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FILE NAME Georgia Pacific GP DATE 2007 Nov 14 DOC GP118 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION Legal - Deposition of Dr. Morton Corn 0001 IN THE STATE COURT OF FULTON COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA EUNICE TAYLOR AND JOHNNY TAYLOR ) 123 Plaintiffs ) CIVIL ACTION vs. ) File No. GEORGIA PACIFIC ) 2007ev001878D CORPORATION et al ) Defendant ) 10 12 TELEPHONE DEPOSITION OF DR MORTON CORN 13 14 In accordance with Rule d of 15 the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure as 16 Amended effective May 15 1988 , Maya 17 Rose am hereby delivering to PATTERSON 18 KEAHEY the original transcript of the 19 oral testimony taken on the 14th day of 20 November 2007 along with the exhibits 21 Please be advised that this is 22 the same and not retained by the Court 23 Reporter nor filed with the Court 0002 1 APPEARANCES via telephone 2 FOR THE PLAINTIFFS 3 Mr. Gary Dimuzio 4 Attorney at Law 5 The Keahey Law Firm 6 1 Independence Plaza Suite 814 7 Birmingham Alabama 35209 8 9 FOR GEORGIA CORPORATION 10 Mr. Thomas F. Wamsley Jr. 11 Attorney at Law 12 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough 13 Atlantic Station 14 201 17th Street NW Suite 1700 15 Atlanta Georgia 30363 16 17 FOR CHRYSLER LLC 18 Mr. Todd E. Schwartz 19 Attorney at Law 20 Hawkins & Parnell 21 400 SunTrust Plaza 22 303 Peachtree Street 23 Atlanta Georgia 30308 0003 1 APPEARANCES via telephone - continued 2 FOR GENUINE PARTS COMPANY 3 Ms. Lawrie E. Demorest 4 Attorney at Law 5 Alston & Bird LLP 6 One Atlantic Center 7 1201 West Peachtree Street 8 Atlanta Georgia 30309-3424 9 10 FOR GM FORD AND HONEYWELL 11 Mr. Sam Griffin 12 Attorney at Law 13 King & Spalding 14 1180 Peachtree Street Suite 4100 15 Atlanta Georgia 30309 16 17 FOR PNEUMO ABEX 18 Mr. Ivan A. Gustafson 19 Attorney at Law 20 Evert Weathersby & Houff 21 200 Cleveland Road Suite 6 22 Bogart Georgia 30622 23 0004 INDEX PAGE EXHIBITS PLAINTIFF'S NO PAGE 10 1 Exhibit -deposition notice and = - 9 subpoena duces tecum Exhibit 2 -defendant's objections - 9 Exhibit 3 -Dr Corn's report 10 Exhibit 4 - 8-2 sheets describing - 36 categories 12 Exhibit 5 -documents related to review- 37 Exhibit 6 - date CV - 40 15 Exhibits were not received to be 1716 attached 1619 22 23 0005 , Maya Rose a Court Reporter of Birmingham Alabama and a Notary Public for the State of Alabama at Large acting as Commissioner certify that on this 7 date at 367 Valley Avenue Birmingham Alabama on the 14th day of November 2007 commencing at 9:06 a.m. DR MORTON CORN witness in the above cause for oral examination whereupon the following 10 proceedings were had and done 11 12 MR DIMUZIO Just some little 13 preliminaries here we're taking this by 14 the Atlanta rules I take it 15 MR WAMSLEY That's fine 16 MR DIMUZIO And read and -- 17 is Dr. Corn going to want to do read and 18 sign 19 MR WAMSLEY He is By the 20 Georgia rules you mean 21 MR DIMUZIO Right 22 MR WAMSLEY Yeah 23 MR DIMUZIO Taking the 0006 1 deposition by the Georgia rules 2 And Court Reporter I think 3 we're going to go ahead and do an 4 objection by one is good for all 5 THE REPORTER Okay 6 MR DIMUZIO That will make 7 your life easier and that way you can just 8 put you know counsel down and not have 9 to worry about getting names okay 10 THE REPORTER Great Okay 11 MR DIMUZIO Anything else 12 Tom 13 MR WAMSLEY I don't -- not 14 thIacatn think of 15 MR DIMUZIO Okay I guess 16 you can go ahead and swear the witness 17 Oh I guess also since the court reporter 18 is not actually there in person I guess 19 we need to agree to waive any requirements 20 that the court reporter be there in 21 person correct 22 MR WAMSLEY That's fine with 23 me 0007 123 MR DIMUZIO Okay Good deal 123 Okay Are you ready Dr. Corn 123 THE DEPONENT Yes 4 MR DIMUZIO Okay Madam 5 Court Reporter go ahead and swear in the 6 witness 7 8 DR MORTON CORN 9 being first duly sworn was examined and 10 testified as follows 11 12 EXAMINATION BY MR DIMUZIO 13 Q. Good morning Dr. Corn How 14 are you 15 A. Fine thank you Good morning 16 Q. Good morning Could you 17 please state your full name for the 18 record 19 A. My name is Morton Corn 20 C 21 Q. Okay And Dr. Corn how are 22 you currently employed 23 A. am employed by Morton Corn & 0008 1 Associates a consulting firm I formed in 2 1977 3 Q. Okay And right now is this 4 just a solo operation or do you have other 5 employees as well 6 A. My wife and my son are 7 time to assist me 8 Q. see You don't have any 9 other -- at this point other than your 10 wife and your son you have no other 11 like time or time assistants to 12 help with administrative functions 13 A. My wife and my son help with 14 both substantive assisting namely 15 literature search or literature review as 16 well as administrative 17 Q. see And the way your 18 business is set up do you pretty much 19 handle all the matters that require 20 expertise in terms of forming opinions or 21 do you contract with other experts as 22 well 23 0009 A. have not contracted with any experts for four or five years I did 2 that in the simulation past when I was of something in doing a the field I haven't done any of those recently so 4there's been no contracting Q. see And just in terms of getting the scope of your testimony down I was a little anxious to do that First of all by training and background you're an industrial hygienist is that correct A. I'm initially a chemical engineer and then with master's and doctoral degrees in industrial hygiene and 16 sanitary engineering Q. Okay And absent any sort of industrial hygiene analysis that would just be part and parcel of the state analysis do you intend 19 to offer any industrial hygiene opinions 20 this case specific to Ms. Taylor 21 MR WAMSLEY Object to form 22 A. No. 23 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay Good 0010 deal Do you intend to offer opinions about exposure levels to individuals using joint compounds in a general sense A. Only if asked a question 7 pertaining to the literature as information appears I will not do an exposure analysis in this case Q. see Fair enough Fair enough 10 First of all do you have a 11 copy of your report there with you today 12 sir 13 A. Yes I do 14 Q. Okay I want to talk about 15 that in just a moment 16 MR DIMUZIO First of all 17 Madam Court Reporter I know you're in a 18 remote location But in terms of whatI 19 would like to have marked as Exhibit 20 Number 1 it will be a copy of today's 21 deposition notice of deposition and 22 subpoena duces tecum all right 23 THE REPORTER Okay 0011 ," 2 Whereupon Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 will be marked 3 for identification 4 MR DIMUZIO And Tom } 5 understand that you folks filed some sort 6 objections to that is that correct 7 MR WAMSLEY That's correct 8 MR DIMUZIO Okay Do you 9 want to go ahead and have that marked as 10 Number 2 11 MR WAMSLEY That's fine 12 Whereupon Plaintiff's 13 Exhibit 2 will be marked 14 for identification 15 MR DIMUZIO Okay And then 16 Madam Court Reporter what will be marked 17 Exhibit Number 3 -- and we'll talk about 18 getting you these materials on a break -19 will be Mr. -- Dr. Corn's report in this 20 particular case okay 21 THE REPORTER Okay 22 Whereupon Plaintiff's 23 Exhibit 3 will be marked 0012 1 for identification 2 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay Dr. 3 Corn in -- as part of the report that I 4 was supplied there was an Appendix B to 5 the report And underneath that it was 6 entitled Case Specific Materials Reviewed 8 Is that something that you or your wife or son put together specifically for this case 10 A. No. That was put together by 11 Nelson Mullins for documents that I was 12 either sent or utilized during my trips to 13 Atlanta 14 Q. I see So you have either 15 retained -- come in possession of every 16 one of these documents or reviewed every 17 one of these documents in terms of forming 18 your opinions in this case is that 19 correct 20 A. Correct 21 Q. Okay And first of all do 22 you have possession of every one of these 23 documents as we sit here today 0013 1 A. No. I have two bankers boxes 3 of documents at home I did not bring them today because they're listed here What I did bring is the supporting 4 documentation for each citation in the second part of my report Q. Okay A. Where a letter or document is 3 cited in the Section C chronology of the 10 Georgia Company's approach to 11 asbestos in joint compound products I 12 have a document for each citation here 13 today 14 Q. Oh okay Good Now going 15 back to these documents that are listed 16 here is it part of your professional 17 practice to make notes or tab or highlight 18 the actual documents themselves 19 A. No. I don't touch documents 20 when I do this 21 Q. Okay So any sort of notes or 22 memos that you would have done concerning 23 this would be a completely separate 0014 1 document from the original document that 2 you reviewed correct A. Yes Q. Okay 7 A. take very few notes I might say that to you in the beginning The really important documents i pulled and they're in the package of documents that I have with me 10 Q. Okay Fair enough And we'll 11 get to that in a moment Is there 12 anything else that you brought with you 13 here today that you have not described 14 already 15 A. Yes 16 Q. Okay And what would that be 17 A. Well I brought the notice of 18 deposition And I brought pursuant to 19 your request an expert witness testimony 20 report 2004 through 2007. Those are the 21 depositions or trial testimonies that I 22 have given in that period of time 23 Q. Okay Is there anything else 0015 you've brought with you A. brought a single sheet that is dated 2/8/07 and 2/9/07 that has sixteen entries that describes what was in the bankers boxes that I went through in Atlanta and contain the documents in the Attachment B to my report And they're not -- they just are broad categories They're not details of documents For example the categories are R & D month report specs comparison tests minutes of Gypsum Association annual reports annual reports OSHA inspection folders formulation folders 16 plastic bag manual memos 7776 CPSC bans papers Those are some of the categories that I reviewed and are listed on this sheet Q. Okay And you reviewed these 20 documents in Atlanta Georgia is that correct 22 A. That's correct 23 0016 Q. Okay And was that at the law firm Nelson Mullins 2 A. That's correct 3 Q. Okay And did you meet with 4 any -- first of all did you meet with any 55 company officials or representatives from Georgia in that time frame A. Not at that particular visit I did at other visits to Atlanta Q. Okay 10 A. This was one of three visits Q. Okay Well let's go through 12 those if we could When was the first 13 visit that you made to Atlanta to get 14 materials rolled into your opinions about 15 Georgia 16 A. believe this may have been 17 the first -- well the first was shortly 18 before that I haven't a date I didn't 19 take notes But it was to introduce me to 20 the Georgia and Nelson Mullins 21 people And the bulk of that day was 22 reviewing my experience qualifications 23 consulting involvements and so on And 0017 1 after that meeting I assume they met and 2 judged that they wanted to go ahead And I was invited to come down Because one of my stipulations was I must review documents and would hold in abeyance my 6 appearance on their behalf pending what those documents told me that I had to feel comfortable with the story or I would not go forward That's a standard 10 approach of mine to any potential client 11 that calls 12 Q. Okay 13 A. So second visit was arranged 14 Q. Okay When did this first 15 visit happen approximately 16 A. Approximately in January 17 Q. January of 2007 18 A. Correct 19 Q. Okay Now was that just for 20 this case or was this for a number of 21 cases involving Georgia 22 A. Oh it had no specific case 23 mentioned at that time 0018 1 Q. see Okay Now 2 approximately when did this second meeting 3 occur 4 A. That was on the 8th and the 9th 5 of February 6 Q. Now going back to this first 7 meeting for a moment who do you recall 8 meeting with from the firm Nelson Mullins 9 at that time 10 A. Tom Wamsley was the principal 11 contact at Nelson Mullins 12 Q. Okay 13 A. And he has been the principal 14 contact 15 Q. Okay Did he make any sort of 16 like PowerPoint presentation or anything 17 like that about -- anything about 18 Georgia and its involvement in 19 asbestos litigation 20 A. No. There was nothing at 21 either of these two meetings about 22 Georgia presented 23 Q. see Okay Let's talk about 0019 0019 1 this second meeting What was the purpose of the second meeting 4 A. For me to review documents They put me in a room essentially for two days with twelve bankers boxes and left me alone 9 Q. Okay A. And I went through them I didn't look at invoices for example I disregarded that These were supposedly -- and I believe this day they are -- but at that time } -- I was told these are all the documents that Georgia could collect in the field and in their offices relating to asbestos in their products Q. see Okay And what was your understanding that your role was in reviewing these materials What were you reviewing them with an eye towards A. Well they were quite specific about that They wanted to introduce into 23 their defense an independent -- what they 0020 1 referred to as a state witness but I refer to call a historical witness who could describe -- and in my case they said I was particularly attractive to them because lived through it -- the learning curve for the health effects of asbestos and efforts in the regulatory community and by companies to adapt to this new knowledge And I said well I would start -- if I did this I would start with what I learned in graduate school and progress to the present time I would not focus on the 1930s and 1940s other than what I was told in graduate school because I didn't practice in those years but I would certainly describe the latter half of the 50s and the 60s where I was doing field practice research and teaching Q. Okay And -A. And that was agreeable to them So -- 23 Q. Okay And -- 0021 12 A. -- we went from there 12 Q. Okay And I almost cut you 3 off which leads me to make the suggestion 4 to you that if i do cut you off at any 5 point please let me know Unfortunately 6 I'm not there and , you know can't see 7 the body English and that sort of thing 8 So if I cut you off please let me know 9 and I'll always let you complete your 10 answer sir okay 11 A. That's fine 12 Q. Regarding your graduate school 13 experience and having lived through this 14 I believe you started doing sort of 15 specific industrial education 16 around 1955 '56 is that correct 17 A. 1955. I entered the graduate 18 program at Harvard University for the 19 master's degree in industrial hygiene and 20 sanitary engineering 21 Q. Okay And that was the year 22 that Sir Richard Doll -- 23 MR DIMUZIO o Madam 0022 1 Court Reporter 2 Q. -- published an epidemiologic 3 study which some have held conclusively 4 established that asbestos could cause lung 5 cancer Are you familiar with that 6 particular study that I'm referring to 7 sir 8 A. Yes 9 Q. Okay Was that something that 10 was discussed in your graduate schoolwork 11 at Harvard at that time 12 A. It was brought up by Philip 13 Drinker who taught industrial hygiene in 14 that course yes 15 Q. Okay Fair enough Coming 16 back to the meetings here I'm sorry for 17 digressing there a bit -- 18 A. I did not finish my answer 19 Q. Oh sorry Go right ahead 20 A. It was not brought up in the 21 context that you just described it Let 22 me add that 23 Q. Okay What context was it 0023 1 brought up A. It was