Document nYeVKrB4LyO9L5vqxQpQRvQw

U IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS BEAUMONT DIVISION CECIL SCOTT, et al. Plaint iffs VS. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant * * * * * * CIVIL ACTION NO. * B-84-103-CA * * * * VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITION OF MONTE C THRODAHL May 15, 1987 Holiday Inn West/Airport St. Louis, Missouri Reported by: Linda S. Towery Texas CSR No. 2413/Notary Public Nell McCallum & Associates 2900 Smith, Suite 104 Houston, Texas 77006 (713) 523-3767 Taxable Cost; $___________ Charged to David M. Lacey, Bar No._^_________ Attorney for Defendant ******** NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037177 2. 1 APPEARANCES 2 For the Plaintiffs: 3 DAVID M. LACEY, ESQ. Gilpin, Pohl & Bennett 4 1300 Post Oak Boulevard Allied Bank Tower, 23rd Floor 5 Houston, Texas 77056 6 For the Defendant: 7 MARK A. FREEMAN, ESQ. 8 Wells, Peyton, Beard, Greenberg, Hunt and Crawford 9 Petroleum Building P. O. Box 3708 10 Beaumont, Texas 77704 11 Videotaped by: 12 James Heironimous 13 Executive Service Groups P. 0. Box 890306 14 Houston, Texas 77269-0306 15 ******** 16 17 Videotape deposition of MONTE C. THRODAHL, 18 taken on May 15, 1987, at the Holiday Inn West/Airport, 19 St. Louis, Missouri, commencing at 8:55 a.m., before 20 Linda S. Towery, CSR No. 2413 and Notary Public in and 21 for the State of Texas, pursuant to Notice. 22 23 24 ******** 25 NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37178 EXAMINATI3N_BYi Mr. Lacey I-N_d_e_x 3 PASH 4 NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES. INC. HARTOLDMON0037179 4 1 2 MR. FREEMAN: Before we swear the 3 Witness, I'd like to make just a brief 4 statement. 5 The Witness informed me late last 6 night that he has a 2:00 o'clock 7 commitment that has been scheduled prior 8 to the time he was served with Subpoena; 9 so, he has informed me that it is 10 virtually impossible to reschedule that 11 2:00 o' clock appointment. So, we're 12 prepared to work through the lunch hour 13 and to take care of the obligations here 14 today in every way we can. But we still 15 intend to make the 2:00 o'clock 16 appointment. 17 18 19 MDNTE.^^HRQPAHh, 20 being duly sworn, testified as follows: 21 22 23 Q. Will.you state your full name for the record 24 pi ease, sir. 25 A. Monte C. Throdahl. A AAAiM A TP* f* HARTOLDMON0037180 5 1 Q. Where do you live Mr. Throdahl? 2 A. I live at No. 36 Briar cliff in Ladue, Missouri. 3 Q. That is a St. Louis suburb? 4 A. Yes, it's a suburb of St. Louis. 5 Q. How are you currently employed? 6 A. Well, I'm recently retired from Monsanto, 1984; 7 and I am a partner in a professional consulting 8 corporation that takes up some of my retirement time. 9 Q. What sort of professional consulting do you do? 10 A. It's management, largely involving research and 11 development, environmental policy, long-range planning, 12 international affairs, and the like. 13 Q. Is Monsanto one of your clients? ' 14 A. No. 15 Q. Tell me briefly about your educational 16 background. 17 A. Well, I have a degree in chemical engineering 18 from Iowa State University, 1941. 19 Q. Did you obtain any subsequent education beyond 20 that Bachelor's degree? 21 A. None of a formal nature. 22 Q. What was the first full-time employment that 23 you had following your degree? 24 A. I joined Monsanto immediately upon graduation, 25 in June of 1941. I had previously worked for Monsanto HARTOLDMONOQ37181 6 1 the prior summer of 1940 as a temporary employee; and I 2 stayed with Monsanto continually through that some 43 3 years, until I retired. 4 Q. In 1984? 5 A. That's right. 6 Q. Would you describe for me very briefly the 7 different job positions you held with Monsanto. 8 A. From the beginning? 9 Q. Yes. 10 A. Okay. I joined the analytical department of 11 the manufacturing group at -- at a plant in West 12 Virginia; name was Nitro, N-i-t-r-o. I moved from the 13 analytical department to the research department about a 14 year and a half 1ater. 15 I did organic synthesis in the resear ch 16 department and was 1ater -- somewhere around 1942 or 17 forty -- 1 943 , I was assigned to what was called the 18 rubber evaluation 1aboratory. The purpose of that was 19 to evaluate the efficacy of candidate chemicals for the 20 vulcanization and stabilization of rubber. I became a 21 group 1 eader in about 1945 in this -- roughly the same 22 kind of activity. I became an assistant resear ch 23 director somewhere around five years later. 24 I left Nitro in the summer of 1954. I that - 25 I had, by that time, spent about a year or so as a HARTOLDMON003/ 7 1 development -- a commercial development manager in the 2 field of rubber at Nitro; but when I went to St. Louis, 3 I was an assistant director of development for the then 4 organic chemicals division. 5 I be came the development dire ctor of that 6 division about 1956 ; and about 196 0, I became director 7 of research and then director of marketing in that same 8 organic chemicals division in about nineteen --- late 9 1963 or early '64. 10 I became general manager of the international 11 division of Monsanto, and I held that job -- that was 12 a -- that became a vice-presidency. And I held that' j ob 13 unt il -- let's see -- November of 1966, which I -- at 14 which time I be came the senior corporate technical 15 officer, specifically vice-president for technology. 16 And I held that spot, with various other titles 17 that were accorded as one grew older, until mid-1977, 18 when I became senior vice-president for environmental 19 policy. And I held that assignment until I retired. 20 Q. Which was in 1984? 21 A. Yes, at the end of March of '84. 22 Q. And what was your highest position you 23 attained, senior vice-president - 24 A. Yes. . 25 Q. -- for environmental policy? HARTOLDMON0037183 8 1 A. Well, I was senior vice-president for 2 technology, as well; but as I said, those titles changed 3 from -- I guess about three different times. 4 Q. So, you had responsibility for both technology 5 and environmental policy? 6 A. Not at the same time. 7 Q. I see. Back and forth. 8 A. That -- no, no. I misled you. 9 I became vice-president for technology in 10 November of '66. 11 Q. Right. 12 A. Well, that title changed to group 13 vice-president a few years later. ' 14 Q. I see. 15 A. Then that title changed to senior 16 vice-president, but it was the same job. The -- the 17 company had balooned, and that's why it was changed. 18 Q. And then in 1977 , retaining a title of senior 19 vice-president - 20 A. Right. 21 Q. -- you moved over to environmental policy? 22 A. You're right. 23 Q. Okay. 24 A. I'm sorry. I should have said that. 25 Q. Okay. HARTOLDMON0037184 9 1 What areas were you responsible for in your 2 position as the senior vice-president or a 3 vice-president or group vice-president or whatever the 4 titles were for technology? 5 A. Well, Monsanto was then, as it is now, 6 organized around a -- a decentralized system. We 7 call -- we called the decentralized operating units 8 "divisions" in those days. They're called "operating 9 companies" now. 10 But the responsibility I held then was for a 11 direct management of the -- what was called then 12 corporate resear ch and development, which was a -- a` 13 name given to something that was funded out of corporate 14 funds independent of what the various divisions might be 15 doing obviously related. 16 Then I had functional responsibility for the 17 direction and the quality of the resear ch being done 18 within the various operating divisions at that time. 19 There were also other activities that would be ancillary 20 in nature, and they were assigned as -- and they varied 21 from time to time. 22 At one time, there was no formalized pianning 23 effort for the corporation; and because so much of the 24 problems involving technology involved a sense of 25 direction, it was, I guess, sort of natural I started to HARTOLDMON0037185 10 1 do it informally. And it kind of grew? and, so, I did 2 that for a while, until it became to the point where it 3 should be taken over by a special individual. Things 4 like that, they're -- I would say "ancillary" is perhaps 5 a good description of it. 6 Q. The research function that you had 7 responsibility for in your office over technology was a 8 staff-type function as opposed to a line-type function 9 within the company? 10 A. Yes. The only -- in Monsanto, at that time, 11 you were a line operation if you had profit 12 responsibilities. You were a staff organization if you 13 did not. So, the answer was, yes, that was a staff. 14 Q. And so I can understand that and -- and clearly 15 appreciate the difference between the two, there would 16 be certain groups -- and let's take the organic chemical 17 division -- 18 A. This was -- that was the division I was in. 19 Q. Yes. 20 That division and -- and its changes over time 21 to operating units and companies and whatever, there you 22 would have people who would operate pi ants; and they 23 would report or have responsibility for running that 24 pi ant. And there would be someone upstream to whom they 25 would report, and there would be people who would be HARTOLDMON0037186 11 1 responsible for selling the products that plant 2 generated. And they would have responsibility for 3 reporting upstream in a 1ine type of function all the 4 way up to, eventually, a 1 ine 1 eading to the president 5 of the company. 6 A. That's right. 7 Q. And those individuals in that line of 8 responsibility were responsible for marketing products, 9 for pricing products, for producing products that would 10 be sold -- 11 A. That's right. 12 Q. -- and so on and so forth. 13 A. That's right. ' 14 Q. Then there's an entirely different type of 15 function, where someone is providing support or 16 preparation for that line-type organization which would 17 be, f or example, resear ch and development, where what 18 you did might or what your group did might result in a 19 new product, for example, that would then be put into 20 production, become a line responsibility, for example. 21 A. That's -- that's fairly accurate. 22 Q. Okay. 23 How many people, how many people at your level, 24 other than your own position in technology, were 25 supervising staff responsibilities at Monsanto as HARTOLDMON0037187 12 1 opposed to line responsibilities? 2 A. Well, it's kind -- 3 MR. FREEMAN; What period of time are 4 we talking about, Mr. Lacey? 5 MR. LACEY; Generally, without regard 6 to organizational title. I'm not so 7 interested in the organizational title as 8 to how the -- the actual functional 9 structure worked. 10 A. Well, this -- this vary -- this varied over 11 time, as you -- as you might -- as you might gather. 12 These things moved 1 ike accordians. Sometimes they'd be 13 squeezed in. Sometimes they'd be expanded. But -- 14 Q. Well, let's take the period from the 15 mid-sixties to the mid-seventies, then. 16 A. Well, I suspect that there were probably -- 17 two, three, four -- probably between -- between five and 18 seven. I -- I -- I' d have to think about the given 19 year, but somewhere along in there. There were about a 20 half dozen of us that were what we would call the senior 21 corporate staff officers. 22 Q. Okay. 23 A. Something like that. 24 Q. How were those different areas broken out? 25 Yours was research and development? HARTOLDMON0037188 13 1 A. Yeah. It was called "technology" as a broader 2 thing. There was one for administration, and that - 3 that's the one that -- that had a -- it was kind of a 4 catch-all, but reasonably standard. There was one for 5 finance and -- finance and accounting. There was one 6 for engineering. There was one for manufacturing. 7 There was one for marketing. 8 See, these were functional in nature rather 9 than -10 Q. Exactly. 11 A. -- mission in nature. 12 Q. Exactly. ' 13 A. Okay. , 14 Q. Within that group, I understand that one of the 15 staff-type functions that existed within Monsanto was 16 the group known as the medical department. 17 A. That's right. 18 Q. Which group did that -- or which one of those 19 functions did that report to? 20 A. Well, in the -- in the -- up until '73, that 21 reported to the administration -- 22 Q. Okay. 23 A. -- vice-president. 24 Q. So, up to 197 3 , the vice-president or group 25 vice-president, whatever it was, of administration had HARTOLDMON0037189 14 1 the medical department. 2 What happened in 1973? 3 A. That was assigned to me at that point. 4 Q. Okay. 5 So, from 1973 until 1977, when you changed over 6 to environmental policy, you had the medical department. 7 A. And still continued to have it after 1973 -- 8 after *77. Excuse me. 9 Q. Okay. 10 Let me see if I -- when you went to 11 environmental policy, did somebody replace you in 12 technology? ' 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Okay. 15 Was environmental policy a new staff area? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. And the medical department went along with -- 18 A. That's correct. 19 Q. -- that new staff area? 20 A. That's correct. 21 Q. The new one was created by carving functions 22 out of the others into a new group? 23 A. Yes, in part. We -- we took the entire medical 24 group. It was expanded -- I don't know -- 20-fold, I 25 guess, by that -- about -- between '77 and '79, a a Tro iki/^ HARTOLDMON0037190 15 1 somewhere along in there. 2 We took part of the analytical sciences, that 3 had grown up in another part of the corporation, out of 4 research; and we -- we created toxicology, which is - 5 had been a function performed outside of the 6 corporation, as many companies did at that time. And we 7 then added others, such as epidemiology and industrial 8 hygeine and occupational medicine and so on. And so 9 that formed, then, the thing called environmental 10 policy. 11 And we called it "policy" because that was the 12 most critical thing we felt we had to do, is keep ' 13 reminding people, each time we thought about it, that 14 it -- that the policy was the thing that had to 15 literally come first. 16 Q. Was this group, environmental policy group, 17 then, basically a very vastly expanded set of functions 18 of what had previously been in the medical department? 19 A. Oh, heavens, yes. The medical department in 20 the sixties was very, very, very small. 21 Q. Well -- 22 A. You want numbers, I suppose. 23 Q. No, no, no. I'm trying to -- you described -- 24 and I j ust want to make sure I understand -- what was in 25 the environmental policy group. HARTOLDMON0037191 16 1 You had toxicology and epidemiology -- 2 A. Right. 3 Q. -- and industrial hygiene and occupational 4 medicine. 5 A. Right. Okay. 6 Q. What else? 7 A. Well, we had people who were called 8 environmental managers, who looked after the 9 interpretation of the -- the environmental laws and 10 regulations and helped to shape policy in -- in that 11 sense; and we also had some other people that were 12 involved in --- in corporate planning for the ' 13 environment. We did al 1 that on a corporate basis. 14 But the basic --- the basic change that I guess 15 we're sort of trying to focus on here is that it was in 16 the period probably beginning around the early -- early 17 seventies that I began to realize, as did others like me 18 in other companies, that these environmental issues were 19 very compl i cated. They are -- they' re -- the -- the 20 laws themselves are complex enough. In fact, they're 21 almost contradictory at times. 22 The regulations that followed those laws were 23 even more complicated; and we simply couldn11 permit 24 each manager of a plant, each director of research, each 25 director of marketing to deal with the agencies involved v-% A I 1 IM O ft OOAr*l A TCP IM/ft HARTOLDMON0037192 17 1 on his own. Because it -- it was a decentralized 2 system, it was j us t -- it was impossible. They needed 3 guidance. That's what they needed most. 4 And I began to recognize that in the early 5 seventies; so, it was my idea to bring the corporation 6 under a -- a focal point of senior leadership. And I 7 proposed this, and guess what? 8 Q. You won the job. 9 A. I won the job; that's right. I piayed defense 10 for the rest of the time. 11 But it was -- it was something that -- that the 12 industry, while it -- I think, from the time I began' to 13 work in the company, we had always been concerned about 14 what we called "personal safety." But in those days, 15 personal safety was mostly acute, you know, accidents, 16 things that if you -- if you were exposed to some 17 chemical by touching or inhaling or whatever, they were 18 concerned about acute effects. 19 The idea of chronic effects honestly didn't 20 appear in the -- in the industry lexicon until along in 21 the early seventies . "Acute" meaning -- "chronic" 22 meaning 1ow level, long time, intermittent exposure 23 measured over years. 24 Q. If I understand what you've told me, basically 25 one of the goals or maybe the goal in developing this HARTOLDMON0037193 18 1 environmental policy staff function was to provide both 2 expertise and a consistent position across the company 3 with regard to matters that related to things like 4 toxicology, epidemiology, industrial hygiene, 5 occupational medicine, and the like. 6 A. That's correct. And let me add one more thing 7 to it, be cause this is important. 8 We adapted a policy very early on that we were 9 going to be pro-active. We weren't going to simply 10 comply with the rules, for a number of reasons. 11 By the time you got to compliance, the needs 12 were going to be greater and the reauthorization of the 13 laws; and you perhaps are familiar with that sort of 14 thing. So, we wanted to be out front. 15 So, we took leadership roles in -- in every 16 aspect that we could, usually on a voluntary basis. The 17 Chemical Manufacturers Association was one. The -- The 18 American Industrial Health Counsel, Society of the 19 Plastics Industry, The American Petroleum Institute, and 20 on and on and on. 21 And we did that because, first of all, we 22 thought it was good citizenship. And, secondly, this 23 gave our people hands-on experience in dealing with the 24 regulating agencies themselves; that is, the people in 25 the agencies. We testified inordinately more than mci i Knn na i i i im ft. AccnriATcc imp HARTOLDMONOQ37194 19 1 others at various congressional hearings, and we did 2 this with a -- with a twofold purpose. First, it was 3 good responsibility; and, secondly, it taught us a great 4 deal of -- of -- of things that we would not have 5 1 earned otherwise. 6 And I spend a little time on this only to tell 7 you that we did a 1ot of this informally long before we 8 formalized it in *77. But the company was simpler in 9 those early days pi us the fact that -- that the chronic 10 issues really had never surfaced. 11 It's -- it's an aside; but the pharmaceutical 12 people, even to this day, rarely -- rarely test for ' 13 chronic effects, because it' s a rare individual that 14 takes medicine, you might say, all of his -- all of his 15 1 ife. Insulin, yes, and so on. 16 But the point was: It was not -- when you look 17 back with retroactive wisdom, you say, "Well, why didn't 18 you know something 20 or 30 years ago?" It was simply 19 some -- it was simply something, as a concept, people 20 didn't -- didn't appreciate. 21 Well, at any rate, we started all this on a 22 formaliz ed basis in '77; and it's still going pretty 23 much as I had left it in ' 84. 24 MR. FREEMAN: Mr. Throdahl, let me 25 ask you to do one thing for us. We're HARTOLDMON0037195 20 1 trying to -- 2 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 3 MR. FREEMAN: -- shorten this as much 4 as possible. You've got appointments at 5 2:00 o'clock, of course; and Mr. Lacey has 6 some questions he has to ask you. 7 THE WITNESS: Okay. 8 MR. FREEMAN: And if you could just 9 keep -- keep your answers confined to the 10 question, maybe that will make things go a 11 little quicker this morning. Thank you. 12 THE WITNESS: I'm always wanting to 13 make a point. 14 15 BI-MR^.iASEI: MR. FREEMAN: I understand. 16 Q. Well, the point here, it may be most important 17 to try to answer some specific questions I've got; and 18 that would be maybe the most helpful thing you can do 19 for us today. If we had longer, I'd enjoy the -- the 20 philosophical discussion. 21 With regard to the environmental policy group 22 that was actually formed in 1977 , you had responsibility 23 for starting in 1977 -- 24 A. Uh-huh. 25 Q. -- it was your intention and direction that HARTOLDMON0037196 21 1 your people be actively involved in industry groups, 2 correct? 3 A. That's right. 4 Q. Actively involved in meeting with governmental 5 people and giving testimony, in finding out and in 6 attempting to influence what was going on; is that 7 correct? 8 A. In a very ethical way, yes. 9 Q. Now, had those same approaches of being 10 actively involved in industry groups and meeting with 11 govermental officials and presenting Monsanto's position 12 existed in the company before 1977? 13 A. You say "did they exist"? 14 Q. Yes. 15 A. Well, yes; but you have to remember that EPA 16 wasn't formed until '70. And OSHA wasn't formed until 17 '70. And the Toxic Substances Act wasn't passed until 18 six years later. 19 I said that we did these things more or less on 20 an informal basis, and -- and actually environmental 21 hearings were unheard of in -- in the Congress on 22 environmental issues until, oh, in the late seventies. 23 The medical -- the medical officer -- who at 24 that time was Dr. Kelly, Emmet Kelly -- the medical 25 officer, in my j udgment, performed, in his way, for our > ft i /> HARTOLDMONOQ37197 22 1 size at that time, some of the roles that I performed 2 later on a corporate basis. 3 Q. My specific question is: Was Monsanto pursuing 4 those same courses, to the extent that it was possible 5 to do so, before you came in; or was your approach a 6 brand new direction for the company? 7 A. My approach was a -- a development of -- of a 8 policy of consistency and leadership. 9 Time doesn't permit it, but there were other 10 examples where the -- the senior management of the 11 corporation, on advice from -- from the medical 12 director, shut off the manufacture of several chemicals 13 that they found were -- were causing a -- at that time, 14 measurable bad effects. 15 Q. Okay. 16 If I understand your testimony correctly, then, 17 the idea of being actively involved with the groups that 18 might be regulating or looking to regulate the chemical 19 industry was not new when you started in 1977. Others 20 had been doing that before at Monsanto, correct? 21 A. Right. 22 Q. The idea of being a leader in industry groups, 23 chemical manufacturers' association, others that would 24 attempt to set forth an industry standard, an industry 25 position, was not new when you came on in 1977 . That HARTOLDMON0037198 23 had been going on before? is that correct? 2 A. In a much lesser way and a much more sporadic 3 way. 4 Q. Okay. 5 A. But that's right. 6 Q. And the difference between what happened when 7 the environmental policy group was formed in 1977 and 8 what had existed before was, number one, you had a 9 larger budget and many more people employed in those 10 areas, correct? 11 A. That's right. 12 Q. And if I understand what you're saying, ' 13 essentially the medical department, which had previously 14 carried out whatever functions there were like what the 15 environmental policy group did after 1977, was an 16 organization manyfold smaller than the environmental 17 policy group that you staffed up after 1977. 18 A. Yeah. That's right. 19 Q. In fact, did the medical department have all 20 of -- even have capabilities in each of the areas that 21 you formed? 22 A. Oh, no, no, no; and I didn't mean to give that 23 impression. I said insofar as the needs were perceived 24 in that -- in that manner, it was Dr. Kelly who -- well, 25 as a matter of f act, the -- the medi cal department still HARTOLDMON0037199 24 1 is responsible for toxicology? but he handled many 2 things in those days with the regulatory people that, 3 later on, were handled by others. 4 Q. Okay. 5 Am I correct in understanding that, 6 essentially, prior to 1977, Dr. Kelly and those who 7 worked for him, to the extent the company did it, 8 basically carried out the functions that the 9 environmental policy group later carried out? 10 A. Some of the functions, but not all. 11 Q. What other groups in Monsanto, other than the 12 medical department, carried out the environmental policy 13 group functions prior to 1977? 14 A. The plant managers, as I mentioned. 15 Q. Okay. 16 And that would be by actually visiting with 17 regulatory people, presenting company positions, and the 18 like? 19 A. Oh-huh. And -- and to make certain that they 20 were, indeed, in compliance with whatever the state or 21 the Federal regulations were. 22 Q. Okay. 23 There's a man by the name of Pappageorge, 24 Mr. Pappageorge. 25 Are you familiar with him? HARTOLDMON0037200 25 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Was he carrying out, in the early seventies, 3 the sort of function that would have been in the 4 environmental policy group had it been in existence at 5 that time? 6 A. Well, I don't -- I don't have a accurate 7 recollection of all the things that Bill did, although I 8 know he was involved with a number of chemicals and 9 their various appropriate applications. 10 Prior to -- Bill became -- Bill became a 11 director of environmental operations within one of the 12 operating units in 1977 . We formed a --- you might say a 13 smaller organization in each of the operating companies 14 that did what we did on a corporate basis. 15 So, my relationship with a fellow like Bill 16 Pappageorge was that he reported to me in a functional 17 manner; but he reported to his -- his boss in the line 18 for his paycheck. 19 Q. I understand. And what I'm trying to find out 20 is, in the period prior to 1977 -- 21 A. Yeah, I -- 22 Q. -- whether Mr. Pappageorge was carrying out 23 functions of the type that later were carried out by the 24 environmental policy group. , 25 A. Yeah. He was -- he was in a manufacturing role i i mi a a nnA/'i a Trr iaio HARTOLDMON0037201 26 1 of some kind, but I don't remember what it was at that 2 point. 3 Q. Okay. 4 From 1964 forward, you became a corporate 5 officer? 6 A. No. It was in November of '66. 7 Let's see. Yeah, November of '66 I was elected 8 to the board and made a corporate officer. 9 Q. Okay. 10 I -- I guess I was under the impression, maybe 11 when you were in the international division, you had an 12 office; but you did not? ' 13 A. I was a vice-president; but I was not a 14 corporate officer in that sense, you see. 15 Okay. I see what you're driving at. You dwelt 16 sometime on -- on corporate staff roles. I became that 17 corporate staff officer for technology and a member of 18 the board in November of '66. I was not a member of the 19 board prior to that time, although I carried a 20 vice-presidency. 21 Q. Okay. 22 A. But I was not considered a corporate officer in 23 that sense. 24 Q. Okay. 25 But in 19 -- in November of 1966, you became a HARTOLDMON0037202 1 member of the board of directors? 9 27 2 A. Yes. 3 Q Of Monsanto Corporation? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. The Monsanto Company, I guess it is. 6 A. Yes. . 7 Q. And, in addition, you then held a position that 8 would be considered within Monsanto to be a corporate 9 officer. 10 A. That's right. 11 Q. Even though you'd previously held a title of 12 vice-president. But that wasn't that important a ' 13 position to be a real corporate officer. 14 A. Well, none of them were. 15 Q. Okay. 16 A. Division managers were also vice-presidents. 