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vim chmtcbt, oannn ABXKDUM CnMICTL PLAIT MPPBI, MISSISSIPPI miAiD aid ovnAmm study POft 5305 D8C8DCXF18D lATM SYSTEM rKuJSCT K OCTOBER 1990 VAB.0001089149 Table of Contents HAZOP REPORT VOLUME Legal Notice.....................................................................................................i List of Abbreviations................................................................................ii 1.0 Purpose......................................................................................................................... 2.0 Scope.............................................................................................................................2-1 3.0 Methodology.......................... 3-1 3.1 Introduction..................................................................................................3-2 3.2 Team Members...............................................................................................3-4 3.3 Documents made available ................................................................3-6 3.4 Forms used....................................................................................................3-7 3.5 Preliminary hazard identification.............................................3-7 3.6 Criticality evaluation.......................................................................3-8 3.7 Documents used............................................................................................3-10 4.0 Mitigation.............................................................................................................. 4.1 Mitigation Summary ...................................................................................... 4.2 Critical Identified Hazards................................................................ 5.0 P&IDs.............................................................................................................................. APPENDIX A. Study Data Report by Criticality Rank......................................A-l B. Study Data Report by EquipmentNumber...........................................B-l i VAB.0001089150 LEGAL NOTICE This report was prepared by VISTA Chemical Company ("VISTA") for internal use only. Neither Vista nor any affiliated organizations, nor any person acting in their behalf, (a) makes any warranty, express or implied, with respect to the use of any information or methods disclosed in this report; or (b) assumes any liability with respect to the use of any information or methods disclosed in this report. VAB.0001089151 ACT Aim ALT ATMOS A2-1 A13-1 BLDR BPCV CHK CV DM EX FL FCV F/O H20 HAZAN HAZOP ID INSUL KOH LG LK LS MAINT MALF MATL MAX MIN VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen Chemical Plant List of Abbreviations Actuated Accurately Hazardous Materials Alternate Atmosphere Piping spec Piping spec Bleeder Back Pressure Control Valve Check Control valve Drum % Exchange Filter Flow control valve Fail open Water Hazard Analysis Hazard & Operability Study Identification Insulation Potassium hydroxide Level gage Leak Level switch Maintenance Malfunction Material Maximum Minimum iii VAB.0001089152 VISTA COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen Chemical Plant List of Abbreviations MOC MOD MSDS MV NAP NORM NC NO OTP PAR P&ID PG PIC PM PREP PRESS PROD PRV PSIG REC REG REV RO RV SPEC SRO STD TEMP TG TRANS VAC VCM Material of Construction Module Material Safety Data Sheet Manually operated valve a Normal closed open Operator Training & Procedures Partially Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Pressure Gage Pressure Indicating Controller Preventive maintenance Pressure Production Pressure Relief Valve Pounds per square inch gage Recommend Regulator Revision Restriction orifice Relief Valve Specification Suggested review of Standard Temperature Temperature gauge Transmitter Vacuum Vinyl Chloride Monomer iv m VAB.0001089153 v VISTA COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen Chemical Plant Section 1.0 Purpose The VISTA Chemical Company Aberdeen Plant (Aberdeen, Mississippi) 5305 Decalcified Water System Hazard and operability (HAZOP) study was conducted to serve many purposes. It will bs used to: Provide management with the knowledge of where potential hazards exist in the HF Safety Improvements modifications. Provide safety and operations related documentation for lines and pieces of equipment included in these modifications. Provide a prioritized basis for subsequent risk analysis/assessment work, if necessary. Provide documentation for a Risk Management and Prevention Program. Provide training on HAZOP methodology and techniques for Vista personnel. Performing a HAZOP study is generally an assurance that if procedural and/or engineering modifications are implemented to mitigate risk, the plant will then be operating under some lower risk. It is not, however, a guarantee that no risk exists, nor does it guarantee that hazardous events or operating problems will not be encountered. 1-1 VAB.0001089154 * VISTA COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen Chemical Plant Section 2*0 Scope Vista Chemical Company operates a nominal capacity 455 million pound per year PVC plant located in Aberdeen, Mississippi. The plant manufactures PVC resins by polymerizing VCM in batch reactors. Water is a raw material in the reaction and in 5305 grade resin must be decalcified. The 5305 Decalcified Water System is being installed to address this need. The 5305 Decalcified Water System Project is the subject of this HAZOP study. The hazard identification study focused on the following potential hazards: Personnel injury/death resulting from Fire Explosion Toxic exposure Chemical Contact Thermal Burns Asphyxiation Impact injury Etc. Equipment/property damage resulting from Fire Explosion Corrosion Misoperation Overpressure Vacuum Overheating Etc. Production loss resulting from Equipment damage Maintenance Off specification Turnarounds Raw Material Considerations Etc. Environmental Spills Fugitive Emissions Etc. The HAZOP methodology used during the study