brought up in the 3 context that all of the subjects in the 4 Doll study had fibrosis as well as lung 5 cancer And Professor Drinker expressed 6 the view that it looked like our threshold 7 limit value protected against fibrosis 8 based on the Fleisher studies he 9 had done and therefore it probably 10 protected against cancer So it was not 11 viewed as a hallmark study conclusively 12 pointing to asbestos as a carcinogen And 13 there are still I am told in this 14 country pathologists who believe fibrosis 15 is an essential predicate of lung cancer 16 Q. Okay Scarring is a different 17 disease process though from cancer 18 correct 19 A. Yes 20 Q. Okay I mean cancer is 21 essentially a disease of the DNA right 22 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 23 form 0024 A. Well I wouldn't describe it that way But some do but there are different physiological processes 6 associated with the diseases Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay Fair enough Coming back to the second meeting other than your review of the documents did you engage in any sort of meetings or briefings regarding your 10 document review with anyone at that time A. At the end of the second day I gave a preliminary impression of what i had seen and that -- I put a little 3M 12 tab -- I forget what you call them -- on the documents I wish to be sent and to look over in closer detail Q. Okay And the documents that 18 are listed in the appendix to your report are those the documents that you flagged as a result of your review 20 A. I believe I flagged more than the ones that are in my Appendix B but it 23 included all of that 0025 Q. Oh okay So within Appendix B are things that you definitely reviewed on your second trip to Atlanta correct A. That's correct Q. Okay But there were additional materials that are not listed there right A. Yeah at home And I have many of them Q. I see And is there a list of those additional documents that were flagged but not included in the appendix that's available A. It's not separated out from the documents listed in the appendix They're all in that but I did not make a separate list of the ones in my possession 18 Q. Okay So at no point in time 19 have you ever seen a total list of every 20 document that you flagged in that 21 particular trip 22 A. Not a list no 23 Q. Okay 0026 1 A. No. 3 Q. Fair enough Why were not all the documents that you flagged copied and provided to you 4 A. Well they were Q. Okay So you did get copies of every document that you flagged is 7 that A. Yes 10 Q. -- correct 11 A. Yes There's just no list of 12 the flagged documents It's included --- 13 those document titles are included in 14 Appendix B. 15 Q. Okay And why are those 16 additional documents that are not in the 17 appendix why are they not also listed in 18 the Appendix B 19 A. They were Let me repeat what 20 I said 21 Q. Okay I may have missed -- be 22 a misunderstanding Doctor 23 MR WAMSLEY I think we got 0027 mixed up A. At the day examination of documents I flagged documents to be pulled photocopied and that I asked to be in my possession That was done The documents in my Appendix B are a subset of those but I received copies of everything | flagged Q. I see 11 A. I did not use everything I flagged to write Appendix B. Q. Okay And what would be the 13 reason for not including some of the documents that you flagged and were given 15 copies Why were some of those documents not included in the appendix 17 A. recall some of them go to a second level of detail of the major 211619 decisions I flagged the documents with major decisions There may be financial issues discussed There are may logistical issues discussed But I did 23 not think they were the critical documents 0028 that illustrated the points I was going to make Q. Okay Did you take any notes at the second meeting when you did the review A. No. Q. Did you prepare any sort of 10 materials for your conversation with any of the attorneys from Nelson Mullins or anyone associated with Georgia A. No. as recall this took two days At the end of the second 12 day we had a brief meeting before I left and I gave a preliminary impression 15 Q. Okay And who did you meet with before you left 16 A. Well there were several 18 members of the Georgia legal team 19 present I met with John Childs and 18 woman Karen I don't recall her last 20 2222 name And two other attorneys came in at intervals in that last meeting or at lunch 23 who I was introduced to And Mr. Wamsley 0029 Q. see Were all of these individuals employed by the Nelson Mullins law firm A. No. No. The only one employed by Nelson Mullins I think was Mr. Wamsley Q. Okay Were the other individuals employed by Georgia A. Yes I may have met another Nelson Mullins attorney but I can't recall his name Q. Okay Fair enough So now have we completed the activities for the second meeting that you had in Georgia sir A. That's correct Q. Okay Tell me when did the third meeting occur A. The third meeting occurred in the summer It may have been July or 21 August 22 Q. Okay 23 A. And the purpose of -- I had 0030 1 written my summary and I had also had several meetings not in Atlanta 3 preparing for testimony with a Mr. James Hooper an attorney retained by Georgia who works in Denver And 6 Mr. Hooper and I discussed what my 7 testimony would be both with regard to the 8 state of the art that I had put together 9 and the second part of the report the 10 approach of Georgia to the entire 11 asbestos issue 12 Q. I see And did you actually 13 ultimately give testimony in that case 14 with Mr. Hooper 15 A. There was no case 16 Q. see 17 A. It was all preparing me to 18 testify No case discussed 19 Q. I see 20 A. So there was no specific case 21 I was going to testify only on state of 22 the art to start That was the 23 assignment We didn't discuss any 0031 potential involvement of mine with the 2specifics time of the case at that point in Q. Okay And did you engage in 5any other activities other than the discussion with Mr. Hooper at this third meeting in the summer of 2007 7 A. No. That was not the summer This was prior to that 10 Q. Oh I'm sorry Okay A. Mr. Hooper came to my home -- Q. I see A. -- in Maryland and we spent a day each time going over this and discussing the flow of my testimony and specific points that I would make that I felt were appropriate I got some feedback from him And then the third 14 meeting was scheduled Q. see In this meeting with Mr. Hooper were any sort of documents or presentation materials like PowerPoints 23 created at that time 0032 1 A. No. 1 indicated I did not want to use PowerPoint for my presentations If I thought there were a few visuals that I would use I would let him know But I 6 felt this story was better conveyed without overloading people with a lot of PowerPoints I'm not a fan of presentation of dozens of PowerPoints 1 think the main points get lost But I did 10 reserve the right to select a few that 11 might be w enhance the points I was 12 trying to make 13 Q. Okay Were there any written 14 handwritten or typed notes that you made 15 regarding your meeting with Mr. Hooper 16 A. I don't make notes 17 Q. Okay 18 A. I found that number one I 19 don't need them I do a better job 20 retaining major points I often make 21 notes that I look at and I have questions 22 about why I made the notes and it confuses 23 issues 0033 1 Q. Okay A. I've learned how I work and notes are not a good thing for me Q. Okay Did he provide you with any materials at all in that meeting where he came to your home A. No. These are two meetings in my home and we literally -- he played the devil's advocate When I took points | wished to make he wanted to know the documents I used to reinforce those So his role was the devil's advocate in this process of me putting together what you see is my report Q. Okay And then I guess is the next major contact with anyone affiliated with Georgia be it internal employees or external counsel would this be the third meeting where you went to Atlanta Georgia again A. That's correct Q. Okay And what was the purpose 23 of that meeting 0034 1 A. The purpose of that meeting was 2 to put me through a mock cross examination a presentation of my views and a mock cross examination on the 5 materialsI had prepared I had prepared a report and ! -- I would present that And then there would be a cross 8 examination by an attorney To quote him I was ready to testify Q. Okay You mentioned a report Is this the same report that you've submitted with this case A. Essentially yes There may have been some minor verbal or other changes or -- I don't remember anything really significant that was raised but } did some tuning of words subsequent 18 to that meeting 19 Q. Okay And do you have a copy 20 of the draft of the report that you 21 actually utilized during this little mock 22 trial exercise 23 A. All of my reports are prepared 0035 on the computer and I delete the former one as soon as there's a new one I don't save drafts Q. Okay Did you provide a hard copy of that to anyone at Nelson Mullins or anyone affiliated with Georgia A. don't know if I did I don't recall that if I did I know I took one with me I don't recall if they asked to copy it or not It was reviewed -- it was looked upon as a very preliminary document Mr. Hooper read it But I can't recall if others at Georgia did Q. Okay Any subsequent meetings after this third summer mock trial meeting that you had with the attorneys from Georgia A. No. Q. Okay Have you given any testimony either in deposition or at trial regarding this historical style 23 work that you've done for Georgia 0036 1 A. Yes I gave it in deposition 2 in the Karen Koehne case in August 3 Q. Okay And do you know how 4 that's spelled just so we have that clear 5 for the record 6 A. I believe it's K 7 Q. Okay And who was the attorney 8 for Georgia that was there for you 9 in that case 10 A. Mr. Hooper defended me in that 11 case 12 Q. Okay And do you recall the 13 name of the plaintiff's attorney 14 A. It was in Baltimore I don't 15 recall the attorney's name 16 Q. Okay Do you know what state 17 the case was pending in 18 A. It was pending in Baltimore 19 County 20 Q. see Okay Fair enough 21 A. have slow recall Give me a 22 minute I find with aging you've got a 23 wait a few minutes It's sometimes 0037 0037 longer but let me just take a minute If it doesn't come -- it will come Q. Okay I appreciate it If at any time it comes go ahead and interrupt me and we'll go ahead and get that on the record That's fair enough Doctor I want to go back to the materials that you brought We kind of digressed when I learned about these meetings and I want to get these -- any documents that you brought with you today if they're not too voluminous marked as Exhibit -A. Let me pause On the defense 15 side Robin Silva and Jim Hooper defended me Q. Okay A. And the opposing attorney's name was Parker 20 Q. Okay 21 A. I don't know his first name 22 Q. Okay Fair enough Thank you 23 very much for that 0038 1 You mentioned before that you brought some sheets with you dated 2/8 and 2/9 of 2007 describing documents is that correct sir 2 A. Categories of documents that's correct Q. Okay MR DIMUZIO And Madam Court Reporter I would like both of those 10 sheets to marked Exhibit Number 4 11 A. One sheet 12 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay Oh 13 there's one sheet 14 A. Yes 15 MR DIMUZIO Okay Have that 16 sheet marked Exhibit Number 4 17 THE REPORTER Okay 18 Whereupon Plaintiff's 19 Exhibit 4 will be marked 20 for identification 21 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO And I 22 understand you brought some other 23 materials related to your document review 0039 1 that you were discussing before is that 2 correct Doctor 3 A. Yes That's a collection of 4 documents about an inch thick 5 Q. Okay And why don't we go 6 ahead and have those added as an exhibit 7 MR DIMUZIO And Madam Court 8 Reporter we will those additional 9 materials marked as Exhibit Number 5 10 Whereupon Plaintiff's 11 Exhibit 5 will be marked 12 for identification 13 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Dr. Corn 14 did you reference any of those particular 15 documents in your report that was provided 16 in this case 17 A. Yes That's what I was 18 referring to earlier If you go to my 19 report to Section C every reference in 20 Section C is a document in this 21 collection For instance -- 22 Q. Okay 23 A. -- in the first paragraph the 0040 1 first reference is Gypsum Association 2 Safety Minute Meetings September 19th 3 You will find that document at the top of 4 the pile If you go to the next 25 paragraph there's a reference GP Memo 6 G. Wilson to C. W. Leonard That will be the second document in the pile Q. see I understand now A. So each reference in Section C 10 in this collection of documents 11 Q. Okay 12 A. Okay 13 Q. right Fine Thank you 14 very much 15 MR DIMUZIO And I guess 16 Madam Court Reporter we're going to mark 17 those particular exhibit -- documents as a 18 group We'll mark those Exhibit Number 5 19 THE REPORTER Okay 20 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Doctor I 21 noticed in your report that there's a 22 curriculum vitae for you Is that 23 particular curriculum vitae an date 0041 1 one 2 A. revised it in September so 3 is dated September 2007 4 Q. Okay 5 A. I generally do this annually 6 Q. Okay Actually I'm looking 7 for a date on mine that I have in your 8 report and I don't see a date 9 A. It would be on the last page 10 bottom left 11 Q. Okay 12 A. 9/24/07 13 Q. Okay So this is it This is 14 the most recent Okay Fine We'll just 15 leave that in as part of your report then 16 Hold on here one moment Let me get to 17 the end of this 18 Okay Actually the one that i 19 have in my report says updated June 2006 20 So you have a copy of this more date 21 September CV with you there Doctor 22 A. YeI s do 23 MR DIMUZIO Okay And Madam 0042 1 Court Reporter we'll go ahead and mark 2 that as Exhibit Number 6 Whereupon Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 will be marked for identification Q. BY MR DIMUZIO And just quickly since I don't have a copy of that in front of me what is the difference between the June 2006 CV and the one we're that marking as Exhibit ? A. Well there is one published article on page 28. I was coauthor with Deall Cheng Matthew and Delzell -- that's e C for Cheng and D for Delzell -- entitled Mortality In Cancer Incidents Among Tire Manufacturing Workers Hired In Or After 1962. It appeared the Journal of Occupational Environmental Medicine Volume 49 pages 680 to 690 2007 Q. And so this was basically an occupational exposure that was not limited 23 to one substance is that correct that 0043 was being investigated A. That's correct This was a cohort study of all employees employed at a Goodyear tire plant in Texas that I did the original study with an epidemiologist who since have passed away But the medical director of Goodyear called asking if I would update that from 1989 to 2005 working with Dr. Delzell an epidemiologist I had worked with before So I agreed to do it We did the study in 2007 and submitted it for publication and it was published quick rapidly Q. And Dr. Delzell lives down there in Alabama is that correct A. That's correct Q. Okay And was asbestos one of the substances that was looked at with any scrutiny in this study A. There were very minor uses of asbestos in the plant It was not the major concern but I had some 3,000 personal measurements of exposure in the 0044 first cohort 1962 to '89 and Goodyear had an additional 3,000 measurements that 1 analyzed for the update There may have been a few asbestos measurements in there but asbestos was not a major concern in this facility