17 Q. Okay. 18 A. And the -- the international division was an 19 operating division of sorts at that time. 20 Q. But the time -- when you became the 21 vice-president that you were over technology in November 22 of 1966 , you were then truly a corporate officer of 23 Monsanto? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. How long did you remain on the board of HARTOLDMON0037203 28 1 directors? 2 A. Till I retired. 3 Q. So, you were a board member from '66 till 1984? 4 A. That's right. 5 Q. And throughout that entire period of time, you 6 also remained a corporate officer in the sense that the 7 company uses that word? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Was there any particular division of 10 responsibility in the board -- at the board of directors 11 between those people who were full-time employees of 12 Monsanto as officers of the company and also members' of 13 the board and those people who were members of the board 14 but not employees of the company? And by that I mean 15 outside directors, if you understand what I mean. 16 A. Uh-huh. 17 Was there a difference in their function, you 18 say? 19 Q. Yes, as directors. 20 A. Well, yes. The -- the outside directors did 21 not involve themselves in any of the operational aspects 22 of the corporation. They couldn't. I mean physically 23 they couldn't. 24 Q. Uh-huh. 25 A. But when it came to the -- to the vote on HARTOLDMON0037204 29 1 whatever the board may be -- may have been considering, 2 we all acted as the same kind of person. 3 Q. So, in terms of the operational aspects of the 4 company and the day-to-day affairs and day-to-day 5 decisions, the outside directors weren't normally 6 involved in that; but the inside directors or the 7 officer directors would be involved? 8 A. That's right. 9 Q. When a matter actually came to the board of 10 directors and there was a vote, everybody had one vote? 11 A. That's right. 12 Q. Okay. ' 13 Now, how did the board of directors decide to 14 have the company make policy decisions? Did it set up 15 any groups or committees or anything like that that had 16 responsibility for making recommendations and making 17 evaluation of day-to-day aspects of the company's 18 business? 19 A. Of course, that had been going on ever since 20 the company was formed, I'm sure. 21 Q. Tell me something about the committee structure 22 as it existed at Monsanto from the time you came on the 23 board in 1966 . And I'm talking about the committees 24 that made the top level policy decisions for the company 25 now. HARTOLDMON0037205 30 1 A. There's always been an executive committee of 2 the board. 3 Q. Okay. 4 A. And an executive committee of the board was 5 simply doing the board's work at times the board was not 6 in session. That was usually composed of the chairman 7 and the president and maybe one or two other seniors. 8 There was usually another kind of committee, 9 usually -- it was called, variously, different things. 10 There was a Corporate Development Committee. There was 11 a Corporate Administrative Committee. There was a 12 Corporate Management Committee. The -- they performed, 13 roughly, the same function you're seeking to understand 14 here, but called slightly different names. 15 Q. They were called the Corporate Development 16 Committee, the Corporate Administrative Committee, and 17 the what? 18 A. The Corporate Management Committee. 19 Q. Corporate Management Committee. 20 A. Yeah. And the Corporate Executive Committee 21 then really shrank into almost a -- almost an -- an - 22 kind of an honorary situation, dealing with things 23 that -- well, they had to have one; but they never -- 24 they never really -- in the time I was there, they never 25 really exercised the executive committee as a -- as a HARTOLDMON0037206 31 1 policy-making role, really. 2 Q. Did it recommend salaries for directors or 3 anything like that? 4 A. No. No. There was a board committee of - 5 let's see. What was it called? 6 I've forgotten the precise name; but it had to 7 do with management development, which meant developing 8 people, developing sal ary, compensation. Yeah, it was 9 call the Compensation Committee; and that was a -- that 10 was a -- a -- an actual board committee. And that dealt 11 with the overall policies of what presidents and 12 vice-presidents and senior -- senior directors and the 13 like were to be -- were to be compensated for. 14 And there were other committees of -- there's a 15 Finance Committee of the board, and there was a -- later 16 on there -- in -- in 197 8 or '7 9, a Social 17 Responsibility Committee of the board was created 18 entirely of outside directors. And, by now, you know, 19 the board compositions have changed. It' s almost 20 entirely outsiders; whereas, when I came on, it was 21 about an even split, as I remember. 22 Q. So, basically, the executive committee didn't 23 have a 1 ot of day-to-day decision-making functions? 24 A. No. No. 25 Q. There were separate committees that dealt with I Ifti a *>(AniATPf 1 bio HARTOLDMON0037207 32 1 things like corporate sal ary str uctures for top 2 executives - 3 A. Right. 4 Q. -- selecting new officers, and things like 5 that. 6 A. Right. 7 Q. But the major, what 1*11 call, 8 meat-of-the-company decisions went to this Development 9 Committee, Administrative Committee, and Management 10 Committee? 11 A. Yes . They didn't exist simultaneously, you 12 understand. ` 13 Q. Okay. Well, let me see. 14 Are those basically three different names for 15 essentially the same type of body? 16 A. Yes. That' s what I was trying to tell you. 17 Q. Okay. 18 Which one of those three came first, or which 19 one was the committee called first? 20 A. Well, in my term -- since my term -- in my term 21 of office, I -- I listed them in the order. 22 Q. Okay. 23 So, when you first came on the board, there -- 24 it was the Corporate Development Committee, correct? 25 A. (Nodding head) Kl C 1 fl/ir* O A I I IIMO. Acnri ATCC IMP HARTOLDMON0037208 33 1 Q. You need to answer verbally. 2 A. Yes. Oh, I'm sorry. 3 Q. The camera will get it, but the -- the written 4 transcript won't. 5 Then at some point changed its name to the 6 Corporate Administrative Committee? 7 A. Yeah. 8 Q. And then some point again changed its name to 9 the Corporate Management Committee? 10 A. That's right. 11 Q. And all three of those committees had 12 essentially the same function? ' 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. And had essentially the same responsibility 15 from the board of directors as far as what they were to 16 do? 17 A. Yes. 1 8 Q. Would there be decisions made by those 19 committees that would not require an actual board vote, 20 "We vote to do this or that"? 21 A. Many. 22 Q. What sort of decisions were actually voted on 23 by the board of directors itself? I mean, what things 24 did they actually have to vote on? 25 A. They voted on capital appropriations above a MCI I AilO O A 1 i Ira o. AecnriATCo imp HARTOLDMON0037209 34 1 certain minimum level. They voted on -- on directional 2 change. They obviously voted on dividend policy. They 3 voted on, oh, any number of matters that had to do with 4 fiscal issues, who was to be the -- the -- the 5 corporate -- the outside -- the outside -- 6 Q. Auditors ? 7 A. Hun? 8 Q. Auditors ? 9 A. -- corporate auditors, yeah, and things of that 10 type. I guess it would be appropriations and 11 directional changes is where the -- the board would be 12 involved in that mostly. ` 13 Q. What do you mean by "directional changes"? 14 A. Well, if the management believed that the kind 15 of technical programs ought to pursue a -- a different 16 direction for a given purpose, that would be summarized 17 and presented to the board, probably over a period of 18 several meetings, so that they would begin to get the 19 gist of what was intended. 20 If there was a -- an international policy that 21 had to be thought up, to what extent was the corporation 22 going to be come multinational, they would take on those 23 kinds of directional change decisions. 24 Q. Would that include a day-to-day decision about 25 whether to produce more or less of a particular HARTOLDMON0037210 35 1 product -- 2 A. No. 3 Q. -- that sort of thing? 4 A. No. 5 Q. Those would be handled at some lower level 6 within the company below the board of directors? 7 A. The president would usually handle that. 8 Q. Okay. 9 What was the relationship between -- and what's 10 the best way -- I'd like to just find one name we can 11 use to refer to this committee that was the Development 12 Committee then the Administrative Committee and then' the 13 Management Committee. What -- is there one single name 14 that sort of capsulizes all of that? 15 A. Well, it's -- it's broadly management. That's 16 what it's about. 17 Q. Okay. Can -- 18 A. Why don't you -19 Q. Can we j ust use the term Management 20 Committee -- 21 A. Sure. 22 Q. -- to talk about the Development Committee, the 23 Corporate Administrative Committee, and the Corporate 24 Management Committee? 25 A. That's right. HARTOLDMON0037211 36 1 Q. What was the relationship between this 2 Management Committee and the president of the company? 3 Did they work together? Did he -- 4 A. The president was always -- now, the president, 5 in the day that I came on the so-called Corporate 6 Development Committee, the president was the chief 7 executive officer? and the chairman was not. That 8 changed in somewhere around '72, when Mr. Hanley came 9 in. He became -- he came in as president; but shortly 10 thereafter, he was made chairman and CEO. And it's 11 remained that. 12 But whoever it was, the chief executive ` 13 officer, whatever he was called, was the chairman of 14 that committee and that was his committee and that 15 committee was to give him advice. He -- he voted. He 16 voted for everybody. 17 Q. Okay. 18 A. But -- and that's the way it was set. 19 Q. I understand. 20 So, this -- this Administrative or Management 21 Committee - 22 A. Uh-huh. 23 Q. -- was basically a group of senior management 24 that the board expected to give the president advice; 25 but basically, he would finally make the decision -- HARTOLDMON0037212 37 1 A. You bet. 2 Q. -- on what was brought to it. 3 A. Make no mistake. 4 Q. Okay. 5 His vote counted 51, and everybody else's 6 together counted 49 or something like that. 7 A. Well, there was plenty of time for argument and 8 there was pienty of time to present ones views and there 9 was pi enty of time to reconsider. But in the last 10 analysis, someone had to say, "We're going to do this, 11 and we're going to do it this way." 12 Q. Okay. ' 13 Now, was everybody who was an officer of the 14 company, in the terminology we've used, like you became 15 an officer of the company in 1966 , a member of this 16 management-type committee that consulted with the 17 president? 18 A. Yes, I think so. I -- I -- the chief counsel 19 sometimes was a member, as I recall it, and sometimes 20 was not. And he was always -- he was -- he was always a 21 vice-president of the corporation, but the chief counsel 22 in Monsanto's never been a member of the board. 23 So, it's a little fuzzy, to answer your 24 question directly? but by and large, anybody who was a 25 corporate officer was on that Management Committee. HARTOLDMON0037213 38 1 Q. So, you were, then, throughout the period of 2 time from 1966 through - 3 A. Yeah. 4 Q. -- 1984? 5 A. Yeah. 6 Q. Did those -- strike that. 7 Were there regularly scheduled meetings of that 8 committee? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. They wereheld in St.Louis? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. And was it customary for all the members of the 13 committee to make those meetings? 14 A. Yes, except if important travel, such as 15 overseas or something of the sort, might cause him -- a 16 man to be away. Generally you were expected to be 17 there. 18 Q. These were not a come if you choose to today? 19 A. No, no. No, no, no. 20 Q. How often did the group typically meet on a 21 schedule, if it had a schedule? 22 A. They were usually weekly. 23 Q. And how long would these meetings last? 24 A. Host of the day. 25 Q. So, you're talking about one day a week, Rif-i l RAO o A I l I IRA O. ACCrVOI ATCC IMO HARTOLDMON0037214 39 1 basically? 2 A. Something like that. 3 Q. Okay. 4 Minutes, formal minutes, were kept of these 5 meetings ? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Were they reviewed by the committee for their 8 accuracy after they were prepared? 9 A. Yes. There was always a secretary of the 10 committee that was a -- a -- it was -- it was an --- it 11 was an appointive job; and it was -- it was a difficult 12 one, because he had to -- ' 13 Q. Write it all down. 14 A. Well, he had to write it all down; and he had 15 to -- he had to keep track of the -- of the agenda items 16 and how often they would come up for reexamination or 17 whatever. So, that was a full-time job for him. 18 Q. There was a written agenda that was prepared 19 for these meetings? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Did things come up on the meeting informally; 22 or it was basically, if it wasn't on the agenda, it 23 wasn't going to be discussed that week? 24 A. Oh, no. There were -- there -- there were many 25 times when things came up. It was always a round robin HARTOLDMON0037215 40 1 reporting of something that might have occurred that 2 would be interesting, but not necessarily needing 3 anyone's action. It was a matter of communication. 4 Q. So, each of the officers of the company might 5 report on what was happening in his particular group 6 that was of interest? 7 A. Yes, or it could be something that had happened 8 externally that was important to the company one way or 9 the other. 10 Q. Were there people that would, from time to 11 time, come to this committee and make presentations to 12 it? 13 A. Oh, yes. 14 Q. Was that a regular or an irregular event? 15 A. Depended on the agenda; but if there was a -- 16 if there was a -- if there was a problem involving, 17 let's say, an expansion of a plant facility, a change 18 of -- any -- anything that might be a significant change 19 of one kind or another, whether it was incremental or 20 directional in nature, would come before that committee. 21 And usually the proposers would come, sometimes 22 one, sometimes two or three; and they would make 23 presentations. Sometimes they would be very short, 24 five, ten minutes. Sometimes they would be very 25 lengthy. They might be preceded with a -- a report HARTOLDMON0037216 41 1 ahead of time that you would read and -- 2 Q. A written report, you mean? 3 A. Usually. 4 So, yeah, it varied, depending on the nature of 5 the -- of the information. 6 Q. The people that would come and make 7 presentations, were these usually -- usually very 8 knowledgeable people about the area to be presented 9 within the company? 10 A. Yes, sir. 11 Q. Experienced employees, not low level employees, 12 generally? ' 13 A. Generally, yes. 14 Q. Before you reach the 1evel of being a corporate 15 officer and a member of this committee, do you ever have 16 the privilege of making a presentation to the committee? 17 A. Yes. Yes. 18 Q. And was that a relatively significant event 19 in a employee's life, if he was going to make a 20 presentation to that committee? 21 A. You sweat a lot. 22 Q. It was a chance to either do well or do poorly? 23 A. You always wanted to do well. 24 Q. And doing well could lead to advancement or at 25 1 east help you along the way on advancement. Doing HARTOLDMONOQ37217 42 1 poorly could do the opposite? 2 A. Well, I suppose. 3 Q. Was it your observation that people who brought 4 matters to the committee while you were a member of it 5 appeared to always work, very hard to get their facts 6 accurate, to make an effective presentation and present 7 what they had to say in a way that would be understood 8 and able to be relied upon by the committee members? 9 MR. FREEMAN: Object to the form of 10 the question. It calls for nothing but 11 pure speculation on behalf of this 12 Witness. ' 13 Q. I'm asking for what you observed. Does that -- 14 did you observe those characteristics among the people 15 that were making presentations? 16 A. I think everyone wanted to do his best. 17 Q. You didn't observe anybody who ever came and 18 made a presentation and looked like they hadn't made a 19 serious effort to get the facts correct before they 20 brought it? 21 A. Speaking to that exact question, I'd say I -- 22 I -- I did not observe that, no. 23 Facts have a way of changing. 24 Q. Certainly. 25 A. But it was never -- I -- I -- I'd have to say HARTOLDMONOQ37218 43 1 that the intent here was to -- was to tell the -- the 2 good and the bad equally with -- equally well. 3 Q. And, in fact, that was a key matter. If the 4 committee was to function correctly, it had to have all 5 the information. 6 A. That's right. 7 Q. It couldn't be slanted one way or the other and 8 have the committee do its job correctly. 9 A. Well, si anting is difficult to avoid, 10 obviously, because you're a proposer of something. 11 Q. Certainly. 12 A. And many times there would be independent ' 13 people that would be asked to give opposing views, or an 14 outsider would be invited to present an evaluation or 15 this sort of thing. This always happened with changes 16 of direction. 17 Q. I guess what -- 18 A. We had outside consultants for that purpose. 19 Q. I guess what I'm trying to find out is whether 20 people would -- would slant the facts, not present a 21 proposal with one recommendation or another. 22 A. No, they wouldn't do that, not to my knowledge. 23 Q. That certainly would not have been what the 24 Management Committee was seeking. 25 A. No way. HARTOLDMON0037219 44 1 Q. Because when things were brought to the 2 Management Committee, it was ultimately for that 3 committee and the president of the company to decide 4 what to do. 5 A. That's right. 6 Q. And you had to have accurate information in 7 order to make an informed, correct decision. 8 A. Again, now, "accuracy" is a difficult word, 9 because that depends on whether you're measuring the 10 most fundamental thing. And sometimes things that were 11 accurate at one point in time are no longer accurate at 12 a 1ater time. ' 13 Q. Oh, I understand. But the information needed 14 to be accurate at the point that it was given, in any 15 event. 16 A. That's correct. 17 Q. You understand that we're here on a lawsuit 18 that involves cl aims by various people who were exposed 19 to materials containing polychlorinated biphenyls? 20 A. I understand that. 21 Q. Can we j ust -- I don't want to go into the 22 details of the chemical composition, et cetera. 23 You are familiar with what polychlorinated 24 biphenyls are? 25 A. Yes. \r\ r* a l l I I Ail o_ A A TCP HARTOLDMON0037220 45 1 Q. Can we j ust use the shorthand, PCBs, to refer 2 to them? 3 A. Uh-huh. That's fine. 4 Q. Did the Management Committee ever address, to 5 your recollection, matters relating to PCBs? 6 A. They did. 7 Q. Okay. 8 In terms of PCBs, separate and apart from your 9 role on the Management Committee -- 10 A. Uh-huh. 11 Q. -- did you ever have any functions that had 12 anything to do with PCBs in terms of your -- your ' 13 day-to-day management operations within the company? 14 A. No. These were mature products, had been for 15 many years; and they wer e the full responsibility of 16 the -- whatever the operating division was at the time. 17 They were usually in -- at that -- I guess -- let's see. 18 The organic division was the mother chur ch, as it were. 19 And it retained organic chemicals until the final name 20 change some -- many years later. 21 But as 1ong as they were mature products, it 22 was my job to maintain a -- at 1 east enough familiarity 23 with the research that would be going on that we 24 wouldn1t be caught napping with somebody inventing a 25 competitive process or something that was better. mci i mp pa IMA ACWIATCC IMP HARTOLDMONOQ37221 46 1 If that were going along smoothly, I probably 2 wouldn't pay very much attention to it. 3 Q. I guess my question is: When did you first 4 have any involvement that you can recall, separ ate and 5 apart from the Management Committee functions, with 6 P CBs ? 7 A. Well, certainly I -- I knew from my own reading 8 that P CBs, following DDT, had -- had some ecologi cal 9 effects that had never been measured before. I was 10 aware of that. But I was mostly aware when, indeed, we 11 began to realize that -- that, on a corporate -- from a 12 corporate basis, certain things had to -- had to be made 13 to happen. And I -- I r ecall that the Management 14 Committee had some sessions on that. 15 Q. Yeah. And I'm trying to separate out, if it' s 16 possible, whether or not you had anything to do with 17 PCBs other than j ust reading because you knew the 18 company made it or what you did at the Management 19 Committee versus things you did, for example, in your 20 role as the vice-president over technology. 21 A. No. I tried to explain that by saying that - 22 that I was aware of literature that was going on; and I 23 may have had informal conversations from time to time 24 with -- with Dr. Kelly or some of -- of his people. I 25 certainly may have had them with who made -- who might Iti O A Arrw'l ATfO I At/** HARTOLDMONOQ37222 47 1 have been the research director of that division at that 2 point in time, but I -- I can't recall specifically any 3 deep involvement on that. 4 Q. Nothing more than informal conversation, as 5 best you recall? 6 A. That's correct. 7 Q. And to the extent that Dr. Kelly came formally 8 under your supervision in the technology group in 9 197 3 -- 10 A. Uh-huh. 11 Q. -- from 1973 to 1977, did you have any 12 day-to-day involvement with whatever he might be doihg 13 about PCBs or what his successers might be doing about 14 P CBS ? 15 A. Well, I probably did; but again, at that point, 16 until we ceased manufacture and sale of -- of the 17 products, there's nothing stands out in my mind that 18 focused my attention on that. 19 Q. Did Dr. Kelly report directly to you beginning 20 in 1973? 21 A. Uh-huh. Yes. 22 Q. In other words, there weren't three officers in 23 between you -- 24 A. No. 25 Q. -- and he? HARTOLDMONOQ37223 48 1 A. No ,, 2 Q. And with regard to whatever he might be doing 3 on PCBs, he might make some informal reports; but 4 basically he had your authority to keep on going with 5 whatever programs he had? 6 A. That1s correct. And I would certainly never 7 have had the time to review everything that he and his 8 people were doing. It would have been impossible. 9 Q. Okay. 10 So, it was pretty much up to him in his 11 department to decide what to do, if anything, about PCB 12 matters, separate and apart from whatever the company 13 was doing at the Management Committee 1evel, as far as 14 medical department efforts were concerned? 15 A. Yeah. But he certainly was informed about what 16 the Management Committee was concerned about. 17 Q. I understand. 18 A. Yeah. 19 Q. I guess what I'm trying to do is, again, just 20 understand the extent of your day-to-day involvement; 21 and I understand it was very, very limited. 22 A. That's right. 23 Q. Those were matters left to Dr. Kelly and his 24 successors who reported it to you. 25 A. They reported to me, but they served an MCI pa l illM fl. ACCnriATPQ IMP. HARTOLDMONOQ37224 49 1 operating company very much as a consultant might serve 2 them. 3 Q. Right. 4 And, again, somebody would come -- an operating 5 company would come to them seeking their expertise. 6 A. Absolutely. 7 Q. And basically, I guess, as I picture it, they 8 have the expertise; and they are providing that to the 9 company. 10 A. That's correct. 11 Q. And you're not interfering on a day-to-day 12 basis with what they do in that function. ' 13 A. They would never come to me and say, "Can you 14 do this and this and this, " uni ess it turned out that 15 the medical group, or any group, might not have had the 16 priority or whatever. 17 But that was so rare that -- in fact, that's 18 the way we worked in Monsanto for many years, that we 19 try to avoid this -- this up, down -- this going up and 20 then over and down. 21 Q. Tried -- tried to put authority in the hands of 22 people who needed it functionally to get the job done 23 instead of some specific 1 ine chart structure. Is that 24 what you're saying? 25 A. Well, when it -- when it certainly involved -- HARTOLDMON0037225 50 1 you said the word "support" earlier on, and that's one 2 of the functions of the medical group. It was to 3 support the operations. 4 And they would take initiative, by the way, in 5 many instances and say, "You ought not to do this," or, 6 "You ought to do such and so with certain kinds of 7 constraints, " whatever. 8 Q. And -- 9 A. So, they took initiatives. 10 Q. And, again, that was their function -- 11 A. That's their -- 12 Q. -- and their right -- ' 13 A. That's right. 14 Q. -- within Monsanto? 15 A. Yes, sir. 16 Q. And to the extent that they wanted to take 17 initiatives with regard to matters that related to 18 safety and health, that was their function, to go out 19 and take those initiatives, correct? 20 A. That's right. 21 Q. To whom had the medical department reported 22 before it got assigned to you, the administrative group? 23 A. It reported to the vice-president for 24 administration. 25 Q. Do you know who it was who had been receiving HARTOLDMON0037226 51 1 the medical department reports prior to 1973? 2 A. I -- I -- I can't -- I -- it might -- it might 3 have been a man named Bible. I'm fuzzy on exactly who 4 had that job, but I think it was Bible. 5 MR. FREEMAN: This is prior to '63? 6 MR. LACEY: No. Prior to '73. 7 A. '73. I -- I'd have to look. 8 Q. Okay. 9 When you obtained that responsibility in 1973, 10 I take it you didn't make any significant changes from 11 the way things had been proceeding prior to 1973; is 12 that correct? 13 A. Well, no. 14 Q. What did you do to change the medical 15 department when you took over in 1973? 16 A. The first thing we did was to get them to draft 17 a long-range plan, which they had not been doing. They 18 had been more or less responding to requests. And while 19 we were going to continue to do that, I felt it 20 absolutely necessary, with things becoming more 21 complicated. 22 We, at that time, were considering -- we hadn't 23 made the final decision -- to do our own toxicology. 24 That meant a big f acil ity. It had to be thought up, 25 considered, planned. Moneys had to be approved by the HARTOLDMONOQ37227 52 1 board, eventually. 2 There were other things that we wanted to do 3 that, I think between Kelly and me and also Dr. Roush, 4 who came in as an assistant medical director -- and he 5 sort of ran side -- or he rode sidesaddle with Kelly for 6 a year or so, until Kelly retired. That was the purpose 7 of it. But we definitely wanted to increase the medical 8 role; and, so, that's along -- that was the first thing 9 we did. 10 Q. Did that involve more budget allocation? 11 A. Yeah, it -- yes. 12 Q. Did you have any difficulty to the extent you 13 needed to go higher than yourself to get authority 14 getting the medical department's budget increased? 15 A. None. 16 Q. To your knowledge, from your work on the 17 Management Committee, whatever the name may have been 18 prior to 1973 , had the Management Committee or the 19 president of the company ever denied any funding to the 20 medical department that it had sought for anything it 21 thought necessary to do? 22 A. That's a hard question to answer. I -- I 23 would -- I would think that the answer would have to be 24 "no." There might have been an occasion when somebody 25 wanted to -- not to perform a service or perform a NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES. INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37228 53 1 function, but it might have been to modify something 2 in -- in some respect. 