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FILE NAME Monsanto MON DATE 1993 Dec 16 DOC MON001 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION Legal - Deposition of Jack T. Garrett ra 0 0 0 U U Alaass, ae ~ bene be 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS ~ BEAUMONT DIVISION os PAUL MAJOR et ux Plaintiffs vs. No. 315 . ALCO STANDARD CORP et al Defendants IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY TEXAS 136TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT RITA MAE SCHMIDT et al ) VS. Plaintiffs AC INC et al ) ) ) No. 145,280 ) ) Defendants ) Video Deposition of Witness JACK T. GARRETT On Behalf of the Plaintiffs December 16 1993 [ & set on Reported by JULIE E. STELFOX Certificate of Merit Reporter METRO COURT REPORTING INC [[ 20 South Central Avenue Suite 202 [ St. Louis Missouri 63105-1715 314 725-3333 800 829-6778 | Jack GGaarrrreetttt deposition / 2ft^' fox fr. P. 1953-1988 12/16/93 deposition INDEX OF EXHIBITS Page Page Marked Identified Plaintiff's Exhibit 230112 6 11 GARR - Curriculum Vitae ] Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 216 216 Notice of Deposition Original exhibits attached to original transcript 10 11 12 13 oo. 14 15 CC 16 a 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 es VIDEO DEPOSITION OF JACK produced sworn and examined on T. GARRETT the part of the Plaintiffs pursuant to Notice and pursuant to the following stipulation between the hours of eight o'clock in the forenoon and six o'clock in the afternoon of Thursday December 16 1993 at the Stouffer's Concourse Hotel 9801 Natural Bridge in the County of St. Louis State of Missouri before me JULIE E. STELFOX Certificate of Merit Reporter of METRO COURT REPORTING INC Appearances For the Plaintiff Herschel L. Hobson 10 Joseph Blanks Attorneys at Law 11 2190 Harrison Avenue Beaumont Texas 77701 12 For the Defendant Martin P. Zucker 13 Monsanto Co. Inhouse Counsel 800 North Lindbergh Blvd. 14 St. Louis Missouri 63167 15 For the Defendant G. Joseph Ellis Monsanto Co. Woodard Hall & Primm 16 7000 Texas Commerce Tower Houston Texas 77002 17 For the Defendant Paul Fogarty Pa 18 North America Fulbright & Jaworski 1301 McKinney - 5100 19 Houston Texas 77010 Ei 20 For the Defendant David A. Oliver Goodyear & & Strong Pipkin 21 Nelson & Bissel 1400 San Jacinto Bldg 22 Beaumont Texas 77701 23 For the Defendant H. Tracy Richardson III Mallinckrodt Jenkins Grove & Martin 24 P.O. Box 26008 Beaumont Texas 77720-6008 25 _ ; f : bes es ep CS ~ FF 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Appearances Cont'd For the Ferro Defendant Corp. William B. Gaudet Adams and Reese 1100 Louisiana - 5100 Houston Texas 77002 For the ARCO Defendant Claude R. LeMasters Orgain Bell & Tucker 470 Orleans Street Beaumont Texas 77701 For the Shell Defendant & Texaco Steven M. Duble Hays McConn Rice & Pickering 400 Citicorp Center 1200 Smith Street Houston Texas 77002 For the Defendant Met Life John Hall Liddell Sapp Zivley Hill & Texas Commerce Houston Texas LaBoon Tower 77002 For the Defendant R.T. Vanderbilt James M. Corbett Giessel Stone Barker & Lyman 2700 Two Houston 909 Fannin Center Houston Texas 77010-1063 For the Defendant Alco Standard David K. Vallance McLeod Powel & Box 629 Alexander Apffel Galveston Texas 77553 For the Defendant Armstrong et al Rustin Polk DeHay & Elliston 1500 Maxus Energy 717 North Harwood Tower Street Dallas Texas 75201-6508 For the Defendant M.H. Detrick James E. Brown Jr. Johnson & Associates 4900 Woodway Houston Texas 77056 _Appearances _Appearances Cont'd For the Defendant Dupont John Muir Mayor Day Caldwell & Keeton 700 Louisiana - 1900 Houston Texas 77002-2778 For the Flint Defendant Kote Co. Jan E. Dodd Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard One St. City Centre - 1500 Louis Missouri 63101-1880 For the Defendant Rebecca R. Jackson Bryan Cave One Metropolitan Square 211 North Broadway 10 St. Louis Missouri 63102-2750 11 For the Defendant Jim Powers Fibreboard Corp. Roberts Markel 12 Folger & Powers 24 Greenway Plaza - 2000 13 Houston Texas 77046 14 For the Defendant Edward M. Carstarphen Monsanto Woodard Hall & Primm 15 7000 Texas Commerce Tower Houston Texas 77002 16 Videographer 17 18 Warriene Flatt Legal Images 105 Hunters Court Lumberton Texas 77656 19 nes? va a 20 21 22 23 24 25 pert | ii ee} RR saan fl D D '| U F L r" A [ [ [[ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Stipulation the Before the taking of the within deposition parties by their counsel stipulate and agree that the same is being taken pursuant to Notice Counsel further stipulate same may be taken in stenotypy and thereafter typed of the witness being expressly waived by signature consent of counsel and the witness in his own behalf and regularly filed in the case Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 230112 GARR marked for identification JS JACK T. GARRETT being produced sworn and examined on behalf of the Plaintiff deposeth and saith MS FLATT The date is December 16 It is 9:25 We are on the record THE REPORTER And if everyone would please identify themselves and who they represent starting with the gentleman on my left MR BROWN Jim Brown M.H. Detrick Company MS JACKSON Rebecca Jackson Coltec Industries Inc. and Garlock Inc. MR FOGARTY Paul Fogerty Elf Atochem . North American MR OLIVER Inc. David Oliver In the Major case it will be Goodyear case it will be & In the Schmidt MR LeMASTERS Claude LeMasters representing ARCO in the Schmidt case MR RICHARDSON Tracy Richardson representing Mallinckrodt in the Major case MR POWERS Jim Powers I represent Fibreboard in the Schmidt case Texaco MR DUBLE Steve Duble for Shell and MR ELLIS Joe Ellis representing 10 Monsanto and the witness 11 MR ZUCKER Marty Zucker Monsanto L 12 13 | | J. 14 MR HALL John Hall Met Life MR MUIR John Muir Dupont MR CORBETT Jim Corbett R.T. pe 15 Vanderbilt in the Major case i 16 MR GAUDET Billy Gaudet representing 17 Ferro Corporation in the Major case 18 Pa MR VALLANCE David Vallance 19 representing Alco Standard Corporation in the mes 20 Major case 21 rs MR POLK Rustin Polk representing 22 the Armstrong World Industries A.P. Green GAF oe 23 Flexitallic Asbestos Claims Management 24 Corporation N and U.S. Gypsum in the Schmidt es 25 case em MS DODD Jan Dodd representing the Flint Kote Company in the Schmidt case MR HOBSON I'm Herschel Hobson I represent the plaintiffs in these cases and in attendance with me is Mr. Joseph Blanks DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR HOBSON Q. Would you introduce yourself to the group please sir 10 A. My name is Jack T. Garrett and I'm a Go 11 retired -- retiree from Monsanto and I'm a 3 12 consultant at times 13 Q. Mr. Garrett my name is Herschel 14 Hobson and I represent some people who've brought 15 a lawsuit 16 One of the defendants in the case is [ 17 Monsanto That's your old employer so you i 18 realize I'm on the other side of this lawsuit from 19 your old employer 20 A. Yes 21 22 MR OLIVER were not serious -- Herschel if I may you 23 MR HOBSON I was not One objection 24 is good for all -- 25 MR OLIVER Thank you Cc = e pe Ce ea Se rs i ey aE a ssa MR HOBSON -- and take the deposition pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure if that's -- MR ELLIS Agreed MR OLIVER Agreed Q. Also ask you Mr. Garrett would you like to read and sign your deposition so we have all the little formalities out of the way A. I haven't seen it yet 10 Q. Yes sir That's -- what happens is 11 this young lady that's taking everything down will 12 put it in a book send it to you and you can read 13 it and there will be an eratta sheet and any 14 changes that you would like to make you have the 15 privilege of writing on the eratta sheet and 16 resubmitting 17 A. Okay 18 MR ELLIS Why don't we just handle 19 it this way If you would send his copy of the 20 deposition to me and I'll arrange having him read 21 and sign the original signature page and return 22 the signature page 23 A. If you send it to me he's going to 24 get it anyway 25 MR CORBETT Herschel if I could 10 ask as a housekeeping matter were you planning on splitting up this deposition according to these cases -- your questions in any particular way one case in the morning one in the afternoon anything like that MR HOBSON No. We're going right on through and getting done | MR CORBETT Just every other 2 question 10 0 11 En eae 12 13 : MR HOBSON Something like that THE REPORTER Sir what is your name MR CORBETT Jim Corbett THE REPORTER Okay H' 14 MR GAUDET One additional matter -- 15 THE REPORTER What is your name sir 16 MR GAUDET Billy Gaudet sae}| 17 representing Ferro We wanted to reserve our 18 right to object to the introduction of the video 19 ultimately By not objecting to it earlier we 20 wouldn't want it to act as a waiver to our later r 21 objection ie 22 MR HOBSON What's the basis of your 23 objection sir BOS 24 MR GAUDET I'm reserving my right to 25 object to it I don't know what it will be until re wee 11 after you finish the -- the video There may be numerous objections to its introduction MR HOBSON didn't get notice You're not claiming you MR GAUDET No no Q. Mr. Garrett may I have the date that you first began working for Monsanto please sir A. It was 1950 I believe and I can't -- huh Well I graduated from the University of 10 Tennessee in -- with my Master's and it had to 11 have been in the end of the summer so it had to tae 12 have been either August or September ie 13 Q. You've provided me before we started 14 here this morning a copy of a resume which I've 15 now marked as Exhibit Number 230112 R and 16 would it help you sir to look at your resume to 17 get those dates 18 Ca A. October 1953 19 Q. October of '53 And may I ask when on tas 20 you left Monsanto's employment sir as an [ 21 employee 22 A. Thirty years after that 1 23 Q. So somewhere around 1988 24 A. It was '88 ~- I believe '89 but I'm [ 25 not absolutely sure Wait a minute Let's look ss 12 again see if I've got a better memory than my a own Everything but the date I left out Q. '88 or '89 A. Yes 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Q. As I ask you questions Mr. Garrett I know that some of the things I'm going to be asking you about happened a long time ago and you may not have a exact recollection of everything or even precise dates so if you could just give me your best recollection and if you're estimating just tell me when you're estimating I'd appreciate that sir A. Okay Q. How did you get the job with Monsanto A. Well when I graduated from the University of Tennessee with my Master's I had a doctorate set up at the university -- at Oak Ridge to do a doctoral dissertation in rare earth materials with the -- what's known as the nuclear 21 energy for the propulsion of aircraft 22 Now that's a misnomer It's NEPA 23 All of their unusual research went under that 24 guise and during the latter part of my Master's ies 25 degree work the whole system collapsed dee 13 The American first big post war recession hit The government was withdrawing their support The two people I worked with out there to get this job headed -- I had my Ph.D. thing agreed upon and everything They -- I couldn't even find them One of the -- the University promptly sent him back to his home university which happened to be the University of Illinois So I 10 had to go get a job 11 I was married and had two kids so I 12 went off on foot Went over to my father's home 13 in southeast Oklahoma Durant and went with him 14 who was a salesman for fractional horsepower 15 16 17 engines for lawn mower manufacturers Went with him on -- down on a trip to Houston because I didn't have the money and I 18 stayed in his hotel room and his employer FF 19 apparently paid for it used his car while he f 20 spent all day in his -- went around Houston all 21 the way down to Texas City interviewed everybody 22 along the line and -- and Monsanto offered me a 23 24 job on the spot Q. And that must have been in October 25 1953 thereabouts i D Co sd y 7 z i 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 14 A. That's right Q. When you walked in the gate did you have in mind what you wanted to do when you made your application A. I wanted to do research Q. Did you get to do research A. Damn little An inorganic physical chemist in a primarily organic laboratory is -- does all the spare parts work Q. And that's where you found yourself A. That's right Q. Is that what you did then is you started working in the laboratory there at the | Texas City plant A. The research lab for the Texas Division of Monsanto at the time Q. What kinds of things did they have you doing when you began working at the research lab there A. I did a lot of explosion limit work physical chemistry Mixture work I finally ended up doing pilot -- a lot of pilot plant work for the processes that were being developed Q. Is my appreciation that ultimately you got into industrial hygiene with Monsanto is that right 15 A. Well everything I did at the beginning I guess was a mistake I was ordered by my boss to go out and find out --- I don't know why I don't have any idea -- but to go out and find out all the materials handled in the plant both as primary raw materials intermediates identifiable intermediates and final products and to write a treatise defining the safety and health 10 problems connected with each one of them 11 So I wrote a famous research report ETS 12 that had absolutely nothing to do with research 13 but it was the biggest one they ever had written ID 14 I guess and I -- and I'd research -- reports at ; Cc 15 the time in Monsanto went to the plant manager or 16 to my boss the research director for the Texas Li 17 Division of Monsanto and copies went to St. 18 Louis both to the then president of research 19 and to the corporate research file | esssa 20 These research things are all double [ 21 signed Every page has to be double signed and 22 all that legal nonsense And it was on health and es 23 safety and somebody sent a copy to Dr. Kelly who 24 was the medical director of Monsanto est 25 And he wanted to know who in the hell sss 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16 was interfering in his business I guess so he came to Texas City talked me along with Elmer Wheeler who was then director of industrial hygiene or was the corporate industrial hygienist because there was nobody else working for him and a couple weeks later I got offered a transfer to St. Louis Q. About how long after you got to Monsanto in Texas City did you start your research report that led to this odyssey A. Gosh I don't know Maybe a year Q. And about how long did it take you to do the work for the research report A. I spent most of my time in the library in Houston at the University of Houston library and over at the hospital there which is now that big hospital center I think that was the old Baylor Medical -- Baylor Medical School branch and I spent a good deal in their library Q. Did you utilize the library down at the University of Texas medical branch in Galveston A. No I was over there I had been in that hospital many times but -- and had talked to [ i ay en ae ey rc aN : a 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 17 a couple people but their library was not nearly as extensive at -- in this subject Now you're talking toxicology now not really medicine Not nearly as good as the University of Houston at that time and the other -- the university there -- that university center which is now that big diagnostic center was then I believe attached to Baylor but I'm not sure and they had the best library Q. There's a library there now called Jessie Jones Memorial Library A. That could very be -- very well be it or the beginning of it Q. Had you had any training or experience in the area of toxicology before you began this research report A. I had training in respect to the -- to the methods of keeping yourself reasonably clean and alive in research and at that university believe it or not we had university safety people at the University of Tennessee Knoxville Campus and the research chemists on research jobs got lectured and given the documents necessary for their -- and the TLVs for their materials that they were handling and we stuck within that to d reni cea | [4 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18 the degree that we could do that for sampling TLV means threshold limit value Q. Did any of your course work that you took as a student before you came to Monsanto teach you about how to do scientific research A. Yeah I did a lot of sci- -- I produced the scientific -- researched my report myself Q. So by the time -- A. It was published -- published in the Journal of Physical Chemistry It's on radiation chemistry the measure of radioactive materials in layers the differential effect of layers absorption effect of layers themselves the | Q. So would it be accurate then Mr. Garrett that by the time you got to Monsanto you were well trained and schooled in how to do scientific research how to use a library how to find really what was available in the -- in the scientific literature A. Or do it myself Q. Yes sir A. Keep in mind I did some work on pollution control all along in this same issue so -- and that way we did it ourself We went to SS fo] Ps P P U Eo Fa E 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 19 the State of Texas and with their laboratory facilities and their research biologists set up programs of testing chemicals in expected developments at the Texas City plant We did the -- the marine toxicology work on a number of them including a number of cyanide compounds Q. When you went to the University of Houston as you described earlier in doing the work for your research report would you recount for me as best you can recall how you found that facility from a toxicological research standpoint A. You track it through chemistry is the way I did it I was interested in a great many chemicals and if you track the chemicals back far enough you will find references to some kind of government documents or other documents and if you can look them up or have them shipped and we had a great many shipped on loan We could find out what the threshold limit values were how they were done who did the work and so forth So that was where we did it I had a great leader there by the way Monsanto had a consultant at the University of Houston named Sawin w known as Hod i to. B C L LL ' ' ' 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I don't know what his first name was 20 He was a tremendous biologist and he had knowledge in where you could find a great many things in a university web that I did not know although I had been through the same ruckus at Tennessee Our laboratory system at Tennessee is much different than the University of Houston's Our library system in Tennessee was centralized Theirs was scattered within the individual colleges at that time Q. Yes sir And did you have the feeling that you in fact through the University of Houston and over at the Medical Center library that you say could have been associated with Baylor at the time that you really did have access to pretty much all the literature that you needed A. Yes I think I did and I got put on a bunch of committees that I didn't even know existed by my boss in Texas and one of them was a Manufacturing Chemists Association committee on pollution and this was primarily at the time pollution control standards was the -- was the work of the day if you know what I mean , And I went to a number of those. 21 meetings and met some very good and efficient people from Dupont particularly from Dupont and from Standard oil of New Jersey and they helped me along as well Here I'm an inorganic physical chemist who didn't even know anybody cared and I'm now beginning to be a toxicologist Q. In the Houston area when you got there 10 in the early 1950s did you encounter anyone else 11 other than Dr. Sawin that you told us about who women, vered 12 you found to be helpful or knowledgeable in doing c 13 this toxicological work DD 14 A. There was a guy -- there was a man at 15 Humble then which is then and even now fully a 16 part of Standard of New Jersey but then it was -~ mae 17 even then but it was called Humble & Refining 18 Company Fa 19 It was headquartered in Houston and So 20 whose primary refinery was there I can't 21 remember his name i 22 Q. What was his -- 23 A. He was their -- he was their 24 industrial hygienist 25 Q. James Hammon 22 A. Yes it was Jim Hammon and he led me through a great deal of the labryinth of where you get and why you get there in this business and where you get the data because the data on early -- in those days was pretty -- was there but it was -- you had to dig like the devil to find i it ol It was in reports Lots of it was in Emo the hands of chemical companies and oil companies 10 and if you had access through -- and Jim Q 11 introduced me to that committee of the API which CS 12 Monsanto later put me on was the support 13 committee for the American Petroleum Institute D 14 15 Q. The medical advisory committee A. Yes only it was primarily meeting of 16 loudmouth industrial hygiene and toxicology 17 people We blew the M.D.s out of the place 18 Q. I take it you mean that in 19 constructive sense 20 A. Well no they -- believe it or not 21 they -- we organ- -- they organized a committee 22 that included all of us and then they went to play 23 golf The doctors always play golf 24 [ Q. Left you guys to do the serious work 25 A. That's right So we did all the work rn 5: C1 Soars a [ [ R I 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 23 in connection with toxicology and the work necessary guiding lights toward what kind of work needed to be done to produce adequate controls and this sort of thing and who was doing what and so forth And some of the research projects later put on by the API was largely due to the toxicology committee or whatever they want to call it It was the medicals anyway Q. Can you put a time period on that of course Mr. Garrett when you worked with the API '56 A. I was a member of the API committee probably for fifteen years in the late 50s had to be into the early 70s Okay Q. Yes sir A. And the meetings largely enough then were in Chicago I bet I went to twenty meetings in Chicago in Chicago or Fort Worth Why I don't know Don't ask me Q. Were there other people besides Jim Hammon that you recall working with on these activities A. Oh yes The best group that I knew was the -- was the Standard oil group That was 24 the -- in New Jersey and their people in Columbia and Venezuela which was also a subsidiary of theirs called Creole Production Company I believe And they had a great group down in South America and we got -- we worked with them along -- now we I'm talking about the chemical crowd This is the Dupont Monsanto and all 10 the bunch of that group with the oil group but it 11 really pretty well merged that throughout all the 12 AP -- the committees including the committees on 13 standards We probably -- I probably knew all 14 these people personally and a great many of them I 15 had been in their homes I knew their wives and 16 kids and everything so it was that kind of are 17 relationship 18 Q. Did you mention that Dupont was also 19 part of this API work 20 A. Oh yes 21 Q. Were there other chemical companies 22 involved with the petroleum industry through the 23 API 24 A. No. Dupont -- in the API group was a 25 group of people representing -- in my opinion the i ey >fi >fi E&I oo Ee rea bee 25 most forward and good companie-s- represented a group that the chemical industry group represented together in -- with the American Industrial Hygiene Association in their committees on standards and that group was -- were friends I was a personal friend of the Dupont man as a matter of fact Been in his house Been in his home Q. Who was that sir 10 A. Oh God Don't ask me that question 11 His name his name You'd have to look it up from 12 the records I guess 13 Q. Dow Chemical would that be one of the 14 companies 15 A. Dow was -- Dow was the best treater in 16 the business in pollution control Now keep in 17 mind we're working both sides of this street 18 Now this is not true with everybody else but it 19 was true with a great many people including 20 Monsanto and Dupe and some of the others We 21 treated this as a single issue Dow did not 22 Dow had a strictly pollution 23 engineering group and a toxicology industrial 24 thinking group They knew each other Don't get 25 me wrong I'm not -- and they frequently went to 26 the same meetings because of the crossing of information and need But Dow was the people that had done a lot of very difficult treatment studies and they were wide open to anybody in the industry They taught us a great deal about treatment of organic chemicals in treatment of plants which we -- some we didn't know Some we did know = We turned over to them a lot of 10 experience in connection with some products as a 11 well 12 I also had been frequently in their 13 plant in Freeport Texas 14 Q. Down in the same area of Texas Union 15 Carbide has a large facility Did you have any 16 encounters with Union Carbide personnel EO 17 A. Carbide is a funny company Of the 18 big chemicals They did a lot of work in this C 19 area but they did less coordinating with other Es 20 companies than most big companies 21 They did by zone We had a great 22 group in Texas We had a good group in the 23 Kanawha Valley of West Virginia with Dupont and 24 Monsanto and Carbide and the like but as a 25 corporate structure it was difficult to find 27 whoever was supposed to be the boss man of pollution or industrial hygiene in Carbide at the time They had people some very very good people They attended our API -- or our -- they attended our industrial hygiene meetings but it wasn't coordinated really Their companies were separate companies I guess legally a great deal more 10 separate than Monsanto's divisions were and 11 other companies 12 Q. Now this work that you were doing 13 with the American Petroleum Institute and I think 14 you said also the Manufacturing Chemists a 15 Association this was -- was this after you 16 transferred to the corporate offices of Monsanto wed on 17 A. Well it was during the period -- and rs 18 I don't know I went to -- I made an API meeting 19 in Fort Worth before I went up there and was es 20 talking with their -- largely with their 21 toxicology people and now you're talking 22 industrial hygiene not pollution okay 23 Q. How would you be able to tell us the 24 differentiation between industrial hygiene and 25 pollution as you use those terms cases A. In some cases you couldn't because 28 some companies grew up Like Monsanto grew up from Dr. Kelly into the -- into the industrial hygiene pollution and then the pollution thing . finally fell over into engineering Same was true I know for example with Dupe because Dupont's people were engineering people and they were from Newark Delaware They were not in the main plant They 10 were down at the engineering offices in Newark 11 and when I wanted to visit them I had to go down 12 there to that -- to the Newark operation 13 In the petroleum companies -- an 14 interesting thought who was - their headquarters 15 people these were the kingpin people in what 16 would be considered the good good companies like 17 Standard 18 Standard Oil of New Jersey had a os 19 set where their people in New Jersey working es 20 out of that New Jersey office and the labs there 21 represented all of their subsidiaries except that ro 22 many of their subsidiaries like Humble -- but 23 Humble grew up as a separate company that was 24 owned by them which is the same thing with their 25 set in South America oarn| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 And so they had the same kind of 29 people there how they merged them I don't know But we did deal with them very much They had Dupont -- I mean Standard probably had the best trained young physicians MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive Q. Would you tell us Mr. Garrett as best you recall how it was when you would go to meetings through these organizations or others in exchanging information between companies Was this something that was done not done How -- A. It was done wide open Wide open We -- I had a letter one time -- and I don't know who it was from -- to tell them anything they want to know because it's a business that has to be done and done right by one of our executives So we did -- we told them any data they want I've given them complete research pamphlets connected with that specific toxicology Q. Did you find that there were some companies that were just as open about Monsanto -~ a's Monsanto was and others at work or how did that work MR FOGARTY Objection calls for 30 speculation THE REPORTER What's your name sir MR FOGARTY Paul Fogerty A. We had a group of people we worked with us in detail I don't remember anybody [ [ telling us we didn't -- they wouldn't give us their data or information C Q. Was it your perception at the time tas that the folks that you have told us that you 10 worked with at these other companies that these 11 other companies were just as open as Monsanto was 12 in sharing that 13 A. Yes 14 Q. You said that this initial research Cl. 15 report that you -- that got you into the health 16 and safety and later I guess pollution even area U 17 your charge was to go out and find all the 18 materials used at the Texas City plant 19 k 20 A. Nodding head Q. Can you tell me how you went about 21 doing that 22 A. I went from unit to unit and asked 23 them got their engineer out and had him define DD 24 and diagram his unit And where he actually D 25 peeked at or sniffed at any of the products we 1 Pesrslanka: ... ... me | L re 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 31 took them down and checked them but the report's about -- hundreds of pages long Q. Did that report have a title to it so that we could identify it A. God no I don't think so I have no idea what the report title was I didn't even know that Kelly'd had a copy of the damn thing You know you do -- I'm a young chemist doing a job I'll do the job they tell me to do I recognize that I was a spare part because I was the inorganic physical chemist in a largely organic laboratory and I got all the oddball jobs and that was one of them | Q. When you said you used all the -- you inventoried all the materials used at the plant were these process materials that we're talking about A. Yes primarily purchased or modified If they purchased one product and modified it we did them both If there were known analyzed comtaminants we did those if we could find it If we didn't we did the work ourselves Q. And what about items that were used not in actually as raw material to make a product or as a finished product or intermediate but 32 things like catalysts or filter aids A. We did three catalysts and we did some of the spents where you get two of them and get them We did a lot of raw material or we gathered the data Now keep in mind we're gathering data for this thing You'd be surprised at the number of sources you can tap and surprised I think even more at how even then -- you're talking 1950s 10 now -- even how open they are 11 We had no trouble for example in 12 respect to any of the dusts that we usually 13 handled asbestos cement that sort of stuff 14 The people that -- they give you what 15 they knew and they'd give you any data they had 16 and in fact they'd give you probably literature 17 resources if those were available 18 F Q. Asbestos was a material that was used 19 at the Texas City plant 20 A. Yes 21 Q. You use it in chlorine 22 manufacturing 23 A. We didn't manufacture chlorine at 24 25 Texas City Q. You didn't How did you use asbestos 1 1 1 [[ CEG OT L XN, mned cc ke aaa ET res 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 at the plant as you recall A. As