Document aYX1vZJban4L7eLKvJ3GLpgR

Abstract Asbestos was once used in U. S. Navy shipboard pipe andmachir~ ery thermal insulation and in marry other shipboard products.Itwas also used throughout the country in thousands of commercial products and in some products it remains in use today. The health hazards of asbestos have resulted in an increasing number of lawsuits that involve among marry others, manufacturers of Navy hardware. The plaintiffs in these lawsuits include marry who were exposed ~ to asbestos while serving in Nary ~. ships built during and following WWIL Because the materials are ' dry, friable, and easily accessibly ! the most likely source of their Navy shipboard exposures was thermal insulation. In this article the evalution of thermal insulation systems ; in WWII and posy WWII shzps is described, Navy and national ' asbestos consumption patterns are compared, the asbestos industrial hygiene environment of the times are described, and a perspective on asbestos concerns from a hard ware manufacturers'standpoznt is provided. The liability situation regarding asbestos may be seen as a pattern causing Navy manufaUUrers to seek some form of waiver of liability or other relief from the Government for all hazards arising from their Navy work . Naval engineers have a res(>onsibiL icy to understand the background surrounding the use ofasbestos, particularly as they continue to deal with new systems and materials that could potentially impact the future health of those who come in contact with them. NAVAL ENGINEERS/OURNqL' The Navy and Asbestos Th ermal Insula .~ tion t."DeNisH .RUSHwoeTH Introduction Asbestos was once an industrial material widely used through much of the 20th century to thousands of products including thermal insulation m Navy sh.ips . During the past thirty years, there has been a great deal of litigation regarding such products . The health hazards of asbestos as used in certain industries were first reported as early as the 1930's and were more . genet ally established by the early 1970's . At about the same tithe, a large number of lawsuits were initiated to seek compensation for those injured. These cases first focused an the tnanufaetur Qrs of asbestos products such as thermal insulation and textiles . The cases were supported by documents dating from as early as the 193Q's reporting asbestos-related fibrosis hazards to the Professional occupational health community. Other documents suggested that some manufacturers of asbestos products might have concealed information about the dangers of the asbestos fiber fiomtheir customers and the public, Many of not all of these manufacturers were bankrupted as~a result of perceived or litigation -enforced liability. In recent years, the legal focus of Navy-related asbestos litigation has shifted to manufacturers of hardware such as pumps and valves that used small amounts of asbestos packing or gaskets and which may have carried thermal insulation once installed. The Navy, usually exercising its right to immunity to liability because of its status as a sovereign agency, has avoided liability claimed against it . A recent New York case promises to take asbestos liability a step further. The case involved a sailor who served aboard a WWII ship during the 1960's who asserted that his work near insulated pumps in his ship caused his injuries . The court suggested that the pump whose manufacturer was subject to potential liability because it failed to warn of the dangers of asbestos insulation mat the shipyard, not the pump manufacturer, applied to the pumps, Asbestos was once so widely use. that under this judicial SPRING2005 Q$5 36 [U;PRING2005 ruling, manufacturers of nearly anything that went into a Nary ship during and following WWII could be held liable for asbestos injuries . Should the rational of the New York decision spread; the Navy may be confronted with a whole new series of demands from its equipment manufacturers for legal pro tections such as full indemnity for damages paid to plaintiffs . In this paper, the industrial environment surrounding the past use of asbestos thermal insulation in the Navy is explained, and how the court's requirement that the defendant warn usef of its products could not reasonably have been implemented is explored . The article is written sc that naval enemeeLS can understand what eaulo< ment manuTact the fut object the were outiL wxucn s decades . Some sail who served aboart times have becom( Nary-related asbe: useful to review t6 insulation in these Asbestos Was Once a Common But Not Universal Insulatorin Navy Ships It is likely that the most abundant asbestos product used in Navy ships was thermal insulation . Asbestos consumption data from WWII suggests that there may be more asbestos in a ship's electric cable than in her thermal insulation . The US . Navy ceased using asbestos thermal insulation in the 1970's and in cables about the same time. Asbestos, however, contrary to a popular belief, was not the universal insulator. Even during WWII, many asbestos-free products such as fibrous glass and mineral wool were used, particularly for hull and bulkhead insulation . But asbestos products dominated as piping and machinery insulation simply because they were the best insulators then available. Among eleven different classes of WWII era ships which we have