We were looking at the health status of all the workers in total And if any excesses were found we would then go back to look at the exposures There were three mesotheliomas two of those mesos had worked for many years in the Pittsburg Corning Tyler Texas plant a notoriously noncompliant plant in Texas And I forget what the third one involved So we did not -- or Dr. Delzell I should say because this was her end of the investigation did not feel they were related to this plant Q. see Fair enough Okay Doctor first of all I'm not going to try to belabor this deposition but I'm new to you and I'm 23 certainly new to your state 0045 1 testimony I've read some other 2 depositions of you in doing industrial hygiene so I'm going to try to keep this as short as I can But having said that 52 it's probably going to go well in excess of an hour So at any time you want a break please let me know okay A. I usually like to break about an hour and a quarter So we've been 10 going about quarters of an hour so - 12 Q. Okay 13 A. MU another half hour would be 14 fine with me 15 Q. All right Good deal And you 16 or Tom or I will put a halt to this in 17 probably I guess about another thirty 18 minutes and then take a short break 19 , 20 21 22 23 All right First of all Doctor part of the state analysis has to do -- or historical analysis that you've done have to do with the issues of warnings correct 0046 A. Yes Q. Okay What in your opinion constitutes an adequate warning about a carcinogen in the workplace MR WAMSLEY Object to the form A. Well let me first address the concept of a warning in general in the safety profession Q. BY MR DIMUZIO That's fine Okay A. warning is meant to cause the individual to pause generally because there is an imminent hazard A stop sign is a warning A brief This Can Be Harmful If Inhaled is a warning A warning doesn't go into great detail There are other sources of information 20 available to employees which varied with time during my career that the employee can then go to find out why he or she has been stopped in the course of their doing 23 work So that -- you don't put a lot of 0047 detail on a warning or the purpose of the warning is lost We label hazardous materials with a diamond symbol in four different colors that cover the different types of hazards And each of the four sections of the diamond have numbers for the level of the hazard That's a quick warning You go to a label when you want to give more detailed information if indeed you want to give more detailed information through the label The other recourses to get more information are number one the supervisor that was the primary source in the 1950s and 1960s and then the labeling and the emphasis by OSHA starting in the 1970's on informing workers So that period after OSHA became one of -- a quantum leap in educating workers due to OSHA's 60s standards And then finally in 1980 with the Hazard Communication Standard another quantum leap in the amount of information 0048 1 that had to be given to the employee by 2 law So that has undergone a transition 3 during my lifetime 4 Q. Okay You would agree with me 5 though that the concept of providing some 6 sort of a warning to workers about 7 hazardous substances significantly 8 predates your entry in the graduate field 9 correct 10 A. The concept of it does The 11 actual practice of warnings in the 50s 12 and 60s was very spotty The almost 13 total reliance in those years were on the 14 supervisor In fact as an industrial 15 hygienist I was told not to speak to the 16 employee about anything I was doing I 17 was to convey it to the supervisor the 18 supervisor would pass it on to the 19 employee and I would not break the 20 supervisor chain which was 21 considered essential The supervisor 22 instructed the employee on how to do the 23 job and on how to do the job safely 0049 Q. Okay Objection Nonresponsive Regarding this idea of relying on the supervisor there is a tacit assumption there that the supervisor has adequate information about the risk in the workplace to protect the employee correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the form A. That's correct But even the concept of what is adequate information varied as 1 indicated in my last answer which I believe you objected to Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay Well for example in the 1930 Merryweather and Price article 1 believe the phrase that Dr. Merryweather came up with was the worker should be given a quote sane appreciation of the risk First of all you know that that was published in 1930 by Dr. Merryweather correct 23 A. Yes 0050 1 Q. that Okay And do you disagree with A. No. I think again the interpretation of what a sane appreciation 4 is has varied greatly with time That's what I was trying to describe Q. Do you think that the opinions of the workers themselves about what information they should be given to obtain 10 the sane appreciation of the risk has also 11 varied over time 12 A. Oh absolutely 13 Q. Okay And what do you base 14 that on 15 A. Oh from my experience in the 16 field The -- the workers the more 17 information they got the more they 18 wanted And of course that's what 19 culminated in the Hazard Communication 20 Act Safety was not a major priority with 21 the unions in the 50s and 60s It was 22 only towards the end of the 60s that it 23 started to be a priority After the 0051 1 unions achieved their goals of health care 2 and wages those were the two priorities And then having achieved that through that very prosperous 1960's period they started 4 focusing on safety The first health and safety bill of OSHA was introduced in 1951 by Hubert Humphrey It took nineteen years to get it passed The unions never gave 10 it enthusiastic support until the end of 11 the 60s 12 Q. And by that time the unions 13 had been provided a lot of information 14 about the hazards of asbestos 15 predominantly through the efforts of Dr. 16 Selikoff right 17 A. Yes But asbestos was only a 18 small part of this march to improve health 19 and safety on the job Asbestos was just 20 one of many many hazards in the 21 workplace both traumatic and health 22 hazards in the form of agents One of the 23 things that is unusual about this 0052 litigation is that one coming to it would think asbestos was the only thing that was on the minds of employees and practitioners in my field in those years It didn't come up to the top of the hit parade until after the 1964 conference that Irving Selikoff convened in New York City It was just one of many things that 13 were addressed in my graduate studies that could harm people at work Q. right A. And it wasn't the primary one in the 1955 '56 health agencies Q. Okay But this '64 conference 15 it happened about a year before Georgia became directly involved with containing products through 0055 1 form 2 A. That was in 1973 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Fair enough You mentioned respirators here Respirators that's one of the methods by 10 which people can protect workers in the workplace from hazardous materials correct A. Yes 10 Q. Okay Is that the preferred 11 mechanism for protecting workers from 12 hazardous materials 13 A. No. 14 Q. Okay What is sort of the 15 hierarchy of preferred approaches to 16 protecting workers 17 A. The hierarchy of control is a 18 concept that I have through colleagues 19 developed at Johns Hopkins University and 20 published on We essentially categorized 21 controls that have been known for many 22 years We placed at the top of the 23 hierarchy the most desirable engineering 0056 controls controls that did not require the employee to do anything And illustrations of that would be a ventilation system an enclosure a change of ingredient where you know the potentially hazardous ingredient Those are changes or controls of the workers protected in the workplace alter their behavior The second level of controls on the hierarchy is called work practices ways of doing the job that would minimize the risk Illustrations of that would be for the attorney to try to get the same job by wetting a dust by -- let me think a minute of another illustration By doing all of the work that may have been done in an open location doing it out under a hood or doing it outdoors That could be a work practice that was altered But the -- and different industries have different work practices 23 that work It does require some 0057 1 involvement of the employee to change what 2 they're doing but not maximal 3 The third level on the 4 hierarchy going downwards is 5 administrative controls And what that says is that the particular agent that could potentially cause damage -- for instance noise is an area where administrative controls are extensively used We for instance don't know how to muffle the sound intensity from compressors There's very large compressors in the oil industry If you insulate them to the point where the sound around them is acceptable in the decibel range you burn them up So you limit the time that the employee can be in the vicinity of that sound level If it's a chemical and you would exceed the permissible exposure limit over an eight day but you wouldn't if the employee did the work for 23 four hours you would try to find other 0058 work for that employee for four hours so that they do not exceed the acceptable permissible exposure limit Those are administrative controls Where you can't 6 find other work for the employee it's also common practice to build a special enclosure where they can rest or take time away from the job They don't have other 10 tasks You just don't have anything else to assign them to They're paid for eight hours but they get time out in an 11 enclosure that's been built for them The fourth level and the least 15 desirable and the lowest level is called personal protective equipment In the health and safety profession it is 17 considered the least desirable is because it requires the employee on a continuing basis perhaps every day to do something 19 that may be inconvenient or uncomfortable and they can forget to do it It's not 1522 unlike the use of a seat belt for the 23 general public And I'm told even today 0059 1 the compliance with that is somewhat 2 around eighty percent after so many years of education and training So what are personal protective 5 controls Everything from a hard hat to earplugs to respirators to safety gloves to tipped footwear to resistant aprons There's a whole variety of 9 personal protective equipment much of 10 which may interfere with the task the 11 worker has to perform slow down the 12 worker or be a downright inconvenience to 13 him or her That is the hierarchy of 14 controls 15 Q. Okay Where in the hierarchy 16 of controls would be substitution for a 17 non or less hazardous material 18 A. That would be at the first 19 level of an engineering control 20 Q. Okay So that would be more 21 desirable all other things being equal 22 than say using a respirator 23 A. Yes 0060 1 Q. Okay Fair enough Getting away from this quick warning that we discussed a few moments ago involving symbols and stop signs and that sort of thing you mentioned something about labels What in your opinion makes for an effective warning label A. Well it goes beyond the simple warning and givesa little more detail And in the case of OSHA they have provided for each of their sixty standards what in their opinion would be an adequate label It's part of the standard It specifies the type size it specifies the kind of type and it specifies what should be in it Q. And this is a regulatory minimum correct A. That's correct Well -- Q. Okay There's nothing that prevents a manufacturer from including 22 additional information is there 23 A. There isn't But you used the 0061 term minimum and my immediate reaction was yes But it's a minimum for compliance but it is really what the agency thinks is the best warning In 2 other words in the -- to fulfill the purpose of a warning that's what the agency thinks is needed Now you could put more on it In that sense is a minimum But the agency doesn't believe more is good because it's not going to be taken seriously If there's too much on it the employee or the recipient of this don't even look at this Or if -- Q. Have manufacturers actually -- MR WAMSLEY Wait a second Q. -- manufacturers of containing products actually 18 lobbied OSHA and other health agencies to 19 have a more relaxed warning than had 20 initially been proposed 21 A. Well again you've used the 22 term relaxed For each standard 23 including the asbestos standard a 0062 1 procedure known as the Administrative 2 Procedures Act is followed The agency 3 issues a proposal and comments come in 4 from all those affected And the -- these 5 are kept in an administrative record And 6 the agency will also hold a hearing I 7 think there's only one standard they 8 didn't hold a hearing and that becomes 9 part of the administrative record The 10 agency then promulgates what is required 11 based on that record 12 When you use the word lobby 13 the people who come into these hearings or 14 who provide comments are not lobbying 15 they are engaging in the Administrative 16 Procedures Act which is their right as 17 citizens who are going to sustain some 18 incursions on their fundamental rights 19 when the standard is promulgated That's 20 not what lobbying means to me 21 Q. Okay Did the Gypsum 22 Association engage in this public comment 23 practice that you just described with 0063 regards to joint compound wamings A. I don't recall if I -- that in the minutes I went through minutes but I wasn't focusing on whether they submitted or not I would have to examine that All of the trade associations I have ever had involvement with do provide commentary to regulatory proposals Q. Okay Do you know whether or not Georgia engaged in that public comment period with regards to warnings about asbestos in joint compounds A. There I'm pretty clear I saw nothing on that With respect to the association I may have seen something I went through a lot of minutes I'd have to check that Q. Okay Now with regards to the ultimate ban on the use of asbestos in joint compounds by the Consumer Product Commission do you know whether or not the Gypsum Association participated in that 0064 1 public comment process A. There -- I believe there was some correspondence But again I'd have to check that Q. Okay As we sit here today you would not be able to discuss the details of that A. No. Q. Okay What about Georgia did they participate in the public comment practice that you discussed a few moments ago with regards to the ban on asbestos in joint compounds by the Consumer Product Commission 15 A. don't think so I think anything they did was through the association 20 Q. Okay So based on just your review of the documents that were provided to you you received no information on that particular subject that you can 22 recall 23 A. That can recall I -- 1 0065 1 don't recall those documents 2 Q. Okay Fair enough 3 Okay Doctor What is your 4 opinion about how much information about a 85 potential hazard has to exist before a company has to start providing warnings or labels regarding potential dangers of their products MR WAMSLEY Object to the form A. I think you have phrased the question in a way that is difficult to answer If the company has really no capability to evaluate developing new medical scientific information it will take longer than a company that has its own medical staff hygiene staff perhaps laboratory staff and toxicology The companies that do not have this capability this is not their business and they generally rely on the government for guidance as to what to do The companies in my experience that may move 0066 forward more