is contained in Section 3, the mitigation for the critical identified hazards contained in Section 4, and the criticality sort/data base is contained in an Appendix. is 2-1 VAB.0001089155 section 3.0 Methodology 3.1 introduction 3.2 Team Members 3.3 Document9 Made Available 3.4 l0ias Heed 3.5 Preliminary Hazard zdentifloation 3.4 Criticality Evaluation 3.7 Documents used 3-1 VAB.0001089156 section 3.1 introduction A Hazard and (HhZOP) study is a simple, yet structured investigation for hazard identification. It is an xn the identification of hazards and operational problems. A HAZOP study involves a systematic, methodical examination of design documents that describe the facility. The study performed by a multidisciplinary team to identify potential hazards or operability problems that could result in an accident. Deviations from the design value of key parameters are studied using guide words to control the examination evaluation. This presumes that the design values of flows, temperatures, arid other process variables are inherently safe and operable. The study team consists of trained personnel knowledgeable.in the technology and operations, and the team will have the necessary technical expertise to answer most questions raised during the review without outside assistance. t As a starting point, we will define the following terms: Hazard: Anything (chemical reaction, equipment malfunction or operator error) that can lead to an unwanted event. Operability: Anything that pauses the operator to improvise in his actions. These definitions are an important part of the basic HAZOP premise that the process does not have inherent hazards or operating problems when the unit is operating within design parameters as defined by the basic documents such as the Process Flow Diagrams, equipment specifications, operating procedures, etc. in other words, if there are no deviations from the expected norm, by definition there are no hazard or operability problems. When performing a HAZOP, a proper mix of meeting participants is very important* The mix of participants should normally include most if not all of the following: Team leader Process engineer Mechanical engineer Plant operator Maintenance Electrical Safety Team recorder Instrumentation ' '--"MvMBqapaiMqNpIMHmvWlW 3-2 VMWMMWMP VAB.0001089157 Of these personnel, many are often only part time participants but remain on call for assistance. It can be seen that the electrical, maintenance and other subjects may only be required on a consulting basis. Also, it is important to keep the size of the review team tb a manaoeable number such a* between five to seven so that all members of the teem can participate while keeping the effort moving. The agenda followed during the HAZOP team meetings is as follows: Introduce team members: A short biographical sketch by each team member. Purpoie or goal of HAZOP: A general presentation of the purpose or croal of the HAZOP is made. This serves to direct theiAZOP s HAZOP methodology: A presentation is made by the team facilitator of the methodology to be used in the study. This also establishes the team member "mind set" to conduct an effective HAZOP. Process A process discussion is presented by the Process Engineer to familiarize the HAZOP team With process scenarios which may lead to a hazardous condition as Weil as to ensure that all team members have a clear understanding of the basic process. AHM properties: An identification and discussion by an industrial hygienist or other knowledgeable person is presented to establish a team recognition of the AHM toxic and Identify hazards: A preliminary identification by team members of hazards present within the process. This to focus the HAZOP study. Scope the HAZOP: once the AHM properties are established and discernible HAZOP hazards are identified, the HAZOP scope X EP I* * Establish criticality and frequency ratings: Hazard parameters are set by the team for subsequent of HAZOP identified hazards. Define dispersion models: The team identifies AHM release scenarios which will be different cases for dispersion modeling outside of the HAZOP team meeting. PCHAZOP* on-line: Load the PCHAZOP* computer program for recording HAZOP team proceedings. HAZOP team meetings: A systematic segment by segment team review of the facilities contained within the job scope 3-3 VAB.0001089158 HAZOP A formal facilitator, reviewed and and than are contents. is prepared by the team by the other members, of the team meetings. thechapter for report The HAZOP identified one (1) critical ranked potential hazard with a criticality rank of 2, i.e., which should be improved. Suggested mitigation for this critical ranked hazard is covered in Section 4.0. . The HAZOP identified ten (10) non-critical ranked hazards which require verification that the appropriate engineering arid/or administrative controls are in place. The team identified no hazards of the most critical ranking, that is a hazard rated I-A, i.e., a hazard which could potentially cause a major event to occur more often than once per year. In the event; the HAZOP team did identify a hazard that it considered to represent an imminent danger to life or property, the team would have given a verbal presentation to plant management in order to expedite any required mitigation. Section 3*2 Team Members The HAZOP study team assembled to identify potential hazard or operability problems should be composed of a multiple disciplined team with the sufficient technical expertise to answer most guide word deviation questions without resorting to further expertise. The HAZOP study team meetings were held at the VISTA Aberdeen Chemical plant site in Aberdeen, Mississippi. All team members conducting the HAZOP study are employees of VISTA from the Aberdeen plant. They are as follows: Attendee Expertise/Responsibility Dale Andrews* Mike Kane* Ed Mize* Dave Moore* Rendell Mewton# Needham itahl* Jim White* Steve Hillman* Instrument Technician Senior Process Engineer Maintenence Representative Process Engineer Chief Process Engineer Chief Lead Operator Mechanical Engineer Trainer/Facilitator * full time # = part time 