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vista nwiTfiL oomn CSSBjttMQECwJAIi mnBnKmmMnJmmKMIiM UMorMVTUftUfiTFinIfiXT AID OFBttBIIflYT STUDY FOR 5305 DBCALCI7IED WATBS 8T8TBM * OCTOBER 1990 VAB.0001089121 Table of Contonto HAZOF REPORT VOLUME Legal Notice ...................................................... List of Abbreviations................................ 1.0 Purpose...................................................................... 2.0 Scope........................................................................... 30 Methodology........................................................... 3.1 Introduction ................................................ 3.2 Team Members ................................................ 3.3 Documents made available .... 3.4 Forms used ...................................................... 3.5 Preliminary hazard identification 3.6 Criticality evaluation ...................... 3.7 Documents used ........................................... 40 Mitigation ........................................................... 4.1 Mitigation Summary ...................................... 4.2 Critical Identified Hazards. . 5.0 P&IDs........................................................................... * l * 1-1 2-1 3-1 3-2 3-4 3-6 3-7 3-7 3-8 3-10 4-1 5-1 APPENDIX A. Study Data Report by Criticality Rank.....................................A-l B. Study Data Report by Equipment Number.....................................B-l i VAB.0001089122 LEGAL NOTICE This report was prepared by VISTA Chemical Company ("VISTA") for internal use only. Neither Vista nor any affiliated organizations, nor any person acting in their behalf, (a) makes any warranty, express or implied, with respect to the use of any information or methods disclosed in this report; or (b) assumes any liability with respect to the use of any information or methods disclosed in this report. VAB.0001089123 ACT AHM ALT ATMOS A2-1 A13-1 BLDR BPCV CHK CV DM EX FL FCV F/O H20 HAZAN HAZOP ID INSUL KOH LG LK LS MAINT MALF MATL MAX MIN VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen Chemical Plant List of Abbreviations Actuated Accurately Hazardous Materials Alternate Atmosphere Piping spec Piping spec Bleeder Back Pressure Control Valve Check Control valve Drum % Exchange Filter Flow control valve Fail open Water Hazard Analysis Hazard & Operability Study Identification Insulation Potassium hydroxide Level gage Leak Level switch Maintenance Malfunction Material Maximum Minimum BIS in VAB.0001089124 VISTA COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen Chemical Plant List of Abbreviations MOC HOD MSDS MV NAP NORM NC NO OTP PAR P&ID PG PIC PM PREP PRESS PROD PRV PSIG REC REG REV RO RV SPEC SRO STD TEMP TG TRANS VAC VCM Material of Construction Module Material Safety Data Sheet Manually operated valve Not a problem Normal Normally closed Normally open Operator Training & Procedures Partially Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Pressure Gage Pressure Indicating Controller Preventive maintenance Preparation Pressure Production Pressure Relief Valve Pounds per square inch gage Recommend Regulator Revision Restriction orifice Relief Valve Specification Suggested review of Standard Temperature Temperature gauge Transmitter Vacuum Vinyl Chloride Monomer iv VAB.0001089125 VISTA COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen Chemical Plant Section 1.0 Purpose The VISTA Chemical Company Aberdeen Plant (Aberdeen, Mississippi) 5305 Decalcified Water System Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study was conducted to serve many purposes. It will be used to: Provide management with the knowledge of where potential hazards exist in the HF Safety Improvements modifications. Provide safety and operations related documentation for lines and pieces of equipment included in these modifications. Provide a prioritized basis for subsequent risk analysis/assessment work, if necessary. Provide documentation for a Risk Management and Prevention Program. Provide training on HAZOP methodology and techniques for Vista personnel. Performing a HAZOP study is generally an assurance that if procedural and/or engineering modifications are implemented to mitigate risk, the plant will then be operating under some lower risk. It is not, however, a guarantee that no risk exists, nor does it guarantee that hazardous events or operating problems will not be encountered. 