3 But that's -- I'd have to guess. But Dr. Kelly 4 was the first of the medical directors we had. I think 5 he started in '39. Previous to that time, this had been 6 done on a part-time basis by a number of physicians. 7 And, so, it's -- it' s my impression, though, 8 that Kelly was a -- was a pretty innovative guy; and he 9 had vision. And, so, when Emmet said, "We ought to do 10 this and this and this," people generally fell in line 11 and said, "Well, that -- that makes sense. We'11 do 12 it." ` 13 But I couldn't say there never was a negative 14 decision. 15 Q. But you don't specifically recall any decisions 16 by the Management Committee while you were on it from 17 1966 foward to deny something sought by the medical 18 department? 19 A. Not to my knowledge. 20 Q. Okay. 21 The long-range pianning that you instituted in 22 the medical department after you became the person 23 responsible for it in 1973 , was that something that 24 Dr. Kelly had sought; or was that an idea that you 25 brought to the process? HARTOLDMON0037229 54 1 A. I -- I -- I brought that. 2 Q. Okay. 3 The idea of increasing the role of the medical 4 department and enlarging it and making it a more 5 prominent function within the company, was that an idea 6 that Dr. Kelly had had and you affirmed; or was that an 7 idea you had and you brought to the area in 1973? 8 A. Well, I suspect that was pretty much a joint -- 9 a joint effort. Again, I think that Dr. Kelly had been 10 recognizing that changes were occurring. He -- he had 11 been -- he had been running one of the least costly 12 departments in the corporation and was always - 13 congratulated, you know, for running a tight ship. 14 Running a tight ship and being penurious are not the 15 same thing. 16 So, I would say that Kelly had ideas; but he 17 was perhaps more conservative about making the push. 18 And my role was to push him over and say, "Emmet, if you 19 had your dr uthers, what would you like to do that we 20 ought to be doing but you r eally haven' t brought it up 21 for a number of reasons?" 22 And when you get used to living in the -- in 23 the same atmosphere for a while, you tend to become 24 accustomed to it and think, "Well, we can't do any 25 more." And that's what the outsider -- and I was an MPI l MC CALLUM a ASSOCIATES INC. HARTOLDMON0037230 55 1 outsider in a sense -- said, "Well, come on. Let's get 2 on with it." And I -- I think I'm being fair with Emmet 3 about that. 4 Emmet wasn't much of a pianner, because he'd 5 never had to do that. When you work by yourself, you 6 are your pianner; and whatever you think about, that's 7 it. But when you've got a bunch of people with you, 8 you've got to do something of that sort. 9 So, actually, that was George Roush's role for 10 the first two that we created. He -- George led the - 11 led the medical effort and the planning. And I -- I was 12 the fellow that would stand behind him; and I'd -- I` 13 would crack the whip, saying, "No, that's not good 14 enough, yet. " And that' s the way you do pianning, by a 15 series of variations. 16 So, this was -- this was really the basis of 17 the modern medical department that included doing 18 toxicology, included epidemiology. We had never done 19 that before on any kind of a consistent basis. We'd 20 hired epidemiologists to do the work for us at times, 21 but we wanted to do -- we wanted to get to do it in 22 house as much as possible. 23 Q. What is epidemiology? 24 A. Well, epidemiology is a study of the disease of 25 populations. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES. INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37231 1 Q. And what was your interest in epidemiology? 2 A. Well, we wanted to find out, in effect, whether 3 or not the working conditions all throughout the company 4 were such that our people were not being exposed to 5 inj urious amounts of whatever; and -- and that's -- 6 that's what one does. You study -- the term for that is 7 you study the cohorts; and oftentimes in the chemical 8 industry, since there aren't lots of people working in 9 the plants, you almost have to go to cohorts of his 10 company and your company and my company making the same 11 thing and say, "Can we share our -- our records with 12 each other?" And you do statistical analyses on -- on 13 inj ur ies and on illnesses and whatever. And you -- you 14 couple epidemiology with industrial hygiene and with 15 toxicology, and the three have to be together. You 16 can' t do one without the other two. So, that's why we 17 decided to do those three simultaneously. 18 Q. And prior to 1973, you -- you hadn't had any 19 epidemiologists in your medical department? 20 A. No. We hired that done by outside people, at 21 the universities usually, a common practice at that 22 time. 23 Q. These outside epidemiologists were hired by 24 Dr. Kelly prior to your getting responsibility. 25 A. That's right. HARTOLDMON0037232 57 1 Q. Do you recall who was hired or anything about 2 the facts of that? 3 A. Oh, gosh. There's a fellow at Pittsburgh, I 4 think, named Interline; and he would be one that they 5 used. I -- I -- I can' t remember any more just right 6 off the bat. 7 Q. Then I take it, also, from what you've said you 8 did not have your own toxicology function that was being 9 done in house prior to your getting involved? 10 A. That's right. 11 Q. And, again, was that done by outside people? 12 A. Yes. ` 13 Q. Okay. 14 And do you know who was used for that? 15 A. Oh, yes. Several. Hazeltine outside of 16 Washington. Industrial Biotest was one. 17 There were -- there were several more of a 18 smaller nature that since have been merged with others, 19 and I don't remember the original names. But there -- 20 and there weren' t many of them outsiders -- there 21 weren't many outsiders in those days that did this. 22 But the theory or the philosophy was that if an 23 outside group did it, they would not be thought to be 24 self-serving and they would do this -- get the answers 25 and give you the response. And that was practiced for a uri i KAf* n A I I I IK A O. AOOnrtATCC I Mr* HARTOLDMON0037233 58 1 long time. 2 Q. Did the company have its own industrial 3 hygienist before you got involved? 4 A. Yes. Yes. Elmer Wheeler was one such 5 individual, and a man named Garrett was another such 6 individual. 7 And, indeed, they trained, on a limited basis, 8 people within the plants to practice industrial 9 hygiene -- not nearly to the extent that we insisted 10 upon it after 173. But they were a source of expertise, 11 and they were the ones that had most of the outside 12 conta cts. - 13 Q. Outside -- what do you mean by "outside 14 contacts"? 15 A. Well, dealing with industrial hygiene with 16 other companies, with the agencies that -- that existed 17 such as they did prior to the formation of the EPA or -- 18 I'm sorry -- OSHA. 19 Q. Was the function of the medical department 20 primarily 1imited to working with and protecting the 21 health and safety of workers within Monsanto, or did it 22 also have functions that related to customers of 23 Monsanto? 24 A. Both. Obviously the worker -- the worker 25 exposure was a prime concern, but the product -- the HARTOLDMON0037234 59 1 product safety was also their concern. 2 Q. Was it the -- the goal of the medical 3 department, at 1 east from the time you were involved, to 4 try to provide sufficient worker protection that none of 5 Monsanto's employees actually in production or in any 6 other function where they could come into contact with 7 chemicals that Monsanto made would be exposed to enough 8 chemicals to be harmed by it? 9 A. That certainly was the goal. 10 Q. And that goal included both not being harmed in 11 either an acute fashion -- that is, immediately -- or 12 being harmed in a chronic fashion; is that correct? ' 13 A. Insofar as you understood chronic relationships 14 in those days. 15 Q. Well, the goal was to keep from having a 16 chronic problem? 17 A. That's right. That's right. 18 Q. And what we would mean by that is an acute 19 problem would be if you have the exposure and 20 immediately something bad happens to you. 21 A. Or if you had a spill and you got -- you 22 inhaled -- or your skin was contacted in some way or 23 other. 24 Obviously, that's what the purpose of the 25 nurses and plant doctors were for, was to take care of HARTOLDMON0037235 60 1 that. They also gave routine physicals as appropriate. 2 They also recommended and -- and carried out the 3 surveillance on the industrial hygiene practices for, 4 you know, various containment things; such as, 5 inhalators, respirators, this -- all this sort of thing. 6 And they -- they supervised that. 7 Q. My question is just to make sure I have cl early 8 fixed in my mind the difference between acute and 9 chronic. 10 Acute would mean if I got a -- a one-time 11 exposure to a chemical and something bad happened to me. 12 That would be an acute problem. ' 13 A. That's right. 14 Q. A chronic probiem would be a situation where I 15 have an exposure over time and nothing bad happened 16 immediately but maybe somewhere after a series of months 17 or years of exposure, something bad would happen. Is 18 that what chronic is talking about? 19 A. That's what chronic disease is, yeah. 20 Q. Okay. 21 And the function and the goal of the medical 22 department,. at 1 east, would be to keep Monsanto 23 employees from having either acute or chronic effects 24 from exposure to chemicals they were handling. 25 A. That's right 61 1 Q. Okay. 2 Now, how did the medical department relate to 3 product safety and customers1 products when you were 4 involved with them in 1973 forward? 5 A. Well, certainly with chemicals that were 6 acutely poisonous, our medical group made certain that 7 the customer was qualified to know what to do. If I can 8 illustrate with one example. 9 We sold hydrogen cyanide. That's pretty 10 lethal. We refused to ship hydrogen cyanide by any 11 commercial vehicle: ship, barge, train, truck. Other 12 companies wanted that risk; but we just said, if there 13 was an accident, we didn't want to have any part of 14 that. So, we would only sell it on an over -- 15 over-the-fence basis, meaning they put a plant next to 16 ours and we'd pipe it over or we make a derivative of 17 hydrogen cyanide; sell them the derivative, which was 18 not poisonous; and they reconvert it back to hydrogen 19 cyanide. We did those things for the acute things. 20 And in many of our pesticides, we insisted 21 that -- that distributors and dealers and even farmers 22 understand thoroughly the safety precautions that 23 they've got to take. So, that's been uppermost in our 24 mind. 25 You've got to remember, though, that what was NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037237 62 1 good 10 years ago, 20 years ago, 30 years ago, by 2 today's terms -- I don't have to finish that. You know. 3 Retroactive wisdom. 4 Q. Let me see if I understand what you're saying. 5 It was Monsanto's desire and effort with the 6 knowledge available 10 years ago or 20 years ago or 30 7 years ago, in that time and place, to provide enough 8 information to the customer, based on what was known, 9 for them to handle the products safely so they wouldn't 10 be hurt. 11 A. That was the goal. 12 Q. And what you're telling me is, in some cases or 13 maybe even many cases, not enough was known back then to 14 have the same precautions you would take today. 15 A. Yes. In part, that's right. After all, you -- 16 you cannot f or ce a customer, uni ess you take 17 considerable 1egal precautions yourself, because 18 you're --- you're really monkeying around with his 19 business. So, you've got to be very careful about that. 20 But I think our people have always done their 21 best to see to it that the people who pur chased our 22 products knew about the necessity for proper handling of 23 them. And in the event of a -- of an accident, our 24 people of ten went to the scene of the accidents and were 25 helpful on that score. That's always been true. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037238 63 1 Q. And it was the goal of the company -- 2 A. Right. . 3 Q. -- to have the customer have the same 1evel of 4 information about how to handle the chemical safely -- 5 A. Uh-huh. 6 Q. -- that you at Monsanto had? 7 A. Yeah. 8 Q. And if -- obviously, if you didn't yet know 9 enough, you couldn' t convey more than you knew. 10 A. That's right. 11 Q. Okay. 12 And if I understand correctly, you were ` 13 concerned, not only about the person you initially sold 14 it to, but other people who might come into contact with 15 it, actual people who1d use it. 16 A. Insofar as we knew who they would be. 17 Q. And that was important to Monsanto, too. 18 A. Yes. But, remember, when you sell a chemical 19 to a customer and then he uses that to make another 20 chemical, that first one ceases to exist. 21 Q. The first chemical ceases to exist? 22 A. (Nodding head) 23 Q. Right. 24 But in each case, you were looking to make sure 25 that the people who were going to use it had the NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037239 64 1 information -- or be exposed to it had the information 2 that they needed to handle it safely? 3 A. That was our goal, yes. 4 Q. And that meant the same amount of information, 5 at least, that Monsanto itself had? 6 A. That's right. 7 Q. Okay. 8 And nothing that you did changed that goal of 9 the medical department, did it? That was still the goal 10 when you took over ? 11 A. Yes. If I did anything of a constructive 12 nature, it was to enhance the capabilities of even doing 13 that father -- further. 14 Q. How did you do -- how did you enhance the 15 capability? 16 A. Well, we started out with pianning. We started 17 out, then, by saying we're going to be pro-active, we're 18 going to try to do prevention befor e something occurs. 19 We're -- we -- we would insist upon people examining -- 20 we -- we had a -- a technical and an environmental risk 21 review on every capital project over $5 million, I sat 22 in on that. My counterpart, senior vice-president for 23 engineering and manufacturing, sat in on it. The 24 te chnical directors of the appropriate locations were 2 5 also part of that. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037 65 1 And we went through that whole process, "How 2 are they going to do this," "How are they going to 3 that, " "What was going to be -- what was the worst thing 4 that could happen, " "What preventive measures have been 5 taken?" 6 We sent them packing to redo it until they got 7 to the point where they knew that we were going to do 8 the state of the art regardless of where in the world we 9 made the product, not just the 0.S. So, that's what you 10 call blowing the whistle. 11 And we -- we insisted that -- that that be 12 done; and that was a matter of record, when it went to 13 the board f or their final approval. And they would 14 always ask me, as the environmental officer, "Are you 15 satisfied that this plant is properly designed?" And 16 I'd have to sign off on it. 17 Q. Let me ask you about the policy of the company. 18 And, again, I guess this wouldbe from 196 6 forward, 19 whenyou were a part of the group that was responsible 20 for company policy. 21 Was it the policy of the company that Monsanto 22 standards for safety and the like apply equally outside 23 the U.S. as in the U.S.? 24 A. Well, insofar as one can do that, the answer 25 was "yes." I said I managed the international division NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037241 66 1 for a time, and I've got to tell you that you can't do 2 things in England that you can do here because medical 3 records aren't kept the same way in England. 4 So, insofar as it's possible, we -- we wanted 5 to operate as well. It was -- it was the surveillance 6 that was the most difficult abroad, because records 7 aren't kept the same way. But our intent has always 8 been to have a pi ant that operates in Ar -- in Argentina 9 operates just as well as we can operate it here in 10 St. Louis or wherever. 11 Q. And would it have been your intent worldwide to 12 provide the same 1evel of information to customers about 13 safe handling of your materials and conveying what they 14 need to know? 15 A. We do that. 16 Q. You would not intend to have a different level 17 of information for one place -- 18 A. No way. No way. 19 Q. When you were in the international division, 20 where was that physically located? 21 A. The headquarters were here. 22 Q. But were you -- did you stay here even though 23 you were over the international group? 24 A. Yes. I stayed here for about half the time. I 25 went to Europe to live because of a management problem IMELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037242 67 1 we had there. I had to unify several subsidiaries in 2 Europe that were operating pretty much independently; 3 and with the presence of the Common Market and the -- 4 and the merger of the European Free Trade Asso ciation 5 into the Common Market back around *64 and 15, somewhere 6 in that region, we had to do something about unifying 7 our management in Europe because it was so huge. And we 8 wanted to put a 1ot more investment there. 9 So, I lived there; but I commuted back and 10 forth each month. I spent time each month in different 11 place -- in both places. 12 So, yes, it's been our intent to -- intent to 13 use the best practices, whether they comply -- I'm 14 sorry -- whether they are more stringent than are 15 required somewhere else or not. 16 Q. So, it's the effort to use the most stringent 17 practices that apply anywhere everywhere? 18 A. That's our intent. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. That's a part of policy, by the way. 21 Q. What policy? 22 A. The written policy. We have written 23 environmental policies. 24 Q. Okay. 25 Those were developed by you? ` NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037243 68 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Okay. 3 And I guess my question: Was that the policy 4 before you developed the written policy, to apply the -- 5 A. Of course, but that was more informal. It 6 was -- in many cases, it wasn't written. And this is 7 where our people had more leeway than -- and they 8 interpreted things differently, as you might expect. 9 Q. One of the -- one of the effects that can arise 10 from this decentralized effort is inconsistency, I take 11 it. 12 A. Well, it's a 1ot more difficult to have ' 13 everybody see things the same way. 14 Q. And I suppose there are things in the chemical 15 business that if you don' t have it centralized, where 16 there's a final single decision maker, reasonable people 17 can disagree with what ought to be done. 18 A. And do. 19 Q. And that has happened in Monsanto's history. 20 A. I can't think of situations where the condition 21 was serious that they did disagree. There may have been 22 interpretations on compliance that I'm not aware of; but 23 going back to the early fifties, this same Dr. Kelly did 24 enough -- had enough epidemiology done for him -- for 25 him to know that we had to remove ourselves from the NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037244 69 1 manufacture and sale of the product very quickly. It 2 was a -- it was a bladder carcinogen. 3 Q. Uh-huh. 4 A. And he presented that to the operating division 5 manager at the time; and he said, "You've got to get out 6 of this. My evidence is irrefutable. We can't 7 continue. " And it was done. There was no argument. In 8 fact, it was done without the board approving it. They 9 were told that it was done. 10 So, I -- I got -- I think that, over time, that 11 our senior management has been concerned for safety in a 12 way that, as I look back on it, I -- I don't have any 13 apology for it. 14 Q. My only real question was: Prior to the sort 15 of centralization that you instituted, at 1 east in your 16 area, there was certainly room for management people in 17 Monsanto, operating in a decentralized way, to disagree 18 upon what to do about specific circumstances? 19 A. That's right. 20 Q. And that doesn't mean one person's good or one 21 person's bad. It j ust means that reasonable people can 22 disagree about things. 23 A. I'm only qualifying what you say by saying I 24 think that was minor. 25 Q. Okay. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037245 70 1 But in order to avoid those types of minor 2 things, that's why centralization came along? 3 A. Uh-huh. And also in the anticipation that the 4 rules and the regul ations were going to become more 5 onerous and more complex. 6 Q. Okay. 7 A. And we weren't disappointed in that. 8 Q. Okay. 9 Let me turn your attention to some of the 10 actions of the management committees that we previously 11 discussed; and we have some documents that reflect, to 12 some extent, what the -- and maybe entirely, I really 13 don't know. Well, actually I do know. They're not 14 entirely complete -- but, to some extent, what the 15 Management Committee had to do with regard to PCB 16 materials during the time that you were on the 17 Management Committee. 18 And the first excerpt we have -- and let me 19 just show you the document f irst to make it cl ear how 20 this worked. Let me show you Document 222 80 dash 81, 21 and I guess the actual text of the minutes would be on 22 the second page. 23 Normally you would have -- the actual minutes 24 would be a full page or more in length, correct? 25 A. Uh-huh. mci i Mrr&iniMfl,AQcnriATCc imp HARTOLDMONOQ37246 71 1 Q. And it appears what -- what's happened there. 2 some portions of that document have been taken out ? and 3 we have other portions 1eft -4 A. Uh-huh. 5 Q. -- correct? 6 A. It seems that way. 7 Q. The first page of that document, it has a 8 listing of who the attendees at the meeting were, as I 9 understand it. 10 Is that the way that these things started, with 11 a list of the attendees and the -- 12 A. Yes. ' 13 Q. -- date of the meeting? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. And that was a meeting that you attended in 16 1968? 17 A. It says I did. 18 Q. Okay. 19 May I see the document again for a moment, 20 pi ease. 21 A. (Tendering) 22 Q. So, this is at 1 east the format of the way 23 minutes were kept. 24 A. Yes . 25 Q. Now, when you got on the Management Committee NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037247 72 1 in 1966, were environmental concerns about PCBs a matter 2 that was before the Management Committee? 3 A. I don't think so. I don't know that for a 4 fact. I'd have to review that to refresh myself, but I 5 don't think so. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Do you recall from your reading that the 8 problem of PCBs as an environmental problem came to 9 light in 1966 or ' 67 as a result of Swedish work that 10 was done in discovering them as a persistent chemi cal in 11 the environment? 12 A. You mean did the Management Committee know ' 13 about -- 14 Q. No, no, no. I'm talking about what was -- what 15 was known in the -- what was known in the scientific 16 world, in the chemical business. 17 MR. FREEMAN: Are you asking about 18 this Witness' specific recollection or his 19 specific knowledge about that work -- 20 MR. LACEY: Yeah. I'm trying to find 21 out -- yeah, what he -- 22 MR. FREEMAN: -- or what he knew? 23 MR. LACEY: Well, not so much what he 24 knew but generally that the -- not the 25 substance of the work but generally that NELL NIC CALLUNl & ASSOCIATES. INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37248 73 1 that problem cropped up in 1966, 1967. 2 A. I honestly don't know. When you fix it to 3 those two years, I honest -- I -- I -- i can't remember. 4 You've got to -- I only -- I'm not -- often, when a 5 piece of literature appears, it's isolated; and if it's 6 at variance with what had been supposed to be true, 7 people are going to be skeptical. And I suppose many of 8 those things happened at the time. 9 And, so, as far as that year, that period of 10 time, my memory does not suggest that we were that 11 concerned about it; but it -- it was shortly after that 12 that we became aware. ' 13 Q. Okay. 14 Let me show you this document again, 22280 and 15 81. The portion we have has a reference to what appears 16 to be a report that was made about a particular product 17 group. 18 Was it customary that there would be reports 19 from time to time to the Management Committee about 20 product groups ? 21 A. Oh, yeah. 22 Q. And reports would be made concerning what the 23 plans were and how to continue with the company's growth 24 and profitability and so on and so forth? 25 A. Yes. You see, this committee also looked at -- NEI I MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES INC HARTOLDMON0037 74 1 at -- at the proposed budgets for the ensuing budget 2 year and the -- and the future period. Let's see 3 what... 4 Q. Aroclor was Monsanto1s name for PCBs, was it 5 not? 6 A. Yeah. 7 Q. And at the time of this meeting in - 8 A. '68. 9 Q. -- April of -- is it April of 168? 10 A. April 22. 11 Q. -- a report is being made about the pi an for 12 Monsanto's Aroclor business; and what is being sought at 13 that point is to increase sales and to maintain the 14 profitability -- 15 A. Yeah. 16 Q. -- of that business. 17 A. That's right. 18 Q. There is a reference to the domestic supply 19 position. 20 What was the company1s domestic supply position 21 with regard to PCBs, if you recall? 22 A. Well, we were 1eaders in the -- in the field 23 of -- of supplying these materials and had been, I 24 suppose, since the thirties, somewhere in there. 25 Q. I'm talking -- when we use the term "domestic," NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037250 75 1 we're talking about in the United States; is that 2 correct? 3 A. Yes. Yes. 4 Q. Do you recall whether Monsanto was, in fact, 5 the sole manufacturer of PCBs in the United States? 6 A. At this point in time, I don't know. 7 Q. Okay. 8 But at 1 east it was the leader in the supply of 9 PCBs in the United States? 10 A. Yes. There could have been others imported, 11 you see; and I -- I -- I'm not familiar enough with the 12 details to give you any more than a "I don' t know." ' 13 Q. All right. 14 THE WITNESS: Is there a Diet Coke or 15 something over there? 16 MR. LACEY: Why don't we take a 17 break. 18 THE WITNESS: I don't need a break. 19 I just -- is there a Diet Coke over there? 20 (RECESS) 21 22 Q. Let me show you a set of minutes dated 23 November 17th, 1969, 22284 to 22286. 24 You were apparently present at that meeting? is 25 that accurate? NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37251 76 1 A. Doesn't show me. it doesn't show me as 2 present. 3 Q. You were not? 4 A. It doesn't show me. 5 Q. I see. 6 Where were you at that time? Do you know? 7 A. I don't know. 8 Excuse me. I -- I have no idea. 9 Q. Okay. 10 So, you're not familiar with what went on at 11 that time, then? 12 A. Oh, I'm not -- you didn't ask me that. ' 13 Q. Oh, I'm sorry. 14 A. And I haven't read this; so, I -- I just don't 15 know. 16 Q. Okay. 17 Well, 1et me ask you to take a look at that and 18 see if you know anything about what went on at that 19 time. 20 A. (Complying) 21 A. I think I have the gist of it. 22 Q. From the presentation or the discussion that 23 took place at that day, are these matters that are 24 normally discussed on one occasion and put aside and 25 1eft to rest; or is there continuing discussion on an NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37252 77 1 informal basis between people in the company? In 2 particular I'm talking about now officers and directors 3 of the company. 