rapidly than the government are companies that have tremendous internal capacity to evaluate developing knowledge in the scientific and medical areas So the time varies That's the answer to the question There is no one point in time where there's sufficient information The amount required differs and the vast majority of companies in the 50s and 60s and even in the 70s before that internal capability developed looked to the government As an example when I went to OSHA in 1975 I couldn't retain a hygienist for OSHA I had to develop a training program There were only 1,500 in the country Today there are 13,000 So that capability to move more rapidly is in many more companies today because there have been similar increases in occupational physicians nurses and toxicology capability But in the 50s and the 60s toxicology was just 0067 developing as a science very few companies had their own capability and they definitely looked to the government for guidance Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Would you agree that some companies formed trade organizations and looked to them for additional guidance and research and potential hazards in their products A. Oh absolutely And I think we're dealing with one such organization here the Gypsum Organization But it really didn't have a strong capability It did have some capabilities And as you know it was through the Gypsum Association the first testing of exposures in joint compound occurred But by today's standards those associations have much greater capability to serve their members in the medical and the scientific areas Q. But I think you'd probably 23 agree with me that at least in 1965 0068 1 probably both Georgia and the 2 Gypsum Association would have had the capability of doing some at least preliminary tests to see what the levels 4 of the exposure to asbestos were from using joint compounds in the field right A. No I don't agree with you Q. Okay Why is that 2 A. As I indicate in my report it 10 took a while to digest the information of 11 the 1964 conference Organizations don't 12 act on initial information immediately 13 In this case the information primarily 14 came from Dr. Selikoff who wasn't an 15 epidemiologist but a pulmonologist The 16 government looked to verify it 17 Verification is an essential part of 18 science The Division of Occupational 19 Health the predecessor of NIOSH under 20 the Occupational and Safety Health Act 21 made no issuance The government didn't 22 say anything until 1971. You're 23 suggesting the companies with much less 0069 1 capacity digest this new information 2 coming out in 1965 in printed form should 3 have acted I don't think it works that 4 way 5 The first -- the American 6 Conference of Government Industrial 7 Hygienists that sets the permissible 8 exposure levels did not change the 9 asbestos level until 1971. So there's a 10 period of six to seven years of 11 accommodation to these reported findings 12 Q. First of all would you agree 13 with me that one of the main reasons why 14 OSHA came into existence is that companies 15 were not controlling hazardous exposures 16 or providing the warnings that some public 17 health officials thought were necessary 18 A. No. The primary reason OSHA 19 came into existence was traumatic injury 20 We were killing at that point in time 21 that OSHA came into existence between 22 eight and nine thousand people a year on 23 the job and injuring two million beyond 0070 first aid requirements Health wasn't even on the agenda When I went to OSHA in 1975 my directive was to move it into health And 2 it focused entirely on safety with the exception of asbestos and vinyl chloride So no the primary reason for OSHA's coming into being was traditional safety not health concerns 11 Q. Okay You just acknowledged in your answer that one of the exceptions to 12 that was asbestos correct 13 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 14 form 15 A. Yes asbestos and vinyl 16 chloride were the only two standards 17 passed in the health area from 1971 until 18 came in in 1975. I hired large numbers 19 of hygienists brought a -- two positions 20 for physicians into the agency started 21 the training institute in Chicago to 22 upgrade inspectors in the health area 23 One of the three directives to me from the 0071 0071 Secretary of Labor was move the agency into health where it had done very little Because the demand out there was to cut this traumatic injury rate Q. BY MR DIMUZIO With the exception of vinyl chloride and asbestos A. Well your question was what was the primary motivation that brought OSHA into being and that was not health Now the agency did these two things in health but it was still a minor consideration compared to the concerns at OSHA when I came in The biggest concern were these two materials There were at the time 70,000 chemicals in commercial usage And OSHA was really looking into two of them Q. Okay If you're an expert in the field in 1965 say the researchers of Mount Sinai for example certainly the capability of doing tests on potential 22 exposures to joint compound in the field 23 existed in 1965 for experts correct 0072 1 MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. Yes the capability existed But we knew those exposures were lower I 6 point out in my report the entire community dealing with these matters was in a funk literally Because we had told 300 to 350,000 asbestos workers people working with the raw fiber that they were safe at the equivalent of today's 30 fibers per cc The suggestions coming out of the meeting were this was inadequate The government was trying to verify that We knew we had to go back and get those 300 to 350,000 people at high exposure down We knew exposures to products other than insulation were lower than the asbestos workers exposures So they were as I say that they weren't even on the screen until OSHA had been in existence for several years We weren't thinking about the lower exposures We were -- 0073 0073 1 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO So that take it from your testimony thus far that you do not personally hold companies to the level 5 of knowledge of an expert in their dealings with the public is that correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. I don't understand and their dealings with the public You have to 10 speak to what areas of knowledge they deal with the public They're experts on their products They're experts on their 12 production methods They may not be experts on any potential hazards of their products many of which depending on the point in time are not yet known Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay 16 A. So. 18 Q. So thank you for that 19 2020 response So basically based on your 21 2222 answer there you don't believe that companies have to be experts on the 23 potential hazards of their products 0074 1 correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. don't think I said that 8 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay A. I believe today experts have to be expert on any potential environmental effects any potential occupational effects Absolutely I do not think they had the capability I said the people 11 weren't out there They weren't geared up for it And they had that approach in the 13 50s and 60s That approach started 14 coming in with regulation of these areas 15 and that regulation started really in 16 1969 with the Mining Act in 1970 with 17 the OSHA Act I have published on the 18 curve of regulation through the 70s and 19 the 80s and the increased obligations of 20 the companies The Toxic Substances 21 Control Act didn't come in until 1977 22 Every one of these laid new obligations on 23 organizations and they geared up to deal 0075 1 with them And people were trained and 2. educated so they could fill those 3 positions 4 That -- this is all part of a 5 learning curve that I tried to describe And , obviously haven't described all aspects of it because I haven't talked to the increase of professional personnel to meet the needs which I'm describing here and the staffing of companies throughout the period that enables them to do a job in this area Q. When in your opinion did Georgia have a responsibility to have the knowledge of an expert regarding the hazards of their products MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. I think Georgia had some knowledge through the 1972 standard That's when it went out from OSHA The 1971 emergency temporary standard which 23 the Court remanded had no real 0076 information attached to it It wasn't what we call a Christmas tree standard that didn't have anything -- it didn't have monitoring it didn't have warning it didn't have surveillance so on The 1972 standard did And I think that's when companies were beginning to understand what OSHA was all about So as of 1972 the information starts coming out Trade associations are watching They get it Individual members are beginning to get it And that's the period '72 '73 that I would say Georgia comes into awareness of what it's all about Now I also point out 1970 without all that understanding which is to me the most interesting decision by Mr. Wilson He just sees the turmoil He sees the discussions of asbestos I don't think he knew what it was all about But 22 as a businessman he says our best 23 range strategy is to get it out of 0077 our products and please start doing that immediately I considered that a remarkable decision in the most senior manager in this division But '72 '73 is 7 the answetro my question Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay The comment that you just made about making some decision to move forward with removing asbestos that was in about 1970 10 is that correct 11 A. That's correct 12 Q. Okay And was what 13 approximately three years before they 14 began putting any warnings on their 15 products correct 16 A. Quite the contrary Some 17 warnings went on in '73 others went on in 18 '74 19 Q. Okay So it was three to four 20 years before any sort of warnings were 21 communicated from Georgia to the 22 end users of their product correct 23 A. Well your timing is from Mr. 0078 Mr. Wilson who as I said I don't think had any appreciation of the science and the medical He just saw the turmoil out there and the discussions may have been aware of the efforts to get the Occupational Safety and Health Act through in 1970 which I might say was a major battle It failed to get through in 1968 And I'm referring to get through the Congress So he -- he just didn't like the looks of it I date the response from the 1972 standard which was my answer to your question In that sense the first labels went on in '73 and additional labels went on in '74 in an upgraded form from the -- recommended by the regulatory agency OSHA 20 Q. You mentioned before the Selikoff 1964 conference Do you recall that testimony Doctor A. Yeah And I'd be happy to -- 23 we're about an hour and twenty minutes 0079 1 Can we take that break now Q. You bet How long do you want Doctor A. I want five minutes just to stretch my legs and -- 10 Q. Okay That sounds good A. Okay Be back in five minutes And at worst five to ten Q. Okay You bet Thanks Whereupon a short break was 11 taken 12 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Doctor when 13 we broke we were just beginning to 14 mention the Dr. Selikoff 1964 conference 15 again You recall your earlier testimony 16 about that correct 17 A. Yes 18 Q. Okay When would the 19 proceedings of that have been available in 20 medical and public health libraries around 21 the country 22 A. Well the proceedings came out 23 in '65 I don't recall the month 0080 Q. Okay A. The conference was in October '64 and the proceedings came out in '65 I'd have to check the month 3 Q. Okay That's fair enough Fair enough Now would you agree with me that if somebody is making a product that is used both by professional contractors and consumers that any sort of warnings that are deemed to be needed should be communicated to the end users of that product MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. Again you have to place the question in the context of the time period No question that is true today Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay I take it based on your earlier testimony that you do not believe that companies 22 should test their products prior to 23 putting them in the stream of commerce is 0081 1 that correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. Oh quite the contrary Again in today's context and probably since the Toxic Substances Control Act increasingly until today would be foolhardy But from 10 1977 '78 onward companies engaged in increasing testing of their products because of the potential liability They -- they have to provide information in that act and in the Hazard 13 Communication Act So if they don't have 14 the capability they will contract for 15 such work In the 50s and 60s there 16 were very few places you could go to to 17 get such much work done Today there are 18 many many testing facilities that I 19 utilize to get the information that the 20 Material Safety Data Sheet requires or 21 that the various environmental acts require to be filed 23 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay 0082 A. That -- that has been a tremendous transition in this country Q. Okay So as we sit here today though going back in time and looking at Georgia when they first got into the joint compound business in 1965 you would not hold them to the duty to test that product before putting it in the stream of commerce in 1965 No. Okay A. Absolutely not And -- I'm sorry go ahead Absolutely not Q. Okay And likewise you would not hold Georgia in 1965 to having the level of knowledge of an expert regarding the hazards of their products in the year 1965 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 21 form of the question 22 A. Well I don't think there were 23 any known hazards of their products in 0083 1965. That's the point I tried to make to you The standard for the permissible exposure limit that was considered safe remained in effect through 1971. The government didn't change it The major private advisory group that passed permissible levels didn't change it And you're suggesting Georgia should change things and declare this is a hazard to consumers before any evocation from those sources based on this new knowledge that had to be verified and digested by the very expert communities in public health was done And I do not hold the company accountable to do that in those years Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay Objection nonresponsive I'm not sure if you actually answered my specific question though regardless of what your feelings were about the state of knowledge with -regarding joint compounds in asbestos was 0084 in 1965. Just specifically as to whether or not you would hold Georgia to the knowledge of an expert regarding any potential health hazards of their products in 1965 you would not 6 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 7 form of the question A. can't hold them to the knowledge of an expert because the expert 10 didn't have that knowledge with regard to 11 their product The first publication on 12 their product is 1975. So how can I 13 answer your question and say no I don't 14 hold them Of course I don't hold them 15 I don't hold the experts in 1965 16 accountable for joint compound 17 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Objection to 18 the nonresponsive portion 19 Joint compound aside there was 20 knowledge available in 1965 that exposure 21 to asbestos fibers could result in fatal 22 illnesses correct 23 A. To some people so exposed 0085 1 that's correct Q. Right 