Document b58od53qBgKgX2eqnYpJnXXag

FILE NAME: Phenolic Resins (PHR) DATE: 1993 Dec 16 DOC#: PHR065 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Legal - Deposition of Jack T. Garrett; from Household Contact File u UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS BEAUMONT DIVISION 1 PAUL MAJOR, et ux, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) vs. ) ) No. 93-CV 315 ) ALCO STANDARD CORP., et al., ) ) Defendants. ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS 136TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT RITA MAE SCHMIDT, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) vs. L., ) ) No. D-145, 280 ) AC&S, INC., et al. , ) ) Defendants. ) Video Deposition of Witness JACK T. GARRETT On Behalf of the Plaintiffs December 16, 1993 H i Reported by: JULIE E. STELFOX H Certificate of Merit Reporter METRO COURT REPORTING, INC. < 20 South Central Avenue, Suite 202 St. Louis, Missouri 63105-1715 (314) 725-3333 (800) 829-6778 2 1 INDEX OF EXHIBITS* 2 Page Page Marked Identified 3 4 Plaintiff's Exhibit 230112 GARR - Curriculum Vitae 6 11 5 Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 6 Notice of Deposition 216 216 7 *Original exhibits attached to original 8 transcript. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 : i . j ui !" L i1 . 1 i-y ! 1 .. ! L R L i 1 ' I m 1 3 1 VIDEO DEPOSITION OF JACK T. GARRETT, produced, sworn and examined on the part of the 2 Plaintiffs, pursuant to Notice, and pursuant to the following stipulation between the hours of 3 eight o'clock in the forenoon and six o'clock in the afternoon of Thursday, December 16, 1993, at 4 the Stouffer's Concourse Hotel, 9801 Natural Bridge, in the County of St. Louis, State of 5 Missouri, before me, 6 JULIE E. STELFOX Certificate of Merit Reporter 7 of METRO COURT REPORTING, INC. o8 App earances 9 For the Plaintiff: Herschel L. Hobson 10 Joseph Blanks Attorneys at Law 11 2190 Harrison Avenue Beaumont, Texas 77701 12 For the Defendant: Martin P. Zucker 13 Monsanto Co. Inhouse Counsel 800 North Lindbergh Blvd. 14 St. Louis, Missouri 63167 15 For the Defendant: G. Joseph Ellis Monsanto Co. Woodard, Hall & Primm 16 7000 Texas Commerce Tower Houston, Texas 77002 17 For the Defendant: Paul Fogarty 18 North America Fulbright & Jaworski 1301 McKinney - 5100 19 Houston, Texas 77010 20 For the Defendant: David A. Oliver Goodyear & O&I Strong, Pipkin, 21 Nelson & Bissel 1400 San Jacinto Bldg. 22 Beaumont, Texas 77701 23 For the Defendant: H. Tracy Richardson, III Mallinckrodt Jenkins, Grove & Martin 24 P.0. Box 26008 Beaumont, Texas 77720-6008 25 Li 4 l A p p e a r a n e e s (Cont'd.) 2 For the Defendant: William B. Gaudet Ferro Corp. Adams and Reese 3 1100 Louisiana - 5100 Houston, Texas 77002 4 For the Defendant: Claude R. LeMasters 5 ARCO Orgain, Bell & Tucker 470 Orleans Street 6 Beaumont, Texas 77701 7 For the Defendant: Steven M. Duble Shell & Texaco Hays, McConn, i , 8 Rice & Pickering 400 Citicorp Center J9 1200 Smith Street LJ Houston, Texas 77002 r - 10 For the Defendant: John Hall L 11 Met Life Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Hill & LaBoon j * 12 Lwi Texas Commerce Tower Houston, Texas 77002 13 ; For the Defendant: James M. Corbett 1 14 R.T. Vanderbilt Giessel, Stone, Barker & Lyman 15 [ _ 16 2700 Two Houston Center 909 Fannin Houston, Texas 77010-1063 l 17 For the Defendant: David K. Vallance Alco Standard McLeod, Alexander, f 18 &<B 19 Powel & Apffel Box 629 Galveston, Texas 77553 E 20 For the Defendant: Rustin Polk Armstrong, et al DeHay & Elliston 1 21 L-, 22 1500 Maxus Energy Tower 717 North Harwood Street Dallas Texas 75201-6508 1 23 For the Defendant: James E. Brown, Jr. M.H. Detrick Johnson & Associates 24 4900 Woodway Houston, Texas 77056 25 A p p e a r a n e e s (Cont'd.) For the Defendant: Dupont John Muir Mayor, Day, Caldwell & Keeton 700 Louisiana - 1900 Houston, Texas 77002-2778 For the Defendant: Flint Kote Co. Jan E. Dodd Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard One City Centre - 1500 St. Louis, Missouri 63101-1880 For the Defendant: Rebecca R. Jackson Bryan Cave One Metropolitan Square 211 North Broadway St. Louis, Missouri 63102-2750 For the Defendant: Fibreboard Corp. Jim Powers Roberts, Markel, Folger & Powers 24 Greenway Plaza - 2000 Houston, Texas 77046 For the Defendant:: Monsanto Edward M. Carstarphen Woodard, Hall & Primm 7000 Texas Commerce Tower Houston, Texas 77002 Videographer: Warriene Flatt Legal Images 105 Hunters Court Lumberton, Texas 77656 6 1 Stipulation 2 Before the taking of the within deposition, the parties, by their counsel, stipulate and 3 agree that the same is being taken pursuant to Notice. Counsel further stipulate same may be 4 taken in stenotypy and thereafter typed, signature of the witness being expressly waived by consent 5 of counsel and the witness in his own behalf, and regularly filed in the case. 6 7 (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 230112 8 GARR, marked for identification, JS.) 9 JACK T . GARRETT 10 being produced, sworn and examined on behalf of 11 the Plaintiff, deposeth and saith: 12 MS. FLATT: The date is December 16. 13 It is 9:25. We are on the record. 14 THE REPORTER: And if everyone would 15 please identify themselves and who they represent 16 starting with the gentleman on my left. 17 MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, M.H. Detrick 18 Company. 19 MS. JACKSON: Rebecca Jackson, Coltec 20 Industries, Inc. and Garlock, Inc. 21 MR. FOGARTY: Paul Fogerty, Elf 22 Atochem, North American, Inc. 23 MR. OLIVER: David Oliver. In the 24 Major case, it will be Goodyear, In the Schmidt 25 case, it will be O&I. m ; ! , , ' J T; | PV L V L* .. ! : ! | - u P&ms* Eli i 1 T L ? 7 1 MR. LeMASTERS: Claude LeMasters, 2 representing ARCO in the Schmidt case. 3 MR. RICHARDSON: Tracy Richardson, 4 representing Mallinckrodt in the Major case. 5 MR. POWERS: Jim Powers, I represent 6 Fibreboard in the Schmidt case. 7 MR. DUBLE: Steve Duble for Shell and 8 Texaco. 9 MR. ELLIS: Joe Ellis representing 10 Monsanto and the witness. n MR. ZUCKER: Marty Zucker, Monsanto. 12 MR. HALL: John Hall, Met Life. 13 MR. MUIR: John Muir, Dupont. 14 MR. CORBETT: Jim Corbett, R.T. 15 Vanderbilt in the Major case. 16 MR. GAUDET: Billy Gaudet representing i7 Ferro Corporation in the Major case. 18 MR. VALLANCE: David Vallance 19 representing Alco Standard Corporation in the 3 0 Major case. 21 MR. POLK: Rustin Polk, representing 22 the Armstrong World Industries, A.P. Green, GAF, 23 Flexitallic, Asbestos Claims Management 2 4 Corporation, T&N and U.S. Gypsum in the Schmidt 25 case. 8 1 MS. DODD: Jan Dodd representing the 2 Flint Kote Company in the Schmidt case. 3 MR. HOBSON: I'm Herschel Hobson. I 4 represent the plaintiffs in these cases and in 5 attendance with me is Mr. Joseph Blanks. 6 DIRECT EXAMINATION 7 BY MR. HOBSON: 8 Q. Would you introduce yourself to the 9 group, please, sir. 10 A. My name is Jack T. Garrett, and I'm a 11 retired -- retiree from Monsanto and I'm a 12 consultant at times. 13 Q. Mr. Garrett, my name is Herschel 14 Hobson and I represent some people who've brought 15 a lawsuit. 16 One of the defendants in the case is 17 Monsanto. That's your old employer, so you 18 realize I'm on the other side of this lawsuit from 19 your old employer? 20 A. Yes. 21 MR. OLIVER: Herschel, if I may, you 22 were not serious -- 23 MR. HOBSON: I was not. One objection 24 is good for all -- 25 MR. OLIVER: Thank you. 9 1 MR. HOBSON: -- and take the 2 deposition pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil i 3 Procedure if that's -- 4 MR. ELLIS: Agreed. 5 MR. OLIVER: Agreed. 6 Q. Also ask you, Mr. Garrett, would you r . 7 like to read and sign your deposition so we have ` ' 8 all the little formalities out of the way? 1} 9 13 A. I haven't seen it yet. 10 Q. Yes, sir. That's -- what happens is r b ii this young lady that's taking everything down will P 12 put it in a book, send it to you and you can read L. - 13 it and there will be an eratta sheet, and any 1 14 changes that you would like to make, you have the i 15 privilege of writing on the eratta sheet and L_* 16 resubmitting. ! ' U 17 A. Okay. P 18 MR. ELLIS: Why don't we just handle L 19 it this way. If you would send his copy of the j| 20 deposition to me, and I'll arrange having him read f- 21 and sign the original signature page and return \ *" 22 the signature page. 1 23 A. If you send it to me, he's going to get it anyway. r 24 f 25 MR. CORBETT: Herschel, if I could l 10 1 ask, as a housekeeping matter, were you planning 2 on splitting up this deposition according to these 3 cases -- your questions in any particular way, one 4 case in the morning, one in the afternoon, 5 anything like that? 6 MR. HOBSON: No. We're going right on 7 through and getting done. 8 MR. CORBETT: Just every other 9 question. 10 MR. HOBSON: Something like that. 11 THE REPORTER: Sir, what is your name? 12 MR. CORBETT: Jim Corbett. 13 THE REPORTER: Okay. 14 MR. GAUDET: One additional matter -- 15 THE REPORTER: What is your name, sir? 16 MR. GAUDET: Billy Gaudet, 17 representing Ferro. We wanted to reserve our 18 right to object to the introduction of the video 19 ultimately. By not objecting to it earlier, we 20 wouldn't want it to act as a waiver to our later 21 obj ection. 22 MR. HOBSON: What's the basis of your 23 objection, sir? 24 MR. GAUDET: I'm reserving my right to 25 object to it. I don't know what it will be until 11 1 after you finish the -- the video. There may be 2 numerous objections to its introduction. 3 MR. HOBSON: You're not claiming you 4 didn't get notice. 5 MR. GAUDET: No, no. 6 Q. Mr. Garrett, may I have the date that 7 you first began working for Monsanto, please, sir? 8 A. It was 1950, I believe, and I can't -- 9 huh. Well, I graduated from the University of 10 Tennessee in -- with my Master's and it had to 11 have been in the end of the summer, so it had to n 12 have been either August or September. 13 Q. You've provided me before we started i i. 14 here this morning a copy of a resume which I've 15 now marked as Exhibit Number 230112 G-A-R-R, and 16 would it help you, sir, to look at your resume to 17 get those dates? 18 A. October 1953. 19 Q. October of '53? And may I ask when 20 you left Monsanto's employment, sir, as an 21 employee? 22 A. Thirty-five years after that. 23 Q. So somewhere around 1988? 24 A. It was '88 -- I believe '89, but I'm 25 not absolutely sure. Wait a minute. Let's look L 12 1 again, see if I've got a better memory than my 2 own. 3 Everything but the date I left out. 4 Q. '88 or '89? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. As I ask you questions, Mr. Garrett, I 7 know that some of the things I'm going to be 8 asking you about happened a long time ago and you 9 may not have a exact recollection of everything or 10 even precise dates, so if you could just give me 11 your best recollection, and if you're estimating, 12 just tell me when you're estimating, I'd 13 appreciate that, sir. 14 A. Okay. 15 Q. How did you get the job with Monsanto? 16 A. Well, when I graduated from the 17 University of Tennessee with my Master's, I had a 18 doctorate set up at the university -- at Oak Ridge 19 to do a doctoral dissertation in rare earth 20 materials with the -- what's known as the nuclear 21 energy for the propulsion of aircraft. 22 Now, that's a misnomer. It's NEPA. 23 All of their unusual research went under that 24 guise, and during the latter part of my Master's 25 degree work, the whole system collapsed. 13 1 The American first big post war 2 recession hit. The government was withdrawing 3 their support. The two people I worked with out 4 there to get this job headed -- I had my Ph.D. 5 thing agreed upon and everything. They -- I 6 couldn't even find them. 7 One of the -- the University promptly 8 sent him back to his home university, which 9 happened to be the University of Illinois. So I 10 had to go get a job. 11 I was married and had two kids, so I 12 went off on foot. Went over to my father's home 13 in southeast Oklahoma, Durant, and went with him, 14 who was a salesman for fractional horsepower 15 engines, for lawn mower manufacturers. 16 Went with him on -- down on a trip to 17 Houston because I didn't have the money, and I 18 stayed in his hotel room and his employer 19 apparently paid for it, used his car while he 20 spent all day in his -- went around Houston, all 21 the way down to Texas City, interviewed everybody 22 along the line, and -- and Monsanto offered me a 23 job on the spot. 24 O. And that must have been in October 25 1953, thereabouts? 14 1 A. That's right. 2 q . When you walked in the gate, did you 3 have in mind what you wanted to do when you made 4 your application? 5 A. I wanted to do research. 6 q . Did you get to do research? 7 A. Damn little. An inorganic physical 8 chemist in a primarily organic laboratory is 9 does all the spare parts work. i 10 Q. And that's where you found yourself. c 11 A. That's right. 12 q . Is that what you did then is you u 13 started working in the laboratory there at the 14 Texas City plant? 15 A The research lab for the Texas 16 Division of Monsanto at the time. 17 q . What kinds of things did they have you 18 doing when you began working at the research lab 19 there? 20 A. I did a lot of explosion limit work, r* 21 physical chemistry. Mixture work. I finally 22 ended up doing pilot -- a lot of pilot plant work 23 for the processes that were being developed. 24 q . Is my appreciation that ultimately you rt~ L 25 got into industrial hygiene with Monsanto, is that l 15 1 right? 2 A. Well, everything I did at the 3 beginning I guess was a mistake. I was ordered by 4 my boss to go out and find out -- I don't know 5 why. I don't have any idea -- but to go out and 6 find out all the materials handled in the plant 7 both as primary raw materials, intermediates, 8 identifiable intermediates and final products, and 9 to write a treatise defining the safety and health 10 problems connected with each one of them. So X wrote a famous research report 11 12 that had absolutely nothing to do with research, 13 but it was the biggest one they ever had written, 14 I guess, and I -- and I'd research -- reports at 15 the time in Monsanto went to the plant manager or 16 to my boss, the research director for the Texas 17 Division of Monsanto, and copies went to St. 18 Louis, both to the then vice-president of research 19 and to the corporate research file. 2 0 These research things are all double 21 signed. Every page has to be double signed and 22 all that legal nonsense. And it was on health and 23 safety, and somebody sent a copy to Dr. Kelly, who 24 was the medical director of Monsanto. 25 And he wanted to know who in the hell 16 1 was interfering in his business, I guess, so he 2 came to Texas City, talked to me along with Elmer 3 Wheeler, who was then director of industrial 4 hygiene or was the corporate industrial hygienist I 5 because there was nobody else working for him, and 6 a couple weeks later I got offered a transfer to 7 St. Louis. p i 8 q . About how long after you got to 9 Monsanto in Texas City did you start your research 10 report that led to this odyssey? A. Gosh, I don't know. Maybe a year. 11 q . And about how long did it take you to 12 13 do the work for the research report? 14 A. I spent most of my time in the library 15 in Houston at the University of Houston library 16 and over at the hospital there, which is now that 17 big hospital center. E 18 I think that was the old Baylor 19 Medical -- Baylor Medical School branch, and I 20 spent a good deal in their library. r 21 l q . Did you utilize the library down at 22 the University of Texas medical branch in 23 Galveston? 24 A. No, I was over there. I had been in 25 that hospital many times, but -- and had talked to W 17 1 a couple people, but their library was not nearly 2 as extensive at -- in this subject. 3 Now, you're talking toxicology now, 4 not really medicine. Not nearly as good as the 5 University of Houston at that time, and the 6 other -- the university there -- that university 7 center, which is now that big diagnostic center 8 was then, I believe, attached to Baylor, but I'm 9 not sure, and they had the best library. 10 Q. There's a library there now called 11 Jessie Jones Memorial Library. 12 A. That could very be -- very well be it, 13 or the beginning of it. 14 q . Had you had any training or experience 15 in the area of toxicology before you began this 16 research report? 17 A. I had training in respect to the -- to 18 the methods of keeping yourself reasonably clean 19 and alive in research and at that university, 20 believe it or not, we had university safety people 21 at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville Campus, 22 and the research chemists on research jobs got 23 lectured and given the documents necessary for 24 their -- and the TLVs for their materials that 25 they were handling, and we stuck within that to 18 1 the degree that we could do that for sampling. 2 TLV means threshold limit value. 3 Q. Did any of your course work that you 4 took as a student before you came to Monsanto 5 teach you about how to do scientific research? 6 A. Yeah, I did a lot of sci- -- I 7 produced the scientific -- researched my report 8 myself. 9 q . So by the time -- 10 A. It was published -- published in the 11 Journal of Physical Chemistry. It's on radiation 12 chemistry, the measure of radioactive materials in 13 layers, the differential effect of layers, the 14 absorption effect of layers themselves. 15 Q. So would it be accurate then, Mr. 16 Garrett, that by the time you got to Monsanto you 17 were well trained and schooled in how to do 18 scientific research, how to use a library, how to 19 find really what was available in the in the 20 scientific literature? 21 A. Or do it myself. 22 q . Yes, sir. 23 A. Keep in mind I did some work on 24 pollution control all along in this same issue, 25 so -- and that way we d i d it o u r s e l f . W e w e n t to !____3 VI;? h i i \ fL % * i u 19 1 the State of Texas and with their laboratory 2 facilities and their research biologists set up 3 programs of testing chemicals in expected 4 developments at the Texas City plant. 5 We did the -- the marine toxicology 6 work on a number of them, including a number of 7 cyanide compounds. 8 Q. When you went to the University of 9 Houston, as you described earlier, in doing the 10 work for your research report, would you recount 11 for me as best you can recall how you found that 12 facility from a toxicological research standpoint? 13 A. You track it through chemistry is the 14 way I did it. I was interested in a great many 15 chemicals, and if you track the chemicals back far 16 enough, you will find references to some kind of 17 government documents or other documents and if you 18 can look them up or have them shipped, and we had 19 a great many shipped on loan. 20 We could find out what the threshold 21 limit values were, how they were done, who did the 22 work and so forth. So that was where we did it. 23 I had a great leader there, by the 24 way. Monsanto had a consultant at the University 25 of Houston named Sawin, s-a-w-i-n, k n o w n as Hod. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 20 I don't know what his first name was. He was a tremendous biologist, and he had knowledge in where you could find a great many things in a university web that I did not know although I had been through the same ruckus at Tennessee. Our laboratory system at Tennessee is much different than the University of Houston's. Our library system in Tennessee was centralized. Theirs was scattered within the individual colleges at that time. q . Yes, sir. And did you have the feeling that you, in fact, through the University of Houston and over at the Medical Center library that you say could have been associated with Baylor at the time, that you really did have access to pretty much all the literature that you needed? A. Yes. I think I did, and I got put on a bunch of committees that I didn t even know existed by my boss in Texas, and one of them was a Manufacturing Chemists Association committee on pollution, and this was primarily at the time pollution control standards was the was the work of the day, If you know what X mean. 21 1 And I went to a number of those 2 meetings and met some very good and efficient 3 people from Dupont, particularly from Dupont, and 4 from Standard Oil of New Jersey, and they helped 5 me along as well. 6 Here I'm an inorganic physical chemist 7 who didn't even know anybody cared and I'm now 8 beginning to be a toxicologist. 9 Q. In the Houston area when you got there 10 in the early 1950s, did you encounter anyone else 11 other than Dr. Sawin that you told us about who 12 you found to be helpful or knowledgeable in doing 13 this toxicological work? 14 A. There was a guy -- there was a man at 15 Humble then which is then and even now fully a 16 part of Standard of New Jersey but then it was -- 17 even then, but it was called Humble & Refining 18 Company. 19 It was headquartered in Houston and 20 whose primary refinery was there. I can't 21 remember his name. 22 q . What was his -- 23 A. He was their -- he was their 24 industrial hygienist. 25 q . James Hammon? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 22 A. Yes, it was Jim Hammon, and he led me through a great deal of the labryinth of where you get and why you get there in this business and where you get the data, because the data on early -- in those days was pretty -- was there but it was -- you had to dig like the devil to fxnd it. It was in reports. Lots of it was in the hands of chemical companies and oil companies, and if you had access through -- and Jim introduced me to that committee of the API which Monsanto later put me on, was the support committee for the American Petroleum Institute. q . The medical advisory committee? A. Yes, only it was primarily meeting of loudmouth industrial hygiene and toxicology people. We blew the M.D.s out of the place. q . I take it you mean that in a constructive sense? A. Well, no, they -- believe it or not, they __ we organ--- they organized a committee that included all of us and then they went to play golf. The doctors always play golf. q . Left you guys to do the serious work? A. That's right. So we did all the work H L r i * ' i L nL E > * 1 -_ f 23 1 in connection with toxicology and the work 2 necessary guiding lights toward what kind of work 3 needed to be done to produce adequate controls and 4 this sort of thing and who was doing what and so 5 forth. 6 And some of the research projects 7 later put on by the API was largely due to the 8 toxicology committee or whatever they want to call 9 it. It was the non-medicals anyway. 10 Q. Can you put a time period on that, of 11 course, Mr. Garrett, when you worked with the API, 12 '56? 13 A. I was a member of the API committee 14 probably for fifteen years in the late '50s, had 15 to be into the early '70s. Okay? 16 Q. Yes, sir. 17 A. And the meetings largely enough then 18 were in Chicago. I bet I went to twenty meetings 19 in Chicago in Chicago or Fort Worth. Why, I 20 don't know . Don't ask me. 21 Q. Were there other people besides Jim 22 Hammon that you recall working with on these 23 activities 24 A. Oh, yes. The best group that I knew 25 was the was the Standard Oil group. That was 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the -- in New Jersey, and their people in Columbia and Venezuela, which was also a subsidiary of theirs, called Creole Production Company, I believe. And they had a great group down in South America, and we got -- we worked with them along -- now, we, I'm talking about the chemical crowd. This is the Dupont, Monsanto and all the bunch of that group with the oil group, but it really pretty well merged that throughout all the AP -- the committees, including the committees on standards. We probably -- I probably knew all these people personally and a great many of them I had been in their homes. I knew their wives and kids and everything, so it was that kind of relationship. Q. Did you mention that Dupont was also part of this API work? A. Oh, yes. q . Were there other chemical companies involved with the petroleum industry through the API? A. No. Dupont -- in the API group was a group of people representing -- in my opinion, the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 25 most forward and good companies represented a group that the chemical industry group represented together in -- with the American Industrial Hygiene Association in their committees on standards, and that group was -- were friends. I was a personal friend of the Dupont man. as a matter of fact. Been in his house. Been in his home. q . Who was that, sir? A. Oh, God. Don 't ask me that question, His name, his name. You' d have to look it up from the records, I guess. Q. Dow Chemical, would that be one of the companies? A. Dow was -- Dow was the best treater in the business in pollution control. Now, keep m mind we're working both sides of this street. Now, this is not true with everybody else, but it was true with a great many people, including Monsanto and Dupe and some of the others. We treated this as a single issue. Dow did not. Dow had a strictly pollution engineering group and a toxicology industrial thinking group. They knew each other. Don't get me wrong - I ' m not -- and they f r e q u e n t l y w e n t to 26 1 the same meetings because of the crossing of 2 information and need. 3 But Dow was the people that had done a 4 lot of very difficult treatment studies and they 5 were wide open to anybody in the industry. They 6 taught us a great deal about treatment of organic 7 chemicals in treatment of plants, which we some 8 we didn't know. Some we did know. 9 We turned over to them a lot of 10 experience in connection with some products as 11 well. 12 I also had been frequently in their 13 plant in Freeport, Texas. 14 q . Down in the same area of Texas Union 15 Carbide has a large facility. Did you have any 16 encounters with Union Carbide personnel? 17 A. Carbide is a funny company. Of the 18 big chemicals. They did a lot of work in this 19 area but they did less coordinating with other 20 companies than most big companies. 21 They did by zone. We had a great 22 group in Texas. We had a good group in the 23 Kanawha Valley of West Virginia with Dupont and 24 Monsanto and Carbide and the like, but as a 25 corporate structure, it was difficult to find 27 1 whoever was supposed to be the boss man of 2 pollution or industrial hygiene in Carbide at the 3 time. 4 They had people, some very, very good 5 people. They attended our API -- or our they 6 attended our industrial hygiene meetings, but it 7 wasn't coordinated really. 8 Their companies were separate 9 companies. I guess legally a great deal more 10 separate than Monsanto's divisions were and/or 11 other companies. 12 Q. Now, this work that you were doing 13 with the American Petroleum Institute and I think 14 you said also the Manufacturing Chemists 15 Association, this was -- was this after you 16 transferred to the corporate offices of Monsanto? 17 A. Well, it was during the period -- and 18 I don't know. I went to -- I made an API meeting 19 in Fort Worth before I went up there and was 20 talking with their -- largely with their 21 toxicology people, and now you're talking 22 industrial hygiene, not pollution, okay? 23 q . How would you be able to tell us the 24 differentiation between industrial hygiene and 25 pollution as you use those terms? 28 A. in some cases you couldn't because 1 some companies grew up. Like Monsanto grew up 2 3 from Dr. Kelly into the -- into the industrial 4 hygiene pollution and then the pollution thing 5 finally fell over into engineering. Same was true I know, for example, 6 7 with Dupe because Dupont's people were engineering 8 people and they were from Newark, Delaware. 9 They were not in the main plant. They 10 were down at the engineering offices in Newark, 11 and when I wanted to visit them, I had to go down 12 there to that -- to the Newark operation. 13 In the petroleum companies an 14 interesting thought, who was -- their headquarters 15 people, these were the kingpin people in what 16 would be considered the good, good companies, like 17 Standard. 18 Standard Oil of New Jersey had a 19 set-up where their people in New Jersey working 20 out of that New Jersey office and the labs there 21 represented all of their subsidiaries except that 22 many of their subsidiaries, like Humble but 23 Humble grew up as a separate company that was 24 owned by them, which is the same thing with their 25 set-up in South America. And so they had the same kind of people there,, and how they merged them, I don't know. But we did deal with them very much. They had Dupont -- I mean Standard probably had the best trained young physicians. MR. OLIVER: Objection, nonresponsive. q . Would you tell us, Mr. Garrett, as best you recall, how it was when you would go to meetings through these organizations or others in exchanging information between companies. Was this something that was done, not done? How -- A. It was done wide open. Wide open. We -- I had a letter one time -- and I don't know who it was from -- to tell them anything they want to know because it's a business that has to be done and done right by one of our executives. So we did -- we told them any data they want. I've given them complete research pamphlets connected with that specific toxicology. Q. Did you find that there were some companies that were just as open about Monsanto as Monsanto was and others at work or how did that work? MR. FOGARTY: Objection, calls for 30 1 speculation. 2 THE REPORTER: What's your name, sir? 3 MR. FOGARTY: Paul Fogerty. 4 A. We had a group of people we worked 5 with us in detail. I don't remember anybody 6 telling us we didn't -- they wouldn't give us r7 their data or information. L 8 Q. Was it your perception at the time 9 that the folks that you have told us that you 10 worked with at these other companies, that these P Lt 11 other companies were just as open as Monsanto was p 12 in sharing that? L*j 13 A. Yes. 14 q . You said that this initial research 15 report that you -- that got you into the health 16 and safety, and later I guess pollution even area 17 your charge was to go out and find all the C 18 materials used at the Texas City plant? 19 A. (Nodding head.) 20 Q. Can you tell me how you went about 21 doing that? 22 A. I went from unit to unit and asked 23 them, got their engineer out and had him define 24 and diagram his unit. And where he actually 25 peeked at or sniffed at any of the products, we 1 took them down and checked them, but the report s 2 about -- hundreds of pages long. 3 Q. Did that report have a title to it so 4 that we could identify it? 5 A. God, no, I don't think so. I have no 6 idea what the report title was. I didn't even 7 know that Kelly'd had a copy of the damn thing. 8 You know, you do -- I'm a young 9 chemist doing a job. I'll do the job they tell me 10 to do. I recognize that I was a spare part 11 because I was the inorganic physical chemist m a 12 largely organic laboratory and I got all the 13 oddball jobs, and that was one of them. 14 q . When you said you used all the you 15 inventoried all the materials used at the plant, 16 were these process materials that we're talking 17 about? 18 A. Yes, primarily purchased or modified. 19 If they purchased one product and modified it, we 20 did them both. If there were known analyzed-for 21 comtaminants, we did those if we could find it. 22 If we didn't, we did the work ourselves. 23 q . And what about items that were used, 24 not in actually as raw material to make a product 25 or as a finished product or intermediate, but 32 1 things like catalysts or filter aids? 2 A. We did three catalysts and we did some 3 of the spents where you get two of them and get 4 them. We did a lot of raw material, or we 5 gathered the data. 6 Now, keep in mind we're gathering data 7 for this thing. You'd be surprised at the number 8 of sources you can tap and surprised I think even 9 more at how even then -- you're talking 1950s 10 now -- even how open they are. We had no trouble, for example, in 11 12 respect to any of the dusts that we usually 13 handled, asbestos, cement, that sort of stuff. 14 The people that -- they give you what 15 they knew and they'd give you any data they had, 16 and, in fact, they'd give you probably literature 17 resources if those were available. 18 q . Asbestos was a material that was used 19 at the Texas City plant? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. You-all use it in chlorine 22 manufacturing? 23 A. We didn't manufacture chlorine at 24 Texas City. o. You didn't? How did you use asbestos 25 1 at the plant, as you recall? 2 A. As an insulating material. 3 q . oh. But not in manufacturing 4 products? 5 A. No. 6 Q. You say that you were given 7 information freely about things like asbestos 8 dust. 9 A. That's right. 10 Q. What did you get and how did you go 11 about doing it? How did you get to this 12 impression? 