Document aBkKb2eOgqBqNOOyQg9qrM2KY

TO: Safety Directors TGG: JCL: MMG: AJO: RF XF: ---------------------------- Interoffice Communication FROM: DATE: SUBJ: T. G. Grumbles September 27, 1989 OSHA FINAL RULE: LOCKOUT/TAGOUT For those of you that didn't already request a copy, attached is an article summarizing the subject rule and a copy of the rule. The rule is effective October 31 this year, except for paragraphs (c)(4), (e)(7), and (f)(2) which are awaiting OMB approval. You should review current operation and maintenance practices to determine compliance or needed changes in procedures to comply with the rule. : L . __ T. G. Grumbles dlj SAFETY DIRECTORS Bruce Trego-Aber, Bill Jones-Balt, Harry Peirce-Blane, A. E. Russell-Hmd, K. L. Fogg-LCCP, R. V. Gantz-LCLAB, G. M. ShirleyLCVCM, J. D. Harris-Okc, R. B. Martin-Austin, D. A. Barclay, D. L. Morgan, J. R. Drumwright cc: PLANT MANAGERS w/o attachment R. W. Seymour-Aber, L. R. Bauer-Balt, G. D. Williams-Blane, J. B. Maher-Hmd, J. Friend-LCCP, J. W. Ware-LCLAB, R. A. Conrad-LCVCM, H. D. Garrison-Okc, P. L. Foote-Prem, V. W. Weiss-Austin T. H. Huffman, J. A. DeBernardi VVV 000013981 r -- -- 620 red meat, turkey, salami, to sausages. The facilities employ some 8,000 workers. In a prepared release, OSHA described the agreement as "an important milestone in the agency's continuing drive to cut the incidence in the meatpacking industry of [cumulative trauma disorders].'' While the agreement was heralded by Department of Labor officials, a union in the forefront of ergonomic issues warned against OSHA's trend toward corporate-wide agree ments, questioning whether the agency has either a method or the money to guarantee compliance. As part of the settlement, the company will hire ergono mic consultants to help map out a strategy for eliminating or reducing ergonomic stress using both engineering and administrative controls. The consultants also will help Sara Lee develop a training program for workers and supervisors. The company will Implement a program of early detec tion, treatment, and follow-up and train its medical person nel-including nurses--in the medical aspects of cumulative trauma, including evaluation, treatment, reporting, and fol low-up. "This is one of the most far-reaching agreements in history between an employer and OSHA," Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole said in a press release. Dole added that the breadth of the agreement and its implications "are crucial to the elimination of these hazards nationwide." In a prepared statement. Acting OSHA Administrator Alan C.. McMillan said, "Sara Lee deserves praise for its willingness to recognize the ergonomic hazards which pro duce [cumulative trauma disorders] or repetitive motion illnesses in the meat industry and to take positive steps to control those illnesses throughout its many meat processing plants." PHot Programs For Six Plants Under the agreement, an ergonomics "pilot program" will be established at six plants, including a Hillshire Farm plant in New London, Wis., the plant OSHA cited in November 1988 for four alleged willful violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act for exposing workers to cumulative trauma disorders. The other five plants to get pilot programs are: Kahn's & Co. of Cincinnati, Ohio; Standard Meat Co. of Fort Worth, Texas; Bryan Foods of West Point, Miss.; Bit Mar Foods Inc. of Garretsville, Ohio; and Gibbon Packing Co. of Gibbon, Neb. Under the agreement, the company will have to imple ment cumulative trauma control measures at the six plants within two years and put them in place corporate-wide in three years. Some of the Sara Lee meat facilities are located in states that operate their own job safety and health programs, namely California, Iowa, Michigan, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Virginia. The company will meet with each state OSHA program to iron out a pact similar to the one announced today with federal OSHA. the agency said. As part of the agreement, Sara Lee will pay a reduced penalty of $$,000 per cited violation and withdraw its con test of those citations, OSHA said. OSHA originally proposed penalties of $10,000 per citation. UFCW Lauds Agreement, Questions Policy While the agreement was lauded by OSHA officials, it raised some concern among the United Food & Commercial Workers International Union. Deborah E. Berkowitz, director of UFCW's office of occu pational safety and health, said she was "pleased" that the OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER settlement included ergonomic analysis, worker education, training, and medical management--four aspects that she considers critical for a sound ergonomic program. However, Berkowitz said the agreement again brings to the forefront the problem of monitoring multiple plant or company-wide agreements. Berkowitz faulted OSHA for not having a "rigid system" in place to ensure the companies are complying. Berkowitz said it would have been more "prudent" for OSHA to first issue its guidelines on reducing cumulative trauma disorders in the meatpacking industry, which are expected within a month or so (19 OSHR 204). In this way, the guidelines and the agreement "would dovetail," Berkowitz said. The UFCW--which was instrumental in agreements with IBP Inc. (18 OSHR 1196) and Empire Kosher Foods Inc. (19 OSHR 93)--was not a party to the negotiations with Sara Lee. The company had no immediate comment. Lockout/Tagout OSHA'S RULE FAVORS LOCKS OVER TAOS; UAW WANTS 'ONE-PERSON, ONE-LOCK' CLARIFIED The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is sued its much-anticipated lockout standard Sept. I that will require employers to lock out--when possible--switches oo machines to prevent them from accidentally restarting while workers are servicing them (54 FR 36644). The action--nearly 10 years in the making--prompted accolades from Capitol Hill but drew chagrin from labor unions, including the Auto Workers who earlier this year threatened to sue OSHA if the standard did not require "oneperson, one-lock"--meaning that each employee exposed to the hazard would have an individual lock to put on the energy source (18 OSHR 1863). According to the final rule, employers must use locks when the equipment is "capable of being locked out," and equipment that cannot be locked, must be tagged. The standard, which is expected to protect some 39 million workers, will go into effect Oct. 31, OSHA said. The preamble to the rule is published in the Full Text section of this <ssue and the final rule will be reflected in a future Reference File supplement "This standard has been one of my top safety and health priorities," Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole said in an Aug. 31 prepared statement, describing the rule as complet ing "a missing link in OSHA's general Industry standards." Rule Requires Comprehensive Program Under the final rule, employers must develop and use a comprehensive, written "energy control program" that in cludes step-by-step procedures for turning off and discon necting equipment, and for verifying that the equipment is de-energized and that stored energy has been dissipated before servicing or maintaining the equipment. Workers involved and affected by these processes must be initially and periodically trained. The rule does not require that employers include input from workers and labor unions when developing lockout procedures or training programs, which the UAW called a "terrible missed opportunity." As described in the notice, OSHA defines equipment that is "capable of being locked out" as that designed with a hasp or other fastener that a lock can go through or be affixed on, or that which has a locking mechanism built into it. A lock 9-6-69 Copyright C I960 by The Bureau of National Affaire, inc. 0OB&-3237/89/SO+.5O , 013992 y\/V OOO CURRENT REPORT 621 must be used if doing so will not require the employer to dismantle, rebuild, replace, or permanently alter the equip ment's switch that turns the equipment on and off. under the new rule. For example, some valves and breakers are not designed to be locked, but they can be secured with chains, blocking braces, or wedges, all of which can be locked. When switches, circuit breakers, or other such devices are installed in a single cabinet or box, employers must tag the specific switch or device, not the cabinet or box. Acting OSHA Administrator Alan C. McMillan said about 90 percent of electrical equipment and two-thirds of all energy control valves can be locked. After the rule becomes effective, McMillan said, any new or overhauled equipment must accommodate a lockout device. `Difficult Regulatory Dilemma' "The treatment of lockout vs tagout presents OSHA with a difficult regulatory dilemma," the agency said in the notice. "irj the issue were simply whether a lock or a tag will be better able to prevent equipment from being reactivated, there is no question that a lock would be the preferred method," OSHA said. The issue, however, is the use of locks and/or tags in a "comprehensive program of energy con trol," OSHA stressed in the notice. OSHA estimates the standard will cost the 631,000 affect ed establishments--primarily manufacturing and service Industries--9214 million the first year and $135 million in subsequent years. A small business can expect implementa tion costs to total $120 while costs for a larver firm can go up to $28,000, OSHA said. Mixed Reactions UAW President Owen Sieber sharply criticized the stand ard, saying it has loopholes that appear to "permit employ ers to escape the basic principle of `one-worker, one-lock.' " The UAW, which petitioned OSHA to write the standard in 1979, said the regulation does not state clearly that each worker exposed to the hazard must apply a lockout proce dure. Bieber, in a prepared release, said the union "will seek clarification from OSHA before taking further action." Barry J. White, director of OSHA's safety standards pro gram, told BNA that the rule does intend to embrace the "one-person, one-lock" aspect, but that the agency will clarify this in either a compliance directive or another notice. Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), who chairs the Labor and Human Resources Subcommittee on Labor said he "welcomed the new tougher safety standard" that he said would save lives, but he again criticized OSHA for 10 years of "shameful footdragging." Metzenbaum, who took the unusual move of testifying in opposition to the proposed rule during a public hearing, said he believes the rule should apply to the maritime, agricul ture, and construction industries, which it does not The standard's "limited'* scope also raised the concern of Margaret Seminario, AFL-CIO associate director for occu pational safety and health. The rule does not cover oil and gas well drilling; the generation, transmission and distribution of electric power by utilities; and electrical work on electric conductors or equipment. While OSHA said it is working on "future rulemakings" to cover these industries, Seminario said OSHA has a track record of "never getting around" to doing it The agency published the proposed rule April 1988 (17 OSHR 1766) and held hearings on the proposal later that fall (18 OSHR 896, 974). For more information, contact James Foster. OSHA. U S. Department of Labor. Room N-3649, 200 Constitution Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20210; (202) 523-8148. Formaldehyde STAY ON FOUR LABELING REQUIREMENTS EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1990, AGENCY SAYS Employers must continue to warn their workers of the risks of formaldehyde exposure using the Occupational Safe ty and Health Administration's hazard communication standard--not the formaldehyde standard--at least until the agency irons out all the details affecting both rules, the agency said Aug. 29 (54 FR 35639). OSHA issued the instructions in a Federal Register notice announcing that the agency is extending the adminis trative stay on four labeling provisions of the formaldehyde standard until June 13,1990. The stay was set to expire Sept. 13 (18 OSHR 1371). A year after OSHA published its final rule on formalde hyde in 1987, the agency issued an administrative stay on provisions pertaining to the information that employers need to put on formaldehyde containers as well as the containers of formaldehyde-treated products to warn work ers of the hazards associated with that substance. The two other provisions involved in the stay set require ments for when formaldehyde constitutes a health hazard and information that needed to be included on material safety data sheets. OSHA announced at the time it issued the stay that it planned to revoke these provisions and possibly replace them with warning requirements under the agency's hazard communication standard. However, OSHA has not completed work on amendments to the hazard communication standard that the agency said are "relevant" In deciding whether to indeed replace the four provisions of the formaldehyde rule with hazard com munication requirements. While the stay is in effect, OSHA reminded employers that they must continue to comply with the hazard communica tion standard. For more information, contact James Foster. OSHA, Of fice of Information and Consumer Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N-3647, 200 Constitution Ave. N.W., Wash ington, D C. 20210; (202) 523-8151. Respirators OSHA, NIOSH WORKING ON RULES AFTER BUDGET OFFICE NIXES PROPOSALS Earlier this summer, the budget office returned the Occu pational Safety and Health Administration's draft respira tory protection proposal, telling the agency to "incorporate" its efforts with the National Institute for Occupational Safe ty and Health, which is currently revising the way respira tors are certified. The budget office, at the same time, also asked NIOSH to give the respirator certification proposal its "highest prior ity" in order to allow OSHA and the Mine Safety and Health Administration to finish their related rules. An OSHA official told BNA that the agency continues to work on its proposal, but could not speculate when a new draft would be resubmitted to the Office of Management and Budget. The official also said NIOSH was expected to issue its proposal "soon." 9-6-89 Occupational Safaty a Heattft Reporter 009S-323?/B8/W*50 VVV 000013983 CURRENT REPORT said he is uncomfortable comparing this year's logging fatalities with similar logging seasons in the past, because it may imply that it is all right to experience a certain number of deaths. While one fatality is one too many, using the "enforce* ment hammer is the easy way out," Miller countered. The main task is to train people and prevent accidents, yet the division always wants to use enforcement to solve the problem, the industry official said. "Accident prevention is not just law enforcement, it's training and follow-up and having a positive image, and (the division] doesn't have a positive image," Miller said. "We are not inundated by requests from loggers (for consulting]," responded Sparks. While the division has ac tively consulted with loggers for years, it remains an en forcement agency too, he added. An industry trend during the past decade that has set back safety improvement in logging is the reduction in large company logging operations and the growth of small, inde pendent firms. Sparks and others in the Industry argue (18 OSHR 1758). Most logging now is done by small firms that have leas time and money to spend on safety, training, and supervision. Contract logging is a highly competitive busi ness, and workers' compensation rates for loggers run as high as 40 percent of wages. Publications WORKER SAFETY NEEDS TO BE ELEVATED TO PRIORITY LEVEL OF ENVIRONMENT, GROUP SAYS' Public indifference, government policy, and business atti tudes are barriers to improving occupational safety and health in the 1990s, according to a report issued by the National Safe Workplace Institute and released Sept 4. The report. "UNMET NEEDS--Making American Work Safe For The 1990s," decried the low priority that govern ment and the general public give to workplace safety and called for an "awakening" to put worker protection cm an equal footing with environmental protection. According to the report's estimates, the federal govern ment spends nearly 20 times more on environmental protec tion than it does on worker protection. This year, the House increased the budget for the Environ mental Protection Agency by (839 million--twice the amount of the entire Occupational Safety and Health Admin istration's budget, the report said. Not only should OSHA's coffers be bigger, but tee agency should have the legal muscle to impose tougher and higher penalties on employers who violate the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the report said. In the report, the Institute--a Chicago-based non-profit, worker safety advocacy group--noted that a violation of environmental laws can bring federal fines of $25,000 per day and 15-year prison terms. A willful violation of an OSHA standard, on the other hand, can bring only a fin* of up to $10,000 and six months in prison, if the violation results in a death, it said. The report praised Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole's efforts thus far with worker safety, including such "promis 633 ing examples'' as the department's confined space standard and its actions against Friction Division Products Inc. (19 OSHR 451) and Ford Motor Co. (19 OSHR 203). Equally significant, the report said, "Dole has given OSHA career personnel a sense of purpose, building the agency's morale." Among the host of recommendations for OSHA. the report called on the agency to implement standards on video display terminals, ergonomics, and motor vehicle safety and to standardize its material safety data sheets, which are required under the agency's hazard communication standard. The report also suggested that businesses be required to reveal workplace safety and health records in their annual reports, and that the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health have an annual conference to share its research with other scientists. For more information, contact the Institute at 122 South Michigan Ave., Suite 1450, Chicago, 111. 60803; (312) 939-0690. Diapiay Terminals OFFICE TECHNOLOGY CENTER PUBLISHES SECOND COMPILATION OF VDT RESEARCH A 150-page collection of abstracts from recent major studies on health and safety issues surrounding the use of video display terminals, is. currently available tern the Center for Office Technology, ? New York-based clearing house for information on automated office technology. The book, "Latest Studies on VDTs, Second Edition," is a collection of international abstracts of studies by scientists, academicians, and health experts. Each abstract includes a summary of the issue investigated by the study, the methods used to conduct the investigation, results, and conclusions of the study. The abstracts are divided into six parts. The first five focus on visual research and display quality, musculoskele tal research and workstation design, stress and job design, radiation, and pregnancy outcome. The sixth part provides genera] reviews of the research, recommendations, and guidelines. According to a COT announcement, the book is designed to be used as a reference tool for anyone interested in the findings of basic research conducted on issues related to VDT use. While the book contains only abstracts of studies, copies of the full text of each study may be obtained from COT. The Center for Office Technology was formed in 1985 by a coalition of associations, employers, and manufacturers of automated office technology to serve as a center for current information on office technology and to create and dissemi nate related educational materials. The first edition of "Latest Studies on VDTs" was pub lished in March 1987. The abstracts for both editions were compiled for COT by Ergosyst Associates Inc., a profession al scientific abstracting firm. For more information, contact the Center for Office Tech nology, 575 8th Ave., 14th Floor, New York, N Y. 10018-3011; (212) 560-1298. s-e-as Occupational Safety & Haaltti Reporter 009S-3237/89/SO+.50 ooooi39a4 634 Review Commission Activity ACTIVITY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION This Section includes -- Review Commission Final Orders: Judges' reports that have become final, with date of finality. Court Cases: Filings and dispositions of appeals from commission decisions in the federal courts. Notices of Contest: Notices of contest to Labor Department citations. REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL ORDERS Dnrez Div. of Occidental Chemical Corp., Secretary of Labor v., 8/14/89--citation alleging other-than-serious vio lation of 1910.1200<gX2Xiv), for failure to list target organs affected due to phenol exposure on material safety data sheet, is affirmed with no penalty assessed; employer manu factures phenol formaldehyde polymeric molding compound under name Durez 153; MSDS for Durez 153 lists phenol as hazardous ingredient comprising up to five percent of com pound and states that traces of phenol vapor may be re leased during curing process, and that OSHA permissible exposure limit for phenol is five parts per million; employer argued that (1) MSDS for Durez 153 met requirements of hazard communication standard as chemical compound did not release phenol vapors in excess of OSHA PEL and employer's studies showed that Durez 153 did not pose hazard to heart, lungs, or kidneys; (2) HCS as interpreted by secretary of labor here exceeded agency's statutory promul gation authority; (3) present enforcement of HCS violated employer's constitutional guarantee of free speech; (4) as interpreted by OSHA, HCS defeated employer's ability to meet its tort law duty to warn effectively; and (5) violation, if any, was de minimis. Employer argued that Durez 153 was chemical compound of phenol and formaldehyde that did not retain those chemi cals' identities, and, therefore, Durez 153 should be classi fied as "chemical" and be governed under 1910.1200(d); employer's characterization is found to be correct, however, because Durez 153 releases traceable amounts of phenol vapor, which retains its chemical identity, 1910.1200(dX3Xi) compels chemical manufacturer to consider phenol as haz ardous substance, and, therefore, its potential health hazards must be documented on MSDS; furthermore, employer's argument that MSDS for Durez 153 satisfies standard's requirements because it does not release phenol in excess of PEL is rejected; such argument was specifically rejected in standard's preamble and by U S. Court of Appeals for Dis trict of Columbia Circuit; where actual or potential expo sure to chemicals are intrinsically hazardous, HCS applies regardless of exposure levels. Employer's argument that secretary's interpretation of HCS requiring target organ information when no significant risk of harm is found was beyond secretary's authority is also rejected; secretary has determined that inadequate communication is itself hazard; it is found that secretary satisfied threshold determination that significant risk of harm due to exposure to hazardous chemicals exists in workplace, and that HCS was reasonably necessary to rem edy that risk. Next, employer's argument that secretary's interpretation violates its right to free speech also is rejected; employer's obligation to list potential health hazards of certain hazard ous chemicals directly advances government's asserted in terest in workers' safety and health. Employer's defense that secretary's requirement of target organ warnings on MSDS might obscure or render effective other more imminent health warnings, such as dermal sensi tivity, thereby defeating employer's ability to meet common law tort duty to warn customers of any hazards inherent in its products is rejected; target organ warning requirements fulfill employer's duty to warn, and other health warnings become no less effective with the inclusion of all potential hazards. Finally, employer's argument that violation should be classified as de minimis is rejected; secretary correctly argued that providing phenol health warnings has direct and immediate relationship to safety and health; duty to provide such information is part of integrated system of notice and training, and should not be dependent upon speculation as to whether any significant risk of harm is actually presented to workers (Furcolo, Judge; No. 88-943). Galaxy General Contractors, Secretary of Labor v,, 8/14/89--serious citation with item alleging violation of 1926.100(a), for failure to provide hard hats, is affirmed; item alleging violation of 1926.451(3X15), for failure to properly brace scaffolding, is affirmed; items alleging fail ure to provide guardrail on wall opening (1926.500(cXl)), on open-sided platform (!926.500(dXl)), and on open-sided run way (1926.500(dX2)) are affirmed; and other-than-serious citation with item alleging violation of l903.2(aXl), for failure to post OSHA notice, is affirmed; item alleging violation of 1926.150(aXl), for failure to develop fire preven tion program, is affirmed; item alleging violation of 1926.152(aXl), for failure to properly store flammable and combustible liquids, is affirmed; item alleging violation of 1926.350(aX4), for failure to properly transport compressed gas cylinders, is affirmed with aggregate penalty of $2,050. At time of inspection at New York City work site, employ ees of Galaxy General Contractors were engaged in building two five-story apartment buildings. At preliminary hearing employer's notice of contest was declared late: after conducting research on issue, it was 9-8-89 Copyright 9 1989 by The Bureau of National Affairs, me. 0095-3237/89AO-*- 50 00i J98s CURRENT REPORT 635 decided that both Court of Appeals and commission gave tribunal power to allow filing non pro tunc; under 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, revised and amended decision was written modifying original decision that notice of contest was viable and ordered secretary to file her complaint; when bearing opened, assistant solicitor an nounced that case was settled five minutes prior to opening of bearing; employer withdrew notice of contest and com plainant agreed to reduce penalties (Oringer, Judge; No. 881137). Koppers Co., Secretary of Labor v., 8/21/89--citation alleging serious violation of general duty clause, Section 5(aXl) of Occupational Safety and Health Act, is affirmed, with penalty of 31,000 assessed. Two employees were working on surface of structural steel platform in employer's coke plant when platform collapsed; accident resulted in death of one employee and caused serious injury to another, over time, steel beams supporting platform had rusted and deteriorated, and plat form was sagging in southwest corner, condition was ob served by employees on several occasions before accident and reported to employer's supervisory personnel. On day before accident, employee who regularly worked in area of platform noticed support beam had come loose from groove and reported condition to safety director who in turn advised assistant plant supervisor; supervisor asked mechanic supervisor to inspect condition and take appropri ate corrective action; mechanic supervisor inspected plat form on morning of accident; condition created clear harm to employees working on or around platform and should have placed reasonably prudent person on notice that plat form was unstable and subject to collapse; however, me chanic supervisor took no measures to prevent employees from working on or around platform during period when platform was undergoing repair. Employer has extensive safety program administered by full time safety director, and regular safety meetings and inspections are conducted; employer committed serious vio lation of general duty clause by permitting employees to work on or around unstable platform; acts of employer's supervisor are properly characterized as negligent or care less, rather than intentional or deliberate; accordingly, em ployer did not commit willful violation, and proposed penal ty of $10,000 is reduced to $1,000 (Salyers, Judge; No. 882094). Onnet Corp., Secretary of Labor v., 8/21/89--citation item alleging violation of 1910.212(a)(1), for failure to guard adequately point of operation on cradle straightening press, is vacated; item alleging violation of 1910.213(iXl), for fail ure to guard adequately non-working position of saw blade, is vacated. Employer is manufacturer of aluminum products; hydrau lically powered cradle press is used to straighten cradles, those structural members which have bent during produc tion process; press is activated by either of two foot trea dles; when treadle is depressed, moving ram or jaw moves against cradle and fixed ram or jaw, point of operation is between movable jaw and cradle being straightened. Two employees--operator and helper--are utilized in op eration; inspecting officer contended that helper is exposed to hazard because of inadequate guarding of point of oper ation; to establish violation, secretary must prove existence of hazard; testimony is not refuted that helper's duties required him to stand four to eight feet away from press while it was activated; furthermore, slow rate of speed of movable jaw, and fact that jaw immediately returns to open position when operator lifts foot from treadle are other factors that prevent helper from being exposed to hazard: because no prior injuries had been sustained, and there is no reason for helper to place hand in point of operation, no violation has been established. Compliance officer also cited employer for violation of 1910.213(0(1); compliance officer testified that distance be tween saw blade and front of guard was one and threefourths inches, and that guard does not prevent someone from getting bands in and contacting front of guard: employ er's worker, manager, and safety officer testified that they were unaware of any injuries and that guard was adequate: secretary has burden of proving guard was inadequate: evidence in this case, including fact that inspecting officer did not observe saw in operation, fails to establish violation (Brady, Judge; No. 88-1257). Rawson Contractors Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 8/21/89-- employer's application for award of attorney's fees and expenses, under Equal Access to Justice Act, is denied. Employer filed application for fees and expenses for time spent and costs incurred in connection with two citations issued to it by Occupational Safety and Health Administra tion, relating to instructions in recognition and avoidance of unsafe working conditions (29 CFR 1926.21(bX2)) and failure to shore or otherwise support sides of trench (29 CFR 1926.652(c)); employer filed notice of contest, and after hearing and post-hearing briefs, administrative law judge vacated citations and proposed penalty. Employer's application for attorney's fees and expenses is based on assertion that action of secretary was not substan tially justified and that company prevailed in proceedings before commission; because commission let stand ALJ's decision vacating citation, employer was clearly prevailing party; on issue of whether secretary's position was substan tially justified, evidence shows that compliance officer ob served employee standing on teeth of hydraulic excavator bucket and thereby subject to fall of about twenty feet into trench; furthermore, secretary was advised that it was not accepted practice to ride on attachment to excavator; there fore, secretary was substantially justified in issuing citation. Compliance officer also saw employee working at bottom of.trench varying from 12 to 20 feet deep; while there was metal shield in trench, there were few feet unshored at manhole under construction. Test of whether government action is substantially justi fied is essentially one of reasonableness; standard does not require government to establish that its decision to litigate was based on substantial probability in prevailing; based on foregoing factors, secretary was substantially justified in issuing citation and filing complaint with commission to affirm citation; it was only on basis of facts adduced at hearing and not available to secretary prior thereto that citation was vacated (Goldstein, Judge; No. 87-1365). COURT CASES Suburban Restoration Co. v. Secretary of Labor, appeal filed by employer 8/23/89, CA 3, No. 89-3581 (OSHRC No. 88-710, 19 OSHR 220). NOTICES OF CONTEST Abbott Contractors Inc., Lombard, 111., is contesting a serious citation and a $2,100 penalty for six items, including 1926.59(h), for failure to provide employees with informa tion and training on hazardous chemicals in the work area; 1926.200(gXl), for failure to post legible traffic signs at hazardous points; and 1926.651(s), for failure to install barri- 9-6-89 Occupational Satoty & Haaitn Reporter 0095-3237/B9fl+.50 VVV 000013986 636 cades where mobile equipment was located next to excavations. The employer also is contesting a non-serious citation for 1926.21(b)(2), for failure to instruct eacb employee to recog nize and avoid unsafe conditions in the workplace; and 1926.59(e)(3), for failure to provide a written hazard commu nication program (No. 89-2249). David Abrea Vineyards, Rutherford, Calif., is contesting a serious citation and a $560 penalty for 1926.110(c)(lXm), for failure to have potable water in single use drinking cups or water fountain; and 1928.110(c)(2)(i), for failure to provide adequate toilet facilities for employees. The employer also Is contesting a non-serious citation for 1904.2(a), for failure to keep a log of all recordable injuries and illnesses (No. 89-2330). Advance Boiler and Tank Co., Milwaukee, Wis., is contest ing a failure to abate citation and an $8,000 penalty for violation of Section 5(aXl), general duty clause, for exposing employees to oxygen-deficient atmospheres and excess con centrations of organic substances. The employer also is contesting a serious citation and a $2,560 penalty for 1910.132(a), for failure to use personal protective equipment; 1910.134(bX2), for failure to select respirators properly; and 1910.134(f)(1), for failure to prop erly maintain respiratory protective equipment. The employer also is contesting a non-serious citation for 1904.2(a) for failure to maintain a log of all recordable occupational injuries and illnesses (No. 89-2255). Advanced Automated Feeder Co., Westlake, Ohio, is con testing a failure to abate citation and a $3,000 penalty for 1910.1200(b), for