Document byQrMBvLBrNOydKwVqXBwVVB1

VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY ABERDEEN, MISSISSIPPI A HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY FOR TC COMPLIANCE PROJECT Jufy 1990 VAB.0001089207 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY ABERDEEN, MISSISSIPPI HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY FOR TC COMPLIANCE PROJECT A DEPARTMENTAL APPROVAL: PROJECT APPROVAL: July 1990 VAB.0001089208 TABLE OF CONTENTS A HAZOF REPORT VOLUME Legal Notice....................................................................................................... List of Abbreviations................................................................................. 1.0 Purpose....................................................................................................................... i ii 1-1 2.0 Scope............................................................................................................................ 2--1 3.0 Methodology............................................................................................................ 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................ 3.2 Team Members............................................................................................ 3.3 Documents made available............................................................ 3.4 Forms used................................................................................................. 3.5 Preliminary hazard identification.................................... 3.6 Criticality evaluation ............................................................ 3-1 3-2 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-6 3-7 4.0 Mitigation Summary....................................................................................... 4-1 5.0 P&IDs........................................................................................................................... 5-1 APPENDIX A. Study Data Report............................................................................................ A-l VAB.0001089209 LEGAL NOTICE A This report was prepared by VISTA Chemical Company ("VISTA") for internal use only. Neither Vista nor any affiliated organizations, nor any person acting in their behalf, (a) makes any warranty, express or implied, with respect to the use of any information or methods disclosed in this report; or (b) assumes any liability with respect to the use of any information or methods disclosed in this report VAB.0001089210 UfiiE.Q VISTA COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen AHM ATMOS BETWN CHG CK CS CT CW CWR CWS DHP ELEC EQ ESD ETOH FA FD FL FR FV GA H20 HAZAN HAZOP HC HDR HP ID IMP INJ INSUL LG LIQ LP LT MAINT MATLS MAX MOC MOV MSDS azardous Materials Between Charge Check Carbon Steel Cooling Tower Cooling Water Cooling water return Cooling water supply Drum Handling Procedure Electrical Equipment Emergency Shut Down Ethanol Drum Feed Filter From Flow valve Pump Water Hazard Analysis Hazard & Operability Study Hydrocarbon Header High Pressure Identification Implausible Injection Insulation Liquid Low Pressure Level transmitter Maintenance Materials Maximum Material of Construction Motor Operated Valve Material Safety Data Sheet ii VAB.0001089211 VISTA COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen NAP NO OPS OTP OVHD P P&ID PG PIC PP PRES PSH PSV REGS REV RO RV s S/D SPEC STD STM SW SYST TA' S TCV TEMP THERM THRU VCM VOC Not a problem Normally Open Operations Operator Training & Procedures Overhead Pressure Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Pressure Gage Pressure Indicating Controller Diaphragm Pump Personnel Protective Gear Pressure Pressure Switch High Pounds per square inch gage Pressure Safety Valve Regulations Revision Restriction orifice Relief Valve Shut Down Cracking Standard Steam Service water System Turn Arounds Temperature Control Temperature Thermal Through Valve Vinyl Chloride Monomer Volatile Organic Carbon A iii VAB.0001089212 VISTA COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen A SECTION 1.0 PURPOSE The VISTA Chemical Company (Aberdeen, Mississippi) TC Compliance Project Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study was conducted to serve many purposes. It will be used to: Provide management with the knowledge of where potential hazards exist in the TC Compliance modifications. Provide safety and operations related documentation for lines and pieces of equipment included in these modifications. Provide a prioritized basis for subsequent risk analysis/assessment work, if necessary. Provide documentation for a Risk Management and Prevention Program. Provide training on HAZOP methodology and techniques for Vista personnel. Performing a HAZOP study is generally an assurance that if procedural and/or engineering modifications are implemented to mitigate risk, the plant will then be operating under some lower risk. It is not, however, a guarantee that no risk exists, nor does it guarantee that hazardous events or operating problems will not be encountered. 1-1 VAB.0001089213 BgCTIOM 2.0 SCOPE VISTA COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen Vista Chemical Company operates a nominal capacity 445 million pound per year FVC plant located in Aberdeen, Mississippi. The plant polymerizes VGM in batch reactors to produce FVC. The TC^B^friance project for the Aberdeen plant is the subject of thiA HAPOLjstudy. The project includes: - The Cleanwall Injection System - The Batch Hater Stripper Dump Modifications -- The Low Mole Reactor Jacket Cooling Modifications The hazard identification study focused on the following potential hazards: Personnel injury/death resulting from Feie ^ire Explosion Toxic exposure Chemical Contact Thermal Burns Asphyxiation Impact injury Etc. Equipment/property damage resulting from Fire Explosion Corrosion Misoperation Overpressure Vacuum Overheating Etc. Production loss resulting from Equipment damage Maintenance Off specification Turn arounds Raw Material Considerations Etc. Environmental Spills Fugitive Emissions Haste Hater Excursions Etc. The HAZOP methodology used during the study is contained in Section 3, the mitigation for the critical identified hazards is contained in Section 4, and the criticality sort/data base is contained in an Appendix. 