1-1 VAB.0001089126 VISTA COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL Aberdeen Chemical Plant Section 2.0 Scope Vista Chemical Company operates a nominal capacity 455 million pound per year PVC plant located in Aberdeen, Mississippi. The plant manufactures PVC resins by polymerizing VCM in batch reactors. Water is a raw material in the reaction and in 5305 grade resin must be decalcified. The 5305 Decalcified Water System is being installed to address this need. The 5305 Decalcified Water System Project is the subject of this HAZOP study. The hazard identification study focused on the following potential hazards: Personnel injury/death resulting from Fire Explosion Toxic exposure Chemical Contact Thermal Burns Asphyxiation Impact injury Etc. Equipment/property damage resulting from Fire Explosion Corrosion Misoperation Overpressure Vacuum Overheating Etc. Production loss resulting from Equipment damage Maintenance Off specification Turnarounds Raw Material Considerations Etc. Environmental Spills Fugitive Emissions Etc. The HAZOP methodology used during the study is contained in Section 3, the mitigation for the critical identified hazards is contained in Section 4, and the criticality sort/data base is contained in an Appendix. 2-1 VAB.0001089127 Section 3*0 Methodology 3.1 introduction 3.2 Teen Members 3.3 Documents Made Available 3.4 roras used 3.5 Preliminary Hazard Identification 3* Criticality evaluation 3.7 Documents Deed 3-1 VAB.0001089128 Section 3.1 Introduction A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a simple, yet structured methodology for hazard identification. It is an investigation technique which utilizes imaginative thinking in the identification of hazards and operational problems. A HAZOP study involves a systematic, methodical examination of design documents that describe the facility. The study is performed by a multidisciplinary team to identify potential hazards or operability problems that could result in an accident. Deviations from the design value of key parameters are studied using guide words to control the examination evaluation. This presumes that the design values of flows, temperatures, and other process variables are inherently safe and operable. The study team consists of trained personnel knowledgeable in the technology and operations, and the team will have the necessary technical expertise to answer most questions raised during the review without outside assistance. As a starting point, we will define the following terms: Hazard: Anything (chemical reaction, equipment malfunction or operator error) that can lead to an unwanted event. Operability: Anything that causes the operator to improvise in his actions. These definitions are an important part of the basic HAZOP premise that the process does not have inherent hazards or operating problems when the unit is operating within design parameters as defined by the basic documents such as the Process Flow Diagrams, equipment specifications, operating procedures, etc. In other words, if there are no deviations from the expected norm, by definition there are no hazard or operability problems. When performing a HAZOP, a proper mix of meeting participants is very important. The mix of participants should normally include most if not all of the following: Team leader Process engineer Mechanical engineer Plant operator Maintenance Electrical Safety Team recorder Instrumentation 3-2 VAB.0001089129 Of these personnel, many are often only part time participants but remain on call for assistance. It can be seen that the electrical, maintenance and other subjects may only be required on a consulting basis. Also, it is important to Keep the size of the review team to a manageable number such as between five to seven so that all members of the team can participate while keeping the effort moving. The agenda followed during the HAZOP team meetings is as follows: Introduce team members: A short biographical sketch by each team member. Purpose or goal of HAZOP: A general presentation of the purpose or goal of the HAZOP is made. This serves to direct the