3 A. And we don't -- Q. And the body certainly has no 55 idea whether a given asbestos fiber 6 comes -- A. Wait Wait Q. -- from joint compound or -- A. Can 10 Q. -- a gasket or a brake 11 correct There's no biological difference 12 to the asbestos fiber based on the product 13 that it came out of correct 14 A. I didn't finish my answer sir 15 Q. Okay Go right ahead 16 A. What was known in 1965 in 17 addition to the impact on asbestos workers 18 was that insulators were also receiving 19 excessive amounts of asbestos through 20 inhalation contrary to what 21 Fleischer concluded in 1946 22 There's nothing about anything else except 23 the suggestion by Molly Newhouse of 0086 England that home could be a problem 2 In a study she did she could not explain nine family member cases of cancer and by default attributed it to asbestos taken from a contaminated plant in 5 London That's what was known from that conference And the fact that some of the abscesses of the insulators were malignant And it was known they were 10 very highly exposed So that's what we 11 came away with It wasn't for asbestos as 12 in every form It was for insulators and 13 asbestos workers That's what we came 14 away with 15 And it's known in public health 16 that the impact of a material is 17 dependent how much the lung 18 receives And these people received a 19 great deal That had nothing to do with 20 joint compound There were -- 21 Q. And 22 A. no products -- 23 Q. And in 1965 or 1966 or 1967 0087 that two- or three time frame did Georgia conduct any tests to find out what dose of asbestos people might be receiving from their products in the field 4 A. No. Q. I'm sorry A. said no Q. Okay Now a couple other 10 things this Newhouse study that you mentioned regarding secondary exposures that was published I believe in 1965 the same year Georgia got into the joint compound business correct A. The preliminary findings were published The study was published in '68 Q. Okay Now before you were discussing exposure levels and limits -- | forget the exact context so I'll let you clarify if I'm misrepresenting what you said But at some point you said that a 23 given level was considered quote 0088 1 considered safe I wrote that down Do you recall that testimony earlier A. Yes Q. Okay What do you mean by safe in that context A. The TLV committee defines the threshold limit value as that concentration which a worker may inhale eight hours a day five days a week fifty weeks a year for forty years continuous exposure And that quote nearly all workers will be protected The nearly all refers to a very small number based on the public health OG or curve describing population response to damaging agent The bottom of the S is the sensitive people at very low levels 18 and the top of the S is the resistant 19 population The vertical is the percent 20 responding and my horizontal axis is the 21 intensity of the agent or the dosage 22 So as the horizontal increases 23 to the right more and more people are 0089 affected going up the curve Nearly all in the threshold limit values refers to that small number at the lower left the bottom of the S. I've always taken it to mean 99 percent in that there are sensitive persons to everything There are persons sensitive to hearing persons sensitive to smell and there are persons sensitive to chemical agents The most familiar to the general population is allergy But it's true for toxic agents as well Some people respond to very little and some people are highly resistant In the lead area we find people with ten times the body burden of lead with no symptoms and people with tenth of that with gross symptoms So that's how safe is defined or was defined 20 until OSHA OSHA then defines safe as the 21 permissible exposure limit It said there a 22 is -- they did little more -- there's no 23 zero risk but the risk is very small is 0090 1 what they thought was associated with the PEL 3 Q. And even with today's modern 5 lower limits to asbestos in the PELS by OSHA OSHA still feels that there will be a certain number of asbestos diseases in a population exposed to that 8 level or below correct 9 A. Well that is not as simple as 10 you stated either OSHA utilizes a model 11 called the linear threshold model to 12 calculate risk That model assumes there 13 will be an effect at every level We 14 don't have data on effects at the lowest 15 levels We haven't had those low levels 16 for that long and the incubation period or 17 latency period of diseases associated with 18 asbestos in the malignant category are 19 twenty to forty years 20 So OSHA a draws straight line 21 from the dose response data we have all 22 the way down to zero assuming there's an 23 effect at every level it is called 0091 0091 hypothetical risk We don't know if it will or it will not happen But for prudent public health we assume people 3 will be affected in the future at a calculated level based on this model Q. And I think you would agree with me that in the historical scientific and medical literature articles have appeared that suggested that 10 mesothelioma was a disease capable of being induced by low exposures to asbestos correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the 14 form of the question 16 A. I phrase it at lower exposures 16 than either lung cancer or the -- or 17 asbestosis 1718 19 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay A. But that that level is not at 20 this point in time clear 21 Q. Okay I noticed that most of 22 your analysis of Georgia and their 23 knowledge begins in 1965 correct 0092 A. That was -- those were documents I had that's correct Q. Oh okay Are you familiar -- 7 have you reviewed any documents or been given any information about the corporate history of the Bestwall division that Georgia acquired in 1965 A. No. Q. Okay Let me just ask you a 10 few things here Were you provided any information that suggested to you that the Bestwall division was actually a part of 13 the CertainTeed Company until approximately 1956 A. I think I saw that somewhere 15 Q. Okay Were you aware that 17 CertainTeed became a member of the 17 818 National Safety Council in approximately 19497 A. No. MS DEMOREST Objection to 22 the -- object to the form of the question 23 A. -- don't have the 0093 1 CertainTeed history 2 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay Did 3 the National Safety Council over the years 4 publish information regarding potential 5 hazards from asbestos exposure 6 A. My memory of the Safety Council 7 is they got into this very late very late 8 on asbestos 9 Q. Okay And how are you defining 10 very late 11 A. Oh I don't think I saw 12 anything from the Safety Council until the 13 mid 70s perhaps late early 70s 14 Remember the safety council covers 15 everything from home concerns consumer 16 concerns occupational concerns They're 17 a very based and in my view 18 general organization It's very rarely 19 they get into too much gritty in 20 their communications 21 Q. Okay Are you -- have you 22 received any information suggesting that 23 the Bestwall division of CertainTeed 0094 1 became an independent company from 2 approximately 1956 to 1965 3 A. No I didn't have those dates 4 or that information 5 Q. Okay Were you aware of that 6 at all regardless of the date range that I 7 just gave you 8 A. No. 9 Q. Okay You would agree with me 10 that employees of the Bestwall division 11 either while working with CertainTeed or 12 as an independent company had information 13 regarding the dangers of asbestos that 14 that information could be assumed to 15 travel with them when they became 16 employees of the Georgia Company 17 in 1965 correct 18 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 19 form of the question 20 A. I don't know 21 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay 22 A. don't know if they did 23 have -- I simply don't know anything about 0095 1 the 1965 Bestwall division Q. Okay Well let's just do this hypothetically then Let's say that the there were employees in the 6 Bestwall division prior to 1965 that had information regarding the hazards of asbestos And in 1965 Georgia buys that division It becomes part of 9 Georgia and they become employees 10 now of Georgia still working on 11 the Bestwall line of products Would you 12 then attribute the knowledge of those 13 acquired employees to 14 Georgia 15 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 16 form of the question 17 A. As you asked the question they 18 got that knowledge at CertainTeed 19 Bestwall 20 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO huh 21 A. That's where they learned it 22 And Georgia did not contribute to 23 that if it came with them from 0096 CertainTeed Q. So you would not even if they had employees in tow from those prior divisions you would not attribute that knowledge to Georgia A. Not if they got knowledge at the CertainTeed Corporation no I would not Q. Why does it matter where they got the knowledge from A. Because if the employer's -the employer that usually imparts this knowledge and I'm attributing that activity as your question is phrased to the previous employer So if Georgia didn't impart anything at that point in time then they got the 17 knowledge from the previous employer Q. Well they certainly impart the knowledge of how to make and distribute the product to those former employees and it's -- I mean former employees of 23 CertainTeed and Bestwall It's assumed 0097 they bring that knowledge with them to the job right A. I'm answering on the basis of the knowledge of asbestos which to me translates into potential effects on them I was not -- I'm sure there was educating employees to possible different methods of production to methods of packaging the new owner may change those things But your question as asked 1 interpreted did CertainTeed provide -- if CertainTeed provided knowledge of these effects to the employees that then came to Georgia would I say that Georgia was responsible for that knowledge No they were not Q. Okay 18 A. Your question it seems to me 19 only has one obvious answer 20 Q. Okay Well what if the person 21 who had the information imparted them by 22 either Bestwall or CertainTeed was the 23 safety director and he then becomes the 0098 0098 safety director at Georgia in 1965. Don't you think he has the responsibility to pass that information along to others in the corporate chain and see that the appropriate corporate reactions are given to that risk information MR WAMSLEY Object to the question Object to the form of the question A. If there was reason to believe there was a hazard that the exposures exceeded the existing threshold limit value and this safety director had such knowledge from his previous employment and the methods of production were the same when the company was acquired by Georgia | would think he would then pass on that information The hazard was thought to exist when the TLV was exceeded There's no hazard beneath that in OSHA's standards the requirements click in when you're above the PEL They 0099 do not click in below the PEL Because by definition the PEL is a safe level So previous to the PEL it was a threshold limit value If the plants producing this product were in excess of five million particles per cubic foot and the safety director knew that and the production methods were the same under Georgia and new employees came in 10 I think he would inform new employees of that and try to take steps to lower it 13 below the PEL -- pardon me the threshold limit in those years 14 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Objection to nonresponsive portion 17 Doctor let's -- let's start trying to go over some of your report 2 okay A. Sure Q. And I believe MR DIMUZIO Has that been marked Exhibit Number 3 is that correct 0100 Tom MR WAMSLEY Yep MR DIMUZIO Okay We're doing this long distance so I want to make sure we're all on the same page here Q. BY MR DIMUZIO First of all Doctor could you turn to page six of your report A. Okay Q. Okay What I'm interested in is the second from the bottom bullet point And I just want to read a sentence or two here There was not a -- there was not concern during the 1950's and 60s for workers utilizing asbestos products or intruding upon asbestos products in place period Did I read that correctly A. Yes Q. Okay Now I know you have some follow there but my specific question is when in the medical and scientific literature do you begin to see 23 articles appearing suggesting that users 0101 1 of the finished products themselves were 2 at some increased risk of developing 3 asbestos illnesses A. I gave that later in my report Q. Okay And you believe that the year on that is 1964 A. No I give that on page seven Q. Okay A. And indicate those concerns I like to think of those concerns like dropping a pebble in a surface of water that's calm and the ripples go out So when you had a twelve fiber cc the ripples are close in You have that number of employees As that circle of ripple goes out they're exposed to twelve Then it goes to five Well you have to look at additional workers that are exposed at five Now when it goes to two you've got to look at others And when it goes to .2 in 1986 you're really encompassing a larger surface of the water 0102 and potentially more workers But the industry had shrunk drastically by 1986 due to these requirements and liability considerations But at any rate we started 6 looking at the workers close in They're 7 the asbestos workers and insulators Then 8 I point out after 1976 the focus changed 9 to include workers exposed at 10 concentrations at or below two fibers per 11 cc I'm at the second bullet on page 12 seven Exposures estimates of workers 13 exposed at lower concentrations began to 14 appear in the literature The first brake 15 exposure assessment 1976. Drywall 16 construction '79 with Fishbein 17 Carpenters electricians workers and 18 painters with Pake in 1979 -- pardon me 19 drywall was '76 -- no '79 I was right 20 But there was a '75 on drywall So '75 we 21 had a drywall report in Science 22 Q. Okay 23 A. So it's in the mid 70s as the 0103 two fiber cc PEL is looming that we begin to look at other things I go on to say millwright and maintenance worker exposure much later Airborne asbestos during gaskets and packing much later Because those exposures for instance gaskets and packings is down at around .1 Well in 1986 the .2 PEL standard came So there's a progressive dealing with lower and lower risk The worst first was the philosophy It was the philosophy of the profession and it was the philosophy of OSHA Q. Objection to nonresponsive portion Doctor you're familiar with the 1960 Wagner study out of South Africa are you not A. Yes Q. Okay A lot of people point to that as a pivotal study in making the determination that at least some forms of 23 asbestos cause mesothelioma correct 0104 A. Yes MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. Yes I think it was an important study in the sense you described 10 it Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay A. A form of asbestos caused mesothelioma That was important Q. Okay And you would agree with 11 me that some of those cases of 12 mesothelioma were actually household 13 exposures in 1960 correct 14 A. Yes but again - 15 Q. Okay And but some of those -- 16 MR WAMSLEY Wait wait 17 Q. A exposures reported in that 18 1960 article were actually environmental 19 exposures correct 20 MR WAMSLEY Greg he wasn't 21 done with his answer yet We need to -- 22 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Oh I'm 23 sorry Okay Go right ahead Doctor 0105 1 MR WAMSLEY I know it's 2 difficult but we need to try to give him 3 a little bit of pause -- 4 MR DIMUZIO Okay 5 MR WAMSLEY -- if we can 6 A. You asked two questions there 7 and I was starting to answer the first 8 one 9 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay 10 A. The important thing about the 11 Wagner study is that it applied to a form 12 of asbestos known as called crocidolite 13 We use one percent or less crocidolite in 14 he United States on a weight basis in 15 1960. That study was not deemed by the 16 profession I was in occupational health 17 as relevant to our workers 18 Now time has in a sense 19 borne out our downplaying that concern 20 The latest risk assessments in the 2000 21 and forward years assigned potency factors 22 to the different types of asbestos We 23 didn't have this knowledge back then But 0106 crocidolite is believed to be as much as 500 times more potent in its carcinogenic potential in chrysotile the form of asbestos that we used for 97 percent of the weight of asbestos used in the 1960s in the United States But at any rate the Wagner study which I think is a good study was received in the United States as having little relevance to our experience with chrysotile Q. Objection to nonresponsive portion Doctor a moment ago you mentioned something to the effect that we didn't have this knowledge about these assertions that some forms of asbestos 18 have greater potency than others Do you 19 recall your testimony about that a moment 20 ago 21 A. Yes 22 Q. Okay When do you think that 23 knowledge arose 0107 A. Well I was convinced of it and published an article with others in 1990 But it was still controversial but we 5 took a position that the amphiboles which specifically we were pointing to amosite and crocidolite on the basis of knowledge gained up to 1990 were far more potent than chrysotile for causing malignancy lung cancer and mesothelioma And we 1010 published that article in Science It's in the curriculum vitae in my 12 bibliography 14 Q. And you would agree with me that even through the 1965 publication of the Selikoff conference that there was 15 very little differentiation made in the 17 scientific literature between the various 18 forms of asbestos correct 19 A. Yes I think that is true 16 And for purposes of control we have never 21 differentiated between the types in this 222 country The main factor that led to the downplaying of the Wagner article was the 0108 1 amount of usage It wasn't the 2 differential of the potency in those years Q. But how could the differential 5 usage be a factor when we're talking about home exposures and environmental exposures for people who live some distance from these activities A. Because once again the factory that Molly Newhouse studied we believe had exposures equivalent to about 300 fibers per cc today The men came home white The clothes were laundered everyday by their wives in a close laundry room attached to a noncentrally house They shook the clothes out We believe but can't pinpoint it they received very substantial exposures to amphiboles So it was a different situation It alerted people to the possibility of home But those familiar with that study and how the study was done knew these were very high 0109 0109 exposures even though we couldn't put a number on them 4 Q. Is your position that all of the some cases that were described in the 1960 Wagner paper were -had evidence of high exposures in the 7 paper itself A. Well Molly Newhouse didn't have measurements but she knew they were very high This factory was not only an internal high dust concentration they were emitting high concentrations through their exhaust They weren't only sending it home with employees The factory was known in London I mentioned I was in London on a Guggenheim fellowship at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical 20 Health where Molly Newhouse was as a faculty member I knew her I knew this study was going on I discussed some of it with her That was a very exposure facility 23 Q. Which I think we may be 0110 1 talking -- I was actually trying to pose my questions in regards to the 1960 Wagner study So let me just revisit those same questions with regard to that Is it your opinion that on the four corners of the 1960 Wagner study that there's evidence that all of those some cases had evidence of high exposures MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. I don't think the Wagner study had evidence of exposure They -- we were dealing with crocidolite That's the main feature of the study in my mind I don't believe he had exposure estimates Q. BY MR DIMUZIO And the evidence for exposure to asbestos in these individuals was largely done along the lines of a history of exposure correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. I'd have to reread the study Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay A. I don't -- I come away from it that they had very poor insight into exposure Q. Okay However in that article though some of the cases were 6 described the only known exposures were 7 that of secondary household type exposure 8 correct 9 A. An environmental exposure yes 10 Q. Exactly Thank you much 11 If you could turn to page ten 12 of your report Doctor 13 A. Okay 14 Q. the very top there you're 15 talking about respiratory protection Do 16 you see that particular bullet point 17 there I'll let I read that real quickly 18 A. Yes 19 Q. It's not your position that 20 there were not respirator programs in some 21 industries or facilities prior to the 22 implementation of OSHA is it 23 A. the sense of a respirator 0112 program today there was not That is my position Q. Okay But in some form there were indeed respirator programs prior to 7 the implementation of OSHA correct A. No. There was nothing one could call a program And let me just define myself so it's clear A respirator program consists of giving an individual 10 his or her respirator There are requirements for turning it in There are requirements for individuals who can get the respirator through a pulmonary function test that requires a certain level of a forced expiratory volume in one second There are requirements for turning in the respirator for washing and cleaning And there are requirements mandated requirements under the law and in companies for when the respirator must be worn There was nothing nothing like that in the 1960s Respirators were just there and available I know of no 0113 mandatory respirator requirements in general industry by companies anything like what one would call a program in the years 1950s and 1960s Q. What about in the mining industry Wouldn't you agree that they 10 had a stronger history of having organized respirator programs prior -A. Which -- Q. to OSHA A. Which -- I didn't hear the 12 industry I'm -- 13 Q. Mining Mining 14 A. No mining did not We had an 15 epidemic of coworkers pneumoconiosis for 16 that reason There was no respiratory 17 program either in Great Britain or the 18 United States Nothing That's why we 19 have the Coal Mine Health and safety 20 Health Act 21 Q. Going to the second bullet 22 point there on page ten you're talking 23 about concentration of airborne dust 0114 1 decreasing with distance correct A. Yes Q. Okay Would you agree though that if the exposure activity occurred in a fairly small confined space that the concentration level would sort of equalize within that small enclosed space and remain high for an extended period of time MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. The answer to that question depends on the ventilation If there is no -- literally no air movement yes the concentration would build up If there is air movement there's competition between the rate of generation of the airborne dust and the dilution and cleansing effect of the air movement You'd have to know both of these factors to predict if it would build up or decrease Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay If there was very little air turnover in that 0115 confined space how much -- how long would respirable asbestos fibers remain suspended in the air in that sort of environment MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. Again I'd have to know how much air movement and the degree of mixing I believe what you're buzzing around is the length of suspension of airborne fibers in the absence of any air turbulence and the tranquil equilibrium settling rate Now that is often quoted in litigation but that never occurs in reality It's a theoretical settling according to Stokes Law and it has no relevance to the real world So your 18 question can't be answered without some 19 insertion of the parameters I mentioned 20 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Well the 21 real world aspects of that would actually 22 make those fibers stay suspended for a 23 longer period in time correct 0116 1 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 2 form of the question 3 A. Quite the contrary 4 Q. And why is that 5 A. Because there are removal 6 mechanisms for those particles For the 7 inhalable particles the settling rate is 8 a minimal consideration They're lost 9 through impaction on surfaces due to the 10 turbulence of the air moving towards the 11 surface and the air changes direction 12 The particle impaction sticks on the 13 surface 14 There are electric charge 15 mechanisms when particles gets in the 16 vicinity of the surface and are attracted 17 to the surface There are coagulation 18 mechanisms by which particles hit each 19 other grow and form a mechanism that 20 becomes more important So we speak about 21 the decay rate the rate of decay And 22 actually you can calculate this if you 23 have the parameters that you mentioned 0117 If know the dimensions of the room the ventilation rate in the room and have some insight into the mixing due to the placement of the supply and exhaust in ventilation I could calculate the removal or accumulation rate knowing the particle size distribution of the dust But a simple answer to your question is not possible Q. Okay Some of these mechanisms that you mentioned about becoming impacted on the surfaces through one mechanism or another possibly electrostatic charges that would apply to people's clothing correct A. Yes Clothing could be a sink for that absolutely Q. Okay When to your knowledge based on all the documents that you've reviewed both specifically for Georgia and possibly over the course of your career as a consultant when do you believe the Gypsum Association 0118 1 first had information available that there 2 may be hazards associated with the inhalation of asbestos A. Again I cite that in my 2 summary based on the Gypsum Association Health and Safety Committee meeting I give you -- and I think I can find it in here -- when it first came up Q. It may be page ten Doctor I could be referencing you to the wrong section but -A. Yeah let me go back and try to find that Yes the 1967 was the first I found in reading the minutes of the safety committee And I quoted at that point in time what was in the minutes It was that -- one member noting the recent problem Q. Okay And that involved a cancer case correct A. Yes 22 Q. And it was actually from an 23 environmental exposure as opposed to an 0119 1 occupational or product exposure correct A. My own conclusion which | can't document I think they were referring to the Molly Newhouse study Q. The Molly Newhouse study that 12 was published in 1965 A. Yes Q. Okay A. That's what I think it - that was very startling to everyone And 13 again it's a first report In science 14 it requires verification But it really 15 took -- although I was in contact with a 16 very important -- possibly important and 17 unusual -- and we were startled 18 Q. It was not in any way 19 inconsistent with the findings of the 1960 20 Wagner study though correct 21 A. No because it was also 22 amphibole It wasn't It was just at 23 lower -- well no it wasn't inconsistent 0120 It really wasn't now that I think of it 3 Q. Okay And again I think we've established before that this whole 4 idea of serpentine versus amphibole was not really a topic of concern in the 1960 12 specific question is when did you first 13 in terms of dates find information that 14 the Gypsum Association had passed on any 15 information at all to Georgia 16 regarding potential hazards from 17 inhalation of asbestos 18 A. Well I don't have the Gypsum 19 Association passing on information I 20 have information being discussed at Gypsum 21 Association meetings minutes of meetings 22 Q. Okay And what are the first 23 meetings where in the minutes there were 0123 1 discussions of potential hazards of asbestos A. On page twelve That's the last paragraph The standard appeared in '72 In the February of '73 meeting of the technical committee of the Gypsum Association quote -- and I'm quoting my report The committee proposed the pooling of information on the health and safety of asbestos in joint compounds as a result of sanding and dry mixing They also requested staff to develop a list of testing agencies qualified to conduct tests of dust environments containing asbestos determine estimated cost of test programs and report on methods used And it is also required the safety committee recommend what is needed to protect the applicator working in these conditions So that's February 14 15 and 16 1973. And that's what I referred to The association really got geared up after the standard passed 0124 Q. Okay Sir I take it from reading your report you're familiar with the safety supervisor at Georgia I guess he goes by his initials a lot Mr. M. F. Fink A. Well I'm not familiar with him I'm familiar with some documents that carries his name Q. Right Exactly And what about a Mr. Baranofsky are you familiar with him either through the Gypsum Association or through Georgia documents or correspondence that you've looked at A. It's not a I name recall no Q. Okay Do you recall any correspondence between Mr. M. F. Fink and 18 anyone else in approximately 1966 19 regarding potential hazards of asbestos 20 A. I don't think I had anything 21 from '66 -- 22 Q. Okay 23 A. - I don't think 0125 Q. Fair enough I believe I have a reference there and I'm kind of going off some of my work in other cases so I'm not sure I can link it up to your exact spot in your report But I believe you're familiar that at some point in 1970 Mr. Fink had a memo to a Mr. Fabst an executive at Georgia discussing the Mount Sinai research being conducted by Dr. Selikoff do you recall that particular -- A. Yes do And may I interject a comment -- Q. Sure A. --independent of your questioning I would be very interested in any documents you have that I may have missed The -- I was told I reviewed the 10 universe of documents And if you have anything from 1966 that I did not see I would be very interested Q. Okay Fair enough That's 23 fair And that's consistent with good 0126 science right You want to look at everything that's available out there and make a determination of how useful it is in forming your opinion correct A. Yes I would Q. Okay That's fair enough Okay In that communication between Mr. Fink and Mr. Fabst he acknowledged that Mount Sinai might start 10 looking at drywall industry for exposures 11 in asbestos is that correct A. Yes 13 Q. Okay In fact I think he 14 actually used the word target If I 15 recall does that ring a bell 16 A. I don't remember that word 17 Q. Okay You don't What do 18 you -- what do you take away from that 2019 particular memo What do you think -- do 20 you think Georgia is processing 21 this information about research on asbestos hazards appropriately given the information in that memo 0127 0127 0127 0127 A. I didn't I thought this was 2 an unfortunate wording by one individual in a company of thousands of individuals And I might say I have come across