3-4 VAB.0001089159 section 3*3 Documents ud available Prior to the start of the HAQP, the necessary reference documentation needs to be assembled and made available for use and reference during the HAZOP team study. A meaningful HAZOP study cannot be conducted without the required documentation to review. Assembly of the documentation optimizes the chance for a successful HAZOP. NEW MODULE DECALCIFIED WATER SYSTEM P&ID - October 1, 1990 OLD MODULE DECALCIFIED CHARGE WATER P&ID - August 9, 1990 section 3.4 Forms used The HAZOP team data was recorded on standardized forms containing the key questions and answer elements of the HAZOP; one form for each line segment investigated, one form for each equipment item investigated. The ribults of the HAZOP studies were recorded on the SWEC proprietary computerized program "PCHAZOP", which is a PC based program designed to provide a simple method for recording and * documenting the HAZOP process. The program is designed to run in a database environment to facilitate data storage and retrieval. The results of the HAZOP studies are included in the Appendix within Section A sorted according to criticality rank end within Section B sorted according to equipment number or line segment. section 3.5 Preliminary hazard identification During the initial stage of the HAZOPs, the team should prepare a preliminary list of potential hazards likely to be encountered during the study. This serves to establish the team's mind-set in hazard identification and focus attention during the study. The preliminary hazard identification yielded the following five hazards: Impact - from a fall or from contacting rotating heavy machinery potentially causing physiological injury, death, or equipment damage. Fire - resulting from the ignition of a flammable material potentially causing physiological injury and or equipment damage. Thermal burn - resulting from the contact with a hot or cold material potentially causing physiological injury due to thermal stress. Corrosion - resulting from non-contained chemicals potentially causing equipment failure. 3-5 VAB.0001089160 A Section 3*6 Criticality mluatlon During the initial stage of the HAZOPs, the team should develop a criticality rating and a probability rating for preparation of a hazard ranking matrix. This is to allow screening of identified hazards by prioritization and sorting to focus subsequent corrective action on the significant identified hazards; eliminating the insignificant or trivial hazards from any further consideration To this end, a hazard rating index and a risk ranking matrix was developed in the HAZOP team review as follows: BfclJUlD RATIHQ ZBDBX Criticality Rating I Hajor II Severe III Moderate An incident which may result in a possible lost time injury, or a reportable VCM release, or damage or production loss greater than $1,000,C00 An incident which may result in a restricted work case, or a VCM release, or severe deunage or production lobs between $50,000 and $1,000,000 An incident which may result in a recordable injury, or moderate damage or production loss between $10,000 and $50,000 IV Slight Loss of containment of small amounts of flammable material which may result in slight damage or production loss less than $10,000 Frequency Rating A Frequent Expected to occur frequently in the life of a single plant, i.e., may occur more frequently than once per year B Probable Expected to occur in the life of a single plant, i.e., may occur between 1 and 100 years C Occasional Could occur ih the life of a single plant but expected to occur once in the life of multiple plants, i.e., may occur between 100 and 10,000 years D Remote Unlikely to occur in the life of multiple plants, i.e., may occur less frequently than once per 10,000 years 3-6 VAB.0001089161 RISK RANKING MATRIX Frequency AB C D C R I T I C A L n* t Y The risk ranking codes assigned to each grid of the risk ranking matrix are as follows: Risk Ranking 1 Unacceptable Mitigation planning should be completed within six month# using engineering and/or administrative controls to reduce the risk ranking to a 3 or less. 2 Undesirable Mitigation planning should be completed within twelve months using engineering and/or h<taM^a40tXRtive controls to reduce the risk ranking to a 3 or less. 3 Acceptable with controls Should be verified that procedures or controls are in place 4 Acceptable as No mitigation action required 3-7 # VAB.0001089162 SECTION 4. MITIGATION SECTION 4.X MITIGATION SUMMARY ITEMS WITH A CRITICAL RARE OF 1 Risk COdS I-A No references sighted. Risk Cods I-B No references sighted. Risk Cods II-A No references sighted. ITEMS WITH A CRITICAL RANK OF 2 Risk COdS I-C No references sighted. Risk Cods II--B One reference sighted. d Item 1 Malfunction Causing in reverse flow of VCM into Depletion of the plant nitrogen system due which may result in a severe consequence of probable occurrence. 1 reference see nacres 1 Risk Cods III--A No references sighted. h VAB.0001089163 3-8 SECTION 4.2 MITIGATION SHEETS SUMMARY OF CRITICAL IDENTIFIED HAZARDS Page 1 5305 DECALCIFIED WATER SYSTEM .L' i y CRITICAL RANK: 2,UNDESIRABLE - SHOULD BE IMPROVED * SEVERE CONSEQUENCE = PROBABLE OCCURRENCE DEVIATION: REVERSED FLOW II--B EQUIPMENT NUMBER: LIMES 101/102/106 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: 45-1013 INLET LINE CAUSE: BOTH WATER CHARGE PUMPS FAIL AND CHECK VALVE FAILS WHILE CV--103B/MV(106) ARE OPEN CONSEQUENCE: VCM TO HOT WATER TANK, VCM RELEASE. SUGGESTED MITIGATION: SRO LOW FLOW ON CHARGE WATER, SRO PUMP RUN INTERLOCKS n plovl +0 d RESOLUTION: COMMENTS: VAB.0001089164 Page No, 11/05/90 1 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (5305 DECALCIFIES HATER SYSTEM) HAZQP Study Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) Risk Criticality Equip II PUD ^ l Frequency Cquipueet Description **** ******** >MMMntinntuixttnn:mnMtt Deviation Description Caused By: Consequences: tstnsnatmnmamnnnus Action life Request Action I tee Reap--se H Risk Code is: 2 2 II - I LINES 101/102/104 DM013 INLET LINE PUD: I NEN ROD REVERSE FUN CAUSE: DOTH PIMPS FAIL I CHECK VALVE FAtL,CV103D/HV!0i OPEN C0NSE9: VCH TO H20 