2--1 A VAB.0001089214 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Toast Members 3*3 Documents Made Available 3*4 Forms Used 3*5 Preliminary Hasard identification 3.6 Criticality Evaluation 3-1 VAB.0001089215 SECTION 3.1 A A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a simple, yet structured methodology for hazard identification. It is an investigation technique which utilizes imaginative thinking in the identification of hazards and operational problems. A HAZOP study involves a systematic, methodical examination of design documents that describe the facility. The study is performed by a multidisciplinary team to identify potential hazards or operability problems that could result in an accident. Deviations from the design value of key parameters are studied using guide words to control the examination evaluation. This presumes that the design values of flows, temperatures, and other process variables are inherently safe and operable. The study team consists of trained personnel knowledgeable in the technology and operations, and the team will have the necessary technical expertise to answer most questions raised during the review without outside assistance. As a starting point, we will define the following terms: Hazard: Anything (chemical reaction, equipment malfunction or operator error) that can lead to an unwanted event. Operability: Anything that causes the operator to improvise in his actions. These definitions are an important part of the basic HAZOP premise that the process does not have inherent hazards or operating problems when the unit is operating within design parameters as defined by the basic documents such as the Process Flow Diagrams, equipment specifications, operating procedures, etc. In other words, if there are no deviations from the expected norm, by definition there are no hazard or operability problems. When performing a HAZOP, a proper mix of meeting participants is very important. The mix of participants should normally include most if not all of the following: Team leader Process engineer Mechanical engineer Plant operator Maintenance Electrical Safety Team recorder Instrumentation 3-2 VAB.0001089216 A Of these personnel, many are often only part time participants but remain on call for assistance. It can be seen that the electrical, maintenance and other subjects may only be required on a consulting basis. Also, it is important to keep the size of the review team to a manageable number such as between five to seven so that all members of the team can participate while keeping the effort moving. The agenda followed during the HAZOP team meetings is as follows: ' Introduce team members: A short biographical sketch by each team member. 3 HAZOP methodology: A presentation is made by the team facilitator of the methodology to be used in the study. This also establishes the team member "mind set" necessary to conduct an effective HAZOP. 4 AHM properties: An identification and discussion by an industrial hygienist or other knowledgeable person is presented to establish a team recognition of the AHM toxic and hazardous properties. Identify hazards: A preliminary identification by team members of hazards present within the process. This serves to focus the HAZOP study. Z. Purpose or goal of HAZOP: A general presentation of the purpose or goal of the HAZOP is made. This serves to direct the HAZOP study. Scope the HAZOP: Once the AHM properties are established and discernible HAZOP hazards are identified, the HAZOP scope is set. Establish criticality and frequency ratings: Hazard classification matrix parameters are set by the team for subsequent screening of HAZOP identified hazards. Define dispersion models: The team identifies AHM release scenarios which will be different cases for dispersion modeling outside of the HAZOP team meeting. Process description: A detailed process discussion is presented by the Process Engineer to familiarize the HAZOP team with process scenarios which may lead to a hazardous condition as well as to ensure that all team members have a clear understanding of the basic process. PCHAZOP* on-line: Load the PCHAZOP* computer program for recording HAZOP team proceedings. HAZOP team meetings: A systematic segment by segment team review of the facilities contained within the job scope is executed. HAZOP report: A formal report is prepared by the team facilitator, reviewed and commented by the other members, and then becomes a permanent record of the team meetings. Guidelines are presented later in the chapter for report 3.3 VAB.0001089217 A The HAZOP identified thirteen (13) critical ranked potential hazards: One (1) with a criticality rank of 1, i.e., those which must be improved Thirteen (13) with a criticality rank of 2, i.e., those which should be improved. Suggested mitigation for the critical ranked hazards is covered in Section 4.0. The HAZOP identified five (5) non-critical ranked hazards which require verification that the appropriate engineering and/or administrative controls are in place. The team identified no hazards of the most critical ranking, that is a hazard rated I-A, i.e., a hazard which could potentially cause A LOST TIME ACCIDENT more often than once per year. In the event the HAZOP team did identify a hazard that it considered to represent an imminent danger to life or property, the team would have given a verbal presentation to plant management in order to expedite any required mitigation. SECTION 3.2 TEAM MEMBERS The HAZOP study team assembled to identify potential hazard or operability problems should be composed of a multiple disciplined team with the sufficient technical expertise to answer most guide word deviation questions without resorting to further expertise. The HAZOP study team meetings were held at the VISTA plant site in Aberdeen, Mississippi. The team members conducting the HAZOP study on the VISTA Chemical Company TC Compliance Project are as follows: ATTgyPBg COMPANY EXPERTISE/RESPONSIBILITY Nathaniel Wilson* Craig English* John Wright* Doug Knittig* Sherry Ingwerson* Dale