an insulating material Q. Oh But not in manufacturing products A. No. Q. You say that you were given information freely about things like asbestos dust A. That's right Q. What did you get and how did you go about doing it How did you get to this impression A. Well we got -- we got told -- and I'll tell you the truth I can't tell you who told me -- to look up the TLVs and the first time I ever saw TLVs was during that setting I didn't even know they existed Hell I'm a darn fool Come out of the Army and -- with too many kids and needed a job So I found out that they used asbestos I got ~- looked it up found out the threshold limit value and all of those things that we could find a TLV for or that any company had established one for we used and was in the report bs D | sc U U L4 A 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 34 Q. When you say you found out they used asbestos who were you talking about A. Our maintenance people used it to maintain the pipe equipment Q. Were you aware that there was asbestos in insulation materials -- A. Yes Q. -- before you came to Texas City A. Yes Q. asbestos What do recall learning about A. Well as a matter of fact we were dealing -- we were making some reactor tubes at the University of Tennessee and we got lectured on that to use respirators or use it inside of hand glove compartments in a hood If we were going to do it before -well we mixed it up in the mud because most research laboratories use a lot of it to cover heat sensitive equipment as a mud Q. And this occurred even before you went to Monsanto A. Oh yes I used it before Yes I did Q. Do you remember what was told to you ~ ;: bd i 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 35 when you were at the University of Tennessee about the reasons for handling asbestos this way A. Don't breathe it Q. I'm sorry A. Don't breathe it or use a mask Come to the head of this particular section the research of engineering section Go see him they get you a mask Q. Is there some point in your career Mr. Garrett where you learned about the hazards that were associated with asbestos exposure A. Well if you're told to do a research report on the toxicology and hazards and safety features of all the products in a complicated plant you're going to learn about asbestos and cement dust and catalysts spent catalyst dust and about half a dozen other dusts and we're going to check them out And the primary test period was the surface toxicology what was retained on old catalysts Believe it or not not much made of Second what was the base catalyst Is it -- was it made of some rock substance or asbestos in pellets in little half moons - God we've seen it in every shape you can C ow 0 Gs 0 [ Ea [ ESSs 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 36 imagine -- upon which something is then laid or sprayed or cooked on which is subsequently the solid catalyst which much of the catalysts today or in those days were in catalyst beds and those beds were made up of some kind of rock or base with the material stuck to it somehow Generally by vapor and then that constituted the catalyst used Q. Are you saying that some of the catalysts that you used there at Monsanto the base material was made with asbestos A. Some of it had to have been I don't know I couldn't tell you that I've seen so many different kinds that you can shake a stick at They're made out of cement base Some of them are made out of -- with asbestos in blender They're sort of solid The stuff is then absorbed to it and that constitutes catalyst and it's used in beds or trays in a vapor stream Q. In looking through your -- let me start over In doing your research report that you told us about at the Monsanto plant there at Texas City and going to the University of Houston and the other libraries can you still recall some 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 37 of the sources of information that you found A. The primary source was the Manufacturing Chemists Associations hazard data sheets I later found out that the American Petroleum Institute also had hazard data sheets but that was too late to help my report but it wasn't too late to help me find some of the things they used that we did not in the chemical industry normally used Q. You're talking about the toxicological reviews that the API had A. Yes tox reviews of theirs and the chemical safety data sheets that the old MCA had They still have them today under the Chemical Manufacturers Association CMA today Change of name doesn't change the organization much Q. Do you recall seeing any literature from the Industrial Hygiene Foundation A. Q. Yes Is that a source that you would have been able to -- A. Well when I got transferred to St. Louis and Dr. Kelly after he came down to look at my report and gave me hell for writing it i3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 38 because I wasn't supposed to be qualified then he transferred me to St. Louis as an industrial hygienist which doesn't make a whole lot of sense but what the hell I went up there and then I ran into my -- the boss I had there was a certified hygienist named Elmer P. Wheeler Elmer is now dead He took me through the system and I learned about toxic data sheets that were published by a great number of people including many companies published them as well And if you stacked them all up even available then -- this you're talking now in the mid 50s -- it would crunch this table down with the ones that are published by the API the MCA and a great number of organizations that are not that very well known the organic Chemical Manufacturing Company organization the drug manufacturing people There are thousands of them and then there are all these great ones that are available freely from most companies and we ended up with piles of the darn things There was no lack of safety 39 information on individual compounds even in the 50s It became a great deal more elegant and a great deal more staffed later MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive THE REPORTER Your name sir MR OLIVER David Oliver Discussion was held off the record MR ELLIS You can just ignore what they say They just have to say some things for 10 the record to get it on the record That's all C 11 MR BLANKS They don't really have 12 to 13 MR HOBSON They do it 14 Q. What he's saying Mr. Wheeler - 15 A. I forgot to bring my dugidgits I 16 hate the damn things and so I don't wear them if I 17 don't have to 18 Q. What he's saying he's objecting 19 saying that your answer is not responsive to my 20 question He thinks you're answering something I 21 didn't ask you I guess is what it means but -- [ 22 A. You asked me about data 23 Q. Yes sir 24 25 job MR BLANKS I thought you did a good pees D a on an) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 40 A. And it reminded me of literature MR OLIVER Object to the side bar MR FOGARTY Object to the side bar Q. That's what it means A. Okay Q. You were moved from Texas City to Monsanto's corporate headquarters That's St. Louis right A. Yes sir Q. And you started working for Mr. Wheeler A. I started working for Elmer P. Wheeler yes Q. And Mr. Wheeler was working for Dr. Kelly A. Dr. Kelly yes Q. Was that the staff A. That was the staff In 1954 that was the staff Q. And would you have any recollection Mr. Garrett as to how long Mr. Wheeler had been with Monsanto in his capacities as an industrial hygienist A. He came to Monsanto right after the war from the Chemical Warfare School He was a EK voetel c D Ce iar Fa =s [ ** = cs sane 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 41 CWS officer He was actually an artillary officer that came back from Africa and was in -- since he had trained a hygienist and had worked for the north -- for the New Hampshire Health Department they put him in their hygiene school where part of -- God knows what part of the military he was in and they had a school and they did a pretty good job By the way they also published documents that are way -- they're years old Some of them are excellent up to the date documents for literature research Q. They being who A. Being the Army's industrial hygiene laboratories which I believe was in the CWS Chemical Warfares set in Virginia and that's . where Elmer came back to and Dr. Kelly hired him out of there as soon as the war stopped Q. Was it your impression Mr. Garrett that Mr. Wheeler worked in New Hampshire before the war after the war during the war A. No before the war He worked as a hygienist to the degree that they were defined as hygienists in the 1930s He graduated in chemistry as I did from the University of New 42 Hampshire Q. Would you give us sir your best impression of how knowledgeable you felt Mr. Wheeler was when you joined the staff in 1954 as an industrial hygienist A. He was a very good manager His knowledge was very deep He expected me to gather a great deal of knowledge and become knowledgeable in things that he was not in 10 We had - we were three people running = 11 that show Dr. Kelly Mr. Wheeler and myself and ca 12 later we got broke up and we had a great big -- 13 lots of people and big files Big files 14 So he -- he gave me the API meetings 15 to go to He went to the AIH meetings We all 16 went to the -- to our credited meetings 17 I could have gone to the Chemical 18 Society meetings I'm a member of the ACS have 19 been for eighty hundred years but I did not 20 because they -- until they began to get into -- to 21 have some committee work on occupational health 22 Q. Were there any other organizations 23 that you found had information to share in 24 industrial hygiene toxicology area such as the 25 American Public Health Association 43 Did you ever go to any of their meetings A. Yes I've been to AHS meetings I would say the states -- this is one -- let's take this -- you people may not like this but there are some states whose records and files were excellent Texas was one of them They had an industrial hygiene group in their health department I can't remember that 10 man's name He was a first class man He showed 11 me their records and their -- and I used them 12 too by the way I went up to Austin and they 13 showed me their records 14 The State of Missouri wasn't very 15 wealthy in that area 16 The State of Illinois had excellent 17 facilities and records also in the area of 18 toxicology Some of these belonged to their 19 university some belonged to their state health 2a 20 department 21 And when you work on pollution control FS 22 and industrial hygiene as did I in those days you iz 23 probably run into what's known as the Bureau of 24 Sanitary Engineering of all the various health [ 25 departments and that's what I did in Texas It [ [ 44 was true in Illinois It was true in Iowa true in H R California by districts by zone Six I believe zones in California or areas they call them They had individuals for each of these zones Q. Did you run into Dr. Carl Nau u at Texas A. huh I sure did Q. That might have been the man you were 10 trying to think of 11 A. Yeah Hey he was a great guy too 12 Q. I was asking you about organizations 13 where you might have attended meetings to be able 14 to share information I asked about the APHA 15 Any others that come to mind 16 A. Well we did it on the ba- -- Dr. 17 Kelly took the medical meetings and primarily 18 this was the MCA or the CMA's medical meeting and 19 he despised the American Medical Association for 20 some reason I can understand why but -- because 21 I had to go to the meetings to supernume sic esa 22 him and I can understand that in his -- they were me 23 pretty much all out playing golf [ 24 I mean the meeting wasn't very -- I [[ 25 mean me and two doctors talked to the guy that was 11 fl 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 45 the chairman and he was waiting -- he had his golf clubs around his shoulders So we -- Dr. Kelly didn't think much of that I'm not sure he was a golf player anyway but so I went to some of those meetings to cover him in committee meetings because those people would go astray if you weren't careful Q. And these were AMAmeetings A. Yes Q. Was there a part of AMA that dealt with occupational health industrial medicine A. There's a great -- I'm teasing a lot about it but it's true They -- they got almost all the institutional doctors to go to it None of the people that practiced medicine went to those meetings The people that practiced medicine in corporations and for insurance company stuff went to those occupational health meetings It's much better today They've got some fine committees on just on toxicology and occupational health and the effects of various things upper respiratory effect All the individual colleges in surgery and everything probably have toxicology subgroups that work on materials that are -- that impinge on 46 their specific area So there are plenty of places -- and even then there were plenty of places you could get if you dug enough Now you could find the base of the information It was available You could find who was working on trying to increase or improve that information and that was -- to put it together was difficult 10 Today it's together in a vast number 11 of books and documents that contain -- that did cm 12 what we tried to do as a committee under the MCA 13 We wrote MCA data sheets for example 14 MR FOGARTY Objection 15 nonresponsive 16 MR BLANKS Wait stop here 17 A. MCA means Manufacturing Chemists 18 Association now CMA and they were one of the 19 groups along with the API who published group 20 documents short terse six eight pages some of 21 them Some of them twenty pages some of them 22 five pages of the toxicology and hazards involved 23 in handling individual materials 24 The API did likewise The Organic 25 Chemical Manufacturing Association did also aan : gS fn t Bes 47 publish a bunch and these were largely on die chemicals because they're oddballs and they're also quite toxic because they're largely organic amine compounds So there are a lot of people -- and these were available but you had to participate to get ahold of them so we participated a lot me Q. The impression I'm getting Mr. Garrett is that there wasn't a lot of this 10 information out there being spoon fed to people ae 11 but if you had someone that wanted to find it you otek 12 could get it Is that accurate or not Be 13 MR FOGARTY Objection leading 14 A. If you ask for it within the realm of 15 those materials you got it readily from the 16 people or they would give you copies of the 17 documents they helped make with one of these 18 organizations 19 I'll bet between the API and the MCA Hi 20 put out thousands of copies of those things a 21 year as did almost anybody that made those kind 22 of documents 23 Now some of them were pretty tight 24 within their organizational system because that's 25 the only one that knew who they were there a a 48 The Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association which is largely the die merchants you didn't realize they did a lot of work on a lot of raw chemicals that were used in dies And that turned out to be chemicals some of us manufactured so when we found that out we began to work with them as well and the i document -- the information that had been done in the past was well documented in those -- in those 10 particular issues -- publications that they = 11 issued and everybody had a different name for ca 12 them 13 Q. You at Monsanto and working with Mr. 14 Wheeler and Dr. Kelly I take it in your CT 15 participation you began to gather together quite 16 an assembly of information eS 17 A. We sure did 18 Q. How did you handle that information Es 19 there at the company and the volume that you had mes 20 it to be able to use it 21 A. We had files full and they had -- we ES 22 had them -- we filed them by chemical compound 23 name 24 Q. And this was certainly in the age 25 before computers A. Yes 49 Q. Did you have them indexed in some way A. Yes we had them indexed by -- by their best chemical name The chemical -- the American Chemical Society name is what we used Q. You mentioned American Chemical Society You've told me you're a chemist and that you're a member of that organization A. Yes 10 Q. I take it that Chemical Abstracts 11 something you learned how to use quite early then 12 A. Yes yes 13 Q. And would Chemical Abstracts have been 14 something that you continued to use after you got 15 to Monsanto 16 A. Oh yes sir That's the best way to 17 peruse a whole flock of chemical data out of the 18 American Chemical ACS documents In fact we 19 contributed to -- we were asked usually to L 20 contribute a summary to some of the stuff that -- 21 Q. For those who might not be familiar 22 with Chemical Abstracts would you tell us what fl 23 those were in the 50s 24 A. Chemical Abstracts is a document 25 published by the American Chemical Society since foo GS D DD ES PSs esa cE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 50 the turn of the century abstracting all -- their word not mine -- all of the known reputable chemical literature on a periodic basis And they do a good job because the Chemical Abstracts come out about ten times a year I don't think it comes out every month and it must be a thousand pages in the durn thing now Q. Were there other abstracting services that you became familiar with that were useful in your work A. Well some of the other societies some of the other people did this did the abstracting We saw a lot of company abstracts that they used for their safety and health groups in the handling of materials and in handling chemicals particularly the very toxic ones You're talking now stuff that would absorb through the skin and which is the most hazardous thing people handle by far Q. Can you give us some examples what you mean by those company abstracts A. abstracts Well we had a bunch of company We made them for years I don't know how many files full of the damn things A lot of those were those abstracts ee that we already -- we abstracted a whole bunch of 51 abstracts to get the data the best raw data that we could find and put together Q. Would this information that Monsanto put into abstracts would that be shared with customers of Monsanto a af A. If we put it out it would be shared Pm with anybody that wanted it including most of the technical agencies We wrote many of the MCA data 10 sheets for them of Monsanto products that were -- 11 that we would consider primary manufacturer at our 12 request or theirs 13 Q. How would you at Monsanto make it pen 14 known to the general consuming public that you had ie 15 this information available and that it could be 16 gotten Ea 17 A. I never thought we really had to 18 because we got so many requests for it The 19 plants knew we had it because we had a safety man 20 in every plant and a hygienist later on in the 21 22 23 24 25 day We had industrial hygienists in the plants and in the divisions of Monsanto which later became the companies of Monsanto -- same damn thing different name -- had their own people E and we worked then from inside with them in getting data back and forth "7 Hf There was a blossom time after World War II where there was enormous new compounds discovered and put into use I don't think -- I U think it's a lot easier to track it today than it was then but we -- we had data in our data files on virtually every compound there had been a produced and I might have -- I might say that 10 most of the other companies that I knew had the 0 11 same affair and we traded our own company 12 documents Ca 13 i} We were told by our own company 14 nothing is secret connected with health and 15 safety Nothing 16 MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive " 17 Q. You mentioned earlier about asbestos 18 and how it was used in catalyst and insulation mFS 19 materials Was that something that would have 20 been included in your first research report even 21 A. I suspect it was but I'm not [ 22 absolutely sure We working in the pilot plant me 23 of Monsanto dealt with asbestos insulation 24 materials and with asbestos muds and the asbestos 25 workers in the plant there oo i nasa [' 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 53 We had a crew called insulators and they did the insulation work -- Q. And that was -- A. ~- in the pilot plant operations Q. That was about 1953 '54 time frame you're talking about A. Yes some time through there yes Q. Did you find that the insulators there at Monsanto were essentially following the same kind of practice that you'd experienced in Tennessee A. They had been ordered to work on the standard established by the MCA or established by whoever established the standards I could -- to tell you the truth I don't know on any one of the individual materials because they had been running around so many times but the asbestos dust was on the list for the -- of the toxicology materials and from -- put out by the American Industrial Hygiene Association TLV list and we always stood -- we always maintained at least that level as our standard Q. Did you find that the insulators there at Monsanto in the 50s when you first came were wearing respirators like you had been taught at 54 the University of -- A. They had respirators Now I never saw them insulating so I don't know if they wore them They had them and they had them hanging around their neck okay Q. Yes sir Were the insulators to your knowledge were they given protective clothing of any kind or work clothing A. Well the company furnished work 10 clothing to everybody 11 Q. Why would that have been done at io po 12 Monsanto if you know sir Lent 13 cant Pe s 14 A. What you mean clothing Q. Yes sir 15 A. Well there's a lot of reasons Some 16 of which you may not like It's the best way to 17 get a man to take a shower 18 Q. How is that 19 A. Give him clothes if he does to wear 20 Q. Sort of a incentive to take a shower 21 is that what you mean 22 A. Yes we've got wet shower houses for 23 all of them We had some objections that some of 24 them didn't take showers and the enthusiasm for 25 being up in a close tight place on a hot day with 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 55 them wasn't too hot so it encouraged them to take showers and to clean off And particularly people -- we made lots of people take showers We made the -- the insulation workers had to Q. Why is that sir A. What Q. Why would you do that A. Because they were -- all the dusty operations had to because the dust got inside their clothing They all had MSA approved dust respirators but they get it inside They get it in your hair I've been in too many places I know I didn't get any clothes issued Q. So you're saying that this was a way of decontaminating the insulators MR POWERS Objection A. In a way it was a way to encourage them to clean up We had rules where they had to in some places and particularly true organic manufacturing plants ' But it was hard to -- the unions were pretty tough I don't know why they fought that issue but they did Incidentally some of the unions had OE: i ana CS t CS ES Ss wa ony 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 56 some darn good data too available to them I don't know where they got it but they probably assembled it themselves I've worked with unions industrial hygienist late -- years ago Not early because they didn't know They didn't know but later on I worked with some union people Good people too Q. After you came to St. Louis and got into -- I guess would you call it corporate program A. Yes Q. After you got to St. Louis and got into the corporate program and began to see the things that Dr. Kelly and Mr. Wheeler had been doing would you describe for us what you recall in the 50s about how the Monsanto employees were being followed from an industrial hygienist's standpoint A. Well all the plants had a safety director and so many of them had extra people They had a safety engineer and several called inspectors They had different names for them but they were their grunts They did the grunt work ee | 57 We worked with the inspectors and with the safety directors of each of the plants We did a survey of each of Monsanto's plants and we surveyed every individual job classification in plant In the East St. Louis plant there's over four hundred job classifications so our document was about that thick Covered each job ae what they were provided safety and health what 10 data they had been given their safety training 0 11 programs whether they had company clothing or EE 12 not and so forth oCm 13 And these data were absolutely witched 14 again Took my hygiene crew damn near a year to 15 get a set of them and then we were ready to go 16 for another set and they turned out to be great 17 18 19 20 21 Well the one on two of the plants exceeded one volume and there were more than one volume Had every -- now we were not interested in the production We were interested in the job classifications and what that job classification 22 required them to be exposed to what they were 23 provided with and the data and a number of times 24 at their safety meetings they mentioned their 25 material and went over the thing again aLe ical 58 And I set up a lot of those things the short and abrupt and dirty explanations for these chemicals I used to take a bottle of very light oil and show them how much it would take for one of the amine compounds to kill them if they mopped it on their hand And we did it -- I did it in every plant I did every one of Monsanto's plants and 10 there was sixty of them at the time in the 11 U.S. 12 By the way I did all the foreign 13 plants in Britain and in Belgium 14 MR FOGARTY Objection 15 nonresponsive 16 Q. In what time period are you talking Ee 17 about 18 ma 19 A. Huh Q. What time period are we talking about 20 A. 60s 70s 21 r ke 22 Q. The -- A. By the way the British had a pretty 23 good deal themselves The European was a little 24 different They're so darn competitive They 25 didn't want anybody to do anything except Belgium ES 59 Belgium was worse The Brits were pretty good They had also -- they had some darn good technical people in the British company and particularly in pollution control Q. Did you ever have any interface with the folks at the British Occupational Hygienist Society A. Yes yes Which by the way are good 10 first class people Don't get me wrong I'm not 11 arguing about that I ran into some of the best 12 hygienists in this company working for the States 13 and working for the federal government 14 Q. The work that you just told us about a 15 few moments ago looking at different jobs in 16 plant as opposed to I guess the processes 17 themselves you say you looked at each job 18 Are you talking about like different Es 19 operators 4 20 21 A. That's right Q. Different -- 22 A. Class A operators Class B operator 23 Class C operator department 22 24 Q. And you would profile the exposures of 25 each one of those 60 A. Absolutely profiled each one Q. And would you do the same thing for maintenance workers A. Yes we went through the maintenance workers but here you can't set them up unless | they're zoned and in the bigger plants they'll be zoned Those guys will live and die in zone 3 and if that's true zone 3 handles some 10 particular materials at zone 3 then they get ' 11 special type of clothing and helmets and 12 respirators 13 Q. When you were first relocated to the 14 corporate headquarters in St. Louis is that when 15 you first became aware of being able to take air 16 samples and that sort of thing profile workers E. 17 exposures fi A. No. We knew it in Texas City and did 18 19 some testing We didn't have very good equipment 20 We had to use the old bubblers dual bubblers and 21 that sort of stuff which are awfully -- awfully 22 cumbersome things to be handling around a busy 23 chemist manufacturing operation We did it 24 Later we began to use the better 25 portable equipment and then we did long term like rm weve bow. ee ee C LL L ID : 5 i Le 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 full switch -- I'm sorry full shift We did all 61 three shifts by the way in certain areas Full shifts had to be done when the hygienists -- a very busy year for the hygienists in Texas City to go around through this processing unit because you're -- although they only manufactured two or three products they used some very very very dangerous intermediates and they had to go around and test every one of them And we did it as much as we could every year to see that changes had been made And those were done probably by the chemist after I left probably by the hygienists assigned to the plant Q. So even when you first arrived at Monsanto Texas City in 1953 air sampling capability already existed there -- A. That's right Q. -- as well A. They had air sampling equipment there Q. And that would be for dusts and gasses and both A. That's right Primarily for dust and for -- and bubblers which if you could analyze the results And those analyses were done C C en D es fs rma iad fennenl a) ee . coaivervnah 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 62 elsewhere not at the plant at the time Now I'm sure all the plants can do their own Q. Once you got to St. Louis is that when you yourself first began to do air sampling A. No I did some in Texas City but not much I did it in St. Louis with the plant safety man We made him go along You have to have somebody in the plant tied down to it When I left we had in most of the large plants had professional industrial hygienists The plant staff by this time had broken down into three sections and I was the director of industrial hygiene section and had about fifteen employees in the central office and I had access to a laboratory and I had what I think was the best sound man in the country and that sort of stuff doing the work And we did this we put on shows for the individual plant safety and health people and their groups I did it for the organic division plants many times for their groups that handled this spread of chemical and we stuck to that spread of chemical They were making amine compounds at 63 the East St. Louis plant We did them a job on amine compounds and we had an awful fewer cases than I think we probably would have had if we hadn't been as alert as we were We also probably cost Monsanto a million dollars in uniforms Q. And that was probably a good investment in preventing disease A. I think you're absolutely correct It 10 was a good investment because if you stained that 11 uniform with some of the amines you could tell it 12 13 15 16 17 in a minute Most of them are purple or that darn die in denim will turn the oddist colors you've ever seen That will give a man a quick trip that he's been doused and then he goes through the scrub and down business whether he likes it or 18 not cha 19 So as near as I know we've in my ee 20 tenure we never lost anybody in the organic 21 operations Es 22 Q. What do you remember Mr. Garrett Es 23 about the first air sampling that you did in Texas 24 City cc 25 A. Well it was pretty crude but the soe bo $e 34 a] ron pre Moron oo) = 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 64 system was crude as it was defined in the literature at the time and we did -- you did insoluble sampling in water And it was a damn difficult thing to filter You had to triple filter then you had to dry that damn thing out and get rid of that filter material It's not an easy task I think the reason we did that was because the results were probably higher than they would have been had you been able to get rid of some of the filter material We figured that it was higher and therefore it was safer Then the sampling and the analytical procedure began to improve vastly And in the 50s I believe they probably - and the 60s the analytical methods analytical hardware analytical reagents improved enormously so that it got to where we could do these -- we tested squeeze tubes I'll bet you by the millions I've tested those darn -- hundreds of sulfide tubes and some of those things so that we could test them against our sample If they didn't work we put out a note through the company do not use so and so's sampling tubes They are very good for very 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 65 excellent reasons because they're quick and their reasonably accurate and you could save somebody's life that's messing around with something they didn't need to be MR FOGARTY Objection nonresponsive Q. The sampling that you first did when you joined Monsanto some of that was insolubles You mean by that dust A. That's right we collected in water Collected in water median Q. What kind of dust samples do you remember doing A. You could collect almost any dust One of the biggest problems was separating the dust In other words what dust are you talking about Texas City dust itself particularly with a bunch of trucks around and two or three days with no rain The dust -- you've got much dust on the ground from the streets and around You get a great deal of solid material from the ocean believe it or not You don't believe that but it's true You'd be surprised ial 66 So that you have to separate out of your solid sampling material and make some kind of judgment as to what was the product -- the targeted product I found that out early Q. Did you yourself do -- A. Some of it Q. Did you use a microscope to do your dust count <hr!tects A. I used a dust counter which is the 10 old Bausch & Lomb microscope hook for dust 11 counting and a plate 12 Q. Yes sir 13 A. We used it as a first step piece of D 14 equipment for dust sampling because it gave us a mS 15 quick fix on what we had It is not a very good 16 gravimetric sampling system It will give you a * bag 17 very good idea of your dispursion of particle 18 sizes Load 19 Q. This Bausch & Lomb dust counter would oe soe pentra camns 20 you describe for us how that works and how long it 1b 21 takes to take a sample with it 22 A. Well you had a plate -- that you had 23 these plates It looked like circular straight 24 view plates for microscope and you took this 25 machine and over a period of time you inspirated 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 67 into the material the atmosphere Then you took and you had a counting grid in the machine You never took the plate out You turn it on and you counted it with a microscope attached to the affair itself and made counts and there was a method published by Bausch & Lomb for the counts and we used their method of counting Q. About how long from start to finish would it take someone experienced in this device to actually test it A. Well it wouldn't take long to take a sample It takes some time to do the counting Now a first class man could probably do it and count it in fifteen minutes Q. Pretty much know what's there and types of exposures A. That's right Now he has to clean the plate off if he's going to use it again because he has the stuff on it We also used the old -- oh God what is that darn blood counting thing The blood counting affair for the regular upright microscope is a -- I can't recall what they call it but you have -- there's a gravical in there that you can 68 count a number of specific spaces and calculate the total dust load in particles and into a certain extent the size The same was true by the way at Bausch & Lomb You get a fair idea of the size distribution and when you're coming to inorganic -- to inert dust you're looking for size because it's the size that gets further down in the system and if you want stuff that gets 10 into the pulmonary system you're going down to 11 some small sizes 12 And this is what we did called dust 13 counting They're a pain in the neck to do but it's done -- it's still done to a lot -- to a [| 15 great extent today by a classification of dust in 16 sizes 17 Q. Now the Bausch & Lomb device that's 18 the device that you had ese 19 A. It's long since went out of business 20 yeah 21 Q. But you had that in 1953 '54 ese 22 A. Yes yes ae 23 Q. I take it that there was already 24 someone in Texas City there before you got there co 25 that was the safety in this kind of thing aa si 69 A. Yes safety director Q. Who was that Would you recall sir A. Mooney Stallings was the safety director Mooney Stallings Now in this case keep in mind that in the early days of the chemical industry at least in my experience and this has been in other companies as well is to get a safety -- there was no safety people to be trained 10 Nobody trained anybody Texas M 14 didn't start their safety engineering school until CT 12 way after this So to get a safety man it was 13 customary in our industry -- now this is maybe 14 not true in others -- to take a first class j on 15 foreman and make him the safety director and he 16 ran it 17 18 19 We had probably the best safety people we had some of them were those foremen We had one in Tennessee Even the foreman lost his arm 20 in a car accident and he was such a bright guy 21 they made him one of the deputy safety directors 22 He graduated when the safety director head of 23 safety -- he was first class and his record ~- 24 our record down there was first class for a plant fo 25 that manufactured phosphorous from ore was first * eee& ExAecn class 70 Q. Would you know Mr. Garrett how these men that were made safety directors or in lines that led up to be safety directors how they were trained in areas of health concern A. They were trained believe it or not by the federal government during World War II in the manufacturing burst that occurred as you can imagine Those people were trained and they 10 trained a scad of people as safety people 11 Now this was the guy like Mooney en ery 12 Stalling bright guy without a college education C 13 that probably became a better safety man than a 14 hell of a lot of people with college degrees 15 because he did it through experience 16 And a lot of Monsanto's foremen -- and 17 this was not Monsanto only I know this is from 18 Dallas through Dupont great many there their 19 safety people started as foremen in their plants 4 20 Good first class alert foremen and 21 they went into -- then into the management group fe 22 and became poorer paid than they were when they az 23 were in the early group but that's beside the 24 point Cc 25 Mooney was a pretty good safety [ bY 10 11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 71 director He later got a industrial hygienist assigned in there and then they got a trained safety director out of one of the graduate schools that graduated safety director -- safety engineering and they also had a full time hygienist when the plant was sold Q. The Monsanto plant in Texas City I guess then at some point in time did get a time industrial hygienist A. Yes sir Q. About when was that sir A. Oh gosh I don't know I couldn't even -- I might give you the -- I suspect it was in the 60s late 60s but boy that could be wrong Q. Before they got a time industrial hygienist at Monsanto Texas City plant whenever it was -- A. They had a time engineer there then by that time -- Q. If someone -- A. -- and a safety director Q. And those people the safety director and the engineer they were doing the industrial hygiene kind of work 72 A. They were doing the stuff that we in our staff was doing when I first came to St. Louis We had an excellent staff of people at the Kearny plant in East St. Louis They had generated them themselves because of lack of corporate involvement in that business until after World War II and then corporate involvement got in and started helping them and they ended up with professional 10 industrial hygienists -- no professional safety 11 man and my man assigned to the organic division 12 The old organic division was over 13 there any time that they needed and that safety 14 director would have him any time he wanted him 15 Q. I think you told me that there became 16 a time when you started doing plant surveys 17 yourself and going out and doing inspections 18 A. Well we had to find out what the hell 19 was going on in the plants Who would -- what : 20 were they doing How were they doing it What 21 were they doing it with oa 22 Three very very good questions that 23 you have to ask yourself today and in today most 24 companies do this on a routine basis 25 You can go into a plant in Monsanto reppieteged TS Ba BA i [ eB eoners 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 73 now and ask one of their supervisors even an area supervisor can tell you in detail what they do in each of their processes This wasn't very true -- I can remember one time a man told me in one of our plants you can tell the people working the acid department by the holes in their pants you know That may very well be great but by God that's not very good industrial hygiene MR FOGARTY Objection nonresponsive Q. The occasions when you would go out and do your survey work in the plants I take it you wrote reports of those visits A. We went -- Q. Wrote reports of those visits did you A. Oh I'm sure yes we did but those reports went into the -- I suspect the fire but I don't know Yes we wrote detail What we needed was the individual operating units and those processes That way when we built a plant making the same stuff somewhere else -- and this is where the Europeans got into it because we built plants over there to 74 make products that we made in the U.S. Their enthusiasm for our interference was zero We couldn't speak to them because they would not even if they knew English wouldn't speak to us in English particularly them damn Belgiums We shouldn't have fought the Belgiums a We should have fought just with the Germans I cS guess there 10 MR FOGARTY Objection C 11 nonresponsive 12 Q. I've had the same experience Mr. 13 Garrett with the Belgiums in spades A. We took them over to Great Britain and 15 had the meeting [ 16 Q. I should have thought of that 17 A. Took them over to London and had the 18 meeting Oh we had great luck with the British 19 We provided them with the information They did 20 job of their own 21 All you had to do with them 22 was to get -- they had some of the best people 23 They had one of the best pollution engineers I've 24 ever seen working in one of our plants in great [ 25 Britain 75 Well he worked at the plant but he worked for the whole British company First class man Q. If I understand what you're saying then your -- part of your job was to go out and do survey work learn about things that were either problems or potential problems and then if you built a new process doing the same kinds of things incorporate engineering controls 10 A. We tried to do that beforehand and we 11 got to the point where we had the last twelve 12 thirteen years I was at Monsanto we went to 13 process meetings where we went over the design of 14 every process in Monsanto unit by unit 15 We objected -- we made the 16 president madder than hell but we objected EC 17 anyway and we stopped that crap of putting an 18 arrow in the air that says To air and the one ea 19 going this way says To water 20 What water To waste That's 21 another goody To waste Just arrow Here's a Oe 22 long process designed with fifty arrows saying To a 23 waste Where to waste 24 ia b I mean are they going to go through 25 waste treatment somewhere or are they going to bw 76 just dump them on the ground or are we going to put it in dumpsters So we went over that and made them and we had the vice -- the president -- the president of the operating -- executive president on our side too by God They'll approve it when you agree Show us something Show us a pollution treatment operation or get off the stick 10 And so it was a graduate system from 11 the 19- -- World War II return where a lot of LL 12 safety was generated by the manufacturers of very L 13 hazardous materials to people who were not 14 manufacturing that kind of material started the pery 15 safety engineering business which graduated then ' k. 16 in the 50s from the foreman type person to a Ec 17 graduate trained engineer or hygienist and to 18 today to a staff ea 19 And the staff has the right at the E 20 plant for process to go to the corporate staff and 21 say Hey help us with this thing and make damn 22 sure that we don't put someone's head in a trap 23 with this and so the corporate staff joined with 24 the plant staff and they do anyway because 25 they're working it from the other end of the DD DD ne 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 77 stick and they finally get together and decide what's to be done and it's written out in the construction plans MR ELLIS We've been going about an hour and a half Can we take -- MR HOBSON It's up to Mr. Garrett I'm happy to if he is MR ELLIS Well I need to go to the restroom so THE WITNESS Good I'm glad you say so Temporary recess was held MS FLATT We're on record Q. Mr. Garrett you mentioned the American Industrial Hygiene Association I take it that you've been a member of that organization for a good number of years A. Probably thirty forty years yeah Q. What kinds of activities have you done with that organization that you can tell us about sir in your career A. I've written a number of papers for their journal I've reviewed papers for them like most people that you get on review groups Seana 78 from time to time and up through the time until I quit and even a couple years afterwards I went to their national meetings Q. Were you on any of the committees of the American Industrial Hygiene Association re 5 A. Many of them and to tell you the 4 truth there's so many I don't know whether I could tell you what it represented even I was on the -- the development 10 committee for a while in an effort to find out who 11 was in hygiene regardless of what they claimed to 12 be or accepted as their fate and I think they do 13 pretty well today in getting those people in 14 I've been on the -- one of the review 15 committees for papers My boss for very many Ce 16 years was president of the IHA and through all of Eo 17 that persequential office system 18 Ea And when he was president I had to do 19 his job too but I've been involved with them 20 ever since I joined -- went to St. Louis 21 Q. Do you recognize the publications of 22 the American Industrial Hygiene Association to be | 23 authoritative 24 A. I have run into no -- very few that re 25 were not 79 Q. You're aware of like the Hygienic Guide series that they published A. Yes I am Q. Have you written any of the Hygienic Guides A. Yeah Q. I take it you would find those to be authoritative A. Well they certainly -- we had a hell 10 of a time getting them approved by Monsanto but 11 they finally let them go as is Kelly MAY Dr. ' 12 Kelly got them through actually 13 We did most of the PCB's and that sort 4 of stuff but we only made -- not every company 15 did The stuff they only made or the stuff they 16 were primarily -- not primarily but well known 17 in we did that on our products or when we were 18 asked 19 By the way we did some for the 20 Organic Manufacturing Association too I think 21 but I'm not sure I didn't do it One of my 22 troops did it 23 Q. Had you had any occasion to work with 24 the American Conference of Governmental Industrial 25 Hygienists the ACGIH 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. Yes 80 Q. What have you done with that organization sir A. Well I went to their meetings I wrote some stuff for their -- some editorials for their journals for journals they can put things in and they had a very good handle because they ran the show because they were the primary people that operated the state and federal agencies that set the standards And ultimately they -- we set them voluntarily for years Nobody had any -- then suddenly they began to set them as a legal issue but by that time they'd been washed and cleansed pretty well in respect to what they meant what they did I think their standards are probably the best set of standards there are available and they're pretty much used world wide Q. The ACGIH threshold limit values that I take it you find those to be even more current than OSHA's work A. Well I guess I have a very different view of OSHA than most I think the ACGIH represented a group of good professionals doing a 81 good professional job I cannot say the same about the governmental agency Q. You still feel that way today A. Yes I still do Don't get me wrong D There are a great many great people in the federal agencies involved in this business and God knows [ without some of them we wouldn't have got where we are today in respect to protecting people's lives 10 that work for a living but they have too many 11 political nit wits get in there also and stir 12 around that sort of thing once in while They 13 try to stop them 14 MR FOGARTY Objection 15 nonresponsive 16 A. I've been in that building in 17 Washington D.C. many many times up and down the 18 halls I was on one of their advisory committees 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the Water Advisory Committee drinking water Standards Advisory Committee Q. Did you ever have any input to establishing threshold limit values through the ACGIH TLV committees A. Yes we did We turned over to them any data we had in connection with anything they 82 were working you recall some of the processes they would come out and say we're going to do -- they would show a span of materials they were after and actually they looked up I guess in the blue book us and every other chemical and petroleum company and found out if they made it they sent us a note saying we're going to work on ion ba the aromatics So we said yes we'll do it too and 10 participate and we'd participate with them and 11 give them our data and our views We never gave 12 our data away without a few views Neither did 13 anybody else 14 So we -- yes we participated with 15 them We participated with them making up some of rn 16 the standards We disagreed with some but not <n 17 very many believe it or not Boy some of them 18 were tough 19 Q. The National Institute for 20 Occupational Safety & Health is that an 21 organization you recognize sir NIOSH 22 A. Yeah i 23 Q. They have come out from time to time 24 with a number of criteria documents various 25 materials Are you familiar with those as well | | : -- Ss Pe ee D To Esa ea FS mz ha bas it 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. Yes I've seen some of their 83 criteria which kind of -- blue papers Q. Did you ever make any comments or contribute to any of the writing of this criteria documents A. Well at their request we did some work on organic chemicals that were manufactured in East St. Louis and we dittled with those people for fifteen years We finally went over there and made a survey of the people that lived over there and our results didn't jive with their predictions so they didn't publish our results MR FOGARTY Objection nonresponsive Q. From time to time did you have the opportunity to work with customers of Monsanto's regarding Monsanto products and their use A. Yes many times Q. Tell me how that worked Mr. Garrett when it came to dealing with your customers A. Well if I got a -- we were as you know a staff department of the corporate headquarters in St. Louis Someone in one of the sales groups or 84 product groups as they were called generally the sales section said to Emmet Kelly We need somebody to go help so and so in a certain procedure connected with handling something Monsanto manufactured So I got told to go out and help somebody do something and I did that not as many times as you might Q as you might imagine We did get a -- we answered an awful 10 lot of letters and we were -- we -- the president 11 of Monsanto told us You tell them what you know DD 12 period I don't give a damn if it's good or bad D 13 Tell them what you know 14 So we did We never had anybody - 15 complain inside Monsanto to us either So we 16 helped the customers any time 17 Many of them were states I had more 18 requests from states about this thing -- these al ca 19 things We got thus and so in our state You get 20 involved now in maybe messing around with one of 21 your customers but we did anyway Es 22 Q. The products that you sold at = 23 Monsanto certainly some of those had health 24 effects that they could cause if they were [ 25 improperly handled or if exposures were excessive ELS Cod od ~ D E 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 85 I take it Did you ever as a Monsanto employee go out to customers and sort of precheck them to see if they were capable of handling your materials that were particularly hazardous A. I went to many many of them connected with probably die chemicals more than anything else because the die makers are little companies Primarily small operations And we talked to them about some of the amine and nitro aromatic compounds we manufactured and I did this with many of them I did - they have an organization by the way that I went to twice and talked to them Anybody that asks for help from Monsanto got it from us and we did the medical or industrial hygiene sort of stuff Kelly and I and Emmet and the rest of the doctors and the rest of the hygienists And about -- when I retired I had fourteen people working for me and I had I suspect a good 15 percent maybe even more of that was done from customer relations and that was direct And we weren't out to sell stuff We 86 were out to sell safety and health because it damaged our product name if somebody turned up purple And we just weren't going to have it So yes my whole staff probably spent 15 20 percent of their time with customers Q. Can you recall any circumstances where you would find people who either wanted to buy or were buying Monsanto products and you just said These people aren't capable of dealing with it 10 and we're not going to sell to them 11 A. Well we had some people companies 12 that were pretty irresponsible in our opinion and 13 we were very careful 14 It's difficult to do what you're 15 saying But it's not only difficult it's legally 16 difficult so yes we did We worked with our 1 1 1 17 own law department on some of those at their A 18 request or at ours 19 Q. And actually ceased sales in some 20 instances 21 A. Indeed we did They wouldn't let us 22 look at their operation They had a problem that 23 we knew about We ceased [ [ [ [ 24 Q. Can you give me some idea how far back 25 in time these kinds of activities would have gone | range OE eS mFS [ Es 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 87 at Monsanto A. I guess Kelly probably would -- was doing that for he and Elmer Wheeler before I came When I came we did some -- we did some work with -- we did most -- well a great portion of our work with customers connected with products and changes they wanted to make in the chemical composition We didn't want them to stick amine groups on everything and that sort of thing Arsenides or something like that PCB's We wanted a great deal less foolishness I did a great deal of work with PCB's in tunnels in transformer manufacturing places that sort of stuff Q. So at least by 1954 you had personal knowledge that Monsanto was working with its customers in trying to find problems with customers in some cases - A. When I came up to St. Louis I quickly found out that the customer in any ~- like any other place that's pedaling was pretty much the king through our professional technical staff that did the selling ~ Monsanto sales people I'm sure 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 88 most big companies do the same Most of them are pretty well knowledgeable about the materials they're selling because they're probably chemists or chemical engineers to start with and we did a lot of work with them I did a lot of work with people that wanted to make preformed insulation and tunnel people and tunneling in some areas They wanted some help We did a lot of work with some of the electrical companies because of the transformers in tunnels You don't realize -- I mean a lot of people don't My -- like your wife probably doesn't realize that 90 percent of all the electricity in downtown whatever is in tunnels In fact so is the heat Nobody has a heating plant They buy steam from some guy way off over the boondocks somewhere that's making steam and you get into those tunnels and you start getting into crowded conditions and you get tunnel crews And I've spoken to the tunnel crews which by the way are separate in most electrical companies That's a separate gang of people you know It may be wierd but they're pretty good at ih ta 89 it They know their business And I've lectured many Union Electric's people TVA's people in connection with particularly in restricted use of transformer fluids Yes many times [ Q. The work that you would do as an industrial hygienist in talking to Monsanto employees or customer -- customers of Monsanto's products did that involve training people quite a 10 bit 11 A. Well we did -- we put on training 12 programs and we did when we were using a product 13 we felt was hazardous putting it in a new 14 plant -- we put on a dog and pony show for them be 15 Kelly and I and Elmer or a whole crowd of us 16 Later on we had a big staff We had ES 17 staffs in there too and their staffs whoever 18 they were going to have in whatever plant their wes 19 safety and health staff and we had -- I know lots 20 of people used contract physicians and we did 21 too in some of our plants Fs 22 Some of them we had first -- in some Es 23 of the early days some of the plants had time 24 physicians even re" 25 That was a leftover from World War II 90 by the way I suspect but we had -- we had to do more training I suspect to those contract physicians than most Kelly did it but he'd bring the hygiene crew along and we'd scare hell out of them or something so they'd do what we had to do Q. So the intent was to make sure that these contract physicians that were servicing Monsanto employees they knew the hazards and knew 10 what to look for 11 A. Knew so they could diagnose rapidly 12 if -- so we didn't lose somebody in transit 13 Q. Did you become familiar Mr. Garrett 14 with how the Monsanto medical records were 15 basically kept I'm not talking about in a 16 person's folder but how in general they were EC 17 reviewed 18 A. The physician or the assigned Esa 19 physician at the individual plant and the i 20 physician assigned by Kelly if he had -- from his 21 own staff or himself would handle that affair 22 Now we talked to the physicians -- and I knew all i 23 of them personally but as far as messing with 24 those medical records buddy it was no thanks 25 because you're diddling with something that Dr. L LL LD LD CT s an 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 91 Kelly didn't have allowed We would look at it from a generalized standpoint If we got a couple people with us that showed symptoms okay but looking up a whole twenty or thirty people's medical records was no Kelly would do it or his physicians but our hygienists would not or did not And I was perfectly happy with that when I directed my own group -- when I directed the group Q. Was there a system within Monsanto that you can tell me about that allowed for you to know how many particular incidents of whatever medical condition occurred and how that -- how was that tracked A. Well we got all of that -- Kelly automatically got anything connected with what was considered an associated -- a sickness that you could directly prescribe or ascribe to one of the products we were making or one of the processes we were using And from that we tracked -- a lot of the work my crew did was on those -- plant would say We've got problems here We seem to have two or three guys that -- showing some kind of 92 symptoms connected our doctor says My hygiene crew -- I'd send my hygienist assigned to that division to that plant and work with the plant assigned hygienist find out what the hell was going on and if they needed [|q one of the physicians Kelly would send one of his to: physicians along Yes we did ee ra We were never shown their names and I Santebis didn't want to see their names They marked them 10 out We did not deal with -- directly with 11 medical records of anybody by name unless it was a 12 terrible mess 13 Q. Did your job at all involve claims of 14 occupational diseases that might arise by Monsanto 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 employees A. To a degree I handled accidents Always did Don't know why I got mixed up in that mess and I've seen some messes Rail accidents you wouldn't believe and truck accidents you know fishing a truck out of the Ohio River loaded with chemicals and drums hoping to God the drums are still in the damn truck when you pull it out so you don't have to send a diver down to get each one of them individually We've been there I've been in wreck sites probably all 93 over the country particularly rail wrecks because if our tankers are sitting in that wreck we've got to know where they are on the wreck and whether they've been bashed or not If they've been bashed what the hell is in them and where [ [ that drainage is going [ And we had -- we tested some darn stuff over in Illinois where a railroad accident had occurred before I ever come on the site We 10 tested water around there and that soil and found 11 it was there Sure enough it was there 12 We had a hell of a mess cleaning that 13 and it was years after it occurred So we didn't 14 want that to happen again and we tracked -- aeremnant 15 everybody in the business did that Reet 16 I don't suppose -- I met a American LU 17 industrial -- American cyanide hygienist at a 18 wreck in Atlanta at one time What are you doing 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 here He said I'm trying to find my tank car You found anything I said No I don't think ours are here I think somebody must have shipped them off on the side somewhere Well we go back ~~ he and I worked it together C ~ / * = OT, fice Ct Os 6S m= ieee 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 94 So we -- I knew him personally and he was trying to do the same thing I was Big mess We checked the wrecks We always tracked those wrecks I'll bet you I've been on some of the funniest airplanes you've ever seen in your life getting to some of the funniest places you ever saw in your life There ain't know road there Yeah How do you get there On the train How the hell you going to get there on the train if the damn train is wrecked I don't know Get on the horse Get down that damn track from Pensicola across to -- they ought to put that thing out of business Across the Panhandle in Florida Oh I think it's on floating on mud but that's beside the point MR ELLIS Jack why don't you let him ask another question here We can get on with something MR CORBETT nonresponsive Objection THE REPORTER Who said that MR CORBETT Me Jim Corbett i [ [ Lia a i 3 fa 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 95 Q. Did you ever get involved in any of the Workers Compensation claims Mr. Garrett A. If it reflected on more than a single claim if it reflected a trend of any kind yes we got involved in it Tried to find out if it was indeed our problem and if it was get it stopped Get it put back to bed where it belonged Not very often oddly enough Q. But was there a system that you were aware of where the Workers Compensation claims that involved occupational diseases or claims of occupational diseases were made known to you in the medical department A. It went to Kelly or it went to Dr. Johnson when he was there and he came to us and I -- and if it was - if it was one of my people -- if I had a person assigned directly to that operation I'd send him because he knew more about it than I did Oddly enough there wasn't a lot -- well I don't know It's hard to say Q. What about keeping up with people who were long time Monsanto employees and who would retire and then with the passage of time those ce teat 2 aetn,a: | 11 11 Pew fz [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 folks would pass away would you have access to 96 their death certificates A. No. We did some and we did some purposely and we did some in cooperation with NIOSH in East St. Louis and somewhere else I can't remember the other place I can't remember but we would have and did operate with them connected with processes that might have occurred from a individual chemical or an area where there was a number of identified employees because Monsanto's system like every big company's insurance and so forth system handles wherever they are We've tracked some down I don't know why they all live in Florida and Texas but they do after they leave I don't blame them if they lived in Illinois for moving to Florida or Texas but that's beside the point Yes we've helped but it wasn't -- we got into it probably after everybody else had dug around in the mud so I don't know I worked on processes where have you seen any -- an unusual number of thus and so's and we went to the physicians of a community through their medical -- local medical association and asked them if they'd EO? 