13 A. Well, we got -- we got told -- and 14 I'll tell you the truth. I can't tell you who 15 told me -- to look up the TLVs, and the first time 16 I ever saw TLVs was during that setting. I didn't 17 even know they existed. 18 Hell, I'm a darn fool. Come out of 19 the Army and -- with too many kids and needed a 20 job. So I found out that they used asbestos. 21 I got -- looked it up, found out the 22 threshold limit value, and all of those things 23 that we could find a TLV for or that any company 24 had established one for, we used and was in the 25 report. 34 1 Q. When you say you found out "they" used 2 asbestos, who were you talking about? :j ' 3 A. Our maintenance people used it to 4 maintain the pipe equipment. 5 Q. Were you aware that there was asbestos ! 6 in insulation materials -- j ' 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. -- before you came to Texas City? 9 A. Yes. 10 r Q. What do you recall learning about L 11 asbestos? P 12 LwJ A. Well, as a matter of fact, we were 13 dealing -- we were making some reactor tubes at 14 the University ofTennessee, and we got lectured 15 on that to use respirators or use it inside of L, 16 hand glove compartments in a hood. 17 If we were going to do it before -- 18 well, we mixed it up in the mud because most 19 research laboratories use a lot of it to cover 20 heat sensitive equipment as a mud. r 21 Q. And this occurred even before you went 22 to Monsanto? 23 A. Oh, yes. I used it before. Yes, I 24 did. 25 Q. Do you remember what was told to you $ L 35 1 when you were at the University of Tennessee about 2 the reasons for handling asbestos this way? 3 A. Don't breathe it. 4 Q. I'm sorry? 5 A. Don't breathe it, or use a mask. 6 "Come to the head of this particular section, the 7 research of engineering section. Go see him, they 8 get you a mask." 9 Q. Is there some point in your career, 10 Mr. Garrett, where you learned about the hazards 11 that were associated with asbestos exposure? 12 A. Well, if you're told to do a research 13 report on the toxicology and hazards and safety 14 features of all the products in a complicated 15 plant, you're going to learn about asbestos and 16 cement dust and catalysts, spent catalyst dust, 17 and about half a dozen other dusts, and we're 18 going to check them out. 19 And the primary test period was the 20 surface toxicology, what was retained on old 21 catalysts. Believe it or not, not much. 22 Second, what was the base catalyst 23 made of? Is it -- was it made of some rock 24 substance or asbestos in pellets, in little half 25 moons -- God, we've seen it in every shape you can  Pij p! i r-i ^ 1 ,, r y H L. t ij j i Lj f ' y P L E E 1 r ^ 36 1 imagine -- upon which something is then laid or 2 sprayed or cooked on, which is subsequently the 3 catalyst, which much of the solid catalysts today 4 or in those days were in catalyst beds, and those 5 beds were made up of some kind of rock or base 6 with the material stuck to it somehow. 7 Generally by vapor, and then that 8 constituted the catalyst used. Q. Are you saying that some of the 9 10 catalysts that you used there at Monsanto, the n base material was made with asbestos? 12 A. Some of it had to have been. I don't 13 know. I couldn't tell you that. I've seen so 14 many different kinds that you can shake a stick 15 at. 16 They're made out of cement base. Some 17 of them are made out of -- with asbestos in a blender. They're sort of solid. The stuff is 18 19 then absorbed to it and that constitutes catalyst, 20 and it's used in beds or trays in a vapor stream. Q. In looking through your -- let me 21 22 start over. In doing your research report that 23 you told us about at the Monsanto plant there at 24 Texas City and going to the University of Houston 25 and the other libraries, can you still recall some M 37 1 of the sources of information that you found? 2 A. The primary source was the :'1 3 Manufacturing Chemists Associations' hazard data 4 sheets. I later found out that the American 5 Petroleum Institute also had hazard data sheets, 6 but that was too late to help my report, but it r- 7 wasn't too late to help me find some of the things L` 8 they used that we did not in the chemical industry normally used. i 9 10 Q. You're talking about the toxicological rL n reviews that the API had? P 12 A. Yes, tox reviews of theirs and the - 13 chemical safety data sheets that the old MCA had. ! 'L-' 14 They still have them today under the Chemical I 15 Manufacturers Association, CMA today. 16 Change of name doesn't change the L 17 organization much. R 18 Q. Do you recall seeing any literature L 19 from the Industrial Hygiene Foundation? 20 A. Yes. f> 21 Q. Is that a source that you would have \ lr5J 22 been able to -- . 1 23 A. Well, when I got transferred to St. r 24 Louis, and Dr. Kelly, after he came down to look ~ 25 at my report and gave me hell for writing it 38 1 because I wasn't supposed to be qualified, then he 2 transferred me to St. Louis as an industrial 3 hygienist, which doesn't make a whole lot of 4 sense, but what the hell. 5 I went up there and then I ran into 6 my -- the boss I had there was a certified 7 hygienist named Elmer P. Wheeler. Elmer is now 8 dead. 9 He took me through the system, and I 10 learned about toxic data sheets that were 11 published by a great number of people, including 12 many companies published them as well. 13 And if you stacked them all up, even 14 available then -- this you're talking now in the 15 mid '50s -- it would crunch this table down with 16 the ones that are published by the API, the MCA, 17 and a great number of organizations that are not 18 that very well known, the Organic Chemical 19 Manufacturing Company organization, the drug 20 manufacturing people. 21 There are thousands of them, and then 22 there are all these great ones that are available 23 freely from most companies, and we ended up with 24 piles of the darn things. 25 There was no lack of safety 39 1 information on individual compounds even in the 2 '50s. It became a great deal more elegant and a 3 great deal more staffed later. 4 MR. OLIVER: Objection, nonresponsive. 5 THE REPORTER: Your name, sir. 6 MR. OLIVER: David Oliver. 7 (Discussion was held off the record.) 8 MR. ELLIS: You can just ignore what 9 they say. They just have to say some things for 10 the record to get it on the record. That's all. 11 MR. BLANKS: They don't really have 12 to. 13 MR. HOBSON: They do it. 14 Q. What he's saying, Mr. Wheeler - 15 A. I forgot to bring my dugidgits. I 16 hate the damn things and so I don't wear them if I 17 don't have to. 18 Q. What he's saying, he's objecting 19 saying that your answer is not responsive to my 20 guestion. He thinks you're answering something I 21 didn't ask you I guess is what it means but -- 22 A. You asked me about data? 23 Q. Yes, sir. 24 MR. BLANKS: I thought you did a good 25 job. 1 A. And it reminded me of literature. 2 MR. OLIVER: Object to the side bar. 3 MR. FOGARTY: Object to the side bar. K ' 4 Q. That's what it means. 5 A. Okay. 6 Q. You were moved from Texas City to 7 Monsanto's corporate headquarters. That's St. Li 8 Louis, right? 9 A. Yes, sir. 10 Q. And you started working for Mr. 11 Wheeler? 12 L. A. I started working for Elmer P. 13 Wheeler, yes. 14 Q. And Mr. Wheeler was working for 15 Dr. Kelly? L. 16 A. Dr. Kelly, yes. 17 Q. Was that the staff? E 18 A. That was the staff. In 1954 that was 19 the staff. 20 Q. And would you have any recollection, 21 Mr. Garrett, as to how long Mr. Wheeler had been L, 22 with Monsanto in his capacities as an industrial 23 hygienist? 24 A. He came to Monsanto right after the 25 war from the Chemical Warfare School. He was a 41 1 CWS officer, He was actually an artillary officer 2 that came back from Africa and was in since he 3 had trained a hygienist and had worked for the 4 north -- for the New Hampshire Health Department, 5 they put him in their hygiene school where part 6 of -- God knows what part of the military he was 7 in, and they had a school and they did a pretty 8 good job. 9 By the way, they also published 10 documents that are way -- they're years old. Some 11 of them are excellent up to the date documents for 12 literature research. 13 q . "They" being who? 14 A. Being the Army's industrial hygiene 15 laboratories, which I believe was in the CWS, 16 Chemical Warfares set-up in Virginia, and that's 17 where Elmer came back to and Dr. Kelly hired him 18 out of there as soon as the war stopped. 19 Q. Was it your impression, Mr. Garrett, 20 that Mr. Wheeler worked in New Hampshire before 21 the war, after the war, during the war? 22 A. No, before the war. He worked as a 23 hygienist to the degree that they were defined as 24 hygienists in the 1930s. He graduated in 25 chemistry, as I did, from the University of New 42 1 Hampshire. 2 Q. Would you give us, sir, your best I i 3 impression of how knowledgeable you felt Mr. 4 Wheeler was when you joined the staff in 1954 as 5 an industrial hygienist? 6 A. He was a very good manager. His 7 knowledge was very deep. He expected me to gather ' 8 a great deal of knowledge and become knowledgeable '1 9 in things that he was not in. 10 We had -- we were three people running y n that show, Dr. Kelly, Mr. Wheeler and myself, and R 12 later we got broke up and we had a great big -- 13 lots of people and big files. Big files. 14 So he -- he gave me the API meetings '] 15 to go to. He went to the AIH meetings. We all 16 went to the -- to our credited meetings. Li 17 I could have gone to the Chemical f Society meetings. I'm a member of the ACS, have 18 L 19 been for eighty, hundred years, but I did not 1 20 because they -- until they began to get into -- to have some committee work on occupational health. r 21 L 22 Q. Were there any other organizations | 23 that you found had information to share in ; 24 industrial hygiene, toxicology area, such as the " 25 American Public Health Association? 43 1 Did you ever go to any of their 2 meetings? 3 A. Yes, I've been to AHS meetings. I 4 would say the states -- this is one -- let's take 5 this -- you people may not like this, but there 6 are some states whose records and files were 7 excellent. Texas was one of them. 8 They had an industrial hygiene group 9 in their health department. I can't remember that 10 man's name. He was a first class man. He showed 11 me their records and their -- and I used them, 12 too, by the way. I went up to Austin and they 13 showed me their records. 14 The State of Missouri wasn't very 15 wealthy in that area. 16 The State of Illinois had excellent 17 facilities and records also in the area of 18 toxicology. Some of these belonged to their 19 university, some belonged to their state health 20 department. 21 And when you work on pollution control 22 and industrial hygiene as did I in those days, you 23 probably run into what's known as the Bureau of 24 Sanitary Engineering of all the various health 25 departments, and that's what I did in Texas. It 44 1 was true in Illinois. 2 It was true in Iowa; true in <j 3 California by districts, by zone. Six, I believe, 4 zones in California or areas, they call them. 5 They had individuals for each of these zones. 6 Q. Did you run into Dr. Carl Nau, N-a-u, ... 7 at Texas? " 8 A. Uh-huh, I sure did. 1 9 Q. That might have been the man you were trying to think of? o H r J 11 A. Yeah. Hey, he was a great guy, too. [^ H to Q. I was asking you about organizations 13 where you might have attended meetings to be able 14 to share information. I asked about the APHA. ' ' 15 Any others that come to mind? 16 A. Well, we did it on the ba- -- Dr. b 17 Kelly took the medical meetings, and primarily f this was the MCA or the CMA's medical meeting, and 18 L 19 he despised the American Medical Association for | 20 some reason. I can understand why, but -- because P 21 I had to go to the meetings to supernume (sic) 22 him, and I can understand that in his -- they were | 23 pretty much all out playing golf. r 24 I mean the meeting wasn't very -- I ^ 25 mean me and two doctors talked to the guy that was tote era r~m to o f * . i , j !! t A r L. [r _ . ~y' s U fi 4m fp Is? 1 . . ^ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 25 45 the chairman and he was waiting -- he had his golf clubs around his shoulders. So we -- Dr. Kelly didn't think much of that. I'm not sure he was a golf player anyway, but so I went to some of those meetings to cover him in committee meetings because those people would go astray if you weren't careful. Q. And these were AMA meetings? A. Yes. Q. Was there a part of AMA that dealt with occupational health industrial medicine? A. There's a great -- I'm teasing a lot about it, but it's true. They -- they got almost all the institutional doctors to go to it. None of the people that practiced medicine went to those meetings. The people that practiced medicine in corporations and for insurance company stuff went to those occupational health meetings. It's much better today. They've got some fine committees on just on toxicology and occupational health and the effects of various things, upper respiratory effect. All the individual colleges in surgery and everything probably have toxicology subgroups 46 1 that work on materials that are -- that impinge on 2 their specific area. So there are plenty of 3 places -- and even then there were plenty of 4 places you could get if you dug enough. 5 Now you could find the base of the 6 information. It was available. You could find 7 who was working on trying to increase or improve 8 that information, and that was to put it 9 together was difficult. 10 Today it's together in a vast number 11 of books and documents that contain -- that did 12 what we tried to do as a committee under the MCA. 13 We wrote MCA data sheets, for example. 14 MR. FOGARTY: Objection, 15 nonresponsive. 16 MR. BLANKS: Wait, stop here. 17 A. MCA means Manufacturing Chemists 18 Association, now CMA, and they were one of the 19 groups along with the API who published group 20 documents, short, terse, six, eight pages, some of 21 them. Some of them twenty pages, some of them 22 five pages of the toxicology and hazards involved 23 in handling individual materials. 24 The API did likewise. The Organic 25 Chemical Manufacturing Association did also 47 1 publish a bunch, and these were largely on die 2 chemicals because they're oddballs and they're rl 3 also quite toxic because they're largely organic 4 amine compounds. 5 So there are a lot of people -- and h 6 these were available, but you had to participate n 7 to get ahold of them, so we participated a lot. l, 8 Q. The impression I'm getting, Mr. y Garrett, is that there wasn't a lot of this 9 r~> 10 information out there being spoon fed to people U 11 hut if you had someone that wanted to find it, you r 12 could get it. Is that accurate or not? _ 13 MR. FOGARTY: objection, leading. 14 A. If you ask for it within the realm of : 15 those materials, you got it readily from the 16 people or they would give you copies of the k 17 documents they helped make with one of these 1 18 organizations. 19 I'll bet between the API and the MCA | 20 put out thousands of copies of those things a f 21 year, as did almost anybody that made those kind 22 of documents. | 23 Now, some of them were pretty tight ^ 24 within their organizational system because that's ~ 25 the only one that knew who they were there. 48 1 The Organic Chemical Manufacturers 2 Association, which is largely the die merchants, 3 you didn't realize they did a lot of work on a lot 4 of raw chemicals that were used in dies. 5 And that turned out to be chemicals 6 some of us manufactured, so when we found that 7 out, we began to work with them as well, and the 8 document -- the information that had been done in 9 the past was well documented in those -- in those 10 particular issues -- publications that they 11 issued, and everybody had a different name for 12 them. 13 Q. You at Monsanto and working with Mr. 14 Wheeler and Dr. Kelly, I take it in your 15 participation you began to gather together quite 16 an assembly of information. 17 A. We sure did. 18 Q. How did you handle that information 19 there at the company and the volume that you had 20 it to be able to use it? 21 A. We had files full and they had -- we 22 had them -- we filed them by chemical compound 23 name. 24 Q. And this was certainly in the age 25 before computers. 49 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Did you have them indexed in some way? $ 3 A. Yes, we had them indexed by by 4 their best chemical name. The chemical the 5 American Chemical Society name is what we used. 6 Q. You mentioned American Chemical .. 7 Society. You've told me you're a chemist and that *' 8 you're a member of that organization? ILIi 9 A. Yes. 10 1 Q. I take it that Chemical Abstracts ^ 11 something you learned how to use quite early then? f 12 A. Yes, yes. 13 Q. And would Chemical Abstracts have been f 14 something that you continued to use after you got ! 15 to Monsanto? 16 A. Oh, yes, sir. That's the best way to ? ' y I? peruse a whole flock of chemical data out of the American Chemical ACS documents. In fact, we p 18 ns L 19 contributed to -- we were asked usually to t 20 contribute a summary to some of the stuff that 2 1 Q. For those who might not be familiar L 22 with Chemical Abstracts, would you tell us what B 23 those were in the '50s. , 24 A. Chemical Abstracts is a document ^ 25 published by the American Chemical Society since 50 1 the turn of the century abstracting all -- their 2 word, not mine -- all of the known reputable 3 chemical literature on a periodic basis. 4 And they do a good job because the 5 Chemical Abstracts come out about ten times a 6 year. I don't think it comes out every month, and 7 it must be a thousand pages in the durn thing now. 8 q . Were there other abstracting services 9 that you became familiar with that were useful in 10 your work? 11 A. Well, some of the other societies, 12 some of the other people did this, did the 13 abstracting. We saw a lot of company abstracts 14 that they used for their safety and health groups 15 in the handling of materials and in handling 16 chemicals, particularly the very toxic ones. 17 You're talking now stuff that would 18 absorb through the skin and which is the most 19 hazardous thing people handle by far. 20 Q. Can you give us some examples what you 21 mean by those company abstracts? 22 A. Well, we had a bunch of company 23 abstracts. We made them for years. I don't know 24 how many files full of the damn things. 25 A lot of those were those a b s t r a c t s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 51 that we already -- we abstracted a whole bunch of abstracts to get the data, the best raw data that we could find and put together. q . Would this information that Monsanto put into abstracts, would that be shared with customers of Monsanto? A. If we put it out, it would be shared with anybody that wanted it, including most of the technical agencies. We wrote many of the MCA data sheets for them of Monsanto products that were -- that we would consider primary manufacturer at our request or theirs. Q. How would you at Monsanto make it known to the general consuming public that you had this information available and that it could be gotten? A. I never thought we really had to because we got so many requests for it. The plants knew we had it because we had a safety man in every plant and/or a hygienist later on in the day. We had industrial hygienists in the plants and in the divisions of Monsanto, which later became the companies of Monsanto -- same damn thing, different name -- had their own people t" CO wr.-------J 52 1 and we worked then from inside with them in 2 getting data back and forth. 1 3 There was a blossom time after World 4 War II where there was enormous new compounds 5 discovered and put into use. I don't think 1 1 j 6 think it's a lot easier to track it today than it k. J was then, but we -- we had data in our data files on virtually every compound there had been produced, and I might have -- I might say that 1 9 10 most of the other companies that I knew had the rf? CT1 Li ii same affair, and we traded our own in-company |? 12 documents. U 13 We were told by our own company LH 14 nothing is secret connected with health and n 15 safety. Nothing. 1-1 16 MR. OLIVER: Objection, nonresponsive y 17 Q. You mentioned earlier about asbestos and how it was used in catalyst and insulation p 18 L 19 materials. Was that something that would have been included in your first research report even? E 20 F_ 21 A. I suspect it was, but I'm not 2 2 absolutely sure. We, working in the pilot plant of Monsanto, dealt with asbestos insulation I 23 24 materials and with asbestos muds and the asbestos [' u 25 workers in the plant there. ifciB 53 1 We had a crew called insulators, and 2 they did the insulation work -- 3 Q. And that was -- 4 A. -- in the pilot plant operations. 5 Q. That was about 1953, '54 time frame 6 you're talking about? 7 A. Yes, some time through there, yes. 8 Q. Did you find that the insulators there 9 at Monsanto were essentially following the same 10 kind of practice that you'd experienced in 11 Tennessee? 12 A. They had been ordered to work on the 13 standard established by the MCA or established by 14 whoever established the standards. I could -- to 15 tell you the truth, I don't know on any one of the 16 individual materials because they had been running 17 around so many times, but the asbestos dust was on 18 the list for the -- of the toxicology materials 19 and from -- put out by the American Industrial 20 Hygiene Association, TLV list, and we always 21 stood -- we always maintained at least that level 22 as our standard. 23 Q. Did you find that the insulators there 24 at Monsanto in the '50s when you first came were 25 wearing respirators like you h a d been t a u g h t at 54 1 the University of - 2 A. They had respirators. Now, I never 3 saw them insulating, so I don't know if they wore 4 them. They had them and they had them hanging 5 around their neck, okay? 6 Q. Yes, sir. Were the insulators, to 7 your knowledge, were they given protective 8 clothing of any kind or work clothing? 9 A. Well, the company furnished work 10 clothing to everybody. 11 Q. Why would that have been done at 12 Monsanto, if you know, sir? 13 A. What, you mean clothing? 14 Q. Yes, sir. 15 A. Well, there's a lot of reasons. Some 16 of which you may not like. It's the best way to 17 get a man to take a shower. 18 Q. How is that? 19 Give him clothes if he does to wear. 20 Q. Sort of a incentive to take a shower, 21 is that what you mean? 22 A Yes, we've got wet shower houses for 23 all of them. We had some objections that some of 24 them didn't take showers and the enthusiasm for 25 being up in a close, tight place on a hot day with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 55 them wasn't too hot, so it encouraged them to take showers and to clean off. And particularly people -- we made lots of people take showers. We made the the insulation workers had to. q . Why is that, sir? A. What? q . Why would you do that? A. Because they were -- all the dusty operations had to because the dust got inside their clothing. They all had MSA approved dust respirators, but they get it inside. They get it in your hair. I've been in too many places, I know. I didn't get any clothes issued. q . so you're saying that this was a way of decontaminating the insulators? MR. POWERS: Objection. A. In a way it was a way to encourage them to clean up. We had rules where they had to in some places and particularly true organic manufacturing plants. But it was hard to -- the unions were pretty tough. I don't know why they fought that issue, but they did. Incidentally, some of the unions had 56 1 some darn good data, too, available to them. I 2 don't know where they got it, but they probably 3 assembled it themselves. 4 I've worked with unions, industrial 5 hygienist, late -- years ago. Not early because 6 they didn't know. They didn't know, but later on 7 I worked with some union people. Good people, 8 too. 9 q . After you came to St. Louis and got 10 into -- I guess would you call it corporate 11 program? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q t After you got to St. Louis and got 14 into the corporate program and began to see the 15 things that Dr. Kelly and Mr. Wheeler had been 16 doing, would you describe for us what you recall 17 in the '50s about how the Monsanto employees were 18 being followed from an industrial hygienist's 19 standpoint? 20 A. Well, all the plants had a safety 21 director and so many of them had extra people. 22 They had a safety engineer and several so-called 23 inspectors. They had different names for them, 24 but they were their grunts. They did the grunt 25 work. 57 1 We worked with the inspectors and with ;!- >< 2 the safety directors of each of the plants. We 1 3 did a survey of each of Monsanto's plants, and we 4 surveyed every individual job classification in a 5 plant. 6 In the East St. Louis plant there's . 7 over four hundred job classifications, so our * 8 document was about that thick. Covered each job, if 9 what they were provided safety and health, what 10 data they had been given, their safety training *~-z Jt 11 programs, whether they had company clothing or " 12 not, and so forth. Mi 13 And these data were absolutely witched !->' 14 again. Took my hygiene crew damn near a year to 15 get a set of them, and then we were ready to go ^ 16 for another set, and they turned out to be great. L 17 Well, the one on two of the plants n 18 exceeded one volume, and there were more than one L 19 volume. Had every -- now, we were not interested in the production. We were interested in the job o CM classifications and what that job classification r 21 ** 22 required them to be exposed to, what they were 1 23 provided with, and the data, and a number of times .. 2 4 at their safety meetings they mentioned their ^ 25 material and went over the thing again. 58 1 And I set up a lot of those things, 2 the short and abrupt and dirty explanations for 3 these chemicals. 4 I used to take a bottle of very light 5 oil and show them how much it would take for one 6 of the amine compounds to kill them if they mopped 7 it on their hand. 8 And we did it -- I did it in every 9 plant. I did every one of Monsanto's plants, and 10 there was sixty-one of them at the time in the 11 U.S. 12 By the way, I did all the foreign 13 plants in Britain and in Belgium. 14 MR. FOGARTY: Objection, 15 nonresponsive. 16 q . In what time period are you talking 17 about? 18 A. Huh? 19 Q. What time period are we talking about? 20 A. '60s, '70s. 21 Q. The - A, By the way, the British had a pretty 22 23 good deal themselves. The European was a little 24 different. They're so darn competitive. They 25 didn't want a n y b o d y to do a n y t h i n g e x c e p t Belgium. 59 1 Belgium was worse. 2 The Brits were pretty good. They had 3 also -- they had some darn good technical people 4 in the British company, and particularly in 5 pollution control. 6 Q. Did you ever have any interface with 7 the folks at the British Occupational Hygienist 8 Society? 9 A. Yes, yes. Which, by the way, are good 10 first class people. Don't get me wrong. I'm not 11 arguing about that. I ran into some of the best 12 hygienists in this company working for the States 13 and working for the federal government. 14 Q. The work that you just told us about a 15 few moments ago looking at different jobs in a 16 plant as opposed to I guess the processes 17 themselves, you say you looked at each job. 18 Are you talking about like different 19 operators? 20 A. That's right. 21 Q. Different - 22 A. Class A operators, Class B operator, 23 Class C operator, department 22. 24 Q. And you would profile the exposures of 25 each one of those? A. Absolutely, profiled each one. q . And would you do the same thing for maintenance workers? A. Yes, we went through the maintenance workers, but here you can't set them up unless they're zoned, and in the bigger plants they 11 be zoned. Those guys will live and die in zone 3, and if that's true, zone 3 handles some particular materials at zone 3, then they get special type of clothing and/or helmets and/or respirators. Q. When you were first relocated to the corporate headquarters in St. Louis, is that when you first became aware of being able to take air samples and that sort of thing, profile workers exposures? A. No. We knew it in Texas City and did some testing. We didn't have very good equipment. We had to use the old bubblers, dual bubblers and that sort of stuff, which are awfully -- awfully cumbersome things to be handling around a busy chemist manufacturing operation. We did it. Later we began to use the better portable equipment and then we did long term, like i i r L |` ! ''\ ! :.J s V. . L P la r k f" ifc-i I 61 1 full switch -- I'm sorry, full shift. We did all 2 three shifts, by the way, in certain areas. 3 Full shifts had to be done when the 4 hygienists -- a very busy year for the hygienists 5 in Texas City to go around through this processing 6 unit because you're -- although they only 7 manufactured two or three products, they used some 8 very, very, very dangerous intermediates, and they 9 had to go around and test every one of them. 10 And we did it as much as we could 11 every year to see that changes had been made. And 12 those were done probably by the chemist after I 13 left, probably by the hygienists assigned to the 14 plant. 15 Q. So even when you first arrived at 16 Monsanto, Texas City in 1953, air sampling 17 capability already existed there -- 18 A. That's right. 19 Q. -- as well? 20 A. They had air sampling equipment there. 21 Q. And that would be for dusts and gasses 22 and both? 23 A. That's right. Primarily for dust and 24 for -- and bubblers, which if you could analyze 25 the results. And those analyses were done 62 1 elsewhere, not at the plant at the time. 2 Now, I'm sure all the plants can do t- -i 3 their own. 4 q . Once you got to St. Louis, is that 5 when you, yourself first began to do air sampling? 6 A. No, I did some in Texas City, but not 7 much. I did it in St. Louis with the plant safety t. 8 man. We made him go along. You have to have 9 somebody in the plant tied down to it. fi 10 When I left, we had, in most of the 11 large plants, had professional industrial 12 hygienists. The plant staff by this time had 13 broken down into three sections and I was the 14 director of industrial hygiene section and had 15 about fifteen employees in the central office, and 16 I had access to a laboratory, and I had what I 17 think was the best sound man in the country and P 18 that sort of stuff doing the work. t 19 And we did this, we put on shows for I the individual plant safety and health people 20 f ' 21 and/or their groups. I did it for the organic i . 22 division plants many times for their groups that 23 handled this spread of chemical, and we stuck to 24 that spread of chemical. 25 They were making amine compounds at !-i i t L-j i [1 y r? L ... i f""'' [ 1 y rii m. r B Si-: 63 i the East St. Louis plant. We did them a job on 2 amine compounds, and we had an awful fewer cases 3 than I think we probably would have had if we 4 hadn't been as alert as we were. 5 We also probably cost Monsanto a 6 million dollars in uniforms. 7 Q. And that was probably a good 8 investment in preventing disease? 9 x think you're absolutely correct. It 10 was a good investment, because if you stained that 11 uniform with some of the amines, you could tell it 12 in a minute. 13 Most of them are purple or that darn 14 die in denim will turn the oddist colors you've 15 ever seen. That will give a man a quick trip that 16 he's been doused and then he goes through the 17 scrub and down business whether he likes it or 18 not. 19 So as near as I know, we've, in my 20 tenure, we never lost anybody in the organic 21 operations. 22 Q. What do you remember, Mr. Garrett, 23 about the first air sampling that you did in Texas 24 City? 25 A. Well, it was pretty crude, but the 64 1 system was crude as it was defined in the 2 literature at the time, and we did you did 1 3 insoluble sampling in water. 4 And it was a damn difficult thing to 5 filter. You had to triple filter, then you had to 6 dry that damn thing out and get rid of that filter 7 material. It's not an easy task. 8 I think the reason we did that was 9 because the results were probably higher than they 10 would have been had you been able to get rid of 11 some of the filter material. We figured that it 12 was higher and, therefore, it was safer. 13 Then the sampling and the analytical 14 procedure began to improve vastly. And in the 15 /50s I believe they probably -- and the '60s, the 16 analytical methods, analytical hardware, i 17 analytical reagents, improved enormously so that 18 it got to where we could do these we tested L 19 squeeze tubes, I'll bet you, by the millions. 20 I've tested those darn hundreds of 21 sulfide tubes and some of those things so that we 22 could test them against our sample. 