4 A. Well, this last page shows a twelve-point -- I 5 guess I'd call it a plan, where they've appointed a 6 proj ect manager to get on with it. So, that would 7 suggest, without much doubt, to me that since that -- 8 that person was pulled from some other job and put on 9 this for some ad hoc basis that he's going to be making 10 regular reports to this committee as well as having 11 conver -- conversations with others. 12 Now, all of these names are familiar to me;` and 13 these were all people that had something to do with 14 the -- with the product and the -- and also from the law 15 department and -- and the medical department. So -- and 16 research. Yes, here's Robinson. 17 So, I think that there was a summary of what 18 they've learned; and it says here that they -- they - 19 they feel that there's no -- there are no acute 20 effects --- acute effects but they're seeing some other 21 things on ecological buildup. 22 And I guess at that point that's about all they 23 could really say they honestly knew. But they're going 24 to try to be responsive to this sort of thing, and all 25 of these points here suggest specific things to be done. MFl 1 MP. PA I 1 LIMA ASSOPIATFK IMP. 78 1 I don't know what -- what followed, but my 2 guess is that there are more things like this that were 3 reported over a period of months or maybe even longer to 4 the -- so, this is typical of what might be found in one 5 of these ? and -- and the secretary -- let's see -- who 6 was Ehlers at that time -- it was his task to keep this 7 thing going. 8 Q. Did you get a copy of the minutes of each 9 meeting? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Would you review the minutes of meetings that 12 you missed to be up to date on what had gone on? - 13 A. I generally did, yes. I certainly read them; 14 and if there was action that involved me, you bet I did. 15 But if there was -- if there was information, it' s 16 conceivable that I might have simply noted it. 17 Q. But it was your practice to review -- 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. -- minutes for meetings you missed? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Was it the practice of the secretary to provide 22 a copy of the minutes to each member of the committee? 23 A. That was automatic. 24 Q. Whether they were present or not? 25 A. Yes. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37254 79 1 Q. And, that way, people could be kept up to date 2 on what was going on, even if they had to be away for 3 some reason? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. There is a reference in these minutes, and you 6 made a reference to a legal representative. 7 Who was that? 8 A. Well, Rodney Harris. At that time, he probably 9 was -- he probably was the associate general counsel for 10 the corporation. 11 Yes, Harris is the only one from law here. 12 Q. Was it customary that when matters of ' 13 significance about the company's business came up that 14 you get input from all various aspects in the company? 15 A. Insofar as it -- that could be determined, the 16 appropriate -- appropriate people who were thought to be 17 able to contribute were -- were usually invited. 18 Q. And that would involve legal considerations as 19 well as others? 20 A. In this case, yes. 21 Q. Do you remember a -- an individual in the 1egal 22 department named French? 23 A. Yes . Yes. I can't think of his first name 24 right now. 25 Q. How did Mr. French relate to -- was it NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037255 80 1 Mr. Harris was the -- 2 A. As I said, I think Mr. Harris, at that time - 3 let's see. What was the date on that, sixty -- 4 Q. November 17 th, 1 96 9. 5 A. '69. Well, I think Rod Harris probably was 6 associate general counsel. 7 Q. And was Mr. French in a higher or lower -- 8 A. Lower. 9 Q. -- position? Okay. 10 Would it be customary for the secretary to note 11 each of the presentations that someone might make to the 12 committee and make some note of what the presentation 13 said? 14 A. Oh, yes. That was his main job. 15 Q. So, if a presentation was made by Mr. Harris, 16 then it would be customary to have that noted in the 17 minutes? 18 A. Yeah. 19 Who made this one? I -- I... 20 Q. Well, there seems to be a presentation by 21 Mr. Wheeler; and there's a presentation by Mr. Bergen 22 and Mr . Sp ringgate. And then there' s a section that we 23 don't have, and I was just wondering if that was 24 Mr. Harris' presentation that got left out. 25 A. Well... NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037256 81 1 Q. It appears that that document has a two and a 2 half-page discussion about the topic; and in the middle, 3 there's a part that's not there. 4 A. Well, that's a 1ong time ago. 5 Q. I see. 6 A. I -- I -- I can't help you. 7 Anybody that performed, in terms of having 8 something to say formally, usually was noted this way. 9 Q. The way that Mr. Wheeler' s noted or the way 10 that Mr. Bergen and Mr. Springgate are noted? 11 A. Right. 12 Now, there's a Smith, Mason, another Smith ` 13 were -- they wer e -- they were senior -- senior of f i cers 14 in that operating division at that time. I think Smith 15 was the boss of Bergen, or maybe it was -- yeah, 16 T. K. Smith was the boss of Bergen and so on. 17 Springgate was one of the manufacturing people, 18 I think; but, you know, I shouldn' t -- I shouldn' t think 19 at this point, because that' s a long time ago. And 20 thei r j obs may or may -- may have changed, or maybe I 21 remembered them under a little different context. 22 Q. Would the presentation often include slide 23 shows and things like that to demonstrate graphs, 24 charts, things like that? 25 A. Yes. mpi i Mr pai i iim. iwnriiTcc iwr HARTOLDMON0037257 82 1 Q. Would, if there were -- strike that. 2 Oftentimes people who made those presentations 3 would make the presentation from a prepared text, would 4 they not? 5 A. Yes. - 6 Q. In fact, that was the customary practice, was 7 it not? 8 A. Well, certainly the -- if slides were used, 9 they might serve as the text; and he would fill in as 10 the slides went al ong. Of ten the -- they used both. 11 Q. If there were prepared text, was it customary 12 that the members of the committee received a copy of' the 13 prepared text? 14 A. Sometimes that text was -- was sent out with 15 the agenda be cause of the nature of the material that 16 required maybe thought and reflection upon reading. And 17 other times they wanted to take you through this on a 18 walk-through basis and 1 et you read the text later. 19 Q. But was it customary that at some point in time 20 you got the text, either before, to be prepared for the 21 meeting, or - 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. -- after, with the minutes? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Let me show you a document marked 22295 through NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES. INC. HARTOLDMON0037258 83 1 22319 (tendering) and ask you if that appears to be a 2 portion of the prepared text for that meeting that took 3 place on November 17th, 1969. 4 A. Well, now, wait a minute. This was when I 5 wasn't present. 6 Q. I understand. But you would have gotten the 7 text for the meeting either along -- before the meeting 8 or after the meeting with the minutes, correct? 9 A. Who put this date on here? Is this -- is this 10 accurate? 11 Q. It was provided to me by Monsanto just the way 12 you see it. ' 13 A. Okay. . 14 Q. It does reference the -- the heading of the 15 document is "PCB Presentation to the Corporate 16 Development Committee," is it not? 17 A. Yeah. 18 Q. And the minutes of the meeting that are dated 19 here are the meetings of the meeting of the Corporate 20 Development Committee; and it -- it talks about the PCB 21 presentation, does it not? 22 A. Right. 23 Okay. So, these come from Springgate's 24 presentation, apparently, these 12 items here. Yeah, 25 it's almost the identical language. HARTOLDMON0037259 84 1 Q. The secretary at the meeting did a pretty good 2 job of writing this down. 3 A. Or else he had it there; and he decided, well, 4 that's as good as he could do it and he'd use it. 5 Well, without -- without trying to refresh 6 myself on all the details here, I -- I -- this is 7 typical of what would be presented here? and I have no 8 idea whether the -- whether the slide meant that they 9 had these alternates on the slide or not. I can't tell 10 from the way this is, but it looks to me like -- like 11 this must have been SI ide 1. And maybe all of this was 12 on a slide. ' 13 Q. Okay. 14 A. Because the room is small and you could use 15 or dinary type on a 35 millimeter or an overhead 16 proj ector and it would work out. 17 But -- have I answered your question? 18 Q. I think so. Let me just -- the type of 19 document that we have here at 22295 through 22319 is the 20 sort of prepared text that often would accompany a 21 presentation to the Corporate Development Committee? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. And it's the type of prepared text that a 24 member of the Corporate Development Committee would 25 receive either with the agenda for the meeting, if it HARTOLDMON0037260 85 1 was desired that he review it all before the meeting, or 2 after the meeting, along with the minutes of the 3 meeting? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Let me direct your attention to Page 22298, 6 where there is a chart there relating to Monsanto1s 7 worldwide Aroclor business; and that's the same thing as 8 their PCB business, correct? 9 A. Yes, uh-huh. 10 Q. It1 s indicated there that there are a total of 11 four plants worldwide, correct? 12 A. Yes. ' 13 Q. Two -- 14 A. This -- this was the daughter company in Japan, 15 Mitsubishi-Monsanto. So, it was a 50/50 ownership at 16 Yokkaichi so that the wholly owned were three. This 17 one, we would have no control over. 18 But that's a detail. You said there were 19 four -- there were four plants making that Aroclor, 20 that's right. 21 Q. Well, it says "Monsanto production locations"; 22 and it lists four. 23 A. I understand that, but I'm trying to correct 24 you and say that --- that at Yokkaichi, that was a Mon --- 25 that was a Mitsubishi-Monsanto daughter company that was HARTOLDMON0037261 86 1 making it, for which we -- we did not manage it in 2 Japan, you understand. 3 Q. It' s sort of a three and a half deal, three and 4 one -- three and - 5 A. Sure. Sure. But go ahead. 6 Q. And it describes there the sales figures for 7 Monsanto, both in terms of quantity and price and those 8 things. 9 A. That's right. 10 Q. There is an indication on there of -- at one 11 point, N slash I. What is that? 12 A. Oh, that' s Monsanto over industry. That is13 what is -- a percentage of the total industry 14 participation, and it would be 6 2 per cent. 15 Q. What does that mean? 16 A. Well, if there were -- if the industry wer e a 17 hundred and Monsanto had 6 2 parts of it, then that's 6 2 18 per cent participation. 19 Q. Okay. 20 So, then, Monsanto was producing 62 per cent of 21 the entire PCBs being produced worldwide? 22 A. That was their estimate, yes. 23 Q. Okay. 24 A. It would be Bayer and Kanagafuchi and some 25 eastern European producers not named. Flick and IMF! I MC CALLUM St ASSOCIATES INC. HARTOLDMON0037262 87 1 Cafarro, Protolect. I think Flick was British. 2 Protolect was French. Cafarro was Italian. And 3 Kanagafuchi was Japanese 4 In addition to the -- they must have included 5 the daughter company here of -- yeah -- of at 1 east half 6 of their production. Okay. But -- yes, that's what 7 that means. 8 Q. But would that be the way to do that? Half of 9 that was for the benefit of Mitsubishi, and half was for 10 the benefit of Monsanto? 11 A. That's the way they usually did it, yeah. 12 Q. Okay. ' 13 I notice one of the pi ants that's 1isted there 14 is Newport, which is in the Uni ted Kingdom? 15 A. Yes, that's -- that's right. It's in Wales. 16 Q. Did that plant sell to any countries other than 17 countries in the UK, Scotland, Wales, England, Ireland? 18 A. Yes, I presume so. They were free at that 19 time -- at that time to sell wherever they could. 20 Q. The Common Market would allow them to do that; 21 or when you say "free to," what do you mean? 22 A. Well, the -- at that time, the U.K. operation 23 was owned two-thirds by Monsanto and one-third by the 24 British public. So, from that point of view -- and 25 we -- and we -- we operated them by Monsanto -- by HARTOLDMONOQ37263 88 1 Monsanto people. But the -- and that was called 2 Monsanto Chemicals, Limited; and they were -- they were 3 free to sell wherever in the world they could. They 4 could even sell here in this Country if they wanted to. 5 They could compete with us if they wanted to. 6 Q. Did they subsequently become not free? 7 A. No, not in the sense of -- this is a later 8 subject; but where you had subsidiaries that were using 9 your trade marks and your products and your processes 10 and trying to sell to the same customer, you got that 11 customer kind of confused if you used different -- 12 different terms with them. And that was part of a ' 13 problem 1ater on that we had to tidy up. But -- 14 Q. How did you tidy it up? 15 A. Well, we did -- we did the planning on our 16 worldwide system for product 1ines. 17 Q. Well, did somebody buy back this stock from the 18 British public; or do they still own the stock in that 19 company? 20 A. No. That's a detail I can't -- it's not 21 important right here. 22 Q. Who owned the stock didn't really matter about 23 how it was actually run? 24 A. No. 25 Q. That was run as a Monsanto Company as though it HARTOLDMON0037264 89 1 were owned a hundred percent by Monsanto, even though 2 some British people owned stock and got dividends? 3 A. We owned two-thirds of the shares, of course. 4 Q. That means you controlled it? 5 A. That's right. 6 Q. And to the extent you had management people or 7 you needed to make any decisions, you had the ability to 8 influence what the company did? 9 A. Sure. 10 Q. Where was the corporate headquarters for that 11 United Kingdom company? Did it have a -- did it have 12 its own corporate offices? ' 13 A. London. 14 Q. Do you remember where in London? 15 A. Yeah. It was No. 10 Victoria Street. 16 Q. And did it hav e more than one pi ant or j ust 17 that one plant? 18 A. No. There was another pi ant in Ruabon, North 19 Wales at that time. There was a -- let's see. This is 20 now '69. So, Seal Sands wouldn't have existed. 21 There was a third plant -- there was -- it was 22 a small one in the south of Engl and that did -- did some 23 formulating, but at this point I can't -- I can't recall 24 the details of it. But basically that was it, the 25 Ruabon and Newport. HARTOLDMON0037265 90 1 Q. And was it the effort of Monsanto to have as 2 much safety for the workmen in those pi ants in the U.K. 3 as it did for the ones in the united states? 4 A. Well, now, you're not going to apply 1984 5 standards -- 6 Q. No. The same -- the same -- the same 7 provisions for safety, at whatever period of time you 8 had them in the U. S. , as you had in the United Kingdom. 9 A. That certainly would have been the goal. 10 Q. And the same 1evel of information provided to 11 customers with regard to products in the United Kingdom 12 was supplied in the U.S.? ' 13 A. That's not likely that that would -- that would 14 not likely have happened, because, by and large, the 15 U.K. people sold to U.K. customers and usually European 16 customers. 17 All right. I mentioned earlier that there were 18 different practices that went on within certain 19 countries on such things as medical. There were -- and 20 at that time, there was not the kind of -- of -- of 21 product -- worldwide product pianning and product 22 coordination that later came into the company after the 23 Common Market had been going for -- for a while on that. 24 But often the French would modify things to suit their 25 French customers that would be different. The HARTOLDMONOQ37266 91 1 Brazilians would do this or the Argentineans or the 2 Japanese or so on. 3 And at that point, I would say that there was 4 probably freedom -- much more freedom than we try to 5 give them, particularly on environmental issues. 6 Q. What about health and safety issues? 7 A. I suspect that, at that time in our corporate 8 1ives, the health and safety executive in England 9 certainly had a different role than the EPA did in this 10 Country; and there was no such thing as an OSHA in 11 Engl and. So, it -- the odds are pretty fair that, in 12 1969, there were different operating practices; but 13 I'm -- I'm only making a supposition here. I do not - 14 I don't remember the details of that. 15 Q. But your best recollection is that they would 16 have been free to operate the business the way they 17 thought was best in those sorts of things? 18 A. Well, certainly if it were at serious odds with 19 our own senior management's views, there would have been 20 some -- there would have been some correction of that. 21 If it was minor, I suspect they were -- they were 22 all owed to -- to do it at -- at their pleasure. 23 MR. LACEY: We need to change the 24 tape and the reporter's paper here. 25 (RECESS) HARTOLDMON0037267 92 1 2 Q. When Monsanto management people use the word 3 "franchise," what do they mean? 4 A. The use of the product's trademark and, of 5 course, the -- the Monsanto image that went with that; 6 and sometimes it would be the -- I suppose a geographic 7 franchise. 8 But in terms of our overseas subsidiaries, 9 that -- that franchise really -- really boiled down to 10 the process, the name, and the trademark. 11 Q. Let me direct your attention to the 12 paragraph -- the first full paragraph, I guess it ' 13 is, on Page 22300 of the presentation document for 14 November 17th, 1969 (tendering). If you would, just 15 take a look at that. 16 A. Is that "by competition"? 17 Q. I think it says "not by competition." 18 A. Oh, "not by okay "-- not by competition." 19 Yeah. "Do not discuss..." Okay. All right. 20 Q. Can you tell me what is meant there by the use 21 of the term "franchise"? I mean, I think of a franchise 22 like a Ma cDonald1s restaur ant; and I don't know if 23 that's what it's talking about. 24 A. No, no. In industrial terms, that's never 25 the -- never the same. A MacDonald's franchise gives HARTOLDMON0037268 93 1 them certain authority within certain -- certain 2 geographic regions, doesn't it? 3 MR. FREEMAN: Mr. Wheeler, the 4 question was: Do you know what the word 5 "franchise, " as used in the context of 6 this document, means? If you know, tell 7 us. If you don't, just say you don't 8 know. 9 A. I'11 still stay with it. They had a trademark. 10 In this case, I think the franchise meant that the 11 trademar k car ried itself ; and they were a prominent 12 producer. And -- and from that point of view, I think 13 maybe that word was used 1oosely. 14 Q. Okay. 15 And when we're talking about "they," we're 16 talking about Monsanto had a trademark? 17 A. Yeah, in the U.S. 18 Q. Okay. 19 And that trademark was Aroclor? 20 A. That's right. 21 Q. And the statement that's made here, then, that 22 the market has grown to one of Monsanto's most 23 profitable franchises, would mean the trade -- one of 24 the most profitable trademark products. Is that your 25 understanding? HARTOLDMON0037269 94 1 A. Well, I'm really not much of an authority on 2 that. 3 Q. Okay. 4 A. So, I... 5 Q. Is that -- is that sort of information and 6 understanding the type of thing that, because of your 7 background in the company, you don't have any real 8 experience with understanding and interpreting? 9 A. Well, that's -- that's a blunt way to put it. 10 Q. Okay. 11 From time to time, matters relating to 12 Monsanto's production of PCBs came to the Management" 13 Committee. 14 A. Uh-huh. 15 Q. Did you ever gain an understanding of whether 16 or not PCBs were a profitable product for Monsanto? 17 A. Sure, they were profitable. They weren't -- 18 they weren't the most profitable thing to be made, but 19 they were very important products to us. And certainly 20 they fitted -- they fitted, not only an economic need, 21 but they also had a societal need, which they served 22 admirably. And that's what they were originally created 23 for . 24 Q. Well, were you aware of the fact that they were 25 one of the better performing products, in terms of 95 1 profit, that Monsanto made? 2 A. Yes, in this -- in that sense. 3 Q. Let me show this page back to you again, 22330 4 (tendering). There is a reference at the end of that 5 paragraph that we've already looked at, about a 6 presentation that's going to be made by -- 7 A. Wheeler. 8 Q. -- by Mr. Wheeler. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Let me show you another document now marked 11 22287 through 22294 and ask if that isn't the 12 presentation that Mr. Wheeler made (tendering). ' 13 MR. FREEMAN: I'm going to obj ect to 14 the form of the question. The Witness has 15 already testified that he wasn't present 16 at that meeting. He doesn't have any 17 recollection of what went on at that 18 meeting, other than what the documents 19 contain. 20 A. Where do I stand here, now? What is it you 21 want to know? Is this what I think Elmer Wheel er made? 22 Q. Whether that's Elmer Wheeler's presentation or 23 not. 24 A. Well, he' s right; I wasn't there. But this -- 25 this could be the kind of thing Wheeler would have done, HARTOLDMONOQ37271 96 1 yeah. 2 Q. In fact, at the end of the document, it 3 references the introduction by Mr. Wheeler to the next 4 speaker, in the minutes, does it not, Mr. French? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. And you would have gotten a copy of 7 Mr. Wheeler's portion of the presentation, either with 8 the agenda for the meeting or with the minutes along 9 with the other text, correct? 10 MR. FREEMAN: I'll object -- 11 A. No. 12 MR. FREEMAN: -- to the form of the 13 question. The witness has testified it 14 was customary to receive -- 15 A. Yeah. 16 MR. FREEMAN: -- to receive such 17 text. 18 Whether he has -- did in this 19 particular instance, he doesn't have any 20 idea, as he's testified to. 21 Q. Well, 1et me ask the question differently. 22 If Monsanto's customary practice was followed 23 with regar d to this matter of PCBs, you would have 24 received that group of documents, including . 25 Mr. Wheeler's presentation, correct? HARTOLDMONOQ37272 97 1 A. In this case, he is -- he is -- he is making 2 some anecdotal re cor ding. This might not have appeared 3 in detail unless somebody would have -- would have asked 4 for it. 5 The Springgate thing would have, but I -- I 6 don't know. But this is short. It's all anecdotal. It 7 may or may not. I couldn1t say. 8 Q. Okay. 9 So, you normally would have customarily 10 received the larger package presentation by 11 Mr. Springgate but not necessarily the presentation by 12 Mr. Wheeler? ` 13 A. That's possible. 14 Q. And when you refer to it as being anecdotal, 15 can you explain what you mean by that terminology. 16 A. There aren't any numbers in it. 17 Q. Okay. 18 A. And one of the things that committee's 19 concerned with is numbers, right? 20 A. Well, yeah. Evidence, usually if -- if Wheeler 21 had test data that he would have and if he were 22 reporting on sombody's test results, that would not have 23 been anecdotal. 24 Q. That committee was interested in how much it 25 cost, what the upside and downside might be. Those were HARTOLDMON0037273 98 1 the sorts of things that were of importance to the 2 committee. 3 A. In part. 4 Q. Let me j ust direct your attention to Page 22309 5 of the Springgate document; and those are the sorts of 6 things that were often considered by the committee, the 7 presentation of what businesses were at risk, how much 8 money might be 1ost both in sales and in profits from 9 that? 10 A. I'd answer that the same way, in part; but it 11 wasn't the total. 12 Q. I see. ' 13 A. In f act, this was not -- this final decision 14 was not made on the -- on the basis of numbers only. 15 Q. Those were certainly a part of the decision - 16 A. Of course. 17 Q. -- process, were they not? 18 A. But, remember, this was a -- this was a 19 so cially responsibl e product that had been used for many 20 years for the safety purposes; and this was what was 21 being threatened. And you can assume that was a very 22 natural kind of a reaction to give. 23 Q. Well, Monsanto's approach to products, whether ,24 socially responsible or not was to produce products 25 that were profitable, correct. HARTOLDMON0037274 99 1 A. Of course. 2 Q. You weren't in the business of producing a 3 product that was socially responsible as a loss leader? 4 A. No. But you can do it -- you can do one or the 5 other. The trick is to do both at the same time. 6 Q. I understand. 7 The alternatives that were considered and 8 presented to the committee -- 9 A. Uh-huh. 10 Q. -- included the alternative of getting out of 11 the business, did it not? 12 A. Yes. ' 13 Q. That was not the alternative that the committee 14 adopted, correct? 15 A. Ask that again. 16 Q. Yes. 17 Getting out of the business was not the 18 alternative that that committee in the company adopted. 19 A. Well, it was later on, not in this time. 20 Q. Well, that' s what I'm talking about. In 1969 21 one of the alternatives presented to the Management 22 Committee, the policy making portion of the company, was 23 getting out of the PCB business, correct? 24 A. It was an alternative, yes. 25 Q. And the committee, considering the HARTOLDMON0037275 100 1 alternatives, did not choose to accept that alternative, 2 correct? 3 A. At that time. 4 Q. Yes. 5 A. Okay. 6 See, you're not asking me why. 7 Q. Well, the alter native that was selected -- 8 let's talk about the one that was selected. 9 The alternative that was selected was the 10 alternative that was presented as No. 4, according to 11 Mr. Springgate's report, was it not? 12 A. That's what it says. 13 Q. And that alternative, among other things, was 14 in Monsanto's best interest, wasn't it? 15 A. As well as the best interest of the customers 16 and the -- at that time, the general public. 17 Q. Well, one of the things that was presented to 18 the committee in support of that alternative and the 19 committee took into account in adopting that alternative 20 was the best interest of Monsanto; and by that we' re 21 talking about continuing to be able to sell a profitable 22 product, correct? 23 A. Under these constraints that were listed here. 24 Q. I understand. 25 A. Okay. HARTOLDMONOQ37276 101 1 Q. And had Monsanto, for example, chosen the 2 alternative in 196 9 to simply go out of the business, 3 then you would have had to close down four different 4 production facilities : one in Anniston, Alabama; one in 5 East St. Louis, Illinois, or Sauget; one in the United 6 Kingdom; and one in Japan, correct? 7 A. (Nodding head) 8 Q. Is that correct? 9 A. Yes. Yes. 10 Q. And if those facilities were cl os e d down at 11 that point in time, you'd have a lot of idle plant, a 12 lot of investment that would have to be written off, ` and 13 a substantial loss, correct? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Continuing in the business under the pi an that 16 was adopted meant that those four plants were not closed 17 down at that point in time, correct? 18 A. You're making a supposition that you're not - 19 you're not elucidating here. 20 Q. Well, can I just ask you to answer the 21 questions for me. 22 Isn't that correct, those four pi ants were not 23 closed down? 24 A. They were not closed down. 25 Q. Monsanto continued -- ir. a i i i iaji O- a cenri atcc i MO HARTOLDMONOQ37277 102 1 A. At that time. 2 Q. Yes, at that time. 3 Monsanto continued to sell the product and make 4 a profit on it, correct? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. By keeping those four pi ants open, Monsanto 7 continued to be able to depreciate those plants and 8 write off the investment in it instead of having to 9 write it off as a loss to reduce it from what it would 10 owe in taxes; correct? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. And to the extent that Monsanto later made a 13 decision to go out of the business, it had benefitted 14 from the profit it earned in the meantime as well as the 15 write-offs or depreciation of the plant and facilities, 16 cor rect? 17 A. Narrowly. 18 Q. When you say "narrowly," what do you mean? 19 A. Narrowly correct. 20 Q. I see. 21 Were those economic types of considerations 22 matters that the Corporate Development Committee took 23 into account in making decisions? 24 A. In part. 25 Q. Do you recall Congressman Ryan and the bills MCI I MrPAI I MMX. ASSnrtATFS twc HARTOLDMON0037278 103 1 that he introduced in the Congress that had a 2 relationship to PCBs that were produced by Monsanto? 3 A. No. 4 Q. Do you recall any efforts by Monsanto to 5 develop replacement products for the PCB products that 6 it sold? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. That was done, in part, to try to maintain 9 Monsanto's market share in the various product lines 10 where PCBs were being used, correct? 11 A. Say that again. 12 Q. That was done, in part, to try to maintain ` 13 Monsanto's market share in the various product lines 14 where PCBs were being used. 15 A. It was done to permit Monsanto to continue to 16 serve its customers with safe products that they had 17 been enj oying with the Aroclors. 18 Q. Well, Monsanto was concerned, not only about 19 the customer having a satisfactory product, but also 20 about that satisfactory product being produced and sold 21 by Monsanto, wasn't it? 22 A. That's correct. 23 Q. The -- 24 A. The main concern is to sell the customer the 25 product that he needs and wants. HARTOLDMONOQ37279 104 1 Q. And to make sure that Monsanto has the 2 capability of doing that. 3 A. Right. 4 Q. While from a, I guess, intellectual standpoint 5 it may be satisfying to Monsanto that a customer is able 6 to buy what he wants from a business standpoint, 7 Monsanto wants to make sure it's the one that's selling 8 the product, assuming it's a profitable one. 9 A. Whenever it's possible. It all starts with the 10 customer first. That's what I'm trying to say to you. 11 Q. Certainly. Nobody to buy the product, you 12 won't make it. - 13 A. That's right. 14 Q. Let me show you a copy of the minutes of the 15 Corporate Management Committee of April 20, 1970, 16 Document 22321-22322. 17 And you were at that meeting, were you not? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. There is a reference in those minutes -- and I 20 believe it's on the second page -- to developing a 21 replacement product -- I think the ref erence may be to 22 NCR or carbonless carbon paper -- on a crash basis. 23 A. Would you repeat that last question. 24 Q. Sure. 25 Ther e is a ref er ence in those minutes to a i i i iftia o a atcc* i Kir* HARTOLDMON0037280 105 1 developing a replacement product for a certain 2 application of PCBs on a crash basis. 3 A. I'm trying to find the word "crash." 4 Q. I believe it's down at the bottom there, under 5 "Conclusions. " 6 A. Oh, yes, here it is. 7 Q. And I'm not sure. Is the reference to NCR or 8 carbonless carbon paper? 9 A. Yes, NCR. 10 Q. And NCR refers to National Cash Register? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. And they purchase PCBs from Monsanto for the 13 carbonless carbon paper. 14 A. That's right. 15 Q. Those are the documents you can press on the 16 top one and it comes through on the succeeding page 17 without a piece of carbon paper ? 18 A. Right. 19 Q. PCBs were used for that application? 20 A. That's right. 21 Q. And Monsanto decided to stop selling PCBs for 22 that application? 23 A. And others that involved noncontainment, that's 24 right. 25 Q. And the Corporate Management Committee HARTOLDMON0037281 106 1 concluded that Monsanto should develop an alternative 2 product to PCBs for use in that carbonless carbon paper 3 on a crash basis, correct? 4 A. Oh-huh. Yes. 5 Q. Is that the type of thing that would been -- 6 would have been undertaken in the technology area that 7 you were over? 8 A. No. That would have been undertaken by the -- 9 the then organic chemicals division, their research 10 department. 11 Q. What's the difference between developing an 12 alternative product on a crash basis and any other 13 basis? 14 A. Well, I think the way they've used the term 15 "crash" here is that they would put it as very high 16 priority and try to do this as -- as expeditiously as 17 they could. 18 This was an important product to NCR, in their 19 own -- in their own paper. Their -- this was the only 20 product they found that would do the job that they 21 wanted done; so, because they were large, they were an 22 important customer, and they had -- they had a bus iness 23 that they were supporting with it, these people 24 obviously concluded that, if at all possible, they would 25 do something as fast as possible. HARTOLDMON0037282 107 1 Q. Well, "these people," that included you, didn't 2 it? You were one of these people, weren't you? 3 A. This is being written from the point of view 4 and by the people from the organic division, which the 5 committee's nodded, saying, "Yes, we agree with that." 6 Q. But the point is the conclusion section of 7 those minutes are the conclusion that the committee 8 reached and authorized, correct? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And this -- this is the committee of the most 11 senior management of Monsanto; so, it's really 12 Monsanto's decision, through yourself and the other ' 13 members who were present that day of that committee? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Now, the world could function with carbon 16 paper, I guess, for having documents written and get a 17 copy, correct? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. It wouldn't cause any serious threat to 20 national security or our ordinarily -- or dinary daily 21 lives if we didn't have carbonless carbon paper, would 22 it? 23 MR. FREEMAN: I'm going to obj ect to 24 the form of the question. Mr. Lacey, 25 sar casm really does not have a pi ace here. HARTOLDMON0037283 108 1 MR. LACEY: Well, it's not sarcasm at 2 all. I want to know the answer. 3 MR. FREEMAN: Implying the national 4 security of this Country is dependent upon 5 carbonless carbon most certianly does, 6 thank you very much. 7 MR. LACEY: Well, I'm sorry. 8 Q. There was nothing about carbonless carbon paper 9 that made it critical for any particular national 10 interest that there be carbonless carbon paper. 11 A. No. But the key word here is "replacement" 12 product. 13 Q. I understand. 14 A. Not "Aroclor." It's "replacement." 15 Q. I understand. You're missing the point of my 16 question. Let me raise it again. 17 A. Maybe I'm not. 18 Q. If no replacement for PCBs in carbonless carbon 19 paper were found -- 20 A. We're out of the business. 21 Q. And we go back to using carbon paper. 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Okay. 24 And while that may not be desirable, especially 25 not to National Cash Register, who made the product, HARTOLDMON0037284 109 1 society could function with carbon paper. 2 A. So? 3 Q. But -- really not "so." Isn't that correct? 4 A. If you say so. 5 Q. Well, not if I say so. I'm trying to find out 6 your understanding, Mr. Throdahl. 7 MR. FREEMAN; I'm going to object to 8 the form of the question. This Witness is 9 not a socioeconomic expert in the makings 10 of this Country that contained 200 million 11 people in 1970. And it's a ridiculous 12 question, Mr. Lacey; and the answer's 13 obvious. Go on to something else that's 14 relevant. 15 Q. The answer is; Obviously we could function 16 without it, couldn't we? 17 A. If you say it could. 18 Q. Well, I'm trying to find out your opinion; and 19 you are a man who was on -- and, again, in all candor, 20 Mr. Throdahl, you were on the board of directors of a 21 maj or company in this Country for, what, 20 years ? 22 A. I'm having trouble understanding the relevance 23 of your questions, sir. 24 Q. You need not worry about the relevance. 25 A. Yes , I do. HARTOLDMONOQ37285 110 1 Q. The Judge will take care of the relevance of 2 questions. The jury will decide what they can -- 3 A. I may not get a chance to say this again. 4 Q. I understand you won1t. All I need is the 5 answer to the question. 6 A. Well, I'm not going to answer it. 7 MR. FREEMAN: Very good. Go on to 8 something else. 9 Q. I see. I see. 10 In any event, the board of directors -- I'm 11 sorry -- the Management Committee of the company -- 12 A. Uh-huh. - 13 Q. -- authorized and directed a crash program to 14 develop an alternative chemical to PCBs so that 15 carbonless carbon paper could be produced, correct? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Well... 18 MR. FREEMAN: If you have something 19 else to say, Mr. Throdahl, go ahead and 20 feel free to answer his question as 21 completely as you can. 22 A. Well, it' s totally beside the point of the -- 23 of the interrogation. 24 Q. Well, then, if it' s not an answer to the 25 question, we probably don't need it. 1 11)4< O ArPA/ATCr* iM/* HARTOLDMON0037286 Ill 1 MR. LACEY: I mean, if you want to 2 ask him what he wants to say, feel free. 3 MR. FREEMAN: It1s not necessary. 4 Mr. Throdahl, a lot of these 5 questions may, indeed, be irrelevant, 6 immaterial; and those are issues that will 7 be taken up with the Court at the time the 8 deposition is used in court. So, let me 9 instruct you just to do the best you can. 10 THE WITNESS: Okay. 11 MR. FREEMAN: And the procedure we 12 operate hereunder today is that all ' 13 objections to Mr. Lacey's questions are 14 waived except for a very few types 15 specific obj ections. So, we're operating 16 on a 1ittle different basis today versus 17 in the courtroom. 18 THE WITNESS: Well, he was attempting 19 a trap question that had nothing to do 20 with the safety of Aroclor. That's all. 21 Q. Would you explain the trap to me. I'm afraid I 22 missed it. 23 A. You were trying to get me to -- to agree with 24 you that it was an inane idea for the Management 25 Committee to authorize a crash program to develop a MCI I O./ A I I I fftfl A oon/'t A TCC iMO HARTOLDMON0037287 112 1 replacement for Aroclor in carbonless paper which really 2 wasn't necessary to society1s functioning. That's all 3 you were trying to say to me. 4 Q. Well, let me just ask you: What did you think 5 about that, as a member of the committee? Were you in 6 favor of a crash program? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Why? 9 A. You said "why"? 10 Q. Why? 11 A. Because we were serving a customer. We wanted 12 to keep the customer. If we could keep it with another 13 product that was safe, fine. 14 Q. Surely. And it was a -- that was a 15 suf ficie ntly important consideration to authorize a 16 crash resear ch program, correct? 17 A. Yeah. Let's go on. 18 Q. Is a crash research program typically more 19 expensive than doing it in the ordinary course of 20 business? 21 A. Not necessarily. It just gets higher priority. 22 Q. Are there occasions where crash programs turn 23 out to be mor e expensive be cause of the effort to 24 expedite -- 25 A. Sometimes. HARTOLDMON0037288 113 1 Q. -- and speed up? 2 Sometimes. 3 Q. Do you recall the Corporate Management 4 Committee authorizing any crash research program for any 5 other replacement of PCB products? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. What other PCB replacement products did the 8 Corporate Management Committee authorize crash resear ch 9 programs? 10 A. I must obj ect to the use of the word "crash" in 11 this case. 12 Q. Well -- 13 A. You're -- you're using it there; and, now, if 14 you're going to apply that to this next question, then 15 I'm not going to answer that. 16 Q. Mr. Throdahl, I'm using the word that was 17 used -- who -- who was the secretary of these minutes 18 who took -- who wrote these minutes down on April 20th, 19 1970? 20 A. John Ehlers. 21 Q. Mr. Ehlers used the word "crash program," did 22 he not? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. And Mr. Ehlers was in the practice of writing 25 down what was said at the meetings, wasn't he? 1 1 M /%1 1m l * n A AAA ATrP kl/ HARTOLDMONOQ37289 114 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. So, apparently what was said at the meeting was 3 that a crash program would be undertaken to find a 4 replacement for the use of PCBs in carbonless carbon 5 paper, correct? 6 A. If you'11 use "high priorities," 1111 go along 7 with you. 8 Q. Well, can11 we use the word "crash"? 9 A. No. No. 10 Q. What's wrong with the word "crash"? 11 A. That's his -- that's his term, "crash." I 12 don't think we edited that. If you want to persist in 13 that, then I'm not going to answer the question. I will 14 go along with "high priority." 15 We put high priority effort on all of the 16 Arodor replacements for contained uses and for -- for 17 open uses. And -- and the open uses we found we 18 couldn't do it, and for contained uses we found we 19 couldn1t do it. 20 Q. Couldn't do what? 21 A. We couldn' t -- we couldn't come up with similar 22 f iresaf e products that would do the job nearly as well. 23 Q. And all of those research programs were on a 24 high priority basis? 25 A. Sure. HARTOLDMON0037290 115 1 Q. Equal to the priority on the replacement of 2 PCBs as carbonless carbon paper? 3 A. I don't know. 4 Q. Okay. 5 The meeting on April 20th, 1970, that we've 6 already discussed in part was a relatively major 7 presentation on the PCB situation, was it not? 8 A. I'd j ust have to answer, "Probably." I can't 9 tell from the way the language is worded here. It was 10 important enough to get this kind of a summation; but 11 the conclus ion statements which guess that there must be 12 more to come, I can11 say anything more on that one.13 Q. Well, let me show you a document, 22343 through 14 22362 (tendering) , and ask you if that does not appear 15 to be the presentation text that was actually made at 16 the meeting on April 20th, 1970. 17 A. Yeah, that's pretty comprehensive. 18 Q. Does that appear to be the report that was made 19 at the April 20th, 1 970, meeting? 20 A. Does it appear to be? 21 Q. Yes. 22 A. It appears, but I don ' t know if it is exactly. 23 But it appears to be. 24 Q. All right. 25 Is that a report that you, in the customary A I I i IK A O A I ATCP IMS* HARTOLDMONOQ37291 116 1 business, would have received either with the agenda for 2 the meeting or -- 3 A. Probably. 4 Q. -- or that you would have received with the 5 minutes of the meeting after the meeting? 6 A. Probably. 7 Q. But you don't recall? 8 A. No, sir. That's 18 years -- 17 years ago. I 9 don't recall it, no. 10 Q. One of the decisions that had been made by the 11 Management Committee in 1969 was to replace Aroclor 1254 12 and 126 0; is that correct? 13 A. Yes, I think so. 14 Q. And in response to that problem or in response 15 to that direction from the Management Committee, 16 Monsanto made the customers aware of the proposal, 17 correct? 18 A. That's right. 19 Q. One customer objected to the cessation of 20 production of 1254 and 1260, did it not? 21 A. Is that the one -- is that the GE response? 22 Q. Yes. 23 A. Yeah. That's what it says there. 24 Q. Do you recall that? 25 A. What is that? Ill a * AArt/M A Tf* t HARTOLDMON0037292 117 1 Q. That GE -- 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. -- objected to -- 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. -- the cessation of the availability of 6 Aroclor 1254 and 1260. 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. And the basis for GE's suggestion to Monsanto 9 that it not cease using those or make those products 10 available was that there wasn't sufficient evidence to 11 incriminate them as a contaminant in the environment, 12 correct? 13 A. That's what it says there. 14 Q. Well, do you recall that being brought to the 15 Management Committee? 16 A. Well, I recall in many -- many discussions over 17 a period of time that the evidence that began with 18 sporadic reports in the scientific 1iterature and then 19 gradually increased into the more public literature 20 still contained rather specious results, as people 21 perceived them to be at the time. And I guess to 22 summarize this, they didn't appear to be believable at 23 first. 24 Now, this goes over -- this goes over quite a 25 long period of time, I suppose --- years, in fact -- and HARTOLDMON0037293 118 1 there are still question as to whether that -- that some 2 of the alleged effects are, indeed, real. 3 So, the fact that General Electric reacted as 4 it did, it was using -- the company was using these 5 products because they were safe from a fire -- fire 6 hazard point of view. They were going to be -- they 7 were suddenly going to be eliminated from pur chase or 8 supply to them, and naturally they could see that -- 9 that their firesafe -- fire safety of their own systems 10 was going to be seriously affected. And that seemed to 11 be a very normal kind of reaction at the time. 12 Q. Monsanto -- 13 A. There simply wasn't a logical replacement that 14 could be put into place that was equally firesafe. 15 Q. Monsanto 1 s own corporate decision had been that 16 it should cease production of Aroclor 1254 and 1260, 17 correct? 18 A. That's right. 19 Q. In response to a request from General Electric, 20 Monsanto relented on that decision, correct? 21 A. I don't know that. I -- the way you ask it, I 22 honestly don't know that. 23 Q. Well, did the company change its decision and 24 continue to manufacture - 25 A. I don't remember that. I'd have to refresh HARTOLDMONOQ37294 119 1 myself, and I don't -- I haven't had that opportunity. 2 Q. Okay. 3 At what point in time did the Management 4 Committee decide that the customers to whom it would 5 continue to sell PCBs for dielectric use would have to 6 execute indemnity agreements to Monsanto in order to be 7 able to pur chase the materials? 8 A. At what -- at what point in time? 9 Q. Yeah. 10 A. I can't remember. 11 Q. Do you recall whether that became a topic of 12 dis cuss ion when GE r equested Monsanto to continue to13 supply them with the material that Monsanto management 14 had decided should not be supplied? 15 A. The question was do I recall? 16 Q. Yes . 17 A. No, I don't recall. 18 Q. Did Monsanto have a corporate policy of trying 19 to maintain its image as a responsible and respected 20 member of the industry? 21 A. Did they have a policy then? 22 Q. Yes. 23 A. Yes . 24 Q. Was considerable effort expended in trying to 25 maintain that image? HARTOLDMON0037295 120 1 A. Yes. These -- these minutes would suggest that 2 they tried to do that. 3 Q. Let me show you the minutes of the Corporate 4 Management Committee for May 11th, 1970 (tendering). 5 A. Okay. What is your question, now, about this? 6 Q. This was another major -- 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. -- presentation with regard to PCBs that was 9 made to the Management Committee, was it not? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. That's a two-page -- or a page and a half 12 document, 22363 through 22364. 13 One of the things that the committee determined 14 was that there be no del ay in getting out of certain 15 aspects of the business without committee approval, 16 correct? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. And that's because the committee was concerned 19 that it was important to get out of the business -- 20 those specific businesses referenced there -- and that 21 they did not want anybody below the committee level in 22 the company making a decision for any reason to change 23 what the plan was. 24 A. These dates that were shown here were the dates 25 re commended by the division in question, being, as I i a n a vro i ai/> HARTOLDMONOQ37296 121 1 recall, about as fast as they could develop these 2 replacements -- or close the loops, as they indicated in 3 some of these things -- about as fast as this could be 4 done in what they considered to be a prudent manner. 5 And I think the record of this was to serve as 6 a -- as both a -- a point of reference for the --- for 7 the Management Committee as well as the division itself. 8 And I don' t remember now whether they made these dates 9 on time or not, but they came -- I think they probably 10 came reasonably close. 11 They had to -- they had to deal with their 12 customers in respect to all of these applications. in 13 fact, that was probably -- if it hadn't been for the 14 customer's, naturally, the shutdown could have been 15 effected almost at once. But as I remember that, that 16 was a rather traumatic day. 17 Q. Let me show you document 2236 5 to --- through 18 223 88 and ask you if that isn't the presentation that 19 was made to the committee that day along with a memo 20 from Mr. Mason actually transmitting the presentation to 21 Mr. Bergen and Mr . Springgate. 22 A. Yes. Okay. 23 Q. One of the things that the Management Committee 24 directed the operating division to do was to raise the 25 prices on products sufficient to cover the expenses that aa n a A t"p|" ft HARTOLDMON0037297 122 1 were associated with PCB problems; isn't that correct? 2 A. That's what it says. 3 Q. Okay. 4 And that was one of the directions that came 5 from the Management Committee to the division in that 6 May the 11th, 1 97 0, presentation and the results 7 thereof? 8 A. That's what it says. 9 Q. Okay. 10 And that was the policy, is it not? 11 I mean, you were present at that meeting, 12 correct? 13 A. I was present. 14 Q. And that was, in fact, the decision made by 15 that group and directed by the president of the company. 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Okay. 18 Next I' m going to show you the reports of a 19 meeting of the Corporate Management Committee on 20 June 2nd, 1970, Document 22389; and the committee gets a 21 report that those prices have been raised in accordance 22 with its direction, correct? 23 A. That's what it says. 24 Q. Later that month, at the June 29th, 1970, 25 meeting of the Corporate Management Committee, Document mci i Mir na i i i im a. ACcnriATCQ iwr HARTOLDMON0037298 123 1 223 90 f there is a report regarding the functional fluids 2 group, in which the PCB products were a line, correct? 3 A. Can I see the last one we had, because I 4 don' t.. . 5 Q. Surely. I believe that's it (tendering). 6 A. Well, I guess I don't -- I don't understand the 7 difference in the language here, "with less than a 8 month." In the June 2, it says they're not currently 9 planning to enter the market. 10 Well, I guess maybe that's right. Then the 11 June 29, "The action on expansion is being deferred 12 until the PCB area is resolved." ` 13 Oh, I see. I guess -- I guess that's simply 14 saying -- on the 2nd of June, they said, "We don' t think 15 we' re going to go into the heater business"; and I guess 16 maybe they're saying, "Well, whatever we're going to do, 17 we' re going to wait until we resolve the PCB -- "and the 18 word "area" here is not a misprint; but they mean the 1 9 PCB problems, I think. 20 Q. Right. Y 21 A. But I guess that just simply means they're 22 going to delay that decision on expanding into the 23 heater systems. 0 24 Now, what is your question? 25 Q. Okay. MCI i Mr PA I I I 1M , ACCnn&TPQ IMP HARTOLDMON0037299 124 1 PCBs were part of the functional fluid group, 2 were they not? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. And -- 5 A. They were also piasticizers, part of the 6 plasticizer group, too, at one time. 7 Q. The largest applications -- and by that I'm 8 referring now to dielectrics, heat transfer fluids, and 9 hydraulic fluids -- were all part of functional fluids, 10 were they not? \ 11 A. Yes. Yes. 12 Q. And that group, the functional fl uids group", 13 had always been or had been, at 1 east for some period of 14 time, a high margin specialty group, correct? 15 A. Uh-huh. Yes. 16 Q. By that is meant they had a higher rate of 17 return than was true over the company generally, 18 correct? 19 A. Yes. Over that division is as far as I can go 20 on that, but... 21 Q. Okay. 22 Within the -- and that's the organic division? 23 A. Right. 24 Q. Within the organic division, the functional 25 fluids group, which included the maj ority of the PCB HARTOLDMON0037300 125 1 applications, had had a higher rate of return than the 2 division in general. 3 A. That's right. 4 Q. And the probiem that faced the functional fluid 5 group in June of 1970 was the problem of how to resolve 6 the PCB affairs. 7 A. Uh-huh. 8 Q. That was the thing that was threatening the 9 continued high margin return on the functional fluid 10 gr oup, cor rect? 11 A. That certainly was a resultant. 12 Q. I mean, that was a factor that was threatening 13 that high margin, correct, the problem with PCBs? 14 A. It had to be paid for some way; and the way 15 these -- the way these accounting systems were working, 16 the product -- the product business that had such a 17 problem had to pay for it out of its own earnings. 18 Q. Okay. 19 The cost of covering all these additional 20 expenses wasn't spread across the company generally? 21 A. No. 22 Q. And, in fact -- and if we look at the 23 July 27th, 1970, minutes of the Corporate Management 24 Committee, Document 22391, it is reported that the 25 organic division has a relatively poor year, correct? tl/% /> A o.t i tax APpnriATCc uir HARTOLDMON0037301 126 1 A. That's what it says. 2 Q. And that's consistent with your recoilection, 3 is it not, that PCBs contribute to poor performance in 4 the organic division in 1970? 5 A. I can't remember that. 6 Q. I see. 7 A. That's much too specific. 8 Q. I see. 9 Is there any reason we should not rely on the 10 minutes of the Corporate Management Committee to 11 correctly report information contained in them? 12 A. No, there's no reason to suspect that. 13 Q. Okay. 14 Let me show you the minutes of the Corporate 15 Management Committee meeting on September 14th, 1970, 16 Document 22392 through 22394; and I'm going to be 17 interested in asking you about the summary section of 18 that in par ti cul ar af ter you' ve had a chance to look at 19 it (tendering). 20 A. Okay. 21 Q. Have you had a chance to review the minutes? 22 A. Yes, sir. 23 Q. In the summary section, it discusses the impact 24 of the cost with r egar d to PCB matters and the r el at ive 25 price changes in terms of affecting the return on mci i iwrrai i i im a* asshpiatps imp HARTOLDMON0037302 127 1 investment; is that correct? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Is that type of information information that 4 you're familiar with and can speak to; or again, because 5 of your particular background coming up in the company, 6 is that something you're not generally able to speak to? 7 A. What do you mean by "speak to"? 8 Q. Well, address whether that -- that return's a 9 good return, an excellent return, a fair return, how it 10 was viewed by the top management of the company, that 11 sort of thing. 12 A. Well, I' m not very bright about this; but a13 reduction of an income in 1970 of $400,000 was worth 14 count -- was worth counting; and certainly gross 15 investment return from eleven and a half to eight four 16 was sure in the wrong direction. But -- by some means, 17 because -- and the fact that you have to increase the 18 gross only to get lower return on it and the -- the SARE 19 expense -- those are overhead expenses: sales, 20 administration, resear ch, and engineering; that's what 21 SARE meant -- a half a million increase because of the 22 extra expense involved, all the numbers are going in the 23 wrong direction. So, yes, I -- even I under stood that. 24 Q. Okay. 25 Do you know what performance income was at MCI I MC PAM IIM a ASSOCIATES INC HARTOLDMON0037303 128 1 Monsanto? 