failure to provide information and training on hazardous chemicals in the work area; 1910.1200(eXl), for failure to develop or implement a Written hazard communi cation program; and 1910.1200(gXl), for failure to have a material safety data sheet for each hazardous chemical in the workplace. The employer also is contesting a serious citation and a $900 penalty for 1910.219(dXl), for failure to guard pulleys; 1910.252(aX2Xli)(b), for failure to properly locate storage spaces for compressed gas cylinders; and 1910.157(gXl). lor failure to provide employees with information on firefight ing and fire extinguisher use. The employer also is contesting a non-serious citation for l910.37(qXl), for failure to mark exits with readily visible signs (No. 89-2265). Anchor Blass Container Corp., DayvtUe, Conn., is contest ing a willful citation and an $8,000 penalty for 1910.27(dX2Xi), for failure to provide landing platforms; 1910.28(aXl), for failure to provide ladders or scaffolds; and 1904.2(a), for failure to provide a log and summary of occupational injuries and illnesses. The employer also is contesting a serious citation and a $6,100 penalty for 12 items, including 1910.23(aX8), for failure to guard floor holes; 1910.23(cXl), for failure to guard open-sided floors or platforms; and 1910.1000(aX2), for exposing employees to heavy concentrations of air con taminants (No. 89-2407). Andreassi Equipment Co., Boston, Mass., is contesting a willful citation and a $17,000 penalty for 1926.100(a), for failure to provide employees with protective helmets; 1926.652(c), for failure to shore sides of trenches in hard or compact soil; and 1926.652(e), for failure to shore or brace sides of trenches adjacent to backfilled excavations (No. 892416). OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER Armour Food Co., Eaa Claire, Wis., is contesting a willful citation and a $10,000 penalty for 1904.2(a), for failure to complete a log and summary of occupational injuries and illnesses. The employer also is contesting a serious citatioo and a $1,000 penalty for violations of Section 5(aXl). general duty clause, for exposing employees to cumulative trauma stres sors of hands, wrists, and arms, and on upper extremes of trunk and body, all resulting from repetitive reaching and lifting motions (No. 89-2250). Carpentry Interiors of New York Inc., Melville, N.Y., is contesting a repeat citation and a $400 penalty for 1904.2(a), for failure to maintain a log of all occupational injuries and illnesses. The employer also is contesting a non-serious citation for !926.20(bX2), for failure to initiate a regular inspection program of jobsite; and 1926.25(a), for failure to keep debris free from work areas (No. 89-2347). Champion Home Builders Co., Sangerfield, N.Y., is con testing a serious citatioo and a $2,070 penalty for eight items, including 1910.133(aXl), for failure to require protec tive eye equipment; 1910.22(aXl), for failure to keep place of employment in clean, sanitary condition; and 1910.156(cXl), for failure to provide training and education for fire brigade members (No. 89-2346). John L. Clemmey Co., Mansfield, Man., is contesting a repeat citation and a $560 penalty for 1910.178(pXl). for failure to withdraw defective trucks from operation. The employer also is contesting a serious citation and a $700 penalty for l910.106(eX6Xi), for failure to take precau tions against the ignition of flammable vapors; 1910.212(aX$Xii), for failure to guard machinery points of operation; and 1910.106(eX6Xii), for failure to properly dis pense flammable liquids into containers (No. 89-2409). Combustion Engineering, Uncasville, Conn., is contesting a repeat citation and an $18,800 penalty for eight items, including 1926.25(a), for failure to keep debris from work areas; 1926.350(j), for failure to properly store oxygen cylin ders; and 1926.352(b), for failure to confine beat, sparks, and slag. The employer also is contesting a serious citation and a $2,500 penalty for four items, including 1926.303(cXl). for failure to provide safety guards on floor stand or benchmounted external abrasive grinding wheels; 1926.45 l(iX8), for failure to provide each employee on suspension scaffold with approved safety life belt; and 1926.403(h), for failure to properly mark each service, feeder, and branch circuit (No. 89-2412). E & F Construction Co., New Haven, Conn., is contesting a serious citation and a $2,500 penalty for six items, including 1926.58(eX6Xiv), for failure to comply with mandatory pro visions of an OSHA regulation; l926.58(fX2Xi). lor failure to perform initial monitoring at each asbestos job; and 1926.59(eXl), for failure to provide a hazard communication program; and 1926.59(gXl), for failure to provide an MSDS for each hazardous chemical in the workplace (No. 89-2406). Fireside Construction Co., Los Angeles, Calif., is contest ing a repeat citation and a $1,620 penalty for 1926.451(dX10), for failure to install standard guardrails and toeboards on tubular welded frame scaffolds (No. 89-2261). Garden State Brickface & Stucco Co., Berlin, Conn., is contesting a willful citation and a $60,000 penalty for six items, including 1926.20(bX2), for failure to have frequent and regular inspections of a jobsite; 1926.451(aX3), for fail- 9-6-69 Copyrigm 1969 by Ths Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 0096-3237/99*0+.50 VVY 000013987 CURRENT REPORT 637 are to erect scaffolding under the supervision of a compe tent person; and 1926.451(a)(8), for failure to repair or replace damaged scaffolds and accessories. The employer also is contesting a serious citation and a $1,000 penalty for 1926.100(a), for failure to provide protec tive helmets (No. 89-2411). Golden Metal Product* Inc., Elmwood Park, N.J., is con testing a failure to abate citation and a $2,800 penalty for 1910.217(eXlXi)> for failure to maintain records of mechani cal power press inspections and maintenance work per formed (No. 89-2270). Greensleeves Inc., Passaic, NJ., is contesting a serious citation and a $1,020 penalty for 1910.37(kX2), for failure to property maintain exits; 1910.37(qX2), for improperly mark ing exit doors; and 1910.215(aX4), for failure to use grinding machinery with work rests. The employer also is contesting a non-serious citation for 1904.7, for failure to provide OSHA forms for inspection and copying; and 1903.2(aXl), for failure to post an OSHA notice in a conspicuous place (No. 89-2268). Hartford Stone Works Inc., New Haven, Conn., is contest ing a serious citation and a $640 penalty for 1926.20(bX2), for failure to provide frequent and regular jobsite inspec tions; and 1926.28(a), for failure to provide personal protec tive equipment (No. 89-2414). ICS Interior Constraction Services, St. Louis, Mo., is con testing a serious citation and a $360 penalty for 1926.160(eXl), for failure to provide an alarm system (No. 89-2278). J & B Steel Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, is contesting a serious citation and a $3,760 penalty for 1926.21(bX2), for failure to instruct each employee to recognize and avoid hazards in the workplace; 1926.25(a), for failure to keep debris clear from work areas; and 1926.451(aX13), for failure to provide an access ladder to scaffolds. The employee also is contesting a non-serious citation for 1926.59(eXl), for failure to provide a written hazard commu nication program; and 1926.150(aX3), for failure to conspicu ously locate firefighting equipment (No. 89-2264). Lisanti Foods Inc., Totowa, N.J., is contesting a serious citation and a $2,760 penalty for eight items, including 1910.30(aXl), for failure to have strong portable dockboards; 1910.36(b)(4), for failure to clear debris from building exits; 1910.176(a), for failure to keep aisles clear of debris; 1910.176(c), for failure to keep storage areas free of litter, and 1910.l78(kXl), for failure to set brakes on highway trucks in loading dock area to keep them from rolling (No. 89-2349). Ovation Instruments Inc., New Hartford, Conn., is con testing a willful citation and a $10,000 penalty for violations of Section S(aXl), general duty clause, for employee expo sure to repetitive motions of fingers, wrists, and hands; for carpal tunnel syndrome resulting from hand tool vibration; and inflammation of finger flexor and abductor tendons, from such operations as hand sanding, scuffing, and wet sanding. The employer also is contesting 1904.2(a), for failure to keep a log and summary of occupational injuries and ill nesses (No. 89-2415). Portuguese Structural Steel Inc., Newark, N.J., is contest ing a serious citation and a $1,200 penalty for five items, including 1926.21(b)(2), for failure to instruct employees to recognize and avoid unsafe conditions in the workplace: 1926.352(d), for failure to provide suitable fire extinguishing equipment; and 1926.404(bXlXi), for failure to use ground fault circuit interrupters or an assured equipment grounding conductor program (No. 89-2345). J.R. Remington Co., Enfield, Conn., is contesting a serious citation and a $1,300 penalty for 1926.501(d), for allowing debris on stairways; 1926.352(b), for failure to use guards to confine heat, sparks, and slag; and 1926.352(d), for failure to provide fire extinguishing equipment for immediate use (No. 89-2413). Stainless Systems, Elma, N.Y., is contesting a serious citation and a $1,200 penalty for 1926.59(eXl), for failure to develop or implement a written hazard communication pro gram; 1926.59(gXl), for failure to provide an MSDS for each hazardous chemical in the workplace; and 1926.59(h), for failure to provide information and training on hazardous chemicals in the work area (No. 89-2275). Super Excavators Inc., MUwankee, Wis., is contesting a repeat citation and a $240 penalty for 1926.251(bXl), for failure to properly identify alloy steel slings. The employer also is contesting a serious citation and a $240 penalty for 1926.59(eXl), for failure to develop or implement a written hazard communication program: 1926.59(gXl), for failure to have an MSDS for each hazard ous chemical in the workplace (No. 89-2253). T dr T Lumber Inc, Cortez, Colo., is contesting a failure to abate citation and a $10,200 penalty for 1910.22(c), for failure to provide covers or guardrails along shaker roll case conveyor, 1910.265(cX22), for failure to maintain me chanical power-transmission apparatus; and 1910.26(cX4Xiv), for failure to provide standard railing on elevated walkways and runways. The employer also is contesting a repeat citation and a $600 penalty for six items, including 1910.265(cX4Xiv), for failure to provide standard railing on elevated walkways and runways; 1910.265(cXl2)(i), for failure to properly install and maintain electrical equipment; and 1910.265<dXlXu)(h), for failure to equip log handling machines with a horn. The employer also is contesting a serious citation and a $240 penalty for 1910.265(cX18Xi), for failure to operate and maintain conveyors properly (No. 89-2303). Texas A.C.A. lac., Lancaster, Texas, is contesting a repeat citation and a $600 penalty for 1926.451(dX10), for failure to guard all open ends of tubular welded frame scaffolds. The employer also is contesting a serious citation and a $540 penalty for 1926.150(aXl), for failure to develop a fire protection program; 1926.l50(cXlXt). for failure to provide adequate supply of fire extinguishers; and 1926.451(aX4), for failure to install guardrails on open sides and ends of platforms and scaffolds (No. 89-2408). Trump Plaza Hotel and Casino, Atlantic City, N.J., is contesting a serious citation and a $560 penalty for failure to provide machine guarding on a trash compactor. The employer also is contesting a non-serious citation for 1910.22(aX2), for failure to maintain floors of workrooms in as dry condition as possible; and 1910.305(bX2)t for failure to provide each outlet box in completed installations with a cover (No. 89-2348). Unilliance Inc., Port Clinton, Ohio, is contesting a serious citation and a $200 penalty for 1926.59(eXl), for failure to develop or implement a written hazard communication pro gram; 1926.59(gXl>, for failure to have an MSDS for each hazardous chemical in the workplace; and 1926.59(h), for failure to provide employees with information and training on hazardous chemicals in the work area (No. 89-2245). 9-6-89 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter 0095-3237/89/SC+ SO VVV 000013988 638 Full Text PREAMBLE TO OSHA RULE FOR CONTROL OF HAZARDOUS ENERGY SOURCES (LOCKOUT/TAGOUT) [54 FR 36644, Sept. 1, 1989] DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Occupational Safety and Health Administration 29CFR Part 1910 [Dockat Na S-012A1 RIN 1218-AAS3 Control of Hazardous Energy Soureas (Lockout/Tigout) aosmcy; Occupational Safety and Health Administration. (OSHA). agtkmc Final rule. summary: The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is issuing a standard detailing safety requirement for the control of hazardous energy as a new f 1910.147. This standard addresses practices and procedures that are necessary to disable machinery or equipment and to prevent the release of potentially hazardous energy while maintenance and servicing activities are being performed. The standard requires that lockout be utilized for equipment which it designed with a lockout capability except when the employer can demonstrate that utilization of tagout provides full employee protection. For equipment which was not designed to be locked out the employer may use tagout In addition, die standard also supplements and supports the existing lockout related provisions contained elaewhere in the general industry standards by providing diet comprehensive and uniform procedures be used for complying with those provisions. This standard applies to genera) industry employment under 29 CFR part 1910. but does not cover maritime, agriculture, or construction employment The standard also does r.ot cover oil and gas well drilling: the generation, transmission and distribution of electric power by utilities: end electrical work on electric conrtMc'o'-s and equipment. These will ba th- subject* of separate rulemaking effo'is. The S udani contains definitive criteria fer establishing an effective program for locking out or tegging out energy isolating devices a?d requires training for authorized and affected employees. The standard requires the employer to implement the specified procedures, and to utilize effective control measures based on the workplace hazards that are encountered. OSHA expects that (his standardwil) prevent approximately 122 fatalities. 28,400 lost workday injuries and 31.900 non-lost workday injuries a year. This rule, 11910.147. is being placed In Subpart | of part 1910. The present 1910.147 is redesignated aa f 1910.130 to allow for the new section. DATCK This final standard shall become effective October 31.1989, except for paragraphs (c)(4), (c)(7). and (f)(2), of S 2910.147 which contain information requirements currently under review et OM8- A document announcing the effective date of the recordkeeping portions will be published at later date in the Federal Register. aoorem: In accordance with 28 U&C. 2112(a), the Agency designates for receipt of petitions for review of the standard, the Associate Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health. Office of the Solicitor. Room $-4004. U.& Department of Labor. 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington. DC 20210. FOR FURTHfR INFORMATION CONTACT Mr. fames F. Foster, Occupational Safety and Health AdministratioiL Rjom N3649, U.S. Department of Labor. Washington. DC 20210. (202) 523-8348. SUPMISCMTARV INFOftMATIOSC For additional copies of this standard contact U S. Department of Labor. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Office of Publications. Room N3101. Washington, DC 20210, (202)523-0887. 1. Background OSHA'i General Industry standards, 29 CFR part 1910. were originally published tn the Federal Register (38 FR 10486. May 29,1971) pursuant to Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the OSH Act) and became effective on August 27.1971. Before their adoption as OSHA standards, these occupational safety and health standarda were either national consensus standards or established Federal standards. Virtually all of the current lockout provisions la part 1910 which are affected by this standard were adopted under the section 6(a) procedure- At the time of adoption o! the original OSHA standards, there w as no general, ull-encompassing consensus standard or Federal standard for locking out. out. or disabling of machines or equipment to protect employees when maintenance or servicing activities were being performed--a gap dial this rulemaking addresses. However, OSHA did adept various lockout-related provisions of consensus standards which had been developed forspc. 'flc types of equipment. These provisions are not deleted by this rulemaking. Current lockout-related provisions in the General Industry Standards (29 CFR pari 1910] are found in the following sections: 1910.179 Powered Industrial Trucks 1910.179 Overhead end Gantry Croos 1710.181 1910.213 1910-21? 1910.218 1910.322 1910.281 1919.262 1910.283 1919283 1919272 1919369 Derricks Woodworking Machinery Mechanical Power Presses Forging Machines Welding. Cutting and Brazing Pulp. Paper and Paperbcarii Ml Is Textiles Bakery Equipment Sawmill* Gram Handling Electrical Nets: See Ex. 13 far e detailed list of lockout provisiona in the above standard* Par further information involving the use of these provisions, refer to the discussion found la Section VI, Summary end Explanation of the Standard. addressing paragraph (a)(3)(l>) The present OSHA regulations for locking out or tagging out machines and equipment where they do exist are r.ot uniform coverage. Inconsistencies in these regulations exist between different equipment and industries, and between different types of equipment in the same industry. Some provisions in the OSHA standards require equipment to have the capability of being "locked out'* without requiring such control to be utilized. OSHA feela that the lack of a general standard, and the incompleteness of the existing provisions, have contributed to the alarming number of injuries and fatalities that have occurred. Since the inception of its enforcement program. OSHA. for the most part, has had to ra!y upon the use of the "General Duty Clause" (section 5(a)(1) of the Aa 1 citation to ensure that employers provide safeguarding for their employees from the hazards involving the release oi hazardous energy. This approach has met with only limited success, limited primarily upon the need for OSHA to prove, in the event of the contest of a section 5(a)(1) citation, (hat the hazard was a "recognized" hazard and that tha hazard was causing or could cause death or serious physical harm. Because of these difficulties, vnrf because of the need to fill a significant gap in the current coverage of part 1910. OSHA has been working sines 1977 to gather sufficient information to enable the Agency to write a comprehensive standard fer energy control in general industry. In 1977. OSHA published a Notice .n the Federal Register entitled "Machinery and Machine Guarding. Request for Information on Technical Issues and Notice of Public Meetings" (42 FR 1741. January 7.1977) (Docket S-Z12). In this Notice. OSHA addressed the issue of lockout or tagout, including the general question of whether lockout should always be required when machinery ;s not in its normal operating mode, or whether alternative methods for employee protection, such aa tagout. \ 1' i / OX39B9 VVV 000 CURRENT REPORT 639 should be permitted (42 FR 1807). The purpose of that Notice was to generate information for use in updating the OSKA machine guarding standards (Subpart 0). Respondents to that Notice generally recognized the hazards to employees when maintenance and repair activities are undertaken, and the need to use lockout or tagout to control these hazards. There was. however, a considerable range of opinion regarding the effectiveness of either a lock, a tag. or a combination of these devices when they are used as safeguards. The United Automobile. Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers or America (UAW) petitioned OSHA on May 17,1979 (Docket S-012, (Ex. 2-3|) to establish an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) for locking out machinery and equipment. The petition stated that there existed a need to recognize the complexities of modem industrial equipment which use sources of energy other than electricity. It contained a discussion of the increasing need for locking out equipment to prevent that equipment from cycling without warning while it was being worked on. and related the importance of applying lockout procedures to systems using hydraulic or pneumatic power, to energy stored in springs and electrical capacitors, and to potential energy from suspended parts. Abstracts of case studies for fatalities involving 22 UAW members which were attributed to lockout-related causes since 1974 were submitted with the petition. OSHA also received other petitions and letters in support of the UAW petition from other labor organizations, including the AFLCIO. Allied Industrial Workers, and the United Steelworkers of America. OSHA responded to the UAW petition on September 11.1979 [Ex. 2], declining to issue an ETS. but advising that OSHA was proceeding to draft an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) addressing the subject in which the public would be invited to comment on the major issues involved in the development of a standard. OSHA published the ANPR for a standard on lockout/tagout in the Federal Register on June 17.19SG (45 FR 41012) (Docket S-012). In that Notice. OSHA raised issues about whether or not a generic standard should be proposed; if so. what should be the scope and application of this lockout/ tagout standaid; what constituted the necessary and sufficient energy isolation methods and means; and whe'uer there was a need for written procedures and documented employee training. There was not overwhelming support in the comments submitted to OSHA for a generic standard to cover all facets of the lockout/tagout problem. The comments did indicate, however, that a performance-oriented standard, offering enough flexibility to take current work practices into consideration, was desirable, and that requirements for documented procedures and employee training would have many advantages. The comments pertaining to securing energy isolating devices (the use of locks or tags] did net generate an overwhelming response strongly favoring either method. The comments received in response to that Notice were utilized in the development of the proposed standard published in the Federal Register on April 29.1988 (53 FR 15496). There were several other inputs into the development of the Proposed Rule: First, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) provided considerable data to OSHA on this subject. NIOSH published a notice in the Federal Register entitled "Lockout and Interlock Systems and Devices: Reouest for Information" (45 FR 7006. January 31.1980) (Docket S-C12. [Ex. 2-1]) and provided OSHA with the responses to that Notice. As part of that project, NIOSH also published its "Guidelines for Controlling Hazardous Energy During Maintenance and Servicing" [Ex. 3-4}. Other important sources of information were a Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Work Injury Report (WIR) survey entitled. "Injuries Related to Servicing Equipment" [Ex. 33] and two OSHA-directed studies-- "Selected Occupational Fatalities Related to Lockout/Tagout Problems as Found in Reports of OSHA Fatality/ Catastrophe Investigations" [Ex. 3--5}. and "Occupational Fatalities Related to Fixed Machinery as Found in Reports of OSHA Fatality/Catastrophe Investigations" [Ex. 3-61. Two further studies conducted by OSHA involved the compilation and analysis of OSHA Form 36 Preliminary Fatality/ Catastrophe Event Reports [Ex. 3-7] and a compilation of OSHA section (5)(a)(l) citations [Ex. 3-8). Of great assistance to OSHA in this undertaking was the publication on March 8,1982. of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) national consensus standard for lockout/tagout. ANSI Z244.1-1982, "American National Standard for Personnel Protection-- Lockout/Tagout of Energy Sources-- Minimum Safety Requirements" (Ex. 391. This standaid lists the uniform performance requirements for developing and utilizing a lockout or tagout procedure for the protection of employees from the unexpected energization, s;art-up of machines or equipment or reiease of stored energy during lepair. maintenance, and associated activities. The consensus standard was utilized by OSHA as the primary basis for development cf .ts proposed standard. In July 1983, OSHA developed a preproposal draft of 3 standard for lockout/tegout (Ex. 3-10]. This dm ft was developed by utilizing ah re'evant materials a\ciiab!e tr- OSHA at that time. This draft was distributed to associations, con-par.ies. unions and inctiviu :als which OSHA was ab'e to identify as havir.q art interest in the regulation. There were about 80 comments recc-ived in rescon? tc th.a preproposal draft. Th? comtnenters were generally in support of the effort ?o develop a safety standard for locvo^t or tagout; however, some commenters objected to the inclusion nf a requirement for locking out during activities classified as "normal production operations." Comments from some sources favored the use of locks rather than tags to secure energy isolating devices, while others welcomed the more flexible approach of permitting the use of locks or tags. There was also considerable comment regarding the use of an Appendix. Many commenters wanted the information supplied in the Appendix moved into the body of the standard for enforceability. Others, however, wanted the Appendix material completely removed on the grounds that reference to it by the courts in contested cases would essentially make it mandatory'. The proposed standard was published in the Federal Register on April 29.1988 (53 FR 15495). Interested persons were afforded 60 days to submit comments and/or request a hearing. On August 9.1988, OSHA published a Notice in the Federal Register (53 FR 29920) announcing the scheduling of a public hearing and an extension of the period for the submission of comments. The hearing was scheduled for September 22 and 23 in Washington, DC, and September 27 and 28 in Houston. Texas. The comment period was extended until September 22. On August 30.1988, OSHA published another Notice in the Federal Register (53 FR 33149) changing the dates for the Houston, Texas segment of the hearing from September 27 and 28 to October 12 and 13. ` There were 16 parlies who participated in the public hearing which was presided over by Administrative Law Judge Jeffrey Tureck. During the later stages of the hearing, at the suggestion of several af the hearing 9-S-39 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter VVV 000013990 640 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER participant* fudge Tureck established a post healing comment period, allowing the submission of additional data and evidence through November 2& 1988. and the submission of final arguments and briefs through December 23,1998. Based upon subsequent request of several of the hearing participants, the Administrative Law judge extended the comment period until February 9.1989. Judge Tureck certified the record of the hearing, including materials received in the post-hearing comment period on May 3.1989. The comments concerning the prepropoaal draft (Docket S-012', the special studies and other information used in the development of the proposal fer this standard, die comments received in response to the publication of die proposed standard, the evidence adduced at the public heating and the materials submitted in the post-hearing comment period were ail utilized in the development of this Final Rule. 11. Hazards Whenever machines or equipment are uiilized in industry, there are hazards not only to the employees who work with the machines or equipment but also to other employees who work or otherwise are in the immediate area. Moreover, when it is necessary to perform maintenance or servicing on machines or equipment, such activities generate additional, unique hazards due to l/'e continued presence of the energy used by the machine or equipment to perform its production function. This energy can emanate directly from a power source ur can be stored in the equipment itself. OSHA believes that fai'jre to control energy adequately accounts for nearly 10 percent of the serious accidents in many industries. The following accidents, taken from the NIOSH report entitled "Guidelines for Controlling Hazardous Energy During Maintenance and Servicing" [Ex. 4], are typical of these hazards and demonstrate the applicability cf the pertinent provisions in the final standard. 1. An employee was cleaning the unguarded side of an operating granite saw. The employee was caught in the moving parts of the saw and pulled into a nip point between the saw blade and he idler wheel, resulting in fatal injuries. (Failure to shutdown or turn off the equipment to perform maintenance--iyiQ.147(dK2).) 2. An employee was removing paper from a waste hogger. The hogger had been shut down, but the conveyor feeding the hogger had not been. The employee climbed onto the machine, fell onto the conveyor, was polled into the hogger opening, and was fatally crushed. There was no energy contra! procedure at this operation. tFailure to document and implement an effective energy control procedure-- 1910.147(c)(4).) 3. Two employees were repairing a press brake. The power had been shut off for 10 minutes. They positioned a metal bar in a notch on the outer flywheel casing so that the flywheel could be turned manually. The flywheel had not completely stopped. The men lost control of the bar. which Sew across the workplace and struck and killed another emp'^yee who was observing the c .' .idUon from a ladder. (Failure to control stored energy--1910.147(d)(6).) 4. An employee was partially inside an asphalt mixing machine, changing its piddles. Another employee, while dusting in *he control room, accidentally hit a toggle switch which caused the door of the mixer to close, striking the first employee on the head and killing him. Electrical switches to activate the machine were not deenergized and air pressure to move the doors was not shut off. (Failure to isolate equipment from energy sources--1910.147(d)(3).) 5. An employee was setting up a vacuum forming machine for a run of violin cases. He leaned over the prees and accidentally activated the starting switch. His head was crushed between an air cylinder and the frame hogger opening, and was fatally crushed. There was no energy control procedure at this operation. (Failure lo document and implement an effective energy control procedure--1910.147(c)(4).) 6. A trainee employee w-jS cleaning a flour batch mixer. The employee was reaching into the machine when cuothar worker activated the wrong switch, thereby turning the machine on. The employee cleaning the flour bated: mixer suffered fatal crushing injuries to his neck. There was an unwritten company procedure for locking out during ail maintenance. "Hie procedure was not followed. (Failure to document and implement an effective er.-rsr, ccnLof procedure--1910.147(c)(';` to train employees adequately in lockout/ tagout procedures--1910.147(c)(7)) 7. An employee was cleaning scrap from beneath a large shear when a fellow employee hit the control button activating the blade. The black came down and decapitated the employee cleaning scrap. (Failure to isolate, lockout/tagout or otherwise disable all potential hazardous energy sources before attempting any repair, maintenance or servicing-- 1910.147(c)(2).) Servicing and maintenance activities are necessary adjuncts lo the industrial process. They are needed to maintain the ability of all machines, equipment or processes to perform their intended functions. Additionally, erection, installation, construction, set-up. changeover, and dismantling usually must be performed with the equipment deenergized. These types of operations can present the employee with the same types of hazards of unexpected activation, reenergization, or release of stored energy, therefore, they are addressed by this standard. Similarly, lubricating, cleaning, unjamming, and making minor adjustments and simple tool changes are activities which often take place during normal production operations, but which may expose employees to the unexpected activation of the equipment or to the unexpected release of the energy stored in die equipment. All of the above activities are considered to be "servicing and/or maintenance" for the purposes of this standard. With regard to servicing and/or maintenance which takes place during "normal production operations." it is important to note that this standard is intended to work together with the existing machine guarding provisions of Subpart O of part 1911k primarily 5 } 191CK212 (general machine guarding) and 1919.219 (guarding of power transmission apparatus). When a machine is being used for production, 5 1910-212 requires that the point of operation be guarded. For example, when an employee is using a table saw to cut wooden parts, the employee would be protected by guards around the blade of the saw. if the employee needs to reach into the point of operation in order to adjust the work piece as pari of the production process. 