TANK, VCH RELEASE DAH=> \JC SA Oil'll do VAB.0001089165 k Faye No. 11/05/90 2 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code k Frequency Equipeeet Description VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZOP Study Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) PUD Caused By: Deviation Description Cossequences: Action Iten Request Action Itee Response It Risk Code is: 3 3 III - B BRINE NKUP I CHS TKS PUD: I I 2 TANKS IN BOTH MODULES CORROSION III - I ION El VESS 43-1013 PtID: 1 NEH NOD ION EXCHANGE VESSEL REVERSE FLOH III - B ION El VESS 43-1013 PUD: I NEH MOD ION EXCHANGE VESSEL REDUCED TEMPERATURE 3 II - C LINE 103/10B/109 PUD: I NEH HOD INCREASED PRESSURE 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE III - B LINE 103/108/109 PUD: I NEH MOD 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE REVERSE aOH 3 III - B LINE 103/100/109 PUD: 1 NEH MOO REDUCED TEMPERATURE 45-1013 B1SCHAR6E LINE I III - B LINE 105/110/104 PUD: NEH MOD INCREASED FLDN PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 3 II - C LINES 101/102/104 PAID: 1 NEH NOB INCREASED PRESSURE 43-1013 INLET LINE 3 III - B LINES 101/102/104 PUD: 1 NEH NOG REDUCED TEMPERATURE 45-1013 INLET LINE 3 III - B P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: I NEH NOD INCREASED PRESSURE REGENERATION HEAOER CAUSE: POOR RINSING ACT: SRO OTP ON CLEANUP PROCEDURES CONSEO: STRESS CORROSION CRACKING, TANK FAILURE DAN=> CAUSE: SEE LINE 103/108/109 CONSEO: CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 ACT: CONSEO: CAUSE; SEE LINE 101/102/104 CONSEO: CAUSE: BOTH PUMPS AND CHECK VALVE FAILS,CV103C/HV OPEN Ar- * +. ir . .4 CONSEO: LOOSE ION RESIN. SLON H20 CHARGE CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 CONSED: CAUSE: 105IIV OPEN TOO MUCH CONSEO: FLUSH OUT RESIN r^ STARTUP BAN*> ki -hi. fa CAUSE: FIRE, HV CLOSE, FILTER PLU6, LINE PLUG, PRV101/102 FAIL ACT: CONSEO: VESSEL FAIL, 6ASKET FAIL, LOSS PROD, INJURY 4 CAUSE: COLD H20 CONTROL FAILS, LACK OF USE, INSULATION OFF ACT: SRO NINTERUATION PROCEDURES AND DTP ON N1NTEREI1NI, PN INSUL CONSEO: FREEIE SYSTEH, COLD CHARGE (PARTICLE SUE) JHV*> CAUSE: P-702 DEADHEAD/BACK PRESS CONTROLLER FAIL, MOHV OPEN/BACKPRESS CONSEO: PUHP FAILURE (OLD ROD MORE CR1T1CAI DUE TO PIRIP TYPE) ACT: BYPASS BEING ADDED IN OLD NODULE (EXISTS IN NIN HOOI, SON OTP * JLN=> (fotJ VAB.0001089166 t. Pije No. 11/05/90 3 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code t Frequency Equipaeet Description t VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY l5105 DECALCIFIED MATER SYSTEM) HA2QP Study Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) PUD Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: Action Iten Request Action I tea Response tt Risk Code is: 4 4 IV - A 2-W-207 TANK Efl LINE 4 IV - A 2-MO-207 TANK EO LINE 4 IV - A 2-MO-207 TANK EQ LINE 4 IV - B 2-MO-207 TANK EO LINE PUD: 2 OLD KOI NO FLOM PUD: 2 OLD HOI REDUCED FLOM PUD: 2 OLD HOD REDUCED PRESSURE PUD: 2 OLD HOD REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: VALVE CLOSED, PUMP FAILURE CONSEO: PARTIAL REGENERATION 4C*r 4M OTP CAUSE: PARTIAL MV CLOSED, LINE BLOCKA6E, PUMP PROBLEMS CONSEO: SLIM REGENERATION T-V i -.r1 SjNCTF f CAUSE: PUMP BLOCKED IN AT TANK CONSEO: PUHP CAVITATION CAUSE: COLD HEATHER CDNSEQ: FREEZE LIKE AND PUHP IV - A ION El VESS 45-1013 PUD: I MEN NOD ION E1CNRNGE VESSEL NO FLON CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 CONSEO: ACT: 4 IV - A ION EX VESS 45-1013 PUD: 1 MEN NOD INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 ION EICHRN6E VESSEL CONSEB: 4 IV - A ION El VESS 45-1013 PUD: 1 KEN HOD REDUCED FLOM ION EXCHANGE VESSEL CAUSE: SEE LIME 103/100/109 CONSED: 4 IV - A ION EX VESS 45-1013 PUD: ! MEN HOD REDUCED PRESSURE ION EXCHANGE VESSEL CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 CONSEO: 4 IV - A ION El VESS 45-1013 PUD: 1 NEH HDD MAINTENANCE ION E1CHAN6E VESSEL CAUSE: REPLACE RESIN, INSPECT INTERNALS, SAMPLE RESIN, TEST PRV CONSEB: POTENTIAL VCH EXPOSURE, POTENTIAL SLIP/TRIP HAZARDS i di*i1' ' 1< 4 IV - A ION EX VESS 45-1013 PUD: 1 NCR MOD STAR TUP/SHUTDOWN ION EXCHANGE VESSEL CAUSE: REPLACE RESIN, SAMPLE RESIN, INSPECT VESSEL CONSEB: DISRUPT DEO, POTENTIAL BURN HAZARD, LEAK NATER INTO VESSEL -W DAHO w mmtmmmmmrnmimmitm PMMMPMMMNMW PPPPPP VAB.0001089167 P*9 No. 11/05/90 4 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code 1 Frequency Equipsent Description VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY <5305 DECALCIFIED MATED SYSTEM) HAZQP Study Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) PtIB Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: Action Itea Request Action Itee Response 4 IV - B ION El VESS 45-1013 PiID: I NEN NOD INCREASED PRESSURE ION EXCHAN6E VESSEL CAUSE: SEE LINE 103/I0B/I09 CONSEO: DEADHEAD TREATMENT PUMP ACT: 5R0 OTP 4 IV - A LINE 103/108/109 PUD: 1 NEN NOD NO FLON 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 NO FLON. 106MV/105MV OPEN ACT ft CONSEB: BAD BATCH, LOST PRODUCTION. POORER DUALITY PRODUCT 4 IV - A LINE 103/108/109 PIID: 1 NEN MOD INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 45-1013 01SQMRBE LINE CONSEO: 4 IV - A LINE 103/1OB/109 PUD: I NEN NOD REDUCED FLON 45-1013 DI5CMARBE LINE CAUSE: (SEE NO FLON), FILTER PUJ66E0, NV PARTIALLY CLOSED CONSEO: SLON CHARGE 4 IV - A LINE 103/106/109 PIID: 1 NEN MOO SAMPLING AT LINE 108 CAU5E: CHECK DUALITY 45-1013 DISCMAR6E LINE CONSEB: POTENTIAL BURN, POTENTIAL TRIP/SLIP HAZARD 4 IV - B LINE 103/I0B/109 PIID: 1 NEN HOD INCREASED FLON 45-1013 DISCHAR6E LINE CAUSE: ION El RESIN LOSS, 11QNV OPEN, I09HV TO DRAIN OPEN ACT: RECOMMEND INSTALL CHECK VALVE IN LINE 110 AT PUNP. SRO DTP CONSEO: SLON CHARGE, BACK UP INTO 9H20 TANK JME=> 4 IV - B LINE 103/108/109 PIID: I NEN HOD REDUCED PRESSURE 45-1013 OISCHAftSE LINE CAUSE: I09NV OPEN, ION BED PLU66ED, FILTER PLUGGED, PUMPS FAIL CONSED: SLON CHARGE 4 IV - B LINE 105/110/104 PIID: I NEN MOO REDUCED TEMPERATURE PROCESS H2D THRU 45-1013 4 IV - A LINE 105/110/104 PIID: 1 NEN NOD REVERSE FLON PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 CAUSE: TRACIN6 FAILURE,INSULATION MISSING C0N5EB: FREEZE UP LINE. INEFFECTIVE BACKNASH, LINE