HAZOP study. HAZOP methodology: A presentation is made by the team facilitator of the methodology to be used in the study. This also establishes the team member "mind set" necessary to conduct an effective HAZOP. Process description: A detailed process discussion is presented by the Process Engineer to familiarize the HAZOP team with process scenarios which may lead to a hazardous condition as well as to ensure that all team members have a clear understanding of the basic process. AHM properties: An identification and discussion by an industrial hygienist or other knowledgeable person is presented to establish a team recognition of the AHM toxic and hazardous properties. Identify hazards: A preliminary identification by team members of hazards present within the process. This serves to focus the HAZOP study. Scope the HAZOP: Once the AHM properties are established and discernible HAZOP hazards are identified, the HAZOP scope is set. Establish criticality and frequency ratings: Hazard classification matrix parameters are set by the team for subsequent screening of HAZOP identified hazards. Define dispersion models: The team identifies AHM release scenarios which will be different cases for dispersion modeling outside of the HAZOP team meeting. PCHAZOP* on-line: Load the PCHAZOP* computer program for recording HAZOP team proceedings. HAZOP team meetings: A systematic segment by segment team review of the facilities contained within the job scope is executed. 3-3 The HAZOP identified ten (10) non-critical ranked hazards which require verification that the appropriate engineering and/or administrative controls are in place. The team identified no hazards of the most critical ranking, that is a hazard rated I-A, i.e., a hazard which could potentially cause a major event to occur pore often than once per year. In the event the HAZOP team did identify a hazard that it considered to represent an imminent danger to life or property, the team would have given a verbal presentation to plant management in order to expedite any required mitigation. Section 3*2 Team Members The HAZOP study team assembled to identify potential hazard or operability problems should be composed of a multiple disciplined team with the sufficient technical expertise to answer most guide word deviation questions without resorting to further expertise. The HAZOP study team meetings were held at the VISTA Aberdeen Chemical plant site in Aberdeen, Mississippi. All team members conducting the HAZOP study are employees of VISTA from the Aberdeen plant. They are as follows: Attendee Expertise/Responsibi1ity Dale Andrews* Mike Kane* Ed Mize* Dave Moore* Rendell Newton# Needham Stahl* Jim White* Steve Hillman* Instrument Technician Senior Process Engineer Maintenance Representative Process Engineer Chief Process Engineer Chief Lead Operator Mechanical Engineer Trainer/Facilitator * * full time # part time 3-4 VAB.0001089130 Section 3*3 Documents ud available Prior to the start of the HAZOP, the necessary reference documentation needs to he assembled and made available for use and reference during the HAZOP team study. A meaningful HAZOP study cannot be conducted without the required documentation to review. Assembly of the documentation optimizes the chance for a successful HAZOP. NEW MODULE DECALCIFIED WATER SYSTEM P&ID - October 1, 1990 OLD MODULE DECALCIFIED CHARGE WATER P&ID - August 9, 1990 Section 3.4 Forms used The HAZOP team data was recorded on standardized forms containing the key questions and answer elements of the HAZOP; one form for each line segment investigated, one form for each equipment item investigated. The results of the HAZOP studies were recorded on the SWEC proprietary computerized program NPCHAZ0P", which is a PC based program designed to provide a simple method for recording and documenting the HAZOP process. The program is designed to run in a database environment to facilitate data storage and retrieval. The results of the HAZOP studies are included in the Appendix within Section A sorted according to criticality rank and within Section B sorted according to equipment number or line segment. Section 3.5 Preliminary hazard identification During the initial stage of the HAZOPs, the team should prepare a preliminary list of