1910.212 requires that the guarding protection be maintained. As long as guarding is not removed or bypassed, the Icu'kout/tagout standard is not intended to apply to these types of situations. By contrast, using die same table saw. it may be necessary for the employee to remove a piece of wood which has become jammed against the blade of the saw. in doing so. the employee might need to bypass cr remove the guard on the saw and reach into the point of operation. Although this action takes place "during" normal production operations, it is not actually production, but is servicing of the equipment to perform its production function. When such servicing may expose the employee to the unexpected activation of the machinery or equipment or to the release of stored energy, this Final Rule will apply, if the servicing is performed in a way which 9-6-89 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D.C. 20037 399^ 0 CURRENT REPORT 641 prevents such exposure, such.as by the use oF special tools and/or alternativeprocedures which keep the employee's body out of the areas of potential contact with machine components or which otherwise maintain effective warding, this standard will not apply. Thus, lockout or tagout is not required by this standard if the employer can demonstrate that the alternative means enables the servicing employee to clean or unjam or otherwise service the machine without being exposed to unexpected energization or activation of the equipment or release of stored energy. The above mentioned servicing and/ or maintenance activities are currently being accomplished in general industry with varying degrees of safeguarding or protection for employees. This safeguarding or protection ranges from allowing the employee to conduct the servicing or maintenance activity which the machine or equipment is energized and operating (virtually no protection), to requiring that the machine or equipment simply be turned off or shut down, to providing for deenergization and lockout or tagout of the machine or equipment OSHA believes that the least desirable situation is to allow employees to perform maintenance, repair, or service activities while the machine or equipment is energized and capable of performing its normal production function. The Agency recognizes that there are certain servicing operations which, by their very nature, must take place without deenergization, such as operational testing of machines or equipment. Locking out or tagging out cannot be performed during these operations, since both lockout and tagout require that equipment to be deenergized. Additionally, this standard does not apply when certain tasks are conducted during normal production operations such as repetitive minor adjustments or simple tool changes when these activities do not increase the risk of injury to employees. Conversely, operations such as cleaning and unjamming machines or equipment are covered by this standard when the employee is exposed to greater or different hazards than those encountered during normal production operations; it should be emphasized that this rule applies to cleaning and unjamming when an unexpected activation or release of energy could occur. The vast majority of servicing or maintenance activities can safely be done only when the machine or equipment is not operating and is deenergized; therefore, these activities are covered by this standard. Some servicing operations do not expose employees to hazards which would necessitate that a machine, equipment or process be deenergized and locked out or tagged out. However, practices such as reaching beyond guards during the cleaning of rollers of printing presses or the feed points of screw conveyors w'hich the equipment is operating, violate the safety conditions set forth in 1910.212 for normal production operations, and therefore such activities would be considered servicing activities under this rule. Performance of maintenance or servicing activities on a machine or equipment that is in operation has the potential of exposing employees not only to contact with moving machinery components at the point of operation, but also to contact with other moving components, such as power transmission apparatus, and also increases the risk of injury due to the position the employee must assume and the need to remove, bypass or disable guards and other safety devices. In many cases, these activities expose the employee to the hazard of being pulled into the operating equipment when parts of the employee's body, clothing or the material or tools used for cleaning or servicing become entrapped or entangled in the machine or equipment mechanism. The use of extension tools or devices to permit the operator to stay outside these danger areas, while of some benefit in reducing direct employee exposure to the hazards of entanglement or entrapment can. in itself, result in injuries to employees. This can occur, for example, when an employee is struck by the tools or devices that inadvertently come in contact with moving machine components, and are pulled from the employee's grasp. HoweveT, shutting down a machine or equipment usually is not the total solution to the problem. Once the machine or equipment has been stopped, there remains the potential for employee injury from the unanticipated movement of a component of the machine or equipment, or from movement of the material being handled. This unanticipated movement can be caused either by the release of residual energy within the machine or equipment, or as the result of the conversion of potential energy to kinetic energy (motion). For example, residual energy can be manifested by the presence of springs under tension or compression, or by the presence of pressure (either above or below atmospheric) in systems containing gases or liquids. Potential energy is considered ic be a function of the height of an object above some datum plane. This datum plane is usually considered to be where that object would come to rest if the restraint holding the object were released, such as where the upper die in a punch pre-is is positioned above the lower die. If the restraining device holding the upper die in place was to be removed, the potential energy of the upper die would be converted into kinetic energy (downward motion), resulting m the upper die being propelled downward, coming to rest on the lewer die. This motion can cause a crushing, cutting, iacerating, amputating or fracture injury to nn employee's arm. hand or some other part of the body which occupies the space between the dies. OSHA believes that the most effective method to prevent employee injury caused by the unanticipated movement of a component of a machine or equipment, or of the material being handled. is either to dissipate or minimize any residual or potential energy in the system, or to utilize a restraining device to prevent movement. This can be accomplished by moving machine or equipment components to a point at which springs are at or near a neutral state, by moving components so that liquids or gases reach or approximate atmospheric pressure, and by blocking material or components or moving them to a point of minimum potential energy (moving components to a stable, resting position). Further, even though the machine or equipment has been shut off, and even if residual energy has been dissipated, an accident can still occur if there is an inadvertent activation of that machine or equipment. Inadvertent activation can occur due to an error on the part of the employee who is conducting the maintenance or servicing activity, or by any other person. For example, the servicing employee can unintentionally cause the machine cr equipment to start by shorting across electrical switches or by accidentally moving controllers (either electrical controls or valves) into the "on" or ''operational" position. An accident can also occur when another person who is not necessarily involved with the maintenance or servicing operation causes the activation of the machine or equipment being serviced. This car. occu^ when a person uses the wrong controller and starts a machine or equipment that the employee did not intend to start, It can also occur when a person finds a machine or equipment not operating and 9-6-89 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter ^ o0i3992 642 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER starts it. without knowing someone else HL Accident Data is performing maintenance or service on it This latter type of accident is more apt ta occur when the machine or equipment is large and/or complex, and the employee who is conducting the servicing activity is at a part of the system which is some distance from nr not visible from the controls. The generally accepted best means to The collection of data on accidents resulting iron failure to utilize proper lockout a* tagout procedures is hampered because many accidents are not reported; are reported only locally; or are reported and categorized under other causal factor categories (such as "caught-in" or "caught-between"). Incorrect or incomplete categorization is minimize the potential for inadvertent particularly trie for lockout related activation is to ensure that all power to accidents, since many of the injuries are the machine or equipment ia isolated, grouped under the more commonly used locked or blocked and dissipated at classifications such as. bums, points of control, using a method that electrocutions, lack of machine guarding cannot readily be removed, bypassed, or equipment failure. overridden or otherwise defeated. In the OSHA also recognizes that there has case of an electrically run machine, piece of equipment or process, this can be dene by going back toward the original source of the power and shutting off a main switch or by disconnecting the electrical lines. QSHA believes that this action must be followed by the placement of some safeguard to prevent the reenergization F the circuit during the maintenance or servicing. To ensure that another employee will not attempt to restart the machine or equipment or to reenergize the circuit there must be some assurance that all other employees know that the circuit is deenergized and must remain so. This can be accomplished by the utilization of a standardized procedure for deenergizing the system; by training employees to familiarize them with the restrictions of the procedure which apply to them; and by enforcing a prohibition on another employee removing or bypassing another's safeguard. Those employe'-** whose job require them to opoate or ugit machine or equipment that must have maintenance or servicing performed on it. must be aware that the machine or equipment is going to bo stopped or shut down, and locked out or tagged out. and that they should nor attempt to restart or reenergize it. Additional training is also needed for those employees who must utilize the procedure. Even if all other protective measures been some underreporting of accident data--either inadvertent or intentional. As a result, OSHA believes that the data available represent only a portion of the total injuries and fatalities that have occurred. However. OSHA believes that the accidents which have been recorded or reported and investigated or studied as being "lockout related" provide a graphic illustiation of the extent of tho problem, ihe causal factors, the distribution of accidents in industry, and the type and severity of injuries resulting from those accidents. There have been several studies conducted to determine the magnitude and extent of the problem. These studies were conducted by: (a] The U S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; (b) OSHA*s Office of Data Analysis {formerly Q*ice of Statistical Studies and Analysis]; (c) the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH): (d) OSHA's Office of Experimental Projrsms; and (e) OSIiA's Office of Mechanical Engineering Safety Standards. During the hearing, the UAW provided detailed data on fata'ities and injuries (Tr p. H21.6, H253) which the*' expanded upon in their post-Hsering submission (Ex./ 3-49). The studies ere discussed in the following paragraphs. A. Bureau ofLabor Statistics Work Injury Report Study The first study examined by 06HA was the Work Injury Report Study entitled "Injuries Related to Servicing Equipment" [Ex. &- a re taken, accidents can still occur 3j. This study is a compilation of reports following the completion of the maintenance, repair or servicing of accidents and follow-up survey questionnaires sent out by the Bureau of activity, if the machine or equipment is Labor Statistics (BLS). The survey,, reenergized and started before all conducted from August to November guards and other safety devices have I960, covered workers who were injured been replaced or reinstalled. while cleaning, repairing, onjamming or Additionally, all tools and other foreign performing other non-operating tasks on objects must be removed from the machine*, equipment end electrical or location and a check completed to piping systems. BLS Identified accidents ensure that no employees are in a place from 25 participating states, and smiled where the re-energization and starting of each of the injured employees a follow- the machine or equipment will endanger up questionnaire containing inquiries them. about the specific details of his/her accident. There were I.2SS questionnaires sent out and 933 (approximately 65 percent] of the employees responded. Not all questions were responded to by all participants, since many of the questions related to situations which may not have been relevant to the circumstances of each injury. In some instances, many of the respondents also gave multiple responses to a single question. Tables I through VI present tabulations of the results of the BLS Work Injury Report Study. Table I --Industry Distribution--ot Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Major Oivi&on ano Company Size industry Worker* PercentSeen Total _ _ ..... . DN A--AXcuttu--e. foreeey tnS darting__________ _ 8--Mining............................... C--Construction.................... 0 Manufacturing.................. E--TnraportMlon end 833 IX 12 1 t .. .... ........ 35 4 819 74 F--Wholesale trades_______ Q--Retail trades.------------- H--Fmarce, insurance enS real estate.-.....-- ^ !--Secvioea_____ J4K--Others- ____ 1 57 31 43 B 7 4 1 5 1 SIZE OF THE COMPANIES AT WHICH ACCIDENTS OCCURRED Total...._...... ..............1 I to 19 employees----------20 io 4S employers-----------so to 99 employees.............. 100 to 499 ensiluyaei.......... SX or more employeos------ (5794 %S 123 IX 234 158 IX SO t5 15 29 20 < * Ova to rourdmg, percentages may not to i T*i8 tots! ot see* `sWe represent ire number of i^vyjnavna an*wear lb* pertmetd oueenom*) at J* fewey. Table [f.--Occupational Distribution Occupation Workers Percent Total................................ 033 IX CpwatNes, excluding Iran*port...................... _................ Craft and tarfred workers....... Laborers. ndulcyhim._^j Sennce workers, excluding pe- CtertcM and kindred worker*-,... Meneg and edrMraslrrtor*.... Professional MchtscM A km, rtmri . . Transport equipmem opera- tors.......................... ..... ....... Farm laborers and supervisor*. MnnclaHiedw- .. 3*3 291 94 19 19 13 12 to 8 4 45 34 It 2 2 2 \ t t (') Less then .5. Note.--Oue to roundrig. percentages may nee add to IX. 9-6-89 Publishad by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D C. 20037 000013^3 vvv CURRENT REPORT 643 in.--Table Activity of Time of Accioerr Wwhem WHAT WAS EMPLOYEE DOING? Tot*..... ............. _ unjamnwig ob*ct(>) from 333 100 Repairing equipment_________ Performing memmnanca (oMno. etc.)----------- Installing equmment Adjusting equipment.... -- Doing aet-ap work...___ ............ Pmonwng ataeMcta worn__ Tailing materiel or equipment- (') Last than 0.9 panant 77 3* ia 99 97 29 IS 2 9 4 2 12 7 3 2 P) Table IV.--Circumstances of injuries Worker* Percent H HOW DID INJURIES OCCUR? T*l Injiaed by mowing machine tajwed by contact with erv argttsd alactric pmtA---- Injured by burners, hot Sq uids or other hazardous msmm. Injured by taBng martaria Otfwr. _. ___ __ _ _ .. WAS EQUIPMENT TURNED OFF BEFORE DOING TASK? Total_________ No..__ Yea.... IF EQUIPMENT NOT TURNED OFF. REASONS) GIVEN. Total ____ Warner Mt ft would alow down production or take too long________ Not requrad by company procedure........... __ ....... Worker d not know how to. Did not INrfc R neceeaery -- Teak could not be Arne Worker tad not rettita* power was on____ Olherreaaona IF EQUIPMENT WAS TURNED OFF: a. YFiet happened at m* time ol Inpay? Total____ ________ Injured empioyee sodden* taiy turned equipment on... Co worker aeddentaiy tamed equipment on-.-. Coworker turned equip- ment on, not kndwing equipment waa being worked on.,,......... 133 738 46 29 10 14 833 663 180 (*)592 112 89 S 208 209 62 M 176 20 19 99 too 88 9 3 1 2 100 78 22 (*> 19 12 1 39 10 10 1Q0 11 9 32 Table iv.--Circumstances of injuries---Continued Worker* Percent Cf Equipment or mats**! moved when jam-up cleared-............................ Parte were atM In motion (coasting)........................... Other reason........................ IF EQUIPMENT WAS TURNED OFF; b. ware addlttonta *t taken to de-enwgos equipment? Total............................ 9 30 48 (*) 160 5 17 26 (> No--not required by oompany......--............ ........... No--would slow down proauction,...... No wait dd not have 23 9 14 5 No--reason not given..-........ 37 23 Disconnected main power.--.. Tagged out equipment 14 9 Locked ouy*L RtstaNsd blank ftanga or removed fuse --........................ ....... Oteccrmectad electric Sne-- Drained pmaaute or heardout mater*!..... ...... ............ Othar 3 5 9 11 2 3 6 10O0. n* to roundktg, percentages may not add to (*)Because more than ona teapm-- ia poaetHa. the sum of the laaponam and pareantagaa may not aquta me total manber or parens who answered the question. <a>Tts* two acodanta which occuned after the eauipnant waa locked out took piece becauae (1) the lockout had been dona to the won? power na and (2> a second power t<na had bean spaced Into the wiring beyond the lockoie. Table V.--Training Worker* PKtAnt WAS LOCKOUT INSTRUCTION PROVIDED EMPLOYEES? Total__________ __ _____ Ye____ ______ _____________ No----------- ----- -----------.......... IF INSTRUCTION PROVIDED, IN WHAT FORM? TotB............................... Provided printed kwffuettone--.. Procedures posted on eqt*>- ment____ _________ --. Inspection given as pan of cm Forrr*l baining given at me* ing. etc--------- Other___ ________ ____.__ ___ WMB4 WAS LOCKOUT INSTRUCTION GIVEN? Tatar. After me tedder*.- -- 554 214 340 273 25 37 179 28 7 0199 15 100 39 61 too 9 14 10 3 (`1100 8 Table v.--Training-^Continued Workers Percent One to six months before ac cident-.................................... Si* months to a year before accident............................. . Upon hiring................................ Over a year before accident..... 1 36 | 19 28 15 84 | 46 60 32 (>) Because more man ona response a poaefata. the sum of the responses and Percentage* may not aqual the total. Percentage* ara calculated by divid ing each number of raopowaaa by the total number of persona who answered the question. Table VI.--Estimated Lost Workdays Number of lost workdays worker* Percent Total................... .......... No time lost............................... 1 to 5 workdays lost................ 6 to 10 workday* lost________ 11 to IS workday* loti_______ 21 to 25 workday* lost_______ 29 to 30 workday* lost............. 31 lo 40 workday* lost............. 41 to 90 workday* lost....... ..... More thvt 90 workday* lost-- No mdfcatton ot number of leal workdays.--------------- 793 107 132 95 75 47 47 60 49 54 1 99 too 13 17 12 9 6 6 8 6 7 5 11 B. Analysis of83 Fatality Investigations by OSHA's Office ofData Analysis. The second study examined by OSHA was the compilation of data from 83 fatality investigations conducted by OSHA between 1974 and 1980. This report is entitled. "Selected Occupational Fatalities Related to Lockout/Tagout Problems as Found in Reports of OSHA Fatality/Catestrophe Investigations" [Ex. 3-5], AD of these accidents were identified as having been caused by failure to properly deenergize machines, equipment or systems prior to performing maintenance, repairs or servicing. Tables VTI through IX present tabulations of the results of the OSHA analysis of B3 fatality investigations. Table vu.--Causal Factors Cat** Number Percent Total............................... 83 100 Lack of adherence to *ata work practice* (no proce dure or laium to toeow pro- cedure).-- ----- ------,------ -- Accidental or inadvertent act- vation......... ___ Feitur* to deactivate--.______ Equipment taitar*.-................... Othar......... .................... -......... 21 29 21 7 5 25 35 25 8 6 Not*.--Oue id mundna. pirrentages may not add ip 100. 9-6-89 Occupational Safety a Health Reporter VVV 000013994 644 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER Table viii.--Number of Injury Agent Number Percent Total............... ................. 83 100 Agitators and mixer*................. Rolls and roders....______ ____ Convoyon and augers...... ........ Sawn and cutters---- ..--- ----------, Horsts .......... ................. ...... Earth moving aquipment--~ Crushers and pulverizers--------forges andprssass................... Electrical apparatus---------- ... vendee.......... ............. --___ Other............... .................. 12 11 11 11 a 0 4 4 4 3 9 14 13 13 13 10 7 S 6fr 4 " Table-IX.--Employee Activity Activity Number Percent Conducting rxTiiV assured Aria*............. ...........,,.... ...... Corrtvctjng other dutea.......... 83 100 69 63 14 17 In analyzing the 63 fat ility investigation reports and assigning causes to each accident, no attempt wvs made to draw conclusions or inferences beyond the information contoinod In the reports. For example, if the employee was killed in operating machinery, unless the report stated otherwise, the cause of the accident was considered'to be failure to shut off the machine, rather than a combination of causal factors such as failure to shut off the machine, failure to lockout failure to document adequate procedures, and failure to provide sufficient employee training. Additionally, if a machine was found tn be running, it was assumed that the employee failed to abut off the machine rather than that another employee reatartnd he machine. C of 125 PixoJM.^huiery FaLullties hy OSH \'s Office ofData Analysis. A separate study by OSHA's Office of Data Analysis is entitled "Occupational Fatalities Rclatr.i to Fixed Machinery as Found In imports of OSHA Fatality/Catastrophe Investigations" [Ex. 3-fl[. Thissfudy contained an analysis of investigative reports of 123 fatalities involving fixed machinery which occurred betw uon 1974 and 1376. and which were investigated by OSHA. The primary causal factors under which the accidents were classified were operating procedures, accidental activation, lack of machine deactivation, equipment failure, and other causes. The following.is a tabulation of the results of Ibis study. Table x--Causal Factors. OSHA Analysis of 125 Fatal Accidents Caueat factor Number Percent Total.--------------- Failure to adhere to safe operstmg procedures---------------- Accidental machete activation... Machine *101 deactivated.......... Equipment failure.--................. Other.......................................... 125 41 31 23 21 s too 33 25 18 17 7 D. Motional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Guidelines for Controlling Hazardous Energy During Maintenance and Servicing and Study ofHazardous Release ofEnergy Injuries in Ohio in 1933. The next studies considered by OSHA were done by the National Institute for Occupational Safely and Health (NIOSH) (Ex. 4 and 2-flOcj. fn the first fifty-nine out of a total of J00 accident reports were analyzed to illustrate situations in which adeq.io'.e control of energy might have prevented the accidents. These case files were selected because they contained sufficient detail to enable NIOSH to evaluate the accidents and determine what countermeasures might have been available to prevent the accidents. The report indicated that these typos of accidents are preventable if effective finely control techniques are available, the workers are trained to use them, and management provides the motivii Lion to ensure their use. The following is a tabulation of the results of the first study. Table xi.--Causal- Factors, NIOSH Stuoy Pastor > Number i P^rrent Total................. .......... Famie to da-onergee ma- i chew or control SMjrgy.. ... .: Accidental ra-aner^zaben...... ineOecuve energy eo*ntton...,. 1 0Bregding.rei<.ut .. 59 ` too i 27 i 46 25 ; - ? ' 10 '1 2 The MlOSlf draft report, cndat.d, entitled: "Study ofHazardous Release of Energy Injuries in Oh:TM in ?!?&}." [Yn. 2-nOr.). `Ibis report contains information on 339 Occidents v.bich ocrvrred in the state of Ohio in 1963. These accidents were selected because'. (1} They fell into likely categories of industry, occupation, type of accident, source of injury' end diagnosis of injury: (2) the worker's compensation claim narrative suqgpated applicability: and (3) questionnaire reponses by plant officials positively identified the injuries as resulting from an unexpected energy release clurir^ equipment repair, servicing or maintenance. The report defined an unexpected or unwanted release of energy "as when a press closes on ?.n operator's hand or when steam escapes from a broken pressure line." The "Ohio Study" was submitted bv NIOSH in draft form. OSHA is not aware of whether the study results b v. e since been finalized by NIOSH, or whether any further effort ha9 been expended to follow-up on its findings. However, OSHA has evaluated the dr ift study and has determined that few definite conclusions can be drawn from the available data. For example, most of the injuries reported in the study [70-'M occurred to production workers as a result of servicing which took place during normal production operations. Although the study indicated that firms where injuries occurred used tagout, ti did not indicate whether either tago.ii or tagout procedures were applied in situations where production employ-"* were performing servicing work, as w>*ti as maintenance employees. Without such information, it is not possible to determine whether the tagout procedure* failed in situations whereit was being applied, or whether tigout for other lyp*^1 of employee protection, such as shutting down the equipment) was in use at the time of the accident. In addition, the study only considered the issue of lovks versus tags, and did not evaluate the other elements of the lockout or tagout programs in place. As OSHA has emphasized, the adequacy of a preg-^m for the control of hazardous energy relics on much more than whether a lookout dnvee or a tagout device issu'd on (bc energy isolating meins, Therefore, the Agency has determined that the draft Ohio study raises many more j r -stiorts than it answers, and ih.it no iiliil conclusions can be diawn from ihe ti.:.provided to date. OSHA . o-.M c, .r.iqcs NIOSH to continue its r. -v'.r.v Hud j .wlvsia of this study, nmi looks forward tii receiving a final version of the study after s full evniuution anti n vision h is been performed. The following is a tabulation of dv* csablc rnsu'ts of this study- Table Xii--task Being performs a; Time of Accident t'!>|ar'.'Ting objsct .........-.,.-1 04 : 25 Cfaanmg eQwsur.ent................... J fS | 22 Repairing tHjuiprrwnl........ . . . . j 41 >2 AanisSng e^u>pmem _______| 41 1 '.2 Donq so. *>-,,............... --: 27 | 4 Inapoc'^'-) j : 11 1 I 9--a9 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC., Washington. O.C. 20037 0000O"-c5 CURRENT REPORT 645 Table xd--Task Bbng Performed at Time of accjoent--Continued Task Number Percera Testing eoupment.....-- InttaJJing equpment.-.-.--------- - Other leaks............................... Total........... -..........-...... 9 9 34 339 3 3 10 too Table xiii.--Equipment Mode When injury Occurred Equipment mode Number Percent -- Production mod*......... ............. Maintenance mode.....-....... ... Total.............................. 230 99 (M329 70 30 100 (') Ten respondents did not identify the equipment mode. F. Analyses ofFatality/Catastrophe Reports and General Duty Clause Citations by OSHA's Offices of Experimental Programs and Mechanical Engineering Safety Standards. There were two additional OSHA studies which were conducted jointly by the Of5'ce of Experimental Programs and the Office of Mechanical Engineering Safety Standards. These studies were compilations and analyses of OSHA Form 36 reports [Ex. 3-7} and OSHA 5(a)(1) citations (Ex. 3-8], respectively. An OSHA Form 36 (Preliminary Fatality/Catastrophe Event Report) is prepared each rime an Area Office is notified of a serious accident resulting either in a fatality or in serious injury to five or more employees that necessitates their hospitalization. This report is used to determine whether or not OSHA will conduct an investigation of the circumstances surrounding the accident. Since OSHA does not receive notification of all accidents resulting in a fatality or catastrophe, the total number of Form 36 reports received does not equal the total number of workplace fatalities and serious injuries which occurred during this study period. However. OSHA believes that the causes of. and the circumstances leading to. the accidents clearly demonstrate the nature and seriousness of lockout/ tagout-related accidents. The OSHA Form 36 study which analyzed data reported during the period 1982-1983 [Ex. 3-7], utilized a list of 443 fatalities. From these fatalities, all of which occurred in industries subject to the present regulations, it was determined that 38 (8.1 percent) would have been prevented by the ue of an effective lockout or tagout procedure. The second study [Ex. 3-8) used information developed by OSHA*8 Office of Mechanical Engineering Safety Standards which identified, categorized and recorded "general duty clause" (section 5(a)(1) of the OSHA Act) citations from 1979 to 1984. A general duty clause citation is issued when, during an inspection, a "recognized hazard" Is detected which is causing or is likely to cause death or serious physical harm to an employee, but which is not addressed in an OSHA standard applicable to that Industry. The citations in the latter study have been broken down between maritime, construction, and general industry. The general industry citations were further subdivided to reflect the nature of the hazard which the citation addressed, such as hazardous materials or material handling. When there was special Agency interest in an industry or hazard, the citations were further broken down by industry sector (such as oil and gas well drilling). From 1979 through 1984. 3.638 inspections were conducted which resulted in the isuance of general duty clause citations. Of these 3,838 inspections, there were 376 inspections in wheih the failure to control hazardous energy was cited. Hence, in approximately 10 percent of afi inspections which resulted in the issuance of at (east one General Duty clause citation, herein referred to as a 5(a)(1) citation, failure to lockout or tagout was identified. [Ex 3-8) The following is a tabulation of the breakdown of lockout citations by industry division. Table XJV.--Inoustrv Profile, OSHA 5(aW) Lockout Citations intkuby Ovation* Number at citations Percent Total------------- ---- ----- A--Agriculture, forestry and faring. _ ............... .. 9--Miring...................... E--Trwaportrton and pubic ufilrtisa......... ............. F--WholeaNa trade*........... ,, G--Ret** trades... ............. H--Finance. insurance and reel *_____________ 1--Swvtca*________ ___ _____ J--Pubic administration......... K--Not otherwise ctassifled.... Unknown............................... 376 100 2 .5 1.1 IS 4.8 310 82.4 11 2.9 14 3.7 5 1.3 00 12 32 00 a0 00 Note.--Due to rounding pveentogas to 100. not add At the hearing, the International Union. United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural implement Workers of America (UAW) testified that there were 74 fatalities which it referred to as "lockout fatalities." which had occurred to its members between 1973 and 1988 (Tr. H253). In response to requests at the hearing, the UAW provided additional information on these fatalities (Ex. 49E). (The number of "lockout fatalities" was revised to 72 in the post-hearing submission.) The poet-hearing data reinforce OSHA's determination that fatalities from hazardous energy sources involve more than simply a failure to "lock out" machines or equipment. Of the 72 fatalities. UAW reported that there had been "inadequate training" in 49 cases (68%); "inadequate procedures" in 50 cases (69%); and "adequate, but unenforced procedures" in 19 cases (28%). Although OSHA agrees that lockout provides more security against reenergization of equipment than tagout, the Agency is convinced more than ever that there is much more to energy control than the question of lockout vs. tagout The UAW data make a strong case for the need for OSHA to provide for proper energy control procedures and adequate training in those procedures. In the proposal. OSHA estimated, based on BLS data, that lockout or tagout related fatalities represented 7% of the total number of occupational fatalities. In their post-hearing comment, the UAW indicated that for their workers, this figure is estimated to be 28%. and that OSHA should take this larger estimated percentage into account in its projections. The UAW also argued that its data base is larger than that used by OSHA. and that it is more reliable because of its national scope and inclusion of both large and small facilities. (Ex. 49A). OSHA appreciates the time and effort taken by the UAW In compiling such data and in submitting it to the rulemaking record. At the time of the proposal, the Agency acknowledged that its injury and fatality figures were likely to be understated for various reasons. Regardless of whose figures are used, there is little doubt that the failure to control hazardous energy sources exposes employees to a significant risk, and that this standard is necessary to reduce those risks. IV. Basis lor Agency Action OSHA believes that there exists a sufficient body cf data and information upon which a reasonable standard can be baaed to reduce the number of fatalities and injuries resulting from failure to utilize proper and adequate practices and procedures for tha control of potentially hazardous energy. This position is based upon an analysis of the accident data available to OSHA. aR of 9-6-89 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter 000013996 646 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER * hich is in the docket of this rulemaking proceeding. Most accident reports break down the relevant information in accordance with the classifications contained in the American National Standards Institute. ANSI Z1&2, "Method of Recording Basic Fs?ta Relating to the Nature and Occurrence of Work Injuries'* jEx. 3-U|. These classification* are: The nature of the injury, part of the body, source of the injury, accident type, hazardous condition, agent of injury and unsafe act Many accident reports arc generated primarily to document the occurrence of accidents and concentrate on the information which ia necessary to process workers' compensation, claims, For this reason, they tend to emphasize information about the injury rather than the events and conditions which caused the accidents. Therefore, most of the pertinent information identifying the nature and extent of the problem of controlling hazardous energy was gathered by OSHA by conducting the special studies referred to above. Because of the 'imitation on the available data, no single study iiself can be expectitd to provide conclusive support for comprehensive regulation of err-.rgy hazards However, the studies and other available data, when considered a>? v whole, dearly indicate not only the scop* and extent of the problem, but also '.he need for a comprehensive ctaudard. The. studies are consistent in their demonsL-ation of the causative tors involved in lockout-related accidents, and they provide strong ev dtr.'P for th* potential effectiveness of O'il LVs Final Rule in dealing with those factors. GSHA believes that the (wizards associated with the failure to cc.itrol hazardous energy are widesp;The following table indicates the distribution, by industry, of the accidents reported Ln the Bur,m i of labor Statist; ;a (3L3) Work Injury Report Study f.VlR) end in 0SI1A - coy stations oisr.ussed * .riier. Table XV.