RUPTURE CAUSE: OPEN 105HV.L0SS MATER PRES. CONSED: SLON CHARGE OR ABORT BATCH ACT: SRO NINTERIZATION PROCEDURES JHV=> ACT: SEE LINE 101/102/104, CHICK VALVE LINE 105, SRO OTP JLNO VAB.0001089168 Page No. 11/05/90 5 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY 15105 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZOP Stud/ Data Report (Brouped by Risk Codes) Risk Code Criticality Equip ID PHD Caused By: It Freqeeecy Equipaeat Description Deviation Description Consequences: "sssassssss ststsuitvsttssssttsktvsisessissssssssesK EMfststtosesssI2cssiz:z: ssttsssngssatsssss'ssasssascsasxssssssssxs Action Itee Requeet Action Itee Response mS>2SN2X33nsSlSSIS522S32tSSES222: IV - A LINE 105/110/104 PUD: 1 MEN NOD INCREASED PRESSURE PROCESS N2S THRU 45-1015 4 IV - R LINE 105/110/104 PHD: 1 MEN HOD NO FLDN PROCESS K20 THRU 45-1013 4 IV - B LINE 105/110/104 PHD: I MEN MOO REDUCED FLON PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 4 IV - 6 LINE 105/110/104 PHD: 1 NEN NOD REDUCED PRESSURE PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 4 IV - B LINE 107 PHD: I NEN HOD REDUCED TEHPERATURE SOFT NATER HAKE UP 4 IV - A LINE 107 PAID: 1 NEN HOD REDUCED aON SOFT HATER MAKE UP 4 IV - A LINE 107 PHD: 1 NEN NOD REDUCED PRESSURE SOFT HATER HAKE UP 4 IV - B LINE 107 PHD: 1 NEN NOD NO FLON SOFT HATER HAKE UP 4 IV - t LINE 107 PAID: I NEN HOD INCREASED PRESSURE SOFT NATER HAKE UP CAUSE: HELL PRESSURE RES FAILURE,105 MV .jjpmmm OPEN(NORM DP) CONSEO: FLUSH RESIN OUT, CAUSE: MV CLOSED, VESSa OR LINE PLU66ED, LOSS OF H20 PRESS CONSEO: CANT RINSE,CANT USE SYSTEM 4 CAUSE: LINE DLOCKA6E,I05HV PAR. CLOSED. DED PLUMED, CONSEfi: IMPROPER RED FLUSH, SNITCH PROD. CAUSE: LOSS DF H20 PRESSURE,DRAIN VALVE OPEN, HORN ORIFICE CONSEfi: IMPROPER BED FLUSH CAUSE: TRACING FAILURE. INSULATION HISSING CONSEfi: FROZEN LINE, METER BURST. LINE BURST ACT: SRO HINTERIZAT10N aAH JHV*> CAUSE: ACTUATED OR HV PART. OPEN. METER PROBLEMS CONSEO: SLON HAKE UP, DVERFLOH TANK CAUSE: SEE 103/108/109 CONSEfi: CAUSE: HV CLOSED,METER FAILURE,ACT, VALVE FAILURE, CONSEO: CANT MAKE UP ANY HATER, RAKE UP BY ALT METHOD CAUSE: BLOCKED ACT VALVE I 107HV OPEN CONSEfi: POTENTIAL METER FAILURE ACT: CHECK METER PRESSURE RATINGS.SRO OTP JLH=' VAB.0001089169 Page No. 11/05/90 6 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZOP Study Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) Risk Criticality Equip ID Code A Frequency Equipaent Description : i=-:=st:Ksra:s;izrxti PHD Caused By: Deviation Description Consequeeces: Petion I tea Request Action Itea Response fsit3t:sszs=ssssssxtssss 4 IV - A LINES 101/102/104 PHD: 1 MEN HOD NO FLON 45-1013 INLET LINE CAUSE: CV flISALIGN,MV CLOSE,FILTER PLU6.LINE PLUS,LOSS H2D,PONER FAILURE m mm hater 4 IV' - A LINES 101/102/104 PHD: 1 NEN NOD INCREASED FLON 45-1013 INLET LINE CDNSED: PROD LOSS,VCM NISCHAR6E.BAD BATCH CAUSE: HV104 0PEN,PRV101 OR 102 OPEN.ION RESIN LOSS, CONSEO: SLOW CHARGE 4 IV - A LINES 101/102/104 PUD: 1 NEN HOD INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: COLD H20 CONTROL FAIL, 45-1013 INLET LINE CONSEO: REACTOR TEHP ALARH ACT: LAP 4 IV - A LINES 101/102/104 PHD: I NEN NOS REDUCED PRESSURE 45-1013 INLET LINE CAUSE: HVIOt OPEN, PRV101 OR 102 OPEN, KV TO SENER OPEN, PUMP FAILS 4 IV - A LINES 101/102/104 PUD: 1 NEN NOD MAINTENANCE 45-1013 INLET LINE CONSEfl: SEE NO FLON CAUSE: VALVE FAILURE, FILTER PLUG, P6 AND TB ACCESS ACT: NAINTAIN SAFE MORK PRACTICES 4 IV - B P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: 1 NEN NOD NO FLON REGENERATION HEADER CONSEO: LIFT/FALLING/SLIP POTENTIAL HAZARD CAUSE: HV CLOSED, PUMP FAILURE, LINE BLOCKED, TANK ENPTV 4 IV - B P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: 1 NEN NOD REVERSE FLON REGENERATION HEADER 4 IV - B P 702 TO LINE 110 PHD: 1 NEN NOD REDUCED FLON REGENERATION HEADER CONSEO: NO REGENERATION, SNITCH PRODUCTS 4 CAUSE: CHECK VALVE FAIL 1 NV OPEN CONSEO: OVERFLON TANK, SLOK CHAR6E TO REACTOR CAUSE: DRAIN VALVE OPEN, PLUGGED RO, BPCV FAIL OPEN 4 IV - E P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: 1 NEN NOD REDUCED PRESSURE REGENERATION HEADER CONSEfl: SLDH REGENERATION, NAINTENANCE REQUIRED CAUSE: DRAIN VALVE OPEN, PUHF FAIL, HORN RO CONSEfl: SEE REDUCED FLOW VAB.0001089170 Page No. 11/05/90 7 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) KAZQP Study Data Report (Grouped fay Risk Codes) Risk Critical i ty Equip ID PAID Caused By: Code t Frequency Equipeeet Description Deviation Description Consequences: S3SM*Uft32I lBfC2fWR3SSlSCtt8XS3tSS stsssxssss::ss xxxxni2R=B=xssx==r:r33== 3tX3E3SSS3XZS3XXS33S=SXIS3SSSSSS3X3S=;S5 4 IV - B t 702 TO LINE 110 PAID: 1 NEN NOD REDUCED TEMPERATURE REGENERATION HERDER CAUSE: SEE P-701 PUMP SUCTION AND DISCHARGE Action Itee Request Action Itee Response XSX35S=X3X3S3X3tt3SSC333XXX333333=X3;S ACT: 4 IV - B P 7 TO UNE 110 PAIR: I NEN HOD CORROSION REGENERATION HERDER 4 IV - A P-701 PAID: I NEN NOD INCREASED PRESSURE PUKP SUCTION AND DISCHR6 4 IV - B P-701 PAID: 1 NEN NOO NO FLON PUMP SUCTION AND DISCHRS CONSEQ: CAUSE: POOR FLUSH OF BRINE HATER CONSES: UNE AM) EQUIPMENT FAILURE IPPtlr ilDMiAk-.' CAUSE: CLOSED NV CQNSEO: DEADHEAD PUMP mimw t :, M* J CAUSE: VALVE FAILURE, PUMP FAILURE, LINE PLU66A6E, LS FAILURE ACT: 4 IV - 6 P-701 PAID: 1 NEN NOO REDUCED FLON PUHP SUCTION AND DISCHR6 A CONSED: CANT REGENERATE, SNITCH PRODUCTS CAUSE: NV THROTTLED, CHK VALVE FAILURE. NORN PUMP,SUCTION VALVE CLOSED ACT: CONSES: RUN PUHP MY, DELAYED REGENERATION VAB.0001089171 IP Page No. 11/05/90 L Risk Criticality Equip ID Code l Frequency Equipment Description VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZOP Study Data Report IBrouped by Risk Codes) PUD Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: It Risk Code is: 2-NQ-207 TANK ED LINE PUD: 2 DLD 1)00 REVERSE FLOH 2-ND-207 TANK ED LINE PUD: 2 DLD NOD INCREASED FLON 2-NO-207 TANK EQ LINE PUD: 2 OLD HOD INCREASED PRESSURE 2-N0-207 TANK ED LINE PUD: 2 DLD HOO INCREASED TEMPERATURE BRINE HKUP L CHS IKS PUD: I I 2 TANKS IN BOTH NODULES NO FLON BRINE HKUP t CH6 TKS PUD: I I 2 TANKS IN BOTH NODULES REVERSE FLOH BRINE HKUP ir CHS TKS PUD: 1 I 2 TANKS IN BOTH H00ULE5 INCREASED FLON BRINE