evaluated, including the prewar Fletcber and wartime Suvnner and Gearing class destroyers and the wartime Essex class aircraft carriers, up to 88% by weight of the thermal insulation products used on pipes and machinery in these ships contained asbestos . Thermal Insulation Systems Buil tfrom Four Types of Products insulation systems were constructed c general kinds of products : 1) flexible gads, 2) rigid preformed shapes in a ety 4f sizes and dimensions, 3) cloth, thread and 4) troweling cement to fill .h surfaces and adhesives . pert with cloth and thread and irregular components or pipe flanges . Rigid fitted around pipes and .s and then covered with >weling cement filled nooth damage-resistant ) of paint on the outer d Many Tons of Insulation JS Pletclrer class destroyer bore tons of thermal insulation on her pipes and machinery. The next-generation, USS Gearing class, carried just over 24 long tons per ship despite having the identical power plant as Pletclrer because more efficient and lighter materials became available. At the extreme, the USS Iowa class battleships carried nearly 465 long tons of thermal insulation . Ships intermediate in size between destroyers and battleships carried intermediate amounts of the material . [Insulation weights come from ship weight reports and insulation schedules] . Some Navy Specifications Required Asbestos, Some Did Not In 1945, there were 13 insulation product line specifications for shipboard thermal insulation 'and lagging. (BSTM Chapter 39 1945) . Lagging ` NAVAL ENGINEERS/OURNAL correctly describes only the outer covering of an insulation system but the word is sometimes used to refer to the entire system. Each specification included several variations such as different grades of asbestos cloth or different service temperatures for pipe insulation . Seven of these specifications required, or at least permitted, asbestos as an ingredient and six called specifically for asbestos-free materials such as fibrous glass or cotton . Some of the seven asbestos specifications called for "materials suitable to the intended service," or words to that effect and indeed, some of the products provided under such specifications contained no asbestos . Thus, , even as early as 1945, the Navy's door was open to non-asbestos products as long as they met the! required performance standards, Amosite Was The Dominant Asbestos Fiberin Navy Insu, There are six fibrous mine asbestos, five in the amphi and one in the serpentine the six were used in Navy Navy ships . Because of asbestos shortages, insulation engineers sought ways to stretch the supplies . Cotton fiber was included in some grades of asbestos cloth so as to facilitate weaving of fabrics with the more readily available short-fiber chrysotile. Fibrous glass, a truly modern material at the time (having been first formed as an insulation material in 1938 ) had many uses during the war. [interestingly, workers often complained of skin irritation from fibrous glass and mineral wool products and from that standpoint, they often preferred working with asbestos .] As with asbestos fiber extender cloth and used alone felt. Mineral wool was Fibrous glass insulation "Naw board" was used and aTtertrie war as insulation in most US nets are still widely used . 1 . Amosite, a trade name fibrous mineral (Cumn came from South Africa. It was't Navy insulation fiber amounting mately 86% of all the asbestos fi insulation systems of an average schedules were followed exactly. was used in nearly pure form as a felt and as pre-molded insulation, and as a reinforcing fiber in matrix insulation materials. Amosite asbestos was favored because of its very long water-resistant and matting-resistant fibers . 2 . Chrysotile, the mineral name for the only serpentine asbestiform mineral, was largely imported from Canada . Chrysotile asbestos fibers, while sometimes shorter than amosite's, are soft and flexible unlike amosite fibers and could be made into thread and cloth. Other Materials Were Also Used During W WII, asbestos was scarce but asbestos products still comprised most of the insulation in a component opof the insulation he availability of nts, such as steam use to do so would These and other concerns were all ultimately expressed in the ship's insulation schedules and implemented during construction in accordance with the building yard practices of the time and the availability of the materials listed on the schedule. Substitution of schedule materials with approved alternatives, including asbestos-free alternatives, was common and was expressly authorized on many schedules . Boiler feed system piping, for example, may have required preformed 85 % magnesia insulation conforming to Navy Department Specification 32P8 . Because feed water is not very hot, it may have been insulated with mineral wool under Navy Department Specification 3212 instead: Of course, the opposite could also NAVAL ENGINEERSJOURNAL SPRING2005 tL37 Figure 1: Percentage Asbestos By Weight In Lead Ships happen - a schedule requirement for fibrous glass cloth lagging to meet Specification 3X15 could have been implemented at the yard using asbestos cloth to Navy Department Specification 3X11 . Schedule Requirements Varied Among Ship Classes The insulation materials required by the schedules varied substantially among ship classes . The