--industry BLS WiR a\d OSHA 5(a)(1) Ciwwjb ..MUStTy <Vy JivSiOn) BLS ParCant Par* cent Total.--............ 833 too A--- Aqiteuttura, ion-stiy and tel* ... 8--.Virtue........ ........... . t2 1 1 ... w,,... C--Conavusuon.... ...... 35 4 D--Wacctadurng------ - 619 74 E--Transportation and puMcutMaa........ 19 2 F--Whot--iN trade*. 67 a--Bata* eades...... -- 31 7 4 376 too 2s 4 1.1 18 4.8 310 62.4 tl 2.9 14 3.7 5U Table XV.--Inoustry profile. BLS WIR and OSHA 5(a)(1) CrrArows--Continued liniustry (by division) BLS PV Gu.4 aa)h| | Per cent h--F:nanca. insurance 1 aivj real aetata '[ 8 l--Sarv*r*e................. }. 43 ihar or unknown...... .1 8 J____ 1 ol 0 5 iai 3.2 1 01 0 Although employees hi almost every industrial division are exposed to die hazards associated with the unexpected energization or start up of machines or equipment or by the unanticipated release of stored energy, the preponderance of the accidents and injuries occur in Manufacturing (Division 0). It should also be notud that Services (Division t), includes many employers who perform maintenance on equipment in manufacturing and other sectors covered by Part 1916. In addition ta the accidents which could occur whan maintenance or servicing is being conducted. QSIIA also identified some accidents which could occur while employees are lubricating, cleaning, unjamming or adjusting machines or equipment. These activities tiiffer front other activities which are conducted during normal operation in that thesqactivities can lead to die unexpected release of energy an i are usually done only on an.as-required basis. When these activities arc being conducted during normal operations, the machine guarding required by other OSHA standards (that is, $ 1910.212 for point of operation guarding and 1910.219 for power transmission apparatus guarding) may afford the necessary and sufficient protection for the empluyeeaperforming those activities. However, in many instants the employee moat either remove guards <>. other safety devices or work u-.c-t unusual circumstances which wmiM subject the employee to a different or greater risk than would be encountered during normal production operations. In those instances CSHA \-ievcs that the machine or equipment .nust. if possible, be shut down end locked or tagged out to protect the employee from injury. As noted earlier. OSHA's has evaluated section 5(a)(1) citations that were issue ! for failure to control hazardous energy. and has determined thdi this area accounts for about 1U percent of the serious hazards not presently covered by a specific OSHA standard. The seriousness of the hazrrd to be addressed by this standard is highlighted by the fact that section 5(a)(1) citation* are issued only for recognized hazards which cause or are Ukcly to cause deeth or serious physical harm. Similarly, the OSHA Form ;tfi. also Jfscussed above, is initialed only wr.-n OSHA is notified of deati.a or ip!*> hospitalizations. Further anah tuV .-r lost workday data fvorn the ELS Will indicates tiiat the severity of injuries from failure tixcontrol hazardous enr-ry sources (an overage of 24 lo'it woiHays per lost tine injury) is much hi*"j"r !)*.: the national industry-wide avercz.t ->f M lost workdays [Fix. 14J. In developing thi9 Final Rule. OS! t/\ h is fistvr ited the total numbers of fatalities. lost-workday injuries, arui minor injuries attributable to locknut- related accidents. These estimates wen* based on an extrapolation of the available national data sources discussed earlier [Ex. 3, 5, 0.7]. from these data the number of preventable accidents was determined. OSHA believes that the Final Rule will prevnnl 65% of the total numbers of injuries or fatalities from exposure to hazardous energy In the workplace. The Agency estimates that approximately 31.900 minor (non-lOBt-workday} injuries: 28,400 lost-workday injuries: and 122 fatalities per year (based on 1964 accident levels) will be prevented by * this standard, (see Section on 3I.. Regulatory Impact Analysis below ). These estimates were derived by r identifying the percentage of accidents , in various data sources which were determined to be lockout-related and applying those percentages to the number of accidents. It was determined that two percent of all nonfatal accidents and 7.1 percent of all fatalities occurring in general industry related to failure to adequately control hazardous energy. In addition, the data indicate that the risk of accidents and injuries is iudupendunt of the number of employees in i pnrt'rular workplace. This finding is prcjJcated upon the distribution by size of -.he companies which employed the injured employees surveyed in the BLS WIR. In the survey, almost as many respondents (392, or 49 percent) reported that they were employed at facilities of 100 or more employees as those who were employed at facilities of less than 100 employees (402. or SI percent). Based upon analysis of all of the .I'urementio.-ted evidence, OSHA beLaves that the failure to control hazardous energy results in a significant usk to employees. Further, the data clearly demonstrate that the consequences of an accident involving fiiiure to lockout or tagout are more severe in terms of lost workdays than the average industrial accident OSHA also believes that a significant risk from hazardous energy extends across many segments of general industry. 9-6-69 PutMisftad t>y BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. i, D.C 20037 VVV 000013997 CURRENT REPORT 647 OSHA has also analyzed the studies to determine the underlying causes of the conditions which existed when lockout related accidents occurred. Fiom this information, OSHA developed a list of measures which would have prevented most of the accidents in the studies, and used this list to devleop its proposed standard. It should be noted that the studies vary widely in the quantity and quality of the information provided for the reported accidents (different methods of reporting, and incompleteness of the findings of the causes of the accidents, for example). Therefore, professional judgment was used in the interpretation of the results of the studies, in order to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the data and to correlate the information on accident causation. While the numbers and percentages from all studies do not necessarily agree, the studies all indicate the existence and seriousness of the problems, and provide valuable information as to measures that are necessary to correct the problems. Tables XVI through XX below cover what OSHA believes are the major causal factors in lockout-related accidents, and indicate the prevalence of such factors as reflected in the different accident studies. Table XVI.--Servicing Accidents Oc curring While Equipment is Operat ing Study (total coneidared) Number Percent SLS WIR (833)-____ _________ OSHA anarytis of 83 fatattea OSHA report of fixed mechkv y (125)..-........................ -- NIOSH study (59)............ ......... 653 54 23 27 78 65 18 46 The reasons most often given in the BLS WIR for not turning off equipment prior to servicing were that it would take too long or slow down production; it was not required by the employer; it was not necessary; or the task could not be done with the equipment off. As painted out in the Hazards section of this Notice, just shutting off a machine, equipment or process may not completely control the hazardous energy. Even after a machine, equipment or process is shut down, residual energy may still be present <n the form of moving components, spring or hydraulic pressure, the force of items which have become jammed in machine parts, or the energy which is stored in machine, equipment, or system components due to their position {potential energy). Table XVII.--Accidents Due to Failure To Ensure Power Off Study (total considered) Number Percent SLS WIR--FaBure to check for power on (592).-.,..-...... . OSHA enatyeie of S3 fataSttee (83)................................ .. .... NIOSH study (59)...................... 62 S 8 10 6 10 The Hazards section of this Notice also discussed the fact that even though the machine, equipment or process has been shut down, and the residual energy controlled or dissipated, an employee can still be injured if the machine, equipment or process is restarted by either that employee or another employee. Injury can occur when an employee inadvertently contacts switches, valves or other controllers or when an employee activates the equipment without recognizing the reason it was shut off, inadvertently exposing other employees to a hazard. xvm.--Table accidents Due to Inadvertent Activation Study (total considered) Number Percent BLS WIR (176)____ __ _______ OSHA anelym of 83 fatalitiee (83)-------------- ------------------ OSHA report on fatalities re lated to fixed machinery (125)-------------------------------NIOSH (59)___ ---_____ _____ 91 29 31 25 52 35 25 42 Clearly, it is insufficient simply to shut off machinery to conduct repair, maintenance or servicing. OSHA believes that some means must be utilized to ensure that employees are safeguarded during those operations. After servicing, there is also the need to ensure that all guards have been replaced, that all tools and other extraneous materials have been removed from the machine, equipment r process, and that reenergizing and starting normal productions operations will not subject an employee to an increased potential for injury. This is especially true when the maintenance, repair or service is conducted at or near an employee's workstation. OSHA believes that many of the' problems of de-energization and reenergization of machines or equipment can be reduced by the employer's development and utilization of a program which incorporates a program which incorporates a standardized procedure for servicing/maintenance operations. The procedure would outline the necessary steps to be taken to prepare for. conduct, and complete servicing of equipment, and the program would provide employees with an understanding of the procedure and the reasons why it must be followed. A program can provide the details to be followed in performing servicing operations safely {the procedure), together with the training and motivation needed to assure that employees understand and implement those details. Table XIX--accidents Attributable to Employer Nct Having or Em ployees Not Utilizing a Procedure S'jdy (total ca-isiCered) Numoer Percent SLS WIR (653).......................... OSHA report on fatalities re- tated to fixed machinery (125)..........................-......... <162 41 74 33 OSHA believes that employee understanding and utilization of a standardized procedure are critical to the success of a lockout or tagout program. Without these elements and commitment from management, the effectiveness of the program can be seriously compromised. Proper training in the procedure, and explanation of how it works and why, are crucial to its implementation by the employees. Even though there can be no exact quantification of the effects of training employees, the BLS WIR Study gives an indication of the effect of the lack of training in the necessary measures to be taken in deenergizing machines or equipment (see Table XX below). Table XX--Lockout Training of In jured Employees. Source: BLS WIR (From 613 Responses) Type of training Number Percent Printed instruction............ ......... Procedures posted on equipmerit.....-........ ....... ..... --...... Training at job orientation, at meetmgs. or otharwtee-..... . No training....................-........... 25 37 211 340 4 6 34 55 Of those injured employees who had received training, 15 stated that their training had occurred after their accident. Additionally, 60 employees stated that they had received their training more than a year prior to the accident. Even though training has been provided at some time during employment, the length of time between the receipt of the training and the accident is a limiting factor on any beneficial effect that has been derived from the training. In the Final Rule. 9-6-89 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter wv 00001399a 648 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEAtTH REPORTER diicuaseii below, OSHA recognizes the control hazardous energy. Some of these is used for equipment which requires a need for remedial or refresher training commenters (Ex. 2-2. 2-44, 2-63. 2-79. 2- relatively large number oi servicing of those employees who must use the 98) argued that the use of tags alone did workers, with a large number of po-nts procedure, and that such retmnuig.must aot afford a minimum acceptable level to be locked out be conducted at lea it anauafhfo of protection for employees since as On the other hand, several Cased upoa an asaiyu* at few opposed to locks,, they could be commenters (Ex. 2-33.2-55.2-94. 2-ge. rulemaking record. OSHA baiiayp* that carelessly bypassed without major 2-102. 2-106. and Tr. pg. Wl-144. H197) the safe performance of activitfresuch effort. Several commenters (Ex. 2-27,2- stated that their companies utilize a as repair, maintenance and servicing, 29.2-63. 2-104. Tr. pg. Wl-75, H-225) system of tags to ensure that equipment requires the deenergizatiou of machines stated that the unrestricted use of tags which has-been shut down will not be ot equipment whenever feasible. as the primary means of safeguarding reenergized or restarted. One of these Further, in order to ensu: a that employees during maintenance or commenters (Tr. pg. H198) stated that maintenance or servicing activities are servicing of machines and equipment the tagout system utilized by his conducted safety, a lockout or tagout would seriously erode the gams which company is "well understood by all procedure must be utilised. This had been achieved through past labor- employees. In fuct, we feel so strongly procedure must call out the steps to be management negotiations. Other about our red/danger tag procedures taken to deenergize the machine, commenters (Ex. 2-44. 2-67. 2-63. 2-79, that we require mandatory discipline for equipment or process: to ensure that the 2-90, 2-9* Tr. pg. Wl-71. Wl-72. H-Z26) its violation." The company submitted Jeenergizntion is sufficiently complete: stated that tags were susceptible to its safety record as support for its to dissipate or prevent the release of residual energy: to ecauie that the being lost or damaged in use due to environmental conditions in the . assertion that its tagout program is effective. Hie employees of this machine, equipment or process cannot be reenergized accidentally or workplace or by contact by employees, company have worked over 488 million materials at equipment moving or being hours between January 1980 and unexpectedly: and to ensure th-t the moved about the workplace. These September 1988 with only 130 lost tine rcener^iration :s accomplished safely. The establishment and utilisation of this procedure must be coupled with sufficient initial and follow-up 'raining to ensure the successful utilization of the crocedure. r V.. Major Issue* The evidence submitted to the record is summarized and evaluated in the foilowing discussion of each major isase and in the Summery and Explanation of thia Final Rule. The numbers in bfockets refer to specific written, comments (Ex. --) and to fee-transcript page number of the testimony presented at the public hearing (Tr. p. (W for Washington. DC s-.d H far Houston. TXV--). /. Shouid OSHA require the use of !> 'rka, locks and tags, nr tags ahrte to controtpotentially hazardous energy? The most vigorously contested issue vv'?s the need to use locks or tags as die primary means to prevent the accidental operation of energy isolating devices, such as electrical disconnects, hydraulic or pneumatic valves. The proposed standard did not estabttsiFdeftlftive criteria for employers to us# fefeakfng their choices of control meggwdl that is. the use of locks, tags or a combination of fee-two. -.-7 In general a strongpsefapwnco wae evidenced in fee comments and hearing testimony for locks. Many parties to this proceeding (x. 2-2.2-12.2-27. 5-29.242.2-41 2-57.2-63. 2-66. 2-67,2-79.298.2- fig. 2-103. 2-1012-106.48. 5a 5* 59, 6a 62. 63. Tr. pg. Wl-6* Wl-71, Wl85. Wl-136, Wl-lU, Wl-143. W1-18& coromeniers stated that tags only "warn" and that they are a label not a safety device. Other commenters (Ex. 2108. Tr. pg. Wl-72}stated a view that the use of tags also promotes a false sense of security among employees and that the accident rate when tags alone are used is higher then when not using any safeguard. One participant an employee oi Armco Steel (Tr. pg. W2-91), stated that his employer had discontinued the use of tags in favor of locks. He contended that the Company realized that the use of tags alone was not effective in preventing accidents. Finally, several commenters (Ex. 2-42. 2-79. 2-96. 2-106; Tr, pg. Wl-72. Wl- 138. Wl-140. H98, Hi29. H163) stated that tags can be easily defeated by negligence or Ipierance and that die use of tags wiRnot deter the willful misconductof dm employee who would ignore the message of the tag. that is. not to reenergize or restart a machine or piece of equipment. The a significant body of evidencewhich indicates that the "one parson, one lock, one k"v" concept enjoys wide acceptance across industry lints. For example, the United Auto Workers provided comments (Ex. 2-24. 20) and testimoay (Tr. pg. H213-354) o the use of thieconcept in the automotive industry. Monsanto Company stated (Ex. 3-52. ettnehmest D) that this form of lockout protection represented their basic approactito lockout/tagout. Monsanto indicated that tagout is only used in situations "where tho work is relatively low hazard and the person is accidents. Of those 130 accidents, only one occurred which was marginally related tertagout That one accident occurred because there was no valve to guard against die transfer-of heat ^ through another dosed end tagged ^ valve. Finafijrthfr commenter stated. `"Thekey to safety irrtot'in a specific- ^ device, be it tag lock:^Safety] luttfer;lies in good procedures mid carefuTJ training combined wife assurance of accountability. Iffeeueiftree prihcijpfes are in place, a system whichuses rags only will adequately protect employees. Alockout requirementin.addition,to tagout wtilnot assure piotwfity." (Tr. pg. H19B.J Even 2 commenters (Ex 2-67yTr. pg. Wl-75. Wl-167), who spoke out against the use of tags admitted feel there might be instances in which lockout would be either unpractical or impossible. However, one commenter (Tr. pg, Wl- 97) stated that problems, such as the loss of computer memory by shutting off automated equipment, could be overcome. Retention of the computer memory could be accomplished by providing a separate energy source for the computer so that the energy used to power the movable portions ef fee mechanism could be shut off and locked out without affecting the computer memory. Ibis commenter stated that other innovative means are possible for solving other similar problems Other commenters (Tr.-pg. Wl-139, Wl-157) statedfeat there is no data available on accidents which have occurred when machines or equipment Wl-192, Wl-233, Wl-241. Wl-24* W2- in control of the energy source," such as so. W2-oi. im Hea Hga Hiaa. Hiae, light switches, some velvet. and some H142, H14S, H153) stated that the use of plug and cord connected equipment are taggedout Several commenter* (Tr. pg. Wl-106, Wl--139. Wl--164} suggested tagging locks was the only acceptable means to Monsanto also noted that group lockout should be used only wife an increased 9-6-89 PuMSIWd by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D.C. 20037 VVV 000013999 CURRENT REPORT 649 emphasis on training, supervision, controlled access and employer commitment. Much of the testimony and comment received in this rulemaking has focused on whether the standard should require lockout as opposed to the proposed approach of allowing lockout or tagout. In a sense, it was unfortunate that attention w as focused more on a single aspect of the standard, though it is certainly an important one. than on the standard taken as a whole. The proposed standard was intended to specify that the employer provide a comprehensive set of procedures for addressing the hazards of unexpected re energization of equipment and the use of locks and/or tags was Intended to be only a single element of the total program. In order to provide adequate protection to employees, the Final Rule, as did the proposal, requires employers to develop and utilize a comprehensive energy control program consisting of the development and utilization or procedures and training of employees. The procedures must consist of steps for deenergization of equipment, isolation of the equipment from energy sources, and verification of deenergization before servicing and maintenance is performed on equipment and the employees who either perform the servicing or maintenance or are affected by those operations must be properly trained in the energy control procedures which apply to their work. It should be noted that locks and tags by themselves do not control hazardous energy. It is the isolation of the equipment from the energy source and the following of the established procedures for deenergization and reenergization of the equipment that actually controls the energy. Locks and/ or tags are attached to the disconnects and other energy isolating mechanisms after the machine or equipment has, in fact, been isolated, in order to prevent them from being reenergized before the work has been completed. If the equipment has not been properly deenergized, and if proper procedures have not been followed, neither a lock nor a tag will provide protection. The treatment of lockout vs. tagout presents OSHA with a difficult regulatory dilemma. On the one hand, if the issue were simply whether a lock or a tag will be better able to prevent equipment from being reactivated, there is no question that a lock would be the preferred method. Locks are positive restraints which Cannot be removed (except through extraordinary means such as bolt-cutters) without the use of a key or other unlocking mechanism. By contrast, the limitations of tags used alone are self-evident: They do not serve as positive restraints on energy isolating devices, but are only warnings to employees that the equipment is not to be reenergized. Tags not fastened with a strong material can become detached from the energy isolating device by wind or other environmental conditions, and the legend on some tags can be rendered illegible if the tag becomes wet. Tags may not provide protection if there are affected employees who do not read English or who have not been properly trained in the tagging system and its implementation. However, the issue in this rulemaking is not merely on the use of lockout vs. tagout, but rather die use of locks and/ or tags in a comprehensive program of energy control. As was noted in the preamble of the proposed rule (53 FR 15496. April 29,1988). OSHA is aware of workplaces in which tagout systems are used with great effectiveness. In particular, various electric utilities and chemical plants report that they have used tagout in Heu of lockout successfully for many years (cf. Tr. H194-214; W2.2-3--2-39). In evaluating these industries, OSHA has determined that there are several factors which have contributed to their successful use of tagout programs: first these companies have implemented detailed energy control procedures which are quite similar to those set forth in both the proposed and final lockout/tagout standard: second, they have established and utilized extensive training programs to teach their employees about their energy control procedures, including the U9e of tags and the importance of obeying them; third, these companies reinforce their training periodically. However, it is the fourth common element, discipline, which appears to be the most critical to the success of these programs: the companies with effective tagout programs apply various types of disciplinary action to both supervisors and employees who violate the tagout procedures. OSHA believes that an effective tagout system needs all four of these elements to be successful. However, it is the fourth element, discipline, which is the most difficult to incorporate into a regulatory approach in the Final Rule. Not surprisingly, it also reflects the most serious limitation of tagout which does not arise with lockout Because a tagout program does not involve positive restraints on energy control devices, it requires constant vigilance to assure that tags are properly applied; that they remain affixed throughout the servicing and maintenance of equipment; and that no employee violates the tag by reenergizing the equipment, either intentionally or inadvertently, before the tag is removed. By contrast, a lockout device, once applied, cannot inadvertently be removed, and cannot be removed intentionally by an unauthorized person except by the use cf force. In the Final Rule. OSHA has determined that lockout is a surer means of assuring deer.ergiZHtion of equipment than t3gout. and that it should be the preferred method used by employees. However, the Agency also recognizes that tagout will nonetheless need to be used instead of lockout where the energy control device cannot accept a locking device. Where an energy control device has been designed to be lockable, the standard requires that lockout be used unless tagout can be shown to provide "full employee protection." that is, protection equivalent to lockout These requirements will be discussed in detail in the summary and explanation of the standard, below. The Agency believes that except for limited situations, the use of lockout devices will provide employees with a more secure and more effective means of assuring that equipment will not be reenergized while they are working on it To the extent that equipment is capable of being locked out during servicing or maintenance. OSHA believes that it should be locked out It should be noted, in this regard, that a number of General Industry standards, such as 11910.305(})(4) in Subpart S- Electrical, presently require electrical disconnects to large motors to be capable of being locked out According to OSHA's Regulatory Impact Analysis, approximately 90% of all electrical energy isolating devices (disconnects) and about % of all energy control valves are currently capable of being locked out As previously discussed, the capability for lockout does not necessarily mean that the equipment has an actual hasp or other physical attachment point for a lock. For example, the use of chains can be an effective means of facilitating lockout of many types of valves, even if the valve does not have a specific locking point Many examples of equipment which was made lockable with minor modifications have been provided to the record. For equipment of this type. OSHA believes that the lockout capability should be used in order to maximize the protection afforded by this standard. OSHA also acknowledges that certain types of energy isolating devices currently in place a^e not capable of 9-6-89 Occupational Safety A Health Reporter VVV 000014000 650 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER being locked out Such equipment would need to be replaced with or modified significantly to accept Locking-type mechanisms in order to become capable of being locked out. This equipment constitutes relatively small percentage of all equipment to be covered by this standard, and will primarily involve valves rather than electrical disconnects. OSHA believes that where equipment replacement and major equipment modification would be necessary for the equipment to accommodate a lockout device, such efforts are most effectively and `-fficiently achieved as part of the normal replacement cycle for the equipment, rather than through a specific requirement for retrofitting within a set time frame In this standard. OSHA believes that it Is much more cost-effective and protective to deeign a locking capability into equipment than it is to perform a major retrofitting of that equipment solely to incorporate lockout, for several reasons. First, there are situations in which locking out of equipment can create other, and sometimes greater, hazards to employees. The retrofitting of such equipment for the sole purpose of incorporating e lockout capability would not necessarily deal with die additional braids. By contrast, the incorporation o; a lockout means into the design of n3w equipment is far less costly than modifying equipment whichwas not designed to be locked out Third, incorporating a lockout capability into either new or overhauled equipment is a far less complex task from a technological standpoint since the locking aspect is a small part of the overall design. Surprisingly, although there was considerable evidence submitted on equipment tor which lockout is currently beirg used, this rulemaking provided GSfLA with little new information on the costs or feasibility of extending lockout requirements to equipment which is not currently capable of being locked out Therefore. OSHA is unable to conclude with any degreeuncertainty that a requirement to retrafirah such equipment would be feasible, nor is the Agency able to determine the amount of time or resources that would need to be expended to achieve compliance. For such equipment OSHA wkl allow employers to use the less restrictive tagout programs, but only until the equipment is replaced, oruntil major rehabilitation or modification is performed on it. At that time, the new, overhauled, or mrtdtfjaH equipment must be equipped with lockout-capable energy isolating devices, and the energy control procedure for the servicing of that equipment must be revised to make use of that capability, except if the employer can demonstrate that tagout will provide equivalent protection. OSHA is confident that this standard is a cost-effective approach to providing protection against hazardous energy sources. It recognizes that lockout is. in general, preferable to tagout as a method of assuring that deenergized equipment is not inadvertently or accidentally reenergized. It requires that the employer develop and implement an energy control program and procedure for servicing and maintenance of machinery and equipment, using lockout or its equivalent on the great majority of energy isolating devices, namely those which are currently capable of being locked ouL For energy isolating devices which do not yet have a lockout capability, the standard allows the interim use of tagout but lockout- capable energy isolating devices must be installed when that equipment is replaced or overhauled The standard is written in performance-oriented language, providing considerable flexibility for employers to tailor their energy control programs and procedures to their particular circumstances and working conditions. GSHA is confident that this standard will greatly reduce the toll of Injuries and fatalities which occur each year from the failure to control hazardous energy in genera! industry workplaces. A critical clement of this standard is the determination of whether an energy isolating device is "capable of being locked eat/' In its moat limited sense, a device would be considered to be "capable of being locked out" either if it was designed with a hasp or other integral part to which or through which a-lock could be affixed, or if it has.a locking mechanism built into it. However. OSHA's use of the term for the purpose* of this standard is somewhat broader, without being overly expensive. OSHA considers equipment to be capable of being locked out if the use of* locking mechanism will not require the employer to dismantle, rebuild, replace, or alter in e permanent way the energy control capability of the isolating device. For example, although some valves and other energy isolating devices ere not designed with an integral means of being locked, they can be secured with <***>- blocking braces or wedges, which then can be locked. Because extensive equipment modification is not needed in tide situation. OSHA views ibis type of lockout to be both techaologUmOy and ecooamicaUy feasible. However, a specific energy isolating device is not considered as having the capability f being locked out if the device is installed within a single cabinet enclosure or cutout box containing several other energy isokiting devices or valves and where the only preventing access to the energy isolating device or valve can be locked out individually, tugs mus* be used and must be attached to the specific enerqy isolating device and not simply attached to the cabinet or enclosure door or caver. By contrast, as noted earlier, some types of valves and disconnects would require trial or partial replacement in order to provide the equipment with a lockout capability. 2. Should OSHA require employee participation in the development of lockout procedures and the training programs required by this standard? There was considerable comment on the. part of labor unions (Ex. 2-59.2-44. 2-63. 