Nawrocki* Pete Schirber* Dave Moore^^r Dale Andrews* Steve Hillman# William Early* VISTA VISTA VISTA VISTA VISTA VISTA VISTA VISTA VISTA VISTA Stone & Webster * = full time # part time Operations Electrical Process Engineer - Houston Process Engineer Project Engineer Process Engineer * OKC Process Engineer - Houston Process Engineer Instrument Technician Process Engineer Trainer/Facilitator 3-4 VAB.0001089218 Prior to the start of the HAZOP, the necessary reference documentation needs to be assembled and made available for use and reference during the HAZOP team study. A meaningful HAZOP study cannot be conducted without the required documentation to review. Assembly of the documentation optimizes the chance for a successful HAZOP. The documents used in this study were: Cleanwall Injection Project - Class "A" Design, April 11, 1990. Batch Water Stripper Modifications project - P&ID. Reactor Jacket Cooling Modifications Project - P&ID. 3-5 VAB.0001089219 SECTION 3,4 FORKS USED A The HAZOP team data was recorded on standardized forms containing the key questions and answer elements of the HAZOP; one form for each line segment investigated, one form for each equipment item investigated The results of the HAZOP studies were recorded on the SWEC proprietary computerized program "PCHAZOP", which is a PC based program designed to provide a simple method for recording and documenting the HAZOP process. The program is designed to run in a database environment to facilitate data storage and retrieval. The results of the HAZOP studies are included in the Appendix sorted according to equipment number or line segment. SECTION 3.5 PRELIMINARY HAZARD IDENTIFICATION During the initial stage of the HAZOPs, the team should prepare a preliminary list of potential hazards likely to be encountered during the study. This serves to establish the team's mind-set in hazard identification and focus attention during the study. The preliminary hazard identification yielded the following five hazards: Impact - from a fall or from contacting rotating heavy machinery potentially causing physiological injury and or death. Fire - resulting from the ignition of a flammable material potentially causing physiological injury and or equipment damage. Explosion contained - resulting from the ignition of an explosive mixture within a vessel potentially causing physiological injury due to the overpressure wave, thermal radiation, or missile fragment projectiles uncontained - resulting from the ignition of an explosive mixture such as a vapor or dust cloud potentially causing physiological injury due to the overpressure wave, or thermal radiation. Thermal burn - resulting from the contact with a hot or cold material potentially causing physiological injury due to thermal stress. Toxic exposure - resulting from personnel exposure to an acutely hazardous material potentially causing physiological injury and or death. 3-6 VAB.0001089220 During the initial stage of the HAZOPs, the team should develop a criticality rating and a probability rating for preparation of a hazard ranking matrix. This is to allow screening of identified hazards by prioritization and sorting to focus subsequent corrective action on the significant identified hazards; eliminating the insignificant or trivial hazards from any further consideration. To this end, a hazard rating index and a risk ranking matrix was developed in the HAZOP team review as follows: HAZARD RATING INDEX Criticality Rating I Major An incident which may result in a possible lost time injury, or a reportable VCM release, or major damage or production loss greater than $1,000,000 II Severe An incident which may result in a restricted work case, or a VCM release, or severe damage or production loss between $50,000 and $1,000,000 III Moderate An incident which may result in a recordable injury, or moderate damage or production loss between $10,000 and $50,000 IV Slight An incident which may result in slight damage or production loss less than $10,000 Frequency Rating A Frequent Expected to occur frequently in the life of a single plant, i.e., may occur more frequently than once per year B Probable Expected to occur in the life of a single plant, i.e., may occur between 1 and 100 years C Occasional Could occur in the life of a single plant but expected to occur once in the life of multiple plants, i.e., may occur between 100 and 10,000 years D Remote Unlikely to occur in the life of multiple plants, i.e., may occur less frequently than once per 10,000 years 3-7 VAB. RISK RANKING MATRIX Frequency ABC D A The risk ranking codes assigned to each grid of the risk ranking matrix are as follows: Risk Ranking 1 Unacceptable Mitigation planning should be completed within six months using engineering and/or administrative controls to reduce the risk ranking to a 3 or less. 2 Undesirable Mitigation planning should be completed within twelve months using engineering and/or administrative controls to reduce the risk ranking to a 3 or less. 3 Acceptable With Controls Should be verified that procedures or controls are in place 4 Acceptable as is No mitigation action required VAB.0001089222 II SECTION 4.0 SECTION 4.1 MITIGATION MITIGATION SUMMARY A Risk Code l-A No references siftod. Risk Code l-B One reference sifted* Item 1 Static charge due to inadequate grounding of Bus drum fire and possible explosion resulting in personnel injury. - see page 1 Risk Code ll-A No references wnrL ITEMS WITH CRITICAL RANK OF 2 Risk Code l-C No references Risk Code ll-B Two references Item 1 Wrong material fed to BUS tank due to mix up by supplier or warehouse resulting in contaminated BUS and possible off-spec and/or lost production. - see page 1 4-1 VAB.0001089223 V Risk Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Catastrophic failure of BUS reactor inlet lines due to vibration or impact resulting in VCM release and personnel exposure. - see page 2 A Increased BUS drum pressure and/or temperature due to an external heat source resulting in rupture and possible personnel exposure. - see pages 1,2 Low or no flow and possible high pressure in feed line to BUSS tank due to blocked line, closed valve, plugged filter, failed pump, or empty drum resulting