2 A. Do I know what it was? 3 Q. Uh-huh. 4 A. Well, it was a term that was used for a while 5 that was the income on -- it was earnings before tax and 6 other general corporate overhead expenses that were -- 7 that were j ust a -- a matter of law, and they had to 8 be -- they had to be allocated on the basis of the 9 amount of capital you carried. 10 So, it was a -- that's where the word 11 "performance" came from. It's, "What did you do on the 12 performance on the capital you were assigned to earn13 on?" And that term was used for a while. 14 Q. Would SARE expenses be deducted before you got 15 down to calculating performance income? 16 MR. FREEMAN: I'm going to obj ect to 17 this line of questioning. This Witness is 18 not an expert on the financial affairs of 19 the company. You were provided with the 20 corporate representative designated under 21 30(b)(6) designation yesterday 22 specifically for this area of inquiry. 23 So, I'm going to obj ect to this 24 continued -- this entire line of 25 questioning. HARTOLDMON0037304 129 1 MR. LACEY: He's a fact witness. He 2 was a director of the company from 1966 to 3 1984. I -- I'm certainly entitled to ask 4 a director of the company what he knows 5 about the financial matters of the 6 company. If he doesn't know whether SARE 7 expenses are -- 8 A. Well, I don't remember it in that year. 9 Q. Fine. That's fine. That's all I want to know. 10 A. Good. 11 MR. FREEMAN: I just want to avoid 12 some specific technical accounting - 13 questions, which is what you were doing. 14 MR. LACEY: It's not very technical. 15 It's j us t the level of knowledge that this 16 man had. 17 18 Q. Let me show you the minutes of the Corporate 19 Management Committee meeting that took place on Mar ch 8, 20 1971, Document 223 97 through 223 99 (tendering). Would 21 you review those briefly, please. 22 A. Okay. " 23 Q. The pi an that the Corporate Management 24 Committee had was that the pricing of PCB products would 25 be raised sufficient to offset the additional expenses HARTOLDMON0037305 130 1 chargeable to them so that the profitability of those 2 products would be maintained; is that correct? 3 A. No, not PCB products. PCB replacements. 4 Q. I see. 5 A. Different products. 6 Q. I see. 7 So, the pricing was to be such that the 8 expenses of PCB problems were to be borne by the non-PCB 9 replacements. 10 A. Yes. That's all -- that's all you can have. 11 Q. Well, let me see if I understand what happened. 12 A. Look at it as a product group rather than what 13 you're doing. 14 Q. Okay. 15 Well, there were PCB products that the company 16 was still selling in the period '71 to -- 17 A. In contained systems, that's right. 18 Q. There were PCB products continuing to be sold 19 in that period of time, correct? 20 A. In contained systems. 21 Q. Were those products' pricing strategy a part of 22 the overall effort to maintain the profitability of that 23 group? 24 A. I cannot answer -- I cannot answer you on 25 the -- on the explicitness of that question. I can only HARTOLDMON0037306 131 1 answer you on the replacement products. I -- I just 2 don't know. I wouldn' t have been privy to how they 3 would have handled the pricing of PCBs -- 4 Q. Versus replacement products? 5 A. No. We continued to sell PCBs for closed 6 system use. I do not know what the pricing strategy was 7 on that. 8 Q. Okay. 9 A. I just don't know. 10 Q. Do you know what the pricing strategy was on 11 replacement products, those which replaced PCB products 12 you no longer sold? 13 A. It was -- it was recommended by the -- by the 14 committee that those prices be such to compensate for 15 the 1 oss of the PCB profits. That's what that meant, to 16 me. 17 Q. And your committee was interested in what the 18 results were in maintaining the overall profitability of 19 the functional fluids group, correct? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. And, in particular, at least in 1971, the 22 thought of the Corporate Management Committee was that 23 the functional f1uid group had essentially met the goals 24 that had been set out for it by the Management 25 Committee, correct? HARTOLDMON0037307 132 1 A. "The goals" meaning the elimination of PCBs 2 from those uses where the environmental questions were 3 at issue. That's the way I understand that. Yes, they 4 did. 5 Q. And the goal was also to do that in a 6 profitable fashion? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. And in 1971, it is noted that those goals had 9 been met while maintaining the profitability of that 10 group . 11 A. It says without a major reduction in 12 profitability. That's what it says. - 13 Q. And that would then maintain that group as a 14 profitable group, correct? 15 A. Relatively so. But the -- the profitability 16 had dropped from el even -- it's somewhere in here -- 17 yeah, el even five to nine two. 18 Q. Okay. 19 And was nine two an acceptable rate of return? 20 A. No. 21 Q. I see. 22 Well, the last sentence, then, I have a hard 23 time understanding. It notes that the president 24 commended the division for the excellent results. 25 A. What's your problem? NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037308 133 1 Q. Well, that doesn't seem to be consistent with 2 your view, that that's not an acceptable rate of return. 3 A. That's not what that sentence says. 4 Q. I see. 5 A. The excellent results are the elimination of 6 PCBs from the uses that were endangering the environment 7 and -- as well as the operating practices and slipping 8 only from 11 and a half to 9.2. Taking the whole 9 package is what the president had in mind there, my 10 j udgment tells me. 11 Q. Well -- 12 A. But he wouldn't be satisfied with 9.2 per cent. 13 Q. I see. I see. 14 A. But I think, as a conclus ion statement, that -- 15 is that the one I was present in when... 16 Q. No, it doesn't appear that you were there. 17 A. No. But having -- having read it now and - 18 let's see. Sommer was present. 19 No. Bock was chairman then. There was a -- 20 there was an entire mood throughout the period of time 21 in question. You've moved from '68 onward here. 22 Q. We're going right up in order of the documents 23 that have been provided to me. 24 A. All right. 25 But there's a prevailing mood on the part of ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037309 134 1 the senior management and the division management that 2 the company had a -- had a problem. It was trying to 3 deal with that problem responsibly without significant 4 damage to its profitability. And that's what they did. 5 And, so, when the president says, "That's an 6 excellent report," I' m certain that he's taking into 7 provision he'd sure like to have had bettern than 9.2 8 results but he couldn't do it. But he got most of it; 9 so, he said, "That's excellent." 10 Q. Well, what was the overall Monsanto return on 11 investment res ult? 12 A. Of that year? I -- I can't remember. - 13 Q. Well, generally, what sort of numbers did 14 Monsanto produce in return on investment results? 15 A. Are those returns on gross -- gross profit 16 returns or -17 Q. Let me j ust give that document to you 18 (tendering). 19 A. Yeah. Return on investment, that's net after 20 tax. Probably, at the time that was going on, it was in 21 the neighborhood of 10 per cent or so. 22 Q. The reason I'm as king: We know from the 23 minutes of the June 29th, 1970, meeting that the 24 functional f1uids group, which included these products, 25 had been a high margin group, correct? NFI I MC rAI I IJM Ri ASSOCIATFS INC HARTOLDMON0037310 135 1 A. That's what it says. 2 Q. And the old margin was 11.5, which must have 3 been a high margin. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. And the new products are returning 9.2. 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. And your recoilection is that the average 8 margin was somewhere between those two. 9 A. You said that the Monsanto Company -- 10 Q. Yes. 11 A. All right. 12 Now, at that time, the fibers part of the 13 company was making 1ots of money. The agricultural 14 company was making -- or the agricultural division was 15 making 1ots of money, probably outearning the organic 16 division at that time. But I -- I j ust don' t remember 17 that 1 ong ago what the numbers were of that -- of that 18 period. 19 Q. If I provided you with a 10K, would you be able 20 to 1ook at that and help us figure that out? 21 A. Well, if you don't have anybody else to talk 22 to, I guess maybe I'll try it; but I -- I'm really not 23 the guy to do that. 24 Q. I see. 25 A. I haven't earned the right to opinions, WPI 1 Mr. CA I I IIM Si ASSOCIATES INC HARTOLDMONOQ37311 136 1 although I have them. 2 Q. Being a director for, what was that, 18 years 3 doesn't qualify you to have opinions on that? 4 A. You're putting words in my mouth when you say 5 that. 6 Q. Well, you were a director for 18 years, weren't 7 you? 8 A. Correct. 9 Q. And I j ust -- I guess I -- I guess I've always 10 understood that a director of a company had a right to 11 have opinions about its profitability and what were 12 simple rates of return and how to achieve desirable ` 13 results. 14 MR. FREEMAN; He's already answered 15 the question, that he doesn't recall the 16 specific rates of return in 1971. You -- 17 A. I can't help you. 18 MR. FREEMAN; -- questioned somebody 19 extensively yesterday about the 10K's and 20 all sorts of subj ects about that 21 yester day, Mr. Lacey. 22 MR. LACEY; Let me -- let's take 23 about a five-minute break so I can find 24 the documents that I want to look at next. 25 (RECESS) 137 1 2 Q. The Corporate Management Committee or Corporate 3 Administrative Committee, whatever name we use for it as 4 it changed over time, determined the areas that Monsanto 5 was going to stop selling PCBs in, correct? 6 A. They approved the -- the proposal of the 7 operating division, yes. 8 Q. And they had the ability to either approve or 9 disapprove the proposal. 10 A. That's right. 11 Q. The decision that was approved by the Corporate 12 Management Committee resulted in a situation where, 13 after about 1972, PCBs were only being sold for 14 dielectric uses, correct? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. As a part of that policy of only selling PCBs 17 for dielectric uses, the Corporate Management Committee 18 also approved instituting a requirement that everyone 19 who bought PCBs for dielectric uses sign an agreement 20 indemnifying Monsanto from any actions that might result 21 from the pur chase of those PCBs, correct? t22 A. I was not a part of the formation of that and 23 I assume, if you -- if you say that that was done, it 24 was. I -- I paid -- I knew that -- I knew that the 25 customers had to act with certain constraints; but NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037313 138 1 beyond that, I am not familiar with the details of 2 whatever agreements were signed. 3 Q. Well, were you familiar with the fact that 4 there were certain requirements put on customers? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. And that was a part of the over all sales policy 7 instituted by the Corporate Management or Corporate 8 Administrative Committee, correct? 9 A. Well, I don't recall that exact kind of 10 discussion being made in my presence. 11 Q. I see. 12 A. But it could have been; and I might have let it 13 pass, because there would have been no way I could have 14 inf1uenced that or that I particularly cared. Somebody 15 that was responsible was doing it. 16 So, if you ask me if it's correct, I'd have to 17 assume that you'd know as much about it, from the 18 records, as I would. 19 Q. Well, let me show you a document, No. 15117 20 through 15119, which I believe is one of the indemnity 21 letters that the company required its dielectric 22 customers to provide to the company. 23 My question to you about that is: Have you 24 ever seen that type of do cument before? Would that come 25 to your attention in your role as a director of the NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37314 13 9 1 company or in your role as a member of the Corporate 2 Administrative Committee? 3 A. No. There would be no reason for me to see 4 that. 5 Q. What group within the company would be 6 responsible for the development of those types of 7 documents? 8 A. The law department. 9 Q. And would they be the ones to approve their 10 use ? 11 A. I would certainly think so. 12 Q. And they would have the ability to do that 13 without bringing it to the Corporate Management or 14 Corporate Administrative Committee? 15 A. Oh, sure. 16 Q. And it is your recoilection, then, that the 17 Corporate Management or Corporate Administrative 18 Committee never made a decision one way or the other 19 whether to have customers sign that type of document 20 before they could continue to pur chase PCBs for 21 dielectric use; is that correct? 22 MR. FREEMAN: I obj ect to the form of 23 the question. It's miscontruing the 24 Witness 1 testimony completely. 25 MR. LACEY: That's why I'm asking the NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37315 140 1 question. He can tell me if that's 2 correct or incorrect. 3 A. I don't know. 4 Q. Okay. , 5 Was there a written sales policy for the sales 6 of PCBs as dielectric fluids after all other uses had 7 ceased? 8 A. I don't know if there was a written sales 9 policy. 10 Q. Okay. 11 A. I -- I don't recall ever seeing one, but that 12 doesn't mean it didn't exist. 13 Q. Well, PCBs were a product that got more 14 attention from the Corporate Management Committee than 15 many other products of Monsanto, correct? 16 A. Certainly over that period of time in question. 17 Q. And I guess I' m trying to j ust understand how 18 much latitude was left by the top management of Monsanto 19 to the normal business people in terms of deciding what 20 to do about continuing the sale of PCBs and how to 21 handle the details of that. 22 A. Well, those documents you've shown to me would 23 suggest that not much latitude was given once it was 24 proposed and approved. They also suggest that, 25 beginning with almost the earliest -- earliest document NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37316 141 1 you showed me, that the senior management's concern was 2 more about acting responsibly. 3 And, mind you, there was no Toxic Substances 4 Act at that time; and there was no enforcing regulation 5 to cause the company to go out of that business. That's 6 1eft unsaid in these -- in these minutes, of course. 7 But exactly how these operating people did 8 thei r j obs is not shown in the minutes, either. But 9 certainly the inference from the testimony that they 10 presented would suggest that once they were on the track 11 of taking on an assignment, they took it on with -- with 12 consider abl e finesse; and I think they did it very well. 13 Those comments of excellence from either Bock 14 or Sommer aren't lightly given, and that's the only 15 basis I' d have to share with you as to the latitude they 16 may have had. . 17 Q. Okay. 18 Mr. Bock and Mr. Sommer gave praise only when 19 well deserved. 20 A. Rarely. Rarely. 21 Q. Was it customary for the Corporate 22 Administrative Committee to be advised of lawsuits that 23 were filed against the company? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Let me show you a document, 22407 through ' ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37317 142 1 22446, and ask if this represents a presentation 2 document for the Corporate Administrative Committee 3 (tendering). 4 A. The name has changed here. Now it's the 5 Corporate Administrative Committee. Now I see. 6 Q. Oh, okay. 7 A. This must be Potter, R-G-P. 8 Q. Who was Mr. Potter? 9 A. Well, Potter probably, at that time, was either 10 a product manager for that business group; or he could 11 have been one of the general managers. I -- again, 176 12 is a long time ago. This is a young man fast on his- way 13 up. But I think that -- I think that's right. 14 Q. All right. 15 A. Oh, yeah, here it is. 16 Oh, wait a second. No. This is -- this isn't 17 Potter. Who did this? 18 Q. Must have been a long meeting. 19 A. Yeah. 20 THE WITNESS: We flunked here 21 (indieating) . 22 A. We have Russell Train on that day, and the 23 Russell Train today are two different people. 24 Q. You need to speak up so the court reporter can 25 hear you. ' IMF I I MP. CALL LJM R. ASSOCIATF?! INC 143 1 A. Oh, no. I'm mumbling to myself. 2 Well, I don't know who wrote this. I don't 3 know who made this. 4 Q. But that is a presentation to the -- for the 5 committee, is it not? 6 A. Yeah. That's what it says. 7 Q. And it's got a lot of attachments, charts and 8 graphs. 9 A. Well, I' m not going to go through those uni ess 10 you're going to ask me questions about them. 11 You were asking me did I reflect that this is 12 typical of what we brought to this -- the Management13 Committee . Yeah, it is; but I -- I -- Potter didn't do 14 this because -- oh, he -- Potter was the functional 15 products -- they called them functional products then. 16 Functional products business group director, that's what 17 he was in ' 76. 18 And then ther e was a specialty chemicals 19 division, which is -- by that time, organic division had 20 been subdivided differ ently. Okay. 21 But I don't know who this is, who's re -- who 22 authored this. I can't tell. 23 Q. Somebody who was going to make the 24 presentation, or did Mr. Potter and others actually make 25 the presentation? ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37319 144 1 A. No. This is an overall summary, which recalls 2 many of the events that are in early -- earlier things 3 you've given me. And this could have been -- this could 4 have been the managing director of the operating 5 company, of which Potter' s business group and the 6 specialty products division was a part. I don't know. 7 I'd j us t have to go back to a catalog of some kind and 8 see who was on what base at that time. I just don' t 9 know. 10 But this -- this -- this could well have been 11 presented by a managing director. 12 Q. Let me show you the Corporate Administrative 13 Committee minutes for June 14th, 1976, Document 14 22 405-22406 , and ask you to take a brief look at that 15 (tendering). 16 A. Now, this "Dielectrics business directions," 17 5-21 and June 7th. Okay. This must have been -- this 18 must have been the 5-21 date -- well, it would have been 19 logic that would be prepared before this was given. 20 This could have been Fitzgerald that -- that 21 did this . No. Fitzgerald was mentioned -- well, 22 either -- it' s either Harbison, then -- well, it' s not 23 important. He doesn' t care about who did that. 24 Okay. 25 Q. There was a maj or presentation to the MCI I MP PM I I tn.il O. A CCAPI ATCC IMr* HARTOLDMON0037320 145 1 Corporate -- is it Administrative Committee now? 2 A. Yeah. 3 Q. -- the Corporate Administrative Committee on 4 June 14th, 1976 , regarding PCBs, correct? 5 A. Dielectrics business direction, which is 6 broader than PCBs. 7 Q. Well, actually, the dielectric business that 8 Monsanto had was PCBs, was it not? 9 A. That was a major part of it. . 10 Q. And there was a maj or presentation to the 11 Corporate Administrative Committee and a maj or 12 decision-making process that took place on June 14th> 13 1976, correct? 14 A. Yes. That's what it says here. 15 Q. Now, the document that we've 1ooked at that 16 talks about the dielectric presentation to the Corporate 17 Administrative Committee, which begins at 22407, has as 18 its header an indication that it was anticipated the 19 presentation would take place on J une 7th, 1976, 20 correct? 21 A. That's what it says. 22 Q. In looking at the actual minutes of the 23 Corporate Administrative Committee meeting, however, it 24 appears that that presentation was actually made one 25 week later, does it not? ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37321 146 1 A. I guess it does. I don't know. 2 Q. Well, can you tell that the substance of the 3 things that are discussed by the Corporate 4 Administrative Committee on June 14th, 1976, deal with 5 the matters that were to be presented initially on 6 June 7th, 1976? 7 A. Well, I'11 have to take more time to -- to poke 8 at this, then, because I think -- 9 Q. Do that, pi ease. 10 A. Well, yes, it's essentially the same; but I 11 can' t describe -- I -- I can' t explain the -- the 12 seven-day difference here. I don't know. - 13 Q. Well, it' s certainly possible that the 14 committee didn't meet on that day or the presentation 15 got bumped for some reason, correct? 16 A. It could be. It -- it could be any of those. 17 I -- I -- I j us t don't know. 18 Q. I mean, that' s not -- I'm not trying to figure 19 out why it got moved a week or anything like that; but 20 that's what appears happened, is it not? 21 A. It looks like it, but I -- I'm guessing. I -- 22 if you need a -- if you need an explicit answer, I guess 23 I don't know. 24 Q. Okay. 25 Well, given the fact that we've not been ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037322 147 1 provided any minutes of the Corporate Administrative 2 Committee for June 7th, 1976 , and we have supposedly 3 been provided with all the minutes of the meetings that 4 deal t with PCBs, I'm certainly making the assumption 5 that there must not have been a presentation on PCBs on 6 the 7th. 7 A. Well, one of these dates is in error. Let's 8 put it that way. 9 Q. Okay. I think that solves the problera. That 10 really -- that -- that's all I wanted to establish, they 11 were talking about the same thing. 12 A. You realize I was quoted in here, and you 13 didn't even ask me about that. 14 Q. I'm going to ask you about it. 15 A. Okay. 16 Q. I first wanted to get these two documents 17 linked together, and then I want to talk about them. 18 A. All right. 19 Q. I certainly don't want to fail to give you a 20 chance to comment on your quotations there. 21 The -- the minutes of the Corporate 22 Administrative Committee of June 14th, 1976, show the 23 people who attended part time; and those are people who 24 would make presentations for one part of the program, 25 correct? NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES INC_ HARTOLDMONOQ37323 148 1 A. Yes. These -- these -- these people -2 Harbison, Potter, Coll in, and Lapthorn -- were 3 presenters or people who were part of that dielectrics 4 business direction pi an; so, they appeared at the 5 committee for only that portion of what was on the 6 committee 's agenda f or that day. That's what that 7 means. 8 Q. And these presenters included Harbison and 9 Potter; and Potter was the same fellow you had mentioned 10 earlier that - 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. -- you thought might be involved in this? 13 A. Yeah. Well, see that "RGP" up in the corner, 14 that looks like that was Potter's copy. 15 Q. Oh, okay. 16 A. That's all I can suggest. 17 Q. And then, in putting these things together, if 18 we start at Page 22415 in the document on the 19 presentation to the Corporate Administrative Committee, 20 that's the dielectric business plan that -- 21 A. That's referred to here. 22 Q. -- in the Corporate Administrative Committee 23 minutes? 24 A. Right. 25 Q. And that document, according to the minutes, 9MCI I Mir* /'AIII I Ail . AO OAr IATCC Mr* HARTOLDMONOQ37324 149 1 was first circulated in -- on approximately what date? 2 A. Well, it -- the request to the committee was 3 dated 5-21. 4 Q. Okay. 5 A. And that was distributed with the agenda. And 6 apparently Harbison -- well, now it begins to make some 7 sense here. This -- this front part -- 8 Q. The back part, actually. Oh, the front part? , 9 A. This part (indieating). 10 Q. Okay. 11 A. That -- that is Harbison, and he must have been 12 the managing director at that time. And Potter worked 13 for him, or else Harbison was the -- was the general 14 manager. 15 But the pecking order here had to have been 16 Fitzgerald, Harbison, and Potter, for some reason. 17 Q. Starting with Fitzgerald at the top -- 18 A. Yeah. 19 Q. -- and Harbison and then Potter? 20 A. Yeah. And what -- what this is about here is 21 that this -- this business pi an was under Potter1 s 22 supervision; and he, apparently, at that time reported 23 to Harbison, who reported to Fitzgerald. 24 So, I would say that, in a sense, this and this 25 are the same (indieating). HAS' n fL;__________________________________________________________________________ ' MCI I A I I I 1M ACOnri ATC1 iwr HARTOLDMON0037325 150 1 Q. Okay. 2 A. Okay. 3 This ought to be probably the sign-off in terms 4 of -- I -- this takes a long time to read, but the 5 key -- one of the keys in here is that the -- that the 6 resear ch people struck out in developing substitute 7 products that had the required fire safety provisos as 8 well as other physical properties and costs. 9 Q. Well, let me see if we can work our way through 10 what happened; and maybe the minutes will be a -- a 11 pi ace to start. 12 There is the reference in the minutes to the 13 effect that Monsanto made the decision in December of 14 1975 to terminate production and sale of PCBs as soon as 15 customers could get replacement fluids. 16 Who made that decision? Was that made by the 17 Corporate Administrative Committee? 18 A. Yeah, they would have -- they would have 19 reacted to a -- sure. That was a part of the sequence 20 you showed me. 21 Q. Well, actually, it wasn't. I don't have copies 22 of the minutes of that meeting, for some reason. 23 A. Forgive me. 24 The whole -- the whole lineup, the whole parade 25 of papers has -- has been a -- a kind of an iterative NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037326 151 1 process between division and corporate management, 2 division saying -- or corporate management saying, 3 "We're terribly concerned. What can you do? How can 4 you get out? How can you make this safer?" The 5 divisions coming back saying, "We can do these things, 6 we hope." 7 They did most of them, but not all of them. 8 And then finally it became clear that, bang, it had 9 to -- had the -- had to go out. And then this business 10 direction paper -- that' s what this was called -- had to 11 be created to say, "Well, what do we do now," you know, 12 over as long a period of time as they could think about 13 it. 14 So, this also contains the defeats that the 15 technical people suffered in not -- in not developing 16 the substitute products. 17 Q. My question to you specifically is: The 18 decision that took place, according to these minutes of 19 the Corporate Administrative Committee dated June 14th, 20 1976 , in December, 1975, for Monsanto to stop selling 21 PCBs as dielectrics was a decision that would have been 22 made by the Corporate Administrative Committee? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. And that should be recorded in the minutes of 25 that committee meeting somewhere? ` NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37327 152 1 A. Well, isn't that what this is? 2 Q. Well, no . Those are the minutes of June 14th, 3 1976. That's what I'm trying to find out. 4 A. Oh. All right. 5 Now, what is it you're asking, again? 6 Q. Yes. 7 According to those minutes of June 14th, 1976 , 8 Monsanto made the decision in December of 1975 to 9 terminate the production and sales of PCBs for 10 dielectrics, correct? I believe it's about the third or 11 fourth 1ine there. 12 A. Yeah. 13 Q. The question I'm trying to get cl ear in my mind 14 is whether or not that decision that was made in 15 December, 1975, was a decision that would have been made 16 by the Corporate - 17 A. Yeah. 18 Q. -- Administrative Committee. 19 A. That's right. 