23 If they didn't work, we put out a note ! ' 24 through the company, do not use so and so's 25 sampling tubes. They are very good for very 1 excellent reasons because they're quick and their 2 reasonably accurate, and you could save somebody's :=l 3 life that's messing around with something they 4 didn't need to be. 5 MR. FOGARTY: Objection, 6 nonresponsive. , ,, 7 Q. The sampling that you first did when i 8 you joined Monsanto, some of that was insolubles. 9 You mean by that dust? 1:! 10 A. That's right, we collected in water. 11 Collected in water median. 12 Q. What kind of dust samples do you 13 remember doing? L-^ 14 A. You could collect almost any dust. p 15 One of the biggest problems was separating the L: 16 dust. L 17 In other words, what dust are you 18 talking about, Texas City dust itself, P L 19 particularly with a bunch of trucks around and two r Sj 20 or three days with no rain? The dust you've i - 21 got much dust on the ground from the streets and 22 around. 1 23 You get a great deal of solid material , ~ 24 from the ocean, believe it or not. You don't -- 25 believe that, but it's true. You'd be surprised. 66 1 So that you have to separate out of your solid 2 sampling material and make some kind of judgment 3 as to what was the product -- the targeted 4 product. I found that out early. 5 Q. Did you, yourself do -- 6 A. Some of it. 7 Q. Did you use a microscope to do your 8 dust count? 9 ^ i used a dust counter, which is the 10 old Bausch & Lomb microscope hook-up for dust 11 counting and a plate. 12 Q. Yes, sir. 13 A. We used it as a first step piece of 14 equipment for dust sampling because it gave us a 15 quick fix on what we had. It is not a very good 16 gravimetric sampling system. It will give you a 17 very good idea of your dispursion of particle 18 sizes. 19 Q. This Bausch & Lomb dust counter, would 20 you describe for us how that works and how long it 21 takes to take a sample with it. 22 A. Well, you had a plate -- that you had 23 these plates. It looked like circular straight 24 view plates for microscope, and you took this 25 machine and over a period of time you inspirated 67 1 into the material the atmosphere. 2 Then you took and you had a counting 3 grid in the machine. You never took the plate 4 out. You turn it on and you counted it with a 5 microscope attached to the affair itself and made 6 counts, and there was a method published by Bausch 7 & Lomb for the counts and we used their method of 8 counting. 9 Q. About how long from start to finish 10 would it take someone experienced in this device 11 to actually test it? 12 A. Well, it wouldn't take long to take a 13 sample. It takes some time to do the counting. 14 Now, a first class man could probably do it and 15 count it in fifteen minutes. 16 Q. Pretty much know what's there and 17 types of exposures. 18 A. That's right. Now, he has to clean 19 the plate off if he's going to use it again 20 because he has the stuff on it. 21 We also used the old oh God, what 22 is that darn blood counting thing? The blood 23 counting affair for the regular upright microscope 24 is a -- I can't recall what they call it, but you 25 have __ there's a gravical in there that you can 68 1 count a number of specific spaces and calculate 2 the total dust load in particles and into a 3 certain extent the size. 4 The same was true, by the way, at 5 Bausch & Lomb. You get a fair idea of the size 6 distribution, and when you're coming to 7 inorganic -- to inert dust, you're looking for 8 size because it's the size that gets further down 9 in the system, and if you want stuff that gets 10 into the pulmonary system, you're going down to 11 some small sizes. 12 And this is what we did called dust 13 counting. They're a pain in the neck to do, but 14 it's done -- it's still done to a lot -- to a 15 great extent today by a classification of dust in 16 sizes. 17 Q. Now, the Bausch & Lomb device, that's 18 the device that you had? 19 jt's long since went out of business, 20 yeah. 21 Q. But you had that in 1953, '54? 22 A. Yes, yes. 23 q . I take it that there was already 24 someone in Texas City there before you got there 25 that was the safety in this kind of thing? 69 A. Yes, safety director. 1 q . Who was that? Would you recall, sir? 2 A. Mooney Stallings was the safety 3 4 director. Mooney Stallings. Now, in this case, keep in mind, that 5 6 in the early days of the chemical industry, at least in my experience, and this has been in other 7 8 companies as well, is to get a safety there was 9 no safety people to be trained. Nobody trained anybody. Texas ASM 10 tn didn't start their safety engineering school until 11 way after this. So to get a safety man, it was H 12 customary in our industry -- now, this is maybe 13 14 not true in others - to take a first class foreman and make him the safety director, and he 15 16 ran it. we had probably the best safety people 17 18 we had, some of them were those foremen. We had one in Tennessee. Even the foreman lost his arm 19 20 in a oar accident, and he was such a bright guy they made him one of the deputy safety directors. 21 He graduated when the safety director, head of 22 23 safety -- he was first class, and his record our record down there was first class for a plant t 24 Li that manufactured phosphorous from ore was first 25 70 1 class. 2 Q. Would you know, Mr. Garrett, how these 3 men that were made safety directors or in lines 4 that led up to be safety directors, how they were 5 trained in areas of health concern? 6 A. They were trained, believe it or not, 7 by the federal government during World War II in 8 the manufacturing burst that occurred, as you can 9 imagine. Those people were trained and they 10 trained a scad of people as safety people. 11 Now, this was the guy like Mooney 12 Stalling, bright guy without a college education 13 that probably became a better safety man than a 14 hell of a lot of people with college degrees 15 because he did it through experience. 16 And a lot of Monsanto's foremen -- and 17 this was not Monsanto only. I know this is from 18 Dallas through Dupont, great many there, their 19 safety people started as foremen in their plants. 20 Good first class alert foremen, and 21 they went into -- then into the management group 22 and became poorer paid than they were when they 23 were in the early group, but that's beside the 24 point. 25 Mooney was a pretty good safety 71 1 director. He later got a industrial hygienist 2 assigned in there and then they got a trained 3 safety director out of one of the graduate schools 4 that graduated safety director -- safety 5 engineering, and they also had a full time 6 hygienist when the plant was sold. 7 Q. The Monsanto plant in Texas City I 8 guess then at some point in time did get a 9 full-time industrial hygienist? 10 A. Yes, sir. 11 Q. About when was that, sir? 12 A. Oh, gosh, I don't know. I couldn't 13 even -- I might give you the -- I suspect it was 14 in the '60s, late '60s, but, boy, that could be 15 wrong. 16 Q. Before they got a full-time industrial 17 hygienist at Monsanto, Texas City plant, whenever 18 it was -- 19 A. They had a full-time engineer there 20 then by that time - 21 Q. If someone -- 22 A. -- and a safety director. 23 Q. And those people, the safety director 24 and the engineer, they were doing the industrial 25 hygiene kind of work? 72 1 A. They were doing the stuff that we in our staff was doing when I first came to St. 3 Louis. We had an excellent staff of people at the 4 Kearny plant in East St. Louis. 5 They had generated them themselves j ; 6 because of lack of corporate involvement in that , 7 business until after World War II, and then ft . 8 corporate involvement got in and started helping II 9 them and they ended up with professional U 10 industrial hygienists -- no, professional safety r!~ il 11 man and my man assigned to the organic division. r 12 The old organic division was over 13 there any time that they needed and that safety ' 14 director would have him any time he wanted him. i 15 q . I think you told me that there became i . 16 a time when you started doing plant surveys L 17 yourself and going out and doing inspections? 18 A. Well, we had to find out what the hell 19 was going on in the plants. Who would -- what 20 were they doing? How were they doing it? What 21 were they doing it with? 22 Three very, very good questions that 23 you have to ask yourself today, and in today most 24 companies do this on a routine basis. i" 25 Y O U c a n g o into a p l a n t in M o n s a n t o 73 1 now and ask one of their supervisors, even an area 2 supervisor can tell you in detail what they do in 3 each of their processes. 4 This wasn't very true -- I can 5 remember one time a man told me in one of our 6 plants you can tell the people working the acid 7 department by the holes in their pants, you know. 8 That may very well be great, but by 9 God, that's not very good industrial hygiene. 10 MR. FOGARTY: Objection, 11 nonresponsive. 12 q . The occasions when you would go out 13 and do your survey work in the plants, 1 take it 14 you wrote reports of those visits? 15 A. We went -- 16 Q. Wrote reports of those visits, did 17 you? 18 A. Oh, I'm sure, yes, we did, but those 19 reports went into the -- I suspect the fire, but I 20 don't know. Yes, we wrote detail. 21 What we needed was the individual 22 operating units and those processes. That way 23 when we built a plant making the same stuff 24 somewhere else -- and this is where the Europeans 25 got into it because we built plants o v e r t h e r e to 74 1 make products that we made in the U.S. Their 2 enthusiasm for our interference was zero. 3 We couldn't speak to them because they 4 would not, even if they knew English, wouldn't 5 speak to us in English, particularly them damn 6 Belgiums. 7 We shouldn't have fought the Belgiums. 8 We should have fought just with the Germans I 9 guess there. 10 MR. FOGARTY: Objection, 11 nonresponsive. 12 q . I've had the same experience, Mr. 13 Garrett, with the Belgiums in spades. 14 A. We took them over to Great Britain and 15 had the meeting. 16 q . I should have thought of that. 17 A. Took them over to London and had the 18 meeting. Oh, we had great luck with the British. 19 We provided them with the information. They did a 20 job of their own. 21 All you had to do with them 22 was to get -- they had some of the best people. 23 They had one of the best pollution engineers I've 24 ever seen working in one of our plants m great 25 Britain. 75 l Well, he worked at the plant but he 2 worked for the whole British company. First class I 'l 3 man. 4 Q. If I understand what you're saying 5 then, your -- part of your job was to go out and f: 6 do survey work, learn about things that were \" 7 either problems or potential problems and then if [ , 8 you built a new process doing the same kinds of H 9 things, incorporate engineering controls? 10 A. We tried to do that beforehand, and we L 11 got to the point where we had, the last twelve, P 12 thirteen years I was at Monsanto, we went to Lm> -- 13 process meetings where we went over the design of 14 every process in Monsanto unit by unit. L1 15 We objected -- we made the 16 vice-president madder than hell, but we objected t - L 17 anyway, and we stopped that crap of putting an f 18 arrow in the air that says "To air" and the one L 19 going this way says "To water." i 20 What water? "To waste." That's r1 21 another goody. "To waste." Just arrow. Here's a ka 22 long process designed with fifty arrows saying "To H 23 waste." Where to waste? r 24 I mean are they going to go throug 25 waste treatment somewhere or are they going to 76 1 just dump them on the ground or are we going to 2 put it in dumpsters? 3 So we went over that and made them and 4 we had the vice -- the president -- the 5 vice-president of the operating -- executive 6 vice-president on our side, too, by God. 7 They'll approve it when you agree. i 8 Show us something. Show us a pollution treatment 9 operation or get off the stick. L 10 r And so it was a graduate system from 11 the 19- -- World War II return where a lot of 12 safety was generated by the manufacturers of very 13 hazardous materials to people who were not 14 manufacturing that kind of material, started the 15 safety engineering business which graduated then 16 in the '50s from the foreman type person to a 17 graduate trained engineer or hygienist and to r^ 18 today to a staff. 19 And the staff has the right at the 20 plant for process to go to the corporate staff and r 21 say, "Hey, help us with this thing and make damn 5k? 22 sure that we don't put someone's head in a trap 23 with this," and so the corporate staff joined with 24 the plant staff, and they do anyway because 25 they're working it from the other end of the 77 1 stick, and they finally get together and decide 2 what's to be done, and it's written out in the 3 construction plans. 4 MR. ELLIS: We've been going about an 5 hour and a half. Can we take 6 MR. HOBSON: It's up to Mr. Garrett. 7 I'm happy to if he is. 8 MR. ELLIS: Well, I need to go to the 9 restroom so... 10 THE WITNESS: Good. I'm glad you say cri 11 so. 12 L 13 (Temporary recess was held.) MS. FLATT: We're on record. 14 q . Mr. Garrett, you mentioned the 15 American Industrial Hygiene Association. I take 16 it that you've been a member of that organization y 17 for a good number of years? 18 A. Probably thirty-five, forty years, 19 yeah. 20 Q. What kinds of activities have you done 21 with that organization that you can tell us about, r im 22 sir, in your career? 23 A. I've written a number of papers for 24 their journal. I've reviewed papers for them, t ' 25 like most people that y o u g e t o n r e v i e w g r o u p s 78 1 from time to time, and up through the time until I 2 quit and even a couple years afterwards, I went to 3 their national meetings. 4 q . Were you on any of the committees of 5 the American Industrial Hygiene Association? 6 A. Many of them, and to tell you the 7 truth, there's so many, I don't know whether I 8 could tell you what it represented even. 9 I was on the -- the development 10 committee for a while in an effort to find out who 11 was in hygiene regardless of what they claimed to 12 be or accepted as their fate, and I think they do 13 pretty well today in getting those people in. 14 I've been on the -- one of the review 15 committees for papers. My boss for very many 16 years was president of the IHA and through all of 17 that persequential office system. 18 And when he was president, I had to do 19 his job, too, but I've been involved with them 20 ever since I joined -- went to St. Louis. 21 q . Do you recognize the publications of 22 the American Industrial Hygiene Association to be 23 authoritative? 24 A. I have run into no -- very few that 25 were not. \ - r f i \t\ r L r L-- 1 J \ l rL 1 rL 1 % i-- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 79 Q. You're aware of like the Hygienic Guide series that they published? A. Yes, I am. Q. Have you written any of the Hygienic Guides? A. q. Yeah. I take it you would find those to be authoritative? A. Well, they certainly -- we had a hell of a time getting them approved by Monsanto, but they finally let them go as is. Kelly -- Dr. Kelly got them through actually. We did most of the PCB's and that sort of stuff, but we only made not every company did. The stuff they only made or the stuff they were primarily - not primarily, but well known in, we did that on our products or when we were asked. By the way, we did some for the Organic Manufacturing Association, too, I think, but I'm not sure. I didn't do it. One of my troops did it. Q. Had you had any occasion to work with the American conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, the ACGIH? :T! t - ft li r~ L r \ i.y i. y r L 1 IT- 1_I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 80 A. Yes. q . What have you done with that organization, sir? A. Well, I went to their meetings. I wrote some stuff for their -- some editorials for their journals, for journals they can put things in, and they had a very good handle because they ran the show because they were the primary people that operated the state and federal agencies that set the standards. And ultimately they -- we set them voluntarily for years. Nobody had any -- then suddenly they began to set them as a legal issue. but by that time they'd been washed and cleansed pretty well in respect to what they meant, what they did. I think their standards are probably the best set of standards there are available, and they're pretty much used world wide. q . The ACGIH threshold limit values, that I take it you find those to be even more current than OSHA's work? A. Well, I guess I have a very different View of OSHA than most. I think the ACGIH represented a group of good professionals doing a 81 1 good professional job. I cannot say the same about the 2 3 governmental agency. q . You still feel that way today? 4 A. Yes, I still do. Don't get me wrong. 5 There are a great many great people in the federal 6 agencies involved in this business, and God Knows 7 without some of them we wouldn't have got where we 8 are today in respect to protecting people's lives 9 10 that work for a living, but they have too many political nit wits get in there, also, and stir 11 around that sort of thing once in a while. They 12 13 try to stop them. / 14 MR. FOGARTY: Objection, 15 nonresponsive. A. I've been in that building in 16 Washington, D.C., many, many times up and down the 17 halls. I was on one of their advisory committees, 18 the Water Advisory Committee, drinking water, 19 20 Standards Advisory Committee. q . Did you ever have any input to 21 establishing threshold limit values through the 22 23 ACGIH TLV committees? A. Yes, we did. W e t u r n e d ov e r to t h e m 24 any data we had in connection with anything they 25 u:'iA I ' i j r- l . ktjl rL V L_ - 1| li F E rL i r " L-r 82 1 were working. If you recall some of the 2 processes, they would come out and say we're going 3 to do -- they would show a span of materials they 4 were after, and actually they looked up I guess in 5 the blue book us and every other chemical and 6 petroleum company and found out if they made it, 7 they sent us a note saying we're going to work on 8 the chloro-aromatics. 9 So we said, yes, we'll do it, too, and 10 participate, and we'd participate with them and 11 give them our data and our views. We never gave 12 our data away without a few views. Neither did 13 anybody else. 14 So we -- yes, we participated with 15 them. We participated with them making up some of 16 the standards. We disagreed with some, but not 17 very many, believe it or not. Boy, some of them 18 were tough. 19 q . The National Institute for 20 Occupational Safety & Health, is that an 21 organization you recognize, sir? NIOSH? 22 A. Yeah. 23 q . They have come out from time to time 24 with a number of criteria documents, various 25 materials. Are you familiar with those as well? r ~x L [ 83 1 A. Yes. I've seen some of their 2 criteria, which kind of -- blue papers. 3 Q. Did you ever make any comments or 4 contribute to any of the writing of this criteria 5 documents? 6 A. Well, at their request we did some 7 work on organic chemicals that were manufactured 8 in East St. Louis and we dittled with those people 9 for fifteen years. 10 We finally went over there and made a 11 survey of the people that lived over there, and 12 our results didn't jive with their predictions, so 13 they didn't publish our results. 14 MR. FOGARTY: Objection, 15 nonresponsive. 16 q . From time to time did you have the 17 opportunity to work with customers of Monsanto's 18 regarding Monsanto products and their use? 19 A. Yes, many times. 20 Q. Tell me how that worked, Mr. Garrett, 21 when it came to dealing with your customers. 22 A. Well, if I got a -- we were, as you 23 know, a staff department of the corporate 24 h e a d q u a r t e r s in St. Louis. 25 Someone in one of the sales groups or 84 1 product groups, as they were called, generally the 2 sales section, said to Emmet Kelly "We need ^Ti somebody to go help so and so in a certain n 3 , , 4 procedure connected with handling something ` 5 Monsanto manufactured." i i 6 So I got told to go out and help r' 7 somebody do something, and X did that not as many 1 8 times as you might -- as you might imagine. y 9 We did get a -- we answered an awful if--* 10 lot of letters and we were -- we -- the president L ii of Monsanto told us, "You tell them what you know, n 12 period. I don't give a damn if it's good or bad. 13 Tell them what you know." 14 So we did. We never had anybody | . 15 complain inside Monsanto to us either. So we L _ 16 helped the customers any time. L I7 Many of them were states. I had more M 18 requests from states about this thing these L 19 things. We got thus and so in our state. You get involved now in maybe messing around with one of o CM 21 your customers, but we did anyway. LI 22 Q. The products that you sold at Monsanto, certainly some of those had health S 23 24 effects that they could cause if they were ^ 25 improperly handled or if exposures were excessive, 85 1 I take it. : 2 Did you ever, as a Monsanto employee, N 3 go out to customers and sort of precheck them to 4 see if they were capable of handling your i 5 materials that were particularly hazardous? n A. I went to many, many of them connected with probably die chemicals more than anything - 7 1 8 else because the die makers are little companies. H t 9 Primarily small operations. L p 10 And we talked to them about some of n the amine and nitro aromatic compounds we fT 12 manufactured, and I did this with many of them. I fc . -J 13 did -- they have an organization, by the way, that i J 14 I went to twice and talked to them. [ 15 Anybody that asks for help from L 16 Monsanto got it from us, and we did the medical or y I? industrial hygiene sort of stuff, Kelly and I and F 18 Emmet and the rest of the doctors and the rest of L 19 the hygienists. 1 20 And about -- when I retired, I had 21 fourteen people working for me, and I had, I L 22 suspect, a good 15 percent, maybe even more of | 23 that, was done from customer relations, and that ,. 24 was direct. ^ 25 And we weren't out to sell stuff. We s f ` y n y P ~ \ ! J n t_j \ u fILri i r 1 Li 86 i were out to sell safety and health because it 2 damaged our product name if somebody turned up 3 purple. And we just weren't going to have it. 4 So, yes, my whole staff probably spent 5 15, 20 percent of their time with customers. 6 q . Can you recall any circumstances where 7 you would find people who either wanted to buy or 8 were buying Monsanto products and you just said, 9 These people aren't capable of dealing with it 10 and we're not going to sell to them"? 11 A. Well, we had some people, companies, 12 that were pretty irresponsible in our opinion, and 13 we were very careful. 14 It's difficult to do what you're 15 saying. But it's not only difficult, it's legally 16 difficult, so, yes, we did. We worked with our 17 own law department on some of those at their 18 request or at ours. 19 Q. And actually ceased sales in some 20 instances? 21 A. Indeed we did. They wouldn't let us 22 look at their operation. They had a problem that 23 we knew about. We ceased. 24 q . Can you give me some idea how far back 25 in time these kinds Of acti vi tie s wou ld have gone 87 1 at Monsanto? 2 A. I guess Kelly probably would -- was 3 doing that for he and Elmer Wheeler before I came. 4 When I came, we did some -- we did some work 5 w ith -- we did most -- well, a great portion of 6 our work with customers connected with products t: 7 and changes they wanted to make in the chemical r L 8 composition. 9 We didn't want them to stick amine 10 groups on everything and that sort of thing. r Li 11 Arsenides or something like that. PCB's. We 12 wanted a great deal less foolishness. 13 I did a great deal of work with PCB's 1 ^ 14 in tunnels, in transformer manufacturing places, 15 that sort of stuff. 16 q . So at least by 1954 you had personal 17 knowledge that Monsanto was working with its 18 customers in trying to find problems with 19 customers in some cases 20 A. When I came up to St. Louis, I quickly 21 found out that the customer in any -- like any 22 other place that's pedaling, was pretty much the 23 king through our professional technical staff that 24 did the selling. 25 Monsanto sales people, I'm sure Iimi 1 most big companies do the same. Most of them are 2 pretty well knowledgeable about the materials 3 they're selling because they're probably chemists 4 or chemical engineers to start with, and we did a 5 lot of work with them. 6 I did a lot of work with people that 7 wanted to make preformed insulation and tunnel 8 people and tunneling in some areas. They wanted 9 some help. 10 We did a lot of work with some of the 11 electrical companies because of the transformers 12 in tunnels. You don't realize -- I mean a lot of 13 people don't. My -- like your wife probably 14 doesn't realize that 90 percent of all the 15 electricity in downtown whatever is in tunnels. 16 In fact, so is the heat. Nobody has a 17 heating plant. They buy steam from some guy way 18 off over the boondocks somewhere that's making 19 steam, and you get into those tunnels and you 20 start getting into crowded conditions, and you get 21 tunnel crews. 22 And I've spoken to the tunnel crews, 23 which, by the way, are separate in most electrical 24 companies. That's a separate gang of people, you 25 know. It may be wierd, but t h e y ' r e pretty good at 89 1 it, They know their business. 2 And I've lectured many Union 3 Electric's people, TVA's people, in connection 4 with particularly in restricted use of transformer 5 fluids. Yes, many times. I' 6 I: Q. The work that you would do as an 7 industrial hygienist in talking to Monsanto 8 employees or customer -- customers of Monsanto's 9 products, did that involve training people quite a 10 bit? L 11 A. Well, we did -- we put on training V 12 programs, and we did, when we were using a product 13 we felt was hazardous, putting it in a new 14 plant -- we put on a dog and pony show for them, 15 Kelly and I and/or Elmer or a whole crowd of us. 16 Later on we had a big staff. We had 17 staffs in there, too, and their staffs, whoever l 18 they were going to have in whatever plant, their 19 safety and health staff, and we had I know lots 20 of people used contract physicians and we did, 21 too, in some of our plants. 22 Some of them we had first -- in some 23 of the early days some of the plants had full-time 24 physicians even. 25 T h a t w a s a l e f t o v e r f r o m W o r l d W a r II, r~a ' ' Pi i 1 t1' 11 r L f " _ : i 1 ' y L II ip 1 | r ^ 90 1 by the way, I suspect, but we had -- we had to do 2 more training, I suspect, to those contract 3 physicians than most. 4 Kelly did it but he'd bring the 5 hygiene crew along and we'd scare hell out of them 6 or something, so they'd do what we had to do. Q. So the intent was to make sure that 7 8 these contract physicians that were servicing Monsanto employees, they knew the hazards and knew 10 what to look for? ii A. Knew so they could diagnose rapidly 12 if -- so we didn't lose somebody in transit. 13 Q. Did you become familiar, Mr. Garrett, 14 with how the Monsanto medical records were 15 basically kept? I'm not talking about in a 16 person's folder, but how in general they were i7 reviewed? 18 A. The physician or the assigned 19 physician at the individual plant and the 20 physician assigned by Kelly if he had from his 21 own staff or himself would handle that affair. 22 Now, we talked to the physicians -- and I knew all of them personally, but as far as messing with 23 those medical records, buddy, it was no thanks, 24 25 because you're diddling with something that Dr. P r r L r j c 91 1 Kelly didn't have allowed. 2 We would look at it from a generalized 3 standpoint. If we got a couple people with us 4 that showed symptoms, okay, but looking up a whole 5 twenty-five or thirty people's medical records was 6 no. Kelly would do it or his physicians, but our 7 hygienists would not or did not. 8 And I was perfectly happy with that 9 when I directed my own group -- when I directed 10 the group. 11 Q. Was there a system within Monsanto 12 that you can tell me about that allowed for you to 13 know how many particular incidents of whatever 14 medical condition occurred and how that how was 15 that tracked? 16 A. Well, we got all of that -- Kelly 17 automatically got anything connected with what was 18 considered an associated -- a sickness that you 19 could directly prescribe or ascribe to one of the 20 products we were making or one of the processes we 21 were using. 22 And from that we tracked -- a lot of 23 the work my crew did was on those -- plant would 24 say "We've got problems here. We seem to have two 25 or three guys that -- showing some kind of Hit! 1 ? ' i i HL - L* r \__ ** i . L p L, 1 f" if. 92 1 symptoms connected, our doctor says." 2 My hygiene crew -- I'd send my 3 hygienist assigned to that division to that plant 4 and work with the plant assigned hygienist, find 5 out what the hell was going on, and if they needed 6 one of the physicians, Kelly would send one of his 7 physicians along. Yes, we did. 8 We were never shown their names, and X 9 didn't want to see their names. They marked them 10 out. We did not deal with directly with 11 medical records of anybody by name unless it was a 12 terrible mess. 13 q . Did your job at all involve claims of 14 occupational diseases that might arise by Monsanto 15 employees? 16 A. To a degree. I handled accidents. 17 Always did. Don't know why I got mixed up in that 18 mess, and I've seen some messes. Rail accidents 19 you wouldn't believe and truck accidents, you 20 know, fishing a truck out of the Ohio River loaded 21 with chemicals and drums, hoping to God the drums 22 are still in the damn truck when you pull it out 23 so you don't have to send a diver down to get each 24 one of them individually. We've been there. I ' v e been in wrecK s i t e s , p r o b a b l y a ll 25 cri l| r 1 i 11 p b >[' i ! ,,y : j r y R L ps L | ^ 93 1 over the country, particularly rail wrecks because 2 if our tankers are sitting in that wreck, we ve 3 got to know where they are on the wreck and 4 whether they've been bashed or not. If they've 5 been bashed, what the hell is in them and where 6 that drainage is going. 7 And we had -- we tested some darn 8 stuff over in Illinois where a railroad accident had occurred before I ever come on the site. We 9 10 tested water around there and that soil and found 11 it was there. Sure enough it was there. 12 We had a hell of a mess cleaning that, and it was years after it occurred. So we didn't 13 14 want that to happen again, and we tracked 15 everybody in the business did that. 16 I don't suppose -- I met a American i7 industrial -- American cyanide hygienist at a wreck in Atlanta at one time. "What are you doing 18 19 here?" 20 He said, "I'm trying to find my tank 21 car. You found anything?" 22 I said, "No, I don't think ours are 23 here. I think somebody must have shipped them off 24 on the side somewhere." Well, we go back he 25 and I worked it together. 1 So we -- i knew hi.m personally, and he 94 2 was trying to do the same thing I was. Big mess. 3 We checked the wrecks. We always 4 tracked those wrecks. i'll bet you I've been on 5 some of the funniest airplanes you've ever seen in 6 your life getting to some of the funniest places 7 you ever saw in your life. 8 "There ain't know road there." 9 "Yeah. How do you get there?" 10 "On the train." 11 "How the hell you going to get there 12 on the train if the damn train is wrecked?" 13 "I don't know. Get on the horse." 14 Get down that damn track from 15 Pensicola across to -- they ought to put that 16 thing out of business. Across the Panhandle in 17 . Oh, I think it's on floating on mud, but 18 that's beside the point. 19 MR. ELLIS: Jack, why don't you let 20 him ask another guestion here. We can get on with 21 something. 22 MR. CORBETT: Objection, 23 nonresponsive. 24 THE REPORTER: Who said that? 25 MR. CORBETT: Me, Jim Corbett. 95 1 Q. Did you ever get involved in any of 2 the Workers' Compensation claims, Mr. Garrett? 3 A. If it reflected on more than a single 4 claim, if it reflected a trend of any kind, yes, 5 we got involved in it. Tried to find out if it 6 was indeed our problem and, if it was, get it 7 stopped. Get it put back to bed where it 8 belonged. 9 Not very often, oddly enough. 10 Q. But was there a system that you were 11 aware of where the Workers' Compensation claims 12 that involved occupational diseases or claims of 13 occupational diseases were made known to you m 14 the medical department? 15 A. It went to Kelly or it went to Dr. 16 Johnson when he was there and he came to us, and 17 I -- and if it was -- if it was one of my 18 people -- if I had a person assigned directly to 19 that operation, I'd send him because he knew more 20 about it than I did. 21 Oddly enough, there wasn't a lot 22 well, I don't know. It's hard to say. 23 q . What about keeping up with people who 24 were long time Monsanto employees and who would 25 retire and then with the passage of time those 96 1 folks would pass away, would you have access to 2 their death certificates? ;:1 3 A. No. We did some and we did some 4 purposely, and we did some in cooperation with 5 NIOSH in East St. Louis and somewhere else. I ! 