in possible loss of production. - see pages 3,4,5,6 Low or no flow in BUSS supply lines to the reactor areas due to blocked line, failed instruments, plugged filter, failed pump, or failed meter resulting in possible loss of production. - see pages 7,8 Modicon failure for BUSS supply line interlocks due to power failure or hardware problems resulting in possible loss of production. - see page 9 Improper maintenance of pump and filter in BUSS supply line to the reactors resulting in possible personnel exposure. - see page 10 Improper maintenance of BUSS injection nozzles resulting in loss of production, contamination, or personnel exposure. - see page 11 4-2 VAB.0001089224 SUMMARY 07 PAGE 18 I--A 4-3 VAB.0001089225 SUMMARY OF PAGE 1: I-B VISTA TC COMPLIANCE PROJECT CRITICAL RANXX 1, CRITICAL MUST BE IMPROVED MAJOR CONSEQUENCE PROBABLE OCCURRENCE DEVIATION: STATIC CHARGE EQUIPMENT NUMBER: HM-101/102-E-A13 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 CAUSE: FAILURE TO GROUND DRUM/LINE CONSEQUENCE: FIRE EXPLOSION, PERSONNEL INJURY SUGGESTED MITIGATION: SUGGEST REVIEW OF GROUNDING PROCEDURE AND OTP RESOLUTION: COMMENTS: 4--4 VAB.0001089226 4 A SUMMARY OF PAGE 1: IZ-A 4-5 VAB.0001089227 fi' SUMMARY 07 PAGE 1: I-C CRITICAL RANK: I C DEVIATION l 2, UNDESIRABLE - SHOULD BE IMPROVED = MAJOR CONSEQUENCE s OCCASIONAL OCCURRENCE N-O-N-B F-O-U-N-D A 4-6 VAB.0001089228 SUMMARY OR PAGE 1: II-B VISTA TC COMPLZAMCX PROJECT CRITICAL RANK: 2, UNDESIRABLE - SHOULD SEVERE CONSEQUENCE PROBABLE OCCURRENCE DEVIATIONS WRONG DRUM OR MATERIALS EQUIPMENT NUMBERS BUS DRUM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTIONS 55 GAL DRUM IMPROVED CAUSE S MIX UP IN WAREHOUSE WRONG MATERIAL DELIVERED TO PLANT CONSEQUENCE S CONTAMINATED BUS TANK, LOST PRODUCTION SUGGESTED MITIGATIONS SUGGEST REVIEW 07 DRUM HANDLING PROCEDURES AND MATERIAL ID/CONFIRMATION RESOLUTIONS COMMENTSS VAB.0001089229 SUMMARY OR PAGE 2: II-B 4-8 VAB.0001089230 SUMMARY 07 PAGE 1: III-A CRITICAL RANK: III A 2, UNDESIRABLE - SHOULD BE IMPROVED = MODERATE CONSEQUENCE = FREQUENT OCCURRENCE DEVIATZON: INCREASED PRESSURE EQUIPMENT NUMBERS BUS DRUM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: 55 GAL DRUM CAUSE: EXTERNAL HEAT SOURCE 1 I j I I CONSEQUENCE: POSSIBLE PERSONNEL EXPOSURE j SUGGESTED MITIGATION: 8UGGEST REVIEW OF DRUM HANDLING PROCEDURE, OTP, AND PPG | RESOLUTION: ------------------------------------------------- t . .. - . j comments: 4-9 VAB.0001089231 SUMMARY OF PAGE 2: IIX-A 4-10 VAB.0001089232 V SUMMARY OF PAGE 3: III-A CRITICAL RANK DEVIATION S VISTA TC COMPLIANCE PROJECT 2, UNDESIRABLE - SHOULD BE IMPROVED III = MODERATE CONSEQUENCE A = FREQUENT OCCURRENCE NO FLOW EQUIPMENT NUMBER: HM-101/102-E-A13-1 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 CAUSE: VALVE CLOSED FILTER PLUG PUMP FAILURE DRUM EMPTY LINE PLUG CONSEQUENCE: LOSS OF FLOW POSSIBLE LEAKAGE AND PERSONNEL EXPOSURE SUGGESTED MITIGATION: 8UGGEST REVIEW OF OTP, SUGGEST PRESSURE GAGES EITHER 8IDE OF FL--045 NOTE: PG1S ADDED TO PI&D RESOLUTION: COMMENTS: 4-11 VAB.0001089233 SUMMARY OF PAGE 48 IXI-A 4 4-12 VAB.0001089234 SUMMARY 07 PAGB 51 III-A 4-13 VAB.0001089235 SUMMARY OF PAGE 68 III-A 4-14 VAB.0001089236 SUMMARY OF PAQB 7 XII-A CRZTZCAL RANK DEVIATION 8 ZSTA COMPLIANCE PROJECT UNDESIRABLE SHOULD BE IMPROVED MODERATE CONSEQUENCE FREQUENT OCCURRENCE NO FLOW EQUIPMENT NUMBER: HM--104/105/106/107 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION! PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA CAUSE 8 BLOCKED LINE PUMP FAILURE METER FAILURE INSTRUMENT FAILURE PLUGGED FILTER CONSEQUENCE 8 LOSS OF PRODUCTION SUGGESTED MITIGATION SUGGEST REVIEW OF OTP RESOLUTION: COMMENTS: 4-15 VAB.0001089237 SUMMARY OF PAGE 8: III-A VISTA TC COMPLIANCE PROJECT CRITICAL RANKS Z, UNDESIRABLE - SHOULD BE IMPROVED 3C H MODERATE CONSEQUENCE | A s ntEQOHR OCCOKREMd DEVIATIONS REDUCED FLOW EQUIPMENT NUMBERS HM--104/105/106/107--8 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: PP--143/44 TO REACTOR AREA RESOLUTION 8 COMMENTS: 4-16 VAB.0001089238 SUMMARY OF CRITICAL IDENTIFIED HAZARDS PAGE 9: III-A VISTA TC COMPLIANCE PROJECT CRITICAL RANK: 2 , UNDESIRABLE - SHOULD BE IMPROVED III = MODERATE CONSEQUENCE A = FREQUENT OCCURRENCE DEVIATION : KODICON FAILURE EQUIPMENT NUMBER: HM--X04/105/106/107--8 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: PP--143/44 TO REACTOR AREA CAUSE: LOSS OF POWER HARDWARE PROBLEMS (I/O, CPU, ETC.) CONSEQUENCE: LOST PRODUCTION SUGGESTED MITIGATION: SUGGEST REVIEW OF RE8PONSE PROCEDURES AMD VERIFY PERIODIC UPS CHECKS I RESOLUTION: COMMENTS: 4-17 VAB.0001089239 SUMMARY OF CRITICAL IDENTIFIED HAZARDS PAGE 10: III-A CRITICAL RANK DEVIATION: VISTA TC COMPLIANCE PROJECT UNDESIRABLE SHOULD BE IMPROVED MODERATE CONSEQUENCE FREQUENT OCCURRENCE MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT NUMBER: HM-*104/105/10 6/107 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA CAUSE: PUMP FILTER CONSEQUENCE: POSSIBLE PERSONNEL EXPOSURE SUGGESTED MITIGATION: SUGGEST REVIEW OF MAINTENANCE PARTS STOCKING .PPG // RESOLUTION: COMMENTS: 4-18 VAB.0001089240 9 SUMMARY OF PAGE ll: III-A VISTA TO COMPLIANCE PROJECT CRITICAL RANK: III UNDB8IRABLS SHOULD BE IMPROVED MODERATE CONSEQUENCE FREQUENT OCCURRENCE DEVIATION: MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT NUMBER: HM-111-120 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: BU8 REACTOR INLET LINES CAUSE: PLUGGED NOZZLE CONSEQUENCE: PRODUCTION LOSS CONTAMINATION PERSONNEL EXPOSURE A SUGGESTED MITIGATION: SUGGEST REVIEW 07 OTP. MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES RESOLUTION: COMMENTS: 4-19 VAB.0001089241 SUMMARY OF HAZARDS PAGE l: II-C 4--20 VAB.0001089242 SUMMARY OY PAGB 1: III--B CRITICAL RANKS in B DEVIATION: 3, ACCEPTABLE - WITH CONTROLS = MODERATE CONSEQUENCE = PROBABLE OCCURRENCE REDUCED TEMPERATURE EQUIPMENT NUMBERS HM-111--120 4-21 VAB.0001089243 SUMMARY 07 PAGE 2: III-B CRITICAL RANK: DEVIATION: VISTA TC COMPLIANCE PROJECT ACCEPTABLE WITH CONTROLS MODERATE CONSEQUENCE PROBABLE OCCURRENCE FILTERS (300, 400) OMITTED EQUIPMENT NUMBER WX-130/139-E-A13 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: WATER FLUSH LINE CAUSE: CARBON STEEL LINE CONSEQUENCE: CONTAMINATED