60) and other commenters (Ex. 292, 2-97) that OSHA should require that employees and employee rqneeentatives participate in the fcunralation and implementation of lockout programs (compliance plana, procedure* persons to conduct inspection*, edocatiow and training programs and materials): These. *; commenters also sttoedthat any comments by employee representatives should b*incorporated into the training program* One commonter (Ex. 2-63) stated. "The standard does not prescribe worker participation in program design and training which is esMOtiai to an effective program." Another commenter {Ex. 2-97) stated. "Procedures cannot be written in a vacuum and must be accepted by employee* training must be appropriate and up-to-date for the situation." Finally, one commenter (Ex. 2-97) stated, "An effective lockoat program must provide for employee participation and their representatives in program design and training." OSHA has determined that a specific prevision dealing with employee participation in the development of the employer's lockout or tagout procedure is not necessary for the effective implementation of the Final Rule. For standards Hwlmg with exposure to toxic substances and harmful physical agents under section 0(b)(5) of the OSH Act section 6(c)(2) of the Act spells out specific requirements for employee involvement in compliance activity. In particular, it requires that employees or their representatives have the opportunity to observe air monitoring and to have access to monitoring record* By contrast there Is nosuch specific statutory mandate for the 9-6-89 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. O.C. 20037 VVV 000014001 l. L CURRENT REPORT 651 present standard. Although OSHA agrees that active employee involvement may enlmnce understanding aadoooperatjon, the Agency believe*Ifafrt tt would be inappropriate hreqgfca tucfe involvamaot in *hia ttanriiirrt The standard sets out thapeocedure* and steps which the employer must take to establish end implement an effective procedure for controlling hazardous energy, and under the OSH Act it is the employer who is responsible for complying with the standard. .? Should OSflA change the scope and application statements af'this standard in t . .{Final Rule to caret construction, maritime agriculture, electric utility, and oil amtgas wetb driilitig industries? L' Lhe Notice of Proposed Ridemakmg for the standard on the control of hazardous energy sources (Lockout/ Tagout) (53 PR 15496,29 April 1986). OSHA proposed exempting the construction, maritime and agricultural industries. In the preamble of the proposed rule. OSHA explained that the exemption of these industries' was based upon their unique situations and work practices which would unduly complicate the development ofa genoric energy control standard for goner*! industry. For example, the Jarigshroring and the construction indn.ifrfes ere generally characterized by casual (short term) employment which m*y last Just until the project iorwhichtbe employees were hired is completed. The project may involve the erection of a single building or the loading or unloading of a single vessel. Even on longer duration construction projects, the various tasks, such as steel erectionnr brick laying, are usually of relatively short durations One commentar (Be. 2aoi. in discussing the need for regulation uf the construction industry, pointed out the difficulty of providing adequate training of a transient workfbM*: Likewise, the agricultural industries can be characterized ae ones which lt more rapidly changjagtemployment Fee example, agriculturalbanesbag (and its employment of mipnrii wuihurz) and the use of harvestingangritiae*are limited to those-bmee wheomnopherrseedy to be harvested. ' Of additional cOccam fa the*r ~ imposition of regulations in the construction industry is the uniqueness of lhe earthmoving equipment such as ' ^ (lice boom mobile crane* front-end loaders, bulldozer*. scrappers and dump tnn ks, As opposed to maintenance on au'omobilea, buses and over-the-road tr -ks where removal of die ignition key cibaully ensures that the engine cannot be started end the vehicku may be worked upon, some of the maintenance of the above mentioned earth moving equipment involves the positioning of components, such as buckets, blades and machine body parts, which present extraordinary hazards to maintenance or servicing personnel. These hazards and the means to minimize the potential for injury to employees involve additional considerations, which were not adequately addressed during the course of the rulemaking proceeding. Because of the unique nature of those industries, their respective workforces and working conditions. OSHA believes that this Final Rule might need considerable modification in order to provide optimal protection to employees, fn particular. OSHA is concerned with the effectiveness of the basic approach of this standard when applied to a workforce which is highly transient. The energy control procedure n;ay vary widely from one workplace to another, and an employee in construction*.for example, may find him/htr'setf in several workplaces during the course of a single year. Similarly, the Agency wiQ evaluate means by which the training' requirements of this standard could bs.. modified to reflect these conditions. The Agency currently intends to consult with the Advisory1 Committee for Construction Safety and Health (ACCSH) on a proposed lockout-tagout s.-andord for construction under section 197 of the Construction Work Hours and Safety Standards Act (Construction Safety Act), 40 U.S.C, 333. In addition, for the maritime industry. OSHA intends to present these matters to the Shipyard Employment Standards Advisory Curpniittea (SESAC) for consideration as part of that Committee's review of shipgaid standards in part 1915. OSHA bus determined that the Tina! Rule will cover General industry, but will not be expanded to cover construction, maritime and agriculture at this time. The Agency has inadequate infbemation at this time on both the hazards oflockout or tagout and the appropriateness of this standard's approach in those industry sectors. However, the Agency will continue to review informatiaaon these sectors and will evaluate the need to initiate further rulemaking and will consider whether this Final&uie* or an appropriate modification of same, should be used ae the basis for a proposal for construction, maritime and agriculture. There are several coromenters (Ex. 2- 27, 2-49. 2-67, 2-79,2-79. 2-90. 2-106, 60), who were opposed to exempting any industry. Their concern was that the hazards associated with failure to lockout during the maintenance or servicing of machines or equipment were not restricted to a single industry or group of industries, it is their contention that this standard should have universal application. On the other side of the question, there was one commenter (Ex. 2-56} who agreed with the exclusion of these industries. It should be noted that OSHA's electrical standards for construction (29 GFR part 1926, subpart K), which were revised on july 11.1906 (51FR 23318|, currently contain various requirements for deactivating equipment deenergizing electrical circuits, and linuting^mployee access to energized parts is construction work (e.g., 43 1926.4030), 1928.416. 1920.417). Similarly, OSHA's shipyard and marine terminal standards (29 CFR parts 1915 and 1917, respectively) include many provisions which address de*nergix*tion of equipment during servicing of equipment on vessels ar.d in marina terminals (e.g.. 3 1915.162-.165, 1915,181.1917.48(r), 1917.151(b). Baaed on its experience in regelating construction and maritime employment, OSHA believes that a generiffenergy control standard would tikettbe applied quite differently in these areM then in general industry. Fartbe*. tWr .. interrelationship between a generic rule and the specific provisions currently applicable to these indusfey sectors must be considered. In its consultations with its advisory committee on construction and shipyard employment OSHA will seek guidance on whether a generic rale would be appropriate far these industries; on what areas in which such a rule should differ from die general industry standard being issued today; and on the reasons for any such difference".. OSHA is nc* less concerned with the safety of these other employees. However, delaying the promulgation of tei* generic, general industry standard to examine all the unique aspects of tht.-se other industries would further delay the promulgation of this standard. Tnare were five commenter* (Ex. 2-22, 2-26,2-45,2-52 and 2-61} who recommended the exclusion of the natural gas transmission industry from the scope of this standard. Their contention was that OSHA would be preempted under section (4)(b)(l) of the Act fvuin enforcement of this standard since the U S, Department of Transportation has regulations affecting die gas transmission industry. Section (4}[b)(l) of the Act states; Nothing in this Act dull apply to working conditions of employes* with respect to which other FederaL agendas and State agencies, acting under seettog 274 of the s-e-es Occupational Safety 4 Health Reporter vvv 000014002 652 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended (42 representative of the American energy of machines and equipment. U.5.C. 2021). exercise statutory authority to Petroleum Institute acknowledged that Finally, verification of the success of prescribe or enforce standard* or regulations affecting occupational safety or health. the work authorization system was not Inconsistent with the procedures set prior steps of a piping system isolation is the same as verification of proper OSHA recognizes the possibility that forth in the proposal. (Tr. p. H64). implementation of the energy control its lockout or tagout standard may be (OSHA agrees that a work permit program. OSHA acknowledges that preempted under section 4(b)(lj of the checklist system or work authorization when there are additional steps specific OSH Act by other Federal agency system could serve as the required to the preparation for maintenance of actions, such as regulations issued by written procedure as long as it meets the piping systems, these steps would also Che Department of Transportation's criteria tor a procedure spelled out in need to be included in an employer's Division of Pipeline Safety. Section 4 this Final Rule.) energy control program. (b)(1) provides that when another Federal agency exercises statutory authority over working conditions, that exercise of authority will preempt In their comments to the record, the American Petroleum Institute (API) restated their view that the lockout/ tagout rule was not designed to regulate Based upon the foregoing comparison. OSHA believes that the imposition of the requirements of this standard (particularly the need for a standardized OSHA from covering those same working conditions. However. OSHA declines to incorporate a specific piping networks and process systems (Ex. 2-36). OSHA recognizes that the energy sources and control methods procedure) is not a "force fit" but the logical "tailoring" of the steps to a different type of equipment. Based upon provision on preemption into this standard for two reasons: first whether or not preemption takes place for a given working condition is a matter of law. to be evaluated in a case-by-case used in process hazards management are often quite different from those encountered with machinery and mechanical e ; 'rnnenL However, the Agency consi the basic approach of the generic nature of this standard. OSHA recognizes that some modifications or "tailoring" of the requirements of this standard may be necessary, but the basic procedural determination. Second, even in the event this standard : appropriate for the provisions of the standard are designed that preemption takes place, if the control of all rdous energy sources, to be used throughout general industry, preempting agency were to choose to including thoi 3cussed by API. in a wide range of applications. revoke its regulations or other exercise Indeed, many, u not all, of the elements Two commenters (Ex, 2-21 and 57) of authority, there would no longer be any preemption. Inclusion of a covered in the standard are addressed by the "work authorization procedures" pointed out that some of the items listed in the definition of energy isolating preemption provision by OSHA in a commonly used throughout the devices (notably the blank flange and * particular safety or health standard petroleum and chemical industries. bolted slip blind) can require at least as would inappropriately prevent OSHA from asserting its authority under the These procedures, which focus upon the issuance of work permits or permits for much effort to remove as locks. These commenters pointed out that removaLef OSH Act in that situation. There were five commenters (Ex. 2-21. 2-36, 2-40, 2-4B and 2-50-20). who discussed the application of this standard to the petroleum industry. Four of those commenters (Ex. 2-21,2-36.240 and 2-46) stated that OSHA should not try to "force fit" a machinery standard to process systems and piping networks: that OSHA should not expand the scope of the consensus standard; and that, if necessary, OSHA should develop a separate standard for process piping. (There was universal agreement on the part of these industry commenters that this standard did properly apply to the machinery elements of the process piping systems.) On the other hand, one commenter (Ex. 2-50} spoke out in favor of this OSHA standard to piping systems. There were two commentate fcom the petroleum industry (Ex. 2-ttsAdf2-46) and one commenter from the chemical industry (Ex. 2-59) who objected to the use of a written lockout or tagout safe entry into piping systems, were acknowledged at the hearings to be consistent with the procedures set forth in the proposed rule. The primary area which warrants further explanation involves the different means used to isolate the energy in piping and process systems, and how they relate to the lockout or tagout requirements of this standard. According to one commenter (Ex. 20). the procedural steps required for safe performance of process system maintenance are: (1) Deactivation, (2) removing contents, (3) isolation. (4) decontamination, (5) restraining, (6) verification. (7) control and (8) communication. In contrast, this standard sets forth five steps for lockout or tagout: (1) Equipmentshutdown. (2) isolation. (3) lockout or tagout application. (4) stored energy restrictions, and (5) verification. However, these five steps encompass all elements of process system deenergization as well. For example, these devices, when they ate properly bolted in place, requires wreaches to disassemble the nuts and bolts holding the blank flange or blind. The use of these wrenches is comparable to using bolt cutters to remove lock. Although the wrenches used for removing the nuts and bolts from the flanges may benoore readily available with a piping system than a pair of boltcutiera in the average workplace, the time to remove the nuts and belts would surpass the-time to remove, a lock. OSHA believes that this type of bolted system will provide comparable security against the release of hazardous energy in the system, even though a "lock" is not used. Based upon the above rationale. OSHA will consider bolted blank flanges or slip blinds to be an acceptable type of lockout/tagout device. As with all devices, these bolted systems must be used as part of standardized, documented procedure, and they must meet the other requirements of the standard for lockout i procedure as specified in the proposed deactivation of a process system is Standard. These commenters stated that analogous to equipment shutdown. or tagout devices (that is. they must be durable, standardized, substantial and they use a work permit or work Similarly, removing the contents of the identifiable.) authorization system. The safe work piping system and isolation of the If bolted flanges or slip blinds are permit checklist enclosed with one energy source can be compared to used, a means must be devised so that comment (Ex. 2-59) has provisions for isolation and lockout or tagout of a each authorized employee can be the use of blinds and disconnecting machine or equipment and identified as a participant in the project pipes, and for extensive post isolating decontamination and restraining in when he/she is working on iL For cleaning and testing. At the Houston piping systems is essentially the same example; Individual identification can segment of the hearing, the as restraining or minimising the stored be achieved by each authorized 9-s-es Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington, O.C. 20037 VVV 000014003 CURRENT REPORT 653 employee hanging his/her tag on the blank flange or the slip blind when he/ she starts work and removing hie/her tag when he/she stop* work. The tag in this case would supolanrent the locking mechanism of the bolts on the flanges or slip blinds. The applicable consensus standard [ANSI Z244.1!{Ex. 9) has been reviewed for its applicability to process systems, it is clear from this review that this consensus standard was intended to apply to machines, equipment and processes. The definition of energy Isolating device contains examples v. hich include slip blinds, blank flanges, line valves and similar devices. These are devices used for energy isolation in piping systems. QSHA believes that die employees working on the piping portions of jooas-io deserve no leas protection th.-a v.'i.jo thoie same employees work or the mechanical components of the same systems. The advantage of writing this OSHA standard in performance language is to allow flexibility of uunpbjrrce fJr all systems in which hazardous energy is or may be present. OSHA has used this approach to the formulation of this standard because of the wide range of energy control r.i'.uations encountered throughout general industry. OSHA also proposed to exclude from coverage of this standard certain ;.nstj" jfions under the exclusive control if electric utilities, as weii as oil and gas t^ell drilling operations. Those industrial vectors were proposed to be exempted from this stanchrJ because lockout will hd uniquely addressed for these iurfustries in other proposed standards. In both cases, OSHA is actively working on projects to cover the special safety needs of these industries. ISee 54 FR 4974. fanuary 31,1989 for the Proposed Standard on Electric Power Generation. Transmission, and Distribution.) 4. Should OSHA state the requirements of this final standard in performance language? There were two conunenters (Ex 2-27, 2-29, and 2-91) whoqfciected to the uae of performance language in the proposed standard. Their objeiifirms were based upon the fact that, without specific requirements, employers would be allowed too much discretion in the means or methods that they utilize in complying with the standard. There were 11 commenters (2-31. 234. 2-36, 2-37, 2-39, 2-46. 2-53, 2-57, 2- 59, 2-62, 2-09, and a--B7) who favored the use of perfurmance language in the standard. These commenters pointed out that the standard covers a vast segment of industry (both in size end type of companies) and type of operations. It is their contention that the use of performance language allows a degree of latitude to employers to "tailor'' the required procedures, training requirements, and inspection parameters of the standard to fit the individual conditions present in their workplaces. OSHA concurs with those commenters who stressed the need for flexibility in the standard. For example, the detail into which a procedure may have to go may vary depending upon the lypj of power the machine or equipment may utilize or the means used to isolate or block the machine or equipment from the source of power. The amount of detail in a procedure for shutting down a simple conveyor with a signal source of power, and single feed and discharge points, could be much less than the procedure for shutting down a long assembly line conveyor w ith multiple feed and discharge points, one which han many employees working about the conveyor. The use of multiple sources of power applied to die machine or equipment at multiple points would necessarily cause the complexity of the procedire to be enhanced. Finally, the OSH Act, In discussing the promulgation of standards, states in the second sentence of section 9(b)(3), "Whenever practical, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms o: objective criteria and of the performance desired." Ea icu upon the forepoin,^, Oaf!A has decided to return the performance UnRLHie in this final standard. V!. Summary of Explanation of the Final Standard There were 108 comments and 64 exhibits placed in the record of the Proposed Standard for the Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/ Tagout) (53 FR 15498, April 28,1988) and 18 parties participated in the public hearing. There was general agreement on the need for a comprehensive standard (Exhibits (Exs.) 2-1, 2-3. 2-4. 2-5. 2-6,2-9,2-12. 2-13. 2-21. 2-27, 2-29, 2-34, 2-36, 2-38. 2-39, 2-40. 2-42, 2-50, 252, 2-83, 2-55. 2-59. 2-84, 2-69. 2-70, 272, 2-73, 2-74, 2-75, 2-77,2-78, 2-79, 280, 2-83, 2-67. 2-91, 2-Q5, 2-98. 2-100. 2105, 2-106) with the major discussion centering around the form and the content that the Final Rules should take. As previously discussed (see section entitled "Major Issues" above) OSHA has determined that the use of lockout for the control of hazardous energy is the more positive means of ensuring employee safety. The fuse of tagout in lieu oflockout requires the addition of certain elements erf the program and the reinforcement of others to provtde full employee protection. This standard requires the adoption and utilization of standardized procedures and the implementation of safe work practices for the control of potentially hazardous energy during servicing and maintenance activities. It also requires the training of employees in the use of these practices and procedures. An Appendix La provided to serve as an aid in complying with die requirements of this section. In paragraph (a), OSHA defines the scope, application and purpose of this Standard for the control of hazardous energy (lockout or tagout). The standard covers servicing and maintenance in general industry where the-unexpected energization or start-up of machines or equipment or the release of stored energy could cause injury to employees. Tliis Final Rule does cot contain specifications which must be followed in all circumstances, but. rather, provides flexibility for each employer to develop a-program and procedure which meets the needahof the partic'ilur workplaceand the particular types of michinee and equipment being maintained or serviced. In their pcst-hearing comment. (Ex. 60) the AFL-CO suggest adding the word "processes" to the word* "machinery" and "equipment," to clarify that the standard is intended to cover piping systems as wo'T as machinery and equipment. As diacaused earlier, OSHA agrees th.it processes are covered by the standard, although tile Agency felt that the use of tba term "equipment" in the proposal was broad enough to cover aii types of equipment including process equipment Further, had process and piping equipment not been within the scope of the standard, it would have been unnecessary to include a separate provision for "hot tap" operations, which are performed almost exclusively on process and piping equipment However, in response to the comments, and as discussed elsewhere in this preamble, OSHA has revised several of the proposed provisions in the standard to refer directly to piping and process hazards and some of the unique aspects of controlling those hazards in the context of this generis rule. For example, many servicing operations involving process equipment utilize blinds and blank flanges as means of controlling hazardous energy in the process system. These blinds and flanges can be bolted in place, a method of securing which does not involve an actual lock, but which would be of comparable or greater difficulty to defeat either intentionally or inadvertently. OSHA 9-6-69 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter 0000l>04 654 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER believes that the bolting of blinds and flanges should be considered to be a "locking device" for the purposes of the standard, and has modified its proposed definition to reflect this determination. Since the standard requires locking devices to identify the person that affixes them, the employer will need to use a supplemental tagout device on the bolted blinds and flanges to meet this requirement. For the reasons discussed in the section entitled, "Major Issues", above. OSHA has determined that the present rulemaking effort should be limited in scope to general industry. Development of appropriate requirements for the control of hazardous energy procedures for construction, maritime, and agricultural employments will be considered for future rulemaking proceedings. Secondly, OSHA has determined that certain installations under the exclusive control of electric utilities, as defined in paragraph (a)(l)(ii)(B), are not to be covered by this rule. These installations are intended to be covered separately by a new section, i 1910.269, "Electric Power Generation. Transmission and Distribution." which OSHA proposed on junuary 31.1988 (54 FR 4974). Because of the nature of these electrical utility operations. { 1910.269 will tailor the key provisions of this standard on lockout or tagout to meet the special safety needs of that industry. However, non-utility employers and workplaces that are engaged in the activities of power generation, transmission and distribution are covered by this standard and are not within the intended scope of i 1910.269. Whether or not this suggested demarcation is reasonable is an issue which will be dealt with in that rulemaking proceeding. In their post-hearing comment (Ex. 55). the Edison Electric institute (EE1) contended that the forthcoming power generation standard should cover the servicing and maintenance of mechanical and hydraulic equipment in power plants. If such equipment is either an integral part of. or inextricably commingled with, power generation processes or equipment. OSHA agrees that the power generation standard will apply instead of the generic lockout/ tagout standard. Further. OSHA states in paragraph (a'i'Tj(ii)(C) that exposure to electrical hazards from work on. near, or with conductors or equipment in electric utilization installations which is covered by Sabpart S of Part 1910 also are excluded from coverage by this standard. OSHA intends coverage for this work to be provided instead in a separate rulemaking on "Electrical Safety Work Practices." which was proposed on November 30.1967 (52 FR 45530) (new 1910.331 through 1910.335) as an amendment to Subpart S. Those proposed sections have their own provisions for dealing with lockout/ tagout situations, and for controlling employee exposure to hazardous electrical energy with the use of electrical protective equipment. They are based largely on a national consensus standard. NFPA 70E--part II. "Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces." Similarly, paragraph (a)(l)(ii)(D) excludes oil and gas well drilling and servicing installations from coverage by this rule. These installations are intended to be covered separately by a new (| 1910.290, Oil and Gas Well Drilling and Servicing. A proposed $ 1910.290 was published on December 28.1983 (48 FR 57202). The Agency is currently developing a revised proposal to reflect the information in the rulemaking record, which was submitted in response to the initial proposal. The hazards involving lockout or tagout that are unique to oil and gas well drilling and servicing will be given a complete evaluation during that rulemaking process and appropriate steps will be taken to control them. One commenter (Ex. 2-54) recommended the exclusion of the machine manufacturing industry from this Final Rule. This commenter contended that the inclusion of the word "constructing" in the definition of "servicing or maintenance" would seriously endanger the ability of machine manufacturers to perform the initial construction, assembly and manufacture of machines. During the assembly of equipment, it is normally not connected to any external power source, except when a temporary connection U made to effectuate adjustment testing or try-out. The nature of machine manufacturing normally only requires the connection to an external power source to move parts in order to allow for the construction. Once the system has been completely assembled, it is necessary to do final testing or try-out of the system. Energization of the entire system is generally necessary to accomplish the testing. The system is then connected to external power sources and the testing undertaken. If the tests are unsuccessful or further assembly work is needed, the equipment should be disconnected from the external power source and then the additional work conducted. It is during the time when the equipment is being alternately energized and deenergized that the energy control means are particularly significant. OSHA believes that disconnection of a machine or equipment from external power sources, as with cord and plug connected equipment, is a satisfactory method of isolating the equipment from the source of energy. OSHA also recognizes that testing with the power on is often necessary to ensure the proper assembly and functioning of all components. OSHA believes that workers "constructing" machinery and equipment need the same safeguards as other emplolyees doing other servicing on maintenance operations. OSHA is. however, providing specific requirements in paragraph (f)(1) of this Final Rule for the safeguarding of employees during operations which require the alternate energization and deenergization of machines and equipment for testing and trouble shooting. One commenter (Ex. 2-35) recommended that maintenance of medical equipment be excluded from this standard. This recommendation was predicated on the fact that maintenance and servicing of medical equipment is already covered by national consensus standards, that technical persons working on state-of-the-art medical equipment are highly trained professionals and that some equipment must be serviced while units are energized. OSHA believes that national consensus standards, in and of themselves, do not ensure a safe and healthful workplace since they are not enforceable regulations. Compliance with specific provisions of such standards is voluntary except when OSHA incorporates then into its regulations. In addition, as previously discussed in this preamble even if the servicing employeee is highly trained, his/her safety during the servicing operation may well be dependent on the actions of persons who are not as well trained. Other employees, upon finding a machine or equipment not operating, may attempt to start the machines, not realizing that they may be subjecting themselves or others to an increased risk of injury. In paragraph (a)(2)(i), the Final Rule states that the standard applies to servicing or maintenance of machines or equipment These activities are defined in paragraph (b) to include activities such as constructing, installing, setting up, adjusting, inspecting, maintaining, repairing and servicing machines and equipment. These activities generally require the stoppage of the machine or equipment and the resulting 9-6-89 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. O.C. 20037 vvv Q00014Q05 CURRENT REPORT 655 discontinuance of the production process. It is during these activities that the machine or equipment must be isolated from the energy source and the energy isolating device disabled. It is also during these activities that employees are exposed to the unexpected energization, startup or release of stored energy against which the control procedures established in this standard are designed to provide protection. Proper accomplishment of most servicing requires that the machine or equipment be shut down or turned off. However, simply shutting down the machine or equipment has not proven to prevent accidents when there is an unexpected energization or start up of the machine or equipment or the release of stored energy. The control of this hazardous energy is accomplished through the use of a standardized procedure which requires the shutting off of the machine or equipment, locating the energy isolating device and isolating the machine or equipment from the energy source, locking or tagging out the energy isolating device, reducing or eliminating stored or residual energy and then verifying the effectiveness of the energy isolation. There was one commenter (Ex. 2-60} who suggested that this standard should apply before, during, and after servicing or maintenance is performed. The use of this (angauge could be interpreted as meaning the standard should apply at ail times since before and after do not der.ote a beginning or an end. OSHA believes that the steps required by this c :andard are considered part of the c.irvicing activity, regardless of whether they take place before or after the specific work on the equipment has been performed. Based on this interpretation, the final standard requires the control of hazardous energy ai:!y J..rirc servicing or maintenance is b?ing conducted. T'mre aro some activities which are prcperly classified es servicing or maintenance but which are often performed during normal production operations. These activities include lubricating, cleaning, unjamming. and making minor adjustments and simple tool changes. In the proposed standard, OSHA suggested excluding these operations (paragraph (a)(2)(iii) "when it is necessary to perform the activity with the machine energized and if the activity is performed using alternative measures which the employer can demonstrate are equally effective." Two commentera (Ex. 2-44 and 2-80) stated that this exclusion was too broad and that there is difficulty in distinguishing between normal production operations and servicing or maintenance. As discussed earlier. OSHA recognizes that machines and equipment present many hazards during their usage during normal production operations. These production hazards are addressed by the machine guarding standards. 