differences reflected design or building yard practices, the local availability of materials, and the importance the Navy or the Maritime Commission assigned to a ships that needed the great the war effort received the Ships that could fulfill the few sailines were built wit Among msula were usually v shows the tela used i Ships, Essex ming i tion sc Except for 59%), the tos-containing insulation varied between 80% and 99 % . Note that it was never 100% because, for some insulation systems even in the most vital ships, asbestos free products worked well . The lowest value on the chart (59%) is the USS Buckley class of destroyer escorts. These ships were for few-mission escort duty and were therefore insulated with the most readily available and inexpensive materials - many of which were not asbestos . Some Ships Were Asbestos-Free Even During WWII :]'here were many special cases. The USS Indianapolis (CA35), built in 1931 and lost in nally insulated with mineral These materials were also tried ltd commercial ships of the time orly.. The WWII-era mineral wool asilg crushed to dust during open gemto loose their insulating qualibrasive rock dust to the ship's au hinecy .(Cox memo 1933) Others e chemicals in some mineral wool then wet (US. Naval Experiment Rader$ improvements have made roducts entirely satisfactory in but the early experiences may be ~I wool products were not used during WWII . 120 100 N O y $0 C1 N Q 60 a+ G 40 aOi 20 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 Construction Year for Lead Ship eLommission Ships Wide Variety of Materials US . Maritime Commission ships were merchant ships for commercial or naval logistics service. Their merchant crews varied from about 30 to several hundred depending on the ships function and they typically carried a complement of 20 to 30 Nary men, the so-called Armed Guard, to man defensive guns . But despite their wartime features, Maritime Commission ships were much less strictly specified than Nary warships . The Commission's ships were insulated from what was available- asbestos, mineral wool, hair felt or fibrous glass. In the case of the EC-2 Liberty class, the ships and their insulation systems were designed with a lifetime of five years but a single voyage was considered success given the rate of 'ship losses early in the war. Liberty class ships also 38 [U;PRING2005 ` NAVAL ENGINEERS/OURNAL used sprayed-on insulation for the fire protection of magazines. No other use of sprayed insulation has been found although War Production Board records indicate that some was also used in Navy ships. (Office of Procurement and Material 1943) Insulation Materials Changed Over Time Insulation practices changed as engineering knowledge advanced along with the technology. For example, fresh water and cold seawater piping in nearly all early Navy ships was insulated with hair felt until about 1943 when the Nary changed to water-repellent amosite felt in order to eliminate hair fells fire, vermin, and disease hazards . (BUSHIPS letters 1942, continued to be used in auxiliary ships and in smaller warships thr because of the shortage of amosl continued in service in Navy ship system insulation until 1958 whc was specified to save money and : IPS Note 1958) The wisdom of questioned because it remtroducF of the old hair felt, introduced a highly toxic combustion product know, increased the asbestos haz engineers, as with all engineers, with imperfect solutions and ma`( for resolving competing requireir Thermal Insulation is Dry and Can Be Regardless of the fibers involved, installa- tion and removal of thermal insulation creates airborne dust exposing anyone in the vicinity to health consequences . For asbestos those conse- quences are substantial . Vibrations and tempera- ture changes during normal operation of a ship may also release dust as can bodily contact by the ship's force. Many reports of dust measure- ments aboard Navy ships have been reviewed and frequent reference to loose dust on surfaces and in the air, particularly during repairs, but also during operation have been reviewed . While for the most part dust levels were controlled to within the standards of the time, there is no question that many Navy sailors and workers breathed some of this dust and in some it may cause or have caused disease. ,. Incentives for Production of Asbestos-Free Insulation Throughout and following WWII there were many incentives for the Navy and for Navy equipment manufacturers to offer asbestos-free insulation alternatives . Health effects were not among those incentives until the early 1970's but up to then there were many others . The Need for Imported Asbestos Encouraged the Search forAlternatwes Most chrysotile and all amosite asbestos fibers sere imported . (Utrta . Undated) US. production of asbestos fiber never supplied more than about 20% of the nation's total asbestos demands and the best glades needed for fabrication of of is of nt's Metal's Reserve inch of the purchastical;grades. The ks were keenly "xordingly. During all amosite asheswas purchased and imported by MRC and provided under strict quotas to producers of asbestos-containing products almost entirely for the Navy. (War Production Board 1944) The expense and limited availability of imports provided the "asbestos-free" elements of American industry to continually