some 5 other memos in other cases and in my experience where a particular individual just sounds off and usually later regrets 8 it That's the category I put this in and I phrased it that I think he used unfortunate wording I saw no evidence of the extension of the views expressed in this letter by anyone else And again in the 50s 60s and 70s we put everything on paper Later on when the computer came in it's in mail and it's usually erased But people talked to each other informally in letters and memoranda in those early years And there are many such unfortunate wordings that I have encountered And Itry to I think explain what I think a safety director understanding the assignment 0128 responsibility in the safety field had in mind when he used this word blame Q. Okay Well first of all you mentioned the fact that -- and rightfully so -- that Georgia probably had hundreds if not possibly thousands of employees correct A. Yes Q. But all employees are not created equal when it comes to responsibility for potential hazards from their products correct A. That's correct Q. Okay And a safety supervisor certainly would be one of the primary people who should have responsibility for how an organization reacts to risk information correct A. Well this wasn't risk information But they are responsible And unfortunately safety directors in those years had very little insight into 23 health hazards 0129 1 Q. Okay 2 A. But he is a safety director 3 And industrial hygiene wasn't even taught 4 in safety in those years Today -- 5 Q. Objection to the nonresponsive portion I believe you have part of this particular quote from a Fink letter M.F. Fink letter but I don't think you had all the language I want to see if this rings a bell to you from a 1970 Fink letter Quote we realize that someone will be the whipping boy that product liability will be stressed It is our opinion that the entire blame be placed on the contractor for not insisting on respirators end quote Did I read that correctly to your recollection Doctor A. Yes you did Q. Okay First of all we talked about respirators a little while ago 22 didn't we in terms of hierarchy of 23 approaches to protect workers from 0130 1 hazardous exposures correct 2 A. That's correct 3 Q. Okay And that's the approach 44 of last resort wouldn't you agree A. Yes Q. right A. But I would modify that It's 8 a very good approach for noncontinuous 9 work It's the approach of last resort 10 for an eight workday I have used 11 respirators with short tasks very 12 effectively It's when you have to wear 13 it for hours that it's a terrible burden 14 which people who don't think it is should 15 try wearing one for hours But for a 16 short task fifteen minutes even up to a 17 half hour they're -- they're effective 18 Q. And from your -- well even 19 when utilizing respirators if the workers 20 are wearing that in a hazardous 21 environment they need a sane appreciation 22 of that risk if for no other reason so 23 that they continue to use the respirator 0131 1 appropriately in the entire time frame 2 it's required right 3 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 4 form of the question 5 A. Well again you used the 6 terminology the sane appreciation of 7 risk I haven't heard it before and it's 8 an interesting terminology In the 9 1960's what the worker would have gotten 10 from the supervisor for a sane 11 appreciation of risk would have been this 12 dust can harm you you should wear a 13 respirator That would have been the 14 extent of it 15 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay And I 16 admit that all my best lines I've stolen 17 That goes for my entire life probably and 18 it goes here That quote is from the 19 Merryweather Price 1930 article 20 A. Yeah Well it's an 21 interesting phrase 22 Q. Indeed 23 0132 A. And my point is the sane 1 appreciation of risk changed with time 2 Q. huh If there is 3 information in the 1960's regarding at 4 least potential harm from asbestos dust 5 even if you're going to be relying on 6 respirators to protect the worker the 7 worker does need information to understand 8 that that dust could hurt him correct 9 A. I think the information in 10 those years would have been minimal as I 11 described I think a lot of our 12 discussion has been my pointing out what I 13 think is thinking in time And a lot of 14 your questions really don't reflect 15 thinking in time And I've had an answer 16 to every one almost with a time frame So 17 I'm just trying to define what will 18 continue to be the way I'll answer the 19 broad questions you're asking 20 Q. Okay Well in this case 21 we're doing this in the context of the 22 1970 Fink article five years after the 23 publication of the Selikoff conference 0133 At that point in time if a worker is going to be using a respirator to protect himself from asbestos don't you think that that worker in order to have a sane appreciation of the risk should know that that asbestos dust could hurt him A. If there is a risk In 1973 we - government -- the public health community believed the five fiber cc standard was protective with a margin of safety not only for fibrosis but cancer There was no risk in the time frame of 1973 if you were below five fibers Now coincidentally that's when the Clayton study was done for this particular industry And Clayton came back saying you meet that standard When it goes down 18 to two there maybe some short task 19 that will exceed it And maybe you should 20 think about that considering it's just a 21 few years down the road So this industry 22 when went out and got some expertise and 23 got some consoling remarks concerning what 0134 1 the standard of safety was in 1973 and the 2 findings by a consulting firm on their 3 premises So there -- 4 Q. And this -- 5 A. - there was no risk 6 Q. Oh I'm sorry Go ahead 7 A. There was no definable risk in 8 terms of a permissible level at that point 9 in time 10 Q. Okay And when did this report 11 that you just mentioned the Clayton 12 report came out It was in 1973 13 A. That's correct 14 Q. Okay And that's approximately 15 when it was communicated to 16 Georgia is that correct 17 A. Yes The report was 18 distributed to the members and I give the 19 dates in my summary 20 Q. Okay Prior to 1973 that 21 eight period of time where 22 Georgia is putting 23 containing joint compounds on the 0135 market what did Georgia or the Gypsum Association do to insure that the exposures to asbestos from their products 6 were below the TLVS at the time A. Oh they didn't do anything because we didn't think products like that were of a concern when between 19 -- until 1971 the standard was still 30 fibers per cc or five million particles per cubic foot The government didn't say that was 10 inadequate The TLV committee didn't say it was inadequate They didn't do 12 anything because I and others thought 14 we're way below that And in fact subsequent articles in the literature in the '75 to '79 time frame demonstrated 16 they were on average maybe a fifth of 18 that So they didn't do anything in those 22219 years Q. Okay Now we -- I think we discussed earlier and you acknowledge that those levels were never designed to 23 be 100 percent protective especially 0136 0136 1 against cancers from asbestos correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. They say they don't know if 6 they're protective against cancer Nobody knew what was protective against cancer Q. BY MR DIMUZIO And up until 1973 I think you'll agree with me there was no effort made by Georgia or their trade association the Gypsum Association to determine what the levels actual levels of asbestos exposure were when using their products correct A. I've already said that But there was no effort by the government to accommodate to the new knowledge of carcinogens either There was no -Q. Is it your opinion Doctor that companies should be able to rely exclusively on what the government does in terms of whether or not to warn about potential dangers from their product 23 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 0137 form of the question A. I answered that way back Companies who do not have the expertise do not have the know it's not a part of their business they do not have their own laboratories their own hygienists their own medical -- all of the occupational specialists who can advise them they rely on the government yes Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay So again this goes back to your opinion that in your professional opinion these companies should not be held to the level of knowledge of an expert regarding the health aspects of their products correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. Well an expert would have told you in those years there's no problem with these products They weren't on the screen There was -- Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Objection nonresponsive 0138 Again my particular question is in your opinion companies should not be held to the level of experts in that time frame regarding potential dangers from asbestos 6 A. And I already M- 7 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 8 form of the question g A. I already qualified that It 10 depended on the company 11 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO How about 12 Georgia 13 A. This was not Georgia Pacific's 14 area of expertise Georgia did 15 not have the -- the internal knowledge of 16 this It relied on its association And 17 at this point in time that association 18 as well as the government as well as 19 everyone else would not have had insight 20 into this being a hazard 21 Q. Okay So based on your review 22 of the documents I guess as a logical 23 through for that for what you just 0139 said based on your review of the documents prior to 1972 in your opinion Georgia did not have the knowledge of an expert regarding the dangers health dangers of their products MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. They did not have the knowledge of an expert and an expert did not have the knowledge relevant to Georgia Pacific's concern Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Objection to the nonresponsive portion Same question for the Gypsum Association Is it your opinion that prior to 1972 that the Gypsum Association did not have the knowledge of an expert regarding dangers of asbestos in joint compound products MR WAMSLEY I object to the form of the question A. I don't think they had such knowledge and I don't think that 0140 1 knowledge available at that point in time was relevant to their principal concern with their products Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Objection to the nonresponsive portion 10 Doctor when in your opinion did Georgia first have a joint compound product that worked reasonably well that did not contain asbestos A. certain markets they had it 11 as early as '73 12 Q. Okay And why did they not 13 replace all of their products with the 14 asbestos formulation at that time 15 A. There's a great deal of 16 documentation in the records I mentioned 17 and that are listed in the appendix to 18 lack of consumer acceptance of the 19 products in certain markets The product 20 is very susceptible to temperature and 21 humidity variations And Georgia 22 embarked on an extended period of change 23 of formulations for different markets 0141 The acceptable products came in sequentially If they had replaced all products at one time there would not have been acceptability Q. So basically it was market considerations correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. Yes I believe the rate of replacement of asbestos during the period of time when it was believed the hazard did not exist they worked on this during -- before during and after the Clayton report It was a sequential replacement Q. BY MR DIMUZIO And so effectively what these contractors were having to do was sort of a risk benefit or cost benefit analysis as to whether or not to use asbestos containing or asbestos joint compounds correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question 0142 A. No. If the contractors were aware of the information the Gypsum Association was aware of -- and I don't know how knowledgeable contractors associations were -- they would have been in the same position of not believing a hazard exists Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay And what was being communicated by either the Gypsum Association or Georgia to the contractors at that point in time regarding the potential hazards of asbestos A. I think they were adhering to the regulation with warnings And that was their primary means of communicating to users And warnings went on in the 18 '73 '74 time frame 19 Q. So prior to that to your 20 knowledge Georgia did not provide 21 any sort of warnings to these contractors 22 who were making the decision on whether or 23 not to use asbestos or asbestos joint 0143 compound correct A. There was no basis to communicate those warnings and they communicated it when the government said communicate it Even though as I said the government was of the belief they had a protective standard And the Clayton report suggested this industry was below it Q. Objection nonresponsive I guess another way to phrase the question Doctor is that prior to the warnings going on the products that were required by the government in 1973 to your knowledge Georgia passed none of the potential health risk information onto the contractors using their products correct A. Well I don't understand what health risk information you would have them pass on The standard in 1972 was out there for the public It concerned asbestos It didn't concern their 0144 product The warning applied and they complied with the warning The surveillance applied and they got Clayton There's no requirement that's there to take the position of communicating the standard to their users The government publishes a standard distributes it publicizes it That wasn't Georgia Pacific's responsibility Q. You don't think that it's Georgia Pacific's responsibility to provide that information to their customers A. There's no hazard to their customers at that point in time They are not in excess of the PEL All the information they have is they're compliant Only in 1976 is the possibility raised that there may be some excessive amount in the plants If the plants are in compliance the users would be in compliance We speak about the highest exposures in the plants and lower 0145 0145 amongst users So that's the reasoning And every timeI try to inject the reasoning you tell me it's nonresponsive Q. Objection nonresponsive Let me ask a related question Doctor Do you believe that it has to be 10 proved to a scientific certainty that a given type of product containing asbestos hurts an individual before warnings are required MR WAMSLEY Object to the 12 form of the question 13 A. No but think that -- 14 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay When 15 do you believe -- what level of proof do 16 you think there needs to be before a 17 company is charged with providing warnings 18 to their customers 19 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 20 form of the question 21 A. I believe a persuasive level of 22 proof that this indeed is a concern to 23 them Not that asbestos period is a 0146 1 concern Asbestos is a concern But is 2 the asbestos as used in their organization a hazard It's a potential hazard but it's a hazard when the conditions are such 5 that we believe it exceeds a safe level Q. But you would acknowledge that even by 1965 it was clear that asbestos 8 at some doses could cause health problems correct A. Yes Q. Okay And I think we've also established that Georgia did nothing until the early 1970's