11910.212 (general machine guarding standard) and 11910.219 (guarding power transmission apparatus). This standard is not intended to deal with these same hazards. However, if a servicing type activity happens to take place during production, such as unjamming the production equipment the employee performing the servicing may be subjected to hazards which are not encountered as part of the production operation itself. These hazards are manifested when the employee must either remove or bypass guards or other safety devices, when the employee is required to place any part of his or her body into the point of operation of the machine or equipment or where an associated danger zone exists during a machine operating cycle. In those circumstances, when there is potential for unexpected activation or energy release and the machine or equipment can be deenergized to perform the servicing, the standard requires that it be deenergized and be locked out or tagged out in accordance with the procedure required by this standard. As was discussed in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA recognizes that some servicing operations must be performed with the power on; in these situations, it would not make sense to require lockout or tagout. which apply to doenergized equipment. The proposal contained a requirement that when servicing or maintenance must be performed with the equipment energized, the employer must use an alternative procedure which provides, in the language of the ANSI standard, "effective protection." Paragraph 0.8 of the ANSI Z244.1-19G2 (Ex. 9j states in part; in the case of required minor adjustments where this (deenergization) is not feasible, or in the case of normal production operations, these activities shall be accomplished under the protection of specially designed control circuits, control equipment, end operating procedures, that provide proven effective protection for the affected personnel. The proposed provision attracted considerable comment, particularly from the union participants, many of whom felt that it provided a "loophole" in the standard. OSHA believes that much of this concern was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what this provision was intended to accomplish. For example. Mary Twedt. of the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), (Tr. p. Wl-183-1900) testified about a serious injury that she had incurred while clearing a jam in a bacon slicing machine. She indicated that she had switched the machine off. but that a co-worker had inadvertently reactivated it while her hand was in the machine. However, there was no indication that it was necessary to perform that unjamming operation with the power on. (In fact, since Ms. Twedt did turn the machine's power off to clear the jam, OSHA assumes that it was nor necessary to have the equipment energized at that time). Further, if it was necessary to keep the energy on, the proposal would have required the employer to use an alternative procedure to lockout or tagout which would provide protection. In the testimony at the Houston hearing, the UAW contended that the "exemption" for normal production operations was too broadly drawn, and that it would be a "loophole" in the standard. Representatives of the UAW testified that they felt that the provision was unnecessary. Their reasoning essentially was that if alternative methods were used to keep the employee out of the danger zone, there was nothing for the standard to cover, since the employee would not be exposed to the hazard. (Tr. p. H290-291). OSHA agrees in principle with this statement, but believes that the standard needs to cover these situations as well in order to provide comprehensive treatment of the hazards. The Agency also agrees that the proposed provision was not clear enough in indicating the types of operations which were covered by the standard, the types of operations which would not be covered by the standard, and the criteria to be applied to each situation. Therefore, the Agency has revised tbi3 provision in the Final Rule to deal with these problems. In the Final Rule, OSHA is clarifying the intent behind the alternative provision for servicing or maintenance which takes place during normal production operations. The general rule is that servicing or maintenance, as defined in paragraph (b), must be performed under lockout or tagout in accordance with a written procedure established under this standard. Minor tool adjustments and changes or other minor servicing activities performed during normal production operations, are not covered by lockout or tagout requirements if the activities are routine, repetitive and integral to the production operation, provided that there is an 9-6-89 Occupational Safety & Hearth Reporter VVV 000014006 656 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER alternative means being used for employee protection in lieu of lockout or tagout which will provide effective protection to employees. OSHA emphasises that thirvtsnderd is not intended to cover the tepee of minor adjustments end otberectivities which are inherent in the production process. The machine guarding standards in subpart O cover these types of operations. The proposed rule included an exception for these types of operations, but OSHA has determined that there were two significant problems with the exception as proposed. First, the Agency believes that the provision was too broad as to the types of servicing or maintenance which would be excluded from the coverage of this standard. Proposed paragraph (a)(2)(iii) used the phrase "servicing or maintenance which takes place during normal production operations, such as lubricating, cleaning, and making minor adjustments and simple tool changes" to describe activities which would not be covered by this standard. OSHA's intention was to excluds from coverage those actions which would otherwise fit within the definition of "servicing or maintenance," but which are actually routine, repetitive actions which are integral to the operation of the equipment for production, and which are necessary to allow production to proceed without interruption However, the language of the proposal could have been read more broadly, to exclude from coverage certain servicing operations which should not be considered to be part of "normal" production, and which should be performed with the equipment deenergized. OSHA has revised the proposed exclusion to clarify the limitations of the standard, and to provide more guidance as to the types of servicing activities which must be performed under lockout or tagout The second problem with the proposed exclusion was that it would have required the employer to demonstrate that it was necessary to perform the operation with the machtawar equipment energized. Use record reflects rruch concern about thisqifovision. particularly with regeftHodh* criteria to be applied in determining the necessity ot having the equipment energized. OSHA emphasizes that this exclusion '.vas intended to cover the types of routine, repetitive, minor adjustments which are integral to and necessary for the production process. The revised language in the Final Rule sets forth the criteria to be applied in determining whether a given servicing operation is covered by this standard, or whether it i -- in be considered a part of normal production operations, which require alternative means of protection. Normal production operations, together with those minor servicing aspects which are also excluded from lockout or tagout coverage, continue to be covered by the machine guarding requirements of subpart O of part 1916. OSHA has provided several examples of the types of activities taking place during production which the Agency would consider to require lockout or tagout as well as examples of those which would not It must be emphasized that exclusion from lockout or tagout does not mean that the employer can avoid providing protection. As the exclusion itself makes clear, the employer must provkfoaltemative measures which he/she can demonstrate will provide effective protection. This will generally involve compliance with OSHA's machine guarding requirements throughout the production process. In evaluating servicing performed during normal production operations, the first question to be asked is whether employees must bypass guards or otherwise expose themselves to the potential unexpected release of hazardous energy. If no such exposure will occur, either because of the method in which the work fa performed or because special tools, techniques, or other additional protection is provided, lockout or tagout is not required. If there is such exposure, the lockout or tagout requirements of this standard apply. However, if the servicing operation is routine, repetitive and must be performed as part of the production process, it is obvious that lockout or tagout cannot be performed, because these procedures would prevent the machine from economically being used in production. OSHA will continue to treat these operations as being covered by the general machine guarding requirements of subpart D. The employer must provide appropriate guarding to protect employees from points of operation, nip pnirls. and other areas of the equipment where the employees might be endangered. The use of alternative protective methods to keep employees bodies out of danger zones, such as specially designed servicing- tools, remote oilers, and the like, would meet this requirement. The Final Rule, as didlhe proposal, also recognizes that there are some servicing operations in industry which require the equipment to be energized at least at some point during the servicing, for the purpose of testing or positioning the machinery or equipment or the components thereof. Where the energization is limited to those times, and is not shown to be necessary for the entire servicing operation, such servicing will generally be covered by the lockout or tagout requirements of this standard, but with the implementation of the special procedures set forth in paragraph (f)(1) for the temporary removal of lockout or tagout only when the machine or equipment must be energized. The concept behind both the proposed and final provisions on normal production operations was taken from the ANSI standard, which attempted to address situations in which it was necessary to keep equipment energized during servicing, it was clear to the ANSI committee, as it was and is to OSHA, that neither lockout nor tagout is possible in a situation when the equipment cannot be deenergized, because these efforts involve assurances that deenergization has been achieved and that the proper procedures and verifications ofdeenergizatjon have been carried out However, both ANSI and OSHA believe that even if lockout or tagout cannot be done, the employer must provide ehemative procedure!* to lockout/tagout which will protect tie employees doing the servicing unddr those conditions. * Thera are some situations in which lockout or tagout may not be effective or appropriate, and the standard does not require the use of lockout or tagout in these circumstances. In paragraph (a)(2J(iii), OSHA fists those situations where lockout or tagout provisions do not apply. In the proposed paragraph [aK2}(ii)(A|, OSHA specified that the stendard would not apply,when employees are working on cord and plug type electrical equipment for which exposure to the hazards of unexpected energization, starl-up, or release of stored energy of the equipment is effectively controlled by other measures. This exclusion would encompass the many varieties cf portable, hand tools that are found in the workplace, as well as cord and plus equipment wh;ca is intended for use at a fixed locution. There were 12 commenters (Ex. 2-14. 2-20. 2-27, 2-24, 2-38. 2-40, 2-44. 2-63. 2- 76. 2-29. 2-80. 2-97 and 2-1C5) on the issue of the proposed exemption for c?rd and plug connected equipment. Four of these commenters (x. 2-44. 2-63. 2r-~9 and 2-07) stated that die requirements of this standard should apply, to all situations (i.e.. OSHA should not allow an exemption for cord and plug connected equipment). Two commenteia (Ex 2-27 and 2-76) suggested that the standard should apply when the plug is 9-*-e9 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., Washington, D.C. 20037 vVV GOGOl*007 CURRENT REPORT 657 r.ot near the employee or if it could be plugged in without the employee's knowledge. Two commenters (Ex. 2-38 and 2--401 recommended expanding the scope of this exception to all email machinery or to those pieces of equipment for which the energy isolating device is in the control of the employee performing the maintenance. One commenter (Ex. 2-39) concurred with the proposal as written while one commenter (Ex. 2-14) suggested spelling out the alternate measures which were necessary to eliminate the requirement for locking out the energy isolating device. One commenter (Ex. 2-20) concurred with the exception as long as the employee who is doing the maintenance removes the plug and that employee does so only to do the maintenance. Based upon the arguments put forward by each of the above commenters, OSHA has decided that the lockout/tagout requirements of the standard will not apply to cord and plug connected equipment if the equipment is unplugged and the plug is in the exclusive control of the employee who is performing the servicing or maintenance of that equipment. Because this employee would control the plug, he/she would be able to prevent the equipment from becoming reenergized during the servicing operation. Paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) proposed that the use of iockout/taggut procedures would not apply to "hot tap" operations when continuity of service or process operation is essential, and complete shutdown of the system impractical, provided that documented procedures and special equipment are used by the employer which will provide proven effective protection for employees. This provision was intended by OSHA to address the petroleum industry's concern (Ex. 16) for the handling of "hot tap" operations commonly used in their facilities, although it might also address other similar operations. The "hot tap" procedure is employed in repair, maintenance, and service activities, and involves ihe cutting and welding of equipment (pipelines, vessels or tanks) under pressure in order to install connections or appurtenances. It is commonly used to replace or add sections of pipeline without the interruption of service fjr air, gas, water, steam and petrochemical distribution systems. Special metal cutting and welding equipment and specific operating procedures are used to limit explosion hazards. The operation may be performed by in-house maintenance personnel or by outside contractors. The use of "hot tap" procedures appears to avoid several safety rslc3 which would otherwise arise in servicing equipment which is under pressure. First, process shutdowns and start-ups with equipment cf this nature pose extreme hazards of explosions and fires due to the complexities and interrelationships among process components. For example, during start up it is necessary to purge pipelines of air, water and/or inert gases before hydrocarbons are Introduced. Malfunctions or operator errors during purging could easily create explosive mixtures in the equipment In other instances, process shutdowns and start ups can result in rapid condensation within the process equipment and may cause "water hammers." which are sudden pressure changes that can shake, vibrate and stress equipment to the extent that the pipeline breaks or connection leaks develop. Finally, a third class of hazard avoided is one created by the much higher level of worker activity required during a complete process shutdown or start-up. This may result in more extensive worker exposure to the hazards of the shutdown or start-up procedure, and in greater potential for injury than would be involved in performance of "hot tap"type activities, in which fewer employees would be exposed. The OSHA standard, as proposed, stipulated that hot tap operations would be exempt from the requirements of the standard if the employer could demonstrate that: (1) Continuity of service is essential: (2) shutdown of the system is impractical: and (3) documented procedures and special equipment are utilized which will provide effective protection for employees. In the preamble and the Appendix to the proposed rule, OSHA referred to the American Petroleum Institute's (AP!) publication. "Procedures for Welding or Hot Tapping on Equipment Containing Flammable," Publication 2201, Second Edition. November 1978, (Ex. 3-16). Reference to this document was intended to serve as an illustration of an acceptable procedure. It should be noted that the API procedure applies only to piping, vessels and tanka containing flammable liquids, gas or combustible material. OSHA's intent in proposing this exception from the requirements of this standard was to allow, in certain cases, a particular type of woik (the hot tap) in a limited number of cases (that is, when continuity of service is essential and shutdown is impractical) while providing for an acceptable level of safety for employees. Without this exception to the requirements of this standard, a hot tap operation could .-v.-t be conducted since the standard vvo'K-i otherwise require machine or equipment shut down and lockout or tagout of energy isolating devices to perform servicing or maintenance. There were eight commenters (Ex. 220. 2-21. 2-22. 2-27. 2-70, 2-70. 2-80 and 2-81) to this proposed requirement. One commenter (Ex. 2-20) suggested that i;:e first two criteria listed above (that continuity of service is essential and shut down is impractical) are unnecessary and should be eliminated from the final rule. Three comments: 3 (Ex. 2-21, 2-22 and 2-81) recommended eliminating the exception entirely. One commenter (Ex. 2-70) proposed the elimination of the need to use special tools. There were two commenters (Ex. 2-27 and 2-80) who encouraged OSHA to be more specific and to detail exact training requirements and work practices for workers involved in hot tap operations. Finally, one commenter (Ex. 2-76) expressed agreement with this concept as proposed. OSHA believes that employees performing hot tap operations should have comparable protection to workers performing other servicing or maintenance of machines or equipment. OSHA also believes that these operations should be allowed to be conducted when certain limited conditions exist, such as when continuity of service is essential and system shut down is impractical. By specifying these limitations the employer would be prohibited from conducting these operations simply as an expedient. The need for continuity of service would be illustrated by the pipeline containing a petroleum product where stopping the flow of the product and draining the pipeline could Introduce an additional danger to employees since the concentration of the gaseous product remaining in the pipe, when mixed with air. could fall within the explosive range of the product, thereby threatening an employee with serious injury if that employee would attempt to weld on the pipe. In this case, shut down may not be practical because shutting down the system may prove more hazardous than allowing the continued operation of the system while the hot tap operation is being conducted. Another example would be when a large storage tank with a hazardous substance is punctured or otherwise penetrated. There is obviously little or no time available to continue the scr. (store the substance) and shut down the system (drain the tank). In this case, the hot tap operation could be safely and 9-6-89 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter Wv 00001400a 658 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER properly conducted If a documented procedure and the required equipment are used so that they provide effective protection for employees. In paragraph (a)(3), OSHA sets forth the manner in which the employer is required to protect employees from injuries that could result from the unexpected energization or start up of machines or equipment or the release of stored energy, when they are engaged in servicing or maintenance activities. This standard requires the development of a program centered around the utilization of a standardized procedure and the training of employees in their role in the successful use of that procedure. Paragraph (a)(3)(i) specifies that the control of hazardous energy be accomplished by the use of a standardized procedure for affixing the appropriate lockout or tagout devices to energy isolating devices and by otherwise disabling equipment The steps to be followed by the employer to accomplish this goal are set forth in paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(5). In paragraph (a)(3)(ii), OSHA states that the intention of the standard is not to replace existing specific OSHA lockout and/or tagout provisions, but to supplement and support these provisions with the requirement for establishing a procedure and with the requirement for training employees in the energy control program. The / < following listing indicates a number of OSHA standards which currently impose lockout-related requirements: Powered Industrial Trucks 1910.178(q)(5)(i) Overhead and Gantry Cranes 1910.179(g)(5)(h) 1910.179(g)(5){iii) 1910.179(g)(5)(iJ 1910.i79U)(2)(i) (b), (c). (d) Derricks 1910.181(f)(2)(i)(c) 1910.161(f)(2)(i)(d) Woodworking Machinery 1910.213(a)(10) 1910.213(b)(5) Mechanical Power Presses 1910.217(b)(8}(i) 1910.217(d)(9)(iv) Forging Machines 1910.218(a)(3)(iii) 1910.218(d)(2) 1910.21B(e)(l)(iii) 1910.216(0(2) U). (i) 1910.210(a)(3)(iv) 1910.218(e)(1)(H) 1910.218(0(1) (i). (H). (iU) 1910.218(g)(2) Forging Machines (continued) 1910.218(h)(2) 1910.201(0(1) 1910.218{j)(l) 1910.218(h)(5) 1910.218(i)(2) The standards listed above provide limited coverage of machinery, equipment and industries and do not address lockout or tagout issues or methodology in any detail. For example, none of the existing standards cover the need for a procedure or for more than one or two orocedural steps pertaining to the actual application or release of energy control measures. The current provisions also do not address the basic requirements contained in the standard which are needed to support and coordinate the implementation of control measures such as the selection of hardware, communications, periodic inspections, and assignment of duties. Additionally, the need to document a procedure, or to train employees engaged in the relevant activities, is not explicitly required by any of the present regulations. A typical example of this limited coverage is found in the following provisions for mechanical power presses: Section 191017(bX8f(i). A main power disconnect switch capable of being locked only in the off position shall be provided with every press control. Section 1910,217(d)(9)(iv). The employer shall provide and enforce the use of safety blocks for use whenever dies are being adjusted or repaired in the press. A general review of these and other lockout and lockout related previsions in OSHA's $ 6(a) standards would seem to indicate that the consensus groups which originally developed these standards had either of two primary concerns in mind. Those concerns involve the need either (1) to provide equipment with the physical means or capability to isolate energy sources during maintenance and repair activities: or (2) to make a choice of the control measures (locks or tags) which were to be provided and used on the specific machine, equipment or process covered by the standard. The first category of provisions, while requiring the equipment to have the capability of being locked out. does not necessarily require that such control be accomplished. For example, i 1910.213(b)(5) states, "On each machine operated by electrical motors, positive means shall be provided for rendering such controls or devices inoperative while repairs or adjustments are being made to the machines they control." As another example. $ 1910.218(e)(1)(H) states, "Air hammers shall have a shutoff valve as required hv paragraph (d)(2) of this section and shall be conveniently located and distinctly marked for ease of identification." These provisions are specific in nature as they apply to the machines and equipment regulated and are primarily design oriented. For the most part, they address the importance assigned to the proper installation of equipment with regard to the arrangement of electrical and mechanical components. Th?jy do not, however, address the use of these components directly, nor do they establish a procedure for as9vri-g that they are. in fact. used. This standard supplements these provisions and does not conflict with their requirements. The equipment required by this category of current rules will be used as part of the servicing procedures set out in the Final Rule. For these reasons. OSHA did not propose any change in provisions in this category as they currently appear in part 1910. Provisions of similar content are: 1910.179(g)(5) (i), (ii). (iii) 1910:217(b)(8)(i) 19l0.218(e|(l)(iiij 1910.218{j)(i) 1910.261(k)(2)(ii) 1910.263(l)(8)(iii) 1910.213(a)(10) 1910.218(a)(3Kfh) 1910.218(h)(2) 1910^52(c)(l)(i) 1910.262(c)(1) 1910.265(c)(28)(v) The second category of provisions involves those which mandate the specific use of lockout, tagout or other energy control devices for certain machines, equipment or industries. The category addresses the application of locks, jocks or tags, locks and tags, and in some cases the use of blocks, to control potentially hazardous energy. An example of provisions used to specify the use of locks for a control measure is found in 5l910.179(l)(2J(i)(c) which states. "The main or emergency switch shall be open and locked in the open position." Provisions of similar content are sections: 1910.181(f)(2)(il(c) 1910.218(f)(l)(i) 1910.218(h)(5) 1910.218(0(2) ldl0.252[rt){2) I910.262(q)(2) 1910.263(l)(3)(m)(b) 1910.218(d)(2) 191O.210(f!(2)(i) 1910.218(0(1) 1910.261(b)(4) 1910.282(p)(l) 9-6-89 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D C. 20037 yVV 00001*009 CURRENT REPORT 659 Section 19lQ.261(j)(4)(iii) which states: "When cleaning, inspecting, or other work requires that persons enter the beaters, all control devices shall be locked or tagged out in accordance with paragraph (b)(4) of this section." Provisions of similar content are sections: 1910.281(g)(2) 1 >a.2Bl{jJ(5KmJ l-:0.2Ql(g)il9)(iii) An example of provisions used to specify the use of locks combined with tags is found in % 1910.2Ql(g)(15)(i) which states: "Valves controlling lines leading into a digester shall be locked out and tagged. The keys to the locks shall he in the possession of a person or persons doing the inspecting or making repairs." A provision of similar content is found in $ 1910.261(f)(8)fi). An example of provisions used to specify the use of blocks to control hazardous energy is found in S 1910.217(d)(9)(iv) which states: "The employer shall provide and enforce the use of safety blocks for use whenever dies are being adjusted or repaired in the press." Provisions of similar content ore sections: 1330.218{f)(2)(ii) 1879.218(a)(3)(iv) )dlQ.265(c}(13) 1310.218(f)(l)(iti) 1910.261(b)(4) The groups of provisions found in tins ?<*.ond category, and others similar to them covering potentially hazardous energy, are also not replaced by the Final lockout or tagout standard. These provisions selectively require the use of ihe most effective devices for isolating and securing energy sources. This standard will supplement these other previsions in much the same way as with the first category in that it requires the establishment of procedures for energy controls, and the training of *-tc'sovees in the-te procedures. frj summary, tHs standard focuses -''marhy on procedures--procedures ' ,h ftift necessary to provide effective t ntiol when dealing with potentially t'^uardous energy sources. Where current standards require the use of specific measures; those standards are if.piemen+ed and not replaced by the procedures and training requirements of Final Rule. This standard is also intended to infract with any new or revised standards which may be promulgated in the future to address the use of specific control measures on an individual basisSelection of the specific method of control, at that time, will reflect a thorough evaluation of the extent of exposure to the hazard: the risk of injury involving that particular machine, equipment or industry, and the feasibility of applying a particular method of control. This standard requires that procedures be followed to implement the required control as part of a total package including training and education. In paragraph (b), OSHA is adopting a number of definitions to clarify the meaning, intent and purpose of certain terms contained in this standard. In the proposed standard, all but five of the definitions were consistent with those published by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in their consensus standard. ANSI 22i4.i-iM2. The five definitions that were added covered the terms "energized." "setting up," "normal production operations," "hot tap," and "servicing or maintenance." In the Final Rule. OSHA has changed six of the proposed definitions, has added two definitions and deleted one. The definitions of affected end authorized employees, as proposed, received considerable comment. As proposed, the definition of each was: Affected employee. A person, other than the authorized employee, whose job includes activities covered by this standard as set forth in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. Authorized employee. A qualified person to whom the authority and responsibility to perform a specific lockout and/or tagout assignment has been given by the employer. Eight of the eleven commentcrs who discussed these definitions recommended either combining the two (Ex. 2-5, 2-28, 2-32 and 2-85) or revising them for clarity (Ex. 2-34. 2-74, 2-78 and 2-89). One commenter (Ex. 2-20) suggested changing the definitions to include supervisors while one commouter (Ex. 2-50) suyTesed changing "qualified" to "cnmi'smnt" based upon the dictionary definition cf each of these terms. Or.e co.rjnertier (Ex. 2-75) said that the definitions were satisfactory as stated. Based upon the confusion which each of these definitions have erected. OSHA is revising both definitions to identify each type or class of person. This differentiation is based upon their role in the control of energy (the action which they must either take or net take during the servicing or maintenance of machines or equipment) and the knowledge or information which they must possess regarding locking out cr tagjpng not energy isolating devices. OSHA has determined that the definitions of "authorized employee" and "affected employee" need to be clarified to reflect more accurately the person's involvement in the uj>'; of lockout or tagout. If an employee must utilize the energy concol procedure, that employee is considered to be an "authorized employee." By contrast, an "nffected employee" is cne who does not perform the servicing or implement the energy control procedure, b^t whose responsibilities are performed in &n area in which the energy control procedure is implemented and servicing operations are performed under that procedure. The affected employee dees not reed to know how to perform lockout or tagout, nor does that employee need to be trained in Ihe detailud implementation of the energy control procedure. Rather, the affected employee need only be able to recognize when the energy control procedure is being implemented, to identify the locks or tags being used, and to understand the purpose of the procedure and the importance of not attempting to start up or use the equipment which has been locked out or tagged out. The definition of "affected employee" also recognizes that an affected person and an authorized person may be one and the seme person when, a machine operator or user must also perform servicing or maipMenance on the machine or equipmen&ht this case, the employee must have the requisite knowledge of an authorized employee. The proposed definition of "authorized employee' appeared to limit thnt term to a particular person who has responsibility for the overall implementation of an energy con'ml procedure. Mary comments indicated that this took protection away from individual employees who had responsibilities under the procedure but were not actually in charge of its foil implementation (Ex. 2-32, 2-34, 2-40, 74, anJ 2-85). OSHA agrees that as long as .in umplcyee is involved in performing an element of servicing and maintenance which is covered by the energy control procedure, that err.pioj e* shouid be considered an "authorized employee" for the purpose of this standard. This is particularly important in the context cf the requirement in paragraph (d)(3) of the standard. which requires the authorized parson to affix a personal lockout nr tagout device on the energy isolating device as part of the energy control procedure. The revised definition assures that when a servicing task is performed by a team or group of employees, each employee who is directly exposed to the hazards of thcserv'dng operation will have the responsibility to affix his/her personal lockout or tagout device before beginning the work and to remote it 9-6-89 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter vvv 000014010 660 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER when he/she completes the work. In addition, as discussed below, paragraph (c)(5)(U)(D) of the Final Rule provides additional accountability by requiring such lockout and tagout device* to identify the authorized person, responsible for applying then. In the proposed standard. OSHA defined the term ''energized*' to refer to the connection of equipment to an energy source (mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, etc.) which has not been isolated. There was one commenter (Ex. 2-76) who recommended including Innguage for stored energy. Based upon an evaluation of the way which this term is used in the standard. OSHA has changed the definition to indicate that energized means connected to an energy source or containing residual or stored energy. OSHA has dropped the phrase "which has not been isolated" because connection to an energy source means that the machine or equipment has not been isolated. In this final standard, OSHA has amended the proposed definition of "energy source" to eliminate the phrase, "that is capable of causing injury to employees." The definition becomes, in essence, that an energy source is a source of energy. If an energy source does not have the capability of causing injury to employees, it is not "hazardous energy" within the scope of this standard. As used in the standard, an energy source includes the means of transmission of the energy from its true source to the energy isolating device. Therefore, isolating a machine or equipment from an energy source means utilizing an energy isolating device to interrupt the flow of energy irom the means of transmission of die energy to the machine or equipment. The identification of "energy sources." as defined in this proposal, is complicated by three very important considerations: (1) Energy is always present in machinery, equipment or processes; (2) energy is not necessarily dangerous; and (3) danger is only present when energy may be released in quantities or at rates that would harm an employee. Generally speaking, however, potentially hazardous energy sources are defined as those that can cause injury to employees working in, on. or around machines or equipment. The energy sources identified in this standard require a more detailed discussion. "Energy," as used in this document means mechanical motion; potential energy due to pressure, gravity, or springs: electrical energy; or thermal energy resulting from high or low temperature. Some energy sources can be turned on and off. some can be dissipated, some can be eliminated, and some can only be controlled. These concepts will be addressed throughout the discussion of energy control procedures in this Final Rule. The following brief analysis of energy sources may provide the reader with a better understanding of the provisions of this standard. 