYoworkDT, iBmeersg.mJaannuaLr.yD1e0a,t2h0s0o3n. the job, slaps on the wrist. 4. Bswaersatto.wNeDw, YBoerrkgmTiamnesL..JFanamuailryy p9r,o2f0it0s3, .wrung from blood and 5. KSaonrtFernanDcaisvcido,CC.AWBheenrreCt-oKrpooehraletiroPnusbRliushleertsh,e20W01o.rld. 2nd ed. 6. bEegriylmlliaunmD"Sd,oBubaglelesytaSn,dBarikdl"enstaMnd, aGrdo.luIbntAJSH, eBaolthhmSeerSvR. .20T0h3e; 7. E33g:i7lm69a-n81D2.S. The suppression of science: how corporate inter ecsotnsfheridenecteh,e20t0ru4.th. Center for Science in the Public Interest 8. iFtsriperdomfiatsn. MNe.wThYeorskocTiiaml reessMpoangsaibziinliety. Soefpbtuesminbeesrs1is3,to19i7n0c.rease 9. BMlaocnkkwseRllAPGu,blMisihneorws, 2N0.03C.orporate Governance. Malden, MA: 1101.. BMaikllaennJJV. T, HheolCtzoTrpHo.rDatyioinng. fNoerwgrYowortkh:,FPraeretPI:rTesrsa,n2s0n0a4ti.onal cor pIrowraintiAon, sGearnsdhmthaenJhe(eadltsh).oDfytihneg fpooroGr.roIwn:thK: GimloJbYa,l IMneilqleunalJiVty, Panredsst,h2e00H0e. alth of the Poor. Monroe, ME: Common Courage 12. ROergseaanriczhatioanndfodrevEecloonpommeinct Ceoxoppeenrdatiitounre anind iDndevuesltoryp--meLnets. d19p7e7n/1s9s98e. nOErCecDh,e2rc0h00e. et dveloppement dans l'industrie: 13. Senciceencaen,dETnegcihnneoelroignyg, aUnnditTedecKhinnogldoogmy ,SJtuatniseti2c9s., 2O0f0f5ic.e of Sci 14. WHiagshhebruErnduJc.atUionniv. eNrseiwty,YoIrnkc::BTashice BCoookrps,o2ra0t0e5.Corruption of 15. Rlaonddn: eByoWgl.e-HLo'OwuEveutruorpee, 1U97n2d.erdevelops Africa. London, Eng 16. MUniticvheersllityLP. rCesos,rp2o0r0a1t.e Irresponsibility. New Haven, CT: Yale 17. Vtioisncuasni dWAKn, tViterurnsot.n3JrMd,eHd.aCrrainmgbtroindgJEe,JMr.AE:cMonIoTmPircessso,f2R0e0g0u. la 18. Sbeurm1m2,er1s99L1H. . Memo to "Distribution" entitled "GEP." Decem 19. KinjtaeerregsatsrdanLdL,aAultsh-oNrise'lsceonnBcl.uAsiossnosc:iaetpioidnembeitowloegenicaclosmtupdeytinogf r2a0n0d2;o3m25is:2e4d9. clinical trials published in the BMJ. BMJ. 20. Afulns-dNinieglsaenndBc,oCnhcleunsiWon,sGinluruadndCo,mKijzaeedrgdarrudgLtLri.alAs:ssaorceifalteiocntioonf 21. KofritmresaktymeSn. tSecfifeenccteoriandvtehresePervievnattse. JIAnMterAes2t.00L3a;2n9h0a:m92,1-U8..K.: 22. RMoicwhmaealns D&.LDitotluebfiteilsdt,h2e0ir03p.roduct: industry groups are fighting gSociveenrtnifmiceAnmt reergicualna.ti2o0n0s5b;2y92fe(6rm). enting scientific uncertainty. 23. Uica.S..<Dhtetppa:/r/twmwenwt.sotfaSteta.gte0.vM/se/tlh/ca5n8ex18C.ohrtpm, u>.U2n0i0te5d. States ofAmer 24. ACoshmfomridssNio,nCoanstOelcmcaunpaBtiIo,nFarlaHnekaAltLh,(IeCt OalH. )TahnedIInttseIrnnfaltuieonncael o20n02In;8t:e1r5n6a-t6i2o.nal Organizations. Int J Occup Environ Health. 25. IICntOerHn.aItniotenranlatCioonmaml Cisosmiomn isosnionOocncuOpcactuiopnaatilonHaelaHlteha.lthA,bJouulyt 26. K12im, 20JY05, .Millen JV, Irwin A, Gershman J. Dying for Growth: GColombmaloInneCqouuarlaitgyeaPnrdesst,h2e00H0e.alth of the Poor. Monroe, ME: 27. wUwNCwT.uAnDct.adT.orargd/eena/nddocDse/tvderllo7pomvee.nptdfR>.ep2o00rt5,. 1997. <http:// 28. sBerrovcaktivDe.. BNleiwndYeodrkb:yTthhreeRe iRghivte:rTs hPeresCso, n2s0c0i2e.nce of an Ex-Con 29. aLabprhieafmhisLt.oTrye.nHtaacrlepsero'sf.r2ag00e:4:t3h0e9.Republican propaganda mill, VOL 11/NO 4, OCT/DEC 2005 www.IJoeh.com Introduction 337