potential hazards likely to be encountered during the study. This serves to establish the team's mind-set in hazard identification and focus attention during the study. The preliminary hazard identification yielded the following five hazards: Impact - from a fall or from contacting rotating heavy machinery potentially causing physiological injury, death, or equipment damage. Fire - resulting from the ignition of a flammable material potentially causing physiological injury and or equipment damage. Thermal burn - resulting from the contact with a hot or cold material potentially causing physiological injury due to thermal stress. Corrosion - resulting from non-contained chemicals potentially causing equipment failure. 3-5 VAB.0001089131 Section 3.6 Criticality evaluation During the initial stage of the HAZOPs, the team should develop a criticality rating and a probability rating for preparation of a hazard ranking matrix. This is to allow screening of identified hazards by prioritization and sorting to focus subsequent corrective action on the significant identified hazards; eliminating the insignificant or trivial hazards from any further consideratIon. To this end, a hazard rating index and a risk ranking matrix was developed in the HAZOP team review as follows: HAZARD RATING INDEX Criticality Rating I Major An incident which may result in a possible lost time injury, or a reportable VCM release, or major damage or production loss greater than $1,000,000 II Severe An incident which may result in a restricted work case, or a VCM release, or severe damage or production loss between $50,000 and $1,000,000 III Moderate An incident which may result in a recordable injury, or moderate damage or production loss between $10,000 and $50,000 IV Slight Loss of containment of small amounts of flammable material which may result in slight damage or production loss less than $10,000 Frequency Rating A Frequent Expected to occur frequently in the life of a single plant, i.e., may occur more frequently than once per year B Probable Expected to occur in the life of a single plant, i.e., may occur between 1 and 100 years C Occasional Could occur in the life of a single plant but expected to occur once in the life of multiple plants, i.e., may occur between 100 and 10,000 D Remote Unlikely to occur in the life of multiple plants, i.e., may occur less frequently than once per 10,000 years 3-6 VAB.0001089132 RISK UUfKIlTO MATRIX Frequency ABC D The risk ranking codes assigned to each grid of the risk ranking matrix are as follows: Risk Ranking 1 Unacceptable Mitigation planning should be completed within six months using engineering and/or administrative controls to reduce the risk ranking to a 3 or less. 2 Undesirable Mitigation planning should be completed within twelve months using engineering and/or administrative controls to reduce the risk ranking to a 3 or less. 3 Acceptable with controls Should be verified that procedures or controls are in place 4 Acceptable as is No mitigation action required 3-7 VAB.0001089133 SECTION 4. MITIGATION SECTION 4.1 MITIGATION SUMMARY ITEMS WITH A CRITICAL RANK OF 1 Risk COdS I-A No references sighted. Risk Code I-B No references sighted. Risk Code 11**A No references sighted. ITEMS WITH A CRITICAL RARE OF 2 Risfc Code I-C No references sighted. Risk Code II-B One reference sighted. Item l Malfunction Causing in reverse flow of VCM into Depletion of the plant nitrogen system due which may result in a severe consequence of probable occurrence. Risk code III--A No references sighted. VAB.0001089134 3-8 SECTION 4.2 MITIGATION SHEETS SUMMARY OF CRITICAL IDENTIFIED HAZARDS Page 1 : II-B 5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM CRITICAL RANK: 2,UNDESIRABLE - SHOULD BE IMPROVED = SEVERE CONSEQUENCE = PROBABLE OCCURRENCE DEVIATION: REVERSED FLOW EQUIPMENT NUMBER: LINES 101/102/106 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: 45-1013 INLET LINE CAUSE: BOTH WATER CHARGE PUMPS FAIL AND CHECK VALVE FAILS WHILE CV--103B/MV(106) ARE OPEN CONSEQUENCE: VCM TO HOT WATER TANK, VCM RELEASE. SUGGESTED MITIGATION: SRO LOW FLOW ON CHARGE WATER, SRO PUMP RUN INTERLOCKS. RESOLUTION: THE VCSM PROJECT WILL INSTALL SOFTWARE TO DETECT LOW/ REVERSE FLOW FOR THE CHARGE WATER LINE IN EACH MODULE. COMMENTS: VAB.0001089135 Paqe No. 11/05/Y0 1 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM! HAZQP Study Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) Risk Code ==-= Criticality Equip ID PHD l Frequeucy Equipsest Description rts2*sisssi2 as#assaaass2S2Sx;ssMS52saasE35Sis3Baa Deviation Description Caused By: Consequences: ss&ssssKSSxasasssMStMssmESS tt Risk Code is: 2 2 II - B LINES 101/102/104 45-1013 INLET LINE PHD: I MEN HOD REVERSE FL0N CAUSE: BOTH PUMPS FAIL 1 CHECK VALVE FA1L,CV103B/HV106 OPEN CONSEB: VCH TO H20 TANK, VCH RELEASE Action Iten Request Action Itee Response ssssnsiaxssMtsnssnzisssstsssiaci i: ACT: SRO LON FLDN ON CHARGE HATER, SRO PUMP RUN INTERLOCKS 0AM*> V<CSM 'n/lt.l-- 1/TS+C.li VAB.0001089136 Page No. 11/05/90 2 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZOP Stady Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) Risk Criticality Equip ID PUD Code it Frequency Equipment Description r~ =**= 3SSSSS3SSSXSBXSSSESSS3S5SSSStSS: Caused Dy: Deviation Description Consequences: XTSB =* SXSSSSSCSSS3 Action Itea Request Action tten Rosponso M Risk Code is: 3 3 III - B BRINE MKUP I CH6 TKS PHD; 1 I 2 TANKS IN BOTH MODULES CORROSION 3 III - B ION EX VE5S *5-1013 PHD: 1 NEM HOD REVERSE FLDN ION EXCHANGE VESSEL 111 - D ION El VESS 45-1013 PHD: l MEN MOD ION EXCHAN6E VESSEL REDUCED TEMPERATURE II - C LINE 103/108/109 PHD: I NEK NOD 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE INCREASED PRESSURE 3 III - B LINE 103/108/10? PAID: 1 NEK HOD REVERSE FLOH 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE 3 III - B LINE 103/108/109 PHD: 1 NEK MOO REDUCED TEMPERATURE 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE III - B LINE 105/110/104 PHD: 1 NEM HDO PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 INCREASED FLOH 3 II - C LIKES 101/102/104 PAID: 1 NEK HOD INCREASED PRESSURE 45-1013 INLET LINE 3 III - B LINES 101/102/104 PAID: 1 NEK HOD REDUCED TEMPERATURE 45-1013 INLET LINE 3 III - B P 702 TO LINE 110 PAID: 1 NEM HOD INCREASED PRESSURE REGENERATION HEADER CAUSE: POOR RINSING CDHSEO: STRESS CORROSION CRACKING, TANK FAILURE ACT: SRO OTP ON CLEANUP PROCEDURES DAH*)Ww- 6* Addow . CAUSE: SEE LINE 103/108/109 CONSEO: CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 ACT: CONSED: CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 CONSEO: CAUSE: BOTH PUMPS AND CHECK VALVE FAILS,CV103C/MV OPEN CONSEO: LOOSE ION RESIN, SUM H2D CHARGE ACT: SRO OTP DAH>l*JttV cJ'rc&ige/ a**. CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 CONSEO: CAUSE: 105HV OPEN TOO HUGH CONSED: FLUSH OUT RESIN CAUSE: FIRE, MV CLOSE, FILTER PLUS, LINE PLUG, PRV101/102 FAIL ACT: SRO RAX FLOM AT STARTUP DAM*) Kb-lO i/ZO\ CortflC/rNft <4 -fa /1 nrs a H -V /o wer . ACT: CONSEO: VESSEL FAIL, GASKET FAIL, LOSS PROD, INJURY CAUSE: COLD H20 CONTROL FAILS, LACK OF USE, INSULATION OFF CONSEO: FREEZE SYSTEM, COLD CHAR6E (PARTICLE SIZE) ACT: SRO NIKTERIZATIDN PROCEDURES AND OTP ON NINTERI2IN8, PH INSUL JHV'> CAUSE: P-702 DEMMEAO/BACK PRESS CONTROLLER FAIL, 1I0HV OPEN/BACKPRCSS CONSEO: PUMP FAILURE (OLD HOD MORE CRITICAL DUE TO PUMP TYPE) ACT: BYPASS BEING ADDED IN OLD NODULE (EXISTS IN REM HOD), SOR OTP JLN'> k/i IJ Le, L^bTp. VAB.0001089137 * ' * Page Ho. 11/05/90 3 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code & Frequency Equipment Description VISTfl CHEMICAL COMPANY (5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZOP Study Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) PUD Caused By: Description Consequences: Action Itee Request Action Itee Response It Risk Code is: 4 4 IV - A 2-H0-2Q7 TANK EQ LINE 4 IV - A 2-NO-207 TANK EO LINE 4 IV - A 2-NO-207 TANK EO LINE 4 IV - B 2-N0-2O7 TANK E8 LINE PAID: 2 OLD HOD NO FLON PAID: 2 OLD MOD REDUCED FLOM PAID: 2 OLD MOO REDUCED PRESSURE PAID: 2 OLD MOD REDUCED TEMPERATURE IV - A IDN El VESS 45-1013 PAID: l NEM HOD ION EKCHANGE VESSEL NO FLON 4 IV - A ION El VESS 45-1013 PAID: 1 NEH HOD INCREASED TEMPERATURE ION EXCHANGE VESSEL IV - A ION EX VESS 45-1013 PAID: 1 NEN ROD ION EXCHANGE VESSEL REDUCED FLON IV - A ION El VESS 45-1013 PAID: 1 NEN MOD ION EXCHANGE VESSEL REDUCED PRESSURE 4 IV - A ION EX VESS 45-1013 PAID: 1 NEN HOD MAINTENANCE ION EXCHANGE VESSEL IV - A ION EX VESS 45-1013 PAID: 1 NEN HOD ION EXCHANGE VESSEL STARTUP/5KUTD0HN