offer insulation products to the Navy. Over the ensuing years many were adopted. Throughout and after the war, the Buy America Act providing encouragement to domestic firms to develop insulation materials made entirely from domestic materials 9War Production Board Asbestos Insulation Was Technically Mature Typical asbestos-containing insulation in use NAVAL ENGINEERSJOURNAL SPRING2005 Q$9 40 [3 PR ING2005 during WWII weighed from 12 to 27 pounds per cubic foot and had adequate thermal insulation capabilities . (Various WWII Navy Specs) While these products were good for the times, mineral wool and fibrous glass systems offered the promise of much lower weight and better insulation properties that would reduce each ship's total weight by many tons . Perhaps most importantly, at the end of WWII, asbestos insulation was at its performance limit. Asbestos products dated from 1866 and had been used and perfected for nearly 80 years by the end of the war. "85% magnesia " asbestos in Navy 1882 and had gpn tions and unnraue: Babcock and Wilcox; and Fiberfax, The Carborundum Company) The Navy Searched forNew and Better Insulation In 1959, the Bureau of Ships began an active search for more new products that weighed less, cost less, and were better insulators than their predecessors . (BUSHIPS memo 1959) This work slowly bore fruit. By 1960, many new products were in use and half were asbestos-free materials. By 1967, the Navy continued to move towards non-asbestos products with the number of asbestos insulation products having been reduced to less than half of all. (NSTM 1967)) 1970, these changes were being e of engineering goals, not because Insulation High current dollars a cost of many ask long fiber amosii insulation servic( and in scarce sub be shipped from Non-Asbestos Products ` Became More Popular With Time Over the years, many new insulation products were developed. A Bureau of Ships report from 1955 summarizes the development of four new non-asbestos materials. (BUSHIPS hr 1955) The material LK-61 was an "aerojel developed by Johns Manville for USS Nautilus (SSN 571) . The material was much lighter than the common in- sulation materials of the time but it dissolved in water. While it was tested in Nautilus, it was not ultimately approved for widespread use. Three other firms developed aluminum silicate refrac tory fiber materials for very high temperature service that were ultimately approved for use. (Thermoflex, 1200 Jon's Manville ; Kaowool, ienes About 1970 . :S ; Navy engineering !rted to the urgency of the b1Qm by a letter from Brit - Of the serious disease rate British "dockyards ." The it because of the problem, the animating the use of asbestos in their shipbuilding and programs, a process it had essentially eted by 1971 . (Harries 1971) In about the U. S. Navy initiated its own "Asbestos Elimination Program" . Almost immediately Navy acquisition of amosite felt and the pure amosite grades of preformed pipe insulation ceased . Work then began to qualify asbestos free substitutes for the remaining materials . By 1972 six asbestos-containing products remained on the approved list (NSTM 1972) and 6y1974 there were none. MIL-STD 769E 1974) The Navy asbestos elimination program continued on for many years to find and approve substitutes for the myriad of other asbestos-containing products used in Navy ships such as electric cable insulation, gaskets, packing, adhesives, caulks, and others . TABLE 1 summarizes these developments . Asbestos-containing product lines are highlighted in red for clarity. ` NAVAL ENGINEERS/OURNAL Navy Insulation Product Development Prohibiting Asbestos in Specifications Did Not SolveAll of the Problem By the end of 1974 the Nary was neither specifying nor purchasing asbestos or asbestos- containing thermal insulation materials either for new construction or for the repair of ships. (MIL-STD-769E 1974) But at that time there were still supplies of asbestos-bearing materials that had been acquired earlier. For some ships under construction or repair, money was found to dispose of the asbestos products purchased for them and to buy new asbestos-free product For others, existing asbestos insulation product were consumed to exhaustion . Several. material. "purges" were also conducted to rid the Navy of residual stores of asbestos materials. By the end of 1979, all asbestos insulation materials had been disposed of and ships delivered after then were free of asbestos insulation products. (NSTM 198 There were, however, still hun- dreds of ships built in the earlier pears that zver, still in service with asbestos insulation products While Navy safety procedures were instituted li the early 1970's and improved over the peens, there remained potential for asbestos-caused harm to workers and sailors aboard these ships until the insulation was replaced or the ship retired and recycled . , .. . . National Safety and Consumption Patterns Recent court decisions suggest that manufacturers of Navy hardware such as pumps and valves knew or should have known about the dangers of asbestos as far back as the 1940's and should have taken action to eliminate the material or at least warn their customers of the dangers. (Berkowitz v. A.C . and S, Inc. 2001)The available records concerning the regulation and consumption of asbestos do not support this expectation. TABLE 