HKUP I CH6 TKS PUD: 1 t 2 TANKS IN BOTH NODULES INCREASED PRESSURE IRINE HKUP I CHS TKS PUD: I I 2 TANKS IN BOTH K0BULES INCREASED TEMPERATURE BRINE HKUP It CHS TKS PUD: 1 I 2 TANKS IN BOTH NODULES REDUCED FLON BRINE HKUP l CHS TKS PUD: I l 2 TANKS IN BOTH MODULES REDUCED PRESSURE BRINE HKUP t CHG TKS PUD: 1 t 2 TANKS IN BOTH MODULES REDUCED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: Action Itee Request Action Itea Response * * ACT: Hw VAB.0001089172 vm mmmmm wmm Page No. i1/05/90 2 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code It Frequency Equipment Description VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY 15305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEMI HA?OP Study Data Report (Grouped fay Risk Codes> PUD Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: Action Itea Rtqufst Action Itn Nsponu I DR El VESS -1013 PHD: | NEH MS ION EXCHANGE VESSEL INCREASED FLOK LINE 105/110/104 PUD: 1 NEH MD PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 INCREASED TEMPERATURE LINE 105/110/104 PUD: I NEH MO MAINTENANCE PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 LINE 105/110/104 PUD: l NEH HOD PROCESS K2D THRU 45-1013 CORROSION LINE 107 SOFT HATER HAKE UP PUD: 1 NEH NOD REVERSE FLON m LINE 107 SOFT HATER MAKE UP PUD: I NEH Ml INCREASED FLON LINE 107 SOFT NATER HAKE UP PUD: 1 HEN MD INCREASED TEMPERATURE LINES 101/102/104 45-1013 INLET LINE PUD: 1 NEK NOD REDUCED FLON P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: I NEH MOD IMCREASED FLOH REGENERATION HEADER P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: 1 NEH MD INCREASED TEMPERATURE REGENERATION HEADER P-701 PUD: 1 NEK MOD PURP SUCTION AND DISCHR6 REVERSE FLOH P-701 PUD: 1 NEH MOO PUMP SUCTION AM DISCHR6 INCREASED FLOH CAUSE: NAP CQNSEQ: CAUSE: ELEC TRAC HEATIN6 CDNSEB: NAP CAUSE: FLON METER FA I LURE/CALI MAT ION CONSEO: NAP CAUSE: FAILURE TO FLUSH 105 CONSEO: NAP CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE; NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: SEE M FLON CONSEO: CAUSE: DRAIN VALVE OPEN BEFORE VESSEL CONSEO: NAP CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: CAUSE: CHECK VALVE FAILURE I PUMP OFF, DRAIN VALVE OPEN CONSEO: NAP CAUSE: NAP CONSEO: * * t 4 4 t/ # T VAB.0001089173 ' rm Page No. 11/05/90 3 VISTA CHEHICAL COMPANY 15305 DECALCIFIES HATER SYSTEM) HA20P Study Oita Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) Risk Code ssss Criticality Equip IS I Frequency Equipment Description PUS Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: SSS3S33SSSS3 3B3SS33S3S3CS3S33Sa3SS3S33S33333333SS33 SSSSSBSSSSSSSSSZKSSSBSSSS *BSSSSSSS=SS3S33S=SSS3S33* P-701 PIID: 1 NEH HOD INCREASED TEMPERATURE PUMP SUCTION AND DISCHR6 P-701 PUD: 1 NEH HOD REDUCED PRESSURE PUHP SUCTION AND DISCHflG P-70! PIID: 1 NEN HOD REDUCED TEMPERATURE PUHP SUCTION AND DISCHR6 CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE; SEE LINE 107 CONSEQ: Action Itee Request Action Itee Response ACT: ACT: ACT: l VAB.0001089174 VAB.0001089175 NEW MODULE . DECAL WATER SYSTEM P&ID MHif'i- HP- lti||rHP 'HM' -i .Ht'IMlh 'mi'ilH J'-I-UI- "I'`irimfe........................................................................................... ............................................hph................. .. ^nwomnwh,.^wihiiifcHiiytfitto^tniKto^wpjn,. ................................................................................................................................................................................hum 1 -i ao yo ? c-jv-n-zu-to-z 2 g 3 *a T El & i 00 h- ac O CL i o Ts \<o Ul 8 Q i sdnnd aetMo NOfcl 1i - * r" ** H ** - i CM O I Q_ VAB.0001089176 3-8 SECTION 4.2 MITIGATION SHEETS SUMMARY OF CRITICAL IDENTIFIED HAZARDS Page 1 5305 DECALCIFIED WATER SYSTEM CRITICAL RANK: 2,UNDESIRABLE SHOULD BE IMPROVED = SEVERE CONSEQUENCE - PROBABLE OCCURRENC DEVIATION: REVERSED FLOW II-B EQUIPMENT NUMBER: LINES 101/102/106 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: 1013 INLET LINE CAUSE: BOTH WATER CHARGE PUMPS FAIL AND CHECK VALVE FAILS WHILE CV--103B/MV(106) ARE OPEN CONSEQUENCE: VCM TO HOT WATER TANK, VCM RELEASE SUGGESTED MITIGATION: SRO LOW FLOW ON CHARGE WATER, SRO PUMP RUN INTERLOCKS RESOLUTION: COMMENTS: VAB.0001089177 To ScH___ From DtA Calculation Sheet % <^nwo L' ST PgUiflTK?*) K>fZ\JefiS F*\jh^ -iuCb lot| )ox| 10C41 d/l AJq Fux*> se^ FLolo C)/U4s /o$y f/tj/oV UUL \s i^si^l/i/g I P/oow9 0 S OAolwm KO-tOf / prey'd' //7cAt*$t> ^Locd, OJ>u* lsenn=y uf)*ro f7~m?r~ /)/! or#n sreftc (*/flr SV?o 077 **\et frJt // totesur^ 0p4*ntch(y 7>&*o Made By ----------------------------------------------------Date ----------------------------------------------------------Page of_____________________________________ V3-20G-S Job No. Title ________ VAB.QQQ1Q89178 ft ft T R 1 ft 1 r^ A F E T Y i^ a* + ** #hf *- ^ VP* * * i * * P* - frp4 *4* - **> * P 0 o w C h e i'i'i i c -a i. i.i * S * ft * a Midi, a n d , 1) A i A ##- *- *4* r- 4HI 4if M * *-#* HI h ft I 4 8 6 7 4 stj H E H T * M *4*> t#- 4 + mergency Phone: tfc' +P 517-36 -440 i-' r o tf u c t C o 6 e : 1- 3 0 6 6 P a g e : -, Product Name: DOWEX (R) MSC-1, 20-50 MESH, NA CATION EXCHANGE RESIN E11 0 c t i v e D a t e : 0 6 / 1 8 / 9 (> D a 10 P r I n t e d : 0 9 / <) !5 / 9 0 M S D: 001153 1 J.NGRDIENTS ; ( % w / w , u n I. e-as o therw i se no ted ) Su 1. f ona t 0d copoiymer of s t y r 0 *n e a n d divinytbenze ne in the sodium form Wa t 0r CAS* 069011-22-9 CAS* 007732-18-5 40- 1 OX This document is prepared pursuant to the 03HA Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200)* In addition, other substances not `Hazardous1 per this OSHA Standard may be listed. Where proprietary ingredient shows, the identity may be made avaliable as provided in this standard* V Aa * *\ P (-i Y SIC A L D A T A : 8 QILIN G P 01N 1 No t app i. i cab l e V A P p R If. <- No t app I. i cab i. e VAP 0ENSIT Y : No t app I. f cab i. e S 0 J.. a IN I/; A f l R : I n soLub L e GRAVI T Y : Density 53 I. b / f 13 APPEARANCE: Light yeLLow to amber ODOR: Not applicable solid (beads) 3. FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD DATA: F LAS H P01N T: ft E T H 0 D U S E D : Not applic. Not