6 can't remember the other place. 7 P I can't remember, but we would have i . 8 and did operate with them connected with processes that might have occurred from a individual ILfI 9 10 chemical or an area where there was a number of P L ii identified employees because Monsanto's system, f ; 12 like every big company's insurance and so forth ` 13 system, handles wherever they are. . J 14 We've tracked some down. I don't know , 15 why they all live in Florida and Texas, but they ' 16 do after they leave. I don't blame them if they ! lived in Illinois for moving to Florida or Texas, L 17 but that's beside the point. p 18 ^ 19 Yes, we've helped, but it wasn't -- we got into it probably after everybody else had dug 20 21 around in the mud, so I don't know. I worked on 1" l 22 processes where have you seen any an unusual number of thus and so's and we went to the 1 23 24 physicians of a community through their medical -- r * ^ 25 local medical association and asked them if they'd i r Li iLj C V I i r( L 97 1 help us. 2 We've never had any turn downs. They 3 really -- it really isn't easy to do. You go look 4 at the medical records and the insurance records 5 are, my personal opinion, shouldn't exist, but 6 they do. 7 And what do you do -- what is a person 8 in for if he's got a respiratory disease? And 9 he's eighty-two years old. You know, that sort of 10 thing. I don't know. 11 It may be they are significant and 12 maybe it can be done. We did the big OSHA study 13 twice for -- with them. Nothing ever came of it. 14 We were looking at that -- at really 15 at age and we're looking through the medical 16 records to find out what caused the cessation of 17 age in some of these people and really never came 18 to much of any conclusions. 19 Q. This OSHA project dealt with what, 20 sir? 21 A. What? 22 Q. What did the OSHA project deal with 23 that you said you did twice? 24 A. There were -- really it was NIOSH that 25 was after it. Q. I'm sorry. A. It was do you have -- do you have any residual? And they looked into some magic ball and said that people in certain areas have a tendency to stay in those areas more than they do in most areas. So we -- they'd pick one of our plants and they were working -- they wanted to know about some of the products that are made in the plant anyway, but that particular -- they have to be -- they have to be right because that particular area, an awful lot of those people are still alive, still living in that area. I wouldn't think in the retirees from St. Louis -- from Monsanto that retired from the main office, I don't think nearly as many percent wise would have stayed in the St. Louis area, but a lot of those people did over there. It's a very clannish place, I guess. I don't know. Just -- and they wanted some studies done and they -- and we did them, provided the data. Nothing ever came of it, that I ever knew. Q. Would it be accurate -- A. But we would have done it if they'd have wanted us to. 99 1 Q. Would it be accurate to say, Mr. 2 Garrett, that at least from your perspective of 3 seeing things, you learned more about any kinds of 4 disease processes in Monsanto employees that were 5 in the current work force as opposed to anything 6 that would have existed in retirees or people who 7 left Monsanto's employment? 8 A. I don't know. That's a difficult 9 question to answer. I'd probably, from point of 10 view of incident -- of incidences, yes. 11 From a point of view of studies and 12 desire to know whether things are happening, no, 13 we probably looked at it. I didn't. I didn't 14 have access to the medical records either, and 15 Emmet Kelly is one of the toughest guys in the 16 world that don't allow anybody to look at 17 anybody's personal medical file, and I don't blame 18 him. 19 Q. Was there any way for you at Monsanto 20 when you were doing industrial hygiene work to be 21 able to see if there was any correlation between 22 any of the exposures that you were measuring and 23 monitoring and any resultant diseases that might 24 be occurring? 25 A. We did with some of the contract 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 100 doctors. Kelly did it. He had a bunch of - he hired doctors, and they were largely contractors in the individual areas, and he had a tic sheet for them. If anything had happened that they thought was unusual, I ended up at the plant trying to find out what the hell it was. But as far as looking at those records, I didn't get a chance to do that. At least with any names on them I didn't. q . Did you have, after you started doing the profiling and surveying of plants, did you identify certain groups of workers that ultimately, either through Dr. Kelly or others, were given certain kinds of physical examinations because of the kind of work they did? A. We had -- we had those people, yes, and those people were in - when we checked the plant, we knew when we went in that department X-l or X-2 had a certain screen, physical screen, through the physician, whether he was Monsanto or whether he was contract. Made little difference. He dealt with those records. We did it on PCB's. We did it on amine and nitro aromatic workers. We did it on --** 11 to H ELJ R ! L i li r ' ( 1 ib' E y n " If j| , -- 101 1 chlorine workers, too. By government asked us to 2 do that. 3 Q. Was there ever a time while you were a 4 Monsanto employee that you did one of these 5 physical screens for people who worked with asbestos? 6 7 A. Well, asbestos was a product that s everybody in every plant had to use because of the 9 insulation problems. 10 As far as I -- and I'm not sure in my 11 own mind, I don't believe we ever had very many 12 catalysts that used asbestos or asbestos form 13 carriers, pallets, if you know what I'm talking 14 about. We sold the pallet, cook it and then 15 16 use it for cattle. I don't think so. What we did I? do in these areas was we made sure, and we I lectured eight thousand times about the TLV levels 18 19 and their darn respirators, and they were issued 20 respirators by name and the respirators were periodically cleaned and recartridged even if they 22 had not shown use. It's the only way you can run a 23 respirator program, and it's like helmet programs. 24 2 5 We had the same problems there. 1 2 ':'i 3 4 5 i 6 r 7 1 8 (! 9 10 p b 11 fr 12 13 -- 14 i ; 15 ' 16 * : ii I' * 18 m L 19 |i;. 20 f 21 22 || 23 , 2 4 ^ 25 102 You know, you go visit a guy in the hospital in some place, he's got a crushed skull, and he's got a perfectly good helmet and, of course, it wasn't on his head, and when the rock hit his helmet, it didn't hurt anybody, which was on the ground, of course, not on his head. So we did some of that. That was largely the safety people, and the safety people got -- their system corporately grew like the industrial hygiene and medical system grew, and we went together frequently in looking at the safety and health aspect of something because it's awfully difficult to separate. Are you doing something here that's making a person be exposed too much? The safety * guys, some of their guys could do a lot better job than our hygiens could do in connection with what they did and, therefore, where they interfaced with an individual compound that was hazardous. q . if i could get you, Mr. Garrett, to do it for me as best you can, if we can kind of go back in time to the mid 1950s after you came to St. Louis and were in the corporate program. What would be the typical thing that you could tell us that you would be telling 103 1 workers working with asbestos about TLVs and wearing respirators and -- M 3 A. Respirators, respirators, respirators. 4 Helmets with respirators because the helmet rule - 5 Monsanto is absolutely universal and we could r " i! 6 enforce that. 7 We could enforce the respirator rule. 1 8 We also could scare them a bit because it's a M 9 scary material. And we lectured. I lectured them 10 on lots of things, including asbestos. I lectured L ii the East St. Louis plant periodically about that r 12 and about amine compounds. L 13 Q. Can you give us just your best ! 14 recollection of what you would say about asbestos ! 15 in the '50s? 16 A. Tell them it's a hazardous material L 17 only if you inhale it. "If you inhale it, it n 18 becomes a very hazardous material and you will L 19 maybe regret it down your life span. It will 1 20 certainly shorten it if you inhale enough of it. r 21 "So the respirator is given to you for ^ 2 2 that purpose. Wear the damn thing," and it was 1 23 essentially that, but the safety people in the r 24 plants did a good deal better job than I did. 2 5 They had records and they had -- I 104 1 don't know where they got some of the films they 2 had, but they had some films that -- Dr. Kelly P 3 wouldn't have allowed us to use films showing 4 people that were dying of asbestosis, but some of 5 the plants could get them, and I think I did a ; 6 pretty good job, you know. P 7 We had -- we had asbestos, to my 1 8 knowledge, in every plant in Monsanto. I watched a bunch of people redoing some valves in our main i; 9 office, and that was the worst looking mess I ever o H r n saw, and we stopped that. 12 We got the contractor in and he either 13 changed his manner or out he went. We'd get UJ 14 another contractor. So I don't know. I've never n 15 -- we talked it. It was one of the talking L_ 16 problems. r L 17 If you were handling problems where you were in the racks changing insulation all the 18 u 19 time and we had insulators that were by -- in some ^ 20 of the unions they were individuals that were r 21 classified as insulators. * 2 2 In our case in one of the -- I don't |j 23 know who -- I don't know what union is what in 24 these cases, but we had one called asbestos - 2 5 workers, and then one of them were called insulators, and in the insulator system they used asbestos insulation. We used preform a lot. Later as we came down the tube, we began to use preform because it created less problem of smearing and mudding joints and so forth. And so as far as I know, our plant safety and health people did a first class job of raising cane about asbestos. So did we. It's one of the routine raised cane things. It's like cyanide and Monsanto made enough cyanide or used cyanide. So, yes, we did it. Q. So when you said earlier, respirators, respirators, respirators, how did you mean that? A. Anybody that in any way installed or took out any asbestos for any reason, however small, wore a respirator. They were issued a respirator and they wore it, and they changed it each day. They turned it in even if they did not use it and it was recartridged if that was on a project where they were insulating. Q. Would that be true whether they were called insulators or asbestos workers or anybody 106 1 else? 2 A. Yes, because in the plant you're 3 looking at a process unit here that's 4 manufacturing aniline compounds. 5 If the insulators are in there 6 insulating, the process people have got to -- that 7 are running the process, have got to have 8 respirators too, and they're issued them and 9 they're issued them from our safety supply people, 10 and that's the way we keep records, the way we've 11 always kept records. 12 Q. How far back in time can you tell us 13 that that was done at Monsanto this way, the 14 wearing the respirators? 15 A. No, I can't. I can tell you that in 16 the last fifteen or twenty years they've been 17 doing it. What happened prior to that, I do not 18 know. 19 All I know is they had them, and in 20 most of the plants where I was at, the respirators 21 were issued so they had a record of it. 22 Q. At Texas City when you were there in 23 the '53-54 time period, was it your experience 24 that asbestos was handled as you've described in 25 Texax City? A. When the two Americans came into my pilot plant to take loose the asbestos, when we checked it, you had to have two insulators come in. I had two electricians disconnect this and pipefitters and so forth. The insulators came in, took off the insulation, they both had respirators. As a matter of fact, one of them told me to go get lost while they took it off. Q. to wear? A. Because you didn't have a respirator Because I didn't have a respirator there, so I got lost. Q. Now, the insulators that were at Texas City that you've described, they were given the clothing and they showered? A. As near as I can tell you, yes, and when it happened -- started and when all of the issues came afoot, I do not know, but they were when I was there, they wore respirators. They came out with their respirators. They came out with gloves and aprons and took my -- the insulation off my pot. Q. Was there a way that you had at the corporate offices in Monsanto in the '50s of 108 1 keeping track with your monitoring data that you 2 collected? 3 A. We always -- and I don't know. If I 4 did it today, I think I'd do it the same way. We 5 did it by plants and overlaid the plants by 6 product. 7 For example, we made the same product 8 in three plants. We took plants that you would be 9 interested in if you're talking about aniline or 10 chioroanilines or this plant, this plant and this 11 plant, and you go and check their records 12 individually or go to the plants, we frequently 13 did, and looked at their records in their safety 14 department, and frequently the doctor would come 15 along and go to the physician if he was assigned. 16 If he was one of our physicians, which 17 in the bigger plants like Springfield, we had a 18 physician. I'd go talk to the physician and take 19 the poop back to Dr. Kelly or Dr. Johnson or one 20 of the other doctors. 21 Q. You say Springfield was one of the 22 bigger plants? 23 A. Springfield had a physician all the 24 time for the while I was there, and I didn't 25 realize that until the Springfield plant manager 109 1 introduced me to him. 2 I will have to say he had the most 3 hidden place I ever saw. His dispensary was 4 excellent but it was underground. I don't know. 5 I don't know why. Don't ask me. Go ask the plant U 6 manager why. r 7 Q. Springfield's located in -- the i i , 8 Springfield plant? 9 A. Springfield, Mass. 10 U 11 Q. Springfield, Massachusetts? A. Primarily a polymer plant. P 12 Ld Q. I've seen some records that seem to 13 indicate that asbestos was used in making products U~y 14 in Springfield. Are you familiar with that? n 15 A. Yes, because we used -- not only that, 16 we used wood meal, if you know what wood meal is. 17 Q. I'm afraid I don't. p 18 A. You grind wood up until it's like 19 flower, a wood flower, and what it was used for 20 was the early manufacture of plexi- -- not r 21 plexiglass. Oh, the damned -- oh, the most common 22 of all the early -- i 23 rr 24 i 25 MR. GAUDET: Phenolics. THE WITNESS: What? MR. GAUDET: Phenolics. m rn i i i f "5 l A L r \ L ? " 110 1 Q. Plastics? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Phenolic resins? 4 A. Yes. And the stuff was used as a 5 reinforcer in phenolics. This, by the way, was 6 made for telephones. We had problems with -- 7 terrible problem with that powdered stuff. 8 We had a man fell in that thing one 9 time, working, maintenance man, and they had to 10 empty that whole damn thing out to get him out of 11 there, and he was dead. He died. He suffocated. 12 And we did some safety rack work up 13 there. Ground wood. And I mean it's called wood 14 fiber. It looks like fiber, and the asbestos is 15 also used in that same process for different kinds 16 of plastic. 17 And in the phenolics, what you use as 18 you're reinforcing material is frequently based on 19 what the phenolic is going to be used for, and 20 there's eight million recipes. 21 So sitting outside of the phenolic 22 resin unit at Springfield used to be several large 23 -- these forty feet high tubes filled with the 24 stuff they use to make various types of resin. 25 Now, Monsanto got out of that business 1 Ill a lot and people made their own stuff. We sold in 2 phenolics. We got out of the phenolic business, 3 too, but we sell them plastic monitors and they 4 can make it in -- our technical research people 5 helped them set up. 6 We set up people in business like 7 everybody does. I'm sorry, but let's be honest 8 with ourselves. Gasoline companies set up service 9 stations for people. 10 So the -- yes, we used asbestos there 11 in chop form in the tower and the asbestos workers 12 and the aniline wood workers, both, were required 13 to wear respirators. The guy had a respirator on, 14 bY the way, that was in the tower when we dropped 15 him out. 16 Q. The use of asbestos at the 17 Springfield, Massachusetts, plant, is that 18 something that you yourself monitored? 19 A. Yes, I did. I took samples up there 20 on that -- that whole system where they went back 21 through and I'll bet -- we did it until they quit 22 making phenolics there, which was years ago, by 23 the way. 24 Q. Yes, sir. 25 A. I was in a place that made -- one of 112 1 our customers made equipment to cremate people, and they used a lot of plastic there, too, but M 3 that7s beside the point. That had nothing to do 4 with this. 5 Q. Have you learned that any of the 6 people at the Springfield, Massachusetts, plant f - 7 that worked with asbestos have come down with 5 8 asbestos-related disease? f i 9 k. - A. I 7ve learned that there -- I have not 10 learned that any have. Now, the best -- you best 11 ask Dr. Kelly that now, but to those -- in those 12 days I never heard of one, but when I first went -, 13 to Springfield, they had very strong rules and 14 regulations connected with their -- with that P 15 operation, and that was before there was really a L 16 big organized central health and safety group. L 17 P. 18 Q. That would have been in the mid 750s? A. Yeah. 19 Q. At the Springfield plant that you if^ CO o visited, Mr. Garrett, in the mid 750s, do you recall if there were any other kinds of control r 21 22 techniques being used besides just wearing l respirators for asbestos? r 24 A. No, they were taking samples. ^ 25 Q. They were? A. Yes. The crank samples, yeah. I remember the hemocytometer we used to use to count. You remember? Q. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. A. Pain in the butt. Q. Were there ventilation systems being used at Springfield? A. Yes. We had -- as you probably know, Monsanto owned half interest in a plant next to the Monsanto plant there. That was half owned by a company -- a big power company in Canada, and that plant, we did work and dealt with the parent company in Toronto, I believe, or Montreal, I guess it was, with the other -- because they were a partner in it. Little bit more -- you'll remember it because it had to be done with the other partner. That is -- and I guess each -- both owned half, and the agreement was that they were power plant operators up in Canada. They owned much of the power out of the falls, and the government bought that out and we had a deal in the contract that if the government bought it out, we could buy out their part of that plant, and we did, and it became part of the Springfield plant. 114 1 And they had -- they made resin 2 materials there more than just raw material. They !i ! . 3 actually made certain kinds of resins and a great f 4 many specialty resins in that plant. ` 5 And we -- and we -- they were just ! 6 like they -- the Monsanto plant, regardless of who r-' 7 owned them. 1 J 8 Q. And they were using asbestos as part f j 9 of the specialty's formulations, too? r 10 A. They -- as near as I know. We checked L n it. I did sampling in that plant at the request f' 12 of the plant manager. Did much sampling, and we i_. ~ 13 used the old cytometer to count the squares. I 14 Q. Can you recall what you generally f ! 15 found? I know the numbers would not come to mind, 16 but did you generally find that exposures were | y 17 below the threshold limit values, above, near? | 18 A. We found -- I tell you the truth, I 19 don't think I ever saw with that method a sample H 20 that exceeded the TLV. Now, the TLV shrank during the years r 21 ` 22 as you know, and people began to dodge the use of | 23 asbestos in some respects and probably rightly so. 2 4 I don't argue the asbestos Lj 25 manufacturers here because I'm saying that it's l;'i j; T- U || p L 1 : L* '-S ii< y R L fi p L H p 115 1 better for them as well as everybody else. If you don't need it, don't use it, and I think probably 3 in the 1950s that began to become the issue, and 4 we didn't -- we -- I don't know that we did any 5 great changes, but wherever we didn't need it, we e didn't. v We stopped using it in a couple of g operations at the East St. Louis plant, but they 9 finally went out of business anyway. So... 10 MR. OLIVER: Objection. n Q. So basically that's the application of 12 one of the industrial hygiene principles of 13 substitution? 14 A. Absolutely. Eradication is a very 15 good one, too, if you can get to it. No, it's 16 senseless. I think we probably -- I think the i7 chemical industry by and large has solved more 18 problems by removal and change than any other 19 single issue. 20 "Don't use the damn stuff." 21 "Well, how we going to do it?" 22 "Well, you got research people, tell 23 them to find out how," and oddly enough in very 24 many cases they could find out. There are other 2 5 materials. 116 1 We use chopped rag in some of the damn 2 things. In those specialty resins they made in 3 that old plant, the one that we finally bought the 4 other half of when the government of Canada took 5 over the power plants up there, that plant used I 6 don't know what -- God, they used everything from 7 old Maggy's drawers off -- as additives for 8 various small batch operations, and they were very 9 clean and very neat about it, but they -- you ask 10 when are you going to make some kind of fender on 11 some automobile that General Motor's wanted, and 12 this is what they wanted. So who am I to argue 13 with them. 14 Those specialty plants probably were 15 the best knowledgeable plants that we had in 16 connection with respirable dust of any kind, and 17 that plant did a very good job of I think probably 18 -- if you want to know the truth, in Texas I could 19 get most dust sample out over there by the beach 20 than I could anywhere else, but in the plants that 21 we tested dust in -- I tested some for the State 22 of Texas one time, and we were in a dust storm and 23 I said, "You got to be kidding. We ain't going to 24 get anything but dust. What do you want? You're 25 not going to find out anything with the state !!;:* h ! ' f: r * |: _ t L 1 ' - : iL. r L I8 Hi f | ^ 117 1 guy,"It so we quit, but out in west Texas on the 2 spray berry (sic) trend. 3 No, I think we did -- I think we 4 probably are lucky for two reasons. One, when I 5 came to Monsanto, the knowledge of asbestos was 6 pretty considerable. They had the respirators. To me they should have used 7 8 respirators in doing other things, too, but they 9 didn't, but the asbestos man come by, he always 10 had a respirator. But some of the other people 1]L did not who needed them, too. Not with the same 12 filter. I don't mean that. 13 And that's what we did in the years I 14 was there. We got it to the point where a person 15 was exposed to something, he was either protected 16 or we changed the process. 17 Q. I thought I heard you say something 18 earlier, and tell me if I'm wrong, but that 19 because a TLV was set at a certain level, that, 20 what I think I heard you say, is that that wasn't 21 what you maintained exposures at, if you could get 22 lower, you would. 23 A. We tried the 50 percent. I think a 24 lot of people did that. I think you'll find a lot 25 of practicing industrial hygienists that -- where 1 L f-5 i ,, fl r L, 1 _ *v ! 1 P r fa r | r ! L. 118 1 you could do it. 2 Now, we also had tied up some -- we 3 fenced them off and tied them up so you 4 couldn't -- you couldn't get to them. People 5 couldn't get to them. 6 You could do that today a good deal 7 better than you could with better instruments 8 today. You could get electronic switching gear 9 that will open and close valves better than a man 10 can. 1X That wasn't true in the old days, and 12 so we -- where you could do that, we do it. And I 13 think our safety design people have come a long 14 way in the years. 15 I -- well, hell, we didn't even have 16 any when I first came up to St. Louis, but we do 17 now and we've got a very first class group and I 18 think they do a good job. 19 Q. What would be the rational that you 20 were using in trying to look at 50 percent of the threshold limit values? 21 22 A. Well, we would -- it just gave you -- 23 all it did was gave them a way to look at their 2 4 counter thing and say "That's within our standard. 25 It's 50 percent of the TLV," if they wanted to use ip pff|*'k*' Hi i S r-i i 1 n Id n _ 1 ' L r L S E 1 r ^ V " 119 1 that. 2 Personally I'd just as soon it be 3 zero, but there's never -- I never saw a zero, so 4 I don't know what anybody's talking about when 5 they say there was no exposure to anything, if 6 it's in the county. 7 And in the chemical plants along the 8 Texas area, you can find anything you want to in 9 the area. I mean, hell, if you have got a good enough sampler or good enough method, you can 10 ii practically find anything in very, very minute 12 amounts. 13 Q. Was it your philosophy then, Mr. 14 Garrett, what I think I'm hearing you say, is that 15 any exposure that wasn't absolutely necessary, you 16 ought to just not have? 17 A. Absolutely, and/or if there were -- if the hazard was sufficient to justify the 18 19 manufacturer, then the hazard was sufficient to 20 justify the construction of facilities where less and less exposure could be possible in -- at 21 22 enclosed operations. 23 When I -- you know, these old four 24 unit chemical manufacturing houses where you've 25 got one unit on each corner of a processing 120 1 operation where you walk in, everybody's got them. 2 First thing we did was we stripped the 3 concrete down and, boy, you talk about having a 4 hissy, and the hissy was because they'd get cold 5 or get rained on, but why put an envelope over 6 that damn thing to encourage that? 7 If you have an accident and a leak, 8 get the damn building down, so we took more 9 buildings down than you can shake a stick at and 10 caught hell from the plant manager because "It's 11 going to get cold and we're going to have to 12 insulate better and we're going to have to do this 13 and that." 14 But we took a lot of buildings down, 15 and particularly in the old organic processing 16 plants. 17 Q. That was to minimize exposures? 18 A. Well, where you had an accident. 19 Hell, we blew a valve every once in a while, so 20 did everybody else that I know of, and the process 21 to follow that up is one hell of a mess inside. 22 I'll tell you what I saw one time was 23 one where there was a darn flammable leak inside 24 of one of those four unit buildings, and they 25 handled -- well, but the point is if something 1 would have happened and ignited that, it would 1 2 have blown those other three processes to pieces, 3 too, and my God only knows what's in those 4 processes. 5 So we got them in that plant -- that 6 process got the plant to remove most of the brick 7 and the concrete and support it with steel, and 8 most of them, if you find today in a multipurpose, 9 multiprocess unit operation, petroleum or 10 chemical, you won't find any buildings. 11 Buildings is where the foreman's 12 ffice is, and where their damn coffee machine is 13 and where their card punching machine is, and 14 where most of the bitching goes on, but the fact 15 is the processes are sitting out in the open in 16 open racks, which is a -- the greatest thing that 17 ever happened in the chemical industry and the 18 petroleum industry. 19 Q. Would you recall, Mr. Garrett, if 20 Monsanto's plants in the '50s when insulating work 21 was going on, if it required the removal of old 22 insulation, if that was done wet or not? 23 A. I saw a whole system being done down 24 at our Chocolate Bayou plant and it was wetted 25 down, but -- as a matter of fact, they had the 122 1 sprinklers on it. Guy worked in water all over 2 the place. r^7s| '"> 3 You, in a way, you got me in a trap. 4 I don't know whether I agree with that or not, and 5 I'll tell you the reason. Unless that water is 6 trapped and carefully gotten rid of, you could r 7 spread that damn asbestos from here to hell and i . 8 back and, when it dries, everybody is going to get 1 9 asbestos. r 10 If you take care of it properly, fine, ^ n but that means where does that water go? How are i 12 you going to trap it when you're messing around ... 13 with a rack in the middle of the plant? " 14 Have you got a ditch dug over here : 15 where you're going to trap it? So you can take 16 that stuff out so it doesn't dry on the ground and f L 17 every truck and every man that walks by it helps P 18 generate dust. 19 We had a hell of a mess over that F fe 20 thing. They finally decided that you couldn't do jr 21 that. So they dry removed it. The last part of i- 22 that same process at Chocolate Bayou was dry | 23 removed. r 24 Yeah, you have respirators on, but the 25 majority of it was dry removed. The rest of it 123 1 was sprayed down and into the gutters, but the -:o;: 2 point is parts of the racks go over areas that are H 3 not well drained. That was my point. ' 4 MR. OLIVER: Objection, nonresponsive 5 again. --s I 6 MR. BROWN: To that last one? r-. 7 MR. OLIVER: Yes, to the entire - 8 response of that last portion as well. l?i 9 L) A. Goody for his side. I realize I'm r 10 giving you a lesson in industrial hygiene that b n maybe you don't need. * 1 ; 12 _. _ 13 Q. No, sir. A. That's my only way to answer the 14 questions. 15 L Q. That's exactly what I would hope that 16 you would do. Along that line, you're a certified * y 17 industrial hygienist, Mr. Garrett? m is A. Yes. 19 Q. And I would think you consider 1 20 yourself to be a professional in that area? p 21 A. Yeah, I do. 22 Q. And are so recognized by your peers? 1 23 A. I'm too blunt, but I am not a very r- 2 4 good consultant. ~ 2 5 Q. Well, perhaps that's what makes you a tea* i to qyV ' ri ' ' r - 1: r t r" L 1t*; . ,, \ s '} ^ L r L E H f!" h : 1 a 1 good consultant. 124 2 A. Well, I told them first it was lousy 3 and they didn't like it. I don't know any other 4 way to tell them it. 5 MR. FOGARTY: Objection. 6 Q. Mr. Garrett, I've got about 12 7 o'clock. Do you want to stop for lunch? Give me 8 a chance to get reorganized again here and see if 9 we can get -- 10 A. This time let's take off all the n hardware so we don't pull the eguipment apart. 12 (Deposition stood in luncheon recess 13 at approximately 12:00 p.m. and resumed at 14 approximately 1:37 p.m.) 15 AFTERNOON SESSION 16 All parties present, by and through 17 counsel and the witness, JACK T. GARRETT, having been previously sworn testifies further, to wit: 18 19 MS. FLATT: We're on record. 20 (Edward Carstarphen not present at 21 this time.) 22 CONTINUED DIRECT EXAMINATION 23 BY MR. HOBSON: Q. Mr. Garrett, during the luncheon 25 break, I noticed something -- and perhaps we made 125 1 a mistake this morning. I was looking at your 2 resume, and I'd asked you earlier about when you 3 first went to work at Texas City and you looked on 4 here and you told me October '53, and when I was 5 looking back through your resume, I noticed here, 6 where you had October '53, that's the date that r * 7 you left Texas City and it shows you starting at i i 8 Texas City in January 1950 and I wonder if v * r 9 about -- 10 A. January '50 is the right date. I'm 11 sorry. 12 Q. That's okay. I might have rushed you 13 through that? i ^ 14 A. I must have got the wrong. You know, r 15 I saw October of 1953. That's when I went to work 16 in '50. I graduated the University of Tennessee iL 17 in 1950. p 18 Q. And so then it would have been in 1953 L 19 that you moved to St. Louis? f - L 20 A. To St. Louis, yes. ? 21 Q. While you were down in Texas City, I 22 wanted to ask you if you might remember any names 1 23 from that facility. Would you recall a Mr. 24 William F. Woolley, W-o-o-l-l-e-y? 25 A. Name sounds familiar. Woolley. I 126 1 can't place him. 2 Q. Would you recall a Dorothy Wilson? 3 A. Yes. r ' 4 Q. And how would you have known Dorothy 5 Wilson , sir 7 f!1; 6 A. Oh, the name is familiar. I don't 7 know. I can't place the place. Dorothy Wilson. 8 Q. Were there occupational nurses at the 9 plant? .-4 10 A. She was a nurse. Yes, bless her u 11 heart. She was a -- she lanced a couple of dandy 12 boils I had . She was a nurse, uh-huh. I couldn't 13 argue. 14 My wife is the nurse from St. -- from 15 Monsanto -- from here, so I better keep quiet. 16 That Dorothy was -- Dorothy was the nurse, uh-huh. L 17 Q. Would you recall a -- it's either 18 Marietta or Marita Pawlik, P-a-w-l-i-k, Pawlik, 19 Powlik? 