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 97 help us We've never had any turn downs They really -- it really isn't easy to do You go look at the medical records and the insurance records are my personal opinion shouldn't exist but they do And what do you do - what is a person in for if he's got a respiratory disease And he's eighty years old You know that sort of thing I don't know It may be they are significant and maybe it can be done We did the big OSHA study twice for - with them Nothing ever came of it We were looking at that -- at really at age and we're looking through the medical records to find out what caused the cessation of age in some of these people and really never came to much of any conclusions Q. sir This OSHA project dealt with what | A. What Q. What did the OSHA project deal with that you said you did twice A. There were -- really it was NIOSH that was after it 98 Q. I'm sorry A. It was do you have -- do you have any residual And they looked into some magic ball and said that people in certain areas have a tendency to stay in those areas more than they do in most areas So we -- they'd pick one of our plants and they were working -- they wanted to know about onesocil some of the products that are made in the plant 10 anyway but that particular -- they have to be -- os 11 they have to be right because that particular Crotpee 12 area an awful lot of those people are still 13 alive still living in that area 14 I wouldn't think in the retirees from 15 St. Louis -- from Monsanto that retired from the 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 main office I don't think nearly as many percent wise would have stayed in the St. Louis area but a lot of those people did over there It's a very clannish place I guess I don't know Just -- and they wanted some studies done and they -- and we did them provided the data Nothing ever came of it that I ever knew Q. Would it be accurate -- A. But we would have done it if they'd have wanted us to s aed ao C 1 11 1 i ro oe | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 99 Q. Would it be accurate to say Mr. Garrett that at least from your perspective of seeing things you learned more about any kinds of disease processes in Monsanto employees that were in the current work force as opposed to anything that would have existed in retirees or people who left Monsanto's employment A. I don't know That's a difficult question to answer I'd probably from point of view of incident -- of incidences yes From a point of view of studies and desire to know whether things are happening no we probably looked at it I didn't I didn't have access to the medical records either and Emmet Kelly is one of the toughest guys in the world that don't allow anybody to look at anybody's personal medical file and I don't blame him Q. Was there any way for you at Monsanto when you were doing industrial hygiene work to be able to see if there was any correlation between any of the exposures that you were measuring and monitoring and any resultant diseases that might be occurring A. We did with some of the contract a ot Gadel Bed i D Za i 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 doctors Kelly did it He had a bunch of -- he hired doctors and they were largely contractors in the individual areas and he had a tic sheet 100 for them If anything had happened that they thought was unusual I ended up at the plant trying to find out what the hell it was But as far as looking at those records I didn't get a chance to do that At least with any names on them I didn't Q. Did you have after you started doing the profiling and surveying of plants did you identify certain groups of workers that ultimately either through Dr. Kelly or others were given certain kinds of physical examinations because of the kind of work they did A. We had -- we had those people yes and those people were in -- when we checked the plant we knew when we went in that department - or - had a certain screen physical screen through the physician whether he was Monsanto or whether he was contract Made little difference He dealt with those records We did it on PCB's We did it on amine and nitro -- aromatic workers We did it on = DD a peer C CC L D D D 1 Ea Ca ia [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 chlorine workers too do that By government asked us to 101 Q. Was there ever a time while you were a Monsanto employee that you did one of these physical screens for people who worked with asbestos A. Well asbestos was a product that everybody in every plant had to use because of the insulation problems As far as I -- and I'm not sure in my own mind I don't believe we ever had very many catalysts that used asbestos or asbestos form carriers pallets if you know what I'm talking about We sold the pallet cook it and then use it for cattle I don't think so What we did do in these areas was we made sure and we -- I lectured eight thousand times about the TLV levels and their darn respirators and they were issued respirators by name and the respirators were periodically cleaned and recartridged even if they had not shown use. It's the only way you can run a respirator program and it's like helmet programs We had the same problems there 8 | 11 11 [ [ [ HH f 11 D D [4 L Li f: i fi r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 You know you go visit a guy in the hospital in some place he's got a crushed skull and he's got a perfectly good helmet and of course it wasn't on his head and when the rock hit his helmet it didn't hurt anybody which was on the ground of course not on his head So we did some of that That was 102 largely the safety people and the safety people got -- their system corporately grew like the industrial hygiene and medical system grew and we went together frequently in looking at the safety and health aspect of something because it's awfully difficult to separate Are you doing something here that's making a person be exposed too much The safety guys some of their guys could do a lot better job than our hygiens could do in connection with what they did and therefore where they interfaced with an individual compound that was hazardous Q. If I could get you Mr. Garrett to do it for me as best you can if we can kind of go back in time to the mid 1950s after you came to St. Louis and were in the corporate program What would be the typical thing that you could tell us that you would be telling 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 workers working with asbestos about TLVS and 103 wearing respirators and -- A. Respirators respirators respirators Helmets with respirators because the helmet rule Monsanto is absolutely universal and we could enforce that We could enforce the respirator rule We also could scare them a bit because it's a scary material And we lectured I lectured them on lots of things including asbestos I lectured the East St. Louis plant periodically about that and about amine compounds Q. Can you give us just your best recollection of what you would say about asbestos in the 50s A. Tell them it's a hazardous material only if you inhale it If you inhale it it becomes a very hazardous material and you will maybe regret it down your life span It will certainly shorten it if you inhale enough of it So the respirator is given to you for that purpose Wear the damn thing and it was essentially that but the safety people in the plants did a good deal better job than I did They had records and they had -- I don't know where they got some of the films they had but they had some films that -- Dr. Kelly wouldn't have allowed us to use films showing people that were dying of asbestosis but some of the plants could get them and I think I did a 104 pretty good job you know We had -- we had asbestos to my knowledge in every plant in Monsanto I watched a bunch of people redoing some valves in our main 10 office and that was the worst looking mess I ever 11 saw and we stopped that i 12 i We got the contractor in and he either 13 changed his manner or out he went We'd get 14 another contractor So I don't know I've never 15 -- we talked it It was one of the talking 16 problems 17 If you were handling problems where 18 you were in the racks changing insulation all the 19 time and we had insulators that were by -- in some ee 20 of the unions they were individuals that were 21 classified as insulators ese 22 In our case in one of the -- I don't 23 know who -- I don't know what union is what in 24 these cases but we had one called asbestos 25 workers and then one of them were called | aoecs~ insulators and in the insulator system they used asbestos insulation 105 We used preform a lot Later as we came down the tube we began to use preform because it created less problem of smearing and mudding joints and so forth And so as far as I know our plant ee safety and health people did a first class job of a raising cane about asbestos So did we It's one 10 of the routine raised cane things CJ 11 It's like cyanide and Monsanto made Co 12 enough cyanide or used cyanide So yes we did 13 it | 14 Q. So when you said earlier respirators 15 respirators respirators how did you mean that 16 A. Anybody that in any way installed or 17 took out any asbestos for any reason however Ea 18 small wore a respirator They were issued a 19 respirator and they wore it and they changed it 20 each day 21 t; 3 They turned it in even if they did not 22 use it and it was recartridged if that was on a 23 project where they were insulating 24 Q. Would that be true whether they were Cc 25 called insulators or asbestos workers or anybody L L D ES ES ea bes 2 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 else 106 A. Yes because in the plant you're looking at a process unit here that's manufacturing aniline compounds If the insulators are in there insulating the process people have got to <-- that are running the process have got to have respirators too and they're issued them and they're issued them from our safety supply people and that's the way we keep records the way we've always kept records Q. How far back in time can you tell us that that was done at Monsanto this way the wearing the respirators A. No I can't I can tell you that in the last fifteen or twenty years they've been doing it know What happened prior to that I do not All I know is they had them and in most of the plants where I was at the respirators were issued so they had a record of it Q. At Texas City when you were there in the -54 time period was it your experience that asbestos was handled as you've described in Texax City re : D fo | er be eo Ee 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. When the two Americans came into my pilot plant to take loose the asbestos when we checked it you had to have two insulators come in I had two electricians disconnect this and 107 pipefitters and so forth The insulators came in took off the insulation they both had respirators As a matter of fact one of them told me to go get lost while they took it off Q. Because you didn't have a respirator to wear A. Because I didn't have a respirator there so I got lost Q. Now the insulators that were at Texas City that you've described they were given the clothing and they showered A. As near as I can tell you yes and when it happened -- started and when all of the issues came afoot I do not know but they were when I was there they wore respirators They came out with their respirators They came out with gloves and aprons and took my -- the insulation off my pot Q. Was there a way that you had at the corporate offices in Monsanto in the 50s of oe eniee i j D 6 Ue es oes on eo 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 keeping track with your monitoring data that you collected A. We always -- and I don't know If I did it today I think I'd do it the same way We did it by plants and overlaid the plants by 108 product For example we made the same product in three plants We took plants that you would be interested in if you're talking about aniline or chloroanilines or this plant this plant and this plant and you go and check their records individually or go to the plants we frequently did and looked at their records in their safety department and frequently the doctor would come along and go to the physician if he was assigned he he was one of our physicians which in the bigger plants like Springfield we had a physician I'd go talk to the physician and take the poop back to Dr. Kelly or Dr. Johnson or one of the other doctors Q. You say Springfield was one of the bigger plants A. Springfield had a physician all the time for the while I was there and I didn't realize that until the Springfield plant manager introduced me to him I will have to say he had the most 109 hidden place I ever saw His dispensary was excellent but it was underground I don't know I don't know why Don't ask me Go ask the plant manager why Q. Springfield's located in -- the Springfield plant A. Springfield Mass 10 Q. Springfield Massachusetts 11 A. Primarily a polymer plant 12 Q. I've seen some records that seem to 13 14 15 16 indicate that asbestos was used in making products in Springfield Are you familiar with that A. Yes because we used -- not only that we used wood meal if you know what wood meal is 17 18 19 20 21 Q. I'm afraid I don't A. You grind wood up until it's like flower a wood flower and what it was used for was the early manufacture of plexi- -- not plexiglass Oh the damned -- oh the most common - 22 of all the early 23 MR GAUDET Phenolics L g e a t m1 24 25 THE WITNESS What MR GAUDET Phenolics Ese Q. Plastics 110 A. Yes Q. Phenolic resins A. Yes And the stuff was used as a reinforcer in phenolics This by the way was made for telephones We had problems with -- terrible problem with that powdered stuff We had a man fell in that thing one ' time working maintenance man and they had to 10 empty that whole damn thing out to get him out of C 11 there and he was dead He died He suffocated [[ 12 And we did some safety rack work up 13 there Ground wood And I mean it's called wood 14 fiber It looks like fiber and the asbestos is 15 also used in that same process for different kinds a 16 of plastic 17 And in the phenolics what you use as 18 you're reinforcing material is frequently based on ma 19 what the phenolic is going to be used for and 4a] 20 there's eight million recipes 21 So sitting outside of the phenolic 22 resin unit at Springfield used to be several large 23 -- these forty feet high tubes filled with the 24 stuff they use to make various types of resin 25 Now Monsanto got out of that business a lot and people made their own stuff We sold in 111 phenolics We got out of the phenolic business too but we sell them plastic monitors and they can make it in -- our technical research people helped them set up We set up people in business like everybody does I'm sorry but let's be honest with ourselves Gasoline companies set up service stations for people 10 So the -- yes we used asbestos there 11 in chop form in the tower and the asbestos workers 12 and the aniline wood workers both were required 13 to wear respirators The guy had a respirator on 14 by the way that was in the tower when we dropped 15 him out 16 Q. The use of asbestos at the 17 Springfield Massachusetts plant is that 18 something that you yourself monitored 19 A. Yes I did I took samples up there eae 20 on that -- that whole system where they went back 28 21 through and I'll bet -- we did it until they quit 22 making phenolics there which was years ago by 23 the way 24 Q. Yes sir 25 A. I was in a place that made -- one of ser 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 our customers made equipment to cremate people and they used a lot of plastic there too but that's beside the point That had nothing to do with this Q. Have you learned that any of the people at the Springfield Massachusetts plant that worked with asbestos have come down with asbestos disease A. I've learned that there -- I have not learned that any have Now the best -- you best ask Dr. Kelly that now but to those -- in those days I never heard of one but when I first went to Springfield they had very strong rules and regulations connected with their -- with that operation and that was before there was really a big organized central health and safety group Q. That would have been in the mid 50s A. Yeah Q. At the Springfield plant that you visited Mr. Garrett in the mid 50s do you recall if there were any other kinds of control techniques being used besides just wearing respirators for asbestos A. No they were taking samples Q. They were 112 A. Yes The crank samples yeah H remember the hemocytometer we used to use to 113 count You remember Q. Yes sir Yes sir A. Pain in the butt Q. Were there ventilation systems being used at Springfield A. Yes We had -- as you probably know Monsanto owned half interest in a plant next to 10 the Monsanto plant there 11 That was half owned by a company -- a 12 big power company in Canada and that plant we 13 did work and dealt with the parent company in 14 Toronto I believe or Montreal I guess it was Pa 15 with the other -- because they were a partner in + = 16 it Little bit more -- you'll remember it because 17 it had to be done with the other partner 18 That is -- and I guess each -- both 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 owned half and the agreement was that they were power plant operators up in Canada They owned much of the power out of the falls and the government bought that out and we had a deal in the contract that if the government bought it out we could buy out their part of that plant and we did and it became part of the Springfield plant And they had -- they made resin 114 materials there more than just raw material They actually made certain kinds of resins and a great many specialty resins in that plant And we -- and we - they were just like they -- the Monsanto plant regardless of who owned them Q. And they were using asbestos as part of the specialty's formulations too C 10 A. They -- as near as I know We checked 11 it I did sampling in that plant at the request U 12 of the plant manager Did much sampling and we 13 used the old cytometer to count the squares ID 14 Q. Can you recall what you generally 15 found I know the numbers would not come to mind oot 16 but did you generally find that exposures were Sa 17 below the threshold limit values above near 18 A. We found -- I tell you the truth I 19 don't think I ever saw with that method a sample cs 20 that exceeded the TLV 21 Now the TLV shrank during the years i: 22 as you know and people began to dodge the use of 23 asbestos in some respects and probably rightly so 24 I don't argue the asbestos 25 manufacturers here because I'm saying that it's 11 11 [| 11 0 L BD\ [ fs esa i F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 better for them as well as everybody else If you 115 don't need it don't use it and I think probably in the 1950s that began to become the issue and we didn't -- we - I don't know that we did any great changes but wherever we didn't need it we didn't We stopped using it in a couple of operations at the East St. Louis plant but they finally went out of business anyway ... MR OLIVER Objection Q. So basically that's the application of one of the industrial hygiene principles of substitution A. Absolutely Eradication is a very good one too if you can get to it No it's senseless I think we probably -- I think the chemical industry by and large has solved more problems by removal and change than any other single issue Don't use the damn stuff Well how we going to do it Well you got research people tell them to find out how and oddly enough in very many cases they could find out There are other materials ] awere: b)e. lee L > oct ge7~ | ome cs 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 We use chopped rag in some of the damn 116 things In those specialty resins they made in that old plant the one that we finally bought the other half of when the government of Canada took over the power plants up there that plant used I don't know what -- God they used everything from old Maggy's drawers off -- as additives for various small batch operations and they were very clean and very neat about it but they -- you ask when are you going to make some kind of fender on some automobile that General Motor's wanted and this is what they wanted So who am I to argue with them Those specialty plants probably were the best knowledgeable plants that we had in connection with respirable dust of any kind and that plant did a very good job of I think probably -- if you want to know the truth in Texas I could get most dust sample out over there by the beach than I could anywhere else but in the plants that we tested dust in -- I tested some for the State of Texas one time and we were in a dust storm and I said You got to be kidding We ain't going to get anything but dust What do you want You're not going to find out anything with the state guy so we quit but out in west Texas on the 117 spray berry sic trend No I think we did -- I think we probably are lucky for two reasons One when I came to Monsanto the knowledge of asbestos was ens, pretty considerable They had the respirators To me they should have used respirators in doing other things too but they didn't but the asbestos man come by he always 10 had a respirator But some of the other people 11 did not who needed them too Not with the same 12 13 14 15 filter I don't mean that And that's what we did in the years I was there We got it to the point where a person was exposed to something he was either protected 16 or we changed the process 17 Q. I thought I heard you say something 18 earlier and tell me if I'm wrong but that 19 because a TLV was set at a certain level that E 20 what I think I heard you say is that that wasn't 21 what you maintained exposures at if you could get 22 lower you would ll 23 A. We tried the 50 percent I think a 24 lot of people did that I think you'll find a lot ee 25 of practicing industrial hygienists that -- where a Cad K... ee C [ DeT DD 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 you could do it Now we also had tied up some -- we fenced them off and tied them up so you 118 couldn't -- you couldn't get to them People couldn't get to them You could do that today a good deal better than you could with better instruments today You could get electronic switching gear that will open and close valves better than a man can That wasn't true in the old days and so we -- where you could do that we do it And I think our safety design people have come a long way in the years I -- well hell we didn't even have any when I first came up to St. Louis but we do now and we've got a very first class group and I think they do a good job Q. What would be the rational that you were using in trying to look at 50 percent of the threshold limit values A. Well we would -- it just gave you -- all it did was gave them a way to look at their counter thing and say That's within our standard It's 50 percent of the TLV if they wanted to use Ed that 119 Personally I'd just as soon it be zero but there's never -- I never saw a zero so I don't know what anybody's talking about when they say there was no exposure to anything if f it's in the county And in the chemical plants along the [ Texas area you can find anything you want to in the area I mean hell if you have got a good 10 enough sampler or good enough method you can ESS 11 practically find anything in very very minute = 12 amounts 13 Q. Was it your philosophy then Mr. 14 Garrett what I think I'm hearing you say is that 1 15 any exposure that wasn't absolutely necessary you be 16 ought to just not have OE 17 A. Absolutely and if there were -- if 18 the hazard was sufficient to justify the ES 19 manufacturer then the hazard was sufficient to ea 20 justify the construction of facilities where less 21 and less exposure could be possible in -- at 22 enclosed operations 23 When I -- you know these old four 24 unit chemical manufacturing houses where you've [ 25 got one unit on each corner of a processing ee operation where you walk in everybody's got them 120 First thing we did was we stripped the concrete down and boy you talk about having a hissy and the hissy was because they'd get cold or get rained on but why put an envelope over that damn thing to encourage that [ If you have an accident and a leak get the damn building down so we took more buildings down than you can shake a stick at and 10 caught hell from the plant manager because It's 11 going to get cold and we're going to have to 12 insulate better and we're going to have to do this 13 and that 14 But we took a lot of buildings down 15 and particularly in the old organic processing 16 plants 17 Q. That was to minimize exposures 18 A. Well where you had an accident 19 Hell we blew a valve every once in a while so 20 did everybody else that I know of and the process 21 to follow that up is one hell of a mess inside 22 I'll tell you what I saw one time was i 23 one where there was a darn flammable leak inside 24 of one of those four unit buildings and they 25 handled -- well but the point is if something Goo fc D D D 7S Es &#s Ee Gr ct ec ia pai 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 would have happened and ignited that it would have blown those other three processes to pieces too and my God only knows what's in those processes So we got them in that plant -- that process got the plant to remove most of the brick and the concrete and support it with steel and most of them if you find today in a multipurpose multiprocess unit operation petroleum or chemical you won't find any buildings Buildings is where the foreman's office is and where their damn coffee machine is and where their card punching machine is and where most of the bitching goes on but the fact is the processes are sitting out in the open in open racks which is a -- the greatest thing that ever happened in the chemical industry and the petroleum industry Q. Would you recall Mr. Garrett if Monsanto's plants in the 50s when insulating work was going on if it required the removal of old insulation if that was done wet or not A. I saw a whole system being done down at our Chocolate Bayou plant and it was wetted down but -- as a matter of fact they had the sprinklers on it Guy worked in water all over 122 the place You in a way you got me in a trap I don't know whether I agree with that or not and I'll tell you the reason Unless that water is wer trapped and carefully gotten rid of you could I spread that damn asbestos from here to hell and foe ee back and when it dries everybody is going to get asbestos 10 If you take care of it properly fine 11 but that means where does that water go How are 12 you going to trap it when you're messing around 13 with a rack in the middle of the plant 14 Have you got a ditch dug over here 15 where you're going to trap it So you can take 16 that stuff out so it doesn't dry on the ground and 17 every truck and every man that walks by it helps 18 19 generate dust We had a hell of a mess over that 20 thing They finally decided that you couldn't do 21 that So they dry removed it The last part of 22 that same process at Chocolate Bayou was dry 23 removed 24 Yeah you have respirators on but the [ 25 majority of it was dry removed The rest of it aaie was sprayed down and into the gutters but the 123 point is parts of the racks go over areas that are not well drained That was my point MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive again { MR BROWN To that last one MR OLIVER Yes to the entire Cd response of that last portion as well A. Goody for his side I realize I'm 10 giving you a lesson in industrial hygiene that 11 maybe you don't need 12 Q. No sir 13 A. That's my only way to answer the 14 questions 15 Q. That's exactly what I would hope that CO 16 you would do Along that line you're a certified ES 17 industrial hygienist Mr. Garrett 18 FS 19 A. Yes Q. And I would think you consider me 20 yourself to be a professional in that area 21 es 22 A. Yeah I do Q. And are so recognized by your peers a 23 A. I'm too blunt but I am not a very 24 good consultant ro 25 Q. Well perhaps that's what makes you a good consultant A. Well I told them first it was lousy 124 and they didn't like it I don't know any other way to tell them it MR FOGARTY Objection Leen Q. Mr. Garrett I've got about 12 o'clock Do you want to stop for lunch Give me a chance to get reorganized again here and see if 10 we can get -- A. This time let's take off all the 11 hardware so we don't pull the equipment apart 12 Deposition stood in luncheon recess 13 at approximately 12:00 p.m. and resumed at 14 approximately 1:37 p.m. 15 AFTERNOON SESSION 16 All parties present by and through EE 17 counsel and the witness JACK T. GARRETT having Ea 18 been previously sworn testifies further to wit 19 MS FLATT We're on record 20 Edward Carstarphen not present at 21 this time 22 CONTINUED DIRECT EXAMINATION 23 BY MR HOBSON 24 Q. Mr. Garrett during the luncheon 25 break I noticed something -- and perhaps we made a mistake this morning I was looking at your 125 resume and I'd asked you earlier about when you first went to work at Texas City and you looked on here and you told me October '53 and when I was looking back through your resume I noticed here where you had October '53 that's the date that you left Texas City and it shows you starting at Texas City in January 1950 and I wonder if about -- 10 A. January '50 is the right date I'm 11 sorry 12 Q. That's okay I might have rushed you 13 through that 14 A. I must have got the wrong You know C 15 I saw October of 1953. That's when I went to work 16 in '50 I graduated the University of Tennessee Es 17 in 1950 18 OURS Q. And so then it would have been in 1953 19 that you moved to St. Louis mT 20 A. To St. Louis yes oy 21 Q. While you were down in Texas City I ee any 22 wanted to ask you if you might remember names 23 from that facility Would you recall a Mr. 24 William F. Woolley 0-0-1-1 25 A. Name sounds familiar Woolley I can't place him Q. Would you recall a Dorothy Wilson A. Yes 126 Q. And how would you have known Dorothy Wilson sir A. Oh the name is familiar I don't know I can't place the place Dorothy Wilson Q. Were there occupational nurses at the plant 10 A. She was a nurse Yes bless her bec. 11 heart She was a -- she lanced a couple of dandy amen} 12 boils I had She was a nurse huh I couldn't 13 argue D 14 My wife is the nurse from St. -- from 15 Monsanto -- from here so I better keep quiet 16 That Dorothy was - Dorothy was the nurse huh er 17 Q. Would you recall a -- it's either 18 Marietta or Marita Pawlik w Pawlik 19 Powlik 20 A. No no can't recall that 21 Q. And how about a Douglas Pierce 22 e 23 A. Nope not readily 24 Q. Claude