20 Q. Okay. 21 And, so, that means that, in December of 197 5, 22 somewhere in the minutes of the meetings of the 23 committee, we should have minutes where that decision 24 was made, correct? 25 A. I suppose. The -- and the qualifier here was NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES. INC. HARTOLDMON0037328 153 1 "as soon as our customers could qualify and have 2 available replacement fluid." And this is some six 3 months later. 4 Q. Yeah. I'm not -- I'm not trying to find out 5 about anything on the decision. I'm j ust trying to 6 identify the fact that it should have been a decision or 7 was a de cision of the Corporate Administrative Committee 8 in December of 1975. 9 This is not a decision that would be made by 10 anybody other than the Corporate Administrative 11 Committeer is it? 12 A. That's right. - 13 Q. And any de cision that' s made by the Corporate 14 Administrative Committee is going to be memorialized in 15 minutes like we've been 1ooking at. 16 A. I' would certianly think so. If you don't have 17 them, I guess you can ask about them; but I -- 18 MR. LACEY: Let me do that. Let me 19 ask for the minutes of the Corporate 20 Administrative Committee or its 21 predecessor, whatever the appropriate name 22 may have been in December, 1975, along 23 with whatever presentation was made at 24 that time when the decision was made to 25 cease selling PCBs as dielectrics. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES. INC. HARTOLDMON0037329 154 1 MR. FREEMAN: I will ask that a 2 specific search be made for December, '75. 3 We've previously endeavored to give you 4 everything from the CAC, CDC, or the CMC? 5 and if somehow we've overlooked something, 6 we'll make a specific search. 7 MR. LACEY: Well, I've been trying to 8 go through with this man, as you've been 9 able to tell, meeting by meeting what 10 happened; and I have not been able to find 11 that in the documents we've got. 12 BY,,M^_MEY s ` 13 Q. Now, may I take a look at that again j ust a 14 moment. 15 A. (Tendering) 16 Q. The meeting that takes pi ace on June 14th, 17 1976, is something of an explanation of what has 18 happened in the dielectric business after the effort or 19 after the announcement that Monsanto is not going to 20 continue selling PCBs for dielectrics, correct? 21 A. Uh-huh. Yes. 22 Q. And essentially that these people come in and 23 have to report that Monsanto's replacement fluids that 24 is tendered have not been successful in the market. 25 A. That's right. HARTOLDMON0037330 155 1 Q. And some other company or group of companies, I 2 guess, will wind up actually supplying whatever these 3 manufacturers then use in the future. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Okay. 6 Now, as a part of the dielectrics business 7 direction presentation that was distributed with the 8 agenda for the Corporate Administrative Committee, there 9 were documents that recounted the history of Monsanto1s 10 production and sale of PCBs from 1966 through 1975, 11 correct? 12 A. Well, this is it. - 13 Q. That' s what I'm saying. That was a part of 14 what each member - 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. -- of the committee got with the agenda. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. And there were discussions of what happened 19 to -- historically what happened in the decisions that 20 took pi ace. I say "discussions." Ther e were charts 21 or -- 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. I guess you'd call them charts -- that 24 identified what historically had taken place with the 25 PCBs product 1ine that Monsanto had. MCI I Mr PA I I II1U1R. ASSOCIATES INC- HARTOLDMON0037331 156 1 A. Uh-huh. Yeah. 2 Q. And there were recitations of events and 3 sequences of events that took place in terms of the 4 phaseout of PCBs, correct? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. And specifically, if we look at Page 22418, 7 there are some key events that took place in 1975 and 8 1976 relating to the phaseout of PCBs as dielectrics, 9 correct? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. The task for ce that's referred to in November 12 of 1975 to plan the withdrawal, that's talking about' 13 planning Monsanto's withdrawal from the PCB business, 14 cor re ct? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Was that task for ce appointed by the Corporate 17 Administrative Committee? 18 A. No. It was appointed by the general manager or 19 the manage -- I guess he was a general manager of that 20 division. The committee would not have appointed him. 21 Q. In the sequence of events that transpired, 22 there was a meeting between Monsanto management and GE 23 in December of 1975 with regard to problems in the 24 dielectric fluid area, correct? . 25 A. That's what it says here. HARTOLDMON0037332 157 1 Q. What management personnel from Monsanto 2 participated in that meeting? 3 A. I can't tell you. I don't remember. 4 Q. Following that, there were some reference - 5 there are references to Mr. Train. 6 A. Yeah. 7 Q. Who was Mr. Train? 8 A. He was the EPA administrator of that date. 9 Q. It was in Mar ch or April of 1976 f a couple of 10 months before this June 14th Corporate Administrative 11 Committee meeting, that Monsanto's replacement products 12 were finally rej ected by General Electric, correct? 13 A. Well, I -- the way this thing reads suggests to 14 me that in that two-month period, rej ection or the - 15 excuse me -- the reactions of many different customers 16 for many different products had been sorted out, 17 analyzed; and over that period of time, the conclusion 18 was reached that, essentially, the rej ection has out - 19 outnumbered the number of acceptances to the point where 20 that conclusion had to be reached. That's my 21 interpretation of it. 22 Q. I see. 23 There are, then, following this dielectrics 24 business direction, other summaries of what -- what the 25 characteristics of the replacement products were -- ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37333 158 1 A. That's right. 2 Q. -- discussion of what General Electric had 3 concluded, dis cussions regarding what the rest of the 4 people in the industry had concluded, and then a 5 discussion of what course Monsanto itself would follow. 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. The conclus ion that was reached was, basically, 8 be cause the Monsanto replacement products had been 9 rej ected, to turn Monsanto1s efforts with the personnel 10 and resour ces that had been used in dielectrics to some 11 other venture, correct? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. And to reaffirm again, which is what happened 14 in June of 19 86 , to get out of the PCB business. 15 A. I think "reaffirm" means to reaffirm to the 16 public. 17 Q. I see. 18 A. The -- the withdrawal. 19 Recall that PCBs were still being made by other 20 people in other parts of the world. And while not many 21 of them were being -- while not many of those products j22 were being imported here, there were some and remember, 23 this is also prior to the Toxic Substances Act passage 24 and the regulations therein. 25 So, I think here that was simply to remind the ' WFll MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES INC. HARTOLDMON0037334 159 1 public again and again and again that we had withdrawn 2 voluntarily from that business. 3 Q. Let me ask you about that. 4 Congressman Ryan had proposed the Toxic 5 Substances Control Act back in the early 1970's, had he 6 not? 7 A. I told you earlier I did know Ryan and I --- I'm 8 not familiar with precisely what it was he did. I knew 9 there was a congressman named Ryan; but he was such an 10 insignificant part of this whole gemisch later on that, 11 I'm sorry, I don't associate with him. That's my fault, 12 but I j ust don' t associate with him the detailed 13 knowledge about it. 14 Q. Okay. 15 A. I never met the man. 16 Q. Okay. Let me ask it another way. 17 The Toxic Substances Control Act had been a 18 proposed piece of legislation for several years before 19 it was passed. 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. And, so, for several years, there was the 22 prospect that Congress would ban the manufacture, sale, 23 and use of PCBs. 24 A. No. They would ban the manufacture and sale of 25 many different kinds of products. HARTOLDMON0037335 160 1 Q. But specifically including PCBs. 2 A. PCBs is the only one that was listed in the law 3 itself, 4 Q. So, my question is: For several years before 5 the act passed -- 6 A. I'm not familiar with whether or not PCBs was 7 mentioned in early drafts. I just don't know. I 8 honestly don't know. 9 Q. All you know is that the actual statute that 10 passed Congress specifically listed PCBs as a chemical 11 that was to be banned. 12 A. I do not happen to know when it was inserted 13 in -- it may have been at the markup period. I honestly 14 don't know. 15 I worked on a team with some other industry 16 types to help draft some language for the Toxic 17 Substances Act, and I do not recall that PCBs was 18 specifically listed. But I think that -- well, no. I 19 won't say what I think. 20 Q. Well, go ahead. Feel free to say what you 21 think. 22 A. Well, they needed a whipping boy -- 23 Q. Uh-huh. 24 A. -- to put there; and here was a good product to 25 put in. And that -- that's the only time they've ever 1A Trp HARTOLDMONOQ37336 161 1 done it. 2 Q. PCBs are the only product that's ever been 3 spe cifically -- 4 A. That's right. 5 Q. -- banned? 6 A. That's right. And they did this in the face of 7 overwhelming misevidence or the misuse of evidence, and 8 it's caused them no ang -- no -- no end of agony. Many 9 of them regret now that it ever got written in there 10 that way, because it was a proscribed -- prescribed set 11 of conditions instead of a performance-oriented law. 12 Q. So, you think it was a mistake? ` 13 A. I do. 14 Q. Okay. 15 In fact, at the meeting of the Corporate 16 Administrative Committee in June of 1976, you 17 specifically voiced to the committee the fact that you 18 thought that Congress had made a mistake. 19 A. I still feel that way. 20 Q. Never has changed. 21 A. No, because there's never been a replacement 22 for it that -- look, these things were made for high -- 23 for -- for safety of electrical systems, transformers, 24 and the like that were to be put in highly inaccessible 25 places, like high-rise buildings. We've never had a HARTOLDMON0037337 162 1 confrontation since then. We will have one one day; and 2 then we will ask ourselves, "Well, why did we do this?" 3 And that was my point. That's all. 4 That isn't the first product Monsanto 5 voluntarily got out of, and I think that -- and it's - 6 I wouldn't argue with it. There's enough ecological 7 concern that, so long as it's that persistent, we ought 8 not to have it in the environment. But it's not harmful 9 to man, hasn't been shown that way; and it's a myth. 10 Q. I see . 11 A. So, I hold those views strongly. You can tell 12 that. 13 Q. I can tell that. 14 Was Monsanto's action, in deciding not to 15 continue to produce PCBs for dielectric use, at all 16 motivated by seeing the handwriting of the Toxic 17 Substances Control Act passage on the wall and acting to 18 beat the passage of the act? 19 A. I don't think so, and I probably would have had 20 the most inf1uential opinion of anybody on the committee 21 if -- if that were true. I don't think so. 22 Q. What do you mean by that, you would have had 23 the most influential - 24 A. Well, I was the one that was thinking most 25 about this whole problem; and I --- I don' t think so. ' NELL MCCALLUM& ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037338 163 1 Q. You feel like you would have been the person 2 most likely, on the entire committee, to think ahead and 3 say it would be to Monsanto' s advantage to be able to 4 say it had voluntarily decided to withdraw PCBs from the 5 market before the act passed? Is that what you're 6 saying? 7 A. No, I wouldn't have said that. I would have 8 said we should withdraw it from the market just as soon 9 as it's possible to do so with prudence. I mentioned 10 this earlier. 11 I had no -- I had no concern at the time. As a 12 matter of fact, nobody knew that that act was going to 13 get passed in ' 76, because it had been so long in the 14 making; and then it was so many -- it was a 15 controversial thing. In f act, it' s a very bad law that 16 was drafted by some people. It is. It's very 17 contradictory. And, so, we had no knowledge that that 18 would occur in '7 6 or ' 77 or *78. 19 So, no, I can honestly tell you that the -- I 20 think the company was acting in the good faith, that 21 there were some ecological situations where it was not 22 as biodegradable as it should be. There's no question 23 about thin shelled eggs. There was no question about 24 accumulation in the fatty tissues of humans, other 25 animals. i---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NELL MC CALLUM fit ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037339 164 1 And, so, from that point of view, we knew that 2 prudence dictated we had to get out of it. Once that 3 conclusion was reach, in spite of the positive data that 4 people are now trying to lean on, that was what drove 5 it. It drove it ten year -- no -- 20 years earlier with 6 para-aminobyphenol, which we got out of on a -- there, 7 the evidence was unmistakable. Here, the evidence 8 was -- was, at best, circumstantial. 9 Q. What added evidence came to light in 197 5 that 10 c a us e d Monsanto to reach the decision in December of 11 1975 to stop making PCBs versus having reached that 12 decision back in 196 9, when that was first presented' to 13 the committee as an alternative for dealing with the 14 problem? 15 A. Well, I told you when you asked that question 16 before that the perception in the early days didn't have 17 the advantage of retroactive wisdom. And I think, with 18 this period of six or so years that went on, the -- 19 the -- the public opinion gradually took its -- took its 20 toll, the media, the activist groups, the various 21 agencies themselves. And I think this -- this gradually 22 worked up there. 23 I don't know that there was a point of 24 discontinuity, where everyone said, "That's it, and 25 we' 11 decide -- you know, we' 11 --" we could have said, NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. 165 1 "Gee, why didn't we think of that in '69?" 2 But there was such a gradual change of these 3 things that it wasn't possible, I believe, to notice a 4 particular point of discontinuousness that says, "Now we 5 have to do it." I think that maybe many societal 6 decisions come around the same way. 7 And, again, I would be the one that would 8 probably be most sensitive on that point of anybody on 9 the committee. 10 Q. So, you can't really explain why the decision 11 was made in December of '75 versus being made in 12 December, '76 , or December, '7 4, or any other particular 13 time, except that just the mounting weight of evidence, 14 the mounting weight of public pressure, the mounting 15 weight of everything else that was going on. 16 A. Yes, sir. 17 Q. It eventually reached the point that you acted. 18 A. Well, you get a choke point, I think. 19 Q. You say, "We've had all this good stuff we can 20 take, and we've got to do something." Is that what 21 you're talking about? 22 A. Well, no , no . You ' re -- you' re making that 23 much too strong. 24 Q. Well, what do you mean by "choke point"? I 25 guess I'm trying to understand what you mean by that. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________ ' NELL MCCALLUM& ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37341 166 1 A. Well, you reach a point on many decisions where 2 you say, "It isn't cl ear and concise and succinct; but 3 the evidence is there, it's building up." You just 4 can't -- you j ust can't simply go along with it in good 5 cons cience. And I don' t know when that point comes to a 6 person. There -- there are a number of them that we 7 find in -- in -- most of these societal decisions are 8 not made with that cl ear -cut evidence. And I think this 9 is j ust an example of it. 10 It's a pi us to the -- to the effect that it 11 only took that 1 ength of time for senior management, 12 coming from many different positions of heterogeneity 13 and their backgrounds and their outlooks and their own 14 personal philosophy, to coalesce to the extent that it 15 was cl ear that this had to be done and -- and done that 16 way, rather than be forced to do it later on. 17 And we could have, I suppose, waited until 18 the -- whatever law would have been passed would have 19 said, "No. That's got to go." We didn't do that, and I 20 think that' s a pi us. But why it took that long, you 21 know, I've tried to explain it; and it's not very 22 effective. 23 Q. Okay. 24 One other portion in the presentation -- or not 25 the presentation, but the dielectrics business direction ` NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC, HARTOLDMON0037342 167 1 document was a section that appears at 22425, on the 2 transformer business direction. Is that correct? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. One of the points that is noted in the 5 transformer business direction section discusses the 6 efforts by Monsanto to develop a replacement product 7 that would work in the market failure to do that. 8 A. Uh-huh. 9 Q. But one of the things that's noted there is the 10 fact that customers themselves had been moving away from 11 buying PCB transformers, correct? 12 A. That's what this says, yes. That's what this 13 says. 14 Q. Well, and do you believe that information to be 15 accurate? 16 A. I believe the information is accurate; but, 17 remember, the customers are the customers of the GEs and 18 the Westinghouses. 19 Q. I understand. 20 A. They're -- they're also seeing all this stuff 21 in the press on PCBs. 22 Q. I understand. 23 A. Okay. 24 Q. And -- and the point of all that is: If 25 customers of people like GE and Westinghouse don't want ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037343 168 1 to buy PCB transformers anymore, then GE and 2 Westinghouse aren't going to be making them, right? 3 A. That's right. 4 Q. And if GE and Westinghouse aren't making PCB 5 transformers, they're not going to be buying PCBs to put 6 in those transformers from Monsanto, right? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Now, my question to you is: Was the decision 9 that Monsanto reached in December of 1975, to stop 10 selling PCBs as dielectrics, motivated by the fact that 11 the market was shrinking and, therefore, it was going to 12 be more difficult, if not impossible, to maintain the 13 product profitably? 14 A. I really can't answer that one. You'd have to 15 ask somebody from the marketing group. That certainly 16 was not my motivation at the time; and I'm not sure it 17 was ever evinced by others, as well. 18 Q. You don't recall any thought process being 19 given at the time the decision was made to stop making 20 PCBs that related to what the future prospect for that 21 business was and whether it might be profitable or 22 unprofitable? 23 A. Not the way you're asking it. These customers 24 that are -- are stated to be moving away -- okay. So 25 they could go to air cooled. That was a change of NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37344 169 1 technology. Okay. Oil cooled, that's flammability; and 2 they traded flammability for environmental or 3 ecological, quote, "safety," unquote. Safety is a 4 question mark there in my -- in this man's mind. That' s 5 what they've traded. 6 And, so, sure, that was just -- I suppose those 7 things ran in parall el to some extent. The customers 1 8 customers saw this change of move, and the newspapers 9 and all other media were full of this stuff on PCBs. 10 And the decision to -- to move out as soon as you could 11 make an orderly transition, part of the orderly 12 transition was air cooled -- that's a new technology- - 13 and oil cooled. That means they traded safety of one 14 kind f or saf ety of another. And, so, sure, the two are 15 con -- I guess, consistent. 16 Q. Well, air cooled wasn't a new technology, was 17 it? 18 A. Certainly for the big ones. 19 Q. I see. 20 And oil cooled certainly wasn't a new 21 technology, was it? 22 A. No. No. No. 23 Have you ever seen a transformer fire? 24 Q. I haven't personally witnessed one. 25 A. Okay. I hope you don't. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037345 170 1 Q. I hope not, too. 2 By the way, there can be transformer fires and 3 problems with PCB transformers, can't there? 4 A. It's because the PCB content on some of them is 5 so low that the oil content over comes the -- the 6 inflammability of the PCBs. They're blends. 7 Q. The answer to my question is that there can be 8 transformer fires with PCB transformers, can't there? 9 A. No, not the way you asked the question. 10 Q. I see . 11 A. Ask the question differently. 12 Q. Well, 1et me ask you about a specific - 13 situation. 14 Have you ever heard of an office building in 15 Binghamton, New York - 16 A. Right. 17 A. -- that stands vacant to this very day? 18 A. That's right. And the PCB content of that 19 fluid was a very minor component of the fluid. 20 Q. That transformer was filled about 21 Monsanto-supplied transformer fluid, was it not? 22 A. That -- that's a detail I don't know. I 23 can' t -- I don' t know that for a -- for a f act. 24 Q. A fire took place in that transformer, didn't 25 it? NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037346 171 1 A. You didn't hear my response to you. 2 MR. FREEMAN: I'm going to object to 3 this line of questioning. What are we 4 doing here, Mr. Lacey? This man is a 5 corporate director of the company, and 6 you're talking to him about a specific 7 fire incident that happened years ago. 8 That's not the purpose of this Witness 9 here. 10 Q. That fire incident was something that was 11 discussed at the highest 1evels in the company, wasn't 12 it? 13 A. We -- we discussed it. 14 Q. Sure. 15 A. The PCB content was so low that it could not 16 have a -- a fire-retardant effect, and you're not 17 understanding that point. 18 Hello? 19 Q. I'm here. I'm 1istening. 20 A. You're not understanding it. 21 Q. Well, my question to you was -- 22 A. It's not a PCB transformer unless it has all 23 PCBs in it. This was a blend. 24 Q Well, Monsanto sold blended fluids, didn't 25 they? NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37347 172 1 A. Not with mineral oil. 2 Q. That was a mineral oil plus PCBs transformer? 3 A. Well, you're getting into a detail that I 4 honestly can't tell you about now. 5 (RECESS) 6 A El: 7 Q. Just so I'm cl ear on what Monsanto1s 8 understanding of the situation in Binghamton was, was it 9 the understanding that there was a misuse of PCBs as a 10 part of a transformer fluid? 11 A. There was never -- in my presence, there was 12 never a discussion on that particular point. ` 13 Q. Okay. 14 And you don't mean to suggest here today that 15 that fire occurred because somehow PCBs had been misused 16 or mismixed in a transformer fluid? 17 A. I didn't suggest that at all. 18 MR. FREEMAN: Do you have any 19 personal knowledge about what happened in 20 the Binghamton incident, Mr. Throdahl? 21 THE WITNESS: Do I have personal 22 knowledge? 23 MR. FREEMAN: Yes. 24 THE WITNESS: No. 25 Q. You didn't witness that, either, did you? NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037348 173 1 A. No, I didn't. 2 Q. And that really comes back to the very point 3 about transformer fires. 4 They can occur in transformers that do not have 5 any PCBs in them. 6 A. Uh-huh. 7 Q. They can also occur in transformers that have 8 PCBs in them, correct? 9 MR. FREEMAN: Some amount of PCBs? 10 MR. LACEY: Correct. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Okay. - 13 A. What you're going to do with that will be 14 interesting. 15 MR. LACEY: I'm going to obj ect to 16 the last part of that comment. 17 THE WITNESS: Please do. 18 MR. LACEY: It's nonresponsive. 19 Q. Now, the summary of the dielectrics business 20 direction section, at Page 22427, concluded that the 21 company was getting out of the production of an 22 environmental pollutant, correct? 23 A. Uh-huh. 24 MR. FREEMAN: You have to answer 25 verbally, Mr. Throdahl. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37349 174 1 A. Yes. Yes. Excuse me. 2 Q. It also concluded that the company was exiting 3 the business profitably while covering all of the 4 phaseout costs, correct? . 5 A. That's what it says. 6 Q. And that the company was preventing what would 7 have been a serious capital mistake. 8 A. That's what it says. 9 Q. Now, the reference to preventing a serious 10 capital mistake is a reference to not going forward with 11 these alternative products; is that correct? 12 A. I don't know. I've only skimmed this and -- 13 and I -- I'11 have to say I don't know at this point. 14 Q. Okay. 15 A. But I bel ieve that what' s here must be 16 accurate. 17 Q. Okay. 18 Beginning at Do cument No. 22428 and going 19 through 22446 , there is more of the detail for a 20 presentation that was to be made to the Corporate 21 Administrative Committee, correct? 22 A. That's what it says, yes. 23 Q. And, again, it has the June 7th date; but 24 either the June 7th date on that document or the 25 June 14th date on the minutes of the committee is -- one NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037350 175 1 is erroneous, correct? 2 A. Yes. It seems that way to me. 3 Q. And, so, beginning at Page 22428, we have part 4 of the presentation that was actually made to the 5 committee, correct? 6 A. That's what it says, yes. 7 Q. Let's see if I can find a section here that 8 helps explain that summary piece. 9 At page -- or Document No. 22436, there is the 10 text of the summary section of the presentation. It 11 begins at that point, correct? 12 A. This says "Summary," yes. ' 13 Q. Would you j ust review that and on -- I think it 14 goes on for another page or two there that may be 15 helpful. 16 A. (Complying) 17 Is it at the 437 is where this stops? 18 Q. I believe that's where the summary se ction 19 stops, and then it invites questions that might follow. 20 Reviewing that, there is more detail about 21 those three points that we looked at in terms of 22 dielectric business plan. 23 A. Uh-huh. Yes. 24 Q. And under Point No. 3, it makes it cl ear that 25 the serious capital mistake would have been trying to go ' NELL MCCALLUM& ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037351 176 1 forward with production of this developmental fluid, 2 MCS 1238. 3 A. That's what it says, yes. 4 Q. Okay. 5 On the point where regard to exiting the 6 business profitably, that's talking about getting out of 7 the dielectric business, including the PCB business, is 8 it not? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And what that indicates is that the company was 11 able to do that, including covering its phaseout costs, 12 and remain profitable while doing so, correct? ' 13 A. That's what it says, yes. 14 Q. That would not be something the company could 15 have done had it followed the approach in 1969 of 16 ceasing the sale of PCBs for all purposes at that point; 17 isn't that correct? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. So, one of the effects of going forward with 20 the continued sale of PCBs as dielectric fluids from 21 1969 through 1976 or '77 was to allow the company to get 22 out of that business without incurring a loss, correct? 