20 A. No, no, can't recall that. 21 Q. And how about a Douglas Pierce, 22 r-c-e 7 i a) i H 1 23 A. Nope, not readily. 24 Q- Claude Hamilton? 25 A. Hamilton? 127 1 Q. Yes, sir. 2 A. Boy, that don't tick a big bell, but 1 3 it rings a bell. What was his -- 4 Q. That's all I know about the gentleman, 5 sir. 6 A. How about a Mr. B.D. DeWalt, D-e P 7 capital W-a-l-t? 8 A. DeWalt. He was an engineer in the 9 plant, I think. 10 r Q. Would you recall any of his 11 activities, any of his duties? 12 A. No, not specifically. 13 Q. What was the safety engineer or safety 14 person's name? 15 )L 16 y 17 i 18 19 A. Mooney -- Q. Mooney? A. -- Stalling. Q. Stalling? A. Stallings. 20 Q. Stallings. 21 A. I think it's the plural name, but it L 22 doesn't make any difference. It's Stallings or 23 Stalling. S-t-a-l-l-i-n-g, I believe is his name. r 24 { Q. Do you remember attending the Gulf 25 Coast Regional Conference on industrial health in 128 1 Houston when you first joined the company? 2 A. I've been to so darn many of them. I Cs7 {`.M 3 think I remember that name of that outfit. I 4 think I gave a paper at one of their meetings, but 5 I don't know where it was. It was a discussion of 6 the toxicology of fish to various kinds of r* 7 cyanides. 8 Q. Would you recall a Florence Andrews? 9 A. What? 10 Q. Florence Andrews. 11 A. Florence Andrews. No. 12 Q. How about a Mr. Fred L. James, 13 J-a-m-e-s? 14 A. Not good there either. 15 Q. In your work for Monsanto, Mr. 16 Garrett, did you ever have any interface with the k. 17 ASA, the American Standards Association, later 18 became ANSI, the American National Standards 19 Institute? 20 A. No. I had -- I think we had some 21 dealings with them over a standard connected with Ik) 22 tank streaks one time, but I don't remember what 23 it was about. ! ' 24 Q. Are you familiar with what ASA 25 standards were? 129 1 A. Yeah, some of them, I am. We used 2 them as everybody does, I guess. 3 q . Would you give me your best 4 understanding of how ASA standards were in use in 5 the 1950s? 6 A. They set down standards along with 7 many other standard setting organizations for 8 many, many things that ultimately became safety 9 related but weren't necessarily safety related 10 initially, and that's the strength of materials, 11 bursting strength of eguipment, that sort of 12 thing. 13 And I think they set down standards 14 for example, they would set down an example of how 15 bursting strength of a large tank or the bursting 16 strength of a milk bottle for that matter because 17 both of them can be hazardous, and that has been 18 my -- most standards are ASA standards of one kind 19 or another. A lot of construction standards. 20 Q. Would it be accurate to say that these 21 ASA standards were the standards of good practice 22 for industry at the time? 23 A. Partly, but because industry had many 24 agencies establishing standards. I think they're 25 better now than they used to be. I think there 130 1 were more people out setting standards in the old 2 days than they were -- the petroleum people set 3 standards for petroleum products and the chemical 4 people for chemical products and I don't know how 5 many -- how -- you mess around with railroad 6 equipment and you find out the railroads set their 7 own standards, if you want to know the truth about r"~i 8 the matter. 9 And they had their set of reasons for 10 it. I'm not -- really I'm not trying to in any 11 way derogate them. I'm just saying that there are 12 so many different standard organizations that you 13 meet in construction or in transportation. 14 Look at the standards established for 15 aircraft, for example, for passenger carrying 16 aircraft. The same is true for railroads. I wish 5 ' 17 somebody'd enforced them, but that's beside I 18 chased too many wrecks, I guess. 19 q . in the case of ASA standards, would 20 those standards be something that Monsanto would 21 have been looking to and relying upon in their 22 work? 23 A. For construction materials probably, r" 24 but I don't think they'd look forward to ASA to 25 set any kind of health standards. I think there are too many much better equipped and better educated agencies to set those, including some federal and state agencies. Q. Well, for instance, are you familiar with ANSI - A. Yes. Q. -- or ASA standards for respiratory protection? A. Yes, I am now. Q. Was that one of the safety or A. One of the -- yes, and one of the ones that established the pressure cushions on masks and so forth. Yes, I agree. No. We used the word ANSI. I don't know. Q. Is the ANSI -- A. American National Standards. Q. Is the ANSI standard for respiratory protection one that you felt was not a good one for ANSI because it was health related? A. No, not necessarily. No, not necessarily. I -- to tell you the truth, the standard setting associ- -- people that I knew that we did most of the early work with for standards in handling products probably came from manufacturers or from the MCA, the then MCA, now i r-* \'4 !'| ' ! r~! L ' || P L | : ^ '4 1 L P L Il w L. H " 132 1 CMA, and the American Petroleum Institute group. I worked with them, too. I was a 3 member of one of their committees, one of their 4 medical committees. 5 I would be more inclined -- now, for strength of materials and stuff like that, the 6 V standards established by the health agencies 8 probably took into account any standards that were 9 otherwise required. 10 We used, probably more than anything n else, used the TLV list. We put many things on 12 the TLV list, did the work and established them 13 there. 14 And we put some in the CMA's guide 15 books and we put some -- we did some of the work 16 that ultimately led to standards from the IV Petroleum -- American Petroleum Institute. 18 And their -- they also put out daily 19 sheets. And this is many years ago. They put out 20 daily sheets, chemical safety data sheet, that s what you call them, was put out by the 21 22 Manufacturing Chemists Association. 23 The API put out a whole series of data sheets on things that were largely petroleum to 25 related. 133 1 The drug people put some out as well. 2 These were raw material drugs. These were not 3 because they had to put out very detailed ones for 4 approval on drugs that were being used by people. 5 So the agencies involved that we were 6 most involved with, that I've been most involved 7 w ith, were probably the TLV committee of the 8 MCA -- I mean of the American Industrial Hygiene 9 Association, the MCA committee work that backed up 10 a lot of the chemicals. 11 We established the data for some 12 chemicals that went to the MCA and from the MCA 13 went to -- went to -- ultimately set the standard 14 in the -- for PCBs, for example, and for some of 15 the nitro and amine compounds. 16 So the agencies I'm most frequently 17 most familiar with were probably the government 18 agencies, and they took their numbers from most of 19 these committees or agencies established by 20 individual manufacturing groups, like the MCA and 21 the API, and there are a lot of others that do 22 these drug people. 23 So that's where most frequently I 24 most of the standards that are currently 25 used probably came out of a composite of these % '"i r~' i i L.lS y *_ t - 134 1 agencies. 2 Q. Did any of your work, whether it was 3 with these agencies or these organizations that 4 you mentioned about or through Monsanto, did they 5 bring you in contact with any of the insulation 6 manufacturers or their employees? 7 A. Probably, but the trouble is that the 8 particular committee was established for 9 specific -- the specific business and the -- any 10 insulation manufacturers would have been ancillary 11 to the primary business of chemicals or petroleum 12 products. 13 But in any case, their standards were 14 always put forth to the -- to the TLV committee of 15 the American Industrial Hygiene Association. 16 Q. Do you recall meeting any of the 17 employees from the insulation manufacturers? 18 A. Oh, I knew -- I knew a guy who was a 19 member of the American Industrial Hygiene 20 Association, friend of mine, that worked for, oh, 21 the big -- big asbestos manufacturer on the west 22 coast. Well, the one that got sued to death. 23 Q. Well, there have been several. 24 A. I'm sure they were. 25 Q. Fibreboard? 11 i rL 1 p C pL ;^ 'n i.^ p L li FL 1 r 1 r L> F 135 i A. No. 2 q . Johns-Manville? 3 A. Johns-Manville. I knew those people, 4 two of their people. 5 Q. Do you recall their names? 6 A. Good Heaven's, no. My recall of 7 incidents is fine. My recall of names is zero. 8 q . Can you tell me under what 9 circumstances you remember meeting those folks? 10 A. Well, I met them in a meeting 11 somewhere. I think it was -- I think it was 12 probably a AIT meeting on standards somewhere. I 13 don't recall where it was. Probably one of the 14 national meetings. 15 (Some gentleman came in and it was not 16 Zucker.} 17 Q. You've been talking about several 18 organizations and I wanted to try to make sure 19 we're talking about the right one, the same one 20 together. 21 TLVs are levels - 22 A. Threshold limit values. 23 q . Yes, sir. Those are set by the 24 American Conference of Governmental Industrial 25 Hygienists. A. Governmental Industrial Hygienists, yes. Q. The ACGIH. A. With most of the input from AIHA and their -- and the people that manufactured that material. I've been involved in that many times. q . Now, when you say you were involved in committees that had to do w i t h TLVs, then the committees you worked with were in the American Industrial Hygiene Association? A. The IHA, that's right. q . Not the American Conference Governmental Industrial A. No, but we dealt with them because they were the regulators and we gave them the data. We dug up half the data. They come to us and ask us for data on this and that or something else, particularly some of the oddballs. The AIHA published a little series of booklets or data sheets of their own, and we set the standards for the PCBs and some of the others, gave them the data we had, which was extensive, particularly in our manufacturing data, and -- so we've dealt with all of them, and it turned out to be the standard that was established on the TLV 137 1 list. 2 Q. You did say earlier I think that 3 you -- I think Monsanto put things on the TLV 4 list, is that right? 5 A. We put -- we were asked freguently 6 where we had -- we were one of the manufacturers 7 of chemical products -- to help develop TLVs with 8 the _ with the TLV committee of the AIHA which 9 dealt with the committee of the association. 10 We said -- we did this on products 11 that we were primary manufacturer of or one of the 12 primary. We did the PCB work because we were the 13 only one that made the PCBs. 14 And incidently, our standards were 15 accepted by the French and Britain German 16 manufacturers of it, too, because we had enormous, 17 enormous amounts of information on the data on the 18 exposure to those materials in our own 19 manufacturing operations, and we manufactured them 20 at four different sites. 21 But anyway, we did some of the 22 others. We were asked on -- particularly when 23 they got to setting some of the standards on 24 anilines and the chloroanilines, the 25 nitroanilines, Monsanto's a primary manufacturer of aniline materials or was. I don't know that they still are or not, and we did a lot of work on that because those things are dangerous son of a bucks. MR. FOGARTY: Objection, nonresponsive. A. The chloroanilines were probably the most dangerous material I ever saw manufactured. Q. In that list of materials that you just told me about that involved setting TLVs, is there any one or one group of those that you had particular responsibility for more than any others? A. The PCBs we did. Elmer P. Wheeler and I did the PCBs and wrote the backing for it. You have to write a backing sheet or a backing report detailing where your data came from, how much data you have, what your manufacturing facilities are, where they are and so forth, what regulations you feel are necessary to protect the health of the people and what have you practiced in safe handling, and that's what we did. But in answering all those guestions, we frequently got a lot of questions about materials that you were not the primary "i f ' 1 . F r-' It H i Vk^t \.:J ! t.J y p m ? IJ! 139 manufacturer of but you manufactured it and had 2 some data, and we dumped the data into any time 3 they asked , we dumped the data for them. 4 One thing I loved about Monsanto, I 5 never got told not to by anybody any time 6 anywhere. 7 Q. Was it so that for PCBs which I 8 think you said you had direct responsibility for 9 doing. 10 A. I sure did. 11 Q. Did you at Monsanto come up with a TLV 12 number for PCBs then? 13 A. We came up with a recommendation as to 14 the least -- what we considered the least 15 hazardous level that we had seen in manufacturing 16 practice. 17 The unhappy part of it is we'd never 18 seen any hazard in manufacturing, and we told the 19 committee this, but we also gave them copies of 20 all of our detailed toxicological research work, 21 including long term tests. 22 q . So you had some animal datas that were 23 sent? 24 A. Oh, yes, we had two year data on that. 25 So we turned it over to incidentally, we turned 140 1 it over to the -- to the OSHA, too. 2 q . About how many people were involved in 3 manufacturing PCBs over the years? t ' 4 A. Oh, God, five hundred. No, four 5 hundred probably. Wait a minute. One, two, i 6 three -- we manufactured PCBs in Anniston, 7 Alabama, in East St. Louis, Illinois, and t . 8 originally at the plant in Missouri, the old home 9 plant, in small quantities there. The test 10 materials came out of there, but the manufacturing L 11 levels were at East St. Louis and in Anniston, f: 12 Alabama. 13 The Anniston plant was shut down for 14 reasons -- if you saw it, you'd understand why. 15 We had no way of talcing care of any waste there at L_ 16 all. We had a hell of a time with it. i' 17 Now, somebody would build a 18 phosphorous manufacturing plant out in the middle 19 of no place. We had a creek about this wide. We 20 finally ended up owning it and putting tile in and 21 making it a sewer, which we tested, checked and r-'i 22 treated, and finally they give up. 23 So we moved. The only plant in the 24 latter years of the manufacturing of PCBs were 25 done in -- at East St. Louis, Illinois, and we had 141 1 a manufacturing plant in Europe, and I believe 2 that was in Belgium, but I'm not sure. b 3 Q. I'm curious to know what kind of logic 4 you used in coming up with your recommendations 5 for TLV for PCBs. How did you do that? 1 6 A. Well, it was difficult to do. We looked at the toxicology with long term studies r- co r " with rats and acute studies with several species, || 9 rats, rabbits and guinea pigs; although we rarely 10 used guinea pigs. Rats, rabbits, and we had a ri L ii third -- a third specie. I can't even remember y 12 . what it was. 13 And we tested from these data -- by f | ^ 14 the way, it's not very toxic, as you can easily i 15 imagine. From these data we calculated based on 16 the most sensitive animal -- and the most L 17 sensitive I believe was a rat -- what it would be 4Q H CO if we took one-tenth of that and if that -- we L. 19 felt that would be hazardous. t 20 Based on our experience with our f 21 maintenance people primarily, we figured that was ^ 2 2 probably correct. So that's essentially how we i 23 set it. Q. In what kinds of programs do you r 24 L 25 recall having to deal with the maintenance people 142 1 to observe what kind of medical problems they X. 2 might have experienced? i 3 A. Well, we went through and sampled. We - 4 sampled PCBs in those areas. And incidently, we 5 had a hell of a time doing it because we never 6 found very much. - 7 The stuff, as you know, unless you're 8 -- it's very hot, is a syrupy material to start with. It's diluted in using it in transformer y 9 10 cases, for example. L 11 It's not -- you say the electrical I 12 people do this. They don't. They dilute it and ,, 13 there's what's known as transformer fluids are : 14 made, and these are mixtures of PCBs, different 15 numbers, different chlorinated types and bland 16 solvents, nonflammable if -- as much as possible ! ' L 17 because PCBs were not flammable. P 18 They were used in places where you it 19 were -- it was well to take a little care because |j 20 they were used in tight places. r 21 q . I take it that in doing the animal 22 toxicology work, that these test animals would be | 23 exposed to different doses of the material and r. 2 4 then you would look at the animals to see what " 25 kind of biological effects were present? A. That is correct. That's correct. The reason we used multiple species is because we wanted to know if there was anything -- we'd never seen a case with our own people. We'd -- the only manufacturer of PCBs and the work in the U.S. was Monsanto. And the only manufacturer in Europe, I believe, was Rhone Poulenc and, oh, Leber Quesin, a German company in Leber Quesin. Made in Leber Quesin. What the hell was the name of the company? But anyway, make -- but we dealt with them, too, by the way. The people from Germany came over to talk to us, and we were over in Europe, talked to them and talked also to -- they had a toxicologist. One of the great toxicologists of the world was a German that worked for Bayer, and we talked to them -- wasn't any sense in talking to the French, as you probably already know, so we talked to Germans. They came over and talked to us, looked at our data, and they felt that our standard was pretty severe. They didn't think anybody would ever exceed it, but they thought it 144 1 was pretty severe based on the data. 2 But that's the general sense of how it 3 happened. 4 q . In doing these laboratory animal 5 studies, I take it that the exposure to the animal 6 would be monitored over their exposure time period 7 of years? 8 A. These lifetime studies, yes. There's 9 no -- no basis in acute studies going to help you 10 except it gives you an idea of when to start 11 running, and if you exceed X number of -- you'd 12 have a hell of a time getting that much PCB. 13 It would be like drinking too much 14 Karo syrup. It's very difficult, very 15 doesn't -- it isn't very volatile. 16 But anyway, we tested it and we worked 17 with the toxicology laboratory. We did not do it 18 ourselves. We never did any of our own toxicology 19 work. We did it with contract labs. 20 q . Were the animals exposed by having 21 them breathe it or by putting it on their skin? 22 A. We breathed. We both breathed. We 23 pasted it on their skin, the abdomen that had been 24 shaved using a standard transfer to see if it was 25 absorbed through the intact skin and inhalate -- _ . 111? >;il 1: r L H r< k 1 i i *' *\ i J--/ ! i m L |i r ** 1 -- 145 1 inhalation. 2 We did everything but duck them in it. 3 I didn't do it. We did it -- had it done by our 4 contract people, and we used the University of 5 Cincinnati a lot. We used two private labs that -- out on the east coast a lot. 6 7 We had an acute place in St. Louis 8 that did acute work, pret nearly exclusively for us and for Mallinckrodt and maybe a couple of 9 10 other people. n Q. Now, the workers who made PCBs that 12 were Monsanto employees, about what time period 13 would Monsanto have made PCBs? 14 A. From about 1935 to about 1985. 15 Q. And I take it that at least for some 16 of that, about fifty year time period, there would rH have been no monitoring data to determine 18 exposures to the Monsanto -- 19 A. Well, we didn't -- we did monitoring 20 but we didn't get anything, and we did -- we took monitors on the people. 21 2 2 In the first place, the process was an 23 enclosed -- tight enclosed process and it required very few people. Actually, the guy that ran it CM 25 sat in a control room with dials and adjusted the 146 1 temperatures and the pressures. 2 The only person that ever got any 3 exposure after we cooled it, shut it down, 4 depressurized it, was the people that did the 5 maintenance on it, and it was those people that we 6 tracked more often than anybody else. 7 We never found any problem. We 8 thought you might get a rash and irritation 9 because of the chlorinated contact, but we never 10 did that either, but we never got enough exposure 11 either, I don't suppose. 12 Q. And I take it that these employees 13 that would have been making the PCBs at Monsanto, 14 that included the maintenance workers as well as 15 the operations people? 16 A. If the maintenance workers at the 17 Krummrich plant was assigned by region -- but it 18 isn't fair because they might -- if this regional 19 maintenance group had too many pipefitters, they 20 went over here. 21 So you're talking -- if you went and 22 looked at the standard workers, including fitters 23 and insulators and the whole bunch would be -- 24 could be transferred from group to group, but they 25 probably stayed within their own craft shell 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 147 because this was a - this was a united chemical worKers plant, and they used individual recognized crafts, which we could care less. I don't, you know, an insulator's an insulator whether he's working under what union rules, and these people would frequently be transferred from unit to unit and would be used from this uni+t- +t-on -tth-hiiss iif this unit was down for maintenance t.o help iitt- bbrriinnqg ixt down and make sure it's -- they don't dump all that stuff m the creek because it would do a creek no good. It would separate and you'd have two levels in the creek. The fish may like the top level and they may not like the bottom level. In any case, this is how we did it. The people that worked on it were, oddly enough one at Kearny. the plant was pretty large, the The one at AanrvnniisittoOInl wWHS SltlHllS^ XII output. Pretty much the same. The one at Krummrich was built after the one in Anniston, so it had a few modern conveniences, like flushing toilets maybe, but otherwise the thing - the people themselves had very little exposure to anything. We tested with standard orga n i c fluid 148 1 testing materials and found -- I don't think we 2 ever found any or very little. It's not easy to 3 analyze these things, by the way. I'll 9ive You 4 credit for that. 5 It's damn difficult to analyze for 6 very tightly chlorinated compounds. You got to 7 break them down somehow and knock that chlorine 8 out of there so you can test -- you can test a 9 sample for it. So it really is a pretty tough r 10 analysis. L 11 But as far as we were concerned, based i ` 12 on what we saw in many, many thousand acute tox 13 tests and many, many hundreds of long term tox , ^ 14 tests, that's probably the most innocuous material i 15 we ever tested. 16 I hate -- I know they'll holler PCBs. L* - 17 Let them holler. They're going to burn this soil f 18 out here in St. Louis, sure as God made green few 19 apples. They better crank that little dude up l 20 pretty high to be able to burn those chlorinated f 2 1 hydrocarbons out of there, but if they want to, 22 fine, it's done because it couldn't possibly hurt 1 23 anybody. * " 24 q . Now, is it your experience or can you 25 tell me, Mr. Garrett, is this how other TLVs have 149 1 been set historically? 2 A. In most TLV committees, and I've been i' 1 3 on a couple of them, you gather any information 4 you can from any kind of literature source, and if 5 you've got a lot of good buddies, you can get a 6 whole lot of them to look in some literature that r * 7 you don't normally have, particularly medical 8 literature that you don't maybe have access to, 9 particularly foreign medical journals which they r 10 don't really have. L 11 Most of their stuff is, if it's for 12 safety or health control reasons, it's in the 13 medical journals. 14 If you had somebody that could read i 15 French and read French journals regularly 16 or -- we had a man in Europe that did the German r 17 journals for us. 18 Get all this junk dumped into the m 19 committee, all these pieces and bits of 20 information, and then get a detailed tox study, r 21 which we did, detailed long term tox study, 22 lifetime term, and a whole mass of short terms in 23 various types of animals and all of this together, 24 it begins to look like probably it ought to be 25 thus and so, and then you begin haggling and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 150 arguing about it, and a bunch o people that are highly skilled and trained in this business -- and these are not hygienists. These are almost exclusively toxicologists that do this, maybe a medical doctor or two thrown in, and they come up with the answer. My personal opinion is they ve done one hell of a good job and, by the way, our TLVs are copied by everybody in the world. q . And the TLVs that ultimately get published by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, those are put forth as levels that it's believed that most workers won't suffer ill effects, not all workers, right? MR. FOGARTY: Objection, leading. A. Well, I don't know. I've never heard of a TLV in no one, and we certainly would never recommend and we recommend - many - any TLV that is in the area that even causes a symptom, whatever it is. We don't want that to happen. You don't have to have it happen today with modern equipment. 151 l You can't run a backyard chemical 2 plant anymore with a bunch of castoff kettles, and jv* 3 believe me there were a lot of those when I first 4 come into this business. You can't do that. 5 These things are in triple out -r 6 triple layered stainless steel containers with r - 7 everything running through multiple dials and i . 8 pressure guages, pressure drop guages, 9 concentration guages, and everything you can li 10 measure. L 11 It just doesn't make any sense to put 12 it out. If you can smell it, there's too much. PL--* 13 There's too much. j \_J 14 That was the old rule. That old rule | 15 had a hell of a lot of sense to it. It had a hell --j 16 of a lot of sense to it. L 17 Q. I'm sorry, I didn't understand. The 18 old rule being what? 19 A. The old rule, it used to be, the old 20 rule was if you can smell it it's too much. Hell, 21 you've heard that for God's sakes. Lord knows we 22 used it enough times in the old days. 23 That is not true. There is a lot of 24 stuff -- I mean that is probably as good as you L 25 can get, but you're going to get below that if y o u do these full tox studies, and we did them not only once but we did them more than once in a multitude of animals. We should have. We got shalalied enough about it. q . So what you're saying is the old rule was, if you can smell it, it's for sure too much, and - A. Or you could feel it, that's right. That's the old rule and it served fairly well. Not good enough by any stretch. Q. And now as things have progressed, the fact that you can't smell it is not good enough? A. Well, the old rule worked for toxic immediate effects, acute effects. It never would work for the subtle effects of long term exposure, no. And that's the reason we did the long term tests. If our own processes -- any time we manufactured a new chemical that we were going to market for whatever reason, we did the full tests and it's strange there are some we withdrew. We did not think they were -- we thought they were too toxic in some kinds of toxicity that might -- and we withdrew. They weren't that happy a compromise of the materials already on the market. Q . Getting back for a second to TLVs. The TLVs that were in effect in the 1950s and 1 9 6 0 s , it's pretty clearly stated, isn't it, that those TLVs were intended to protect most of the workers but not necessarily all the workers? A. Well, I never heard it put that way. I think -- I think in my company I'd have been fired if I'd have used that term at all. q . How is that, sir? A. Well, the old man wouldn't have it. You're going to protect all of my workers or you aren't going to protect -- or you're going to go _ we'll find somebody who can or we'll quit making it," and that's the way we worked. You'll find Kelly will tell you that tomorrow, I think. q . is that one of the reasons why you weren't satisfied just to meet a TLV, that you wanted 50 percent or even less? A. Well, we didn't even -- that -- you got to give yourself credit. Every safety margin -- look at the number of materials that you've seen through the years in your professional experience that have suddenly became more toxic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 154 because of some specific effect on some specific organ that took years to develop, and by that time you're too far into it to help some of them, so we didn't want to do that. We've always been pretty cautious. We, by the way, have our own toxicology groups at Monsanto that supervise all these studies. We do some of the toxic -- the acutes ourselves. We don't any more. We used to. We do -- now, these professional toxicologists do the supervisory work with the people that do the work. q __ if i understood what you were saying there, then because it's known that as more and more work gets done, new effects are discovered, and so the prudent thing to do, even though there's a TLV, is to minimize the exposure as much as you can -- A. Absolutely. q . -- because you never know when the new effects are going to come out? A. That is correct. MR. FOGARTY: Objection, leading, also mischaracterizing his testimony. MR. BLANK: Do you have some problem with leading an adverse witness? I mean is there 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 155 some wierd rules that you're working under that make that a reasonable objection? MR. FOGARTY: I don't think that this witness is an adverse witness. MR. BLANK: Oh, I forgot we sued Monsanto. Excuse me. It must be a mistake. THE WITNESS: Do you want me to go out while you fight? q . n o , sir. We're just trying to figure out why these unnecessary interruptions seem to be happening. A. Can you possibly hold it off for a minute so that we can have a -- a break to go to the john? q. A. Absolutely, sir. Okay. Please. MR. OLIVER: I object to the last side mark, too. MR. HOBSON: Which one, the "absolutely, sir"? (Temporary recess was held.) MS. FLATT: We're on record. q . Mr. Garrett, before our break we were somewhat into a discussion on TLVs, I think. You said that the concept of protecting most w o r k e r s 156 1 was something that you didn't think would go over 2 well at Monsanto. 5''1 h 3 MR. FOGARTY: Object to the 4 mischaracterization of the testimony. 5 Q. Well, tell me if that's wrong then. 6 A. That was right. I don't think that if i- 7 it's possible to determine the end effect, no L 8 effect level, that you don't do it. 9 Q. Okay. I'm not sure I understood what 10 you're saying. I don't want somebody else to say *"* 11 I mischaracterized it, so explain to me what you j ' 12 mean by that, please. L^, _ 13 A. If you can determine the no effect i 14 level of the material, whatever it takes, you 1 ' 15 should do it. That's my opinion. 16 Q. Can you tell me, talking about y i7 materials for which there are TLVs, are those no ^ 18 effect levels? 19 A. Many of them are. f' 1: 20 Q. How about asbestos? f 21 A. I don't know. I have nothing to do \fc< 22 with setting that standard. It was already on the books when I came around and we abided by it, so I B 23 2 4 don't really know about that. " 25 You might go back and check whoever r"5 L ii l-i l L. i ' L * \I \ 1-'y ' k r i 1 IP*' L 1 *? L t'"' f ti 157 l did it and find out what they did and how they did 2 it. 3 q , so you just wouldn't know one way or 4 the other -- 5 A. No. 6 q . -- whether asbestos was a no effect 7 level or not? 8 It's been set so long and been 9 practiced so many years that I didn t we just 10 didn't argue it. We used it and that served us 11 well, as far as I can surmount. 12 Q. Now, you were talking about the use of 13 PCBs and how Monsanto being the only U.S. 14 manufacturer, that you were involved in putting 15 PCBs on a TLV list. 16 Did you feel that at Monsanto that 17 you, in fact, did establish a no effect level for 18 PCBs? 19 A. Based on the years we had manufactured 20 it and the yearly physical exams of the men that 21 worked it for years and years, we think we 22 established a no effect level, yes. 23 q . And do you feel, Mr. Garrett, that 24 that's the manufacturer's responsibility to find a 25 no effect level if there is one? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 158 A- T h a t 's an onion I'd just as soon not bite into. I don't know how you mean by that. If a manufacturer does not help establish the standards of the materials that he's manufacturing that are going to expose someone else, I think they should help at least. q . And how would you advise today in your consulting practice a manufacturer to help set TLVs, find no effect levels? A. Well, if the r e is eno u g h literature m the tox or medical or industrial hygiene literature to establish - to show specific finite levels and their effect or no effect on workers, then it should be looked up, and it should be used in a judgment that goes behind all standards. We've judged wrong in some standards. Everybodaythas. tI ftVihiinnkx vyoouu'll fa.ind that looking at the records. Then I think whoever manufactured has the responsibility of taking these data and filling in the gaps with his own data and coming up with a summary that says thus and so is the case and that it is, as near as we can determine, a no effect level or whatever you want to determine. 