1 : 1sas 19156 1s67 1972 Not Not Not Not 5 ecificatfon Material Asb Asb Asb Asb Asb Asia Asb Asb 32P8 .... Wood pi pe ,... ...... . + 32P11 Molded cork + 3218 Molded block + 32P1 Thin feR szFS mickren + 3211 Thick batt + 3212 Thick bee 3215 Molded pipe + + 3271 3X14 Ta pe Cement + 32P10 Raster + 3X11 3X15 24D8 `. MIL-P-2781 Cloth Goth Cloth Molded pipe + + + + + + HH-F551 Moiled p i pe & bbck +++ MIL-F876 Molded cork + MIL-42819 Molded block + MIL-F-20077 Thin felt MIL-F-15091 'fhickfett + ++ MIL-415475 Thick bait +++ MIL-I-2878 Thick bad +++ '. MIL-416022 Thin felt + r MIL-T-15349 Ta pe MIL-G2861 Cement + +++ MIL-G2908 Raster ++ ': MIL-P-15280 MIL-P-52350 MIL-416471 '. MIL-422023 SS-G466 S MIL-G20079 Moiled sheet & tube Ro per Thick felt thin felt Cloth loth ++ ++ +++ ++ ++ + +++ '. MIL-G788 Cloth ++ MIL-R15006 Pa per + ! HH-9351 MIL-423128 MIL-I-24172 1 UU-8490 Board thin felt Moiled sheet & tube Pa per ++ ++ ++ ' SS-G160 Raster + 7 6 H-9 9 11 6 12 Total 13 18 20 18 safety standards as this knowledge spread and a corresponding decline in consumption as asbestos became progressively more difficult to use. As we will show, there were neither improved asbestos safety standards nor a decline in its consumption for nearly 30 years following the war. Consumption Continued to Climb and Asbestos Limits Stayed High The Navy was not the only consumer of asbestos and was not the only party that may have been concerned with asbestos safety issues . If the larger community of asbestos users knew of asbestos hazards, one would expect improved NAUALENGINEERS/OURNAL' Industrial Hygiene Standards Did Not Suggest Serious Danger (FISHER 1998) In 1938, the National Bureau of Standards set an American Standard Safety Code for mineral dusts, of which asbestos was only one, of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for continuous exposure of workers. This is equiva- SPRING 2005 [Ifl 42 [U;PRING2005 lent to about 177 particles per cubic centimeter. The threshold of visibility for airborne dust is about 10 particles per cubic centimeter so a limit of nearly eighteen times higher easily permitted visible airborne dust. In 1943, the U . S . Navy and the U. S . Maritime Commission jointly issued minimum safety and health standards for "contract shipyards', i.e., private shipyards building ships for the government. (US. Navy and Maritime Commission 1943) This document established minimum requirements for several safety and health matters with a focus on industrial safety, welding safer, fumes from welding and painting . Asbe was mentioned briefly as a material tha: be handled safelv with orooer veaYilaria changed Post In 1 ing tion fists (AC ence of it equal to the exvsli limit. The ACGIH 1 dard of the time for Walsh-Healy Act (193 6) and remained so for some 34 years until the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was created in 1970 . (Williams-Steiger 1970) OSHA issued an asbestos standard (5 f/cc) under its own authority in December of 1971 . The Measurement Method Changed The 5 mppcf limit was measured by a so-called `impinger method involving collection of dust in a water bath and then counting all particles in a measured volume of water. When new asbestos dust standards were later developed, the measurement method was changed to a socalled "membrane filter" method . This involved collecting dust on a filter and counting under a microscope only those particles defined as fibers, i .e ., having a length to diameter ratio of at least three, and counting only those fibers that were greater than 5 microns in length - the limit of visibility in the prescribed microscope. A sample drawn in an atmosphere containing 5 mppcf of asbestos dust would appear as roughly 30 fibers >5 microns under the new method. [The factor for conversion of mppcf to f/cc is contentious because asbestos mineral is originally a fibrous mass that is broken down into individual fibers by mechanical action . What is a non-fibrous in one setting such as asbestos mining Mme a large number of fibers in another asbestos textile production . The convertor,u5ed in this paper (Smppcf =30 f/cc from futile production] The balance of an the sample (177 less 30 particles per ntimeter) aright be asbestos "chunks" 1d break down to fibers after being Thus the new method might be nonative, but it is hard to tell in an industrial nenT just from what visible chunks are i later discussions, 30 fibers per cubic er .{flccj . areused as the reference basis nanne old and new standards. the 1970's as supplemented by ventilation was reviewed by the ACGIH in 151; 1956, 1958, 1960, and beyond . (Fischer Maritime 1998) In 1965, a paper published by the New York Academy of Science first questioned the suitability of the old limit and suggested that something lower is needed . (Schall 1965) At about that time the work of Dr. Irving Selikoff of New York City's Mount Sinai Hospital and many others began to make clear the nature of the asbestos hazard . But even then there was conflicting evidence. In 1968, the Industrial Hygiene Foundation of America reported that asbestos disease among workers was significantly reduced in industries that effectively used ventilation and respirators under the old 30 f/cc standard . (Goodman 1968) That same year, the U.S . Department of Labor declined to regulate asbestos dust as a