1. Mechanical motion can be linear translation or rotation, or it can produce work which, in turn, produces changes in temperature. This type of energy can be turned off or left on. 2. Potential energy can be due to pressure (above or below atmospheric) as in hydraulic, pneumatic, or vacuum systems, or it can be due to springs or gravity. Potential energy manifested as pressures or in springs can be dissipated or controlled; it cannot be turned off or on. 3. Electrical energy refers to generated electrical power or static electricity. In the case of generated electricity, the electrical power can be turned on or turned off. Static electricity cannot be turned off; it can only be dissipated or controlled. 4. Thermal energy is manifested by high or low temperature. This type of energy is the result of mechanical work, radiation, chemical reaction, or electrical resistance. It cannot be turned off or eliminated; however, it can be dissipated or controlled. The definition for "normal production operations" noted that these were operations which, enable the machine or equipment to perform its intended production functions. These functions would be carried out by employees with the machine or equipment energized. There were two comments fEx. 2-29 and 2-60) who discussed this definition. One commenter (Ex. 2-29) contended the minor repairs, adjustments and operations should be considered servicing and maintenance rather than normal production operations. The other commenter (Ex. 2-80) suggested that the language of the Final Rule more clearly differentiate between normal production operations and servicing and maintenance. As evidenced throughout this rulemaking proceeding, the line between "normal production operations" and "servicing or maintenance which takes place during normal production operations" is not always evident. The coverage of these activities, in simplest terms, is as follows: Normal production operations are covered by the machine guarding requirements in subpart O of part 1910. If servicing or maintenance is performed during normal production operations without the removal or bypassing of the machine guarding required by subpart O. this standard does not apply. Servicing or maintenance which occurs during normal production operations is covered by this Final Rule only if employees must bypass guards or otherwise place part of their bodies into an area in which they are exposed to the unexpected energization or activation of the equipment. If the employee is not exposed in this manner, such servicing or maintenance during normal production is not covered by this Final Rule. OSHA believes that the following examples will illustrate the types of activities which will come within each set of requirements. In a printing shop, when a printing press is being used to produce pnnied materials, there is often the need to make minor adjustments such as to correct for paper misalignment while the press is running. This is a part of the production process, and is subject to the machine guarding requirements. The use of remote control devices will keep the employees from reaching beyond the machine guards. In addition, the use of inch (or jog) devices will permit machine speed control for test purposes- By contrast, however, printing presses may jam, requiring the employee to bypass, the machine guards in order to reach die area of the jam and clear it. Although the need to unjam the machine comes about during normal production operations, it is a servicing activity which involves employee exposure to unexpected activation of the machine or release of energy, and as such, is covered by this Final Rule. In a machine shop, a milling machine machine operator must adjust the flow of coolant oil to parts being milled while the nutting tool is in operation. This operation, which is part of the normal production process for the machine, is covered by the machine guarding requirements. Guarding must be provided to keep the employee's body away fiom nip points and other points of operation. If it becomes necessary to adjust the movement of the long-bed milling machine worktable where the isolating hydraulic cut-off valve is not in exclusive control of the person making the adjustment, and this requires the employee to place any part of his/her body in an area which was otherwise required to be guarded, this Final Rule would apply. If this step is performed without the employee having to bypass the guarding or otherwise expose his/ her body to the potential release of energy or the unexpected activation of the milling machine, this Final Rule would not apply. An employee is operating a machine which applies and seals a clear plastic 9-4-89 Published by THE BUREAU OP NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., Washington. O.C. 20037 VVV 0000X4011 CURRENT REPORT 661 sheet around a packaged product. There is a blade on the machine which cuts the plastic sheets, and this blade must be cleaned off periodically during the production process, Since the process must be stopped to clean off the blade, one could argue that-this operation is more in the nature of servicing or maintenance than normal production; on the other hand, since it must be performed frequently during production, one might also argue that it was actually pert of the production process. Because of the dovetailing of the requirements of ibis standard and the machine guarding requirements of subpart O, protection must be provided, regardless of whether t'<f> above operation is considered to be production or servicing. If it is production, tbs employee must be provided with guarding to protect him/ u'tr from the dangers of contacting the Ijbida dv part of his/her body; the cleaning would need to be done with special tools and procedures to provide Ihs necessary protection. However, if it is servicing, and the employee is exposed to the point of operation which is otherwise, required to be guarded, the lockout or tagout provisions of this standard would apply. The definition of normal production operations has been simplified to sta*e th- normal production opc-radons are the utilization of a maojins or equipment ro perform its intended production function. Anything thht done to prepare a machine or equipment to operate, such as setting up or citiirying the blade on a power saw. would rot be included in the utilization or the n-n chine or equipment and would be classified as servicing or maintenance rather than normal production operation*. OSHA believes `hit this definition complements rfce de.iiii::on of''servicing or maintenance" U' d;'s Final Rule. Further, fhae tv. j defimli ns together help to provide a dividing line between the requirements oi this s*anchrii and the safeguards already required for normal production operations by the general machine y :.a"Jing standards in subpert 0 of part 1510 (| 1910.212 and 5*14219). Whereas the definitioiujf servicing or maintenance includes those activities which require an employee to remove or bypass guards or other safety de\ iues or to otherwise expose himself/herseif to hazardous machine elements, the standards for machine guarding offer protection when the machine is being used in the manner in which it was designed and intended to be used, that is. when the machine or equipment is used to perform its intended production function. OSHA has also amended the definition of setup to limit that activity to preparing a machine or equipment to perform its intended function. As proposed, setup involved placing a machine or equipment into an operational mode which could have included activities such as turning it on. Many types of machines and equipment can be turned on or started without doing what is commonly thought of and referred to as setup work. The definition of lockout/tagout as proposed has been changed in the Final Rule to two separate definitions. This was done to clarify the fact that a iockout device, when properly applied, prevents operation of the energy isolating device whereas a tagout device indicates that the energy isolating device and the machine or equipment should not be operated. OSHA has eliminated the definition of qualified pereon from this Final Rule. This was done because OSHA believes that this standard adequately specifies the type cf training which is necessary ami appropriate to prepare any person to perform the tasks involved in the employer's energy control program. The Final Rule requires that both authorized employees and affected employees be trained in and understand those things which are necessary for the employee to knew m order to do tha lockout or tagout softly. Paragraph (cK^KiKA) r?quLra3 teat authorized employees receive training ia toe recognition of the applicable hazardous energy' sources, the tvs* and magnitude of the energy avu.iabls in the workplace and in the procedure to be used for energy isolation and control Additionally, paragraph (c)(7)(v) requires that, before the machine or equipment is turned off, the authorized empiovey knows the pe ar.d nvijititude of the energy to h a COflu vUcd. the hazarua mvoiv^ti v.uh such, energy, and the procedure io be used for controlling the energy. The-development and documentation of energy centre* procedures ;s of little use unless fhe-etnptoyer requires all authorised employees to utilize the procedures that h.*ve been provided wh.ir.crtrthey are servicing or maintaining machines or equipment. In general, whenever lockout or tagout is used in ttcucrdancs wv.h this standard, each employee performing servicing or muuilananca shall affix and remove, as necessary, an individual and identifiable lock or tag on the energy isolating device as part of the energy control procedure. To meet these requirements, paragraph (c)(1) requires the employer to ensure that hazardous energy control procedures have been implemented for all activities covered by this standard, and are being complied with by die employees Methods for evaluating and maintaining the proper implementation of these procedures are provided in two >ther paragraphs of the standard: paragraph (c)(3), which addresses periodic inspection for observ ing employee compliance with the procedures: and paragraph (c)(7), which covers initial and periodic follow-up training to develop and mainraiz* the knowledge and skills needed by employees for the safe application ard removal of energy controls. Paragraphs (c)(2) of this stanucia contains a discussion of the conditions under which either iockout or tagout may be utilized. OSHA makes a distinction between the method of controlling the energy (the type of energy control devices utilized) fcaced primarily upon whether or not i'ie energy isolating device was designed o accommodate a lockout device. As discussed in the major issues section of this preamble, OSt L\ recognizes that there are many?; important elements of any energy control program, and that the choice c lockout versus tagout is just one of thece elements. Further, OSHAelso acknowledges that in isolation, the attachment of a lockout device to an energy isolating device, will provide greater protection against reactivation that an attachment of a tagout device. How ever, tha issue to be resolved in this rulemaking is not the simple question of whether a lock ia mere protective dtan a tag. Rath-*:. the Agency must address a series of related questions involving not only the effectiveness of lockout or tagout, but the feasibility and cost inrpi.cations of requiring one method or chs other in all eneigy control nrosprarc.3. i ce rscro-d :.s replete with c'jraa.tr.n fenJ ic-. oc the superiority of lockout to tagout as a means of seeming e: orgy isolating devices. However, there ore also considerable data in the record on pr.-grams which use only luga ar.tl appear to be effective in doing so. in addition, whereaa there is much information ott equipment cuneetiy hi pla.ro which tins been designed ta accept lockout devices, there is a dearth of data indicating the extent to which equipment across general industry would need tc be retrofitted or mouified to give it the capability to be locked out. There is little question that there is a significant hazard which needs to be addressed by an OSHA standard, but OSHA must regulate in the face of much conflicting evidence on the issues of feasibility and effectiveness. Under these circumstances, the Agency has 9-6-89 Occupational Safety & Haaittv Reporter VVV 000014012 662 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER reached several conclusions. First, as a general rule, lockout must be implemented as part of the overall energy control program for equipment which is "capable of being locked out." The term "capable of being locked out" is defined in the standard. Equipment which is designed with a hasp or other attachment which can be locked, or which incorporates a locking mechanism, is obviously considered to be "capable of being locked out." However, other equipment without such a designed-in locking capability may still be considered "capable of being locked out." but only if lockout can be achieved without the need to dismantle, rebuild or replace the energy isolating device, or permanently alter its energy control capability. Second, for equipment which is capable of being locked out OSHA recognizes that employers may, nonetheless, wish to implement a tagout program instead of lockout OSHA will allow die use of tagout programs under these conditions only if the employer can demonstrate that the complete program will, when using tagout devices attached to the energy isolating devices, provide full employee protection. In most cases, in order for OSHA to consider a tagout program to be sufficiently protective, the elements of such a program will need to be very detailed and intensive, and will necessitate far more commitment and day-to-day vigilance to make it work than will a lockout program. This is necessary because a tag serves only as a warning and not as a positive restraint on hazardous energy. The Final Rule establishes criteria which OSHA will evaluate in determining whether a given tagout program does, in fact, provide full employee protection. Thus, when equipment is capable of being locked out OSHA anticipates that it will be easier for employers to use that capability than to bypass it in favor of a tagout program. Third, for equipment which is not "capable of being locked out." OSHA has determined that the employer's energy control program shall use either lockout or tagout. In making this determination, the Agency recognizes the efforts ofmany employers, as reflected in various comments and testimony, to retrofit their equipment to accept lockout devices. However, for equipment which would require significant modification to make it capable of being locked, such actions are necessarily taken on a case- by-case basis. Despite die Agency's efforts to acquire data in this area throughout the course of the rulemaking, there is still inadequate information in the record to allow OSHA to make a determination on the overall costs or feasibility of modifying such equipment to accept lockout devices. Accordingly, for such equipment the standard allows the use of lockout or tagout as part of the energy control program. Fourth, and perhaps most critical. OSHA reemphasizes that the selection of lockout or tagout is only one element of the overall energy control program. Locks and tags do not deenergize equipment: they are attached after the equipment is deenergized. The actual deenergization must be accomplished using e carefully--developed and implemented set of procedures, combined with adequate training of both affected and authorized employees. Therefore, in determining the protectiveness of the standard, it is necessary to look at the entire standard, and not just at portions of it in isolation. OSHA is confident that the interrelationship between the different requirements of the standard will result in effective protection to employees during the performance of equipment servicing and maintenance operations. Although OSHA has determined that lockout is, in general, a safer means of assuring deenergization of equipment than tagout the Agency has also determined that the record provides inadequate evidence on which to support the extension of lockout to all machinery and equipment throughout general industry. Two points must be emphasized In this regard: First the standard is a "generic" one, and as such, will apply to virtually all types of machines and equipment in use in American industry today. The designs range from the simplest to the most complex, from the oldest to the newest, and from the moat worker-intensive to the most automated. Despite this determined effort to obtain the necessary information in the course of this rulemaking. OSHA has been unable to develop the type and quality of evidence on the available technology and the impacts on the affected industries which would support a finding that lockout is feasible throughout general industry. It is not possible, based on the current record, to develop a reasonable estimate of the amount of equipment modification that would be necessary throughout industry to provide such equipment with the capability of accepting lockout devices. Secondly, OSHA is concerned about whether such existing equipment could be modified for lockout without the possibility of creating greater hazards to employees as a result of the modifications. This latter concern was shared by the State of Virginia's special Task Force on lockout/tagout in General Industry, which is made up of representatives from major employer and employee associations and major industries in that State. The Task Force recommendations to OSHA. which were submitted to the record by the Virginia AFL-CIO. provided that where some kind of modification would have to be made to equipment in order to accommodate a lock, the standard should only require a tagout procedure. (Ex. 13A). OSHA acknowledges that there are significant problems involving the use of tagout devices, as discussed above. However, the Agency also recognizes that where equipment is not designed to accept a lockout device, tagout will need to be used, even though it does not provide the same assurance that the equipment will not become energized during servicing or maintenance. What becomes important in such situations, therefore, is for the standard to address as many of the weaknesses of tagout as possible, and to impose more stringent requirements which improve the capability of a tagout program to provide effective employee protection. In developing the Final Rule. OSHA Has considered the major shortcomings of the use of tagout as discussed in the comments and testimony, and has revised the proposed requirements to focus on appropriate means by which these shortcomings can be avoided or minimized. In particular, the Final Rule requires tagout devices te be considerably stronger and more, durable than provided for in the proposal. The revised provisions on tagout are intended to deal with the problem of tagout devices deteriorating when they become wet or when they are exposed to a corrosive atmosphere. The final standard also requires the tagout device to have a much stronger means of attachment which cannot simply be twisted off or unwound from the energy isolating device. The record clearly indicates that the tag must remain securely affixed throughout the servicing operation in order to serve as an effective warning device. The use of flimsy attachments makes it too easy for an unauthorized employee to remove the device, either intentionally or inadvertently. As noted earlier, there is also testimony presented at the hearings about situations in which tags have become dislodged from their attachment point by environmental conditions such as wind and rain. Perhaps the greatest limitation of tagout is that it does not actually secure the energy isolating device and prevent the equipment from being reenergized. In lockout, the 9-6-89 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington, O.C. 20037 VVV 000014013 >0 II CURRENT REPORT 663 presence of a servicing employee's locking device on a piece of equipment will prevent another employee from activating that equipment, even if that other employee doauMt understand the energy control procadum- By contrait tagout is highly dependent ml human factors, and requires constant vigilance to ensure that tagout devices are not bypassed. In addressing this limitation, OSHA is requiring additional training for employees who work with tagout or who work in areas in which tagout is used. Such training must be provided on at least an annual basis. Further, the training program must incorporate information which emphasizes die problems involved with the use of tagout* to make employees aware of why they must not deviate from the. requirements of the tagout program. In addition, the standard requires that the employ*) s energy control procedure incorporate provisions for monitoring and enforcing the proper use of tagout OSHA has determined dial these strengthened requirements will greatly enhance the protection which can be provided by tagout programs under the I'inai Rule. Paragraph (c)(2)(i) states that either lockout or tagout may be used when the energy isolating devices are not considered "capable of being locked out," as defined in the standard. This paragraph allows the employes to choose either system in this limited circumstances. If the employer wishes to perform modifications of the equipment to accommodate a looking device* OSHA enooureges such modifications, Lucas noted above, the standard.does not require diem* In paragraph (cK2)(tik OSl-iA.requires the use nf lockout if the energy isolating Jovic.es are "capable of being-locked out." However, an employer may use a program for this equipment, but only if the employer can demonstrate hat his/her tagout program provides '"full employee protection." The term "i.;il employed protection" is set forth in paragraph (c)(3), and is.diacussedmore fully below, in brief* "uR employee protection" in thia ooolext means that whero equipment it capable of being lucked out. the tagout program must be shown to provide equivalent safety to lockout for such equipment. This requirement also states that the attachment of a tagout device must be at the same point as a lockout device would have been attached An employer whochooses to use tagout in this situation must demonstrate that tagout will provide full employee protection, as explained in paragraph (c)(3). The employer must obviously demonstrate that the tagout program meets ail tagout-related requirements which are spelled out in the standard, such as prpper materials and construction of the tagout devices, the durability of the tag, and the capability of the attachment means to prevent die unauthorized or accidental removal of the tagout device. However, as noted earlier, OSHA does not believe that a tagout program which simply meets the requirements of the standard will be as protective as a lockout program, even though the tagout requirements have been strengthened considerably from the proposal. In order for the employer to demonstrate that a tagout program is as protective as lockoutfor a lockable' piece of equipment, that employeswill noad to show additional elements which bridge the gap between lockout and tagout OSHA believes that these elements will need to be evaluated by the Ageqcy-on a case-by-case basis. As discussed in paragraph (c)(3)(u), tbe^employer must consider additional measures which will further enhance the safety of^e tagput program, such as the removaltpf on isolating circuit element-the locking of a controlling switch, or the opening qf an additional disconnecting device. By requiring thpt the employer made a showing of file effectiveness efjagout in. situations which,are otherwise amenable to lockout the standard assures that each type of control (lockout or tagout) will provide an u acceptable level of safety for those . employees who must perform- the servicing or maintenance cn the machine.or equipment Eased upon the ran^e of variations which are pqssible in dlturent situations. OSHA believes that' the comparative effectiveness of any particular energy control program can be made only after examination and evaluation cf the factors present at each point of application. Several parties contended that because of statistical limitations end due to underreporting, the use of an authorized and affected employees to determine the thoroughness of their training and their knowledge of the energy control program. Although the company data would certainly be reviewed by the Agency, it would be only one element of the overall determination. Further, OSHA anticipates that if energy control-related accidents have occurred, whether or not they have been reported, the employees in die facility would have knowledge of the circumstances surrounding those accidents, weaknesses in the procedure which may have contributed to the accidents, and any steps which the employer has taken since the accident to deal with the problem. In response to OSHA's requests for additional information. NIOSH provided additional sugggestions on elements to be included in a tagout procedure in the event that lockout would not be implemented. (Ex. 50). NIOSH agreed with OSHA that management involvement is critical for both lockout and tagout procedures. NIOSH recommended that tagout procedures be documented (written) and should include the supervisory and enforcement duties and the disciplinary actions to be implemented when the procedure is not followed. Other elements recommended, such as training and hazard isolation, were quite similar to those already included in this rule. Most of the items recommended by NIOSH have been incorporated into the Final Rule in some form. Although OSHA has serious concerns about the feasibility of retrofitting existing.equipmant to be lockout- capable. the Agency has different .. conceresabout what is to rtsrdone when such equipment is replaced, when new equipments installed, or when major modifications or renovation*are performed texistingequipment. OSHA believes thatthe optimal time to : incorporate lookoutcapability is-where this capability i programmed into the design of the equipment in.the first - instance. For example: much of today's automated and computerised equipment contains programmed instructions in computer memory which can be lost if the equipment ia totally deenergized. If the equipment were designed and built either with a back-up energy source, or by the splitting,of the incoming energy for computer memory and mechanical functions, with the mechanical function power supply being lockable, or wi:h othar mean* of maintaining the tnemcry while allowing the mechanical elements to be deenergized and locked out. servicing or maintenance could be performed safely on the deenergized equipment without losing the programming for its proper operation. The implementation of such control methods would, in OSHA's judgment, be a relatively small element in terras of both design and cost when compared to the overall design and construction costs of the equipment Accordingly, paragraph (c)(2)(iii) of the Final Rule requires that new equipment, ordered or purchased after the effective date of this standard, and existing equipment which otherwise undergoing extensive repair, renovation or modifications, must be provided with a capability of being locked out if such 9-6-89 Occupational SifWy & Hcsttt ncpccwr VVV 00001^014 664 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER design is feasible. This provision will assure that even if current equipment is not designed to be locked out. future generations of such equipment wiU havea lockout capability. Under the requirements of this Final Rule, this equipment will then be subject to the requirement to use lockout except when e tagout system can be shown to be equally effective. OSHA anticipates, however, that the designing of lockout capability into new equipment will encourage the employer to utilize that capability in the energy control program, rather than relying on tagout In paragraph (c)(4), OSHA requires that employers develop, document and utilize procedures for the control of potentially hazardous energy, and that the procedures clearly and specifically outline the steps to be followed, techniques to be used, and measures to be applied by the employer to assure that the procedure is used. OSHA also specifies that the employer ensure that the control measures are used by employees whenever they might be exposed to injury from the unexpected energization or start up of machines or equipment or the release of stored energy. There were four commenters (Ex. 238, 2-58,2-70 and 2-87) to this requirement for the development and utilization of a procedure. Two of these commenters (Ex. 2-38 and 2-70) objected to the use of the word "specific" when defining the elements of the procedure while one commenter interpreted the requirement at mandating a generalized procedure for each plant, as well as a specific procedure for every machine or piece of equipment The last commenter on this issue (Ex. 2-87) suggested the standard make it clear that it may not be necessary to have multiple procedures. This commenter also alluded to the fact that the standard should require a determination that a need to control hazardous energy exists and how this should be done before work begins. In this final standard. OSHA has retained the word "specific" when detailing the elements of the procedure. This was done to emphasize the need to have a detailed procedure, one which clearly and specifically outlines the steps to be followed. Overgeneralization can result in a document which has little or no utility to the employee who must follow the procedure. However, whereas the procedure is required to be written in detail, this does not mean that a separate procedure must be written for each and every machine or piece of equipment. Similar machines and/or equipment (those using the same type and magnitude energy) which have the same or similar types of controls can be covered with a single procedure. The written energy control procedure required by this standard need not be overly complicated or detailed, depending on the complexity of the equipment and the control measures to be utilized. For example, if there is a single machine with a single energy source that must be isolated, and the control measure chosen is simple, such as opening an electrical disconnect and locking out that energy source during servicing, the written procedure could be very simple. The steps set forth in the standard can be incorporated into the procedure with very little detail, reflecting the lack of complexity of the control measure. In addition, the employer's procedures may not need to be unique for a single machine or task, but can apply to a group of similar machines, types of energy and tasks if a single procedure can address the hazards and the steps to be taken satisfactorily. OSHA believes that because of the need to follow the steps in the energy control procedure carefully and specifically, and the number of variables involved in controlling hazardous energy, a documented procedure is necessary for most energy control situations. However, the Agency has determined that in certain limited situations, documentation of the procedure will not add markedly to the projections otherwise provided by the standard. These situations incorporate several common elements: First, there is a single source of hazardous energy which can be easily identified and isolated, and there is no potential for stored or residual energy in the equipment This greatly simplifies the procedure for controlling the energy, since the single energy source is all that need to be Isolated. Second, the isolation and locking out of that single energy source will totally deenergize and deactivate the machine or equipment There are no collateral sources of energy which need to be addressed. Third a full lockout of the energy source is achieved by a single lockout device which is under the exclusive control of the authorized employee performing the servicing or maintenance. As used in this provision, exclusive control means that the authorized employee is the only person who can affix or remove the device. The authorized employee follows all steps necessary for deenergizing the equipment verifying the deenergization, performing the work, and reenergizing the equipment upon completion of servicing. Because the energy control elements are simple, with a single energy source being locked out and no other potential sources of unexpected activation or energization, the authorized employee can perform them without referring to a written document. Fourth, while the equipment is locked out the servicing or maintenance cannot expose other employees to hazards For example, shutdown and lockout of a conveyor cannot cause jams or other hazards at other conveyors which feed into the conveyor being serviced. The exception is intended to apply to situations in which the procedure for deenergization, servicing, and reenergization can be carried out without detailed interactions