159 q . And if there are gaps to be filled and i 2 the data doesn't exist should the manufacturer i 3 attempted to test to fill those gaps? 4 A. Yes, I think so. 5 q . Are there situations, Mr. Garrett, : 6 where it's just not possible to find a no effect 7 level for chemicals or for materials? L. 8 A. I guess you could say that a material 19 that is inherently a corrosive is probably going T" 10 to subcutaneously effect the skin of a human being L 11 in some ways. r 12 Now, your point is well made in that k<3*a 13 you're talking about where is the end of this ``s. J 14 affair going to -- where is it going to end up. | 15 There are ways of testing the very, very minute 16 effects of corrosives, for example, on skin. L 17 Your question is okay. If those 18 exceeding the minute effects, is that the one you r^a 19 want to set for your standard? If it's possible 20 to be set at the level that doesn't effect the 21 standard. Now, that's not always possible. I 22 won't buy that. 23 q . What about at -- 24 A. Let's look at petroleum, for example. 25 Let's look at the ordinary gasoline and what 160 1 happens to this from the flammability standpoint. 2 I mean you can't -- you've got to do a lot of 3 professional judgment has got to go into these 4 standards. 5 It just happens that in the case of 6 the PCBs, we couldn't find any effect at all. 7 q . in the case of materials that can 8 cause cancer, do you believe it's possible to find 9 a no effect level that will protect everyone? 10 A. Everyone? 11 Q. Yes, sir. 12 A. No. In my -- if this is a -- if this 13 is an active, reactive chemical that can cause 14 cancer, can you get a level that won't cause 15 cancer in anybody in the world? 16 I don't think you could do it by any 17 normal toxicological means and/or any of the 18 mathematical means of calculating the effect based 19 on the positives, negatives and nulls. I don't 20 think you can. So that you've got to -- again, you're 21 22 back on the judgment base, and everybody that 23 stands on the judgment base is going to get shot 24 at. So I don't know. 25 Q. Do you hold, Mr. Garrett, to the 161 1 opinion that workers should be told if they're * 2 working with materials that can cause cancer? r' 1 3 A. You damn right. . 4 Q. How long have you felt that way? And 5 I take it you feel that way fairly strongly. 6 A. At the number of lectures I've given r , 7 to worker groups at Monsanto and to other groups ` ' 8 at request, largely somebody requesting through 1'S some vice-president of Monsanto, X would say from N 9 r~- 10 day one that they should be told. i- 11 Now, they should have some good -- and \ 12 this is one of the biggest problems. You brought 13 the best one up that you can bring up, and that's :J 14 cancer. You've got to preeducate your people as 15 to what these levels mean and what they are. 16 For example, if you can create cancer V L with one molecule, I don't know how you'd ever 17 r? 18 prove it. 19 Second, if you can create cancer with |t 20 levels of way below the level that causes any f 2 1 other discernable effect, I don't know whether you L 2 2 could justify that because I don't think you'd H 23 ever develop a cancer enough to do it because m 2 4 cancer studies you've got to have more than one 2 5 because you'll have ideopathic stuff occur and, 162 1 boy, you certainly will in some of them damn 2 beasts that they breed for that. If you stomp on the floor, 11 percent 3 4 of them drop dead from something anyway, so it's a 5 difficult task. Your question is well asked. I 6 don't know the answer to it. I think that a good set of genuine 7 8 systemic toxicological studies is the base of all 9 this stuff. s 10 When you get through that, you find * i from a good set of diagnoses of the carcasses of 11 n 12 what -- the effect it had. If the beast died, b what did he die of? An enlarged liver? A ripped 13 14 out esophagus or what? f! 15 And then back off from that situation 16 and find out where the target probably is for that *- particular material, and you'd be surprised l 17 18 incidently by what the targets are. p bm 19 And then from that point try to evaluate it -- first, evaluate whether it's needed 6 20 F 21 or not. If it isn't needed, don't make it. 22 And believe me, the chemical 23 companies, most of them that I know, have turned 1 24 down literally thousands of materials that people 1" i_; 25 want them to make. I know we have, Monsanto. rn H Lt y >- f !' L_: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 163 Many, many, many times we've turned them down. "Will you make this for us? "No, you dummy. Make it yourself, because it's going to be highly hazardous, and even the raw materials will cause cancer. "No, we're not going to make it for you. Why should we do it? It would be foolish and would endanger our employees. I don't know whether we really realize how much good, trained employees mean to a manufacturing company, and you frighten one of them in a processing unit and you got beau-coup troubles in that processing unit. You may never meet quality again. You just can't do it. And Monsanto -- and most companies I know that I dealt with deep -- in very great depth, and this would probably be Dupont and Dow and some others, some of the good petroleum companies, Phillips, the Standard Oil groups, and I've dealt with both their - back when they did have a South American deal, I even dealt with those people. The point I'm trying to make is there's a word called prudent, and, boy, everybody in this business, whether it's safety, industri hygiene, occupational medicine, toxicology or whatever, it damn sure better understand what is prudent and what it means. q . What's it mean to you, sir? A. Is it prudent to manufacture? Do you make enough money to pay for the corpses? The answer is no, nobody makes that much money. So that's not prudent. That isn't even smart. Getting down below the smart level, is it prudent to run the risk? Evaluating risk is an exceedingly difficult task unless you've got a hell of a lot of data that shows what happened when something did go wrong, and you almost never have that. I think good prudence in the minds of good, industrial, medical personnel is probably good enough. At least it's been my experience. Now, you can't grab these things out of the air. Boy, they -- and oddly enough, some of the old TLVs probably were grabbed out of the air. They have come -- they have been grabbed out of the air with experience and some of them have played the same game. They have turned out to be prudent standards. 165 i Setting standards is my idea of 2 running in a three wheel car. I don't think r;;i ` -i 3 you're going to get there without at least some 4 accidents. You're going to drag that wheel 5 somewhere. It just isn't possible to do it. 1 6 t t You can run down to the -- as low as r 7 you can go and you've got to run two years in 8 rats, and then you find out nothing happened or 9 that something did happen. What are you going to 1 10 do, go back another two years on another? That's m-- L 11 the only way to do it unless you're spread and, 12 boy, you don't know. 13 The other thing that fouls you up is 1 14 the differences in the toxic manifestation at i 15 different levels. 16 Hell, at one level it kills you li 17 because it blows out your respiratory system, and 18 down here much lower it kills you for something f L 19 else. We better know that, too. That's also 1 20 prudence in testing. ar 21 The other thing is to be prudent is L 22 into the prudent equation requires the how are | 23 they going to use it and how are they going to 24 make it? ir ~ 25 How much personal contact can be had 166 r i in the manufacturing and can you eliminate that in i . 2 the proper manufacturing? Comes under the prudent fii 3 argument. ! 4 No, I -- when we had anything to say 5 about it, and we had a lot to say about it from 6 time to time -- by the way, we didn't make a whole [i r- 7 lot of people happy sometimes either, but if the L 8 industrial hygiene or industrial physicianist [! 9 thinks he's going to make his boss happy all the 10 time, he's crazy. He's not going to function. r\~- L 11 It's tough to go into a big meeting p 12 where we're going to manufacture Alpha Baloney A, 13 and it's going to solve the world's problems, and \ - 14 you walk in and say, "No." j 15 il 16 Boy, I've done it. I know. "What do you mean?" L 17 18 "Peace." And then we start that scare business. 19 How would you like to have cancer? How many times |j 20 you been asked that? I wouldn't like to ever have r 21 it. Anybody'd be an idiot that would. 22 So the answer is use good data, use E 23 prudence, use experience, and believe it or not, r 24 sometimes you might be wrong. 25 MR. OLIVER: Objection, nonresponsive. i. J r L i y 167 1 Q. Is it best to - 2 A. What is that babbling going on down 3 there? 4 q . I think you've identified it, sir. 5 A. Okay. 6 q . Is it also prudence that, in 7 considering what steps to take, that one should 8 error on the side of caution when possible? 9 MR. FOGARTY: Objection, leading. 10 A. Probably. I think what you need to do 11 is assemble all the data you've got, all the data 12 anybody else has got, and you know as well as I do 13 within the chemical industry or within the 14 petroleum industry you can probably pretty well 15 get the data. 16 I don't think -- we never have held it 17 up from anybody. We've sent bundles -- used to 18 send -- if you had a regular bundle and PCB must 19 have been that thick, and we got questions from 20 Denmark and all over the world. 21 We sent them a bundle and let them put 22 their prudence in motion. There used to be an old 23 statement -- how did it go? In the mind s a 24 p r u d e n t m a n thus and so. Okay. 25 If p r u d e n c e d o e s n ' t p l a y a p a r t in it, 168 1 I don't think we know from half the things we use 2 now. We've got enormous experience with them. We 3 don't know how much because nobody's ever touched 4 that subject to find out how many hours of work 5 hours have been assembled. 6 We've been doing that to -- in some of 7 the newer chemicals, and the number of working t , 8 hours that are assembled become immense in a big 9 operation where you've got a big maintenance group 10 and a big production group and a big handling in 11 your handling and packaging group. It's an 12 enormous number of hours. I don't think anybody i 13 ever realized that before. I 14 We did some at our Chocolate Bayou 15 plant. We were running -- what did we do? How 16 many people get it? How many hours of exposures? ii 17 Exposures, ran unto the zillions of hours. 18 Did we get anybody hurt? Okay. You 19 go through the medical records. You go through 20 the records of your dispensary. You go see your 21 safety people. You go through your hygiene and 22 occupational medical people if you've got them. 23 And you find out together, no, we've 24 had no problems. We got fourteen million man I" 2L) 25 hours of work in with no problems develop. All right. The equation now is beginning to solve some of the prudence that s needed. Frequently, we can't do that. What are you going to do about that same manufacturing before you started it? There's where the problem comes in. I don't know how to solve it. We did what we thought -- we would put our own sons to manufacture. That's the best standard I've ever known. Would that be where you'd let your own kid do it? q . xf you were assembling the literature on a particular material that already had a TLV established and you found an exposure reported in the published literature that was below the TLV and associated with that exposure there was disease, what would that mean to you? A. If you could -- if you could establish that, in fact, that was true, that the standards should be changed. Q. Would it at least be a red flag to you to pay more attention? A. It would be a red flag to your prudence, it certainly would. But the trouble with that is how many pieces of data have you seen |kq D p :i~/ B L k e 170 1 that contain sufficient safeguards to be accurate 2 and honest? I don't know. I'm asking you because 3 I don't know. 4 Q. The prudent thing to do, though, would 5 be at least to pay attention to that and 6 A. I would think so, yes. 7 q . -- and further work would be indicated 8 then to establish whether or not that TLV is 9 variable? 10 If it's possible or if the further 11 work wouldn't do anything more than duplicate 12 what's already been done because you're talking 13 two years at least and probably more than that if 14 you're looking at exposure to dust. 15 Q. And if you're talking about looking at 16 exposures to human populations, you may be looking 17 at a working lifetime before you know the answer? 18 A. You may also be looking at a 19 population that has a certain level of exposure 20 significantly as -- by simply being alive, 21 particularly in cities. 22 Have you ever done any of these 23 curbside tests? 24 Q. (Nodding head.) 25 A. Oh, boy. You can find anything at the 171 i curbside. You've got a product. How did it get 2 there? I haven't the vaguest damn notion how some 3 of them got there. 4 Some complicated organic identifiable 5 chemicals can be obtained on the corner of a busy ! 6 street corner. How did they get there? X don t f " 7 know. They're there. i i 8 It's from the combustion of gasoline fl 9 at various levels of auto maintenance, various r 10 heats of engine, various slides of tires, skidding L 11 tires, and all the rest of the crap in the world, j' 12 including asbestos from fading brake shoes. So X *"* 13 don't know. 14 From the standpoint of intelligent i : 15 prudent people, you've got to set some kind of *- - 16 method of doing this or quit manufacturing y 17 anything. F 18 Okay. If you decide not to do that, L.; 19 then you're going to have to make some kind of 1 20 planned approach to these things and at some point r 21 in the data collection time you're going to have t. 22 to say "The data looks like it's okay, so we'll do E 23 it or we won't do it." That's my only way. I 24 don't know any other way to do it. \L'j 25 Now, if you find out, as you pointed 172 l out, that that selection is not doing the job, 2 then it should be reevaluated, but you better have S| 3 some damn good substantiated data. 4 Q. Is what you're saying, Mr. Garrett, is 5 it before a professional industrial hygienist 1: 6 ought to think about recommending a TLV be 1 - r 7 changed, that you have to have very well 8 substantiated data to make the challenge? 9 A. Oh, that depth -- that would be r 10 difficult to make a good answer to that. If I Lf_i 11 were in a -- if I were working with something that 1 12 would cause end -- untreatable and noncorrectable 13 disablement, I wouldn't use any. You couldn't do ) ^ 14 it at all. j 15 You'd have to use a triple standard. u*- 16 You'd have to use your own judgment, the data you L 17 see, your own experience with materials of similar m 18 type, and a good deal of trained prudence. L 19 Q. So the higher the risk of use of the t 20 product and the more likely that outcome can't be JF- 21 reversed, the more careful you have to be in using s k; 22 the product? l 23 24 i- 25 MR. OLIVER: Objection, leading. q . Is that right? A. Now, in the -- during the war the 173 1 government made people manufacture things that 2 were just plain hazardous. I'm sorry, but they 3 were just plain hazardous. I don't know. Was 4 that right? I don't think so, but they did it. 5 We -- they manufactured more gasses 6 that you couldn't -- you can't manufacture without 7 some problems. But like we always said, somebody l , 8 had to whip them, and with fifteen minutes and 9 another peanut gun, they could have whipped us. 10 q . In looking at the setting of threshold T" L 11 limit values or permissible exposure levels that 12 you would recommend as a professional industrial iiili 13 hygienist, if we're talking about a material that 14 can cause cancer, would it be prudent that no i - 15 matter what number is attached to that material, 16 that workers still be told that this can cause L 17 cancer? 18 A. If the prudent -- if the material r^> 19 were -- if all the data were plain and 20 unobstructed, unobstructed by normal f 21 circumstances, okay? What is the man normally 22 exposed to in his everyday life? 23 You can't stop some exposures. You 24 just can't. It's a part -- unless you stopped us L-: 25 from using automobiles and stop from using airplanes and everything else. You can't. Now, I don't know who went through those prudent exercises, but somebody did. I don't know. I know one thing, that if the stuff if you've got clean and clear enough data, unobstructed by other effects, unobstructed by other materials, and that justify lowering the PLY, it ought to be lowered. Q. In dealing with asbestos today, is there a no effect level that you can tell us for asbestos-causing cancers? A. There's levels that you cannot get any identifiable results from in animals, but is that what -- is that going to emulate anything else? I don't know. But there are levels starting at zero, if you can find zero, where things don't create problems, and you can actually back into or go up to levels that are harmful -- that knowledgeably are harmful. I think the other problem connected with this material is that a trained person it depends on who's going to be using it. I certainly wouldn't put many of the things that we 175 1 have -- we sell today that have satisfactory limit 2 values, I wouldn't put them into households as ;:?)n 3 such, but in the hands of experienced and trained 4 and prudent people, I don't in manufacturing, I 5 don't think there's a problem. 6 q . In looking -- P 7 A. So you -- you're really in a bad ball L- 8 game here. You -- should you stop the manufacture 9 and use of any product, any product, that under 10 any set of circumstances and any test, one test, r l 11 should you do that? 12 I think you'd be out of business 13 completely. You'd probably be wondering around 14 with a club in your hand. {I 15 q # in your career at Monsanto, was there 16 ever a time when you thought or you believed > 17 someone at Monsanto had a no effect level for 18 asbestos exposure? 19 A. I never saw any effect, and by the 20 way, we did lung screens on lots of workers. I 21 never saw any effect that I thought asbestos 22 created using threshold limit values, at least in 23 the latter years. 24 I don't -- I haven't seen any in the T L 25 earlier years when it was higher, but I h a v e n ' t 'I * n r {. 1 i > L V i, .V/ 1 L r f L ? - 176 i seen any. Now, that doesn't mean, as it doesn't 2 in the case of our PCBs, doesn't include everybody 3 and under every circumstance, as far as I know. I 4 don't know. 5 No, I think you could -- you could 6 my problem is are you -- are we going to use this 7 standard for lawsuits or are we going to use this 8 standard for the health of workers in plants that 9 have full medical facilities and so forth? 10 I don't know whether that's even a 11 relevant question or not. 12 q . But what I'm really trying to find, 13 Mr. Garrett, is was there a time when you felt 14 while you were a Monsanto employee or that you 15 were aware someone else in Monsanto had an 16 established no effect level for asbestos where you 17 could go and say "This is the level for asbestos 18 exposure below which no one will get disease"? 19 A. You know, it's funny. We use the TLV 20 for asbestos and I never had any arguments about 21 it or any arguments with it. 22 No, I don't think it ever created any 23 problems that we know of. Please, believe me, 24 w e ' r e a chemical company. We have about sixty, 25 seventy thousand workers. 177 1 Most of them are exposed to insulation 2 materials of one kind or another because they're in A 3 close by and you've got wind blowing over 4 insulated material and what there is. 5 We can find asbestos by analysis 6 anywhere. I can find it in your street corner in 7 pretty heavy concentrations if you've got a stop 8 sign there, stop light there. 9 Q. But were you able to convince yourself 10 or to tell others that at this level there will be V L 11 no effect from asbestos while you're a Monsanto 12 employee? 13 A. I thought that the TLV establishment 14 system was sufficiently armoured with protection 15 that the chances that a person was going to get 16 any problem from that level of asbestos, if you 17 could analyze it, and it was a continuous level, I 18 would -- I don't know. 19 I don't think we've ever seen 20 anything. We've done the same with a lot of other 21 materials that are very toxic. We've set 22 standards on those, and I don't know if we had 23 twenty-four hour exposure. r 24 That's the other problem we faced 25 always. If you had twenty-four hour exposure to highly toxic substances, I don't know. Q. So if I hear what you're telling me then, and tell me if it's wrong, Mr. Garrett, you're saying that for asbestos while you were at Monsanto, you believe the threshold limit value as it was then set was the no effect level? A. No, I thought that was the -- a good, safe standard. Now, no effect level is a term that is extremely difficult to define and probably is not ever obtainable in any case, so I would say that I thought it was a safe level for our workers, yes. Q. But you at Monsanto, even as far back as the 1950s, still chose to control asbestos exposures well below the threshold limit value? A. We chose to control them and we didn't really sample that much, but, yes, they were below the threshold limit value because we took care. I think anybody -- we -- but that's nothing. We did the same thing with other levels. Any time we even approached the TLV level in concentration of certain material, we'd press the rush button. We would do it for asbestos. It just -- it's one of these things. You set a standard. I know. We've set some 179 1 standards and I -- you know, you wonder in your 2 own mind, hey, if you've got the right guy at the 3 right time with the right weaknesses in his organ 4 system that you don't know of and he doesn't 5 either and you feed him this stuff at this level, 6 is it not going to do any harm? I don't know. 7 The answer is we've done the best we 8 know how and we've done it with beasts and it 9 hadn't hurt them, so we don't think it's going to 10 hurt you. 11 And our records have been -- are very 12 excellent following that premise. 13 Q. If you would have been working with a 14 threshold limit value for asbestos of 5 million 15 particles per cubic foot back in the 1950s and 16 would have gone out and done measurements and 17 found say 4 . 5 million particles per cubic foot -- 18 A. I'd start coasting -- I'd tell them to 19 start coasting back, start cutting her back. 20 Q. What do you mean by that? 21 A. Their effect -- their exposure's 22 coming from something. The pipe, it's either 23 going out the pipe or it's going off their tables 24 or somewhere. 25 Put a l i t t l e m o r e c o n t r o l in. T h a t 's !1 -w i: r L' j;j P L L. _ -P' ! L i L m L F E! , L 180 1 getting too close. 2 Q. You would not be content that close 3 to -- 4 A. Not when they're approaching the TLV 5 in a material that can cause lung diseases of fatal termination, no. I'm not going to do that. 6 I'd have them raise the stack level or 7 8 do something immediate or shut the bloody thing 9 down. And that's going to be one hard thing to 10 do. ii It's difficult. You're talking about 12 useful materials and very, very tight limits where 13 people are exposed in very, very different ways, 14 and we're doing that in everyone. 15 How -- we don't know what people -- 16 how people are going to use materials. We give 17 them a TLV that we think is correct. We have no is idea how they're going to use it. They may be 19 bathing people up to their necks in the damn 20 stuff. We don't know. Now, how far can you go with a 21 2 2 customer -- let me answer you this question. How 23 far can you go with your customers in interfering 24 in their business, because that's what they think 2 5 it is . r~a to o ' l r 1' Ht. , iy' P L i Li f? U r | ^ 181 1 Q. Of course, you have the option not to 2 sell to them which you said you've done. 3 A. Of course you do, and you find this 4 out after you make -- you build a big plant to 5 provide a couple of customers and you find out 6 those customers are that way, and what do you do? 7 I don't know. 8 If you can demonstrate there's a 9 reasonable hazard there, I think you should shut 10 the two plants down. 11 The point is, are you looking at 12 twenty-four hour samples? Are you looking at 13 twelve to eight hour samples? Are you looking at 14 what? 15 What about the guy that double shifts? 16 We always run that problem past you. We've had I7 every guestion you can imagine asked, particularly 18 by the federal people. 19 What happens if the guy is working a double shift? Well, how often does he work a double shift? I don't know, you know. That's a 21 22 good point. 23 In the manufacture of chlorinated nitrated organic chemicals where you do have a 24 25 tit of a tendency if you build beyond certain levels of some internal problems, do we shut the damn thing down or what? I don't know. We've never had anybody we thought were hurt -- was hurt. That's a bad that s a -- the starting point only in setting examples. Only the starting point. We've been making this stuff for forty years, never hurt anybody. How do they know? Have they looked at the kids in schools? Have they looked at the birth rates? Are they down? Have they looked at the general viability of the fetuses born in their particular area? Heaven's knows. There are a lot of things you can do that TLVs should reflect on and do more and more and more, and I think it's a great idea. We did a survey with OSHA at East St. Louis. We did it in the community. Just the community in the area of several chemical plants, including our big Krummrich plant and they we went out and got the birth records and the still birth records and the records showing what occurred to the degree that you could match them. Now, you're talking a hundred thousand people which you're playing games with five 183 1 hundred of them, and it's difficult to draw any l 2 conclusion, but the conclusions that we drew were 3 it was a reasonably healthy community. f 4 OSHA themselves told us we can show 5 you a lot unhealthier ones and some healthier I 6 ones. So I don't know. 7 My personal opinion is if you can show t 8 me that there is a genuine risk in connection with 9 the use of any prpduct at the levels and you know r 10 that that -- those exposures are at the levels or IL 11 below the levels you say they are, then I think 12 they ought to change it. 13 Q. Let me ask you the flip side of that, 14 Mr. Garrett. For the threshold limit value for 15 asbestos that existed in the 1950s and early '60s, 16 do you believe that there should have been the 17 same pure, clear, conclusive data to establish the 18 TLV as you would need to change it? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Do you know if, in fact, there was r'"3*! 21 that kind of pure, clear, conclusive data? 22 A. Well, you've got to go back and look 23 at the levels and what they -- the levels are a 24 damn difficult job. You're talking fibers. 25 You're talking bits. You're talking the damndest 184 1 things to measure there is in God's green earth 2 accurately. 3 I wish they'd do it on gravimetric 4 levels. That's my personal opinion. 5 God, we've -- what kind of -- are you 6 going to measure -- how about this size asbestos 7 particle? Is that one in the count? 8 I'd rather see it in a gravimetric 9 way, I'm sorry. Sure you're going to say, "Well, 10 all you got to do is get -- inhale a rock." Okay. 11 If he inhales a rock, he's probably going to hurt 12 himself anyway. 13 The point I'm trying to make is what 14 is the best and most prudent thing to use to 15 protect the most people and all the people if 16 possible, or guit using the damn stuff. That's my 17 opinion. 18 Q. I take it from your comments then you 19 were certainly personally aware of problems that 20 were inherent in doing these dust counts when it 21 came to asbestos? 22 A. Oh, yes. I've dust counted with that 23 damn Bausch & Lomb contraption. It gives you an 24 answer, invariably wrong, but that's beside the 25 point. 185 1 It's an answer and you can write it 2 down. And you take the hemacytometer and take a r> ;i 3 bunch of damn dust into a liquid medium and 4 measure it in there and it conglomerates or 5 associates and you've got a whole flock of crap. 6 It's not easy to do. That's why . 7 people in this trade get bald, like you are, and 8 I'm rapidly getting there just trying to figure i 9 out what the hell you can do to better, better . i r ~ 10 operate the system for all workers. t* 11 You don't kid yourself. Chemical r 12 workers and people that plaster with this are not ,, 13 the only workers at risk. Everybody's at risk. 14 I think if we got rid of automobiles, i 15 we'd get rid of most of the bad things in this 16 country anyway, but I'd have to get rid of my is Li 17 T-bird. What the hell, I don't want to do that. P 18 So there you are. 19 I think that when you start out -- and we started out with some of ours, we set the first CO o standards. We did just about as much as we could r 21 ^ 2 2 and we backpeddled. We'll take one-tenth of this and so forth. It's as good a way as I know of to | 23 24 do it even now. ^ 25 You have a material that caused an C*-", . . rjrt |!|j m s il p i J,j n L n ; r' L P L r > 1 ri> &v> *7 186 1 acute intoxication which upon continuance over a 2 few minutes is going to cause death, that's where 3 you start with. 4 Now, how -- you back off from there. 5 Where do you stop? In any case. I don't give a damn if it causes cancer or causes your toe nails 6 7 to turn backwards, where do you stop? 8 And in a manufacturing handling 9 operation, they're only there eight hours usually 10 and you hope they get to go into a environment ii that's a little less hazardous or potentially 1 2 hazardous, so I don't know. I don't know how to 13 do it. 14 I can say this, we've been doing very 15 well in the American chemical industry with the 16 standards, as we set them, with all their faults. 17 Q. And from time to time when the wrong 18 standard was set and information came to light 19 that there were new biological effects -- 20 A. There were recommendations for change, and most of them were changed if that -- if those 21 22 data could be duplicated. 23 Q. And for someone to know if these 24 biological effects, the new ones, are happening, 25 someone has to be looking, correct? fl , . ' i , . ` |j T<j~ L j : L.A ! -/ ! % ' L m fsc r Ii r L B i U 187 1 A. Yes, but I think you'll find in most 2 health is one of the most expensive products 3 most expensive states of mind you can pay for in 4 modern day manufacturing. If you don't believe 5 that, go ask your insurance people. 6 So you're going to do -- you've got to 7 rule out the people who have certain kinds of 8 let's say you're looking at a respiratory irritant, okay? You've got to rule out people 10 that have got tuberculosis, people that in the war ii somebody shot one of their lungs out, they only 12 got one pump. Do you do this? Do you know who 13 they are? Do you have any concept of who does 14 have that? 1 5 Who's a pulmonary cripple in an area 16 where you're looking at pulmonary effect? It s 17 hard. It's hard. And I think the people in the is threshold limit committees have done a marvelous 19 job with what they've had to do with and have made 20 the changes necessary through the years where 21 there's a sufficient data to justify them. 22 That's what I think, and God knows, if it weren't true, I don't know how many Monsanto 23 24 people would be dead right now. 25 Q. What would be your thoughts, Mr. r I'l , i r t . \i i . r~ ^ L~* _ [*J S " L R ] L; l r H -- 188 1 Garrett, about a company that would have some 2 data, be it laboratory animal data or human data, 3 that could possibly contradict a threshold limit 4 value and they not send it in to the committees to 5 be set? A. Produce it. 6 Q. I'm sorry? 7 8 A. Produce, publish it, and get it in the 9 literature and it will then immediately go into 10 the committees. 11 Q. What would be your impression of a 12 company, instead of doing that, sending it in and 13 publishing it, would hold it back and let people 14 to continue to use a TLV that would have the 15 that they'd have questions about? 16 MR. OLIVER: Objection, calls for 1 7 speculation. Incomplete hypothetical. 