RESIN, PLUGGED NOZZLE A SUGGESTED MITIGATION: REVIEW THAT ALL CS LINES HAVE FILTERS RESOLUTION: COMMENTS: 4--22 VAB.0001089244 SUMMARY OF PAGE 3: III-B __________________________B a PROBABLE OCCURRENCE_______________________________ DEVIATION S NO FLOW 1 EQUIPMENT NUMBER: SK--139/148-H-A13 1 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: STEAM LIMES 1 4-23 VAB.0001089245 SUMMARY 07 PAGE 4: III-B CRITICAL RANK: DEVIATION: VISTA TC COMPLIANCE PROJECT ACCEPTABLE WITH CONTROLS MODERATE CONSEQUENCE PROBABLE OCCURRENCE NO PLOW EQUIPMENT NUMBER: WC-100/109 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: CWS TO MIDDLE OF JACKET CAUSE : CLOSED VALVE COOLING WATER OFF PLUGGED LINE CONSEQUENCE: POSSIBLE BUILD-UP AND CONTAMINATION LOSS SUGGESTED MITIGATION: SUGGEST REVIEW OF VALVE LOCKING PROCEDURE RESOLUTION: COMMENTS: 4-24 VAB.0001089246 SUMMARY Or PAGE 5 CRITICAL RANXX DEVIATIONS VISTA TC COMPLIANCE PROJECT ACCEPTABLE WITH CONTROLS MODERATE CONSEQUENCE PROBABLE OCCURRENCE INCREASE FLOW EQUIPMENT NUMBER: WC-100/100 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: CWS TO MIDDLE OF JACKET CAUSE: OPEN GLOBE VALVE CONSEQUENCE: LONG HEAT-UP TIME TEMPERATURE CONTROL PROBLEMS CW CAP. PROBLEMS SUGGESTED MITIGATION: RESOLUTION COMMENTS: VAB.0001089247  VAB.0001089248 VAB.0001089249 VAB.0001089250 From __________________________________ Calculation $htt COOLING^ water RETURN COOL tNG__ jij WATER SUPPLY Mu * - /> " O'bo^. ffT r (i*C ~ bj*Ur<x Uh^ " V*I \4 01 Lo Lt C-Cfciv o<W ryv * 2- >/<(*. "ic 4*~ (^IwWfctJl Vtfh'tii b*<i'Uir+> STEAM CO TJ O 7) 8* SO VAB.0001089251 Page NO. 07/24/89 1 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Risk Code 1131 Criticality Equip ID & Frequency Equipment Description B13S1XSESSC1 IXllBXlEXllSlllIlllBEZl P&ID Deviation Description Caused By; Consequences: BUS DRUM 55 GAL DRUM BUS DRUM 55 GAL DRUM BUS DRUM 55 GAL DRUM 2 III - A BUS DRUM 55 GAL DRUM 2 III - A BUS DRUM 55 GAL DRUM BUS DRUM 55 GAL DRUM BUS DRUM 55 GAL DRUM 4 IV - B BUS DRUM 55 GAL DRUM 2 II - B BUS DRUM 55 GAL DRUM BUS DRUM 55 GAL ORUM 4 IV - A BUS DRUM 55 GAL DRUM P&ID: MS033668 P&ID: MS033668 P&ID: MS033668 P&ID: MS033668 P&ID: MS033668 P&ID: MS033668 P&ID: MS033668 P&ID: MS033668 P&ID: MS033668 P&ID: MS033668 NO FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: REVERSE FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: INCREASED FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: INCREASED PRESSURE CAUSE: EXTERNAL HEAT SOURCE CONSEQ: POSSIBLE PERSONNEL EXPOSURE INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: SEE INCREASED PRESSURE CONSEQ: REDUCED FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: REDUCED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: WINTER EXPOSURE CONSEQ: FREEZE/CONGEAL WRONG DRUM OR MATERIALS CAUSE: MIX UP IN WAREHOUSE WRONG MATERIAL DELIVERED TO PLANT DRUM DAMAGE IN TRANSIT CONSEQ: CONTAMINATE BUS TANK, LOSSED PRODUCTION CAUSE: FORK LIFT ERROR CONSEQ: SPILLAGE, EXPOSURE P&ID: MS033668 EXPOSURE TO AIR CAUSE: CAP LEFT OFF FOR LONG PERIOD OF TIME CONSEQ: CONGEALS, ETOH RELEASE Action Item Request Action Item Response SSlSSSIBSIBaSS3SS:S3SSSSSSSSXBISS: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: SRO ORUM HANDLING PROCEDURE, OPERATOR TRAINING, AND PPG ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: SRO DRUM HANDLING PROCEDURES AND OTP ACT: SRO DRUM HANDLING PROCEDURES AND MATERIAL ID/CONFIRMATION ACT: SRO DRUM HANDLING PROCEDURE, PPG, AND ENVIROMENTAL IMPACT JAW=> ACT: SRO DRUM HANDLING PROCEDURE AND OTP VAB.0001089252 Page No. 07/24/89 2 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Risk Code Criticality Equip ID & Frequency Equipment Description P&ID ESBSSSSKSSS BHIKHMtannSSISSSSSSSSXSISXSSS Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences Action Item Request Action Item Response sssttiissrissssssssssssssssssssssxrstssss 2 III - A HM-101/102-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 NO FLOW BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 CAUSE: VALVE CLOSED FILTER PLUG PUMP FAILURE DRUM EMPTY LINE PLUG ACT: SRO OTP SUGG. PRESSURE GAUGES EITHER SIDE OF FL-045 NOTE: PC'S ADDED TO PI&D CONSEQ: LOSS OF FLOW POSSIBLE LEAKAGE AND PERSONNEL EXPOSURE HM-101/102-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 REVERSE FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: HM-101/102-E-A13-1 P&IO: MS003668 BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 INCREASED FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: 2 III - A HM-101/102-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED PRESSURE BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 CAUSE: SEE NO FLOW CONSEQ: HM-101/102-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: 2 III - A HM-101/102-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED FLOW BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 CAUSE: SEE NO FLOW FILTER ORAIN OPEN CONSEQ: SEE NO FLOW 2 III - A HM-101/102-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED PRESSURE BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 CAUSE: SEE NO FLOW CONSEQ: HM-101/102-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: HM-101/102-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 DIAPHRAGM FAILURE CAUSE: INCOMPATABILITY CONSEQ: PUMP FAILURE POSSIBLE PERSONNEL EXPOSURE ACT: CONFIRM C0MPATA8ILITY JAW=> 1 B HM-101/102-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 STATIC CHARGE BUS FROM DRUM TO TK-021 CAUSE: FAILURE TO GROUND DRUM/LINE CONSEQ: FIRE EXPLOSION ACT: SRO GROUNDING PROCEDURE AND OTP VABR.j0001089253 Page NO. 07/24/89 3 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code & Frequency Equipment Description P&ID VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences AI-149/150-N-M2-1 UTILITY AIR LINES P&ID: MS003668 NO FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: AI-149/150-N-M2-1 UTILITY AIR LINES P&ID: MS003668 REVERSE FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: AI-149/150-N-M2-1 UTILITY AIR LINES P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED FLOW AI-149/150-N-M2-1 UTILITY AIR LINES P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED PRESSURE AI-149/150-N-M2-1 UTILITY AIR LINES