hazard- ` NAUALENGINEERS/OURNAL ous agent in new shipbuilding labor standards. (US. Department of Labor, Wage and Labor Standards Administration National Airborne Asbestos Standards ACGIH Began Tightenii In 1967, the ACHIF tion in the allowable proposed 12 f/cq a 1 than the old 30 f/cc dust in the workplac posed 5 f/cc and in 7 limits for chrysotile, asbestos of 2, 0.5, ai split limits came fra ing among some exr cidolite are substant chrysotile . In 1991 f standard of 0 .2 f/cc there was no good fi between the three m 1997, it proposed a f/cc . (ACGIH 2001) the standards somev proposed and while sometimes different trend of ACGIH act not until about 197( community began re oration about the he FIGURE 1 illustrates t In later years, the Gc fully to ban asbestos usable in the US . The mineral dust limits were limits for asbestos dust remained very high and were not made truly restrictive until the 1990's . Yet recent court decisions manufacturers of equipment delivered during the 7940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 "dusty" years to the standard that has been only recently established . Figure 3: WorldAsbestos Production IM to 2000 World Asbestos Production Continued to Grow Until 1980 Throughout the 1940's and well beyond, the world production of asbestos fiber continued to increase rapidly. It is apparent from the consumption data that consumers of the fiber mere NAVAL ENGINEERS/OURNAL' not aware of concerns regarding health or safety or any other issue that might restrict the use of the mineral. (Virta) FIGURE 2 shows the fiber production trends and also indicates the time of the Navy's final effort to eliminate the last uses of asbestos thermal insulation . SPRING2005 03 900 soo .Q roo his is not the same ve asbestos fiber tats .] 600 on continued to c 00 500 ig the main thrust ilion program O ,s 400 NN a 300 Q v) zoo too nsumers were apwing recognition and the Navy's os-free insulation }, had no apparconsumption . L and then rose Business downturn Figure 4: U. 979 when, despite it began to decline 25 `p 20 Va =N G F-0 15 OU U a 0 10 o the growing iers of the fiber's arising from that ar 2000, however, umed, despite n$ onsumption ite consumption c to 1956 are not Q 5 faction of total peaking at about 20,000 tons _ , _ out 800,000 tons 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 per year for all asbestos as seen in Figure 3. Figure 5: US Amovte Consumption World consumption of asbestos fiber steadily increased to just over 5,000,000 metric tons of asbestos fiber per year in 1980, leveled off, and stayed above 4,000,000 metric tons until 1990 when it began to drop rapidly as the truly serious nature of the asbestos problem became well known. U.S. Total Asbestos Remained High Until 1979 American demand and consumption shows a pattern comparable tat world production and The Navy Was a Small Consumer Figure 4 suggests that the Navy's asbestos elimination program may have been responsible for the sudden decline in US . amosite consumption . This is not confirmed by examination of the insulation quantities demanded by Navy ships . The quantity of insulation in Navy ships of the 1970's ranged from about three long tons in a tugboat, about long 39 tons in a new DDG, and about 55 long tons in a nuclear powered cruiser. (VAdm.T.J . Bigley 1979)Aircraft carriers of course, carried much more. The US . Navy shipbuilding rate in the 1960's and 1970's 44 [3 PR ING2005 ` NAVAL ENGINEERSJOURNAL averaged about 14 ships per year totaling about 100,000 long tons light ship weight . (Colton Co .) If we assume that the full weight of all insulation in Navy ships of the time was amosite asbestos (and by far it was not) and we assume that the average ship was equivalent to a DDG in terms of its insulation burden, about 550 long tons of amosite would be needed to insulate 14 ships per year. Further assuming that an equal amount is needed for fleet maintenance, our estimated annual Navy consumption of 1,100 long tons still leaves us well short of the 700,000 to 800,000 metric tons of total asbestos or the 10,000 to 20,000 metric tons of amosite sumed annually at the time. Navy Actions Were Consistent with National Patterns While the Navy was a major; tos during WWII, thereafter tion increased and Navy ship declined, it became one of m industries in the US . and, if a eliminate asbestos use much other industrial sector. The ns hygiene community did not 6 tos as a special problem until even then, took about 20 yea. restrictive regulations . It was Navy equipmentmanufacturers could not be expected to have known from the 1940's to the 1970's that asbestos was a unique hazard and even if a manufacturer did know, a recommendation to warn the Navy would have been inconsistent witb the national consumption patterns and industrial hygiene regulations of the time . The Hardware Manufacturer's Perspective Manufacturers Products had to Meet Navy Department Specifications Equipment for Navy ships was manufactured in accordance with a large number of Navy De- partment Specifications promulgated by various Navy offices. Beginning about 1950, these spedfications were reissued as Military Specifications . There were many thousands of these specifications that detailed the design, construction end pre-delivery testing of ships, the equipment that goes in them and the materials from which