Document gaeq3Q7JE01DpZE5qmk9X9w1Q

448 Txccnly-sccond Congress--National Safety Council ten days, she became bis safety supervisor from that tim on, and he was never thereafter' crytired. That was one oi those object !*>* that cannot be forgotten. 1 eras also modi interested in the idea of repetition of safety instructions. I hare two daughters whom 1 taught to drive an automobile. I said to them: "There b just one rale m driving an automobile, that I want you to remember: and that is to learn to talk to whoever is sitting alongside of you without moving year head sideways.** 1 drilled this idea into the head of the younger one time and time again until she got it down pat- One day she was di ivmg alongside of me and I said suddenly, "There's a new house.** Instantly she turned around and looked at the new boose, and then she caught herself. I don't believe anyone could catch her on that land of thing again. I have heard it said that the railroads are obsolete, that their equipment is ran down, cndcr-cnamtaincd. and everything of that kmd. I was greatly interested in that, so I cheeked up a while ago carefully and I find we have a decrease in ownershill of freight cars of 337.000 compared -with 1923. There has been a decrease in freight trains. We have better cooperation in loading and unloading. You do out get the fufl results of the efficiency and movement unless you reduce the units required to handle that business. How much has the reduction of 3373)00 car* in the handing of a given business contributed to the safety movement? How much has the retirement of L091j000 cars since 1923 and the addition of approximately 900000 new ones added to the safety, movement? If you buy a new car that is better than the old owe. it is a move toward safety. If yon buy a locomotive that is better, you add to safety. If you can handle ware cars on the tram, you lore less opportunity for employees to become injured. The more safely you operate the more economically you operate. t saw some figure* prepared by someone in a statement. I believe by ifr. Palmer, comparing the last ten years with the previous ten years, showing that the m>meut for personal injuries alone showed a decrease of $15HOODJOO. To carry it further, to make a comparison on the question of the reduction is the cost of operation doe to wrecks, derailments, etc, we have something in excess of a billion dollars saved during that same period. Report of Committee on Statistics By T. H. CARROW Superintendent of Safety, Pennsylvania Railroad, Philadelphia The speaker said in part: 1 want to summarise as briefly as I can some of the previous reports of tins committee, because it is necessary to give a lasts to what 1 am going to recommend today.* In 1921 the first report covered the question of accuracy. In 1922 we were able to report that the Interstate Commerce Commission had adopted a aril]ton raza-hours as the tasb for comparisons by roads and by occupations. In 1923 we made a general analysis of fata) and non-fata! injuries due to being struck by trains. In Salt Lake CUy in 1924 for the first time the possibilities of reductions were ajvpumt, because up to that time we had no knowledge of what we might do. and even (hen our eonctusloos were predicated largely on our practical imagination, be* anse the statistics were more or less in a Trade state no further back than 1924. We. therefore, recommended the 33 per cent goaL In 1923, recognising the necessity of a definite program, the committee worked Safety Section .-IRA--Strain Railroad Srrtian NSC 449 up twelve skeletonized bulletins fur publicity and recommended that the Association adopt these as a regular program. In 1926 we presented four resolutions on the basts that the remedy for accidents on the railroads rested directly with traimnasters. road foremen, toaster nedancs, and division engineers. In 1926 we introduced four resolutions appealing to these four classes of supervisors. There were mis cellaneous analyses from 1927 to 1931% particularly In charts that were put out showing the different departments of each railroad bow they stood m comparison with each other. I think that was an innovation that marked great progress. In 1932, for tits first time, we suggested the poss&fthv of a standard rate; we sug gested for toe first time the possibilities of standard casualty rates. I have here a statement which is a composite of the aecidmt situation on all the railroads in the United States. It is one that shows casualties in tbe.sevoi classes of service, from 1923, 1931, 1932. In maintenance of war and structures m 1932 we have, roughly, 4J000 accidents; in maintenance of equipment and stores we have also AfiCO accidents; asd in "other transportation** which is nearly all station, we have nearly ZfiOO accidents. Then in train and argine service, wre have in round figures 7,000 injuries. If you examine those rates you wOl notice a very marked drop from 1923 to 1931. But we came to an impasse in 1932, and showed almost no Improvement. A* a matter of fact, in the maintenance of cquipuwm department the raze was virtually the same each year. There are two significant featores to that statement. The first it the fact that we made no appreciable progress m 1932, and the second is toe preponderance of accidents to train and engine service employees. The total number of accidents to att employees last year was, roughly, 18,000; h the tram and engine service, however, 7,000 accidents occurred, which it 38 per cent of toe total, while toe train and engine service had only 19 per cent of the man hours. There is something, however, very much mure significant even U&n that, and that is the rate in engine service is very small indeed, and in the passenger service there is oo more hazard than with clerks. The fact that the tram and engine service predominates indicates that we must concentrate our energy on that department, and I am prepared to say that I don't believe that from a purely numerical standpoint the hazard m tram and engine service is materially grater than it is re the shop or in the maintenance of way department, and that toe explanation for the poor performance is that we as a body have not done our job, and that the trainmasters lave not done their jobs, and that mdtvtduafly aad eollcvtndjf we have got to get together and find the solution for the train service accident situation, which is indicated very dearly by an analysts ol the statistics. I want to speak of toe fluctuation in tram service accidents. Fifteen trainmen were killed in 1923 on account of negligence in connection with train orders, and not a single one Is 1931. That was good work, wasn't it ? No, it wasn't good work, but just largely Inch, because in 1932 there were ten of these accidents. Now let me turn to another natter. I will not mention any roads specifically, but 1 hare taken fifteen roads and designated them as No. 1 to IS, inclusive. Isn't it indicative that something is decided wrong when we find that the first road I hare listed has a rate of 2.40, and the last road has s rate of 13.40? There is something wrong somewhere, there Is sow deficiency, as sorely as figures can indicate h.