P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED TEMPERATURE AI-149/150-N-M2-1 UTILITY AIR LINES P&ID: HS003668 REDUCED FLOW AI-149/150-N-M2-1 UTILITY AIR LINES P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: AI-149/150-N-M2-1 UTILITY AIR LINES P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED TEMPERATURE IV - B IN-219-N-A2-2<M2-2) P&ID: MS003668 NITROGEN SUPPLY TO TANK NO FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: BOTTLE EMPTY VALVE CLOSED IN-219-N*A2"2(M2-2) P&ID: MS003668 NITROGEN SUPPLY TO TANK REVERSE FLOW 4 IV - B IN-219-N-A2-2CM2-2) P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED FLOW NITROGEN SUPPLY TO TANK CONSEQ: NO BLANKET - LONG TERM DEGRADATION TO BUS CAUSE: IMP CONSEQ: CAUSE: REGULATOR FAILURE CONSEQ: RELIEF Action Item Request Action Item Response ACT: THIS LINE REPRESENTS MINOR OPERABILITY PROBLEMS ONLY ACT: ACT: NONE REQUIRED ACT: ACT: NONE REQUIRED VAB.0001089254 Page No. 07/24/89 4 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code & Frequency Equipment Description P&ID VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HA20P) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Deviation Description Caused By: Consequences - IN-219-N-A2-2(M2-2) P&ID: MS003668 NITROGEN SUPPLY TO TANK - IN-219`N`AZ-2(M2'2) P&ID: MS003668 NITROGEN SUPPLY TO TANK - IN-219-N-A2-2(M2-2) P&ID: MS003668 NITROGEN SUPPLY TO TANK - IN-219-N-A2-2CM2-2) P&ID: MS003668 NITROGEN SUPPLY TO TANK - IN-219*N-A2-2(M2-2) P&ID: MS003668 NITROGEN SUPPLY TO TANK IV - B HM-101-E-A13-1 RECIRCULATION LINE P&ID: MS003668 - HM-101-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 RECIRCULATION LINE - HM-101-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 RECIRCULATION LINE - HM-101-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 RECIRCULATION LINE - HM-101-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 RECIRCULATION LINE - HM-101-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 RECIRCULATION LINE - HM-101-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003668 RECIRCULATION LINE INCREASED PRESSURE INCREASED TEMPERATURE REDUCED FLOW REDUCED PRESSURE REDUCED TEMPERATURE NO FLOW REVERSE FLOW INCREASED FLOW INCREASED PRESSURE INCREASED TEMPERATURE REDUCED FLOW REDUCED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: PLUGGED LINE CLOSED VALVE CONSEQ: OPERATIONS PROBLEM CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP Action Item Request Action Item Response ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: NONE REQUIRED ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: VAB.0001089255 Page No. 07/24/89 5 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code & Frequency Equipment Description P&IO VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences HN-101-E-A13-1 RECIRCULATION LINE P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: 4 IV - A HM-103-E-A13-KM2-1) P&ID: MS003668 NO FLOW PUMPS PP-143/144 SUCTION CAUSE: VALVE CLOSED LINE PLUGGED PUMP FAILURE EMPTY TANK CONSEQ: LOSS OF FLOW REACTOR SEQ. SHUTS DOWN HM-103-E"A13*1(M2-1) P&ID: MS003668 PUMPS PP>143/144 SUCTION REVERSE FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: 4 IV - D HM-103-E-A13-KM2-1) P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED FLOW PUMPS PP-143/144 SUCTION CAUSE: LINE BREAKAGE CONSEQ: LOSS OF TK-021 CONTENTS PRODUCTION LOSS HM-103-E-A13-KM2-1) P&ID: MS003668 PUMPS PP-143/144 SUCTION INCREASED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: HM'103'E'A13*1(M2`1) P&ID: MS003668 PUMPS PP-143/144 SUCTION INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: 4 IV - A HN-103-E'A13'1(M2-1) P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED FLOW PUMPS PP-143/144 SUCTION CAUSE: SEE LOSS OF FLOW CONSEQ: HM-103-E-A13-KM2-1) P&ID: MS003668 PUMPS PP-143/144 SUCTION REDUCED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: HM-103-E-A13-1(M2-1) P&ID: MS003668 PUMPS PP-143/144 SUCTION REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: 2 III - A HM-104/105/106/107-8 P&IO: MS003668 NO FLOW PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA CAUSE: BLOCKED LINE PUMP METER INSTRUMENT FAILURE PLUGGED FILTER t-0**?** i fgjbtovtruo*) Action Item Request Action Item Response ACT: ACT: NONE REQUIRED ACT: ACT: NONE REQUIRED ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: SRO OTP VAB.0001089256 Page NO. 07/24/89 6 Risk Criticality Equip 10 Code & Frequency Equipment Description P&ID VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Uithout Grouping) Deviation Description Caused By: Consequences Action Item Request Action Item Response - HM-104/105/106/107-8 P&10: MS003668 REVERSE FLOW PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: ACT: HM-104/105/106/107-8 P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED FLOW PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: * * HM-104/105/106/107-8 P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA CONSEQ: HM-104/105/106/107-8 P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA CONSEQ: ACT: ACT: 2 III - A HM-104/105/106/107-8 P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED FLOW PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA - HM-104/105/106/107-8 P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED PRESSURE PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA - HM-104/105/106/107-8 P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED TEMPERATURE PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA CAUSE: SEE NO-FLOW, OPEN BLEEDERS CONSEQ: SEE NO-FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: ACT: ACT: 2 Ill - A HM-104/105/106/107-8 P&ID: MS003668 MODICON FAILURE PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA CAUSE: LOSS OF POWER HARDWARE PROBLEMS (I/O, CPU, ETC.) ACT: SRO RESPONSE PROCEDURES AND VERIFY PERIODIC UPS CHECKS CONSEQ: LOST PRODUCTION WCE=> 2 III - A HM-104/105/106/107-8 P&ID: MS003668 MAINTENANCE PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA 4 IV - A HM-104/105/106/107-8 P&ID: MS003668 PUMP SEAL FAILURE PP-143/44 TO REACTOR AREA CAUSE: PUMP FILTER CONSEQ: POSSIBLE PERSONNEL EXPOSURE CAUSE: OVERHEATING, BEARING FAILURE, IMPROPER FLUSH, COUPLING FAILURE ACT: SRO MAINTENANCE PREP. PARTS STOCKING PPG