CAUSE: VALVE CLOSED, PUMP FAILURE CDNSED: PARTIAL REGENERATION ACT: SRO OTP OAM*)^1 ^ CAUSE: PARTIAL MV CLOSED, LINE BLOCKAGE, PUMP PROBLEMS CONSEQ: SLON REGENERATION ACT: SRO OTP m-yUtU U`^eJlkarp CAUSE: PUMP BLOCKED IN AT TANK CONSEQ: PUMP CAVITATION ACT: SRO OTP DAM*) V\) l* I) bit aj=/d CAUSE: CULD HEATHER CDNSED: FREEZE LINE AND PUMP ACT: SRO FREEZE PROTECTION AND HINTERIZATION PLANS DAH=> CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 ACT: CONSEQ: CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 CONSEQ: CAUSE: SEE LIKE 103/10B/109 CONSEQ: CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 CONSEQ: CAUSE: REPLACE RESIN, INSPECT INTERNALS, SAMPLE RESIN, TEST PRV CONSEQ: POTENTIAL VCH EXPOSURE. POTENTIAL SLIP/TRIP HAZARDS ACT: SRO VESSEL PREP FDR MAINT DAM*) U),U lx, ode/cesSn*/ OTP+ CAUSE: REPLACE RESIN, SAMPLE RESIN, INSPECT VESSEL CONSEQ: DISRUPT BED, POTENTIAL BURN HAZARD, LEAK RATER INTO VESSEL ACT: SRO BLINDING PROCEDURES, SRO RESIN REPLACE. & STARTUP PROCEDURES mm=>Wi (J lac c*td<J"U cTTf*. VAB.0001089138 Page No. 11/05/90 4 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code i Frequency Equipment Description VISTA CHEMCAL COMPANY 15305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZQP Study Data Report ! Grouped by Risk Codes) PiID Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: Action Iten Request Action Iten Response 4 IV - B ION EX VESS 45-1013 PilD: 1 KEH MOD INCREASED PRESSURE ION EICHAN6E VESSEL 4 IV - A LINE 103/106/10? PilD: 1 NEN HDD ND FLOW 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE CAUSE: SEE LINE 103/108/10? CONSEB: DEADHEAD TREATNENT PUMP CAUSE: SEE LINE 101/102/104 NO FLON. 10&HV/105HV OPEN CONSED: BAD BATCH, LOST PRODUCTION. POORER DUALITY PRODUCT ACT: SRO OTP DAH=) 11 ACT: SEE LINE 101/102/104 NO FLOH, SRO OTP, REVIEN NEED FOR CHK VALVE dah=>\/Ji (] cuddecas^d OT/7. 4 IV - A LINE 103/106/10? PUD: 1 NEN NOD INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE; SEE LINE 101/102/104 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE CONSEB: 4 IV - A LINE 103/108/10? PUD: 1 NEH MOD REDUCED FLON 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE CAUSE: (SEE NO FLON), FILTER PLU66ED, MV PARTIALLY CLOSED ACT: # CONSEB: 5L0H CHAR6E 4 IV - A LINE 103/108/10? PilD: 1 NEH HOD SAMPLING AT LINE 106 CAUSE: CHECK QUALITY 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE CONSEB: POTENTIAL BURN, POTENTIAL TRIP/SLIP HAZARD ACT: SRO SAMPLING PROCEDURES daho UM / addressed. L*. OTP. 4 IV - B LINE 103/10B/109 PilD: 1 NEH NOD INCREASED FLON 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE 4 IV - B LINE 103/10B/109 PilD: 1 NEH HOD REDUCED PRESSURE 45-1013 DISCHARGE LINE CAUSE: ION El RESIN LOSS, JiOHV OPEN, 109MV TD DRAIN OPEN CONSEB: SLOH CHARGE, BACK UP INTO 6H20 TANK CAUSE: 109HV OPEN, ION BED PLUGGED, FILTER PLUGGED, PUMPS FAIL ACT: RECOMMEND INSTALL CHECK VALVE IN LINE 110 AT PUMP, SRD DTP JME*> CLccJk- ifoXaM- oddxA. will Lt- U&rP. ACT: . CONSEB: SLOH CHARGE 4 IV - B LINE 105/110/104 PilD: I NEN HOD REDUCED TEHPERATURE PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 4 IV - A LINE 105/110/104 PilD: I NEN HIM) REVERSE FLOW PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 CAUSE: TRACING FAILURE,INSULATION HISSIN6 CONSEB: FREEZE UP LINE, INEFFECTIVE BACKHASH. LINE RUPTURE b CAUSE: OPEN 105HV,LDSS HATER PRES. CONSEB: SLOH CHARGE OR ABORT BATCH ACT: SRO WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES JHV=> ACT; SEE LINE 101/102/104, CHECK VALVE LINE 105, SRO OTP JLH=> QJUmJc, VUuLk. rx.dd*$ 4-9 otfco 4^^. VAB.0001089139 Page No. li/05/90 5 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code l Frequency Equipaent Description VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY <5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZOP Stud/ Data Report (grouped by Risk Codes) PIID Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: Action Itea Request Action Itei Response 4 IV - A LINE 105/110/104 PUD: I NEH NOD INCREASED PRESSURE PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 4 IV - B LINE 105/110/104 PUD: 1 NEN NOD NO FLOH PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 4 IV - B LINE 105/110/104 PUD: 1 NEH HOD REDUCED FLOH PROCESS K20 THRU 45-1015 4 IV - B LINE 105/110/104 PUD: 1 NEN NOD