they were made . Particular attention was paid to those features involving interfaces with systems or other manufacturer's equipment or affecting how the ship was operated . Even the content, organization and format of operating manuals (if any were required) was exactly defined by specification to ensure the crew could find the same type of information in the same place in each of the many manuals a ship carried. Similarly, the content, organization, and format of label plates from which they were i~fied so the crew could yes identity and key fall items such as some dates the necest into the bodies of the by ~thzr clauses have been 1 acquisitions in variowina WWII . These ts::demanded strict concations - no more and 'ior Navy approval for P-1995 1959) Additionally, Article 4 of the Special Provisions used for shipbuilding contracts states in part : "No changes shall be made in the contract, exclusive of the plans and specifications, except on written order of the Secretary of the Navy, and no changes shall be made in the plans and specifications unless approved in writing by the Secretary of the Navy or by the Chief of the Bureau of ships, as his duly authorized representative. . . ." See for example, the contract for construction of five Pletcher class destroyers (DD 498-502) executed in September 1940 with Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co . of Kearny, New Jersey NAVAL ENGINEERS/OURNAL' " SPRING 2005 [If5 46 [3 PR ING2005 Occasionally, equipment specifications themselves expressly required prior approval of any deviations from requirements . For example, Nary Department Specification 45V18(INT) of 1946 states : Specific approval shall be obtained where departunes are made from the referenced specifications." (Specification 45V18(INT) 1938) would be insulated in service was specifically relieved of any additional responsibility to his workers regarding asbestos through compliance with the then-current safety standards. Given the Governments contractual statement that all one needed to do regarding health hazards was to comply with Walsh-Healey standards in the workplace, it is not at all surprising that no manufacturer took the matter further. Such a practice appears to be rare in Navy Department specifications, likely because the issues of specification coi of changes were so tract clauses. Rega.. no reauirementsfo the early tion of at Nary co silent on sample e manuals warnings concerna for cleaning oily health issues were addressed national policies . General Pi Navy shipbuilding contracts contract clause invoking the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act were the vehicles . Such clauses required shipbuilders and equipment manufacturers to comply with the relevant safety, sanitary and factory inspection regulations of the time . Until 1967 as we have previously explained, the national asbestos dust standard was 30 f/cc . GP 17 specifically stated in part: "Compliance with [these laws] shall be prima-facie evidence of compliance with this subsection." Thus a machinery manufacturer who may have dealt with small amounts of asbestos gaskets or packing or might have known that tits product Safety and Health Warnings are Common Now, but Were Not Earlier machinery comes with operating instruodete with safety warnings and cautions eGCars . Reference to the reader's automoaXor?s .:manual makes that clear. It was gs so . Dozens of Bureau of Ships and ups Technical Manuals from the WW11 ough the 1960's covering piping systems, train propulsion equipment, electrical Lit, and others have been reviewed as oral equipment technical manuals prothe eauaoment manufacturers. It is rare ny personnel 5atety warnings, cautions, coons whatsoever in these documents . at are present deal with major system ahons such as turning off the steam to ie before opening it . The focus of these was ship, system, and machinery safety. >I safety was covered in separate safety such as "Safety Precautions for Shore 3 and others. (NAVSO P-2455 1965) The Navy Was Unlikely to Approve An Asbestos Warning A request from an equipment manufacturer to add an asbestos warning to his equipment would have been referred to the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) for action . Up to the late 1960's or early 1970's, BUMED would have noted that the national asbestos dust standard was very high, that work on the equipment was unlikely to release dust approaching this level, asbestos was widely used in Navy ships and in worldwide industry and the product manufacturers had reported no problems . Therefore, it is not believed BUMED would have takenEthe matter forward. ` NAVAL ENGINEERS/OURNAL Equipment Labels or Manuals Were the Wrong PlaceforAsbestos Warnings Furthermore, the proper place for warnings concerning asbestos insulation (or packing or gaskets) that were thought hazardous to the crew was not on an individual machine or item of equipment or in any of the hundreds of equipment technical manuals carried by a ship but in the long-established insulation or packing and gasket manuals covering the use of these products aboard ships, e .g., BUSHIPS Manual Chapter 39 (1938) The Navy did not see fit to include any warnings or cautions in any of such documents until 1972 . .. Sunimary and Conclusions The Navy's thermal insulation practic WWII on were consistent