ACT: SRO MAI NT, SCHEDULING PROCEDURES 4 IV - B HM109 P&ID: MS003668 NO FLOW PUMP RELIEF LINE CONSEQ: SEAL LEAK, PUMP FAILURE CAUSE: VALVE BLOCKED, LINE PLUGGED, PSV FAILS CONSEQ: PUMP FAILURE, POSSIBLE EXPOSURE ACT: VAB.0001089257 Page No. 07/24/89 7 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code & Frequency Equipment Description P&ID VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences Action Item Request Action Item Response HM109 PUMP RELIEF LINE P&ID: MS003668 REVERSE FLOW CAUSE: PSV FAIL OPEN CONSEQ: NAP ACT: 4 IV - B HM109 P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED FLOW PUMP RELIEF LINE CAUSE: PSV FAIL, FLOW WHEN NOT DESIRED CONSEQ: LOSS OF BUS FORWARD FLOW, SYSTEM SEQUENCE SHUTDOWN, EXPOSURE ACT: HM109 PUMP RELIEF LINE P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: HM109 PUMP RELIEF LINE P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: HM109 PUMP RELIEF LINE P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: HH109 PUMP RELIEF LINE P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: HM109 PUMP RELIEF LINE P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: TK-021 BUS TANK P&ID: MS003668 NO FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: TK-021 BUS TANK P&ID: MS003668 REVERSE FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: TK-021 BUS TANK P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: III - C TK-021 BUS TANK P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED PRESSURE CAUSE: CONSERVATION VENT FAIL CONSEQ: TANK FAIL, SPILL. EXPOSURE ACT: REVIEW FILL PROCEDURE, VERIFY NEED FOR CHECK VALVE IN N2 LINE DEK=> VAB.0001089258 Page No. 07/24/89 8 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code 8 Frequency Equipment Description P&ID VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Deviation Description Caused By: Consequences: Action Item Request Action Item Response TK-021 BUS TANK P&ID: MS003668 INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: EXTERNAL FIRE CONSEQ: TANK OVERPRESUURE ACT: CONFIRM VENT SIZED FOR FIRE CASE JAW=> TK-021 BUS TANK P&ID: MS003666 REDUCED FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: TK-021 BUS TANK P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED PRESSURE CAUSE: LOSS OF N2, CONSERVATION VENT FAIL CONSEQ: IMPROBABLE ACT: 4 IV - B TK-021 BUS TANK P&ID: MS003668 REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: LOSS OF HEAT TRACE CONSEQ: BUS FREEZE/CONGEAL ACT: 4 IV - A TK-021 BUS TANK P&ID: MS003668 LEVEL SENSING CAUSE: SIGHT GLASS DISCOLORED OR PLUGGED, PROBE FAILURE ACT: CONSEQ: LOSS OF LEVEL INDICATION OR ALARM IV - A TK-021 BUS TANK P&ID; MS003668 OVERFILLING CAUSE: 4 DRUMS DON'T FIT IN TANK CONSEQ: SPILL ACT: SRO FILLING PROCEDURE JAW=> HM-111-120 P&ID: MS003669 BUS REACTOR INLET LINES NO FLOW CAUSE: PLUGGED NOZZLE, BLOCKED VALVE, PLUGGED LINE CONSEQ: SEQUENCE SHUTDOWN, LOSS OF BUS FLOW, LOST PRODUCTION ACT: PETE REVIEW PCS> HM-111-120 P&ID: MS003669 BUS REACTOR INLET LINES REVERSE FLOW CAUSE: IMPROBABLE, THROUGH NOZZLE CONSEQ: ACT: HM-111-120 P&ID: MS003669 BUS REACTOR INLET LINES INCREASED FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: HM-111-120 P&ID: MS003669 BUS REACTOR INLET LINES INCREASED PRESSURE HM-111-120 P&ID: MS003669 BUS REACTOR INLET LINES INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: SEE OTHER LINES CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP ACT: act: VAB.0001089259 Page NO. 07/24/89 9 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code & Frequency Equipment Description P&ID VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: Action Item Request Action Item Response HM-111-120 P&ID: MS003669 BUS REACTOR INLET LINES REDUCED FLOW CAUSE: SEE OTHER LINES CONSEQ: HM-111-120 P&ID: MS003669 BUS REACTOR INLET LINES REDUCED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: 3 III - B HM-111-120 P&ID: MS003669 REDUCED TEMPERATURE BUS REACTOR INLET LINES CAUSE: HEAT TRACE FAILURE CONSEQ: NOZZLE PLUG, POOR BUS COATING 2 II - B HM-111-120 P&ID: MS003669 CATASTROPHIC LINE FAILURE CAUSE: VIBRATION, IMPACT BUS REACTOR INLET LINES CONSEQ: EXPOSURE , VCM RELEASE 2 III - A HM-111-120 P&ID: MS003669 MAINTENANCE BUS REACTOR INLET LINES CAUSE: PLUGGED NOZZLE CONSEQ: PRODUCTION LOSS CONTAMINATION PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IV - B UX-130/139-E-A13-1 WATER FLUSH LINE P&IO: MS003669 NO FLOW CAUSE: CHECK VALVE PLUGGED VALVE PLUGGED WX-130/139-E-A13-1 WATER FLUSH LINE P&ID: MS003669 WX-130/139-E-A13-1 WATER FLUSH LINE P&ID: MS003669 UX-130/139-E-A13-1 WATER FLUSH LINE P&ID: MS003669 WX-130/139-E-A13-1 WATER FLUSH LINE P&ID: MS003669 IV - A WX-130/139-E-A13-1 WATER FLUSH LINE P&ID: MS003669 REVERSE FLOW INCREASED FLOW INCREASED PRESSURE INCREASED TEMPERATURE REDUCED FLOW CONSEQ: PLUGGED NOZZLE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: FILTER PLUGGED LOW HEADER PRESSURE f Visr .3 . pLvu,)7 fc ACT: ACT: ACT: SRO WINTERIZATION, OTP ACT: SRO OTP, SUPPORT DESIGN, MAINT. PROC ACT: SRO OTP, MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: VAB.0001089260 Page No. 07/24/89 10 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code & Frequency Equipment P&ID VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY <TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences WX-130/139-E-A13-1 WATER FLUSH LINE P&ID: MS003669 REDUCED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: - WX-130/139-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003669 REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP WATER FLUSH LINE CONSEQ: 3 MI - B WX-130/139-E-A13-1 P&ID: MS003669 FILTERS (300,400) WATER FLUSH LINE CAUSE: CARBON STEEL LINE CONSEQ: CONTAMINATED RESIN PLUGGED NOZZLE 3 III * B SM-139/148-H-A13 P&ID: MS0036669 NO FLOW STEAM LINES CAUSE: CLOSED GLOBE VALVE PLUGGED LINE UTILLITY FAILURE CONSEQ: IMPROPER BUS INJECTION 4 III - C SM-139/148-H-A13 P&ID: MS0036669 REVERSE FLOW STEAM LINES CAUSE: KILL VALVES LEAK IMPROPER SEQUENCE OF VALVES CONSEQ: 1SONOX COATING IN STEAM LINE, ISONOX IN NEXT BATCH, BAD BATCH 4 IV - A SM-139/148-H-A13 P&ID: MS0036669 INCREASED FLOW STEAM LINES CAUSE: GLOBE VALVE OPEN TOO WIDE CAT. PIPE FAILURE CONSEQ: OVERHEAT REACTOR PRODUCTION LOSS THERMAL BURN