Hamilton 25 A. Hamilton Q. Yes sir A. Boy that don't tick a big bell but it rings a bell What was his -- Q. That's all I know about the gentleman sir 127 A. How about a Mr. B.D. DeWalt e capital W A. DeWalt plant I think He was an engineer in the 10 Q. Would you recall any of his 11 activities any of his duties 12 A. No not specifically 13 Q. What was the safety engineer or safety 14 person's name 15 A. Mooney -- 16 Q. Mooney 17 A. -- Stalling 18 Q. Stalling 19 A. Stallings 20 Q. Stallings 21 A. I think it's the plural name but it 22 doesn't make any difference It's Stallings or 23 Stalling n I believe is his name 24 Q. Do you remember attending the Gulf 25 Coast Regional Conference on industrial health in Houston when you first joined the company A. I've been to so darn many of them I think I remember that name of that outfit I 128 think I gave a paper at one of their meetings but I don't know where it was It was a discussion of the toxicology of fish to various kinds of cyanides Q. Would you recall a Florence Andrews A. What 10 Q. Florence Andrews 11 A. Florence Andrews No. 12 Q. How about a Mr. Fred L. James 13 m 14 A. Not good there either 15 Q. In your work for Monsanto Mr. 16 Garrett did you ever have any interface with the 17 ASA the American Standards Association later 18 became ANSI the American National Standards 19 Institute 20 A. No. I had -- I think we had some 21 dealings with them over a standard connected with rs 22 tank streaks one time but I don't remember what ss 23 it was about 24 Q. Are you familiar with what ASA [ 25 standards were ~ ~~ ~ Lak bal 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. Yeah some of them I am We used 129 them as everybody does I guess Q. Would you give me your best understanding of how ASA standards were in use in the 1950s A. They set down standards along with many other standard setting organizations for many many things that ultimately became safety related but weren't necessarily safety related initially and that's the strength of materials bursting strength of equipment that sort of thing And I think they set down standards -- for example they would set down an example of how bursting strength of a large tank or the bursting strength of a milk bottle for that matter because both of them can be hazardous and that has been my -- most standards are ASA standards of one kind or another A lot of construction standards Q. Would it be accurate to say that these ASA standards were the standards of good practice for industry at the time A. Partly but because industry had many agencies establishing standards better now than they used to be I think they're I think there were more people out setting standards in the old days than they were -- the petroleum people set standards for petroleum products and the chemical 130 people for chemical products and I don't know how many -- how -- you mess around with railroad equipment and you find out the railroads set their own standards if you want to know the truth about L the matter bation And they had their set of reasons for | 10 it I'm not -- really I'm not trying to in any ae 11 way derogate them I'm just saying that there are ene 12 so many different standard organizations that you 13 meet in construction or in transportation 14 Look at the standards established for 15 aircraft for example for passenger carrying 16 aircraft The same is true for railroads I wish FE 17 somebody'd enforced them but that's beside -- I 18 chased too many wrecks I guess FPS 19 Q. In the case of ASA standards would ea 20 those standards be something that Monsanto would 21 have been looking to and relying upon in their 22 work 23 24 25 A. For construction materials probably but I don't think they'd look forward to ASA to set any kind of health standards I think there D EQo ate al oa) a nst@ Es 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 are too many much better equipped and better educated agencies to set those including some federal and state agencies Q. Well for instance are you familiar with ANSI -- 131 A. Yes Q. -- or ASA standards for respiratory protection A. Yes I am now Q. Was that one of the safety or -- A. One of the -- yes and one of the ones that established the pressure cushions on masks and so forth Yes I agree No. We used the word ANSI I don't know Q. Is the ANSI -- A. American National Standards Q. Is the ANSI standard for respiratory protection one that you felt was not a good one for ANSI because it was health related A. No not necessarily No not necessarily I -- to tell you the truth the standard setting associ- -- people that I knew that we did most of the early work with for standards in handling products probably came from manufacturers or from the MCA the then MCA now 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CMA and the American Petroleum Institute group I worked with them too I was a member of one of their committees one of their medical committees 132 I would be more inclined -- now for strength of materials and stuff like that the standards established by the health agencies probably took into account any standards that were otherwise required We used probably more than anything else used the TLV list We put many things on the TLV list did the work and established them there And we put some in the CMA's guide books and we put some -- we did some of the work that ultimately led to standards from the Petroleum -- American Petroleum Institute And their -- they also put out daily sheets And this is many years ago They put out daily sheets chemical safety data sheet that's what you call them was put out by the Manufacturing Chemists Association The API put out a whole series of data sheets on things that were largely petroleum related | awe aS seca. E The drug people put some out as well 133 These were raw material drugs These were not -- because they had to put out very detailed ones for approval on drugs that were being used by people So the agencies involved that we were most involved with that I've been most involved _ with were probably the TLV committee of the MCA -- I mean of the American Industrial Hygiene Association the MCA committee work that backed up 10 a lot of the chemicals 11 We established the data for some 12 chemicals that went to the MCA and from the MCA =) 13 went to -- went to - ultimately set the standard 14 in the -- for PCBs for example and for some of 15 the nitro and amine compounds 16 So the agencies I'm most frequently -- & 17 most familiar with were probably the government rs 18 agencies and they took their numbers from most of 19 these committees or agencies established by wee 20 individual manufacturing groups like the MCA and 21 the API and there are a lot of others that do j 22 these drug people 23 So that's where most frequently I 24 think most of the standards that are currently 25 used probably came out of a composite of these aca ACBE ean ol D DD 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 agencies 134 Q. Did any of your work whether it was with these agencies or these organizations that you mentioned about or through Monsanto did they bring you in contact with any of the insulation manufacturers or their employees A. Probably but the trouble is that the particular committee was established for specific -- the specific business and the -- any insulation manufacturers would have been ancillary to the primary business of chemicals or petroleum products But in any case their standards were always put forth to the -- to the TLV committee of the American Industrial Hygiene Association Q. Do you recall meeting any of the employees from the insulation manufacturers A. Oh I knew -- I knew a guy who was a member of the American Industrial Hygiene Association friend of mine that worked for oh the big -- big asbestos manufacturer on the west coast Well the one that got sued to death Q. Well there have been several A. I'm sure they were Q. Fibreboard ; U Co fo Ee 0 c= DD Co Ea q E E 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. No. 135 Q. Manville A. Manville I knew those people two of their people Q. Do you recall their names A. Good Heaven's no My recall of incidents is fine My recall of names is zero Q. Can you tell me under what circumstances you remember meeting those folks A. Well I met them in a meeting somewhere I think it was -- I think it was probably a AIT meeting on standards somewhere I don't recall where it was Probably one of the national meetings Some gentleman came in and it was not Zucker} Q. You've been talking about several organizations and I wanted to try to make sure we're talking about the right one the same one together TLVs are levels -- A. Threshold limit values Q. Yes sir Those are set by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists A. Governmental Industrial Hygienists 136 yes Q. The ACGIH A. With most of the input from AIHA and their -- and the people that manufactured that material I've been involved in that many times Q. Now when you say you were involved in committees that had to do with TLVs then the committees you worked with were in the American 10 Industrial Hygiene Association 11 A. The IHA that's right 12 Q. Not the American Conference 13 Governmental Industrial -- 14 A. No but we dealt with them because 15 they were the regulators and we gave them the es 16 data We dug up half the data They come to us 17 and ask us for data on this and that or something 18 else particularly some of the oddballs ea 19 The AIHA published a little series of i ia 20 booklets or data sheets of their own and we set 21 the standards for the PCBs and some of the others 22 gave them the data we had which was extensive 23 particularly in our manufacturing data and -- so 24 we've dealt with all of them and it turned out to 25 be the standard that was established on the TLV C r Fa esa Nen ed 7 i 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 list 137 Q. You did say earlier I think that you -- I think Monsanto put things on the TLV list is that right A. We put -- we were asked frequently where we had -- we were one of the manufacturers of chemical products -- to help develop TLVs with the -- with the TLV committee of the AIHA which dealt with the committee of the association We said -- we did this on products that we were primary manufacturer of or one of the primary We did the PCB work because we were the only one that made the PCBs And incidently our standards were accepted by the French and Britain -- German manufacturers of it too because we had enormous enormous amounts of information on the data on the exposure to those materials in our own manufacturing operations and we manufactured them at four different sites But anyway we did some of the others We were asked on -- particularly when they got to setting some of the standards on anilines and the chloroanilines the nitroanilines Monsanto's a primary manufacturer of aniline materials or was I don't know that 138 they still are or not and we did a lot of work on that because those things are dangerous son of a bucks MR FOGARTY Objection nonresponsive A. The chloroanilines were probably the most dangerous material I ever saw manufactured l Q. In that list of materials that you 10 just told me about that involved setting TLVS is C 11 there any one or one group of those that you had 12 particular responsibility for more than any 13 others 14 A. The PCBs we aid Elmer P. Wheeler and 15 I did the PCBs and wrote the backing for it You 16 have to write a backing sheet or a backing report 17 detailing where your data came from how much data 18 you have what your manufacturing facilities are 19 where they are and so forth what regulations you 20 feel are necessary to protect the health of the 21 people and what have you practiced in safe 22 handling and that's what we did 23 But in answering all those questions 24 we frequently got a lot of questions about 25 materials that you were not the primary manufacturer of but you manufactured it and had 139 some data and we dumped the data into -- any time they asked we dumped the data for them py One thing I loved about Monsanto I never got told not to by anybody any time ed en a anywhere Q. Was it so that for PCBs -- which I think you said you had direct responsibility for doing 10 A. I sure did 11 12 Q. Did you at Monsanto come up with a TLV number for PCBs then 13 A. We came up with a recommendation as to 14 the least -- what we considered the least 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 hazardous level that we had seen in manufacturing practice The unhappy part of it is we'd never seen any hazard in manufacturing and we told the committee this but we also gave them copies of all of our detailed toxicological research work including long term tests Q. So you had some animal datas that were sent 24 25 A. Oh yes we had two year data on that So we turned it over to -- incidentally we turned it over to the -- to the OSHA too 140 Q. About how many people were involved in manufacturing PCBS over the years A. Oh God five hundred No four hundred probably Wait a minute One two three -- we manufactured PCBs in Anniston Alabama in East St. Louis Illinois and originally at the plant in Missouri the old home plant in small quantities there The test 10 materials came out of there but the manufacturing 11 levels were at East St. Louis and in Anniston Ca al 12 Alabama ES 13 A The Anniston plant was shut down for a 14 reasons -- if you saw it you'd understand why ee 15 We had no way of taking care of any waste there at erKe with 16 all We had a hell of a time it 17 Now somebody would build a 18 phosphorous manufacturing plant out in the middle 19 of no place We had a creek about this wide We hi 20 finally ended up owning it and putting tile in and 21 making it a sewer which we tested checked and Fs 22 treated and finally they give up ee 23 So we moved The only plant in the 24 latter years of the manufacturing of PCBs were cS 25 done in -- at East St. Louis Illinois and we had | aes ae Sica a manufacturing plant in Europe and I believe 141 that was in Belgium but I'm not sure Q. I'm curious to know what kind of logic you used in coming up with your recommendations for TLV for PCBs How did you do that A. Well it was difficult to do We looked at the toxicology with long term studies with rats and acute studies with several species Seeonde rats rabbits and guinea pigs although we rarely oo 10 used guinea pigs Rats rabbits and we had a 11 third -- a third specie I can't even remember 12 what it was 13 And we tested from these data -- by 14 the way it's not very toxic as you can easily 15 imagine From these data we calculated based on 16 the most sensitive animal -- and the most 17| 18 sensitive I believe was a rat -- what it would be if we took tenth of that and if that -- we 19 felt that would be hazardous 20 Based on our experience with our 21 maintenance people primarily we figured that was 22 probably correct So that's essentially how we 23 set it 24 Q. In what kinds of programs do you 25 recall having to deal with the maintenance people to observe what kind of medical problems they 142 might have experienced A. Well we went through and sampled We sampled PCBs in those areas And incidently we had a hell of a time doing it because we never found very much The stuff as you know unless you're -- it's very hot is a syrupy material to start with It's diluted in using it in transformer 10 cases for example 11 It's not -- you say the electrical 12 people do this They don't They dilute it and 13 there's what's known as transformer fluids are 14 made and these are mixtures of PCBs different 15 numbers different chlorinated types and bland 16 solvents nonflammable if -- as much as possible 17 because PCBs were not flammable 18 rs They were used in places where you 19 were -- it was well to take a little care because ps 20 they were used in tight places 21 Q. I take it that in doing the animal mrey 22 toxicology work that these test animals would be 23 exposed to different doses of the material and | | 24 then you would look at the animals to see what cree 25 kind of biological effects were present we eset ve i 143 A. That is correct That's correct The reason we used multiple species is because we wanted to know if there was anything -- we'd never seen a case with our own people We'd - the only , y t. manufacturer of PCBs and the work in the U.S. was ve Monsanto And the only manufacturer in Europe I [ believe was Rhone Poulenc and oh Leber Quesin a German company in Leber Quesin Made in Leber 10 Quesin What the hell was the name of the 11 company Bs scacemnid =rane 12 But anyway make -- but we dealt with 13 them too by the way The people from Germany 14 came over to talk to us and we were over in 15 Europe talked to them and talked also to -- they | 16 had a toxicologist 17 One of the great toxicologists of the 18 world was a German that worked for Bayer and we 19 talked to them ~-- wasn't any sense in talking to 20 the French as you probably already know so we 21 talked to Germans 22 They came over and talked to us 23 looked at our data and they felt that our 24 standard was pretty severe They didn't think ee 25 anybody would ever exceed it but they thought it Sea ast C oe wey _m Coo QA L i aa 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 was pretty severe based on the data 144 But that's the general sense of how it happened Q. In doing these laboratory animal studies I take it that the exposure to the animal would be monitored over their exposure time period of years A. These lifetime studies yes There's no -- no basis in acute studies going to help you except it gives you an idea of when to start running and if you exceed X number of -- you'd have a hell of a time getting that much PCB It would be like drinking too much Karo syrup It's very difficult very - doesn't -- it isn't very volatile But anyway we tested it and we worked with the toxicology laboratory We did not do it ourselves We never did any of our own toxicology work We did it with contract labs Q. Were the animals exposed by having them breathe it or by putting it on their skin A. We breathed We both breathed We pasted it on their skin the abdomen that had been shaved using a standard transfer to see if it was absorbed through the intact skin and inhalate -- inhalation 145 We did everything but duck them in it i I didn't do it We did it -- had it done by our contract people and we used the University of Cincinnati a lot We used two private labs that -- out on the east coast a lot We had an acute place in St. Louis that did acute work pret nearly exclusively for us and for Mallinckrodt and maybe a couple of 10 other people 11 Q. Now the workers who made PCBs that 12 were Monsanto employees about what time period 13 would Monsanto have made PCBs 14 A. From about 1935 to about 1985 15 Q. And I take it that at least for some 16 of that about fifty year time period there would 17 have been no monitoring data to determine 18 exposures to the Monsanto -- esa 19 A. Well we didn't -- we did monitoring es 20 but we didn't get anything and we did -- we took 21 monitors on the people Fs 22 In the first place the process was an Ee 23 enclosed -- tight enclosed process and it required 24 very few people Actually the guy that ran it [ 25 sat in a control room with dials and adjusted the i. Ke sstaat tina | t ORLR } see | ee 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 temperatures and the pressures 146 The only person that ever got any exposure after we cooled it shut it down depressurized it was the people that did the maintenance on it and it was those people that we tracked more often than anybody else We never found any problem We thought you might get a rash and irritation because of the chlorinated contact but we never did that either but we never got enough exposure either I don't suppose Q. And I take it that these employees that would have been making the PCBs at Monsanto that included the maintenance workers as well as the operations people A. If the maintenance workers at the Krummrich plant was assigned by region -- but it isn't fair because they might -- if this regional maintenance group had too many pipefitters they went over here So you're talking -- if you went and looked at the standard workers including fitters and insulators and the whole bunch would be -- could be transferred from group to group but they probably stayed within their own craft shell because this was a -- this was a united chemical 147 workers plant and they used individual recognized crafts which we could care less I don't you know an insulator's an i insulator whether he's working under what union cond rules and these people would frequently be transferred from unit to unit and would be used from this unit to this if this unit was down for maintenance to help it bring it down and make sure 10 it's -- they don't dump all that stuff in the 11 creek because it would do a creek no good 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 It would separate and you'd have two levels in the creek The fish may like the top level and they may not like the bottom level In any case this is how we did it The people that worked on it were oddly enough -- the plant was pretty large the one at Kearny The one at Anniston was smaller in 19 output Pretty much the same 20 The one at Krummrich was built after 21 the one in Anniston so it had a few modern 3 22 conveniences like flushing toilets maybe but 23 otherwise the thing -- the people themselves had 24 very little exposure to anything 25 We tested with standard organic fluid testing materials and found -- I don't think we ever found any or very little It's not easy to analyze these things by the way credit for that I'll give you 148 It's damn difficult to analyze for i j very tightly chlorinated compounds You got to ro i break them down somehow and knock that chlorine out of there so you can test -- you can test a sample for it So it really is a pretty tough 10 11 analysis But as far as we were concerned based 12 on what we saw in many many thousand acute tox 13 tests and many many hundreds of long term tox 14 tests that's probably the most innocuous material U 15 we ever tested U 16 I hate -- I know they'll holler PCBs 17 Let them holler They're going to burn this soil L 18 out here in St. Louis sure as God made green 19 apples They better crank that little dude up i 20 pretty high to be able to burn those chlorinated 21 hydrocarbons out of there but if they want to 22 fine it's done because it couldn't possibly hurt 23 anybody 24 Q. Now is it your experience or can you 25 tell me Mr. Garrett is this how other TLVs have  1 11 [ rn L L e Boe D D D 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 been set historically 149 A. In most TLV committees and I've been on a couple of them you gather any information you can from any kind of literature source and if you've got a lot of good buddies you can get a whole lot of them to look in some literature that you don't normally have particularly medical literature that you don't maybe have access to particularly foreign medical journals which they don't really have Most of their stuff is if it's for safety or health control reasons it's in the medical journals If you had somebody that could read French and read French journals regularly or -- we had a man in Europe that did the German journals for us Get all this junk dumped into the committee all these pieces and bits of information and then get a detailed tox study which we did detailed long term tox study lifetime term and a whole mass of short terms in various types of animals and all of this together it begins to look like probably it ought to be thus and so and then you begin haggling and arguing about it and a bunch of people that are 150 highly skilled and trained in this business -- and these are not hygienists These are almost exclusively toxicologists that do this maybe a medical doctor or two thrown in and they come up with the answer My personal opinion is they've done one hell of a good job and by the way our TLVS 10 are copied by everybody in the world [ [ 11 Q. And the TLVs that ultimately get ry 12 published by the American Conference of 13 Governmental Industrial Hygienists those are put 14 forth as levels that it's believed that most 15 workers won't suffer ill effects not all workers 16 right 17 MR FOGARTY Objection leading a 18 Sir: A. Well I don't know I've never heard 19 of a TLV in no one and we certainly would never i ci 20 recommend and we recommend -- many -- any TLV that 21 is in the area that even causes a symptom OF 22 whatever it is me 23 We don't want that to happen You D 24 don't have to have it happen today with modern DD 25 equipment leane >fi D CO Fo BFS eS wd 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 You can't run a backyard chemical 151 plant anymore with a bunch of castoff kettles and believe me there were a lot of those when I first come into this business You can't do that These things are in triple out -triple layered stainless steel containers with everything running through multiple dials and pressure guages pressure drop guages concentration guages and everything you can measure It just doesn't make any sense to put it out If you can smell it there's too much There's too much That was the old rule That old rule had a hell of a lot of sense to it It had a hell of a lot of sense to it Q. I'm sorry I didn't understand The old rule being what A. The old rule it used to be the old rule was if you can smell it it's too much Hell you've heard that for God's sakes Lord knows we used it enough times in the old days That is not true There is a lot of stuff -- I mean that is probably as good as you can get but you're going to get below that if you ae Ee ~ ~ ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 do these full tox studies and we did them not only once but we did them more than once in multitude of animals We should have shalalied enough about it We got Q. So what you're saying is the old rule was if you can smell it it's for sure too much and -- 152 A. Or you could feel it that's right That's the old rule and it served fairly well Not good enough by any stretch Q. And now as things have progressed the fact that you can't smell it is not good enough A. Well the old rule worked for toxic immediate effects acute effects It never would work for the subtle effects of long term exposure no And that's the reason we did the long term tests If our own processes -- any time we manufactured a new chemical that we were going to market for whatever reason we did the full tests and it's strange there are some we withdrew We did not think they were -- we thought they were too toxic in some kinds of toxicity that might -- and we withdrew They weren't that happy a compromise of the materials alreadoyn the market Q. Getting back for a second to TLVS The TLVs that were in effect in the 1950s and 153 1960s it's pretty clearly stated isn't it that those TLVs were intended to protect most of the workers but not necessarily all the workers A. Well I never heard it put that way I think -- I think in my company I'd have been fired if I'd have used that term at all 10 Q. How is that sir 11 A. Well the old man wouldn't have it 12 You're going to protect all of my workers or you 13 aren't going to protect -- or you're going to 14 go -- we'll find somebody who can or we'll quit 15 making it and that's the way we worked 16 You'll find Kelly will tell you that U 17 tomorrow I think 18 es Q. Is that one of the reasons why you 19 weren't satisfied just to meet a TLV that you 20 wanted 50 percent or even less 21 A. Well we didn't even -- that -- you 22 got to give yourself credit Every safety 23 margin -- look at the number of materials that 24 you've seen through the years in your professional 25 experience that have suddenly became more toxic [ ASUDANE ROZKR ASUDANE r- e [ [ [[ 12 1212 by [ na ua Moa oot because of some specific effect on some specific organ that took years to develop and by that time you're too far into it to help some of them so we didn't want to do that 154 We've always been pretty cautious We by the way have our own toxicology groups at Monsanto that supervise all these studies We do some of the toxic -- the acutes ourselves We don't any more We used to We 10 do -- now these professional toxicologists do the 11 supervisory work with the people that do the work 12 Q. If I understood what you were saying 13 there then because it's known that as more and 14 more work gets done new effects are discovered 15 and so the prudent thing to do even though 16 there's a TLV is to minimize the exposure as much 17 as you can -- 18 A. Absolutely 19 Q. -- because you never know when the new 20 effects are going to come out 21 A. That is correct 22 MR FOGARTY Objection leading also 23 mischaracterizing his testimony 24 MR BLANK Do you have some problem 25 with leading an adverse witness I mean is there >fi >fi came [ [[ [; i [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 some wierd rules that you're working under that make that a reasonable objection MR FOGARTY I don't think that this witness is an adverse witness 155 Monsanto MR BLANK Oh I forgot we sued Excuse me It must be a mistake THE WITNESS while you fight Do you want me to go out Q. No sir We're just trying to figure out why these unnecessary interruptions seem to be happening A. Can you possibly hold it off for minute so that we can have a -- a break to go to the john Q. Absolutely sir A. Okay Please mark too MR OLIVER I object to the last side MR HOBSON absolutely sir Which one the Temporary recess was held MS FLATT We're on record Q. Mr. Garrett before our break we were somewhat into a discussion on TLVs I think You said that the concept of protecting most workers was something that you didn't think would go over well at Monsanto 156 MR FOGARTY Object to the mischaracterization of the testimony Q. Well tell me if that's wrong then A. That was right I don't think that if it's possible to determine the end effect no effect level that you don't do it Q. Okay I'm not sure I understood what ad 10 you're saying I don't want somebody else to say eang 11 I mischaracterized it so explain to me what you M prvmens sos 12 mean by that please 13 A. If you can determine the no effect 14 level of the material whatever it takes you 15 should do it That's my opinion 16 L L Q. Can you tell me talking about 17 materials for which there are TLVs are those no 18 effect levels 19 A. Many of them are 20 Q. How about asbestos 21 A. I don't know I have nothing to do 22 with setting that standard It was already on the 23 books when I came around and we abided by it so I [ 24 don't really know about that [ 25 You might go back and check whoever ites did it and find out what they did and how they did it 157 Q. So you just wouldn't know one way or the other -- A. No. Q. -- whether asbestos was a no effect level or not A. It's been set so long and been practiced so many years that I didn't -- we just 10 didn't argue it We used it and that served us 11 well as far as I can surmount 12 Q. Now you were talking about the use of 13 PCBs and how Monsanto being the only U.S. 14 manufacturer that you were involved in putting 15 PCBs on a TLV list 16 Did you feel that at Monsanto that 17 you in fact did establish a no effect level for 18 PCBs OES 19 A. Based on the years we had manufactured ee 20 it and the yearly physical exams of the men that 21 worked it for years and years we think we es 22 established a no effect level yes 23 Q. . And do you feel Mr. Garrett that 24 that's the manufacturer's responsibility to find a 25 no effect level if there is one A. That's an onion I'd just as soon not 158 bite into I don't know how you mean by that If a manufacturer does not help establish the standards of the materials that he's manufacturing that are going to expose someone else I think they should help at least Q. And how would you advise today in your