18 A. I don't know. My enthusiasm for it 19 would be less than zero, but I don't know what you 20 could do about it. 21 If you knew the data, had it -- had it 22 correctly obtained, did it with proper testing and backing, you could publish it yourself, I suppose. 23 24 You'd probably get shot, but that's beside the 25 point. Many of us are going to get shot one of 189 1 these days anyway. 2 MR. OLIVER: Objection, nonresponsive. ; | 3 A. All right. We have had first class 4 excellent luck with TLVs, and believe me, we don't 5 just make asbestos. We make -- we had at one time ! 6 over eleven hundred materials that Monsanto 7 manufactured. r L. 8 God bless them, they quit making a lot P9 of that small crap, had small unit -- U 10 manufacturing units that made buckets full of f --i L 11 stuff for people. r 12 Now, I suppose we probably have 13 sixteen or seventeen hundred problems that you 14 would make sure that you were not messing with or \ 15 that your people were not being exposed to i . 16 excessive amounts of, or that people with certain t ' L 17 kinds of -- of physiological ailments were not 18 messing with. f L 19 That's another thing that we didn't 20 put into this equation, and that is what do you do 1 21 with a guy that has a problem -- a liver problem? r* % L 22 You can't fire him. You can't do it 1 23 by law. You hired him, and if you didn't properly 24 test him or physically examine him to start with, r a- 25 you got him on your rolls. What do you do with 190 1 those kind of people? I don't know. Frankly, I don't know what you do. '"! 3 You try to move them around in the , - 4 plant. First thing you know they end up as the 1 5 guard at the gate, and we got some guards at the 0 6 gate in our company, too. 7 P Q. I take it from something you said ` ; 8 earlier that you would be critical of someone who 1:1 9 said "We've been making this product for forty 10 years and we've never found a problem," if they've H Li ii never looked to see if there were problems. n 12 A. But of course not, because they L _ 13 haven't found a problem. If they haven't looked, j 14 they don't know whether there's a problem there or | ' 15 not. They wouldn't know what a problem looked H like if it came to them. y 17 We do -- a good industrial hygienist L is not going to allow that to happen. He's going f* 18 V 19 to say "Hey, we looked. If we don't look, I go E 20 somewhere else and look because I'm not going to r 21 be a party to this kind of nonsense. I'm not A 22 going to be a party to that kind of business." 1 23 Hell, you might just as well put him in the electric chair and say electricity doesn't , 24 U 25 hurt him, or better yet, I got a better excuse.  N ! , 1 ' 1 rj- i ! l . L P ito. E f, &?S jj r^ 191 1 He did it himself. He pushed the wrong switch. 2 No thanks. 3 I don't think we have in our -- you're 4 asking my experience base. We've never messed 5 we've never had any occasion in Monsanto that I 6 know of to criticize the TLV on asbestos, so to 7 talk to you about that, it really is not quite 8 fair. 9 Q. Well -- and I don't want to be unfair 10 with you, Mr. Garrett -- 11 A. Oh, I know. 12 q . -- at all. I was under the 13 impression, though, that at the Springfield 14 Massachusetts, plant that Monsanto had found cases 15 of asbestos disease. 16 Do you know anything about that at 17 all? 18 A. Not to my knowledge. If they have, I 19 do not know. It happened either before me or 20 after me. If they did in -- in the old long term 21 employees, I don't know. I don't know how they 22 would. They haven't handled it for so many years. 23 Q. I understand that Monsanto even went 2 4 back and did medical evaluations of people who had 25 retired that had worked in that operation. li!111" T'\ f ' ! . r-- \ ! ? i. i li r lui V __ ! oJ? ! . * XL r L 1 rt i :i! Li 192 1 A. We've done that several times. We 2 id -- on many other things. We did when we did 3 the TLV work on -- when we did the work on - 4 that's a customary project. 5 If you've got a company town, and 6 Springfield certainly is a company town, but a 7 better one is East St. Louis, Illinois, or that 8 immediate area, we found that 84 percent of our 9 employees at the East St. Louis plant and the 10 retirees lived within fourteen miles of the plant, 11 I think. 12 And we went back and checked the 13 health of many of those people in connection with 14 the problems on PCBs and on some of the 15 chloroanilines, some of the nitroanilines, we went 16 back and check6 d their health, and also with their 17 permission, and most of them gave us their 18 permission. 19 We had a few that didn't, and we 20 stirred up a couple of court cases out of it, as 21 you can easily imagine. And we -- we went back 22 and checked with their physician in connection 23 with problems connected with their health. 24 The thing that surprised me is our 25 epidemiological work that OSHA did not like at Cf 193 1 all. We did all of East St. Louis and all of the 2 manufacturing people separate, and it indicated 3 that without doubt you were healthier if you 4 worked at Monsanto, two or three other big 5 companies, than if you didn't work at all if you 6 lived in that area. 7 Now, these are obviously eschewed data 8 from where you're looking for something and get 9 something for free. Every time you get it, you 10 know damn well it isn't any good, but it's true. 11 The actual data -- because we had 12 very, very detailed health data done over a three 13 year period by OSHA on the people that lived in 14 that area and then we did our employees 15 separately, and they accepted it. It was by their 16 standards. 17 And they came up with that, well, we 18 know people that work always were healthier people 19 that don't work. Well, I think that is probably a 20 truism. 21 Now, a truism is something that's true 22 as long as you believe it. So I don't know. 23 Q. But as far -- 24 A. My personal opinion is that in our 25 c a s e w e ' v e n e v e r had a p r o b l e m w i t h the T L V s if 194 1 they were genuinely, genuinely followed. *2 3 1 3 q . Of course, at Spring A. We've had some awful problems trying to put __ noise is probably the worst thing that 4 5 I've ever tried to check out. : 6 When you find out how many people shoot guns and shoot skeet and ride around in a F ^ 7 j motor boat without any - that sounds like a damn 8 0 9 net taking off by the hour on every weekend fishing, I don't know how you then come back with 10 the records of what noise they encounter in the 11 i* 12 plant has to do with their total hearing acuity at 13 age sixty or seventy or eighty or whatever. J 14 It's difficult to do. q . But as far as M o n s a n t o going back and 15 16 looking at any retirees from the Springfield Massachusetts plant for asbestos disease, you y 17 m 18 really don't know anything about that? A . i'm sure they hav e it, if someone's 19 ?" said that and produced any data to indicate that t 20 2 1 We've gone back and chec ked the Spr in gfie ld 22 employees for other things. q . But you don't know personally about 23 24 any of the asbestos? A. No, not about anything done for 25 : p;. 1 ? j,j i-- i . 1 0 fl LJ-^ p iIPi. | ' ii !! B r 1 | ^ L j* 195 1 asbestosis -- asbestosis or any evidence of lung 2 engagement -- involvement in that. No. 3 Now, the problem I face I think 4 probably every day and the problem everybody else 5 faces is do you -- what effect does coirritants 6 have on things? 7 And that -- I suppose liquor is the 8 biggest problem with that. What does it do? Does it solubilize materials that are not otherwise 9 10 soluable or increase the solubility or absorption? ii Interesting question, isn't it? 12 Q. Yes, sir. 13 A. Do you have any idea how much liquor 14 is drank by the employees of the average Monsanto 15 chemical plant? A hell of a lot. Some of which 16 they make in their own backyard. 17 The point I'm trying to make is I don't know how you can -- how you can say that 18 19 this is what they got, this is what they're 20 exposed to, because we tested them while they were 21 at work. 22 Q. You say you don't know how you can say 23 that? 24 A. No, I r e a l l y don't. We d o say it. 25 D o n ' t -- I d i d n ' t say w e d i d n ' t say it. I sa i d I 196 1 don't know how you can say it and be completely 2 honest with yourself. 3 Noise exposure, for example, is a good f - 4 example. Any dust exposure. Where in the world 5 do you suppose they could not get dust? At home? 6 You got to be kidding. r ^ 7 That's my problem. And this is true 8 honestly of a lot of things. There are a lot of 9 other material, believe it or not, that they're 10 exposed to. Caustics, for example, particularly f L. 11 in the wintertime. 12 q . I guess what I'm hearing you say, Mr. 13 Garrett, is that it's really almost impossible to 14 know what workers are exposed to? 15 A. To positively demonstrate toxicology 16 or any toxic effect on anything except those Li 17 things that are so unique they will not experience 18 involvement with them in anything except their 19 work, and where can you do that? 20 In the PCBs we were in -- we were home r 21 clean because there was no way they were going to 22 have that stuff in their normal every day affair, 23 but when you start messing with dust, we started 24 trying to mess with alcohol. I mean you're 25 kidding yourself. 197 1 q . So if you've got these epidemiological 2 studies of workers and they're exposed to dust and 3 they're exposed to things at home and alcohol that 4 they drink and then they -- you look at their 5 health experience, it's just almost impossible to 6 say what anything causes or doesn't cause? 7 A. Unless there's a unique circumstance 8 that recurs physiologically, then you might. 9 Q. Something like mesothelioma asbestos? 10 A. Could be. Certainly mesothelioma 11 would. Asbestosis in itself, I don't know. You 12 can -- that just -- ordinary tracing of the lungs 13 in the picture, I'm not sure you could really 14 prove that's asbestos, but, boy, when you get down 15 to mesothelioma, you're down to a -- pretty close 16 to specific that I know of. L. 17 I've never seen one. We've seen lung 18 cancer, incidently. All of lung cancer, not w L 19 necessarily mesothelioma, by any mess of the ri 20 means. As a matter of fact, the commonest lung V' 21 cancer is not mesothelioma. 22 q . Would it be accurate to say, Mr. 1 23 Garrett, based on your experience as an industrial 24 hygienist, that once you get asbestos fibers into -- 25 the air that are of the particle size that can be 198 1 breathed into the lungs, that that asbestos fiber 2 tends to stay airborne? 3 A. In those levels at which we test for 4 as respirable sizes, probably right. Probably 5 very little movement of the air mass would not S 6 keep them lofted. That's my personal opinion. 7 Anything -- I don't know. It depends. 8 Anything above certain levels, I suspect would 9 drop eventually and a lot of asbestos will occlude 10 to other materials in the atmosphere and drop out. I* 11 So will a lot of other fibers, by the n 12 ay. These fibers like manufacturing silk or 13 manufacturing nylon, yarns and stuff, we have a 14 lot of fiber problems, and we've ventilated 15 ventilate those machines so that we try to 16 backvent them to get away from the workers' mouth u 17 and nose. 18 We have a problem with people shutting r*n BF7! r'-^a 19 them off once in a while. That's a nit-wit to do 20 that. You know, this is a person asking for 21 something that he wouldn't like when he gets it. 22 I don't know. I think the average 23 American worker, average American worker, is 24 probably as healthy as any in the world, and the 25 records show in -- that most of the time at least 199 1 the TLVs are sufficiently severe for an eight hour 2 day. '! 3 Now, you work back -- you can always * 4 question this because how many people double 5 shift, how many people don't have days working and 6 how many factories are there in little countries 7 where they can work all day and all night, too? 8 Second, where you can always find { i 9 places where there are materials handled that are Lj r 10 not normally handled- in commerce that are Li n hazardous that nobody knows about or cares about V 12 that can create troubles. 13 tX r+.nwivnK fuvnilbc _-lic0= wwhnaatu ayrew ithe cwuxrsnt ,J 14 OSHA. I think it was grown because of negligence t 15 on the part of a few, but I think it was caused. L _ 16 We don't -- it's the most difficult b 1 7 damn thing in the world to mess with a blend of materials, inorganics or organics, don't make any ^ 1189 difference. 20 What effect does each of them have? f 23. What is the cumulative effect of five different L 22 organic ornate compounds, for example? Are they | 23 the same? r - 24 No, they're not the same because ^ 25 they've got different molecular diameters or * h 200 1 radii, if you wish. So they can get into places 2 that the others cannot. 3 Some of these compounds are so damn 4 big it's a wonder you can get them in your nose 5 even, so I don't know. You asked a question I 6 don't know how to answer. 7 All I know is that in our own 8 experience, we have worked on the TLV base, and 9 until I -- and we think it's good because we've 10 contributed to the TLVs. 11 We've done a lot of research to make 12 sure that -- that if there's a need for change, 13 that we get the change in. That's where we stand. 14 MR. POWERS: Object to the 15 responsiveness of that answer. 16 A. We've got the peanut gallery growling 17 again, I guess. 18 Q. The threshold limit values experience 19 that you've had with them that you just told me 20 about where you think it's been mostly good, the 21 threshold limit value, though, for asbestos has 22 been one that has been changed because the values 23 that were originally selected didn't improve that? 24 A. We've changed benzine twice that I 25 know of during my own working experience, and by the way, this is probably because of chronic possibility, very limited possibility, of chronic problems. We've changed a great many of the major petroleum fractions. We've changed a lot of those. So it's been a dynamic system. It's not a completely stagnate system. They don't just do -- do this and lay it aside and move it over here. To a certain extent they do. But if you bring up the subject sufficiently with sufficient data and submit it, the TLV committee will go over that data. I can assure you of that. I don't know the answer to all the questions by any stretch. If I did, I would be a soothsayer, I guess. Q. But the asbestos TLV is one that proved by time needed to be changed, correct? A. I don't know. I can't really say that. We have not experienced that, but again, we're not primary asbestos users, so I'd be remiss professionally to even answer that question. Q. Well, you know that the TLV for asbestos has been changed? A. I knew it was changed as was about .] H O {>:' ::? v*i n | ` H ii L f ' b*4 | -S 1 " L !p Ito , \ 8 203 1 just can't be afforded. 2 So I would say that if we tested the 3 atmosphere around where they were working and, 4 boy, that is difficult to do. You're mostly 5 outside and the wind blows one way or the other 6 way and it's a hell of a mess to do a decent 7 asbest- -- or dust study. 8 Anyway, you'd have to have fifty dust 9 test machines and you'd have to pretty nearly put them around in a ring so that you'd catch the n nuances of the wind and its effect on that 12 floating cloud or whatever you got up there. 13 You better be able to separate 14 asbestos from everything else, too, in your 15 testing, which I'm not sure everybody does. So I 16 don't know. No, I don't think you ought to if 17 18 you can demonstrate that asbestos is hazardous to 19 people at levels in a working environment of less than what it is now, then it ought to be submitted o CM 21 to the TLV committees for change. 2 2 MR. POWERS: Object to responsiveness of that answer. 23 24 Q. The question, though, Mr. Garrett, is 25 at Monsanto in the 1950s when you were dealing 204 1 with your insulators and you told them 2 'respirators, respirators, respirators," the "m 1 3 reason you did that was because you felt it was . 4 prudent to minimize their exposure to asbestos 5 because you knew that it was a dangerous material, 6 correct? . 7 A. That's right, and you couldn't test 8 for it because you just simply didn't have the j 9 people and the testing equipment. r 10 Q. And the methods were questionable L ii anyway and that was the prudent response for you 12 and your people? 13 A. Probably. Probably. Excessive 14 prudence, I suppose, would get you to stop all of 15 it, but -- all TLV because there are probably 16 levels at which they can create problems, but I i,, 17 don't know. pH 18 All I know is that in our own -- we ' 19 were primarily organic chemical people. We did a i 20 lot of organic chemical work. We did a lot of . 21 work on the TLVs in that area. 22 We -- in an ancillary way, we were I 23 interested in the materials that we had to use for , 24 maintenance of our equipment and to keep it - 25 operating. t 205 1 Asbestos was one of those issues. We 2 knew it was a hazard. We tested for it. We found 3 levels pretty close to the then TLV, and we found 4 that upwind work was a good idea and we 5 recommended it, particularly when you're out on 6 the racks taking asbestos out off of old pipe 7 racks. t . 8 Other than that, we never saw an 9 asbestosis case or anything that we thought 10 approached it. r L 11 q . And further step of prudence that you r 12 made in the 1950s at Monsanto at Texas City 13 A. Was put them respirators on. J 14 q . And not only for the insulators but 15 for anybody else who was going to be there when 16 the insulators were doing their work? 17 A. That's right. That's right, including 18 their foreman, who didn't like it worth a damn. 19 Q. And if it was an operator that was 20 going to have to be there while the work was m " 21 done - 22 A. He wore one, too. 23 q . Mr. Garrett, I've been reminded of an 24 area X wanted to go into. 25 C a n y o u r e c a l l a n y of t h e i n s u l a t i o n manufacturers for the products that you used at Monsanto ever sending you any information about health hazards that could be connected to their products? A. Yes, Johns-Manville sent us some. MR. POWERS: Object to the question as being vague. A. Now, the asbestos, we ordered insulation materials loose and we got it with it got a folder from Johns-Manville. Q. And do you remember what the A. It was pretty complete as far as what was known at that time about asbestos' hazardous as an insulation toxic, as a ventilation dust. It would cause all kinds of problems including cause you to lose your hair, you know, that sort of stuff and, yes, I saw it. We didn't need it. We already knew it. Q. Is that the only insulation manufacturer that you can recall seeing? A. The only one that I can remember. That was loose stuff that we used to make s o- cal le d mud stuff, the bags of it. You've seen it. In fact, Jo h n s - M a n v i l l e were w r itt en all over r~i r R , . 1 T * i-: fj IT*" L f * ktid _ \> . : > 1 " L t* L E * L" | ^ 207 1 it, and we used it for patching is primarily what 2 it was used for and to mud over preformed stuff that had just been wired to the stuff. 3 4 And on a plant like Texas City, which 5 was all liquid, you can imagine the number of 6 miles of pipe they had and all of it was 7 insulated. And so -- 8 Q. Sir -- 9 A. -- in fifty different sizes. 10 Q. About what time period is your ii recollection of getting this Johns-Manville 12 material? 13 A . /5_ -- oh, Lord, it had to have been 14 '5 5 , '60, or something like that, but I didn't 15 need it. It was already outlined in most of the 16 books in this area. By the way, when I first started in 17 the business, there wasn't any industrial hygiene 13 19 books. You depended on medical, journal articles, committee work, and your own common sense, I 20 guess, if you had any. 21 22 Sometimes you don't have a very good 23 temper in this business, but they won't let you 24 kill anybody, though. Boy, some of them needed 25 it. < 5 Oh, I saw foremen sometimes that ought to have been hanged. Oh, you know, tobacco dripping out. "I'll have you know it ain't ever hurt me." It's a fine thing to teach young operators. It's too bad you couldn't retire them early just to get them out of the way. It's happened to everyone, you know. And that's another one of the problems that we face. Q. What is your earliest recollection, Mr. Garrett, of when you began to find reports of cancer being related to asbestos exposure? A. I wrote a report one time called Cancer and Chemical Structure. I thought I was doing somebody some good so I decided to do it. It turned out to be about three hundred pages long, and it's been copied and recopied around. I see it every once in a while at Monsanto. I wrote the damn thing twenty-five years ago, and what was known then about cancer and those structures of chemicals and materials of common materials that were available. In a big, multiunit chemical plant it is difficult to tell a operator who's rotating 209 1 through the many different units all the things 2 that in excessive concentrations would cause 3 cancer because his drinking water is likely to do 4 that if he drinks too much of it. That's very 5 likely why he drinks Wild Cat Whiskey, but that's 6 beside the point. 7 The point I'm trying to make is if 8 you __ you could tell people that primarily were 9 interested in asbestos in their insulating 10 operations, so you're talking about insulators and 11 their immediate supervisors, about asbestos and 12 its hazard as far as cancer is concerned. 13 At the same time in a big chemical 14 plant you've got a dozen other places where you've 15 got to tell someone about excessive exposure to 16 this or that or someone else, or if you overcook 17 your operation, you're going to get thus and so, 18 which will cause cancer, and you've got an awful 19 lot of different problems to address and maintain, 20 and the problem is you're trying to maintain some 21 feeling of control amongst those amongst your 22 people. 23 Everybody handles asbestos that s in 24 the insulating business. Those same people are 25 1 ikely are liable to be exposed to m a t e r i a l s , 210 2 bunch of exit pipes, a bunch of unit vent pipes, ' 1 3 not looking for asbestos but looking for the stuff 4 in the vent pipes. Some of that stuff might be 5 causing the same problem. 6 The other you don't know is synergism r 7 amongst chemicals to -- and believe me there are 8 synergistic couples of stuff like asbestos and : 9 some chemical material. So you've got a hell of a 10 jo b . T~ L 11 Asbestos, we thought, and to -- and r 12 our records show would cause no problems at the L. 13 TLV, okay? 14 Q. And that was in your plant? f 15 i 16 A. That's right. Q. In your plant -- L 17 A. In our plants, as near as I could F 18 determine, we did a lot of sampling, and the L 19 plants did a great deal of sampling. We took care I: 20 of asbestos in workers by demanding them to wear 21 protection l' i-, 22 Q. Respirators, respirators, respirators? l 23 A. Right, respirators, respirators, 24 respirators. 25 Q. And by f o l l o w i n g t h a t p r a c t i c e y o u 3 |; % i ij. S r> L r --v | L F i r fe* | L 211 i never saw any asbestos-related disease? 2 A. No. What you're asking, a lot of it 3 is conjecture. You're looking at industrial 4 hygiene data and the many, many, many, many gobs 5 of data I've seen from all kinds of things, 6 particularly couplets. 7 We were looking at couplets, one of 8 which was asbestos in those couplets. We never 9 found anything. 10 We did find some in where you could -- 11 where other material would cause about the same 12 effect and, therefore, if you had 50 percent of 13 one and 50 percent of another, you had a hundred 14 percent, like chlorinated aromatics, for example. 15 So. . . 16 q . Would there be any other products 17 other than the phenolic resins that you told me 18 about earlier that you're aware of that were made 19 by Monsanto that contained asbestos? 20 A. Contained it, no. The years I know, 21 the old -- what the hell was that stuff called? 22 Carbide made it. 23 Q. Bake-A-Lite? 24 A. Bake-A-Lite. The old Bake-A-Lite 25 processes. None of it that I know except that. 212 i I've seen reinforcing fibers used, but I've seen a 2 lot of nylon reinforcing fibers, too. So I don t 1 3 know. 4 I've seen a lot of work done on nylon 5 reinforcing fibers, but it isn't really i i 6 toxicology. It's more stretch and break. I ^ J 7 don't know. - - 8 All I know is that our experience, a 9 chemical company primarily who manufactured a 10 chemicals and at one time petroleum products, we p ii 11 had an oil refinery at Lyon Oil in Arkansas at H 12 Monsanto. __v 13 They used probably more insulating 14 incidently, I think probably a refinery uses more | i 15 insulating material than even an organic chemical 16 plant, at least it looked like to me they did. y 17 We had no problems. We had we had f 18 lots of problems. We had no problems with L 19 asbestos that I know of in my own experience, in i 20 my own time. I knew it was a problem and we r 2 1 certainly used that to prevent it if we could. 22 Q. And by "prevent it," you mean that's 23 the respirators, respirators, respirators? That's 1 ? - 24 coveralls? That's taking showers? i l* 25 A. Every day they got changes of clothes. t .. II r La I1 i t " y m r is 213 1 We wbnt down to shoes and socks, underwear and 2 all. We didn't want it at home. 3 q . And that was even back in the 1950s? 4 A. That's right. And I will say this, 5 you cannot force a man -- we went through a court 6 suit to find this out. You can't force a man to 7 bathe. Did you know that? You probably already 8 know that. ' 9 Q. But you went to that extent to try to 10 get people to bathe to reduce the hazard? 11 A. In many cases. We did it for PCBs. 12 We did it for a lot of things, and we tried to 13 scare the hell out of them if that -- that don't 14 do much good. 15 Then Time magazine comes along and 16 writes it up as a hell of a scare affair. Then it 17 scared the hell out of them. I don't understand 18 that but, no, we didn't -- we had -- we did a lot 19 of work on a lot of products. 20 We got to where we were fairly 21 competent at picking the ones that we thought. We 22 tested all. We had regular screen that we tested 23 them in using rats, and anything that occurred in 24 those rats on postmort, we followed up on 25 anything. n i t j I *** b C r' L- 214 1 If that thing blew the kidneys out 2 through the anus, we wanted to know why the hell 3 that happened and we wanted to back off on our 4 standards. That we did. And I think we tested 5 them all. 6 Now, when we got into a product where 7 it was going to be used by other people, then we 8 began to do a very detailed toxicological study 9 using rats, rabbits and so forth and multiple 10 levels of exposure and so forth. 11 Q. In your work that you did with amine 12 compounds, did you ever get into any research or 13 any literature that dealt with the nitrous amines? 14 A. Oh, any time you manufacture amine 15 compounds, you're going to mess with nitrous 16 amines, yes. 17 Q. What is the earliest time period that 18 you can tell me you worked with nitrous amines. 19 A. Oh, gosh, I guess when we first got to 20 messing around with nitrogen chemicals, and that 21 probably was in -- early in my St. Louis career. 22 Q. So mid '50s or so? 23 A. Probably, yes. 24 Q. What was it that, from a toxicologists 25 industrial hygienist's standpoint, that y o u f o u n d 215 1 for nitrous amines in that in that era? 2 A. Well, nitrous amines were extremely 3 acutely toxic. You probably didn't have a chance 4 to test the toxicology over a period of time 5 because if your subject was dead so we -- many 6 of the nitrous amines are extremely toxic. 7 They're very reactive. Oh, don't ever 8 mix them with anything, including your shirt tail. 9 They are extremely reactive substances. And if 10 you can get them off clean, you're lucky. 11 It's very difficult to get a nitrous 12 amine, one of the short chain nitrous amines loose 13 as a -- it's a wonder it doesn't grab the glass, 14 you know, that sort of thing. It's a difficult 15 thing to do. 16 We've done -- we did a lot of work on 17 it. We did it at Nitro -- I mean at, yeah, Nitro, 18 West Virginia. We did it at in Alabama. 19 We found nitrous amines in practically 20 every amine operation at a certain extent to 21 certain levels in virtually every nitrogen 22 compound. Every amine operation we had, there was 23 some nitrous amines formed. 24 q . Being a chemist, can you explain that? 25 Why? 216 1 A. Pretty easily as the degradation of 1 2 amine compounds and the slight base oxydation of 3 nitrous amines. T ' 4 MR. HALL: Question, could we take a I . 5 break? | 6 Q. Is a break okay with you, Mr. Garrett? r7 8 9 A. Certainly. (Temporary recess was held.) (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1 marked 10 for identification, JS.) 11 MS. FLATT: We're on record. P 12 Q. Mr. Garrett, I went over your resume L 13 just a little bit earlier and I've been informed [ 14 by my associate here that I've gotten the wrong pi 15 title on here. 16 I should designate it as 230112, 17 capital G-A-R, capital J-A-C, capital T. So with 18 that change for the record, so it's consistent 19 with our numbering scheme that we've been using. 20 Let me ask you, sir, is this a true 21 and correct copy of your resume? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. All right. I've also asked the court 24 reporter to mark as Exhibit 1 to the deposition Fi 25 the notice for the deposition which calls for i , 217 1 certain documents to be brought to the deposition 2 by yourself. 3 Does that look like the list of 4 documents you were asked to bring? 5 A. Yeah. ' J 6 Q. And I understand that you have 7 reviewed that list and the only document that you 8 have that's responsive is your resume, is that 9 right? 10 A. That's right. I don't keep documents. 11 I did't -- they all belong to the company and they n 12 all went back when I quit. LJ 13 q . Before the break X was asking you some i.P 14 questions about nitrous amines and you were kind n 15 enough to go into that with me. 16 A. We -- 17 Q. The materials that you called nitrous 18 amines in the 1950s that you said were 19 contaminants of some of the other materials, the 20 amine compounds, you said that those were very 21 acutely toxic, is that right? 22 A. Uh, it's hard to say. It's hard to 23 generalize, as you know, but by and large, nitrous 24 amines are oxidizing agents of some caliber and iLi) 25 they consequently are probably toxic by inhalation La rn 218 1 or by swallowing. 2 I don't know why in the world anybody 3 ever swallowed it, but that's beside the point. . 4 Q. The compounds that these nitrous 1 . 5 amines were being found in, the aniline materials r 6 or the nitrogen materials, were there already r ' 7 concerns about the carcinogenicity, the abilities i . 8 of materials to cause cancer that were sort of 9 apparent compounds in nitrous amines? 10 A. The only ones we really have worked L 11 with in the last twenty years were comtaminants in v 12 processes where you were pretty roughly treating 13 amine compounds, largely aromatic amines, and for 14 that reason we assumed, and I think probably ! 15 rightly so, that there were some minor amounts of i - 16 aromatic nitrous amines in some of those products. * L 17 It's difficult to analyze for in 18 extremely low concentrations. As near as I know, r\;>tts-i 19 we decided that the contaminants from these y 20 processes were not a very good idea to be eating F' 21 your lunch on and had issued restrictions in the 22 manufacturing plants on the processes and process 1 23 wastes. 24 I think I would still do the same. 25 Q. Some of the aromatic amines that 219 1 you're talking about were known to be carcinogenic 2 at the time, is that right, sir? 3 A. Well, not nearly so much carcinogenic 4 as just plain toxic. You're talking about the 5 nitro -- aromatic nitro amines, aromatic 6 chloroamines, and this group of compounds. 7 And you chemically mash at them a bit, t 8 you might -- particularly with a -- with nitric 9 acid, something like that, you'd all end up with a 10 nitrous amine. It will split off on you, and so l-s 11 our interest in nitrous amines -- and it was 12 really -- we have been interested in them 13 toxicologically as a contaminant forever, I guess. 14 Q. It would be fair to say, wouldn't it, ! 15 though, that at least one of the toxic properties 16 of the aromatic amines that you were concerned 17 about was the ability to cause cancer? 18 ifc 19 MR. FOGARTY: Objection. A. Certainly the suspicion that it might, 20 yeah. Now, whether they were all tested or not, 21 none of ours -- none of the ones I have any 22 knowledge of were tested. 23 But, no, I wouldn't -- they are 24 extremely active materials. 25 Q. And then would It be also true, Mr. 220 1 Garrett, that you were concerned about the 2 potential ability of these materials to cause 1 3 cancer that were aromatic nitrous amines as well? j . 