Document jygJ9naanqGQw8pVakbLdp46p

CAemuuit- INC. ESCAMBIA PLANT INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM To: M. R. Chmura From; R . B . Chandler Re: Process Hazards Dote: 29 August 1980 Copies: W. R, Bone M. B. Cobb R. L. Dugganv D. C. F ec R, E. Gadomski B. A. Gebbia J. W. Gentile K. D. Greene R. E. Jones W. T. Johnson/J, W. Moody A. K. McMillan T. J. Regan F. C. Rydzewski Preparations for the scheduled Process Hazards Reviews for units in my area include updating P&I drawings. This is estimated to cost $203,000 broken down as follows: Nitric Acid Ammonia Utilities Methanol $ 48,000 60,000 45.000 50.000 Total $203,000 At the present time these costs are unbudgeted and will have an adverse impact on production costs in FY81 in the amount shown above. These costs will appear in the Outside Services element on the E schedule. Drafting will begin September 8 unless I recieve instructions otherwise prior to that date. RBC ;bg R. B. Chandler AP00036335 c^fi^7^oc&ic&- and Gt&mica& A CSCAM8IA PLANT INC, INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM To: Distribution. Date: 1L September 1980 From: B. A. Gebbia Copies: Re: Ammonia/Me Process Hazards Committee Meeting R. B. Chandler R. Li. Duggan L. S. Forester T. J. Regan Please plan to attend a meeting of the Process Hazards Committee for NH^/MeOH area at 9:00 a.rxi. on Monday, 15 September 1980, in B. Gebbia's office to review the plant Change Log entries. BAG:dl Distribution: E. A. Barnes C. Blackledge B. Cooley D. Henn C. Simpson R. Scott (X . B. A. Gebbia AP00036336 ESCAMBIA PLANT INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM To: T. J. Regan From: D. W. Henn* Re: Process Hazards Review of Compressor Boiler Project Date: 28 October 1980 Copies: C. T. Blackledge* R. B. Chandler* M. R. Chmura G. D. Cooper* R. L. Duggan L. S. Forester B. A. Gebbia* L,. Gilley* W. T. Johnson fe---B. --Jones-----G. Kalwaitis* J. Kentf/W, Baker J. A. Marts* F. E. Sommer * Those in attendance . A Process Hazards Review was done for the Compressor Boiler project on 24 October, 1980. The tabulation of the potential occurrences, consequences, and recommendations, and a copy of the P&cl diagram, revised according to the committee's re commendations, are attached. DWHrdl Attach: D. W. Henn R- f -i'.ES AP00036337 AP00036338 PROCESS HAZARDS REVIEW PROJECT: Compressor Engine Exhaust Heat Recovery Location: Escambia Plant Date: 24 October 1980 " WHAT-IF 11 Boiler Feed Water pressure control valve fails open. Boiler/Economizer is blocked in while engine is running. Pressure control valve in BFW line fails clo sed. CONSEQUENCE CONC LUSION/R ECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS 1. Boiler peed Water and 1. Project had provided for one relief valve in economizer systems exposed BFW line between control valve and down to 800 psi pressure. stream block valves. This would be sufficient to prevent overpressure rupture, but the team recommended that two relief valves be in stalled with a three-way valve to provide for annual checks. Once the system is started, it is unlikely that all five boilers would be down simultaneously. Estimated incremental cost of two additional relief valves and three- way valves was $18,000. (NOTE: The team recommended that all relief valves be sized' for steam service. Since all of the water in the system is above 2l2F, some flashing would occur if the relief valve opened. Also, all relief valves are to discharge into drain stacks for personnel protection.) 2. Water heated in confined piping. 2. The boiler and economizer sections each have a relief valve between the inlet and outlet block valves. Since individual engines come down often enough to allow annual relief valve inspections, the single relief valve in each location was deemed adequate. No further recommendations. 3. Steam drum could be emp tied. In the extreme case, the boiler tubes could run dry. 3. No real hazard. There is a low level alarm on the steam drum. The consequences listed would occur only if the operator cannot take remedial action when this happens. i AP00036339 PROJECT: Compressor Engine Exhaust Heat Recovery (Cont Page 2 "WHAT-IF" CONSEQUENCE 4. A boiler or economi zer tube develops a small leak. 4. If undetected, water could back up into turbo-charger, causing equipment damage. Personnel in vicinity could be injured by casing frag ments. 5. A tube breaks com pletely. 5. Water would probably get back to the turbocharger before action could be taken. Same consequences as above. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS/CO MMF The steam drum has been ordered with a specification for full vacuum design. Thes* are not fired boilers; the typical gas inlet temperature is 825F, so that tube damage due to operating dry is unlikely. This has been confirmed by the heat exchanger manufacturer. Also, because of the by-pat- valve arrangement in the exhaust line, the hot gas can be diverted from the boilers without shutting an engine down and losing production. This same arrangement also allows the boilers to be restarted with no equipment damage after the feed water malfunction is corrected. . 4, The presence of steam in the exhaust stach should alert operator to this condition. As a double check on tube leaks, the team recommended that the heat exchanger boxes be provided with drains, and that these drains be left open to allow detection of leakage. This will be done. If leakage occurs, boiler will be by-passed, 5. Possible hazard, but probability of this occurrence was deemed very low. Most tubing failures occur at return bends and circumferential welds, and these are out side of the heat exchanger box. Tubing is to be certified by manufacturer. No recommendations. i AP00036340 PROJECT: Compressor Engine Exhaust Heat Recovery (Cont'd) Page 3 " WHAT-IF" 6. A fire occurs in the turbocharger. 7. A general power failure occurred. 8. A general instrument aii1 failure occurred. CONSEQUENCE 6. Finned boiler tubes could be damaged. 7. Forced circulation through the boilers would cease. If engines continued to run and boilers were not by-passed, tubes could run dry. 8. BFW feed and five BFW flow control valves fail closed. Other valves fail open to relieve localized pressures. Engines go down. CONCLUSION/RECQMMENDATIONS/COMMENT 6. It was recommended that temperature switches which would trip the engines whe: the exhaust temperature got too high be installed in the five exhaust ducts involved Estimated total cost was $15, 000. 7. No hazard. As noted in Item 3 above, boilers can run dry with no damage. 8. No hazard. DWHtdl 10/28/80