to determine what the dose of asbestos from using their product would be correct A. Yes Q. Fair enough Do you need a break I think we've been going about an 19 hour and five or ten minutes Doctor 20 A. That's fine 21 Q. Okay Let's go ahead and take 22 a break and that way I can go over my 23 notes We're not over yet but I think 0147 1 we're getting close And if I could have 2 about five minutes to organize I think I 3 can cut this down 45 A. Okay 5 MR WAMSLEY We'll give you 6 five then 7 MR DIMUZIO All right 8 Thanks g MR WAMSLEY You can take six 10 then if it will help 11 MR DIMUZIO I'll probably 12 take six 13 MR WAMSLEY All right 14 Whereupon a short break was 15 taken 16 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO If you could 17 turn to page 13 of your report Doctor 18 A. Okay 19 Q. Okay It's the first full 20 paragraph there and they're talking about 21 an April 11 1983 memo And in that you 22 have quote here The memo states 23 quote it is my understanding that our 0148 1 competitors will begin marketing their 2 bags -- marking their bags shortly 3 unquote Did I read that correctly 4 A. Yes 5 Q. Okay So in essence is it 6 your understanding that Georgia 7 waited until the other manufacturers began 8 labeling their bags before they did the 9 same 10 A. That's what this suggests that 11 they would march in sequence with their 12 competitors at that point in time in 13 1973 yes 14 Q. Okay But apparently the 15 decision had been made by those 16 competitors somewhat before 17 Georgia correct 18 A. No. I think they're all 19 responding to the 1972 standard I don't 20 know if Georgia -- I didn't see whether 21 Georgia -- the people at Georgia 22 were thinking about this or not but 23 they -- but what I took away is the whole 0149 1 industry marched in unison Q. Who was the last company to 3 actually produce and sell 4 containing joint compounds in the 53 United States A. I don't know Q. You don't know whether it was Georgia one way or the other A. No. 10 Q. Okay And who actually banned 11 the use of asbestos in joint compounds in 12 the United States 13 A. The Consumer Product Safety 14 Commission banned it 15 Q. Okay Did Dr. Selikoff have 16 any input into starting that process 17 A. I don't know 18 Q. Okay And why would the 19 Consumer Product Commission do that as 20 opposed to say the EPA or OSHA 21 A. Well I think in the safety 22 field there's the general belief that 23 consumers are inexpert as contrasted to 0150 the professionals who use things in the field And from my own efforts at home 4 improvement I would agree with that Q. Okay And in fact that's what we're dealing with here in the Taylor case people who are not professionals actually applying these materials 7 correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. Yes Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay And I think it's generally deemed at least among the experts in the field that 14 usually amateurs who try to do joint compound work end up doing -- using a lot more joint compound and doing a lot more sanding than a professional would do is that correct 21 MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question 22 A. I'm not sure of that I don't 23 know that But I will say that they don't 0151 1 do as good a job from my own experience Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay Let's turn to page 14 of your report sir And it's really the first full paragraph that I'm interested in here It says George D. 10 Clayton & Associates Firm study do you see that paragraph A. Yes Q. Okay You would agree with me that nowhere on that report do they take into effect the nature of the exposure of someone who's doing this in their home and they're going to stay there for 24 or 48 hours after the work is being done correct A. No. They -- they measured the individual's exposure over the -- there 18 were personal samples over an extended 19 period They were not doing the work all 20 of that time That's what the personal 21 measurement is But I can't as I sit 22 here remember the periods of inactivity 23 and the periods of activity 0152 1 Q. But the work was actually -- the work in question as in Ms. Taylor was 3 actually done in a fairly small trailer and these people continued to live in that trailer in the days afterwards Wouldn't you agree that the fact that the surrounding had been contaminated and their clothes had been contaminated et cetera would actually increase the exposure to a consumer using the product in that situation as opposed to a professional in the field MR WAMSLEY I object to the form of the question A. No. The type of -- and there's 10 a whole literature on this which you may know I've contributed greatly to The sense of contamination of surface dust of material that settles out it's very hard to make it airborne The point you make 21 of a period of decay of what's in the air is one you made earlier and is valid 23 The work ceases in the trailer and 0153 depending on the ventilation of the trailer what is airborne when the work ceased will have a decay curve It will decrease over a period of time 6 That should come down to the background level with any halfway decent ventilation And by that I mean say four air changes an hour or more which is the lowest design for any building 10 occupancy I don't personally know what trailers are designed for but it would come down in a couple of hours two to three hours at most to background Now the dust left in there would be a very minimal exposure in subsequent cleaning Again due to the duration of time and that which is on 10 surfaces would be very much less for the amount that got airborne than what was generated during the primary work So that would be relatively a small contributor to the dosage 23 But the -- if they remain two 0154 to three hours in the trailer they get a progressively decreasing amount beyond the 3 period of work Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay Now you mentioned that you -- and again correct me if I'm wrong but something 6 about you would generally want to look for something like four air changes per hour is that correct A. That's a typical home occupancy design Just from leakage you can get that In the 1980's there was some tightening up of buildings But even in those buildings you get two air changes an hour So if I had to guess what a trailer was I'd say it's probably four air changes an hour Q. right Now you made the comment earlier also that it's hard to get this dust that has settled out back up into the air do you recall that testimony -- 23 A. That's correct 0155 1 Q. -- minute ago 3 A. Yes Q. Okay You would agree with me that sweeping up this material with a 4 broom would be one way where the dust particles -- dust fibers could indeed be in the entrained into the respirable 8 air around people A. That's true The application of energy does that But it generally gets the larger particles inhalable with lesser amounts of the inhalable And I described that in great length in many publications which I can point out to you It was the subject of my doctoral thesis of Harvard It's still much to my amazement occasionally quoted Q. Okay A. If you'll turn to page 16 -- 20 Q. Okay 21 A. -- see the first publication 22 at the top of the page see page 15 the 23 first publication -- instead of the 0156 1 bottom And these -- this darn thing 2 hasn't got the -- oh go to page 17 and it is contained in the -- at the bottom of the page Skip Theander and Corn and the 5 three publications above it describe this 6 phenomena And there's even another one 7 later where I went into it again I 8 believe Oh yes Page 18 middle of the 9 page Corn M. Stein the entrainment of 10 particles from a plane surface It was a 11 subject that interested me for many years 12 Q. Okay And along those lines 13 regarding fiber size if someone was to 14 use a kind of standard consumer vacuum 15 cleaner that would be available in the 16 1960's and 70s -- and by that I mean one 17 that does not have a high efficiency 18 particulate filter on it -- would that 19 vacuum cleaner be able to contain the 20 respirable asbestos fibers that we're 21 concerned about that someone would breathe 22 into their lungs 23 0157 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 1 form of the question 2 A. It would contain a portion of 3 it Because the filter the bag is the 4 filtering mechanism only in the initial 5 period that a dust layer builds up on the 6 bag And then it's the dust layer that is 7 doing the filtering not the bag So the 8 pores on the bag are fairly large a dust 9 layer builds up and then filtration 10 occurs through the dust layer And I 11 don't know what portion of respirable 12 fibers it would get but it would get a 13 significant portion once that layer 14 existed But -- 15 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO And prior to 16 that layer existing probably a very high 17 percentage of the respirable particles 18 would escape correct 19 A. Yes 20 Q. And even after that probably 21 some percentage of those respirable 22 particles would continue to escape would 23 you agree 0158 1 A. Yes even though I can't put 2 numbers on that percentage 3 Q. Okay 4 A. There probably are data | -- 5 I don't recall it 6 Q. Okay When to your knowledge 7 did Georgia first receive 8 information that sanding of joint 9 compounds could offer a potential hazard 10 from breathing asbestos dust 11 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 12 form of the question 13 A. think they received that when 14 they received the Clayton report which 15 was -- the work was done in '73 I think 16 the report was issued in '74 17 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO So based on 18 the materials you reviewed that's the 19 earlier that you would think they would 20 have information specifically regarding 21 the sanding of their products right 22 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 23 form of the question 0159 A. It was called to their attention by Clayton that during the peak period the short period they could exceed the short PEL And I might point out that is not a health PEL That is a control PEL The only health permissible exposure limit is the eight weighted average The short limit is one to make the efficiency of OSHA inspectors greater There was statistical argument of a large database OSHA carried the argument before the administrative law judges and the commission that they could predict that there was a high probability the eight hour PEL would be exceeded if the short minute value was exceeded So there is a short value And that was when Clayton alerted the Gypsum Association too that they believed there were some short excursions and felt it was associated with these operations Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Objection to 0160 nonresponsive portion Doctor in your opinion based on the materials that you've reviewed -well first of all we've established that there was an asbestos joint compound at approximately 1972 is that correct MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question A. I thought late '72 early '73 yes Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay And 12 when in your opinion did it become clear that they had worked out any potential kinks and they had a product that could keep most contractors happy under most circumstances 17 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 18 form of the question 19 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO If you have 20 an opinion 21 A. They had different products for 22 different regions of the country Even at 23 the time of the ban I don't think they 0161 1 had worked out a satisfactory product 2 acceptable to users for the entire 3 country I don't know what proportion of 4 users they had a satisfactory product for 5 1 suspect that number is available But 6 even when they stopped manufacturing it 7 they had not satisfied all the parts of 8 the country 9 Q. Fair enough Doctor if a 10 particular product is banned by a 11 government agency say OSHA EPA or the 12 Consumer Product Commission for example 13 because of potential health problems Do 14 you believe it is acceptable for companies 15 in that -- to produce that particular 16 product to continue to sell those 17 products once they learn that the product 18 will be banned 19 MR WAMSLEY Object to the 20 form of the question 21 A. First let me just correct your 22 question if I might 23 Q. BY MR DIMUZIO Okay 0162 A. OSHA has never banned a 2 chemical or product EPA has never banned a chemical or product They don't believe 4 in banning it They believe in working 53 with it safely The Consumer Product Safety Commission banned this product but other regulatory agencies in this country do not ban They believe there are safe levels of working with them The ASTDR 10 the agency that was assigned Hazardous 11 Waste Site Safety believes there are safe 12 levels of all chemicals at waste sites 13 So we're talking about the 14 CPSC and they issued a ban And your 15 question is is it appropriate once the 16 ban is issued to keep distributing it 17 The ban has a compliance period a period 18 for those using it to get themselves in a 19 position to curtail production And I 20 think it's appropriate for a company to 21 utilize that period to try to improve it's 22 position until such time as the ban takes 23 effect And it's following the law It 0163 0163 1 is -- as I said Georgia was still working on getting the substitute at certain places Before the ban they curtailed production They were left with a large reservoir of asbestos that they sold to another company I think their behavior was in line with the behavior the government was asking for Q. Objection to the nonresponsive portion Do you think that there was any responsibility for them to inform the public who was buying these products that the product had been banned and would cease to be produced MR WAMSLEY Object to the form of the question 12 A. I don't think there was any obligation And I think the government publicized this very widely The newspapers publicized it The magazines publicized it No I don't think it's 23 necessary for the company to do it 0164 Q. Okay A. First of all it doesn't know all its users But I think that 4 informing by the time this occurred was handled by the media and it was handled well Q. Objection to the nonresponsive portion Doctor believe it or not I 10 believe that's all the questions I have at this time I thank you very much for 12 giving me some time to ask you some questions today A. You're most welcome 16 MR WAMSLEY Anybody else got anything FURTHER THE DEPONENT SAITH NOT DEPONENT'S CERTIFICATE , DR MORTON CORN the witness 4 herein have read the transcript of my 5 testimony and the same is true and 6 correct to the best of my knowledge Any 7 corrections and additions if any are 8 listed separately 9 10 11 DR MORTON CORN 12 13 14 Sworn to and subscribed before me 15 this day , 2007 to 16 certify which witness my hand and seal of 17 office 18 19 20 21 22 NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR 23 THE STATE OF ALABAMA 0166 1 CERTIFICATE 2 3 STATE OF ALABAMA 4 SHELBY COUNTY ) S 6 , Maya Rose Court Reporter do 7 hereby certify that I recorded by means of 8 stenotype the foregoing proceedings at the 9 time and place stated in the caption 10 hereof That later under my supervision 11 the proceedings were transcribed by means 12 of computer transcription and the 13 foregoing represents a full true and 14 correct transcript of the proceedings on 15 said occasion 16 1 further certify that I am 17 neither of counsel nor of kin to any 18 parties of said cause nor am I in any 19 manner interested in the result thereof 20 21 22 23 Maya Rose - ACCR 242