consulting practice a manufacturer to help set TLVs find no effect levels 10 ad A. Well if there is enough literature in aon 11 the tox or medical or industrial hygiene 12 literature to establish -- to show specific finite 13 levels and their effect or no effect on workers 14 then it should be looked up and it should be used al 15 in a judgment that goes behind all standards 16 We've judged wrong in some standards COS 17 Everybody has I think you'll find that looking 18 at the records hU6e 19 Then I think whoever manufactured has fs 20 the responsibility of taking these data and 21 filling in the gaps with his own data and coming FS 22 up with a summary that says thus and so is the i 23 case and that it is as near as we can determine 24 a no effect level or whatever you want to es 25 determine 159 Q. And if there are gaps to be filled and the data doesn't exist should the manufacturer attempted to test to fill those gaps A. Yes I think so Q. Are there situations Mr. Garrett where it's just not possible to find a no effect level for chemicals or for materials A. I guess you could say that a material that is inherently a corrosive is probably going 10 to subcutaneously effect the skin of a human being 11 in some ways [ [[[ 12 Now your point is well made in that 13 you're talking about where is the end of this 14 affair going to -- where is it going to end up 15 There are ways of testing the very very minute 16 effects of corrosives for example on skin 17 Your question is okay If those C 18 exceeding the minute effects is that the one you C 19 want to set for your standard If it's possible 20 to be set at the level that doesn't effect the 21 standard Now that's not always possible H 22 won't buy that 23 Q. What about at -- 24 A. Let's look at petroleum for example 25 Let's look at the ordinary gasoline and what happens to this from the flammability standpoint 160 I mean you can't -- you've got to do -- a lot of a oS | professional judgment has got to go into these standards It just happens that in the case of the PCBs we couldn't find any effect at all Q. In the case of materials that can cause cancer do you believe it's possible to find a no effect level that will protect everyone 10 A. Everyone 11 Q. Yes sir 12 A. No. In my -- if this is a -- if this 13 is an active reactive chemical that can cause 14 cancer can you get a level that won't cause 15 cancer in anybody in the world 16 I don't think you could do it by any EE 17 normal toxicological means and any of the 18 mathematical means of calculating the effect based Ps 19 on the positives negatives and nulls I don't we 20 think you can 21 So that you've got to -- again you're Bers 22 back on the judgment base and everybody that 23 stands on the judgment base is going to get shot 24 at So I don't know [ 25 Q. Do you hold Mr. Garrett to the POPETeS opinion that workers should be told if they're working with materials that can cause cancer A. You damn right 161 Q. How long have you felt that way And I take it you feel that way fairly strongly A. At the number of lectures I've given to worker groups at Monsanto and to other groups at request largely somebody requesting through some president of Monsanto I would say from 10 day one that they should be told [ [ 11 Now they should have some good -- and 11 12 this is one of the biggest problems You brought 13 the best one up that you can bring up and that's 14 cancer You've got to preeducate your people as 15 to what these levels mean and what they are 16 For example if you can create cancer 17 with one molecule I don't know how you'd ever 18 prove it 19 Second if you can create cancer with 20 levels of way below the level that causes any 21 other discernable effect I don't know whether you 22 could justify that because I don't think you'd 23 ever develop a cancer enough to do it because in 24 cancer studies you've got to have more than one 25 because you'll have ideopathic stuff occur and 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 boy you certainly will in some of them damn 162 beasts that they breed for that If you stomp on the floor 11 percent of them drop dead from something anyway so it's a difficult task Your question is well asked H don't know the answer to it I think that a good set of genuine systemic toxicological studies is the base of all this stuff When you get through that you find from a good set of diagnoses of the carcasses of what -- the effect it had If the beast died what did he die of An enlarged liver A ripped out esophagus or what And then back off from that situation and find out where the target probably is for that particular material and you'd be surprised incidently by what the targets are And then from that point try to evaluate it -- first evaluate whether it's needed or not If it isn't needed don't make it And believe me the chemical companies most of them that I know have turned down literally thousands of materials that people want them to make I know we have Monsanto t Baud ae)Ke J nn PS Ss Fs maz r [ Many many many times we've turned them down Will you make this for us 163 No you dummy Make it yourself because it's going to be highly hazardous and even the raw materials will cause cancer No we're not going to make it for you Why should we do it It would be foolish and would endanger our employees I don't know whether we really realize 10 how much good trained employees mean to a 11 manufacturing company and you frighten one of 12 them in a processing unit and you got coup 13 troubles in that processing unit You may never 14 meet quality again You just can't do it 15 And Monsanto -- and most companies I 16 know that I dealt with deep -- in very great 17 depth and this would probably be Dupont and Dow 18 and some others some of the good petroleum 19 companies Phillips the Standard oil groups and 20 I've dealt with both their -- back when they did 21 have a South American deal I even dealt with 22 those people 23 The point I'm trying to make is 24 there's a word called prudent and boy everybody 25 in this business whether it's safety industrial ID ID Cs C Ea 4 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 hygiene occupational medicine toxicology or 164 whatever it damn sure better understand what is prudent and what it means Q. What's it mean to you sir A. Is it prudent to manufacture Do you make enough money to pay for the corpses The answer is no nobody makes that much money So that's not prudent That isn't even smart Getting down below the smart level is it prudent to run the risk Evaluating risk is an exceedingly difficult task unless you've got a hell of a lot of data that shows what happened when something did go wrong and you almost never have that I think good prudence in the minds of good industrial medical personnel is probably good enough At least it's been my experience Now you can't grab these things out of the air Boy they -- and oddly enough some of the old TLVs probably were grabbed out of the air They have come M they have been grabbed out of the air with experience and some of them have played the same game They have turned out to be prudent standards Setting standards is my idea of running in a three wheel car I don't think 165 you're going to get there without at least some accidents You're going to drag that wheel somewhere It just isn't possible to do it \! You can run down to the -- as low as you can go and you've got to run two years in rats and then you find out nothing happened or H that something did happen What are you going to 10 do go back another two years on another That's 11 the only way to do it unless you're spread and | Senen ania 12 boy you don't know 13 The other thing that fouls you up is 14 the differences in the toxic manifestation at 15 different levels [ 16 Hell at one level it kills you 17 because it blows out your respiratory system and Ps 18 down here much lower it kills you for something 19 else We better know that too That's also 2S 20 prudence in testing 21 The other thing is to be prudent is -- [ 22 into the prudent equation requires the how are 23 they going to use it and how are they going to 24 make it 25 How much personal contact can be had Seu in the manufacturing and can you eliminate that in 166 the proper manufacturing Comes under the prudent argument No I -- when we had anything to say about it and we had a lot to say about it from | time to time -- by the way we didn't make a whole lot of people happy sometimes either but if the industrial hygiene or industrial physicianist thinks he's going to make his boss happy all the 10 time he's crazy He's not going to function 11 It's tough to go into a big meeting 12 where we're going to manufacture Alpha Baloney A 13 and it's going to solve the world's problems and D D 14 you walk in and say No. 15 Co 16 Es 17 Boy I've done it I know What do you mean Peace 18 And then we start that scare business es 19 How would you like to have cancer How many times oe 20 you been asked that I wouldn't like to ever have 21 it Anybody'd be an idiot that would Fs 22 So the answer is use good data use ma 23 prudence use experience and believe it or not [ 24 sometimes you might be wrong [[ 25 MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive 1 fi" Q. A. there Is it best to -- What is that babbling going on down 167 Q. I think you've identified it sir A. Okay Q. Is it also prudence that in considering what steps to take that one should pe ave | error on the side of caution when possible MR FOGARTY Objection leading 10 A. Probably I think what you need to do 11 is assemble all the data you've got all the data 12 anybody else has got and you know as well as I do 13 within the chemical industry or within the 14 petroleum industry you can probably pretty well 15 get the data L 16 I don't think -- we never have held it 1 17 up from anybody We've sent bundles -- used to 18 send - if you had a regular bundle and PCB must 19 have been that thick and we got questions from ws 20 Denmark and all over the world 21 We sent them a bundle and let them put [ 22 their prudence in motion There used to be an old 23 statement -- how did it go In the mind's a 24 prudent man thus and so Okay 25 If prudence doesn't play a part in it raee eed - to [i r La ro 3 U [ D DD [ f: i [ i m [ es catael F : el 168 1 I don't think we know from half the things we use 2 now We've got enormous experience with them We 3 don't know how much because nobody's ever touched 4 that subject to find out how many hours of work 5 hours have been assembled 6 We've been doing that to -- in some of 7 the newer chemicals and the number of working 8 hours that are assembled become immense in a big 9 operation where you've got a big maintenance group 10 and a big production group and a big handling in 11 your handling and packaging group It's an 12 enormous number of hours I don't think anybody 13 ever realized that before 14 We did some at our Chocolate Bayou 15 plant We were running -- what did we do How 16 many people get it How many hours of exposures 17 Exposures ran unto the zillions of hours 18 Did we get anybody hurt Okay You 19 go through the medical records You go through 20 the records of your dispensary You go see your 21 safety people You go through your hygiene and 22 occupational medical people if you've got them , 23 And you find out together no we've 24 had no problems We got fourteen million man 25 hours of work in with no problems develop All right The equation now is beginning to solve some of the prudence that's needed Frequently we can't do that 169 What are you going to do about that same manufacturing before you started it There's where the problem comes in I don't know how to solve it We did what we thought - we would put 11 our own sons to manufacture That's the best 11 10 standard I've ever known Would that be where 11 you'd let your own kid do it 12 Q. If you were assembling the literature 13 on a particular material that already had a TLV 14 established and you found an exposure reported in 15 the published literature that was below the TLV 16 and associated with that exposure there was 17 disease what would that mean to you 18 A. If you could -- if you could establish 19 that in fact that was true that the standards 20 should be changed 21 Q. Would it at least be a red flag to you 22 to pay more attention 23 A. It would be a red flag to your 24 prudence it certainly would But the trouble 25 with that is how many pieces of data have you seen FF eae that contain sufficient safeguards to be accurate and honest I don't know I don't know I'm asking you because 170 Q. The prudent thing to do though would be at least to pay attention to that and -- A. I would think so yes Q. -- and further work would be indicated then to establish whether or not that TLV is variable 10 A. If it's possible or if the further 11 work wouldn't do anything more than duplicate 12 what's already been done because you're talking 13 two years at least and probably more than that if 14 you're looking at exposure to dust 15 Q. And if you're talking about looking at 16 exposures to human populations you may be looking 17 at a working lifetime before you know the answer 18 fait,sa A. You may also be looking at a 19 population that has a certain level of exposure 20 significantly as -- by simply being alive 21 particularly in cities 22 Have you ever done any of these 23 curbside tests 24 Eo 25 [ [ Q. Nodding head A. Oh boy You can find anything at the I curbside You've got a product How did it get there I haven't the vaguest damn notion how some 171 of them got there te Some complicated organic identifiable chemicals can be obtained on the corner of a busy street corner How did they get there I don't know They're there It's from the combustion of gasoline at various levels of auto maintenance various 10 heats of engine various slides of tires skidding 11 tires and all the rest of the crap in the world L 12 including asbestos from fading brake shoes So I 13 don't know 14 From the standpoint of intelligent : imeonane 15 prudent people you've got to set some kind of L 16 method of doing this or quit manufacturing EC 17 anything 18 es Okay If you decide not to do that 19 then you're going to have to make some kind of i 20 planned approach to these things and at some point 21 in the data collection time you're going to have 22 to say The data looks like it's okay so we'll do i 23 it or we won't do it That's my only way I 24 don't know any other way to do it 25 Now if you find out as you pointed Ex iew end [ oorrn D DD : out that that selection is not doing the job 172 then it should be reevaluated but you better have some damn good substantiated data Q. Is what you're saying Mr. Garrett is it before a professional industrial hygienist ought to think about recommending a TLV be changed that you have to have very well substantiated data to make the challenge A. Oh that depth -- that would be 10 difficult to make a good answer to that If I 11 were in a -- if I were working with something that 12 would cause end -- untreatable and noncorrectable 13 disablement I wouldn't use any You couldn't do 14 it at all 15 You'd have to use a triple standard 16 You'd have to use your own judgment the data you 17 see your own experience with materialosf similar 18 type and a good deal of trained prudence 19 Q. So the higher the risk of use of the 20 product and the more likely that outcome can't be 21 reversed the more careful you have to be in using 22 the product 23 MR OLIVER Objection leading 24 Q. Is that right 25 A. Now in the -- during the war the government made people manufacture things that were just plain hazardous I'm sorry but they 173 were just plain hazardous I don't know Was that right I don't think so but they did it We -- they manufactured more gasses that you couldn't -- you can't manufacture without some problems But like we always said somebody had to whip them and with fifteen minutes and another peanut gun they could have whipped us 10 C Q. In looking at the setting of threshold C 11 limit values or permissible exposure levels that tTe. ~ee 12 you would recommend as a professional industrial 13 hygienist if we're talking about a material that 14 can cause cancer would it be prudent that no 15 matter what number is attached to that material 16 that workers still be told that this can cause 17 cancer 18 6s A. If the prudent -- if the material 19 were -- if all the data were plain and ea 20 unobstructed unobstructed by normal 21 circumstances okay What is the man normally 22 exposed to in his everyday life E 23 You can't stop some exposures You 24 just can't It's a part -- unless you stopped us 25 from using automobiles and stop from using airplanes and everything else You can't Now I don't know who went through those prudent exercises but somebody did I don't know 174 I know one thing that if the stuff -- if you've got clean and clear enough data unobstructed by other effects unobstructed by Cc] other materials and that justify lowering the ees TLV it ought to be lowered 10 Q. In dealing with asbestos today is meee 11 there a no effect level that you can tell us for i 12 asbestos cancers 13 A. There's levels that you cannot get any 14 identifiable results from in animals but is that 15 what -- is that going to emulate anything else I 16 don't know 17 But there are levels starting at zero 18 if you can find zero where things don't create 19 problems and you can actually back into or go up 20 to levels that are harmful -- that knowledgeably 21 are harmful 22 23 24 25 I think the other problem connected with this material is that a trained person -- it depends on who's going to be using it I certainly wouldn't put many of the things that we have -- we sell today that have satisfactory limit values I wouldn't put them into households as 175 such but in the hands of experienced and trained and prudent people I don't -- in manufacturing I don't think there's a problem Q. In looking -- A. So you -- you're really in bad ball | game here You -- should you stop the manufacture and use of any product any product that under 10 any set of circumstances and any test one test 11 should you do that me e: 12 I think you'd be out of business 13 completely You'd probably be wondering around 14 with a club in your hand 15 Q. In your career at Monsanto was there 16 ever a time when you thought or you believed gaan 17 someone at Monsanto had a no effect level for 18 asbestos exposure ES 19 A. I never saw any effect and by the Ss 20 way we did lung screens on lots of workers I 21 never saw any effect that I thought asbestos 22 created using threshold limit values at least in 23 the latter years 24 25 I don't -- I haven't seen any in the earlier years when it was higher but I haven't seen any Now that doesn't mean as it doesn't 176 in the case of our PCBs doesn't include everybody and under every circumstance as far as I know I don't know No I think you could -- you could -- my problem is are you -- are we going to use this standard for lawsuits or are we going to use this standard for the health of workers in plants that have full medical facilities and so forth 10 I don't know whether that's even a 11 relevant question or not 12 Q. But what I'm really trying to find 13 Mr. Garrett is was there a time when you felt 14 while you were a Monsanto employee or that you aoe 15 were aware someone else in Monsanto had an 16 established no effect level for asbestos where you LMy 17 could go and say This is the level for asbestos 18 exposure below which no one will get disease 19 20 21 A. You know it's funny We use the TLV for asbestos and I never had any arguments about it or any arguments with it 22 No I don't think it ever created any 23 problems that we know of Please believe me 24 we're a chemical company We have about sixty 25 seventy thousand workers  eS ma [ 1 P= 10 11 12 13 /14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Most of them are exposed to insulation materials of one kind or another because they're close by and you've got wind blowing over insulated material and what there is 177 We can find asbestos by analysis anywhere I can find it in your street corner in pretty heavy concentrations if you've got a stop sign there stop light there Q. But were you able to convince yourself or to tell others that at this level there will be no effect from asbestos while you're a Monsanto employee A. I thought that the TLV establishment system was sufficiently armoured with protection that the chances that a person was going to get any problem from that level of asbestos if you could analyze it and it was a continuous level I would -- I don't know I don't think we've ever seen anything We've done the same with a lot of other materials that are very toxic We've set standards on those and I don't know if we had twenty hour exposure always That's the other problem we faced If you had twenty hour exposure to | naseeZ| Leaszece ro ES L 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 highly toxic substances I don't know Q. So if I hear what you're telling me then and tell me if it's wrong Mr. Garrett you're saying that for asbestos while you were at Monsanto you believe the threshold limit value as it was then set was the no effect level A. No I thought that was the -- a good safe standard Now no effect level is a term that is extremely difficult to define and probably is not ever obtainable in any case so I would say that I thought it was a safe level for our workers yes 178 Q. But you at Monsanto even as far back as the 1950s still chose to control asbestos exposures well below the threshold limit value A. We chose to control them and we didn't really sample that much but yes they were below the threshold limit value because we took care I think anybody -- we -- but that's nothing We did the same thing with other levels Any time we even approached the TLV level in concentration of certain material we'd press the rush button We would do it for asbestos It just -- it's one of these things You set a standard I know We've set some | <== sanee> mn agus IDID coL. Fa ea Fs a cs z Es 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 standards and I -- you know you wonder in your own mind hey if you've got the right guy at the right time with the right weaknesses in his organ system that you don't know of and he doesn't either and you feed him this stuff at this level is it not going to do any harm I don't know The answer is we've done the best we know how and we've done it with beasts and it hadn't hurt them so we don't think it's going to 179 hurt you And our records have been -- are very excellent following that premise Q. If you would have been working with a threshold limit value for asbestos of 5 million particles per cubic foot back in the 1950s and would have gone out and done measurements and found say 4.5 million particles per cubic foot -- A. I'd start coasting -- I'd tell them to start coasting back start cutting her back Q. What do you mean by that A. Their effect -- their exposure's coming from something The pipe it's either going out the pipe or it's going off their tables or somewhere Put a little more control in That's me ES Pra ees 3 www 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 getting too close Q. You would not be content that close 180 to -- A. Not when they're approaching the TLV in a material that can cause lung diseases of fatal termination no I'm not I'd have them raise going to do that the stack level or do something immediate or shut the bloody thing down And that's going to be one hard thing to do It's difficult You're talking about useful materials and very very tight limits where people are exposed in very very different ways and we're doing that in everyone -- How -- we don't know what people how people are going to use materials We give them a TLV that we think is correct We have no idea how they're going to use it They may be bathing people up to their necks in the damn stuff We don't know Now how far can you go with a customer -- let me answer you this question How far can you go with your customers in interfering in their business because that's what they think it is en rene Be C Et i 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q. Of course you have the option not to sell to them which you said you've done A. Of course you do and you find this out after you make -- you build a big plant to provide a couple of customers and you find out those customers are that way and what do you do 181 I don't know If you can demonstrate there's a reasonable hazard there I think you should shut the two plants down The point is are you looking at twenty hour samples Are you looking at twelve to eight hour samples Are you looking at what What about the guy that double shifts We always run that problem past you We've had every question you can imagine asked particularly by the federal people What happens if the guy is working a double shift Well how often does he work a double shift I don't know you know That's a good point In the manufacture of chlorinated nitrated organic chemicals where you do have a bit of a tendency if you build beyond certain ~ levels of some internal problems do we shut the damn thing down or what I don't know We've never had anybody we thought were hurt -- was hurt That's a bad -- that's a 182 -- the starting point only in setting examples Only the starting point We've been making this stuff for forty years never hurt anybody How do they know Gs Have they looked at the kids in schools Have 10 they looked at the birth rates Are they down 0 11 Have they looked at the general viability of the 12 fetuses born in their particular area Heaven's 13 knows 14 15 There are a lot of things you can do that TLVs should reflect on and do more and more 16 and more and I think it's a great idea 17 We did a survey with OSHA at East St. 18 Louis We did it in the community Just the 19 community in the area of several chemical plants 20 including our big Krummrich plant and they -- we 21 went out and got the birth records and the still 22 birth records and the records showing what 23 occurred to the degree that you could match them 24 i i Now you're talking a hundred thousand 25 people which you're playing games with five hundred of them and it's difficult to draw any conclusion but the conclusions that we drew were 183 it was a reasonably healthy community OSHA themselves told us we can show you a lot unhealthier ones and some healthier ones So I don't know My personal opinion is if you can show me that there is a genuine risk in connection with the use of any product at the levels and you know 10 that that -- those exposures are at the levels or 11 below the levels you say they are then I think 12 they ought to change it 13 Q. Let me ask you the flip side of that 14 Mr. Garrett For the threshold limit value for 15 asbestos that existed in the 1950s and early 60s 16 do you believe that there should have been the 17 same pure clear conclusive data to establish the 18 TLV as you would need to change it Esa 19 A. Yes 20 Q. Do you know if in fact there was 21 that kind of pure clear conclusive data 22 A. Well you've got to go back and look 23 at the levels and what they -- the levels are a 24 damn difficult job You're talking fibers 25 You're talking bits You're talking the damndest H 4 ae? fen PS ee i [ rtche tonpace things to measure there is in God's green earth accurately levels I wish they'd do it on gravimetric That's my personal opinion God we've -- what kind of -- are you going to measure -- how about this size asbestos 184 particle Is that one in the count I'd rather see it in a gravimetric way I'm sorry Sure you're going to say Well 10 all you got to do is get -- inhale a rock Okay 11 If he inhales a rock he's probably going to hurt 12 himself anyway 13 The point I'm trying to make is what 14 is the best and most prudent thing to use to 15 protect the most people and all the people if 16 possible or quit using the damn stuff That's my 17 opinion 18 Q. I take it from your comments then you 19 were certainly personally aware of problems that 20 were inherent in doing these dust counts when it 21 came to asbestos 22 A. Oh yes I've dust counted with that 23 damn Bausch & Lomb contraption It gives you an 24 answer invariably wrong but that's beside the 25 point It's an answer and you can write it 185 down And you take the hemacytometer and take a bunch of damn dust into a liquid medium and measure it in there and it conglomerates or associates and you've got a whole flock of crap It's not easy to do That's why people in this trade get bald like you are and I'm rapidly getting there just trying to figure out what the hell you can do to better better 10 operate the system for all workers 11 You don't kid yourself Chemical 12 workers and people that plaster with this are not 13 the only workers at risk Everybody's at risk 14 I think if we got rid of automobiles 15 we'd get rid of most of the bad things in this i 16 country anyway but I'd have to get rid of my OE 17 bird What the hell I don't want to do that 18 So there you are PS 19 I think that when you start out -- and es 20 we started out with some of ours we set the first 21 standards We did just about as much as we could FS 22 and we backpeddled We'll take tenth of this mm 23 and so forth It's as good a way as I know of to 24 do it even now [ 25 You have a material that caused an ser acute intoxication which upon continuance over a 186 few minutes is going to cause death that's where you start with Now how - you back off from there we Where do you stop In any case I don't give a damn if it causes cancer or causes your toe nails D to turn backwards where do you stop And in a manufacturing handling operation they're only there eight hours usually 10 and you hope they get to go into a environment 11 that's a little less hazardous or potentially 12 hazardous so I don't know I don't know how to 13 do it 14 I can say this we've been doing very 15 well in the American chemical industry with the 16 standards as we set them with all their faults 17 Q. And from time to time when the wrong 18 standard was set and information came to light 19 that there were new biological effects -- L 20 A. There were recommendations for change 21 and most of them were changed if that -- if those E 22 data could be duplicated i 23 Q. And for someone to know if these 24 biological effects the new ones are happening UES 25 someone has to be looking correct [ Ess [ [ [ Ee D Co | cc, Me rn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. Yes but I think you'll find in most 187 health is one of the most expensive products -- most expensive states of mind you can pay for in modern day manufacturing If you don't believe that go ask your insurance people So you're going to do -- you've got to rule out the people who have certain kinds of -- let's say you're looking at a respiratory irritant okay You've got to rule out people that have got tuberculosis people that in the war somebody shot one of their lungs out they only got one pump Do you do this Do you know who they are Do you have any concept of who does have that Who's a pulmonary cripple in an area where you're looking at pulmonary effect It's hard It's hard And I think the people in the threshold limit committees have done a marvelous job with what they've had to do with and have made the changes necessary through the years where there's a sufficient data to justify them That's what I think and God knows if it weren't true I don't know how many Monsanto people would be dead right now Q. What would be your thoughts Mr. Garrett about a company that would have some 188 data be it laboratory animal data or human data that could possibly contradict a threshold limit value and they not send it in to the committees to be set A. Produce it Q. I'm sorry bai A. Produce publish it and get it in the literature and it will then immediately go into 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the