4 A. Well, we were concerned about the ` 5 general toxicity involved in the handling materials that ultimately developed either from 1 6 7 their own self-destruction due to heat or 1 J 8 something and in handling nitro and amino aromatics. 1 9 10 We handle lots of them. We've handled G ii anilines. We made die anilines. We made the [1 12 chloroani1ines. We made chloronitrobenzenes, and L _ 13 for these reasons we had a fear of nitrous amine 14 formation in our processes. 1 15 Some of it -- to the best of my L 16 ability, I don't know that we ever isolated any of G 17 them. Q. But part of the concern that led to f 18 L 19 these fears was at least in part the ability for these materials to cause cancer in people? 1 20 j 21 MR. FOGARTY: Objection, vague and ^ 22 ambiguous. ^ 23 A. Well, I think it was probably the cost K - 24 of what the toxicology, in fact, was. Whether you 25 had -- whether you could develop a c a r c i n o g e n e s i s t - T ? 221 1 from minute quantities or whether you could get :*.* , 2 the hell blown out of you first with small -- with ;1 3 larger quantities. 4 They're toxic. Most aromatic amine 5 and nitro compounds are toxic in the first place, f 6 and with a little help, they'll put you underground pretty quick. n 7 1 ' 8 And anything that you subsequently make out of them with -- where you still maintain i 9 10 that amine structure, you're liable to have the r L ii same problems. H 12 { So we -- we always were and always _ 13 were dealing with nitrogen containing aromatic i 14 compounds, and the nitrous amines happened to be a ! 15 by-product. L ,, 16 We never -- I don't think we ever made L 17 one purposely. We made some, but we didn t make f 18 them purposely. 19 To tell you the truth, I don't think it ever was much of a -- I think we probably 1 20 conked those processes out or didn't make them or r 21 L 22 something because I don't recall -- I have a 1 23 pretty fair memory. r 24 I don't recall that we ever did *-* 25 anything or ever occasioned any great studies rrm r ' t . i;;: ; : ; P [ 1 [ ' p ` 1 Vi . i r[~ L P _ i ! L. ! ' L p L *" 1 ,, ^ i * 1 2 3 4 . 5 6 7 8 9 10 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 2 4 2 5 o CM 222 because I don't think we had any reason to. Q. And earlier we talked about prudence in the area of industrial hygiene and toxicology. A. Yeah. Q. Would it be your opinion, sir, that in dealing with nitrous amines, even back in 1950s, that prudence would have said there should be some concern about the ability of these materials to be toxic and in part carcinogenic? A. In the 1950s, probably not, but shortly thereafter, yeah. And the problem we tested, of course, we tested some of our materials. Some of which were -- turned out to be carcinogenic, but they were not nitrous amines. We did some straight nitrogen or straight nitrogen containing aromatics that were not nitrous amines. The problem with -- our problem with nitrous amines was that an unwanted by-product build-up in processes using amine compounds in efforts to condense them and otherwise in other chemical reactions, and I think probably anybody would be interested. The materials themselves are pretty toxic as per se, and whether they're carcinogenic i . X ' 1 L I L r ! L [ r Lj 223 1 or not is an interesting argument. I doubt 2 seriously if -- well, I imagine that a great many 3 of them are, but -- because of they're extreme 4 activity. 5 But we never had any problems with it 6 because they were minute by-products in our 7 processes, and it took some mighty fine analytical 8 chemistry to find them and to characterize them as 9 less than so. 10 I don't think we could ever isolate 11 some of them enough to test them, plus the fact 12 that carcinogenic testing is, boy, is something 13 else. Wow. That is extremely costly, extremely 14 argumentative, the results. I don't know. 15 We made and sold an awful lot of 16 amine -- simple amine compounds, aromatic amine 17 compounds. 18 I don't know -- I don't know that we 19 ever got any comments or compliment or reguests 20 from customers to test them for carcinogenicity. 21 I don't know whether we ever did ourselves or not. 22 If we did, I didn't know about it. 23 Toxic -- my tox group could have done 24 it. I don't think they did it without our 25 knowledge, but we were -- we would be somewhat 224 1 suspicious if we were going to manufacture them xn 2 any great quantity or if we were going to rqn FI 3 manufacture anything in the quantity that would i 4 produce enough of them as a by-product to be a 5 product hazard. p1 - 6 So, yes, we probably suspected that 7 some of them at least, if they were -- if they i ; 8 were electrically imbalanced ones, you probably 9 it probably would be carcinogenic. 10 Q. The "them" you're talking about are 11 the nitrous amines? p 12 A. Uh-huh. No, no, I'm talking about the 13 nitrous amines that would be the result of y 14 operations that produced other chemicals. 15 Q. Yes, sir. The contaminant part. 16 A. That's right, as a contaminant part. 17 Again -- 18 Q. Now, I take it that shortly after you 19 began your career with Monsanto you would have 20 known that the aromatic amines, particularly a ?r- 21 beta napthylamine, had been identified as a human 22 bladder carcinogen years earlier? 23 A. Yes. Lord knows, we made it -- ( 24 Li 25 Q. So -- A. -- and we Knew it caused cancer- I 225 1 will tell you this, in all the years I was at 2 Monsanto, it was the only proven carcinogen that N 3 we ever proved was carcinogen itself per se. . 4 Q. Would it be accurate to say, Mr. 5 Garrett, that because of the experience with beta i 6 naphthylamine that the toxic -- 7 A. We were doubly cautious, yes. i 8 Q. Yes. |3 9 A. We sure were and we canned an awful 10 lot of research projects for a company that f " b 11 was -- one of its primary efforts was in the nitro H 12 and amino chemistry and particularly in the nitro 13 and amino aromatic chemistry. To quit messing 14 around with them was amazing, but we did. ! 15 Q. Would it be your opinion, Mr. Garrett, i ` 16 then that for companies in the 1950s who were interested in nitro and amino compounds and their b 17 p 18 manufacture, that prudence would have said be L 19 cautious of these materials causing cancer? E 20 A. Oh, you're stretching it pretty far. r. 21 We knew that beta naphthylamine -- by the way, 22 this is a naphthylamine, this is not a biphenyl. We were -- we had a great many suspicions about 1 23 24 some aromatic groups, some aromatic structures. ^ 2 5 One of them was where you had an n* i L n , i MLi r LrL 1 | L -. * ' U!: PJ L. rL r L B Li - "-i iLJ 226 i imbalance sufficient to put a nit- a very 2 electronegative group like a nitro nitro, or 3 nitrousa, for that matter, group or an amine group 4 on the end of a very large gob of carbon material. 5 We had a suspicion that that was 6 indicative of some kind of physiological action on 7 the part of human beings. 8 There have been some tests done that 9 didn't necessarily carry that out, but there have 10 been some tests done that do carry it out. We 11 were prudent and very, very careful. 12 We had, as you know, we brought people 13 for all their life, tested them, that had -- that 14 had been exposed to beta naphthylamine, and we 15 tested those people all their lives. Every one of 16 them until they died. Some are still alive. 17 Q. And that is part of the prudence that 18 you spoke of in dealing with these kinds of 19 materials? 20 A. Absolutely. You had to damn near 21 demonstrate and have the money to do toxicology 22 for it before you demonstrated -- before you came 23 to any of Monsanto management with the idea of 24 producing any of these compounds. 25 Q. So it was almost to the point where it 227 1 wasn't a matter of -- , 2 A. Thumbs got to be up. Nobody's going fl 3 to be working with it. If you don't have it, the 4 money to test it and time, go away -- ` 5 Q. Not going to make it? 6 A. -- and think of something else. Yeah. f ' 7 That damn mess caused us more trouble than -- I i i- 8 swear we wrote more letters and more reports and gave away more research reports than you could 1 9 10 shake a stick at over that damn beta naphthylamine b 11 thing. f" 12 Q. Did you ever come in contact with a __ 13 Dr. Charles Hine, that you can recall? ^ 14 A. Yes, Charlie. Fine man. 1 15 16 Q. How did you know him, Mr. Garrett? A. Funny, I can recall the man's name and -- where'd Charlie work at? Damn, I can't. I h 17 m 18 remember him. I can't draw where he came out at. L 19 Q. I'll represent to you that from time 20 to time he went to American Petroleum Institute r 21 meetings and had some affiliation with Shell. 2 2 Does that help you any? || 23 A. Yes, it does help me a lot. He was 24 the guy that helped us, in fact, through some of 2 5 the API meetings, to look at some of these 228 1 aromatics. i . 2 See, Monsanto's a primary aromatic 3 producer of aromatic amine and nitro compounds. 4 We produced the dinitro. We produced the diamine, 5 and we were interested. 6 That's all died of natural death c7 because nobody could ever demonstrate that they 8 had enough money to pay for the toxicology that we 9 had to do on beta naphthylamine. c 10 Q. If I could, Mr. Garrett, here's a 11 letter or, really, it's a memorandum on Shell 12 Development Company letterhead dated April 28th, l. 13 1950, and it shows that the author is one C.H. 5 14 Hie, M.D., consulting toxicologist. Subject is 15 Certain Problems of Environmental Cancer in the 16 Petroleum Industry. 17 This is a document that's been used 18 many times in litigation. I've been involved with 19 it. If somebody wants a copy of it, I'll be glad 20 to let them have it. r* 21 But I wonder, sir, if I could hand you 22 that and ask you if you've ever seen this 23 memorandum that Dr. Hine is shown to be the author 24 of here? 25 A. Boy, I don't know. r 7j t( r n! i '.y L r 229 1 q . it's several pages long. 2 A. Now, Charlie wrote a lot of stuff. He 3 also wrote some -- some parts of books and that 4 sort of stuff in this -- in this racket. 5 He had some beliefs that, well, I 6 don't know whether we've demonstrated them or not. 7 I think he thought the petroleum industry was the 8 dog in all cancer, but I don't know about that. 9 There they are, and that's all of 10 them, their answer seen in its compounds. You 11 mean aniline and its derivatives? 12 MR. FOGARTY: Object, nonresponse. 13 q . You're looking at the table that's 14 a - 15 A. Yes, "Certain Recognized and Suspected 16 Carcinogenic Agents Encountered in the Oil 17 Industry." 18 THE REPORTER: Sir, could you repeat 19 that? 20 THE WITNESS: Ma'am? 21 THE REPORTER: Whatever you just said, 22 could you repeat that, please? 23 THE WITNESS: The title of this table 24 here is "Certain R e c o g n i z e d and Suspected 25 Carcinogenic Agents Encountered in the Oil 230 ' 1 Industry Showing the Organs or Systems Chiefly .X:,x 2 Effected." Okay? if 3 Q. As you look down that list, Mr. 4 Garrett, do you see any there that you would * 5 disagree with being in that table? f | 6 i . A. Yeah, I do, a lot. Charlie was -- 7 went a little overboard. I -- the funny thing is H L J g a lot of them -- some of them are true and some of I 9 them are not true. 10 Q. Okay, sir. Which ones would you agree Q ii with? P 12 A. Well, benzine itself is, in my L. 13 opinion, is a lot less a carcinogen than people \ k 14 think it is, and our -- I don't know why anybody would know any more about it than we do because we I! 15 kJ 16 had handled it by the tons. y I? We're the biggest benzine purchaser in Lm 18 the world at one time according to somebody that 19 told me that. H 20 Benzidine I'll buy. Asphalt I don't r 21 know because I don't know what they're talking ^ 22 about. Asphalt's like saying goo. I mean goo can | 23 be a lot of different things. t 24 Aromatic organic chemicals, I don't ^< 25 believe that's true of that because it indites too 1 '! l . iijijiiji:/ P . i i ; , i ; 1 r b V i i 1 L r Li 1 I i-a 231 many materials. Aromatic organic chemicals l includes an enormous number of chemicals that have 2 never been demonstrated to be carcinogenic. 3 Anthracene, crude, I don't know there. 4 Aniline and its derivatives, when 5 6 you're messing with aniline, aniline does not 7 cause cancer. We tested aniline. We know. You 8 can -- some of its near derivative will because, let's be honest with ourselves, beta naphthylamine 9 10 causes cancer. Creosote, I don't know what creosote 11 12 is. I don't even know what mineral oil is crude, 13 because mineral oil to an oil people is stuff, 14 virgin oil out of the ground, and mineral oil can 15 contain a whole lot of things. Naphthylamine, that's a dandy. That 16 17 is surely a carcinogen and certainly the beta 18 isomer. 19 Oil shale, I don't know. Paraffin, I don't know why paraffin 20 21 would cause skin cancer. I really don't. 22 Pitch, I don't know what pitch is 23 either. Soot, I don't know what soot -- soot 24 can be four thousand compounds on a little carbon 25 spindala. I don't know what spindala even is, and tar, of course, is practically anything. There are some dandies in here, and Charlie knew what he was talking about in some of these things. He suspected these. I don't think there's ever much of proof that some of them were there, the carcinogens of sufficient power to create problems in industry, but there's some here that are dandies. The naphthylamine beta is really a dandy. It causes cancer. Benzidine, some of its close derivatives cause cancer without a doubt. Q. There's a second table there, too, Dr. Hine's letter, or memorandum. A. Oh, he's talking about precancerous lesions and that stuff. Q. Yes, sir. The second page of that table on precancerous lesions, there's one there that shows lungs. Do you see that? A. Bone marrow. Yeah, lungs. Pneumoconiosis and chronic pneumonia. Q. And the causative agents that are listed under lungs? 233 1 A. It says asbestos arsenic, tar, sock 2 oil, whatever the hell that is, or is that soot 3 oil? I don't know. Mist. 4 Chrome salts, chrome pigments, nickel 5 carbonea. That will do it. Some of them will. 6 Some of them won't. He has gone from pure 7 inorganics to organics that really kind of makes 1, 8 the thing not very useful to anybody except that H 9 he has got some of them that are dandies. y 10 Q. Do you have any recollection, Mr. r 11 Garrett, of Dr. Charles Hine sharing his thoughts r 12 about the pneumoconioses and asbestos being Uj 13 precancerous lesions? 14 A. No. 15 q . As far as you can recall, that never 16 came up at any of the API meetings? 17 A. Not to my -- no, not to my knowledge. 18 To be perfectly honest with you, I never saw s L, 19 Charlie at many of those -- many of those 20 meetings. Well, this may not be true. I knew T' 21 him. la 22 You know, you're asking me to look 23 back thirty-five years and come up with a name of 24 the guy and what his serial number was on his butt 25 or on his tag. I can't even remember my own ji]j i [ r - i .. I! PL p tuu -1 .> [ P. &L r L, * ! ! | U-- 234 1 serial number anymore. I'm glad. 2 q . That's why I said earlier just your 3 best recollection is the best we can do. 4 A. No. I knew Charlie. I knew he was 5 a -- was a -- did a lot of work in this area. He 6 has in there included all of those known 7 carcinogens, but there's a lot of them in there 8 that are simply not carcinogenic or do they how 9 many of them raises the back of -- the hair on the 10 back of my head -- and I'll bet I have as much 11 experience with cancer from chemicals as anybody 12 -- would be the beta naphthylamine derivatives. 13 Where is that group listed again? Can 14 I see it a minute? Just a minute. 15 Aniline, no. Anthracene, uh. 16 Aromatic organic chemicals, my God, that's a 17 million of those. It's not specific enough. 18 Asphalt, which is all a mess of 19 benzidine, I would be suspicious of many of its 20 derivatives. Benzol derivatives don't mean 21 anything because benzol is a common name, not a 22 chemical name. 23 Chl or ina te d a lip ha tic hyd ro car bo ns is 24 bologny. We tested too many of those. 25 C r e o s o t e I d o n ' t k n o w a b o u t b e c a u s e V:''Ht l j \t Hi'.- r ", i L r ; >*y 1 -- L p L 1 r 1 235 i creosote is a goo that's created m the oil 2 refining industries. 3 Mineral oil is crude. I'm not I 4 don't believe I'd buy that. 5 Naphthylamine beta is a dandy. It is 6 really a nifty carcinogen in humans. 7 Oil shale, what is the substrate the 8 oil shale is coming out of? He doesn't define 9 that and until you do define that, you haven't got 10 much to go on. 1 1 Paraffin oil crude, I don't know what 12 that means. 13 Pitch, if he means organic slop, goo, 14 that comes out of a heating chemical materials to 15 make products, pitch and soot, I don't know. 16 Spindle oil, I don't even know what 17 that is. 18 Tar, as -- what's tar? I don't know 19 what tar is. 20 Those I would -- I would buy, the ones 21 that he has -- most of the then known carcinogenic 22 materials fall in his categories, but there's a 23 vast number in there that fall -- that have never 24 been proven and we've tested some that have shown no carcinogenic tendencies, and believe me, wwee''vvee 25 p Li 1 ,y y 236 1 had big problems with naphthylamines before. 2 Q. Mr. Garrett, if I could, I would like 3 to kind of switch gears with you for a second. 4 A. Okay. 5 q . Let me ask you some names of some 6 people if I could and see if you might recognize 7 it, and I don't know if this is true, but the 8 affiliation I have for these people is something 9 called Monsanto Research. 10 Is there a separate entity that you 11 know of called Monsanto Research? 12 A. Well, there used to be and I suspect 13 there is still. There used to be a research 14 operation that was for the whole corporation. 15 Then the individual divisions had 16 research as well, and the organization now I think 17 is a little different than that, and changed, but 18 that doesn't make any difference. It still may be 19 true at the time these were done. 20 Q. These names may or may not be 21 associated with that organization, but that's how 22 I have them listed. What -- the first name is William H. Westendorf, W-e-s-t-e-n-d-o-r-f? 23 24 A. Yeah. We had him for a while. 25 q . Can you tell us what he did, sir, at y 237 1 Monsanto? 2 A. No, because I don't know. If you're Ti3l 3 talking about useful work, I don't know. , 4 Q. Well --- 5 6 A. From my standpoint. Q. Okay. Can you tell us that he was in 7 Monsanto Research even? 8 A. No, I can't even tell you that. I think he was. You know, I bet you're talking ui 9 10 thirty years memory and mine is beginning to fade. p _X C311f*tl 1H. S_3a.3yT> WytaO iL lHl a3. ^u.oditti>inii p i "h p i_ b^ X^It C~fO 6 0 H H r r 12 Q. Was there a Monsanto Research 1 13 operation in Pittsburgh at some time that you know 14 of? ! 15 ` 16 A. No, not that I know of. q . The one that you're familiar with was located where, sir? Monsanto? y 17 A. All over the country. We had research * 18 L facilities in the operating divisions. The old J| 20 plastics divisions operation research center was at Springfield, Mass. H to Ls 22 The inorganic division's operational H 23 research center was originally -- oh, God, where 24 is it? All of it's in St. Louis now. i-a 25 It's all been sucked into St. Louis 238 1 and put in the labs either at the main office here 2 or the ones out in the county, the two big labs, 3 which is a good idea because it is -- this is bad 4 ideas and good ideas. 5 You don't have people working on 6 individual division work but you do have them 7 working where you can use the specialists 8 throughout the system here that you couldn't use 9 when they were all over Hell's grace. 10 Q. The next name that I have, Mr. 11 Garrett, is Theodore K. Kozuszek, K-o-z-u-s-z-e-k? 12 A. Kozuszek, Ted Kozuszek. 13 Q. Yeah. How did you know Mr. Kozuszek? 14 A. I would just as soon not say. 15 Q. Well -- 16 A. Well, just one of those things. I 17 don't think -- I don't recall him that well 18 anyway, and I would be -- I've heard the name, 19 let's put it that way. 20 q . I'm not inviting any negative 21 connotations at all. 22 A. Oh, I understand that, too. If I knew 23 anything that would help you, I'd say it, but I 24 don't know. 25 Q- Would you recall a Mr. John E pN? 1 i * 11 rL rL~i 1 / \ L p? * L > *- 1 L--i 239 l Bradley? 2 A. No, that doesn't mean that he wasn't 3 in Monsanto. I just don't recall him. 4 Q. Yes, sir. How about a Mr. Carl D. 5 Bohl, B-o-h-1 ? 6 A. He worked for me. 7 Q. He worked for you? 8 A. He worked for me. He was my noise 9 man. 10 Q- Oh, that's the gentleman that you told 11 me about earlier that was the person that was 12 really good at noise work? 13 A. Best man I ever saw in industrial 14 noise, yes. 15 Q. Okay. Is Mr. Bohls still living or 16 working? 17 A. He's out in St. Louis County living 18 out there. He's divorced -- I mean "He's 19 divorced." He's -- he left Monsanto almost at the 20 time I did , quite -- his wife recently died. 21 He's living by himself out in St. 22 Louis County. In fact, I saw him the other day. 23 Q- Would you recall a Mr. Richard H. 24 Burr, B-u- r-r? 25 A. Dick Burr, yeah, I knew him. p L H -/ f r* &3S L-s 240 1 Q. How did you know him? 2 A. Dick Burr was a -- was a safety man 3 and worked in our -- in one of our safety 4 operations. 5 Q. Was he in manufacturing or at the 6 corporate level or can you say, sir? 7 A. The last time I had track of him, he 8 was in one of the divisions. 9 Q. In which facility, would you recall? 10 A. Oh, I don't know. It would be a 11 number of facilities, but I don't know where 12 exactly he was. 13 Q. Do you remember what division he 14 worked in at Monsanto? 15 A. I would suspect it was the old organic 16 division, but I don't know. I would be hazarding 17 a guess. 18 Q. How about a gentleman named John E. 19 Howell, H--o-w-e double 1 ? 20 A. No. 21 Q. And how about Dr. George J. Levinskus, 22 L-e-v-i-n -s-k-u-s? 23 A. Dr. Levinskus was our toxicology 24 was the director of toxicology in the medical 25 department. 1 Hsl n r 1 - j r"' i ' i C | ! i . , | l'' y n L E r 1 ^ 241 1 Q. And can you tell me for what time 2 period Dr. Levinskus A. George came from -- oh, gosh. Had to 3 have been -- when I retired, he had to have been 4 5 there almost twenty years in St. Louis. 6 Prior to that he worked -- he was a -- 7 was working out of a school, one of the 8 universities in Connecticut, I believe. Q. Would you know if he's still with 9 10 Monsanto? ii A. He retired from Monsanto. Whether 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2 2 23 24 he's still in town or whether he's moved back to the east or whether -- his kids are scattered all over hell. I know that. I don't know. No, I really wouldn't. I'd be hazarding guesses that would be hazarded twice over. Q. Would you recall ever meeting a gentleman named Roy Bonsib, who was with Standard Oil of New Jersey? A. Oh, Roy Bonsib? I wrote two papers with those people. I don't recall that name. I wrote a couple papers with the oil guys, some of the oil guys. 25 What have we got, somebody having a 242 i fit? , ; 2 Q. I think it sounds like a shouting 3 match back there behind the doors. 4 MR. BLANKS: Straighten them out, 5 Warriene. 6 Q. Mr. Garrett, let me just hand this 7 across to you. It's the first page of a L 8 publication, it's called "Dust Producing H9 Operations in the Production of Petroleum Products Li 10 and Associated Activities" by Roy S. Bonsib, who LP 11 is shown to be in 1937 with the Standard Oil P 12 Company of New Jersey. L_ 13 Let me just ask you if you've ever J 14 seen that cover before that you might recall, sir? 1 15 I can tell you I got that from Jim L 16 Hammond. I don't know if he might have ever given 17 you a copy of it or not. 18 A. I know Jim pretty well. Old Jim and I 19 used to fight the battle between Humble and 20 Monsanto. 21 Q. But you don't recall seeing this 22 report from Mr. Bonsib? 23 A. No, I do not. I do not even recall 24 the name actually. Keep in mind you're looking at 25 a very old memory. 243 2_ q . Well, this was written in July 1937, 2 too, long before you came into the business. 3 A. That's true. I was still practicing 4 with my stick in the National Guard Armory in 5 Durant, Oklahoma, at the time 6 Q. Thank goodness. 7 A. -- in an effort to get a dollar and a i i 8 quarter a week for drilling. 1 9 10 Q. I'm glad somebody was doing it. A. Got paid every three months. I needed P ii 11 the dollar and a quarter badly. It got me to P 12 spend five years of my life in the military, 13 though. i\J 14 Q. We're looking here, sir, at your ! ! 15 resume and I see here one of your listed 1 -i 16 publications is called "A Review of Exposures to y 17 Oil Mist," and you have some co-authors on that? 18 pit 19 A. Uh-huh. Q. Nathan Van Hendricks? 1 20 t" 21 A. Van was with the Standard of Jersey. Q. Yes, sir. George Collings? G.H. 22 Collings? 1 23 A. Isn't that strange? I wrote a paper 24 with him. I don't remember where he's from. I L 25 think he probably was with Standard of Jersey, 244 1 also, but I'm not absolutely sure of that. 2 q . And then you've got A.E. Dooley, Allen 3 Dooley? 4 A. God, where did that come from? 5 Q. I believe he was with the Texas 6 company or Texaco. 7 A. Oh, yeah. Al Dooley was our -- was a 8 hygienist, chief hygienist for Texaco, and I knew 9 him very well. He and I ---- but the other guy I 10 don't draw up. ' 11 q . And then J.B. Rather, Jr. is the other 12 listed co-author. I'm afraid I don't know Mr. 13 Rather. 14 A. Neither do I very well apparently. 15 Q. You authored that paper in the 16 archives of Environmental Health in 1962 with 17 those gentleman, at least according to your resume 18 here. 19 How is it that you came to author that 20 paper with these gentleman? Can you give me a 21 rendition there? 22 A. We were -- we were -- actually, it was 23 Van Hendrick and I had get some information from 24 these guys, is what we wrote the paper with, but 25 we wrote the paper because there was a big hoopus 245 1 about pits, oil pits, that sort of thing, and what 2 you do with waste oil. .T'? < ;,v 3 And keep in mind you're talking many 4 years ago, so you didn't have some of the modern 5 destructive devices that we have today. 6 Q. Do you ever remember learning, Mr. 7 Garrett, that Allen Dooley published on the 8 subject of asbestos disease - 9 A. No. 10 V L 11 Q. -- in the 1930's? A. No, I don't doubt that in the r 12 slightest. 13 Q. Did you know that Mr. Dooley had been 14 an employee of the State of Pennsylvania at one !5 15 time before he went to Texaco? L. 16 A. No, no, but that doesn't surprise me. r" 17 Most of the early industrial hygiene people came u 18 out of state governmental operations, including my 19 initial boss, Elmer Wheeler, was the New Hampshire 20 hygienist prior to World War II, went off as a 21 reserve officer, fought his battle with his 22 anti-aircraft unit in the ETO, came back and was 23 put in the then U.S. Army industrial hygiene 24 laboratory. 25 I didn't know they even had one, but 246 i they did and it was over in the -- in the chemical 2 warfare place, and so there were a lot of -- those Sj 3 people came out of -- mostly came out of the 4 states because originally there was no federal 5 government thing. 6 When I came back from the war, there * 7 wasn't even any federal laws on pollution or . , 8 anything else, and we helped to phrase some of 9 them. 11 10 The states were getting to a point 11 where they were so ragged in their applications 12 and their demands that there was never going to be 13 any interstate commerce unless the government 1 14 intervened, and they did in about 1960 1955, 15 '56, '57. i L They didn't bring much to the party, 16 L 17 but the fact is they did bring some kind of 18 interstate ability to the party. You know, 19 Pennsylvania had one law and West Virginia had 1 20 another and, hell, nobody could abide by any of r![* 21 them, so nobody did. iL 22 Q. Do you recall learning about the | 23 W a l s h - H e e l e y Act at any time? 24 Vi. L 25 A. Yes. Q. Would you know, sir, if/ b a s e d o n y o u r 4-5 ri m. 247 1 experience, if Monsanto was subject to the 2 Walsh-Heeley Act? 3 A. No, not -- I wouldn't know whether 4 they were subject to it or not. 5 Q. Do you remember any of your work as an 6 industrial hygienist with Monsanto dealing with 7 compliance with the Walsh-Heeley Act? 8 A. No, probably was, but it was in 9 compliance with whatever we were attempting to 10 comply with at the time. 11 Q. Do you recall meeting Dr. Clyde Berry? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. How is it that you know Dr. Berry? 14 A. Where did I meet him? I have no idea. 15 Q. He's shown as being at the same 16 meeting in Houston in 1951 that you attended. 17 Could you have met him then when he was an 18 employee of Standard of New Jersey? 19 A. Could be. Could be. 20 Q. Do you recall knowing him when he was 21 a Standard of New Jersey employee? 22 A. No, I don't recall him being there. I 23 really don't. But people in this business, 24 highly -- highly skilled separate types of 25 technical people, the oddballs, if you want to 248 1 ask, have really -- in those days we were 2 oddballs. 3 Nobody knew what the industrial 4 hygienist was, so you didn't tell, you know. You 5 worked for Monsanto. What do you do? I work in 6 their laboratories. What laboratories? Their 7 research laboratories. 8 That's perfectly honest because the 9 laboratories for our toxicology work was in the 10 research laboratories. So we told them -- told 11 the flat truth. 12 You tell them you were an industrial 13 hygienist in those days, their mouth would drop 14 open. "What is that?" You know. 15 That's very much like some of the 16 specialties in medicine are just about as bad. 17 Q. I think Dr. Berry's self-description H 18 was a one man molecular film stretched thin and 19 ruptured in places. 20 A. Pretty much so. Some places it was 21 ruptured purposely and in the construction thereof 22 in some it was done accidently. 23 MR. HOBSON: Mr. Garrett, you've been 24 awfully patient with my guestions today and I 25 appreciate it, sir. I'm going to invite these 1 j c J i _> P L r i. iv-1 y r; 249 1 other folks to have any questions, if they don't, 2 we're done. If they do, I might have a few more, 3 but thank you very much, sir. 4 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you. We 5 haven't thrown anything at each other. 6 MR. HOBSON: That's a good beginning. 7 THE WITNESS: You didn't stand up, 8 rare up in the air and call me a dirty son of a 9 bitch so I could get mad at you and then you'd 10 have a picture of me doing this, so - 11 MR. ELLIS: Let's see 12 -- you could and show it to the damn 13 court in Beaumont, Texas. 14 MR. ELLIS: Let's see if anybody else 15 has got any? Anybody? 16 MR. HOBSON: Mr. Garrett, thank you 17 very much for your patience, sir. You've been 18 very kind. 19 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 20 (Witness excused.) 21 (Witness excused.) 22 (By agreement of all the parties, the 23 signature of the witness is not hereby waived.) 24 ******** 25 250 1 I, Jack T. Garrett, do hereby state that I 2 have read the foregoing questions and answers 3 appearing in this transcript of my deposition Page 4 3 through and including Page 249; that this is a 5 true and accurate (corrected) report of said 6 answers given in response to the questions 7 appearing herein. 8 9 Jack T. Garrett 10 11 12 CERTIFICATE 13 STATE OF MISSOURI ) ) SS 14 COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS ) 15 Before me personally appeared Jack T. Garrett to me known to be the person described in 16 and who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to and before me that he executed the 17 said instrument in the capacity and for the purpose therein expressed. 18 WITNESS my hand and official seal this___ 19 20 21 NOTARY PUBLIC 22 My Commission expires: 23 24 25 251 1 NOTARIAL CERTIFICATE 2 STATE OF MISSOURI ) 3 ) SS CITY AND COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS ) 4 5 I, JULIE STELFOX, a Certificate of Merit Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 6 Missouri do certify that pursuant to the foregoing stipulation, taken at the offices of Stouffer's 7 Concourse Hotel, 9801 Natural Bridge Road, County of St. Louis, State of Missouri, 8 JACK T . GARRETT 9 came before me, was by me duly sworn to testify ^ 10 the whole truth of his knowledge of the matters in controversy aforesaid, was examined and his 11 examination then written in stenotypy by me, and afterwards typed, and signed, as hereinbefore set 12 out, on the day in that behalf aforesaid, and said deposition is herewith returned. 13 I further certify that I am not counsel, 14 attorney, or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of either party, or of the attorney 15 of either party, or otherwise interested m the event of this suit. 16 Given under my hand and notarial seal at my 17 office in the County of St. Louis, State of Missouri, on the____day of--------------' 1993. 18 My C o m m i s s i o n Expires: May 31, 1997. 19 20 21 Julie E. Stelfox, Certificate of Merit Reporter and Notary Public in and for the 22 State of Missouri 23 24 25