REDUCED PRESSURE PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 IV - 6 LINE 107 SOFT HATER HAKE UP PUS: 1 NEN NOD REDUCED TEHPERATURE IV - A LINE 107 SOFT WATER HAKE UP PUD: 1 NEN HOD REDUCED FLOH 4 IV - A LINE 107 PUD: 1 NEH NOD REDUCED PRESSURE SOFT HATER HAKE UP IV - B LINE 107 SOFT HATER NAKE UP PUD: 1 NEH HOD NO FLOH IV - B LINE 107 SOFT HATER RAKE UP PUD: l NEH NOD INCREASED PRESSURE CAUSE: NELL PRESSURE RE6 FAILURE,105 MV OPEN(NORM OP) C0NSE8: FLUSH RESIN OUT, ACT: SRO OTP fa*- CAUSE: NV CLOSED, VESSEL OR LINE PLUGGED, LOSS OF K20 PRESS CONSEQ: CANT RINSE,CANT USE SYSTEM CAUSE: LINE BL0CKA6E,105NV PAR. CLOSED, BED FLUEBED, CONSEQ: INPROPER BED FLUSH, SNITCH PROD. CAUSE: LOSS OF H20 PRESSURE,DRAIN VALVE OPEN, NORN ORIFICE CONSEQ: IMPROPER BED FLUSH CAUSE: TRACINE FAILURE, INSULATION KISSIN6 CONSEO: FROZEN LINE, METER BURST, LINE BURST ACT: SRO HINTERIZATION PLAN JHV= > CAUSE: ACTUATED OR NV PART. OPEN. IETER PROBLEMS ACT: CONSEQ: SLOW NAKE UP, OVERFLON TANK CAUSE: SEE 103/108/109 CONSEQ: CAUSE: NV CLOSED,METER FAILURE,ACT. VALVE FAILURE, CONSEQ: CANT HAKE UP ANY HATER, HAKE UP BY ALT METHOD ACT: SRO OTP dan=>*OI UtkJlAs****. OTF CAUSE: BLOCKED ACT VALVE 1 107MV OPEN CONSEQ: POTENTIAL METER FAILURE ACT: CHECK METER PRESSURE RATINGS,SRO OTP VABDOO1089140 Page No. 11/05/90 6 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY <5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZOP Study Data Report <6rouped by Risk Codes) Risk Criticality Equip ID Code It Frequency Equipacnt Description s=s=s= PUD Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: Action I tea Request Action Itea Response 4 IV - A LIKES 101/102/104 PUD: 1 NEH MOD NO FLOH 45-1013 INLET LINE CAUSE: CV HISALI6N,MV CLOSE,FILTER PLUG,LINE PLUS,LOSS H20,P0HER FAILURE CONSEQ: PROD LOSS,VCft M1SCHAR8E, BAD BATCH ACT: 5R0 LOH FLOH ALARM ON CKAR6E HATER DAM=> S/^Ctsm VtSM 4 IV - A LINES 101/ID2/104 PUD: 1 NEN HOD INCREASED FLOH 45-1013 INLET LINE CAUSE: HV104 DPEN,PRV10i OR 102 OPEN,ION RESIN LOSS, CQKSEO: SLON CHARGE ACT: SRO OTP Kmt)WiLiA^tn4*, ftnP, 4 IV - A LINES 101/102/104 PUD: 1 NEH MOD INCREASED TEMPERATURE CAUSE: COLD H20 CONTROL FAIL, 45-1013 INLET LINE CONSEQ: REACTOR TEMP ALARM ACT: LAP 4 IV - A LINES 101/102/104 PUD: 1 NEH MOD REDUCED PRESSURE 45-1013 INLET LINE CAUSE: MV106 OPEN, PRV101 OR 102 OPEN, MV TO SEWER OPEN, PUMP FAILS 4 IV - A LINES 101/102/104 PUD: l NEH NOD MAINTENANCE 45-1013 INLET LINE Ci 0NSE9: SEE NO FLOH CAUSE: VALVE FAILURE, FILTER PLUS, P6 AND TG ACCESS ACT: MAINTAIN SAFE HORK PRACTICES 4 IV - B P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: I NEH HOD NO FLON REGENERATION HEADER 4 IV - B P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: 1 NEH HOD REVERSE FLOH REGENERATION HEADER 4 IV - B P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: 1 NEH HOD REDUCED FLON REGENERATION HEADER CONSEQ: LIFT/FALLING/SLIP POTENTIAL HAZARD CAUSE: MV CLOSED, PUMP FAILURE, LINE BLOCKED, TANK EMPTY CONSEQ: NO REGENERATION, SHITCH PRODUCTS ACT: SRO OTP dan=>uJLjU <*J.JIaQ4+. ^.OTP, CAU5E: CHECK VALVE FAIL L MV OPEN CONSEQ: OVERFLEW TANK, SLON CHARGE TO REACTOR ACT: SRO OTP ^uai ~ otp- CAUSE: DRAIN VALVE OPEN, PLUGGED RD, BPCV FAIL OPEN 4 IV - B P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: 1 NEN MOO REDUCED PRESSURE REGENERATION HEADER CONSEQ: SLOW REGENERATION, MAINTENANCE REQUIRED CAUSE: DRAIN VALVE DPEN, PUMP FAIL, NORN RO CONSEQ: SEE REDUCED FLOH VAB.0001089141 Page Nd. 11/05/90 7 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code t Frequency Equipment Description VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (5505 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZDP Study Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) PAID Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: Action Itee Request Action Itee Response A IV - B P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: 1 NEK ROD REDUCED TEMPERATURE REGENERATION HEADER 4 IV - B P 702 TO LINE 110 PUD: 1 NEN ROB CORROSION REGENERATION HEADER 4 IV - A P-701 PUD: I NEN MOD INCREASED PRESSURE PUMP 5UCT10N AND DISCHR6 4 IV - B P-701 PAID: 1 NEN HOD NO FLOW PUMP SUCTION AND 0ISCHR6 4 IV - B P-701 PAID: I NEN HOD REDUCED FLOH PUMP SUCTION AND DISCHR6 CAUSE: SEE P-70! PUMP SUCTION AND DISCHARGE CONSES: CAUSE: POOR