NOZZLE DAMAGE * SM-139/148-H-A13 P&ID: MS0036669 INCREASED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP STEAM LINES CONSEQ: SM-139/148-H-A13 P&ID: MS0036669 INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP STEAM LINES CONSEQ: SM-139/148-H-A13 STEAM LINES P&ID: MS0036669 REDUCED FLOW * SM-139/148-H-A13 P&ID: MS0036669 REDUCED PRESSURE STEAM LINES CAUSE: SEE NO FLOW CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP Action Item Request Action Item Response ACT: ACT: ACT: REVIEW THAT ALL CS LINE HAVE FILTERS SAI => ACT: ACT: CONFIRM TSO VALVES ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: + ACT: VAB.0001089261 Page NO. 07/24/89 11 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code & Frequency Equipment Description P&IO VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY <TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences Action Item Request Action Item Response SM-139/148-H-A13 STEAM LINES P&IO: MS0036669 REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: 4 IV - B HM-122/128 KILL LINES P&ID: MS003669 NO FLOW CAUSE: PLUGGED LIN LOSS OF TRACING CONSEQ: BAD 600 BATCH ACT: HM-122/128 KILL LINES P&ID: MS003669 REVERSE FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: HM-122/128 KILL LINES P&ID: MS003669 INCREASED FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: HM-122/128 KILL LINES P&ID: MS003669 INCREASED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: HM-122/128 KILL LINES P&ID: MS003669 INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: ACT: HM-122/128 KILL LINES P&ID: MS003669 REDUCED FLOW HM-122/128 KILL LINES P&ID: MS003669 REDUCED PRESSURE HM-122/128 KILL LINES P&ID: MS003669 REDUCED TEMPERATURE 4 IV - A 2.5-WP-105 P&ID: P+ID #3 NO FLOW LINE TO SMALL BLEND TANKS CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: LOSS OF TRACING CONSEQ: PLUGGED LINE CAUSE: BLOCKED VALVE,PLUGGEO LINE, PUMP FAILURE, PLUGGED STRAINER ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: IV - B 2.5-WP-105 P&IO: P+IO #3 LINE TO SMALL BLEND TANKS REVERSE FLOW CONSEQ: LOSS OF PRODUCTION CAUSE: VALVE ALIGNMENT ON STRIPPERS CONSEQ: OVERFILL BATCH STRIPPERS AND ERS SYSTEM ACT: VAB.0001089262 Page No. 07/24/89 12 Risk Code isas Criticality ft Frequency Equip ID Equipment Description ssssssssszssseniru PftIO 2.5-WP-105 P&ID: P+ID #3 LINE TO SMALL BLEND TANKS 2.5-WP-105 P&ID: P+ID #3 LINE TO SMALL BLEND TANKS 2.5-WP-105 P&ID: P+ID #3 LINE TO SMALL BLEND TANKS 2.5-WP-105 P&ID: P+ID #3 LINE TO SMALL BLEND TANKS 2.5-WP-105 P&ID: P+ID #3 LINE TO SMALL BLEND TANKS 4 IV - B 2.5-WP-105 P&ID: P+ID #3 LINE TO SMALL BLEND TANKS 4 IV - A 2.5-UP-105 P&ID: P+ID #3 LINE TO SMALL BLEND TANKS 4 IV - B 2.5-WP-105 P&ID: P+ID #3 LINE TO SMALL BLEND TANKS 3-WP-104 P&ID: P+ID #3 STRIPPER TO CENTRATE 3-UP-104 P&ID: P+ID #3 STRIPPER TO CENTRATE 3-WP-104 P&ID: P+ID #3 STRIPPER TO CENTRATE VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences INCREASED FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: INCREASED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: REDUCED FLOW CAUSE: SEE NO FLOW CONSEQ: REDUCED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: WINTER CONDITIONS CONSEQ: FREEZE LINE PUMP CONSIDERATIONS CAUSE: OVERHEATING, SEAL FAILURE, BEARING FAILURE, CAVITATION, NO FLUSH CONSEQ: PUMP FAILURE PROCESS WATER - NO FLOW CAUSE: CONTROLLER FAILURE, VALVE/LINE PLUGGAGE, FREEZE CONSEQ: PUMP FAILURE NO FLOW CAUSE: CLOSED VALVES, PLUGGED LINE CONSEQ: NAP REVERSE FLOW CAUSE: SEE WP-105 CONSEQ: INCREASED FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: Action Item Request Action Item Response SSSSXSSSSSS3SX1S3XS8SSSSSSSSSSSSSS ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: SRO OTP AND MAINTENANCE ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: VAB.0001089263 Page NO. 07/24/89 13 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP) HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Risk Code sass Criticality Equip ID & Frequency Equipment Description asassssssaas ssasitstssasasaetsass: P&ID Deviation Description Consequences 3-WP-104 P&ID: P+ID #3 STRIPPER TO CENTRATE INCREASED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: 3-UP-104 P&ID: P+ID #3 STRIPPER TO CENTRATE INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: 3-WP-104 P&ID: P+ID #3 STRIPPER TO CENTRATE REDUCED FLOW CAUSE: SEE NO FLOW CONSEQ: 3-UP-104 P&ID: P+ID #3 STRIPPER TO CENTRATE REDUCED PRESSURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: 4 IV - A 3-UP-104 P&ID: P+ID #3 REDUCED TEMPERATURE STRIPPER TO CENTRATE CAUSE: WINTER CONDITIONS CONSEQ: FREEZE LINE 3 UC-100/109 P&IO: JRU SKETCH NO FLOW CUS TO MIDDLE OF JACKET CAUSE: CLOSED VALVE COOLING WATER OFF PLUGGED LINE CONSEQ: POSSIBLE BUILD-UP AND CONTAMINATION, PRODUCTION LOSS WC-100/109 P&ID: JRU SKETCH CUS TO MIDDLE OF JACKET REVERSE FLOW CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: III - B WC-100/109 P&ID: JRU SKETCH CWS TO MIDDLE OF JACKET INCREASED FLOW CAUSE: OPEN GLOBE VALVE CONSEQ: LONG HEAT-UP TIME TEMPERATURE CONTROL PROBLEMS, CU CAP. PROBLEMS IV - B WC-100/109 P&ID: JRW SKETCH CUS TO MIDDLE OF JACKET INCREASED PRESSURE CAUSE: GLOBE VALVE FAILURE CONSEQ: LIFT RELIEF VALVE WC-100/109 P&ID: JRU SKETCH CWS TO MIDDLE OF JACKET INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: Action Item Request Action Item Response lasaaa&ssssaecassaaassassassssssssssass ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: ACT: SRO WINTERIZATION TEST AND SEWER STRIPPER WATER IF ACCEPTABLE ACT: SRO VALVE LOCKING PROCEDURE JAW*> ACT: ACT: VAB.0001089264 Page No. 07/24/89 14 Risk Criticality Equip 10 Code & Frequency Equipment Description p&ID VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (TC COMPLIANCE HAZOP> HAZOP Study Data Report (Without Grouping) Deviation Description Caused By: Consequences - WC-100/109 P&ID: JRW SKETCH REDUCED FLOW CWS TO MIDDLE OF JACKET CAUSE: SEE NO FLOW CONSEQ: WC-100/109 P&ID: JRW SKETCH REDUCED PRESSURE CWS TO MIDDLE OF JACKET CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: WC-100/109 P&ID: JRW SKETCH CWS TO MIDDLE OF JACKET REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: Action Item Request Action Item Response ACT: ACT: ACT: VAR0001089265