23 A. Repeat that question once more. 24 Q. Yes. 25 One of the advantages to the company in NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037352 177 1 continuing to produce PCBs as dielectrics and sell them 2 through 1976 or '77 was that it allowed the company to 3 get out of the PCB business without suffering a loss. 4 A. That was a resultant. It was a resultant which 5 was fortuitous. It had the -- had the company got out 6 of the business in 197 5 -- no -- 196 9 and not made an 7 effort to find substitute products, they would never 8 have known whether they would have been successful or 9 not. The fact that they tried and gave it every effort 10 and still failed and then had the benefit of moving out 11 without a write-off loss, I guess that's a plus. No 12 question about that. - 13 Q. Well, isn't that one of the things that was 14 ref erred to as being in the company's own interest in 15 selecting that alternative initially? 16 A. I don't think so. I think that the -- the own 17 interest was to stay in the -- in the business of 18 supplying customers with firesafe, appropriate hydraulic 19 and dielectric f1uids; and I don't believe that in 19 --- 20 I think in 196 9, had the prognosis for failure been 21 paramount, I suspect that decision would have been made 22 then to get out and take the write-off, because you 23 would have used that expense money to do something else 24 with it. 25 Q. If I understand what you're saying is: Had the NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37353 178 1 company been able to see in 1969 that it would not be 2 successful in developing alternative f1uids to the 3 dielectrics that it was able to sell, it probably would 4 have gone out of the PCBs business right then. 5 A. That would be my judgment. 6 Q. In the minutes of the Corporate Administrative 7 Committee meeting of June 14th, 1976, Document 8 22405-406 , where the discussion of the withdrawal from 9 the PCB market is discussed, there's a reference to the 10 fact, "Should withdrawal render the remainder of the 11 business uneconomical, a committee termination of the 12 polyphenyl tree products. . . " - 13 Now, what are polyphenyl tree products? 14 A. These are products that are based on the 15 chemical call biphenyl. Monophenyl is benzene. 16 Q. Okay. 17 A. Biphenyl are two benzene rings put together. 18 Q. Okay. 19 A. There are a whole family of chemicals made 20 around biphenyl for other purposes, and that's what that 21 meant. 22 Q. Do you know whether or not the company ever 23 did, in fact, go out of the entire biphenyl business? 24 I guess what I'm asking there is: There's a 25 reference to the fact that, conceivably, the company NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37354 179 1 might go out of the biphenyl business. And I j ust 2 wonder if you know whether they did or not. 3 A. No. But it -- it never has reached a -- I'm - 4 I'm fuzzy on the details at this point, but we made a 5 number of -- of high temperature air -- lubricants made 6 around biphenyl and terphenyl. 7 Now, terphenyl are three phenyl rings. Okay. 8 Q. You can, I guess, out -- go even further. 9 A. Well, you get to five and then you've got 10 solids and they're tough to deal with. 11 But these are -- these are very high 12 temperature f1uid -- lubricants for supersonic jet 13 engine air craft. They were very -- they1re very 14 minuscule kinds of businesses, but this was a -- 15 Monsanto had built a 1ot of business around family trees 16 based on aniline, based on phenyl, and things of this 17 kind; and that' s where the biphenyl f amily tree came - 18 idea came from. 19 Does that answer your question? 20 Q. I think so. 21 A. Okay. 22 Q. And if I understand the answer correctly, there 23 are some biphenyl portions of the tree, other than PCBs, 24 that Monsanto's still involved in? 25 A. But they're minor. mci i KAr* r> a i 0I Ail . Aocnni ATCC IMP HARTOLDMON0037355 180 1 Q. Okay. 2 Now, let's get down to your quotations here, 3 where you get to appear by name in this document. 4 One of the things that you brought up at the 5 meeting, and Mr. -- now Mr. Lawler is the -- 6 A. Yes, he's the secretary. 7 Q. Mr. Lawler reports that you, quote, "brought 8 out that the industry has, in effect, forsaken fire 9 safety to some degree in adopting DOP for capacitors and 10 alternate f1uids, such as oil, for transformers where 11 Askar el, Monsanto' s PCB, is presently used much," close 12 quote. 13 Now, what is DOP? 14 A. That's -- it's an organic plasticizer called 15 dioctyl phthalate. 16 Q. And is that the chemical that replaced PCBs in 17 capacitors ? 18 A. Yes, I think basically it did -- it did. There 19 may be some others. There are a whole -- there are 20 whole families of these esters of phthalic anhydride. 21 And that's made from 2-ethyl-hexanol, which is eight -- 22 eight carbons. 23 So, it's -- yeah. And it's -- it burns, burns 24 like mad. But it works very well as a dielectric. But 25 it is -- it's not fire -- fire-resistant. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037356 181 1 And what was the other one you mentioned, DOP 2 and what else? 3 Q. It said "oil. " 4 A. Oil. Okay. 5 Q. Just "oil. " 6 A. The -- as a matter of fact, many hydraulic 7 f1uid systems -- all the military air craft don't use 8 firesafe hydraulic fluids. They just say, "Well, we 9 lose a pilot here and a pilot there, a plane here. 10 That's all right" 11 That was a trade-off, as I saw it, that fire 12 safety was -- was traded off for an environmental 13 pollutant. 14 Now, DOP is -- is widely, widely used as a 15 polyvinyl chioride plasticizer. In fact, it's probably 16 the biggest -- biggest piasticizer made; and it's j ust 17 coincidental that it has these other characteristics. 18 These esters are very good 1ubricants 19 generally; and they act -- they transmit fluid energy 20 very well, almost like water does. 21 Q. I take it that you, in your own mind, would not 22 have made the trade-off that others did; that is, you 23 would have preferred to have the environmental risk that 24 was attendant with PCBs and save what you thought was 25 the more important fire safety issue. ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037357 182 1 A. Yes and no. I would have continued to squeeze 2 the operating practices so that there wasn't weepage in 3 joints, in pumps, in packings? and I would have reduced 4 the spillage tolerable to infinitesimal amounts by 5 j ust -- and when I say "squeeze, " that's what I would do 6 with all the processes, not only the makers that the 7 chemical had, but the users, as well; and I would have 8 really -- I would have really made that a very, very 9 stringent requirement for operations. Then we could 10 have reduced even that incidence of exposure, too. 11 I would have also done work using, say, 12 anerobic bacteria to decompose the bio -- the - 13 nonbiodegradable phases of the PCBs that existed in -- 14 in the -- in the environment so that, over a period of 15 time, this would have been gradually reduced and 16 eliminated. 17 And, so, that's what I -- that's what I would 18 have done. 19 Q. What the industry, electrical industrial -- 20 A. Yeah, this is what I would have tried to 21 persuade the electrical industry to do. 22 Q. Right. 23 A. Maybe I would have lost it, but they would have 24 been better off to have saved the fire safety aspects 25 and treated these things not as -- as carelessly as you ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037358 183 1 treat spillage of so many other things. 2 That's the probiem with pesticides today, that 3 people are using them so prolifically and so carelessly. 4 It isn't that the pesticide is naturally bad. You can 5 protect yourself from that. 6 That' s really what I was trying to say to these 7 fellows. 8 Q. Well, did you make an effort to persuade the 9 electrical industry to do what you wanted to do? 10 A. Boy, listen, I've gotten hoarse trying to talk 11 about these things. 12 It's hard to convince people in the face of- all 13 of this -- this stuff that keeps churning up. You see, 14 PCBs now almost carry cancer-causing chemicals with 15 them. They don't, but they always carry that label. 16 It's become a fact. And you repeat something often 17 enough, and it is a fact. 18 And that -- I've spent three years since 19 retirement trying to persuade people that this is the 20 kind of thing we ought to be doing as an industry, and 21 it's -- maybe it's j ust one voice in the wilderness. 22 Q. Whatever the situation was, despite your 23 suggesting that to the point that you, as you say, got 24 hoarse, the other people in the industry, in particular 25 the electrical industry, did not accept your position. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. 184 1 A. That's right. 2 Q. They thought the better course of wisdom was to 3 change to another product. 4 A. That's right. 5 Q. The alternate f1uid that Monsanto had devel oped 6 was not much better than the DOP in terms of its various 7 characteristics; is that accurate? 8 A. That's right. That's right. 9 Q. And it costs about three times as much as DOP. 10 A. That's right. 11 Q. As for the choise between DOP and your 12 alternate fluids, that was a relatively easy choise for 13 people to make. 14 A. Easy. Easy for Monsanto to make, too. 15 Q. Wasn't much point in talking till you got 16 hoarse on that one. 17 A. No. That's what the third point about the 18 inappropriate investment would have been. 19 Q. Very obvious that you weren't going to win that 20 battle. 21 A. No way. No way. 22 Q. The next thing that is quoted from you in this 23 is a statement, quote, "Mr. Throdahl urged that the EPA 24 may have made a bad decision. They might be asking 25 industry to adopt a more fire-resistant product later ' NELL MCCALLUM& ASSOCIATES, tNC. HARTOLDMON0037360 185 1 and that we should leave the door open for such a 2 product," close quote. 3 What did you mean by leaving the door open for 4 a more fire-resistant product? 5 A. That we should continue to search on an 6 exploratory basis for new chemical moieties that would 7 have fire-retardancy characteristics and the other 8 properties andr if we found one, see if we couldn11 9 bring it back. 10 Q. Did the Administrative Committee adopt your 11 viewpoint on that? 12 A. No, but there was no -- you know, this is -- I 13 don't know -- I wouldn't have expected the committee to 14 have said that, said, "Well, yeah, Throdahl has got a 15 great thought here. Keep it open." 16 There will be people who are 1ooking for -- for 17 something else and will stumble into one of these 18 fire-retardant.things, and somebody else will try it 19 again. And I'll be gray haired by that time, but it -- 20 it will come around again. 21 There's no question that -- that -- that 22 high-rise buildings are going to continue to be built. 23 And I -- I don' t want to predict it but there will be a 24 catastrophic fire and you will see a return, saying, 25 "Well, why can' t we have something like this. " And ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037361 186 1 maybe that will -- that will cause searching to go -- to 2 do back again for it. 3 Q. Well, there, in fact, is a way to design 4 buildings in order to minimize the hazard of those 5 catastrophic fires, is there not? 6 A. I don't know. I -- I really don't know. I -- 7 I expect you've got to have the -- some of those 8 transformer facilities fairly -- fairly reasonably close 9 to where the power consumption is located. And 10 sometimes these things are at 1600 feet or more that are 11 going to be -- be built; and, so, that may be -- there 12 may be an e conomic trade-off. I don't -- but I don ' t 13 know that for a fact. 14 Q. You're not familiar with transformer vaults and 15 what they are and how they work? 16 A. Certainly not to a point to make any judgment 17 on that point. 18 Q. It's been some 11 years -- almost 11 years; we 19 lack a month from 11 years -- from the date of this 20 meeting. 21 In that -- in that period of time, has the EPA 22 come back and asked the industry to adopt a more 23 fire-resistant fluid than the replacements they chose to 24 adopt? 25 A. No. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037362 187 1 Q. There's a reference here to comments by 2 Mr. Bible. Let me let you take a look at that, and I'm 3 not sure I understand what he was talking about there 4 (tendering) . It' s right af ter your comments about - 5 A. Oh. Yes. Okay. 6 Q. You find those comments by Mr. Bible? 7 A. Yes, uh-huh. 8 Q. What was he referring to, asking somebody to go 9 on the record about something? 10 A. I'm only assuming here that he thought Monsanto 11 ought to let the EPA management know how much effort 12 they put into trying to find a replacement, a safe ` 13 replacement -- sorry -- an environmentally safe 14 replacement who was -- that was also firesafe and record 15 that with EPA, as well as some of our maj or customers. 16 Again, I think that was something that was a 17 gratuitous comment popped out that said we ought to tell 18 them how hard we had to work; and they could care less. 19 Q. Did anybody -- strike that. 20 Monsanto's replacement product was thought to 21 be somewhat technically superior to DOP? 22 A. Minor. 23 Q. Was any thought given to trying to see if, 24 through regulation or law or code or anything like that, 25 specifications might be made that would make Monsanto1s ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037363 188 1 product an acceptable replacement product but exclude 2 DOP from the replacement market? 3 A. No, that was never -- in the first place, it 4 wasn't that much better ; and it was going to be several 5 times the cost. And you -- you really don't have a -- 6 an ethical leg to stand on for something like that. 7 No, we never gave that a thought. 8 Q. The 1ast comment was by a Dr. Nol an. 9 A. Yeah. 10 Q. Who is Dr. Nolan? 11 A. He was the vice-president for public 12 Q. I see. 13 His observation is that Monsanto had been very 14 fortunate, thus far, not to 1ink Monsanto with PCBs. 15 What was the point of that comment? 16 MR. FREEMAN: I object to that 17 question. It calls for a conclusion on 18 the mental process of somebody else. It 19 was not what this Witness knows or has any 20 opinion of. 21 Q. Mr. Throdahl, you were there when Dr. Nolan 22 made his comments, were you not? 23 A. Yeah. . 24 Q. What did you understand Dr. Nolan to be talking 25 about ? NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037364 189 1 A. Well... 2 Well, he was -- he was always concerned about 3 the -- the public image of the company. That's what he 4 meant by that. 5 Q. I see. 6 His responsibility was basically to maintain 7 the company's public image. 8 A. Yes . 9 Q. You mentioned that -- when we talked earlier 10 about the English plant where PCBs were produced and its 11 freedom to compete with the American pi ants in selling 12 PCBs to customer s, at least in some point in time --do 13 you recall that testimony? 14 A. Yeah. Yes. 15 Q. Were the American plants free to complete with 16 English plants in selling PCBs -- 17 A. Sur e. 18 Q. -- to customers ? 19 A. Sure. 20 Q. In terms of the profitability of selling PCBs, 21 were they more prof itabl e when sold in the U.S. versus 22 when they were sold overseas? 23 A. I honestly don't know. 24 Q. Okay. 25 Let me show you a -- a document and I'm trying ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037365 190 1 to understand it and you may not know the answer. But 2 it's Document 8782, and it shows some information on a 3 gross profit broken down between domestic and D.S. 4 export. And it shows net income AT. 5 Is that after tax? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Broken down between domestic and U.S. export. 8 As I understand that, it indicates that it was 9 more profitable for Monsanto to sell the PCBs it 10 produced in the U.S. in the U.S. than to sell them 11 overseas. 12 A. It shows five times as profitable on a net 13 basis. 14 Oh, wait a minute. Wait a minute. Her e's 15 the -- wait a minute. Here's the income. Oh, excuse 16 me. I'm sorry. This is the -- this is the total. 17 Yeah, it was about -- it was about a per cent -- 18 1.1 per cent 1 ess. 19 Q. Return overseas than in the U.S.? 20 A. From an export business. 21 Now, export and making it abroad are two 22 different things. 23 Q. Okay. 24 You're saying the cost of production in the 25 U.S. may be different than the cost of production NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37366 191 1 abroad? 2 A. No. You see, U.S. export means U.S. 3 manufacture but exported from the U.S. 4 The U.K. numbers, I don't think, are in this. 5 Q. Okay. Okay. Okay. Let me -- 6 A. We made -- we made a 42.2 per cent margin, gross 7 profit margin, on domenstic sales. 8 Q. That was - 9 A. Huh? 10 Q. That was produced in the United States and -- 11 A. That's right. 12 Q. -- sold in the United States? - 13 A. That's right. 14 When you exported that same product abroad, you 15 got probably less pricing for it or more shipping costs 16 or whatever; and that was some almost five points less. 17 Q. Okay. 18 A. But that refers only to -- 19 MR. FREEMAN: A gross measurement? 20 A. -- a gross measurement. 21 Q. Was that difference also true on a net basis, 22 too, that it was more profitable to sell it in the -- 23 A. Yeah. 24 Q. -- United States? 25 A. Yeah. The income af ter tax was 9.3 vers us 8.2. NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037367 192 1 Q. Okay. 2 A. Yeah. 3 Q. And -- 4 MR. LACEY; We've got about another 5 five minutes or so, don't we, before you 6 can make your meeting? 7 THE WITNESS; I hope. 8 You got something you want to beat on 9 me about? 10 MR. FREEMAN; Not unless Mr. Lacey 11 finishes . 12 AEI; - 13 Q. The overall U.S. numbers would be based on 14 the -- for the entire product line, would be based on 15 combining both the domestic sales out of the U.S. plants 16 and the export sales out of the U.S. plants? 17 A. Yes. That would be for Monsanto Company - 18 Monsanto Chemical Company? and there ought to be, then, 19 a comparable list of numbers for something, say, out of 20 the U. K.. 21 Q. Okay. 22 A. And then you'd have to add those two together. 23 Q. To get the overall -- 24 A. That's right. 25 Q. -- numbers? NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. 193 1 And even, I guess, add half the Japanese in? 2 A. I don't -- no. The Jap -- the 50/50 companies 3 were never in the accounting system. What do they -- 4 what did they -- what' s that terminology they use? 5 Q. Consolidated? 6 A. Consolidated. 7 Only the income was pulled in as a line item 8 from -- from the Japanese company. Anything that was 9 50/50 or less, we only reported as income from it. The 10 consolidation came when it was 51 percent or more; and, 11 so, we had 66 and two-thir ds at that: time of the 12 Monsanto Chemical s , Limite d. So , W! woul d have taken 13 two -thi rds of any of those numbe rs and -- and 14 con soli dated them in an ov er all pi ct:ure. 15 Q. Did you know Mr. Bergen 7 16 A. Bergen, yes. 17 Q. Bergen. 18 He was r esponsibl e for the area of functional 19 flu ids that dealt with PC -- or had PCBS as a part of 20 it, wasi he not? 21 A. He was f or a time yes. 22 Q. The possibility of DOP as a substitute for PCBs 23 in dielectric uses was known for a number of years 24 before Monsanto decided to get out of the PCB business, 25 was it not ? NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037369 194 1 A. I don't know the answer to that question. I'm 2 sure somebody must have known that, functionally, you 3 could -- you could do that; but, again, the fire safety 4 aspect -- well, it was not in your question. But -- and 5 I'm sure somebody knew it. But I'm not sure that any 6 significance was attached to it. 7 Q. Well, let me show you a memo dated 8 January 28th, 1971, written by Hr. Bergen, Document 9 8800; and I direct your attention to the last paragraph 10 (tendering). 11 A. Well, it looks like Howard did. 12 Q. My question was: Did anybody ever bring, to 13 your recollection -- bring to the Corporate 14 Administrative Committee, or whatever it was called in 15 1971, information about the fact that DOP could be used 16 as a substitute dielectric fluid and that information 17 was known to Monsanto in 1971? 18 A. There wasn't -- it wasn't brought, to -- to my 19 recoilection, that was never brought to the committee, 20 because, remember, fire safety was always the issue 21 her e. And, so, whil e this may -- obviously was known - 22 and Benignus was a specialist in PCBs, as was Munch - 23 and Savage I don' t remember -- and Bill Richard and Bill 24 Pappageorge. They obviously knew this, but there are 25 many -- there are many chemicals that have functional ' NELL MCCALLUM& ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037370 195 1 properties that -- that are comparable in one or more of 2 those properties; but when you're looking for the 3 balance, they -- they fall out. 4 And I -- this was -- I think this was the 5 overall thought pi cture of most of us at that time. 6 They just simply don't compete when it comes to the 7 product -- or the fire safety characteristics. 8 Now, Bergen1s insight, as he suggests there, 9 may have been -- 1 ooks like he should have pursued that 10 more; but... 11 Q. Prom your personal standpoint, had Mr. Bergen 12 brought the availability of DOP as a substitute to your 13 personal attention, would you have sought to have 14 Monsanto get out of the PCB business earlier? 15 A. No. 16 Q. Mr. Throdahl, have you ever testified before, 17 either by deposition or 1ive at trial? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Can you tell me on how many occasions. 20 A. Twice on -- on deposition and once in a trial 21 Q. What did the depositions rel ate to? 22 A. Agent Orange. 23 Q. Both of them? 24 A. One -- one specifically on Agent Orange on 25 deposition, and Agent Orange became a part of the NELL MC CALLUM fit ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037371 196 1 deposition and -- and trial testimony in a case on -- a 2 Nitro case. It had -- it had other ramifications, but 3 the -- the dioxin situation was -- was featured in both 4 of them. 5 Q So, you testified 1ive at trial in the case in 6 Nitro, West Virginia? 7 A. Yeah. 8 Q. And you gave a deposition in the case in Nitro, 9 West Virginia? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. And you also testified in the veterans' lawsuit 12 on Agent Orange? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. And those are the only times you've testified? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Have you ever, in your own mind, associated 17 dioxin in any way with PCBs? 18 A. Theoretically. 19 Q. What do you mean by that? 20 A. You can get a 1ittle bit of anything and 21 everything if you go to fine enough limits. And any 22 time you have an aromatic hydrocarbon, air, and halogen, 23 theoretically you can form a molecule of anything. And 24 so a dioxin will be part of it. 25 Q. Okay. So, you -- NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037372 197 1 A. But de minimis is my watchword. 2 Q. Okay. 3 So, you can conceive, from the standpoint of a 4 chemical engineer, where PCBs are present with oxygen, 5 the possibility - 6 A. Well, that's awful hard to do. It's very 7 difficult to do. I mean, from a practical point of 8 view, it -- I would say de minimis has to prevail there; 9 but paper chemistry will let you do that. 10 Q. Okay. You can -- you can, as a chemist, 11 contemplate that possibility in de minimis presence, 12 correct? 13 A. De minimis is present. - 14 Q. And what 1evel, in terms of parts per million, 15 parts per billion, would you think might be a de minimis 16 1evel that you would comtemplate, if you know? 17 A. Well, based on toxicological data, it's -- it's 18 pretty high. 19 Q. I'm not sure I know what you mean by that. 20 A. Well, if you had -- if you even had -- you 21 can't get chloracne unless you've got a very high 22 concentration of dioxin in -- in the Agent Orange to -- 23 just to start with. 24 Q. Well, what -- what do you mean by "high 25 concentration"? I guess that's what I'm looking -- ' NELL MCCALLUM& ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037373 198 1 MR. FREEMAN: Mr. Throdahl, let me 2 caution you that you have not been called 3 as an expert witness in toxicology, 4 epidemiology, analytical chemistry, or 5 theoretical chemistry. If you have some 6 facts you can testify to about here today, 7 please do so in response to Mr. Lacey's 8 question. 9 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't have any 10 facts. 11 MR. FREEMAN: We're not here to play 12 a guessing game or to expound the limits 13 of theoretical chemistry. ' 14 THE WITNESS: Okay. 15 A. I don't have any facts on that, but - 16 Q. Well, what -- 17 A. It's in the literature. You can find it 18 easily. 19 Q. At what literature? 20 A. You look at -- 21 THE WITNESS: Who was the 22 epidemiologist from the University of 23 Cincinnati that did so much of that work? 24 A. Raymond Suskind. You look at Suskind; and you 25 look at, also, Robert Neal of Van -- formerly of NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37374 199 1 Vanderbilt University Medical School and now the 2 Chemical Industry Institute of Technology, who's an 3 expert on dioxin. And you can find it there. I 4 recommend you look at both of them. 5 Q. Okay. 6 And those numbers are the numbers that you 7 believe would be appropriate for identifying whether 8 there would be any potential problem from dioxin? 9 A. Right. 10 MR. LACEY: If you have got a 11 ten-minute trip to be there at 2:00 12 o'clock, I think we've just made it. 13 MR. FREEMAN: Have you completed your 14 examination, Mr. Lacey? 15 MR. LACEY: I'm passing the Witness. 16 MR. FREEMAN: I've got an opportunity 17 to ask a couple of question, Mr. Throdahl. 18 Let me take two seconds to see if I do 19 want to exercise that opportunity. 20 MR. LACEY: If you do, I may have 21 some follow-up. 22 THE WITNESS: Do I need this anymore? 23 MR. LACEY: Feel free to do with it 24 whatever you want. It's yours. It's not 25 mine. ' NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37375 200 1 Why don't we give it to your lawyer 2 there. 3 MR. FREEMAN? I don't have any 4 questions. Thank you, Mr. Throdahl. 5 THE WITNESS: No questions. 6 (DEPOSITION CONCLUDED AT 1:51 P.M.) 1 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037376 201 1 2 3 I, MONTE C. THRODAHL, solemnly swear or 4 affirm, under the pains and penalties of perjury, that 5 the foregoing 200 pages contain a true and correct 6 transcript of the testimony given by me at the time and 7 place stated, with the corrections, if any, and the 8 reasons therefor noted on a separate sheet of paper and 9 attached hereto, and that I am signing this before a 10 Notary Public. 11 12 13 14 MONTE C. THRODAHL 15 16 THE STATE OF TEXAS] 17 18 Subscribed and sworn to before me, the 19 undersigned authority, by the said MONTE C. THRODAHL on 20 this the 21 day of__r 1987. 22 23 24 Notary Public in and for 25 the State of Texas NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES. INC. HARTOLDMON0037377 202 1 THE STATE OP TEXAS] 2 3 ETJIATE 4 5 I, Linda S. Towery, Certified Shorthand 6 Reporter No. 2413 and Notary Public in and for the State 7 of Texas, do hereby certify that I am not related to or 8 employed by any of the parties hereto, or their counsel, 9 and that I am not in any way interested in the outcome 10 of this matter. 11 I further certify that the above and 12 foregoing contains a true and correct transcript of the 13 testimony. 14 Certified on May 22, 1987 15 16 Lirvda S. Towery, CSR No. 2413 17 2900 Smith, Suite 104 Houston, Texas 77006 18 (713) 523-3767 19 My Certificate Expires January 1, 1989. 20 My Notary Commission Expires April 28, 1991. 21 22 23 24 25 NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMONOQ37378 Page Line LAWYER'S NOTES NELL MC CALLUM & ASSOCIATES, INC. HARTOLDMON0037379