committees Q. What would be your impression of a . company instead of doing that sending it in and publishing it would hold it back and let people to continue to use a TLV that would have the -- that they'd have questions about MR OLIVER Objection calls for speculation Incomplete hypothetical A. I don't know My enthusiasm for it would be less than zero but I don't know what you could do about it If you knew the data had it -- had it correctly obtained did it with proper testing and backing you could publish it yourself I suppose You'd probably get shot but that's beside the point Many of us are going to get shot one of an Bed pa Cd foandeal ccd bss edt D a rn C cs es 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 these days anyway 189 MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive A. All right We have had first class excellent luck with TLVs and believe me we don't just make asbestos We make -- we had at one time over eleven hundred materials that Monsanto manufactured God bless them they quit making a lot of that small crap had small unit -- manufacturing units that made buckets full of stuff for people Now I suppose we probably have sixteen or seventeen hundred problems that you would make sure that you were not messing with or that your people were not being exposed to excessive amounts of or that people with certain kinds of -- of physiological ailments were not messing with That's another thing that we didn't put into this equation and that is what do you do with a guy that has a problem -- a liver problem You can't fire him You can't do it by law You hired him and if you didn't properly test him or physically examine him to start with you got him on your rolls What do you do with ne those kind of people I don't know Frankly I 190 don't know what you do You try to move them around in the plant First thing you know they end up as the guard at the gate and we got some guards at the gate in our company too Q. I take it from something you said earlier that you would be critical of someone who said We've been making this product for forty 10 years and we've never found a problem if they've 11 never looked to see if there were problems 12 = A. But of course not because they 13 haven't found a problem If they haven't looked 14 they don't know whether there's a problem there or 15 not They wouldn't know what a problem looked CC 16 like if it came to them fs 17 We do - a good industrial hygienist 18 is not going to allow that to happen He's going 19 to say Hey we looked If we don't look I go E 20 somewhere else and look because I'm not going to 21 be a party to this kind of nonsense I'm not 22 going to be a party to that kind of business 23 Hell you might just as well put him 24 in the electric chair and say electricity doesn't 25 hurt him or better yet I got a better excuse in be He did it himself No thanks He pushed the wrong switch 191 I don't think we have in our -- you're asking my experience base We've never messed -- we've never had any occasion in Monsanto that I know of to criticize the TLV on asbestos so to talk to you about that it really is not quite [[ fair ee Q. Well -- and I don't want to be unfair 10 with you Mr. Garrett -- 7 be. 11 A. Oh I know 12 Q. -- at all I was under the 13 impression though that at the Springfield 14 Massachusetts plant that Monsanto had found cases 15 of asbestos disease 16 Do you know anything about that at ET 17 all 18 FS A. Not to my knowledge If they have I 19 do not know It happened either before me or esa 20 after me If they did in -- in the old long term 21 employees I don't know I don't know how they ra 22 would They haven't handled it for so many years as 23 Q. I understand that Monsanto even went 24 back and did medical evaluations of people who had re 25 retired that had worked in that operation | REToten 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. We've done that several times We 192 did -- on many other things We did when we did the TLV work on when -- we did the work on -- that's a customary project If you've got a company town and Springfield certainly is a company town but a better one is East St. Louis Illinois or that immediate area we found that 84 percent of our employees at the East St. Louis plant and the retirees lived within fourteen miles of the plant I think And we went back and checked the health of many of those people in connection with the problems on PCBs and on some of the chloroanilines some of the nitroanilines we went back and checked their health and also with their permission and most of them gave us their permission We had a few that didn't and we stirred up a couple of court cases out of it as you can easily imagine And we -- we went back and checked with their physician in connection with problems connected with their health The thing that surprised me is our epidemiological work that OSHA did not like at all We did all of East St. Louis and all of the 193 manufacturing people separate and it indicated that without doubt you were healthier if you worked at Monsanto two or three other big companies than if you didn't work at all if you lived in that area Now these are obviously eschewed data D DD from where you're looking for something and get so something for free Every time you get it you of 10 know damn well it isn't any good but it's true 11 The actual data -- because we had 12 very very detailed health data done over a three 13 year period by OSHA on the people that lived in 14 that area and then we did our employees 15 separately and they accepted it It was by their 16 standards 17 18 19 And they came up with that well we know people that work always were healthier people that don't work Well I think that is probably a 20 truism 21 22 23 24 25 Now a truism is something that's true as long as you believe it So I don't know Q. But as far -- A. My personal opinion is that in our case we've never had a problem with the TLVS if they were genuinely genuinely followed 194 Q. Of course at Spring -- A. We've had some awful problems trying to put -- noise is probably the worst thing that I've ever tried to check out When you find out how many people shoot guns and shoot skeet and ride around in a motor boat without any -- that sounds like a damn 10 11 12 13 14 15 jet taking off by the hour on every weekend fishing I don't know how you then come back with the records of what noise they encounter in the plant has to do with their total hearing acuity at age sixty or seventy or eighty or whatever It's difficult to do Q. But as far as Monsanto going back and 16 looking at any retirees from the Springfield 17 Massachusetts plant for asbestos disease you 18 really don't know anything about that 19 A. I'm sure they have it if someone's 4 20 said that and produced any data to indicate that Fr 21 We've gone back and checked the Springfield ig 22 employees for other things 23 Q. But you don't know personally about 24 any of the asbestos 25 A. No not about anything done for 195 5 asbestosis -- asbestosis or any evidence of lung t a engagement -- involvement in that No. Now the problem I face I think probably every day and the problem everybody else faces is do you -- what effect does coirritants ortoak have on things And that -- I suppose liquor is the ~ \.. biggest problem with that What does it do Does Kadsotced it solubilize materials that are not otherwise 10 soluable or increase the solubility or absorption 11 Interesting question isn't it ci) 12 13 Q. Yes sir A. Do you have any idea how much liquor 14 is drank by the employees of the average Monsanto 15 chemical plant A hell of a lot Some of which 16 17 18 they make in their own backyard The point I'm trying to make is I don't know how you can -- how you can say that 19 this is what they got this is what they're 20 exposed to because we tested them while they were 21 at work 22 Q. You say you don't know how you can say 23 24 25 that A. No I really don't We do say it Don't -- I didn't say we didn't say it I said I don't know how you can say it and be completely 196 honest with yourself Noise exposure for example is a good example Any dust exposure Where in the world do you suppose they could not get dust At home You got to be kidding That's my problem And this is true honestly of a lot of things There are a lot of other material believe it or not that they're 10 exposed to Caustics for example particularly 11 in the wintertime 12 Q. I guess what I'm hearing you say Mr. 13 Garrett is that it's really almost impossible to 14 know what workers are exposed to 15 A. To positively demonstrate toxicology 16 or any toxic effect on anything except those 17 things that are so unique they will not experience | 18 involvement with them in anything except their Se a 19 work and where can you do that cs 20 In the PCBs we were in -- we were home 21 clean because there was no way they were going to 22 have that stuff in their normal every day affair 23 but when you start messing with dust we started 24 trying to mess with alcohol I mean you're eer 25 kidding yourself 197 Q. So if you've got these epidemiological studies of workers and they're exposed to dust and they're exposed to things at home and alcohol that they drink and then they -- you look at their health experience it's just almost impossible to say what anything causes or doesn't cause A. Unless there's a unique circumstance that recurs physiologically then you might Q. Something like mesothelioma asbestos 10 A. Could be Certainly mesothelioma 11 would Asbestosis in itself I don't know You 12 can -- that just -- ordinary tracing of the lungs 13 in the picture I'm not sure you could really 14 prove that's asbestos but boy when you get down L 15 to mesothelioma you're down to a -- pretty close L 16 to specific that I know of eee 17 I've never seen one We've seen lung i si: 18 cancer incidently All of lung cancer not 19 necessarily mesothelioma by any mess of the L 20 means As a matter of fact the commonest lung 21 cancer is not mesothelioma re thes 22 Q. Would it be accurate to say Mr. 23 Garrett based on your experience as an industrial 24 hygienist that once you get asbestos fibers into 25 the air that are of the particle size that can be breathed into the lungs that that asbestos fiber tends to stay airborne A. In those levels at which we test for 198 as respirable sizes probably right Probably very little movement of the air mass would not f keep them lofted That's my personal opinion Anything -- I don't know It depends oo bee Anything above certain levels I suspect would drop eventually and a lot of asbestos will occlude 10 to other materials in the atmosphere and drop out 11 So will a lot of other fibers by the 12 way These fibers like manufacturing silk or 13 manufacturing nylon yarns and stuff we have a 14 lot of fiber problems and we've ventilated -- 15 ventilate those machines so that we try to 16 backvent them to get away from the workers mouth 17 and nose 18 We have a problem with people shutting 19 them off once in a while That's a wit to do 20 that You know this is a person asking for 21 something that he wouldn't like when he gets it 22 I don't know I think the average 23 American worker average American worker is 24 probably as healthy as any in the world and the CS 25 records show in -- that most of the time at least seas lHSc OT} ID . sind tis Ee [ a fs a [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the TLVS are sufficiently severe for an eight hour 199 day Now you work back -- you can always question this because how many people double shift how many people don't have days working and how many factories are there in little countries where they can work all day and all night too Second where you can always find places where there are materials handled that are not normally handleidn commerce that are hazardous that nobody knows about or cares about that can create troubles I think this is what grew the current OSHA I think it was grown because of negligence on the part of a few but I think it was caused We don't -- it's the most difficult damn thing in the world to mess with a blend of materials inorganics or organics don't make any difference What effect does each of them have What is the cumulative effect of five different organic ornate compounds for example Are they the same No they're not the same because they've got different molecular diameters or - radii if you wish So they can get into places 200 that the others cannot Some of these compounds are so damn big it's a wonder you can get them in your nose even so I don't know You asked a question I don't know how to answer All I know is that in our own experience we have worked on the TLV base and until I -- and we think it's good because we've 10 contributed to the TLVs 11 We've done a lot of research to make 12 sure that -- that if there's a need for change 13 that we get the change in That's where we stand D 14 MR POWERS Object to the C 15 responsiveness of that answer 16 A. We've got the peanut gallery growling 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 again I guess Q. The threshold limit values experience that you've had with them that you just told me about where you think it's been mostly good the threshold limit value though for asbestos has been one that has been changed because the values that were originally selected didn't improve that A. We've changed benzine twice that I know of during my own working experience and by the way this is probably because of chronic 201 possibility very limited possibility of chronic problems We've changed a great many of the major petroleum fractions We've changed a lot of those So it's been a dynamic system It's not a completely stagnate system ; t They don't just do -- do this and lay oe it aside and move it over here To a certain 10 extent they do But if you bring up the subject 6m 11 sufficiently with sufficient data and submit it | 12 the TLV committee will go over that data I can 13 assure you | of that 14 I don't know the answer to all the 15 questions by any stretch If I did I would be a 16 soothsayer I guess oc 17 Q. But the asbestos TLV is one that rs 18 proved by time needed to be changed correct 19 A. I don't know I can't really say Et 20 that We have not experienced that but again 21 we're not primary asbestos users so I'd be remiss em 22 professionally to even answer that question Gee 23 Q. Well you know that the TLV for 24 asbestos has been changed Le. 25 A. I knew it was changed as was about t : 1 r | cxagene 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 four others at the same time that one was changed 202 I think -- well Q. And you know the people who are in charge of making those decisions correct about TLVS A. Yes Q. And you would expect them to exercise the same judgment A. Prudence that everybody ~-- yes H think they would yeah Q. So you know of no reason that they acted with any imprudence in changing those TLVS as far as asbestos A. I have no evidence that that's the case yes Q. Now would it be correct Mr. Garrett that one of the reasons why you at Monsanto in the 1950s told your insulators respirators respirators respirators is to minimize any possible exposure to asbestos they might have A. If you sample them all day long every day at every one of them it would be a different situation but you can't do that You can't afford that kind of maintenance You just -- it just can't be afforded So I would say that if we tested the 203 atmosphere around where they were working -- and boy that is difficult to do You're mostly outside and the wind blows one way or the other way and it's a hell of a mess to do a decent asbest- -- or dust study Anyway you'd have to have fifty dust test machines and you'd have to pretty nearly put 10 them around in a ring so that you'd catch the eel 11 nuances of the wind and its effect on that cS 12 floating cloud or whatever you got up there 13 You better be able to separate 14 asbestos from everything else too in your 15 testing which I'm not sure everybody does So 16 don't know ae IS 17 No I don't think you ought to -- if 18 you can demonstrate that asbestos is hazardous to ra 19 people at levels in a working environment of less 20 than what it is now then it ought to be submitted 21 to the TLV committees for change 22 MR POWERS Object to responsiveness 23 24 25 of that answer Q. The question though Mr. Garrett is at Monsanto in the 1950s when you were dealing with your insulators and you told them respirators respirators respirators the reason you did that was because you felt it was prudent to minimize their exposure to asbestos because you knew that it was a dangerous material correct 204 A. That's right and you couldn't test for it because you just simply didn't have the people and the testing equipment 10 Q. And the methods were questionable 11 anyway and that was the prudent response for you 12 and your people 13 A. Probably Probably Excessive 14 prudence I suppose would get you to stop all of 15 it but -- all TLV because there are probably 16 levels at which they can create problems but I 17 don't know 18 All I know is that in our own -- we 19 were primarily organic chemical people We did a 20 lot of organic chemical work We did a lot of 21 work on the TLVs in that area 22 We -- in an ancillary way we were 23 interested in the materials that we had to use for 24 maintenance of our equipment and to keep it 25 operating Asbestos was one of those issues We 205 knew it was a hazard We tested for it We found levels pretty close to the then TLV and we found that upwind work was a good idea and we recommended it particularly when you're out on the racks taking asbestos out off of old pipe racks 4 we. Other than that we never saw an Ce asbestosis case or anything that we thought 10 approached it 11 Q. And further step of prudence that you el web 12 made in the 1950s at Monsanto at Texas City -- 13 A. Was put them respirators on 14 Q. And not only for the insulators but 15 for anybody else who was going to be there when 16 the insulators were doing their work 17 A. That's right That's right including 18 their foreman who didn't like it worth a damn 19 Q. And if it was an operator that was 20 going to have to be there while the work was 21 22 23 24 25 done -A. Q. He wore one too Mr. Garrett I've been reminded of an area I wanted to go into Can you recall any of the insulation = baad manufacturers for the products that you used at Monsanto ever sending you any information about health hazards that could be connected to their 206 products A. Yes Manville sent us some et MR POWERS Object to the question as A being vague A. Now the asbestos we ordered insulation materials loose and we got it -- with 10 11 12 it got a folder from Manville Q. And do you remember what the --~- A. It was pretty complete as far as what 13 was known at that time about asbestos hazardous 14 as an insulation toxic as a ventilation dust It 15 would cause all kinds of problems including cause fy 16 you to lose your hair you know that sort of 17 stuff and yes I saw it 18 We didn't need it We already knew 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 it Q. Is that the only insulation manufacturer that you can recall seeing A. The only one that I can remember That was loose stuff that we used to make called mud stuff the bags of it You've seen it In fact Manville were written all Over [ " C DD ? x, en, : oa i co Fa 5 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 it and we used it for patching is primarily what it was used for and to mud over preformed stuff that had just been wired to the stuff And on a plant like Texas City which was all liquid you can imagine the number of miles of pipe they had and all of it was insulated And so -- 207 Q. Sir -- A. -- in fifty different sizes Q. About what time period is your recollection of getting this Manville material A. 5- -- oh Lord it had to have been '55 '60 or something like that but I didn't need it It was already outlined in most of the books in this area By the way when I first started in the business there wasn't any industrial hygiene books You depended on medical journal articles committee work and your own common sense I guess if you had any Sometimes you don't have a very good temper in this business but they won't let you kill anybody though Boy some of them needed it | ee EE [ C fi" | sagen: E E :: : ; te a stal 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Oh I saw foremen sometimes that ought 208 to have been hanged Oh you know tobacco dripping out I'll have you know it ain't ever hurt me It's a fine thing to teach young operators It's too bad you couldn't retire them early just to get them out of the way It's happened to everyone you know And that's another one of the problems that we face Q. What is your earliest recollection Mr. Garrett of when you began to find reports of cancer being related to asbestos exposure A. I wrote a report one time called Cancer and Chemical Structure I thought I was doing somebody some good so I decided to do it It turned out to be about three hundred pages long and it's been copied and recopied around I see it every once in a while at Monsanto I wrote the damn thing twenty years ago and what was known then about cancer and those structures of chemicals and materials of common materials that were available In a big multiunit chemical plant it is difficult to tell a operator who's rotating through the many different units all the things that in excessive concentrations would cause 209 cancer because his drinking water is likely to do that if he drinks too much of it That's very likely why he drinks Wild Cat Whiskey but that's beside the point The point I'm trying to make is if you -- you could tell people that primarily were interested in asbestos in their insulating 10 operations so you're talking about insulators and 11 their immediate supervisors about asbestos and 12 its hazard as far as cancer is concerned 13 At the same time in a big chemical 14 plant you've got a dozen other places where you've Co 15 got to tell someone about excessive exposure to 16 this or that or someone else or if you overcook 17 your operation you're going to get thus and so a 18 which will cause cancer and you've got an awful ie, 19 lot of different problems to address and maintain ee 20 and the problem is you're trying to maintain some Fe 21 feeling of control amongst those -- amongst your 22 people mz 23 Everybody handles asbestos that's in 24 the insulating business Those same people are rt 25 likely -- are liable to be exposed to materials ory OR soni rn / see pan^' rs es [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 and I've taken air samples up on the racks near a 210 bunch of exit pipes a bunch of unit vent pipes not looking for asbestos but looking for the stuff in the vent pipes Some of that stuff might be causing the same problem The other you don't know is synergism amongst chemicals to -- and believe me there are synergistic couples of stuff like asbestos and some chemical material So you've got a hell of a job Asbestos we thought and to -- and our records show would cause no problems at the TLV okay Q. And that was in your plant A. That's right Q. In your plant -- A. In our plants as near as I could determine we did a lot of sampling and the plants did a great deal of sampling We took care of asbestos in workers by demanding them to wear protection Q. Respirators respirators respirators A. Right respirators respirators respirators Q. And by following that practice you ors never saw any asbestos disease A. No. What you're asking a lot of it is conjecture You're looking at industrial hygiene data and the many many many many gobs of data I've seen from all kinds of things 211 2 particularly couplets We were looking at couplets one of oT which was asbestos in those couplets We never SS found anything 10 We did find some in where you could -- C 11 where other material would cause about the same 12 effect and therefore if you had 50 percent of 13 one and 50 percent of another you had a hundred 14 percent like chlorinated aromatics for example 15 ... 16 Q. Would there be any other products 17 other than the phenolic resins that you told me 18 about earlier that you're aware of that were made 19 by Monsanto that contained asbestos te r 20 A. Contained it no The years I know 21 the old -- what the hell was that stuff called res 22 Carbide made it Ee 23 Q. Lite 24 A. Lite The old Bake [ 25 processes None of it that I know except that ] ] Cee D ~~ some CO Li f k 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I've seen reinforcing fibers used but I've seen a lot of nylon reinforcing fibers too So I don't 212 know I've seen a lot of work done on nylon reinforcing fibers but it isn't really toxicology It's more stretch and break H | don't know All I know is that our experience a chemical company primarily who manufactured chemicals and at one time petroleum products we had an oil refinery at Lyon oil in Arkansas at Monsanto They used probably more insulating -- incidently I think probably a refinery uses more insulating material than even an organic chemical plant at least it looked like to me they did We had no problems We had -- we had lots of problems We had no problems with asbestos that I know of in my own experience in my own time I knew it was a problem and we certainly used that to prevent it if we could Q. And by prevent it you mean that's the respirators respirators respirators That's coveralls A. That's taking showers Every day they got changes of clothes We went down to shoes and socks underwear and 213 all We didn't want it at home Q. And that was even back in the 1950s A. That's right And I will say this you cannot force a man -- we went through a court suit to find this out You can't force a man to 10 11 12 13 bathe Did you know that know that You probably already Q. But you went to that extent to try to get people to bathe to reduce the hazard A. In many cases We did it for PCBs We did it for a lot of things and we tried to scare the hell out of them if that -- that don't 14 15 16 17 18 do much good Then Time magazine comes along and writes it up as a hell of a scare affair Then it scared the hell out of them I don't understand that but no we didn't -- we had -- we did a lot 19 of work on a lot of products 20 We got to where we were fairly 21 competent at picking the ones that we thought We 22 tested all We had regular screen that we tested E 23 them in using rats and anything that occurred in 24 those rats on postmort we followed up on C C C 25 anything C 214 ra If that thing blew the kidneys out through the anus we wanted to know why the hell that happened and we wanted to back off on our standards That we did And I think we tested them all {{ Now when we got into a product where it was going to be used by other people then we C began to do a very detailed toxicological study Ce using rats rabbits and so forth and multiple 10 levels of exposure and so forth C 11 Q. In your work that you did with amine er 12 compounds did you ever get into any research or 13 any literature that dealt with the nitrous amines 14 A. Oh any time you manufacture amine 15 compounds you're going to mess with nitrous 16 amines yes canaan 17 Q. What is the earliest time period that 18 you can tell me you worked with nitrous amines 19 A. Oh gosh I guess when we first got to 20 messing around with nitrogen chemicals and that 21 probably was in -- early in my St. Louis career 22 Q. So mid 50s or so 23 A. Probably yes 24 Q. What was it that from a toxicologists 25 industrial hygienist's standpoint that you found for nitrous amines in that -- in that era 215 A. Well nitrous amines were extremely acutely toxic You probably didn't have a chance to test the toxicology over a period of time because if your subject was dead -- so we -- many of the nitrous amines are extremely toxic aed They're very reactive Oh don't ever f buHi mix them with anything including your shirt tail pares They are extremely reactive substances And if 10 you can get them off clean you're lucky 11 It's very difficult to get a nitrous 12 amine one of the short chain nitrous amines loose 13 as a ~~ it's a wonder it doesn't grab the glass you know that sort of thing It's a difficult 15 thing to do 16 We've done -- we did a lot of work on 1 1 1 17 it We did it at Nitro - I mean at yeah Nitro 18 West Virginia We did it at -- in Alabama ea 19 We found nitrous amines in practically 20 every amine operation at a certain extent to 21 certain levels in virtually every nitrogen [ 22 compound Every amine operation we had there was ie 23 some nitrous amines formed 24 Q. Being a chemist can you explain that PE 25 Why & ae0a isin =o boa DD To FES Ea A. Pretty easily as the degradation of amine compounds and the slight base oxydation of nitrous amines 216 break MR HALL Question could we take a Q. Is a break okay with you Mr. Garrett A. Certainly Temporary recess was held Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1 marked 10 identification JS 11 MS FLATT We're on record 12 Q. Mr. Garrett I went over your resume 13 just a little bit earlier and I've been informed 14 by my associate here that I've gotten the wrong 15 title on here 16 I should designate it as 230112 17 capital A capital A capital T. So with 18 that change for the record so it's consistent 19 with our numbering scheme that we've been using 20 Let me ask you sir is this a true 21 and correct copy of your resume 22 A. Yes 23 Q. All right I've also asked the court 24 reporter to mark as Exhibit 1 to the deposition 25 the notice for the deposition which calls for U U Zk 2 sen a ie a bos 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 certain documents to be brought to the deposition 217 by yourself Does that look like the list of documents you were asked to bring A. Yeah Q. And I understand that you have reviewed that list and the only document that you have that's responsive is your resume is that right A. That's right I don't keep documents I did't -- they all belong to the company and they all went back when I quit Q. Before the break I was asking you some questions about nitrous amines and you were kind enough to go into that with me A. We -- Q. The materials that you called nitrous amines in the 1950s that you said were contaminants of some of the other materials the amine compounds you said that those were very acutely toxic is that right A. Uh it's hard to say It's hard to generalize as you know but by and large nitrous amines are oxidizing agents of some caliber and they consequently are probably toxic by inhalation b L. [ [ C C [" _ i [ ~ L r~ 4 r ze - or by swallowing 218 2 I don't know why in the world anybody - 3 ever swallowed it but that's beside the point 4 Q. The compounds that these nitrous 5 amines were being found in the aniline materials 6 or the nitrogen materials were there already 7 concerns about the carcinogenicity the abilities 8 of materials to cause cancer that were sort of 9 apparent compounds in nitrous amines 10 A. The only ones we really have worked 11 with in the last twenty years were comtaminants in 12 processes where you were pretty roughly treating 13 amine compounds largely aromatic amines and for 14 that reason we assumed and I think probably 15 rightly so that there were some minor amounts of 16 aromatic nitrous amines in some of those products 17 It's difficult to analyze for in 18 extremely low concentrations As near as I know 19 we decided that the contaminants from these 20 processes were not a very good idea to be eating 21 your lunch on and had issued restrictions in the 22 manufacturing plants on the processes and process 23 24 25 wastes Q. I think I would still do the same Some of the aromatic amines that are: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 you're talking about were known to be carcinogenic 219 at the time is that right sir A. Well not nearly so much carcinogenic as just plain toxic You're talking about the nitro -- aromatic nitro