with nation consumption patterns, health and safel tion, and the available materials of the Navy developed more and more non-2 products in the years following WWII performance goals. It did not act to elt: asbestos insulation entirely until the ea when the health hazards of asbestos fil apparent to it and the nation . Nary ca were required to follow specifications ~. the Nary told them exactly what to dc any health hazard (follow Walsh Heal. of the abundant and continuing uses c throughout the country well into the 1970's and the acceptable dust levels permitted by Government standards until then, we believe that the Navy would not have approved an asbestos warning recommended by a manufacturer before then nor would ship's equipment have been the proper location for such a warning. The legal environment for any Navy equipment manufacturer is increasingly perilous . Recent court decisions are holding manufacturers to health standards and legal standards that did not exist until decades (and sometimes a half a century) after the equipment was built . The legal environment for other toxins may follow the same path . Should equipment manufacturers begin to be affected by this trend, there can and will be uncertainty and substantial confusion in the Navy's ship production and repair programs . Perhaps the Nary will be forced to recreate the pre-World War I practice of building everything itself and rely on its agency sovereign immunity for liability protection . Or perhaps military equipment manufacturers will demand some new form of complete indemnification from the Government . REFERENCES Bureau of Ships Technical Manual, Chapter 39, "Thermal Insulation ;" NAVSHIPS 250-000(39) August 24,1945 Cox, Captain memo Tuscaloosa CA 37 Specifications for covering and laqqmq submitted with 1 . M . letter CA37/539 (14) of 7 Apri 1 19 3 3 to Bu. Enq't Updated U . S , Naval Engineering Experiment Station, Annapolis, Report No, 7386, "Corrosion of Steel by Rock Wool Cement," September 9, 1935 Nary Department Office of Procurement aril Material, "Current Status of Cntical Materials, Vol ume #2,15 December 1943 Bureau of Sh ips letter Set 539-1/EN 28/A2, October 13, 19N2and Bureau of Shi ps letter $39-1(5H8)EN28/q2-11 of April 17,1443 BUSHI PS Notice 9390, Set 548-198, "Anti -sweat pipe insulation, procurement and installation oP'15April795a Virja, Robert L, "Worldwide Asbestos Supply and Consumption Trends from 1999 to 2040 " United States Geological Survey Open File Report03 83, Undated . Divisional Supplyand Requirements Decision No. 11 on Asbestos for1944, Requirements Committee, Cork, Asbestos and Fibrous Glass Division, War Production Board, February 1, 1944 . Bureau of Ships letter Set 446-23, Enclosure (2), "Excerpts for a presentation on the status of piping insulation by Mr. Sirotta, Code 548" 27 May 1995. Bureau of Ships Memorandum Set 648-M374, "Thermal Insulation for Piping Systems, request for investigation of;' 2s 1 my 1959 . Naval Ships Tech nical ManuaI,Chapter 9390,"Thermal Insulation ;' September 1967 and l July 1972 . Harries, P.G ., "Asbestos Dust Concentrations in Ship Repairing: A Practical Approach to Improving Asbestos Hygiene in Naval Dockyards;'Anna lsofOccupational Hygiene, Vol. 14, Perqamon Press, 1971 MIL-STD-769E (Ships), "Thermal Insulation Requirements for Machinery and Piping," 15 July 1974 NAVAL ENGINEERSJOURNAL SPRING 2005 [Jf7 Naval ShipsTechnicalManuaI,Chapter 635,"Thermal, Fire andAcousticlnsulation ;'FirsiRevision,4February1986 Berkowitzv. A.C . and 5., Inc., 733 N.Y. 52d 412 (Sup . Ct . App. 2001) "Asbestos in Shipbuilding, United States Shipbuilding Practices, 1930s-1970s;" Fisher Maritime Transportation Counselors Inc, 01998 "Minimum Requirements for Safety and Industrial Health in Contract Shipyards;" Approved by the Navy on January 20,1943 and by the Maritime Commission on February 9, 1943 Fleisher,W.E .andP.Drinker,"AHealth Survey ofPipe Covert nqOperations inConstruction ofNaval Vessels,' Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxoloy, January 1946. Walsh-HealeyPublic Contracts Aci*Aeloflune30,1936, ch .881,495tat2Q36,codifiedto41U5CA35to43,43a, 43 b, 44, 45 . Williams5teigerOCCUpatipnalSafety anclHealth Actof 1970,PL 91-595,Dec 29,1970,84Stat 1580,codifieclto 29 USCA 65110 675, 431,678 aid42 USCA 3142 1. Scha11,6L,"FreseniThresholdLimitValueiniheUSA forAsbestosf3usLACritique ;'NewYorkAtademyoF, Goodman,losephL,FibrousDusiSeminar1968,"AsbestosExposure iniheU.S .Textile lndusiry-1930todate;'Indusirial Hygiene Foundation of America, Inc ., pub . 1970 U .S, Department of Labor, Wage and Labor Standards Administration, "Safety and Health Regulations for Shipbuilding ;' 1968 . AGGIH, "Threshold Limit Values for Asbestos, All Forms;" 2001. Biqley, VAdm . T.1 ., VCNO (Logistics), Lir Ser 454D/318571 dated 8 February 1979 to Robert F. H uqhes, Acti nq Director of the U .S. General Accounting Office. CoItonCompany,Figure 4data . NAVEXOSP-1995,NauyContract Law,Second Edition, 1859;: Specification 45V18(INT),Valves,High Pressure,Globe andAngIe,Steel,?15January 1938andAmendment 2 dated 1 March 1946 . MpUSQP2455,"SaFefy Precautions forShore Activities ;' April 19H5 Bureau4fShipsManuaI,Chapter39,"Thermallnsulalion":or&ureeuofShipsIJIanuaI,Chapter95,"InsiructiQns Relative toGaskets andPackinqs;'Revisions dated 48 9PRING2005 ` NAVAL ENGINEERS/OURNAL