app i. i c . FLAMMABLE LIMITS L. F L. N o t a p p I. i c * UFL N o t a p p L i c: . EXTINGUISHING MEDIA: Dry chemical. ** . h X & EXPLOSION HAZARDS: Product is not combustibLe u vi t i l m o i s t u r e \ s r e m o ved, the n r e s i n s t a r t s to bur n i n i' I. ante a t 230C. Au to i gn i t i on occu rs above 500C. Naphthalene, benzaldehydes, phenol, carbon dioxide, water, su l f u r ox i des , o r gan i c su i. t ona tes a r e poss i b L e t i r e combust i on p r o du c t s . FIft E - FIG H TIN G E 0 UI P ft E N : b r ea t hing apparatus. Wear positive pressure self-contained (C o v 11 i n u e d o n P a g e 2 ) < R ) I n d i c a t e s a T r a d a m a r i< o f T h e Dow C h e m i c a l C o m p a n y x A n 0 p e rat i n g IJ n i t 0 f T h & D o w C h e m i c a l C o m p a n y * VAB.0001089179 V MA Dow T ER I Ai c> A F T Yr'wtt * il* I f |HI 4P i Mp t 4 Chem ica I. U * 3 * A * Midland, I) A T A HI 43674 SHEET *B f** Emergency Phone: - 517--636--4400 I-' t o d u c t C ode : 2 3 0 6 6 Pa ge : 2 Product Name: DOWEX (R) MSC-1, 20-50 MESH, NA CATION EXCHANGE RESIN E t f & c t i v D a t e : O 6 / "i S / 9 <) Date Printed: 09/05/90 MSD: 001158 4 R E A C T I! VI TY I> A T A : S T A B X LIT Y : < CONDITIONS TO AVOID) Stab i. e u n de r no r ma i. handling and s tor a ge conditions* See i ncowpa tibility sta tement INCOMPATIBILITY: (SPECIFIC MATERIALS TO AVOID) Warning: Oxidizing agents such as nitric acid a 11 a c k organic ion exchange resins under certain conditions and could result in slightly degraded resin up to an explosive reaction* Before using strong oxidizing agents, consu L t sources knowledgeable h a n d t. i n g s u c h m a t e r la i. s * a in HAZAR D0US DEC0MP0SITION PRODUCTS: Pro du c t s in sectio n 3 * See possible co m bustio n HAZARD0US P0L YMERIZATI 0N: W i I. I. n o t o c cur c: E N VIR 0 N M E N T A l A N 0 I) 13 P 0 S A L 1N F 0 R M A T 10 N : ACTION TO TAKE TOR SPILLS/LEAKS: s L i ppery * Sweep up Caution: May be DISPOSAL METHOD: Bury resin in licensed landfill or burn in approved incinerator according to Local , state, and federaL regulations* For resin contaminated with hazardous material dispose of mixture as hazardous material, according to local, s t a t e , a n d fede r a L r e gu L a t i ons * A i IE A L r H H A Z A R D D A T A : EYE May cause sLight transient (temporary) eye irritation* Solid or dust may cause irritation or corneal injury due to mechan i c a I act i on * S K I N C 0 N T A C I : Essentially nonirrita ting to sk in* S K I H A B S 0 R P T10 N P rope r t i es * Sk i n absor p t i on i s u vi L i k e L y due t o phys i c a l INGESTION: Single dose oral toxicity is believed to be low* hazards anticipated from ingestion incidental to industrial e xp osure* No < Con t i nu e d o n Pa ge 3 ) < R ) I Vid i cates a T r a demark o f I he Dow Chem i c a i 0omp any * A n 0 p rat i n g U *n i t 0 f T It e D o w C h e m i c a I. C o m p a n y * VAB.0001089180 ha IH* Dow r e k t a l. sa "** * li#* *'-4 4 41 +**i 4 M4 L-'hem i c a I. U * SA * x f !: r r DA TA V-#* * t*4 r 4+m 1 <4 |>* 4M* i^4 iM* Ml 4f4 a|l i#4 f i4 rt i d f. a n d , ft I 4 8 6 7 4 SHEET * *-*4-4 hn4 m ergo ncy *i i4 M4 A** * * *4-4* Phone : 51 / - 636-4400 P r o a u c: t C o cl 0 : 2 3066 1 aye - w A r o d u c t N a m e : DOW E X t R ) M S C -1 .. 2 0 - 3 0 ftE S H , NA C A TION E XCHANGE RESIN E t tec: t s ve Da 10 : 06/1 8/90 D a + e P i- i n ted-' 0 9 / 05 / 9 0 MSD: 001158 6 * ; 1 A L r H H A / A ft D D A T A : < C 0 N T IN U E D ) INHALATION: Vapors are unLikely due to physical properties SYSTEMIC & OTHER EFFECTS-; No spec 1 f i r. da t a repeated exposures a re not ant 1cipa ted to adverse effects* a va I l ab l e , however , cause any signI ficant < FIRST AID: I- V ir c- - 1**- I Iih * I r r i ga t e i inine d i a t e l y with e r for a t lea s t 3 m i nutes* 3 KIN: No adverse e f f 0ct s anticip a t edd by this r 0 u t of exposu re. I N G E S T10 N : No adverse 1 p a t e d by t h 1 s r ou t e of 0xposu re i nc 1 den t a 1. to proper 1 ncms trial handling* I N H A L A T10 N : exposu re * No adver se effee ts a nt 1 cipa ted by t his route of 8 H A N D I.. IN G P ft E C A U T10 N S : EXPOSURE GUIDELINE(S > : None established* V E N TIL A TI 0 N : Good g e n e r a l v e n t i l a t i o n s h o u I. d b e s u f f 1 c 1 e n t R S P IR A T 0 R Y P R 0 T E C T 10 N : nee de d * N o r 0 s p i r a t o r y protect! o n s h o u 1. cl h 0 SKIN PROTECTION: No" precautions other than clean body-covering c: L o t h in g sh ou I. d h e nee de d * I:. Y E P R 0 T E C T ION: Use s a f e t y g I. a s s e s 9 * ADD IT I GNAL. INFORMAT I ON : SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN HANDLING AND STORAGE: I- ' r a c: tic r c? a s o n a o l e c a r 0 a n d c: a u t i o n * M 0 t a I. e g. u 1 p m 0 n t s h o u I. ci be c ompa t i b i. e w 1 t h f eea , r 0 gener an t , r es i n f or m , a na ef f I. un t o f that p r ocess * ( C o n t 1 n u. e <.1 o n P a g e 4 ) () Indicates a Trademark of The Dow Chemical Company * A n 0 p e rat 1 n g U n i t 0 f T h e D o w C h e m i c a l C o m p a n y VAB.0001089181 MA Dow ER I AI A i.: t t: i y mt *f>i |#p itof *V i C n e ifi i c a I. U a 3 * A * * M s clI. ancl, IX A A ih> - * * ** t#* ' MI 4Q674 3HEE I i-* *< Emer gency * ** * w ^ Phone : 31 7 *** 636-* 4 4 0 0 P r o d u c i C o ci e : ' o`V '.v o 6 Product Name: DQUEX (R) MSC-1, 20-30 MESH, NA CATION EXCHANGE Pa ge : 4 1 SIN 15. f f e c t i v e D a t e : 0 6 /1 8 / 9 0 Date P r i n t e cl : 09 / O 3 / 9 0 MSD: 0 0113 8 9 A adon :i:onal information <contj:nued > rSCA CON SID ER A T10N S: Every d i f f e r en t s a I. t o r I o n i c f o r m o f a n i o in - e xchange Test n i s a s e p a r a t e c h e m j cal. If .you use an i on-exchange res i n for ion-exchange pu rposes and then 1 t o rrt i t s v e s s e I. o r c on t a i ner prior o r a n o t h e r f o r m o f the res i n or of b y - profluc t r e s i n or u st be I. i sted on remove the by~p r oduc t resin t o recovery of the or j g i na I. another chem i ca 1. , the the ISCA Inventory (unless a n e x e n> pt io n i s a p p i t cab I. e) * It is the respons ibiL i ty of the customer to ensu re tha t such i so