amines aromatic chloroamines and this group of compounds And you chemically mash at them a bit you might -- particularly with a -- with nitric acid something like that you'd all end up with a nitrous amine It will split off on you and so our interest in nitrous amines -- and it was really -- we have been interested in them toxicologically as a contaminant forever I guess Q. It would be fair to say wouldn't it though that at least one of the toxic properties of the aromatic amines that you were concerned about was the ability to cause cancer MR FOGARTY Objection A. Certainly the suspicion that it might yeah Now whether they were all tested or not none of ours -- none of the ones I have any knowledge of were tested But no I wouldn't - they are extremely active materials Q. And then would it be also true Mr. en i Se Co Ee GE Co D D r Li 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Garrett that you were concerned about the potential ability of these materials to cause cancer that were aromatic nitrous amines as well 220 A. Well we were concerned about the general toxicity involved in the handling materials that ultimately developed either from their own destruction due to heat or something and in handling nitro and amino aromatics We handle lots of them We've handled anilines We made die anilines We made the chloroanilines We made chloronitrobenzenes and for these reasons we had a fear of nitrous amine formation in our processes Some of it -- to the best of my ability I don't know that we ever isolated any of them Q. But part of the concern that led to these fears was at least in part the ability for these materials to cause cancer in people MR FOGARTY Objection vague and ambiguous A. Well I think it was probably the cost of what the toxicology in fact was Whether you had -- whether you could develop a carcinogenesis i } ae Ex esa [ [[ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 from minute quantities or whether you could get the hell blown out of you first with small -- with 221 larger quantities They're toxic Most aromatic amine and nitro compounds are toxic in the first place and with a little help they'll put you underground pretty quick And anything that you subsequently make out of them with -- where you still maintain that amine structure you're liable to have the same problems So we -- we always were and always were dealing with nitrogen containing aromatic compounds and the nitrous amines happened to be a product We never -- I don't think we ever made one purposely We made some but we didn't make them purposely To tell you the truth I don't think it ever was much of a -- I think we probably conked those processes out or didn't make them or something because I don't recall -- I have a pretty fair memory I don't recall that we ever did anything or ever occasioned any great studies because I don't think we had any reason to Q. And earlier we talked about prudence in the area of industrial hygiene and toxicology 222 A. Yeah Q. Would it be your opinion sir that in f dealing with nitrous amines even back in 1950s that prudence would have said there should be some cca concern about the ability of these materials to be Eee toxic and in part carcinogenic 10 A. In the 1950s probably not but of 11 shortly thereafter yeah And the problem -- we cm 12 tested of course we tested some of our 13 materials Some of which were -- turned out to be 14 carcinogenic but they were not nitrous amines 15 We did some straight nitrogen or 16 straight nitrogen containing aromatics that were 17 not nitrous amines 18 The problem with - our problem with 19 nitrous amines was that an unwanted product 20 build in processes using amine compounds in 21 efforts to condense them and otherwise in other 22 chemical reactions and I think probably anybody 23 24 25 would be interested The materials themselves are pretty toxic as per se and whether they're carcinogenic eee | ! t i 11 com en H a a {ie k 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 or not is an interesting argument I doubt seriously if -- well I imagine that a great many of them are but -- because of they're extreme 223 activity But we never had any problems with it because they were minute products in our processes and it took some mighty fine analytical chemistry to find them and to characterize them as less than so I don't think we could ever isolate some of them enough to test them plus the fact that carcinogenic testing is boy is something else Wow That is extremely costly extremely argumentative the results I don't know We made and sold an awful lot of amine -- simple amine compounds aromatic amine compounds I don't know -- I don't know that we ever got any comments or compliment -- or requests from customers to test them for carcinogenicity I don't know whether we ever did ourselves or not If we did I didn't know about it Toxic -- my tox group could have done it I don't think they did it without our knowledge but we were -- we would be somewhat suspicious if we were going to manufacture them in 224 any great quantity or if we were going to manufacture anything in the quantity that would produce enough of them as a product to be a product hazard So yes we probably suspected that some of them at least if they were -- if they -- were electrically imbalanced ones you probably it probably would be carcinogenic 10 Q. The them you're talking about are 11 the nitrous amines 12 A. huh No no I'm talking about the 13 nitrous amines that would be the result of D 14 operations that produced other chemicals 15 ae 16 Q. Yes sir The contaminant part A. That's right as a contaminant part a 17 Again -- 18 Q. Now I take it that shortly after you 19 began your career with Monsanto you would have E 20 known that the aromatic amines particularly a 21 beta napthylamine had been identified as a human FF 22 bladder carcinogen years earlier ma 23 24 A. Q. Yes Lord knows we made it -- So -- 25 A. -- and we knew it caused cancer I Sort tk [ | 1 1 7 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 will tell you this in all the years I was at Monsanto it was the only proven carcinogen that we ever proved was carcinogen itself per se Q. Would it be accurate to say Mr. Garrett that because of the experience with beta naphthylamine that the toxic -- A. We were doubly cautious yes 225 Q. A. Yes We sure were and we canned an awful lot of research projects for a company that was -- one of its primary efforts was in the nitro and amino chemistry and particularly in the nitro and amino aromatic chemistry To quit messing around with them was amazing but we did Q. Would it be your opinion Mr. Garrett then that for companies in the 1950s who were interested in nitro and amino compounds and their manufacture that prudence would have said be cautious of these materials causing cancer A. Oh you're stretching it pretty far We knew that beta naphthylamine -- by the way this is a naphthylamine this is not a biphenyl We were -- we had a great many suspicions about some aromatic groups some aromatic structures One of them was where you had an imbalance sufficient to put a nit- -- a very 226 electronegative group like a nitro -- nitro or g i nitrousa for that matter group or an amine group w on the end of a very large gob of carbon material We had a suspicion that that was indicative of some kind of physiological action on the part of human beings There have been some tests done that didn't necessarily carry that out but there have 10 been some tests done that do carry it out We 11 were prudent and very very careful 12 We had as you know we brought people 13 for all their life tested them that had -- that | 14 had been exposed to beta naphthylamine and we 15 tested those people all their lives Every one of Oe 16 them until they died Some are still alive 17 Q. And that is part of the prudence that 18 you spoke of in dealing with these kinds of Os 19 materials rn 20 A. Absolutely You had to damn near 21 demonstrate and have the money to do toxicology 22 for it before you demonstrated -- before you came 23 to any of Monsanto management with the idea of 24 producing any of these compounds 25 Q. So it was almost to the point where it [ wasn't a matter of -- 227 A. Thumbs got to be up Nobody's going to be working with it If you don't have it the money to test it and time -- go away Q. Not going to make it A. -- and think of something else Yeah That damn mess caused us more trouble than -- I swear we wrote more letters and more reports and = gave away more research reports than you could 10 shake a stick at over that damn beta naphthylamine C 11 thing 12 Q. Did you ever come in contact with a 13 Dr. Charles Hine that you can recall 14 A. Yes Charlie Fine man 15 Q. How did you know him Mr. Garrett 16 A. Funny I can recall the man's name 17 and -- where'd Charlie work at Damn I can't I 18 remember him I can't draw where he came out at ea 19 Q. I'll represent to you that from time 20 to time he went to American Petroleum Institute 21 22 23 24 25 meetings and had some affiliation with Shell Does that help you any A. Yes it does help me a lot He was the guy that helped us in fact through some of the API meetings to look at some of these $3 bi oc leriencved er D D DD Co Ee E32 4 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 aromatics 228 See Monsanto's a primary aromatic producer of aromatic amine and nitro compounds We produced the dinitro We produced the diamine and we were interested That's all died of natural death because nobody could ever demonstrate that they had enough money to pay for the toxicology that we had to do on beta naphthylamine Q. If I could Mr. Garrett here's a letter or really it's a memorandum on Shell Development Company letterhead dated April 28th 1950 and it shows that the author is one C.H. Hine M.D. consulting toxicologist Subject is Certain Problems of Environmental Cancer in the Petroleum Industry This is a document that's been used many times in litigation I've been involved with it If somebody wants a copy of it I'll be glad to let them have it But I wonder sir if I could hand you that and ask you if you've ever seen this memorandum that Dr. Hine is shown to be the author of here A. Boy I don't know Q. It's several pages long 229 A. Now Charlie wrote a lot of stuff He also wrote some -- some parts of books and that sort of stuff in this -- in this racket He had some beliefs that well I don't know whether we've demonstrated them or not I think he thought the petroleum industry was the dog in all cancer but I don't know about that There they are and that's all of 10 them their answer seen in its compounds You 11 mean aniline and its derivatives 12 MR FOGARTY Object nonresponse 13 Q. You're looking at the table that's 14 15 A. Yes Certain Recognized and Suspected 16 Carcinogenic Agents Encountered in the oil 17 Industry 18 THE REPORTER Sir could you repeat 19 that 20 THE WITNESS Ma'am 21 THE REPORTER Whatever you just said 22 could you repeat that please 23 THE WITNESS The title of this table 24 here is Certain Recognized and Suspected 25 Carcinogenic Agents Encountered in the Oil Industry Showing the Organs or Systems Chiefly 230 Effected Okay Q. As you look down that list Mr. Garrett do you see any there that you would 11 11 disagree with being in that table A. Yeah I do a lot Charlie was -- went a little overboard I -- the funny thing is Co] a lot of them -- some of them are true and some of evrena them are not true 10 Q. Okay sir Which ones would you agree 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 with A. Well benzine itself is in my opinion is a lot less a carcinogen than people think it is and our -- I don't know why anybody would know any more about it than we do because we had handled it by the tons We're the biggest benzine purchaser in the world at one time according to somebody that 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 told me that Benzidine I'll buy Asphalt I don't know because I don't know what they're talking about Asphalt's like saying goo I mean goo can be a lot of different things Aromatic organic chemicals I don't believe that's true of that because it indites too Fo? ' 1 ea ee Fe ma af aa "i ... 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 many materials Aromatic organic chemicals 231 includes an enormous number of chemicals that have never been demonstrated to be carcinogenic Anthracene crude I don't know there Aniline and its derivatives when you're messing with aniline aniline does not cause cancer We tested aniline We know You can -- some of its near derivative will because let's be honest with ourselves beta naphthylamine causes cancer is Creosote I don't know what creosote I don't even know what mineral oil is crude because mineral oil to an oil people is stuff virgin oil out of the ground and mineral oil can contain a whole lot of things Naphthylamine that's a dandy That is surely a carcinogen and certainly the beta isomer Oil shale I don't know Paraffin I don't know why paraffin would cause skin cancer I really don't Pitch I don't know what pitch is either Soot I don't know what soot -- soot can be four thousand compounds on a little carbon spindala I don't know what spindala even is and 232 tar of course is practically anything There are some dandies in here and re f Charlie knew what he was talking about in some of a these things He suspected these CL I don't think there's ever much of proof that some of them were there the [ carcinogens of sufficient power to create problems in industry but there's some here that are 10 dandies C 11 The naphthylamine beta is really a EE 12 dandy It causes cancer 13 Benzidine some of its close 14 derivatives cause cancer without a doubt 15 Q. There's a second table there too Dr. 16 Hine's letter or memorandum 17 A. Oh he's talking about precancerous 18 lesions and that stuff 19 20 Q. Yes sir The second page of that table on precancerous lesions there's one there 21 that shows lungs Do you see that 22 A. Bone marrow Yeah lungs 23 Pneumoconiosis and chronic pneumonia 24 Q. And the causative agents that are 25 listed under lungs A. It says asbestos arsenic tar sock oil whatever the hell that is or is that soot oil I don't know Mist Chrome salts chrome pigments nickel carbonea That will do it Some of them will 233 Some of them won't He has gone from pure inorganics to organics that really kind of makes the thing not very useful to anybody except that he has got some of them that are dandies 10 Q. Do you have any recollection Mr. 11 Garrett of Dr. Charles Hine sharing his thoughts 12 about the pneumoconioses and asbestos being 13 precancerous lesions 14 A. No. 15 Q. As far as you can recall that never a. 16 came up at any of the API meetings 17 A. Not to my -- no not to my knowledge 18 19 To be perfectly honest with you I never saw Charlie at many of those -- many of those 20 meetings Well this may not be true I knew 21 22 23 24 25 him You know you're asking me to look back thirty years and come up with a name of the guy and what his serial number was on his butt or on his tag I can't even remember my own ae cc] ri . '. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 serial number anymore I'm glad 234 Q. That's why I said earlier just your best recollection is the best we can do A. No. I knew Charlie I knew he was a -- was a -- did a lot of work in this area He has in there included all of those known carcinogens but there's a lot of them in there that are simply not carcinogenic or do they -- how many of them raises the back of -- the hair on the back of my head -- and I'll bet I have as much experience with cancer from chemicals as anybody -- would be the beta naphthylamine derivatives Where is that group listed again Can I see it a minute Just a minute Aniline no Anthracene uh Aromatic organic chemicals my God that's a million of those It's not specific enough Asphalt which is all a mess of -- benzidine I would be suspicious of many of its derivatives Benzol derivatives don't mean anything because benzol is a common name not a chemical name Chlorinated aliphatic hydrocarbons is bologny We tested too many of those Creosote I don't know about because  C eS creosote is a goo that's created in the oil 235 refining industries Mineral oil is crude I'm not -- I don't believe I'd buy that Naphthylamine beta is a dandy really a nifty carcinogen in humans It is Oil shale what is the substrate the oil shale is coming out of He doesn't define that and until you do define that you haven't got | 10 much to go on 11 Paraffin oil crude I don't know what 12 that means 13 Pitch if he means organic slop goo 14 that comes out of a heating chemical materials to 15 make products pitch and soot I don't know 16 Spindle oil I don't even know what 17 that is 18 Tar as -- what's tar I don't know 19 what tar is 20 21 22 23 Those I would -- I would buy the ones that he has -- most of the then known carcinogenic materials fall in his categories but there's a vast number in there that fall -- that have never 24 25 been proven and we've tested some that have shown no carcinogenic tendencies and believe me we've Ea C3 D Co OCU fea 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 had big problems with naphthylamines before Q. Mr. Garrett if I could I would like to kind of switch gears with you for a second 236 A. Okay Q. Let me ask you some names of some people if I could and see if you might recognize it and I don't know if this is true but the affiliation I have for these people is something called Monsanto Research Is there a separate entity that you know of called Monsanto Research A. Well there used to be and I suspect there is still There used to be a research operation that was for the whole corporation Then the individual divisions had research as well and the organization now I think is a little different than that and changed but that doesn't make any difference It still may be true at the time these were done Q. These names may or may not be associated with that organization but that's how I have them listed What -- the first name is William H. Westendorf e A. Yeah We had him for a while Q. can you tell us what he did sir at Monsanto 237 A. No because I don't know If you're talking about useful work I don't know Q. Well -- A. From my standpoint Q. Okay Can you tell us that he was in Monsanto Research even A. No I can't even tell you that I ess think he was You know I bet you're talking & 10 thirty years memory and mine is beginning to fade 11 I can't hear worth a damn either but go ahead 12 Q. Was there a Monsanto Research 13 operation in Pittsburgh at some time that you know 14 of a 15 16 A. No not that I know of Q. The one that you're familiar with was OG. 17 located where sir Monsanto 18 A. All over the country We had research Ea 19 facilities in the operating divisions The old E 20 plastics divisions operation research center was 21 at Springfield Mass 22 The inorganic division's operational 23 research center was originally -- oh God where 24 is it All of it's in St. Louis now ' 25 It's all been sucked into St. Louis and put in the labs either at the main office here 238 or the ones out in the county the two big labs which is a good idea because it is -- this is bad ideas and good ideas You don't have people working on individual division work but you do have them working where you can use the specialists throughout the system here that you couldn't use when they were all over Hell's grace 10 Q. The next name that I have Mr. fe. 11 Garrett is Theodore K. Kozuszek k 12 provenBand 13 A. Kozuszek Ted Kozuszek Q. Yeah How did you know Mr. Kozuszek 14 A. I would just as soon not say 15 Q. Well -- 16 A. Well just one of those things H fern 17 don't think -- I don't recall him that well 18 anyway and I would be -- I've heard the name 19 let's put it that way 20 Q. I'm not inviting any negative 21 connotations at all 22 A. Oh I understand that too If I knew H 23 anything that would help you I'd say it but I 24 don't know rer 25 Q. Would you recall a Mr. John E. [ [ C ~ ~ ~ L LL C 4 &aes aan [ [ * ad bo 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Bradley A. No that doesn't mean that he wasn't in Monsanto I just don't recall him Q. Yes sir Bohl h How about a Mr. Carl D. A. He worked for me 239 Q. He worked for you A. He worked for me He was my noise man Q. Oh that's the gentleman that you told me about earlier that was the person that was really good at noise work A. Best man I ever saw in industrial noise yes Q. Okay Is Mr. Bohls still living or working A. out there He's out in St. Louis County living He's divorced -- I mean He's divorced He's -- he left Monsanto almost at the time I did quite -- his wife recently died He's living by himself out in St. Louis County In fact I saw him the other day Q. Would you recall a Mr. Richard H. Burr r A. Dick Burr yeah I knew him P PP 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q. How did you know him A. Dick Burr was a -- was a safety man and worked in our - in one of our safety 240 operations Q. Was he in manufacturing or at the corporate level or can you say sir A. The last time I had track of him he was in one of the divisions Q. In which facility would you recall A. Oh I don't know It would be a number of facilities but I don't know where exactly he was Q. Do you remember what division he worked in at Monsanto A. I would suspect it was the old organic division but I don't know I would be hazarding a guess Q. How about a gentleman named John E. Howell w double ? A. No. Q. And how about Dr. George J. Levinskus e -- A. Dr. Levinskus was our toxicology was the director of toxicology in the medical department ... Q. And can you tell me for what time 241 period Dr. Levinskus -- A. George came from -- oh gosh Had to have been --- when I retired he had to have been there almost twenty years in St. Louis Prior to that he worked -- he was a - was working out of a school one of the ] posen ke universities in Connecticut I believe Q. Would you know if he's still with 10 Monsanto 11 12 13 14 15 16 A. He retired from Monsanto Whether he's still in town or whether he's moved back to the east or whether -- his kids are scattered all over hell I know that I don't know No I really wouldn't I'd be hazarding guesses that would be hazarded 17 twice over 18 Q. Would you recall ever meeting a Fa 19 gentleman named Roy Bonsib who was with Standard esa 20 Oil of New Jersey 21 A. Oh Roy Bonsib I wrote two papers 22 23 with those people I don't recall that name I wrote a couple papers with the oil guys some of 24 25 the oil guys What have we got somebody having a D fit 242 0. I think it sounds like a shouting match back there behind the doors Warriene MR BLANKS Straighten them out Q. Mr. Garrett let me just hand this across to you It's the first page of a publication it's called Dust Producing Operations in the Production of Petroleum Products 10 and Associated Activities by Roy S. Bonsib who 11 is shown to be in 1937 with the Standard oil 12 Company of New Jersey 13 Let me just ask you if you've ever 14 seen that cover before that you might recall sir my 15 I can tell you I got that from Jim LU4 16 Hammond I don't know if he might have ever given saan 17 you a copy of it or not 18 A. I know Jim pretty well Old Jim and I (2508 M 19 used to fight the battle between Humble and cewense 20 Monsanto 21 Q. But you don't recall seeing this ; 22 report from Mr. Bonsib 23 A. No I do not I do not even recall 24 the name actually Keep in mind you're looking at 25 a very old memory Q. Well this was written in July 1937 too long before you came into the business 243 A. That's true I was still practicing with my stick in the National Guard Armory in Durant Oklahoma at the time -- Q. Thank goodness A. -- in an effort to get a dollar and a oc. quarter a week for drilling Ss 10 Q. I'm glad somebody was doing it A. Got paid every three months I needed 11 the dollar and a quarter badly It got me to 12 spend five years of my life in the military 13 though 14 Q. We're looking here sir at your 15 resume and I see here one of your listed 16 publications is called A Review of Exposures to 17 Oil Mist and you have some authors on that 18 A. huh 19 Q. Nathan Van Hendricks kL 20 A. Van was with the Standard of Jersey 21 e Q. Yes sir George Collings H. leo 22 Collings 23 A. Isn't that strange I wrote a paper 24 with him I don't remember where he's from I 25 think he probably was with Standard of Jersey also but I'm not absolutely sure of that 244 Q. And then you've got A.E. Dooley Allen Dooley A. God where did that come from Q. I believe he was with the Texas company or Texaco A. Oh yeah Al Dooley was our -- was a hygienist chief hygienist for Texaco and I knew him very well He and I -- but the other guy I 10 don't draw up wo 11 Q. And then J.B. Rather Jr. is the other 12 listed author I'm afraid I don't know Mr. 13 Rather 14 A. Neither do I very well apparently 15 Q. You authored that paper in the 16 archives of Environmental Health in 1962 with 17 those gentleman at least according to your resume 18 here 19 How is it that you came to author that 20 paper with these gentleman Can you give me a | 21 rendition there Fe 22 A. We were -- we were -- actually it was Ee 23 Van Hendrick and I had get some information from 24 these guys is what we wrote the paper with but L 25 we wrote the paper because there was a big hoopus ] about pits oil pits that sort of thing and what 245 you do with waste oil And keep in mind you're talking many years ago so you didn't have some of the modern destructive devices that we have today Q. Do you ever remember learning Mr. Garrett that Allen Dooley published on the subject of asbestos disease -- A. No. 10 11 Q. -- in the 1930's A. No I don't doubt that in the 12 slightest 13 Q. Did you know that Mr. Dooley had been 14 an employee of the State of Pennsylvania at one 15 time before he went to Texaco 16 A. No no but that doesn't surprise me 17 Most of the early industrial hygiene people came 18 out of state governmental operations including my 19 initial boss Elmer Wheeler was the New Hampshire i 20 hygienist prior to World War II went off as 21 reserve officer fought his battle with his r 22 aircraft unit in the ETO came back and was E 23 put in the then U.S. Army industrial hygiene 24 laboratory 25 I didn't know they even had one but ive Me [ L A they did and it was over in the -- in the chemical warfare place and so there were a lot of -- those 246 people came out of -- mostly came out of the states because originally there was no federal government thing When I came back from the war there wasn't even any federal laws on pollution or anything else and we helped to phrase some of them 10 The states were getting to a point 11 where they were so ragged in their applications 12 and their demands that there was never going to be 13 any interstate commerce unless the government 14 intervened and they did in about 1960 -- 1955 15 '56 '57 16 They didn't bring much to the party 17 but the fact is they did bring some kind of 18 interstate ability to the party You know 19 Pennsylvania had one law and West Virginia had 20 another and hell nobody could abide by any of 21 them so nobody did 22 Q. Do you recall learning about the 23 Heeley Act at any time 24 A. Yes 25 Q. Would you know sir if based on your experience if Monsanto was subject to the Heeley Act 247 A. No not -- I wouldn't know whether they were subject to it or not Q. Do you remember any of your work as an industrial hygienist with Monsanto dealing with compliance with the Heeley Act A. No probably was but it was in compliance with whatever we were attempting to 10 comply with at the time 11 Q. Do you recall meeting Dr. Clyde Berry 12 A. Yes 13 Q. How is it that you know Dr. Berry 14 A. Where did I meet him I have no idea 15 Q. He's shown as being at the same 16 meeting in Houston in 1951 that you attended 17 Could you have met him then when he was an 18 employee of Standard of New Jersey 19 A. Could be Could be 20 Q. Do you recall knowing him when he was 21 a Standard of New Jersey employee 22 A. No I don't recall him being there I 23 really don't But people in this business 24 highly -- highly skilled separate types of 25 technical people the oddballs if you want to ask have really -- in those days we were oddballs 248 Nobody knew what the industrial hygienist was so you didn't tell you know You worked for Monsanto What do you do I work in their laboratories What laboratories Their [ research laboratories That's perfectly honest because the laboratories for our toxicology work was in the 10 research laboratories So we told them -- told 11 the flat truth 12 You tell them you were an industrial 13 hygienist in those days their mouth would drop 14 open What is that You know 15 That's very much like some of the 16 specialties in medicine are just about as bad 17 Q. I think Dr. Berry's description 18 was a one man molecular film stretched thin and 19 ruptured in places [ 20 A. Pretty much so Some places it was 21 ruptured purposely and in the construction thereof dd 22 in some it was done accidently 23 MR HOBSON Mr. Garrett you've been 24 awfully patient with my questions today and I 25 appreciate it sir I'm going to invite these 7 % other folks to have any questions if they don't we're done If they do I might have a few more but thank you very much sir 249 THE WITNESS Okay Thank you We haven't thrown anything at each other MR HOBSON That's a good beginning THE WITNESS You didn't stand up rare up in the air and call me a dirty son of a bitch so I could get mad at you and then you'd 10 have a picture of me doing this so -- 11 MR ELLIS Let's see 12 A. -- you could and show it to the damn 13 court in Beaumont Texas MR 14 ELLIS Let's see if anybody else U 15 has got any Anybody U 16 MR HOBSON Mr. Garrett thank you 1 17 very much for your patience sir You've been 18 very kind C 19 THE WITNESS Thank you 20 Witness excused 21 Witness excused 22 By agreement of all the parties the 23 signature of the witness is not hereby waived 24 *** 25 I Jack T. Garrett do hereby state that I have read the foregoing questions and answers appearing in this transcript of my deposition Page 3 through and including Page 249 that this is a true and accurate corrected report of said answers given in response to the questions appearing herein 250 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Jack T. Garrett CERTIFICATE STATE OF MISSOURI ) ) COUNTY OF ST LOUIS ) SS Before me personally appeared Jack T. Garrett to me known to be the person described and who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to and before me that he executed said instrument in the capacity and for the purpose therein expressed in the day of WITNESS my hand and official seal , 1993 this NOTARY PUBLIC My Commission expires NOTARIAL CERTIFICATE 251 STATE OF MISSOURI ) ) CITY AND COUNTY OF ST LOUIS ) SS I JULIE STELFOX a Certificate of Merit Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Missouri do certify that pursuant to the foregoing stipulation taken at the offices of Stouffer's Concourse Hotel 9801 Natural Bridge of St. Louis State of Missouri Road County JACK T. GARRETT came before me was by me duly sworn to testify 10 the whole truth of his knowledge of the matters in controversy aforesaid was examined and his 11 examination then written in stenotypy by me and afterwards typed and signed as hereinbefore set 12 out on the day in that behalf aforesaid and said deposition is herewith returned 13 I further certify that I am not counsel 14 attorney or relative of either party or clerk or stenographer of either party or of the attorney c 15 of either party or otherwise interested in the event of this suit 16 bi Given under my hand and notarial seal at my 17 office in the County of St. Louis State of Missouri on the day of , 1993 18 [ 19 My Commission Expires May 31 1997 eS 20 21 Ss 22 23 Julie E. Stelfox Certificate of Merit Notary Public in and State of Missouri Reporter for the and 24 25