FLUSH OF BRINE HATER ACT: SRO OTP CONSES: LINE ANO EQUIPMENT FAILURE CAUSE: CLOSED NV ACT: SRO OTP CONSEO: DEADHEAD PUMP DAH=> Uj CAUSE: VALVE FAILURE, PUHP FAILURE, LINE PLU66A6E, LS FAILURE ACT: CONSEO: CANT REGENERATE, SNITCH PRODUCTS CAUSE: MV THROTTLED, CHK VALVE FAILURE, HORN PUHP,SUCTION VALVE CLOSED CONSEO: RUN PUHP DRY, DELAYED REGENERATION u^txrf . VAB.0001089142 *011/05/90 1 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code fc Frequency Equipment Description VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM HAZOP Study Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) PAID Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: tl Risk Code is: -- 2-40-207 TANK EO LINE PAID: 2 OLD HOD REVERSE FLOH - 2-W-207 TANK E6 LINE PAID: 2 OLD ROD INCREASED FLOH - 2-40-207 TANK EQ LINE PUD: 2 OLD MOD INCREASED PRESSURE - 2-40-207 TANK ED LINE PUD: 2 OLD HOD INCREASED TEMPERATURE - BRINE HKUF l CH6 TKS PUD: 1 tc 2 NO FLOH TANKS IN BOTH NODULES - BRINE HKUf 4 CH6 TKS PUD: 1 ti 2 REVERSE FLOH TANKS IN BOTH NODULES - BRINE HKUP ti CHB TKS PUD: 1 4 2 INCREASED FLOH TANKS IN BOTH NODULES - BRINE HKUP lc CH6 TKS PUD: 1 A 2 INCREASED PRESSURE TANKS IN BOTH NODULES - BRINE HKUP l CHfi TKS PUD: 1 4 2 INCREASED TEMPERATURE TANKS IN BOTH NODULES * BRINE HKUP 4 CHS TKS PUD: 1 It 2 REDUCED FLOH TANKS IN BOTH NODULES - BRINE HKUP It CHS TKS PUD: 1 4 2 REDUCED PRESSURE TANKS IN BOTH NODULES -- BRINE HKUP tc CHG TKS PUD: 1 4 2 REDUCED TEMPERATURE TANKS IN BOTH NODULES CAUSE: NAP CONSEfi: CAUSE: NAP CONSES: CAUSE: NAP CONSED: CAUSE: NAP CONSED: CAUSE: NAP CONSED: CAUSE: NAP CDNSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CDNSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSED: CAUSE: NAP CONSED: CAUSE: NAP CONSED: CAUSE: NAP CONSED: CAUSE: NAP CONSED: Action I tea Request Action I tee Response * 4 ACT: ACT: ACT; r * VAB.0001089143 Page No. 11/05/90 2 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code It Frequency Equipeent Description VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZOP Study Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes! PHD Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: Action Itee Request Action Itea Response ION El VESS 45-1013 PHD: 1 MEN HOD INCREASED FLON ION EXCHANGE VESSEL LINE 105/110/104 PHD: 1 NEH ROD INCREASED TEMPERATURE PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 LINE 105/110/104 PHD: 1 NEH HOD MAINTENANCE PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 LINE 105/110/104 PHD; 1 NEH MOD CORROSION PROCESS H20 THRU 45-1013 LINE 107 SOFT HATER HAKE UP PHD: 1 KEN ROD REVERSE FLON LINE 107 SOFT HATER MAKE UP PHD: l NEH NOD INCREASED FLON LINE 107 SWT HATER HAKE UP PHD: 1 MEN MOD INCREASED TENPERATURE LINES 101/102/104 45-1013 INLET LINE PHD: 1 NEH NOD REDUCED FLOH P 702 TO LINE 110 PHD: 1 NEH NOD REBENERATION HEADER INCREASED FLOH P 702 TO LINE 110 PHD: 1 NEK HOD REBENERATION HEADER INCREASED TEMPERATURE P-701 PHD: 1 NEH MOD PUMP SUCTION AND DISCHRS REVERSE FLOH P-701 PAID: 1 NEN ROD PUMP SUCTION AMO DISCHRS INCREASED FLOH CAUSE: NAP CONSED: CAUSE: ELECTRAC HEATIN6 CONSED: NAP CAUSE: FLON NETER FAILURE/CALIDRATION CONSED: NAP CAUSE: FAILURE TO FLUSH 105 CONSES: NAP CAUSE: NAP CONSES; CAUSE: NAP CONSED: CAUSE: NAP CONSED: CAUSE: SEE NO FLON CONSED: CAUSE: DRAIN VALVE OPEN BEFORE VESSEL CONSED: NAP CAUSE: NAP CONSED: CAUSE: CHECK VALVE FAILURE I PUMP OFF. DRAIN VALVE OPEN CONSED: NAP CAUSE: NAP CDNSEB: ft * * ACT: VAB.0001089144 Page No. U/05/90 3 Risk Criticality Equip ID Code t Frequency Equipment Description VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY (5305 DECALCIFIED HATER SYSTEM) HAZOP Study Data Report (Grouped by Risk Codes) PUD Caused By: Deviation Description Consequences: P-701 PUD: 1 NEN MOD INCREASED TEMPERATURE PUMP SUCTION AND DISCHR6 P-701 PUD: 1 NEN MOD REDUCED PRESSURE PUMP SUCTION AND DISCHR6 P"70* PUD: I NEN HOD REDUCED TEMPERATURE PUMP SUCTION AND DISCHR6 CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: NAP CONSEQ: CAUSE: SEE LINE 107 CONSEQ: Action Itee Request Action Itee Response * A ACT: VAB.0001089145 VAB.0001089146 Ll! i O y Vi C-ZV-N-JU-hO-Z W| UJ Qh| o gSlUJLU M Q >- 1 CD o T1 1 I-Q4- Sdvmd aokMO nmi n<lj " 4 - tOJMR VWpiM^ pp n=. . - >.J\{. : ^s. '(fch.. .jn_p: .. . j.| 4' . VAB.0001089147