l. a ted , recyc i ed by-produc t r e s i n s are i n c: m p I. i ance with I'SCA. Failure to comply could r e s u f. t i n 5 u b s t a n t t a l c. i v i i. o r cr i m i n a l p e n a 1.1 i e s ta e i n g a s s e s s e d by the Environmenta I. P r o t e c: t i o n A g e n c: y * NSDS STATUS: Revised section 9 and regsheet * ( Con t : nue d on Pa ge 3 ) < R ) .1 n d i c a t es a T r a derna r k : * t r h e I) o w C h e m i c a L C o rn p a n y * An Operating Unit Of The Dow Chemical. Company VAB.0001089182 MA F -f4 r f 0ow rER 1 A oA * -* ^4 - * 4 **M VM* - C h e m i c a I. iJ * S * A* * FE 4 4| * *f T 1? A f AY t ^ i > H*i t** +ii Mil Ht* *k#4 *4 f -H * Mi d l. a nd , M I 48674 SHE * H ^l Ht* 4H * mergency Phone : MH r^4 pa*4 51 7- 636-4400 P r oduc t U o cl e : 23 066 I"' t o du c t Na me : 00WX ( R ) MSC-1 Pa ge : 5 20- 50 MESH, N A CATION EXCJ-l ANGE RESIN E f f 0 >:: t i v e u a t e : 0 6/1 B / 9 () Data Printed: 09/05/90 MSI) : 001153 * ft E G U i_. A I D ft Y i H FORM A T 10 N : r 0 gu I. a t i ons r ep r sen t e d * ) t- No t nte a n t t o b e a l L - i nc L u s i ve--se 1. ec ted n o r i CE : The information herein is presented in good faith and bel. i eved to be accurate as of the effective-? date shown above* H o w e ve r , no wa rranty, express or i dip !. i e d , is given* Regulatory re*iu iremsnts are subject to change and may differ from one I. o c a t i on to another; it is the buyer's responsibility to ensure t h a t* its activities comp I. y w i th f edera l , s ta te o r provi nc i a L , a vi d Local Laws* The following specific information is made for the purpose of complying with numerous federal, state or provincial. a n d Iocal taws a nd r egula tions* See M3D Sheet for hea11h and sa fe ty i n fo rma t i on U s * ft!:. G U L A T10 N S 9* IW It*f 4I<( !* mi mi *4i* * 1 ntl #l|l + 4** Ml w(SARA HAZARD CAIECORY: Th i s product has heen reviewed according to the ERA " Ha z a r d Ca t e go r i es " p r omu I. gate d u n de r Bee t i ons 311 and 312 of the Super fund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA iitle III) and i s cons i dered , under app I. i cab t e def i n i t i ons , to meet the f ol I. ow i ng c a t egor i s : Not t o h a v e m e t a n y h a z a r d c a t e g o r y i j A N A i) IA N ' > *1 J 4 fill * #t *i*a R G U L A'T 10 N S 4* * + f pfe |M * # *41 + *44 | 44 * >* ** <* * t* i*** + **+ * t p H --4 ? h e WorkpLace Haz ard o us Materials Info r mat Io n System ( W * H * M * I )\J 4 si fica tion for this pr odu c t is: D2B #-** |W' The Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act ( r * D * G * A * this p roduc t is: L a ssification for ( Con t i nu e d o n Pa ge 6 > ( R ) I n d i c a t e s a T r a de m ark Tne Dow Chemical C o m p a n * An Operating Unit Of The Dow Chemical. C o m p a n y V VAB.0001089183 ft a re r i a l s a f i-:: r y '+* <tp ' >t * -*- t* m ,,J* *r+* M ** + *** i4f rM t *41 iatt HM ` >u Dow Uhewscal. U A O A A' * X ft i d L avid , DArA SHEE1 -- -* i#t ^44 * *-*44 #p4 441 4 * t |t HI 48674 Emergency F`hone : * 5i 7-636-4400 P r o d i k c t C g d e : 2 3 0 66 Product Name: DOW E X <R) HSC-1 , 20-50 P a 9 0 6 SH, NA CATION EXCHANCE RESIN Eff0cfive Date: 06/18/90 Da te P r i nted : 09/05/90 HSD: 001158 R E G U L. A T 0 R Y INF' 0 R ft A T10 N : (CON T 1 N U E D ) Not regulated * R) In dicates a Tradema r k o f Th The I vi l; o v loa t i on Herein I s G i ven E x p r e s - 0 r I m p I. i e d , I s Hade* F or Fu rther Info rmation* C Dow Chemical In Good Faith n , u l t t h e D o w Company But No War ran t y, Ch em i c a l 0omp a ny x A vi 0 p e rat j n g IJ n i t The Chem i c a L Comp a ny VAB.0001089184 THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 3 A L E3 8PECIFICA TION Q U A-i L I T Y A S S U R A N C E 0 T FICI DATE PRINTED: 05 i* c p ; V/f *i i \ PAGE: 01 P R 01) U C T : 23066 E F F E C TIV E : 13 NOV ?1 O S U P E R S E 0 E S : 0 8 A U G 7 7 NAME; D0WEX t R) h3C-1 , 20-5O MESH, NA CAT10N EXCHANGE RESIN D E S C: 3 1R 0 N G A CID CA T10N EX CHAN G E R E SIN IN THE SODIUM FORM G 0 V T / IN D S T D S : F D A + 1 - * * * f * > w - ** *'* M4I - r, I I** * *--** i r e: m 1 * - * 41* ` -M ++** >m *Ht i4l fHl + -*ft iM* *4* *4# iii , .r<M H4 Mat "REQUIREMENTS * W v l * p- *+ Ml LIMI Ir F--4 PiM +-VB* 1 +M * H4f I***- *MI H4 UN I T M-* 4M4 4tat *#* **4 -* *4a* twt 44 METHOD -- * **f I *** M( W L 1 V 0 L U M E C A P A CI 1' Y MIN W A T E R R E T E N T 10 N C A P A CI 1 Y S P HERICITY, MIN SCREEN ANAL ON NO* 16, MAX * SCREEN ANAL THRU NO MAX * 40 , COLOR THROW, APHA, AS PACKAGED . MAX * 1 *7 44 -50 / 0 5ir< 50 MEQ/ML it y VN X */ / DOWEX RESIN MD * 1 DOWEX RESIN MD 4 DOWEX RESIN MD 6 DOWEX RESIN MD* 5 DOWEX RESIN MD l-* # DOWEX RESIN MD READ PRECAUTIONARY INFORMATION AND MATERIAL SAFETY SHEETS* 1 ( 11 3 PRODUCT IS SHIPPED IN COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND REGULATIONS REGARDING CLASSIFICATION, PACKAGING, SHIPPING AND I ABFLING -K) INDICATES A TRADEMARK OF THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY I-AST PAGE VAB.0001089185 I I HE DOW CHEMICAL. COMPAN Y S A L E 3 S P E CIFIC A T 10 N QUAL I T Y ASSURANCE 0F F T CE DATE PRINTED: 05 SEP <; a f P A G E : <) 1 PRODUCT: 23066 EFFECTIVE: 13 NOV 73 SUPERSEDES: 08 AUG 77 NAME; DOWEX (R> MSC-'i, 20-50 MESH, NA CATION EXCHANGE RESIN DESC: STRONG ACID CATION EXCHANGE RESIN IN THE SODIUM FORM GOVT/IND STDS: FDA *-* >^ Mil | |4 #fM *4* fMf I || i TM - '*** #*4t Ml I-PM ! *M# -REQUIREMENTS-------------------- LIMIT *4* 4iM M* uni r METHOD WE Ft 4 K 1- 1 : t IJ L U M E C A P A CI T Y . MIN WATER RETENTION CAPACITY SPH E RICITY, MIN SCREEN ANAL ON NO MAX a 16, SCREEN ANAL THRU NO. 40, MAX. COL.UR I HROW , APHA , AS PACK AGED , hAX * 1 .7 44-50 95 8 **/ 50 M E Q / MI. v ra 7ftt /7 :<II DOWEX RESIN MD 1 DOWEX RESIN MD 4 DOWEX RESIN MD A DOWEX RESIN MD. 1= DOWEX RESIN MD I-* *m DOWEX RESIN MD. t READ PRECAUTIONARY INFORMATION AND MATERIAL SAFETY SHEETS. THIS PRODUCT IS SHIPPED IN COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND REGULATIONS REGARDING CLASSIFICATION, PACKAGING, SHIPPING AND LABELING (R) INDICATES A TRADEMARK OF THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY LAST PAGE VAB.0001089186