of energy sources, machines, and employees. For example, a motor in a small machine shop is wired into a single electrical disconnect, with no other energy source, and the motor does not present the hazards of stored or residual energy. When the motor needs repair, the authorized employee can isolate the motor from the single energy source and lock it out, using his/her personal lockout device on the disconnect, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the standard. Under these conditions, and provided that no other employees are exposed to hazards from the servicing operation, the servicing may be performed without the need to document the energy control procedure. When all of the conditions for the exception are met. the standard does not require the employer to document-the energy control procedure. However, if the employer, in utilizing this exception, has an accident involving the machinery or equipment in which the unexpected release of hazardous energy is a factor, this indicates the need for more formal treatment of the energy control procedure, and documentation then becomes necessary. It should also be noted that a small business does not necessarily have small energy control problems- Much complex machinery and equipment can be found in workplaces with few employees, especially in highlyautomated companies. From the standpoint of the safety to be achieved from development of and compliance with a written energy control procedure, there is nothing to indicate that a small employer needs a written procedure any less than a large employer. As discussed earlier, the available data clearly demonstrate the need for written procedures to control hazardous energy. For example, the BLS Work Injury Reports (WIR) (Ex. 3-3) indicated that printed instructions or posted 9-6-89 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. O.C. 20037 00Q01'*015 vvv CURRENT REPORT 565 procedurps h;2d bmn provided to only C2 ot 534 injured employees responding cn this {ssse in the survey (See Table V. in " -ciion ill of this preamble). The W1R results also clearly demonstrate the lack of differentiation of injuries based on s>ze of establishment. Half of the total number of injuries took place in establishments of under 100 employees: A pproximately 35 percent of the total number of injured employees responding to the survey were injured at workplaces with fewer than 50 employees, and another 15 percent occurred where there were between 50 and employees (See Table I. in ill of this preamble). Therefore, with thii limited exception discussed above. OSIiA has determined that the requirements for written procedures are appropriate for all employers covered by this standard, regardless of size. The complexity of an employer's procedure will depend on the complexity of the energy control problem in the specific facility, and not on anything unique to or inherent in the number of employees or size of the facility. It is nonetheless imperative that the employee who is performing the maintenance or servicing (who must utilize the energy control procedure) understands the hazards of the work and how to control them. It is for this reason that paragraph fc)(7){vi) (which is also discussed below) requires, before the machine or equipment is even turned off, that the authorized employee have knowledge of the type and magnitude of the energy, the hazards of the energy to be controlled, and the procedure to be used. The Appendix provides employers and employees with an example of a s'trple lockout procedure. Where appropriate, this procedure may be used as written in the Appendix by simply filling in the blanks. This procedure is not considered unique and can be applied with considerable flexibility to groups of machines or tasks. It may also he used as 3 guide to develop a more specific or detailed lockout or tagout procedure. The sample would need only minor changes to methods, procedures and/or text to be acceptable for many different workplace situations. The standard, by being written in performance language, also addresses situations in which there is a need for entirely unique lockout/tagout procedures. There may be situations which might require the entire procedure to be unique for its purpose (one of a kind) in dealing.with the hazards, or the employer may only need to provide a supplement to the general procedure. Tor some applications, the supplement could bo in the form of a check list used for gaining access to the machine or equipment and for returning it to service. The check list might address the number and locations of the energy isolating devices in order to guarantee total deenergization. In most cases, if the procedure itself takes the furm of a check list, this check list would need to reflect the necessary order of energy isolation and device application. In paragraphs (c)(5) (i) and (ii). OSHA requires that the employer provide the necessary protective materials and hardware such as locks, tags, chains, adapter pins, etc., for attachment to the energy isolating devices. The standard also requires that the devices be unique to the particular use (the only ones authorized for the purpose); that they be durable, standardized and substantial; and that they identify the user. There were three commenters (Ex. 22fl, 2-67 and 2-60) who commented on the employer providing the necessary protective materials and hardware. One commenter (Ex. 2-28] suggested eliminating the requirement for the employer to provide the needed lockout or tagout materials or hardware. OSHA disagrees with this contention. Whereas other types of protective equipment, such as safety shoes, may be of a personal nature, the protective materials and hardware used to lockout or tagout is more machiae or equipment oriented. The employer is ultimately in the best position, based upon his/her knowledge of the construction and configuration of the plant facility and/or the type of equipment to judge or determine the type and quantity or number of items needed In that plant or facility to effectuate tha control of energy during servicing or maintenance of the machines or equipment If the employer orders the necessary hardware, he/she can ensure that the hardware complies with the provisions of the standard (that is, that the hardware is durable, standardized, substantial and identifiable). The purchase of a larger number of those materials and hardware can also result in an overall cost savings if enough of a particular item or several items are ordered in quantity. One of the other commenters (Ex. 267] recommended eliminating the need for the employer to provide tags since tags should be used only when the equipment design does not allow lockout OSHA has previously discussed the use of tags as an acceptable energy control measure under this standard. The final commenter (Ex, 2-60) recommended changing "securing or blocking" to "blocking and/or securing, to emphasize that there may be situations when the use of a combination of energy control techniques are necessary." OSHA believes that the standard already provides for situations in which mors than one energy control method is necessary. The purpose of tha standard os stated in paragraph (a)(2) is to require employers to establish and utilize procedures for disabling machines or equipment in order to prevent injury to employees. What is necessary and appropriate to control hazardous energy in a given situation is one the determinations which the employer must make when implementing the program. This final standard recognizes that it may be necessary to use several different moans of controlling energy simultaneously to control a particular operation. The standard utilizes performance language in imposing the above requirements, OSHA believes that the obligations imposed by paragraphs (c)(5) (ij and (ii) are not overly restrictive or complicated. To meet the requirement in paragraph (c)(5)(f) to supply protective equipment and hardware, the employer can either issue devices to each employee responsible for implementing energy control measures, or can exercise the option of simply having a sufficient quantity of the devices on hand at any given time and assign or distribute them to employees as the need arises. As noted earlier, all authorized employees will need to have these devices available to attach to energy isolating devices whenever they perform servicing or maintenance using the energy control procedure. The proposed standard specified that lockout or tagout devices be singularly identified, shall be the only devices used for controlling hazardous energy, shall not be used for other purposes, and shall be durable, standardized, substantial, and identifiable. This requirement remains substantially unchanged in the Final Rule. Three commenters (Ex. 2-53, 2-64 and 2-7Q) objected to not allowing energy control devices to be used for other purposes. This restriction was proposed, and is being adopted to ensure that the sight of a distinctive lock or tag will provide a constant message of the use that the device is being put to and the restrictions which this device is intended to convey. If lockout or tagout devices are used for other purposes, they can lose their significance in the workplace. For the energy control procedure to be effective, these devices must have a single meaning to employees: "Do not energize the ti.Hequipment when such a device is affixed to 9-6-89 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter VVV 000014016 666 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 4 HEALTH REPORTER In paragraph (c)(5)(ii)(A) OSHA proposed that lockout or tagout devices be durable. There was no specific comment on this provision. In order to overcome some of the concern* of commenten to the use of tags, OSHA is adding in the Final Rule that tagout devices must be constructed and printed so that exposure to weather or other environmental conditions which exist in the workplace will not cause the tag to become unserviceable and/or the message on the tag to become illegible. For any sign, tag or other message bearing item, the message must remain legible for the employees to be able to ascertain the meaning and intent of the message. In paragraph (c)(5)(ii)(B) OSHA is requiring that lockout or tagout devices be standardized in one of die following criteria; color, shape, size, print or format, in order that they be readily identifiable and distinguished from other similar devices found in the workplace. In addition, the final rule adds a requirement for the use of a standardized print and format for tagout devices. This is done to ensure that the tagout devices, which rely exclusively on employee recognition for their effectiveness, will be so unique as to minimize the chances of their being misidentified or their message misinterpreted. In paragraph (cK5)(ii}(C) OSHA requires that lockout or tagout devices be substantial enough to minimize the possibility of premature removal. The standard requires that lockout devices be substantial enough to prevent their removal without the use of excessive force or unusual techniques. Tagout devices and their means of attachment are similarly required to be constructed so that the potential for inadvertent or accidental removal is minimized. Tag attachment means are further required to be attachable by hand, and to be of strength equivalent to a one-piece nonreleasable, self locking cable tie. These additional requirements are being imposed to ensure that tags do not become disconnected or lost during use, thereby negating their effectiveness. In item (d), OSHA requires that lockout or tagout devices identify the employee who applies the device or devices. This requirement is similar to the proposal. Identification of the user provides an additional degree of accountability to the overall program. It enables the employer to inspect the application of the energy.control procedure and determine which employees are properly implementing its requirements. If locks or tags are not being property attached by an employee. identification on the locks and tags will enable the employer to locate that employee and correct the problem promptly, including additional training, as necessary. For other employees, this requirement will enable them to determine at a glance which authorized employees are performing a given servicing operation. It puts them on notice that if questions arise about the servicing or the energy control procedure, the persons listed on the lockout and tagout devices are the appropriate persons to ask. The authorized employee has the additional assurance that other employees know of his/her involvement in the servicing, and that only he/she is allowed to remove the device. There were three commenters (Ex. 2- 21. 2-36 and 2-62) who objected to having to mark or identify locks. These commenters claimed that identifying a lockout device with a particular employee was unnecessary. OSHA believes that knowing who applied a lockout device to a machine or equipment can save time and lives. If an employee, upon completing a job. forgets to remove a lockout device, the identity of the employee can be immediately determined and the employee made available to complete the procedure. If that employee cannot be located, it is possible that he/she is still working on the equipment. It would then be possible to check out the area and assure that the employee and others are out of the danger area before the device is removed. Marking a lockout or tagout device is a simple way of identifying the person who applies it and can prevent the inadvertent reenergization or reactivation of equipment before that employee has been located and has moved clear of the equipment. Thus, marking the identity of the employes who uses a lockout or tagout device is an appropriate safeguard. Marking of the lockout cr tagout devices can also promote a sense of * security in employees, in that each device is the individual employee's device, used only for his or her protection. This sense of identity also can be used to encourage willing utilization of the energy control procedure. When an employee can identify with a part of the program he/ she controls for his/her own protection, that employee will likely be an active participant in making the program work. In paragraph (c)(5)(iii), OSHA states that the legend (major message} on tagout devices must warn against hazardous conditions if the equipment is re-energized. Five examples of major message are provided in paragraph (c}(S)(iiiJ: Do Not Start Do Not Open. Do Not Close, Do Not Energize, and Do Not Operate. OSHA recognizes, however, that these messages may not be sufficient to cover all conditions involving hazardous energy control. For that reason, the above stated legends arc only examples of what must be stated. The use of graphics, pictographs or other symbols to convey the message which the tag represents serves the same purpose as the written message and therefore would be acceptable to OSHA. Additionally, the use of danger tags would have to-jneet the requirements of $ 1910.145. There were 6 commenters (Dx 2~.u. 2-32, 2-38. 2-41. 2-53, 2-62, 2-70 .md 274) who discussed the requirement contained in (c)(5j(iii). Three of he commenters (Ex. 2-38, 2-53 and 2-62) suggested elimination of the wording in the requirement "shall warn against hazardous conditions if the equipment is re-energized." This is a statement of the purpose of the tug. The significance of this message is imparted through the training of employees and enforcement of the program. The backbone of a tagout system is that when a tagout device is placed on an energy isolating device, it informs employees that the energy isolating device is not to be turned on or otherwise moved to a position which will allow the Row of energy. The printed message on the tag provides information about what the tag stands for and what it prohibits, and indicates the name of the employee who affixed it to the energy isolating device. Three of the commer.ters (Ex. 2-32, 241 and 2-70) commented on the language of the proposal "and shall include the legends: or similar language." Two of the commeniers (Ex. 2-32 and 2-70) suggested amending the wording of the phrase io say, "and shall include the following legends: * * T" The proposal was intended to require that tags nave some ty pe of commonly used message which would serve to prohibit an employee from bypassing or disregarding the tag. The items listed (that is. "Do Not Start", "Do Not Open" etc.) were intended not to be an all inclusive or complete list of the possibilities but rather, to give an indication of the type of prohibitive major message which the tag could contain. Clearly, whatever language is chosen for the message of the tag must coincide with the prohibited action. Further, employees must know and understand that the tag really means "do not touch," regardless of the type of equipment or hazard involved. Due to the severity of the risks associated with a lapse in the 9-6-09 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D C. 20037 Wv 000014017 CURRENT REPORT 667 implementation of the energy control system, paragraph (c)(6) requires that periodic inspections be performed at least annually in order to verify and to ensure that the energy control program is being properly utilized. One method for meeting the performance requirements in this paragraph would be to use random audits and planned visual observations to determine the extent of employee compliance. Another would include modifying and adopting ordinary plant safety tours to suit this purpose. The periodic inspection is intended to assure that the energy control procedures continue to be implemented properly, and that the employees involved are familiar with their responsibilities under those procedures. A significant change in this requirement from the proposal involves the activities of the person performing the inspections. The inspector, who is required to be an authorized person not involved in the energy control procedure being inspected, must be able to determine three things: first, whether the steps in the energy control procedure are being followed: second, whether the employees involved know their responsibilities under the procedure; and third, whether the procedure is adequate to provide the necessary protection, and what changes, if any, are needed. The inspector will need to observe and talk with the employees in order to make these determinations. The Final Rule provides some additional guidance as to the inspector's duties in performing periodic inspections, to assure that he or she obtains the necessary information about the energy control procedure and its effectiveness. Where lockout is used, the inspector must review each authorized employee's responsibilities under the procedure vv ith that employee. This does not necessarily require separate one-on-one meetings, but can involve the inspector meeting with the whole servicing crew at one time. Indeed, group meetings can be the most effective way of dealing with this situation, because it reinforces the employees' and that they need to follow the procedure carefully. Where tagout is used, the inspector's review of responsibilities extends to affected employees as well, because of the increased importance of their role in avoiding accidental or inadvertent activation of the equipment or machinery being serviced. OSHA believes that these reviews, which will need to be performed on at least an annual basis during the periodic inspections, wilt assure that employees follow'and maintain proficiency in the energy control procedure, and that the inspector will be better able to determine whether changes are needed. A related change from the proposal is found in the certification provision in paragraph fc)(8J(ii) of the Final Rule. In addition to the operation, date of inspection, and name of inspector, the Final Rule also requires identification of the employees included in the inspection. This change provides for the inspector to indicate which employees were involved with the servicing operation being inspected, in order to assure that these employees have had the opportunity to review their responsibilities and demonstrate their performance under the procedure- inspections must be made by an authorized employee other than one implementing the energy control procedure being inspected. The * inspections must be designed and conducted to correct any deviations uncovered. In addition, the employer must certify that they have been performed These inspections are intended to provide for immediate feedback and action by the employer to correct any inadequacies observed. These inspections are intended to ensure that the energy control procedure has been properly implemented and to provide an essential check on the continued utilization of the procedure. Some commentets (cf. Ex. 2-4, 2-39) suggested that the standard require employee participation in these inspections. However, the employer has the obligation of assuring proper utilization of the energy control procedure under the standard, and the periodic inspection is a means of assuring that such compliance is taking place. If an inspection reveals flaws in the implementation of the procedure, it is the employer who must make changes in the procedure, provide retraining to employees, and take other steps to make sure that the problems are corrected. Therefore. OSHA does not believe that a requirement for employee involvement in these inspections is necessary under the OSH Act. It should be noted that the standard requires such inspections to be performed by an authorized employee other than one implementing the particular procedure. Because the inspector is also an authorized employee, he/she will have the necessary knowledge to evaluate the effectiveness of the procedure being inspected, and to report back to the employer with regard to necessary corrective measures. In this final standard. OSHA has retained the requirement for a periodic inspection (at least annually) to ensure that the energy control procedure required by this standard is being followed, inspections must be done by authorized employees and are intended to identify and correct any deviations or inadequacies observed. The fir.jl standard retains the requirement for the inspections to be conducted by authorized employees, in order to assure that ths work. (See paragraph (b) of the standard and the explanation of paragraph (c)(7) below.) OSHA believes that periodic inspections by the employer are necessary to ensure continued compliance with the procedure. Therefore, this requirement rfir.mDs unchanged. In paragraph (c)(7), OSKA specifies that the employer provide effective initial training, periodic retraining, and certification of such training of employees. OSHA considers these requirements to be of critical importance in helping to ensure that the applicable provisions of the hazardous energy control procedure(s) are known, understood and striedy adhered to by employees. As it is the case with the other provisions of this generic rule. OSKA believes that the training program under this standard needs to be performance oriented, in order to deal with the wide range of workplaces covered by the standard. However, in order to provide adequate information, any training program under this standard will need to cover at least three areas: The employer's energy control prog;am, the elements of the energy control procedure which are relevant to the employee's duties, and the requirements of this Final Rule. The details will necessarily vary from workplace to workplace, and even from employee to employee within a single workplace, depending upon the complexity of the equipment and the procedure, the employee's job duties and their responsibilities under the energy control program, and other factors. Paragraphs (c)(7)(i) (A), (B). and (C) of the standard establish the amount of training that is required for the three groups of employees: "authorized'' employees, "affected" employees, and all "other" employees. The relative degree of knowledge required by these three employee groups is in descending order, with the requirements for authorized employees demanding the most effort in training. Because authorized employees are charged with the responsibility for implementing energy control procedures, it is important that they receive training in recognizing and understanding all potentially hazardous energy sources 9-6-89 Occupational Safety & Heattn Reporter VVV 000014018 668 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER that they might be exposed to during their work assignments, and that they also be trained in the use of adequate methods and means for the control of such energy sources. These employees are the ones authorized to implement the energy control procedure and to perform servicing of the machine or equipment. Therefore, they need extensive training in aspects of the procedure and Us proper utilization, together with all relevant information about the equipment being serviced. The training OSHA requires for "affected employees" is less stringent than that for "authorized employees." simply b'^ause affected employees do not perform -servicing or maintenance operations which are performed under an energy control procedure. Affected employees are important to the overall protection provided in the energy control program, however, because such employees work in areas where the program is being utilized by authorized employees. It is vital to the safety of the authorized employees that the affected employees recognize lockout or tagout devices immediately, that they know about the purpose of those devices, and. most importantly, that they know not to disturb the lockout or tagout devices or the equipment to which the devices are affixed. Therefore, the standard requires that affected employees be instructed in these matters. The instruction needs to be sufficient to enable the employees to determine if a control measure is in use. The instruction also seeds to make effected employees aware that disregarding or violating the prohibitions imposed by the energy control program could endanger their own lives, or the lives of coworkers. C unsiderable latitude is given to employers in the development and implementation of the required trainmg for both authorized and affected employees. There was considerable comment on the training of die different classes of employees based upon the definitions and duties of the different employees as enumerated in the proposed standard. Five commenters (Ex. 2-5. 2-32,2^44,267 and 2-74) objected to different training for authorized and affected employees while 10 commenters (Ex. 228. 2-30. 2-39, 2-42, 2-46, 2-55. 2-58, 2- 70. 2-73 and 2-85) objected to training "other" employees. One commenter (Ex. 2-27) suggested expanding the training to coincide with the training requirements of other OSHA standards. The training requirements for the different classes or types of employees as they are defined in this final standard arc performance oriented, thereby providing the employer with considerable flexibility in how the training should be conducted The employer is permitted to use whatever method he/she feels will best accomplish the objective of the training. OSHA also requires in paragraph (c)(7)(i)(C) that all other employees shall be instructed about the restrictions imposed upon all employees by the energy control program. This instruction as the employer's lockout/tagout procedure can be conveyed during new employee orientation sessions, by the use of employee handbooks, or through regularly scheduled safety meetings. The training of employees other than authorized and affected employees is considered by OSHA to be essential since other employees working in the plant or facility have been known to have turned on the power to a machine or equipment on which another employee is performing a servicing or maintenance activity. Inadvertent and intentional activation of machines or equipment by employees other than those working on the machine or equipment is not limited to effected employees. The training requirements for these other employees are minimal, essentially required only that these employees know what the energy control program does and that they ate not to touch any locks, tags or equipment covered by this program. In paragraph (c)(7)(h). OSHA is establishing a requirement for additional training for all employees in plants or facilities where tagout Is the preferred method of energy control. The need for this additional or supplemental training for employees in those facilities is based upon the fact that the use of tagout relies upon the knowledge of the employees and their adherence to the limitation imposed by the use of tags. Several commenters who use tagout programs stated In their comments and testimony (cf Ex. 47.52. Tr. p. W2-5, W2-27 and H199-207) that tagout can only be effective when the program provides for extensive training and reinforcement of the elements of the tagout procedures. In paragraph (c)(7)(iii), OSHA requires that periodic retraining be provided for authorized employees at least annually. This retraining may need to be conducted more frequently, that is, whenever and inspection under paragraph (cj(6J reveals, or whenever the employer has reason to believe, that there are deviations from or inadequacies in the energy control procedure. Many participants and commenters (Sx. 2-29. 2-44. 2-57. 2-63. 2-97. 50. 52, 80. 62, Tr. p. Wl-55, Wl-165. W1-2Q8. Wt-263, W2-83. H85, H159, H166) suggested that the basic requirement for retraining should provide for the tniir.mj; to be conducted on a regular b=?-:s at specified minimum intervals. Th;commenters pointed out the fact that although the proposal said that the retraining shall be periodic, the criteria for conducting the training won bas*:d solely upon the periodic insperMon or the employer having reason to believe that there were program problems. The above comments and testimony clearly indicated that the "periodic" training in the energy control procodu'.e needs to be provided at a minimum stated interval, rather than relying solely upon the employer's periodic inspection. Based on many current training programs, including those throughout the automobile industry it was argued that annual retraining would provide adequate assurance that employees understand their duties under abilities to carry out the energy control procedure. There were 13 commenters (Ex. 2-20. 2-32, 2-36, 2-39. 2-41. 2-43. 2-44. 2-52, 262, 2-69, 2-70, 2-74 and 2-87) who suggested limiting retraining to those individuals and in those instances when there is an identified problem. These commenters reasoned that retraining should not be required unless there is some indication to the employer that it is needed. OSHA believes that the effectiveness of training diminishes as the time from the last training session increases. Without the imposition of a requirement for periodic retraining of the employees who are critical to the success of the energy control program, that is, the persons who must utilize the procedure, the overall effectiveness of the energy control program will diminish over art extended period of time. The Agency has determined that the proposed provision, i.e.. simply relying upon the finding of a problem with the program to trigger the retraining program, does not properly address the problem. Retraining is intended to provide for continued proficiency, and not merely to remedy situations in which such proficiency has been found wanting. In addition to the periodic retraining as discussed above, additional retraining is to be conducted whenever a problem is identified during periodic inspections, or whenever the employer has reason to believe that there are problems with the energy control procedure itself or with its implementation. This retraining should be more concentrated or more encompassing than the routine retraining, based upon the severity of 9-6-49 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. O.C. 20037 VVV 000014-019 CURRENT REPORT 669 the problem, encountered with the use of the energy control program in the workplace. QSHA is of the opinion that full and uniform utilization of an energy control procedure is necessary in order for that procedure to maintain its effectiveness. Every effort should be made during the periodic inspection performed under paragraph (c)(6) to determine whether or not the procedure is being used properly. If deviations are observed retraining in accordance with paragraph (c)(7)(iii)(B) would be required. However, retraining could be triggered by events separate from the finding of a periodic inspection. For example, an employee working with an energy control procedure might be injured in the course of his duties, or there might be a "near miss," where no one is actually injured, but where the energy control program has failed nonetheless. If a subsequent investigation indicates that an employee failed to operate within the guidelines of the control procedure, retraining wouid be required. In addition, the investigation might also reveal that the procedure itself was not adequate. Such inadequacies in the procedure could be the result of using a general procedure diet does not handle effectively a specific application, or they may arise because changes have been made to the equipment or process that did not take the existing energy control procedure into consideration. In such cases when changes to the energy control procedure must be made, the employer is required to retrain employees in the new or revised procedures in accordance with paragraph (c)(7)(hi)(B). In the Final Rule, when lockout is being implemented, OSHA is limiting the annual retraining requirement to authorized employees. These are the employees who must implement the energy control procedure, and their protection is the primary consideration under this standard. Because their safety requires them to follow the steps of the procedure precisely, these employees must be properly trained, and that training must be reinforced to assure their continued proficiency. By contrast affected employees are not provided with annual retraining under this standard when lockout is used. In these situations, affected employees are initially trained about the energy control procedure and Its implementation, and the relevance of that procedure to his/ her work. Under lockout conditions, the essential element of the affected employee's training is a simple one: Locks are not to be defeated or bypassed, and locked out equipment must remain deenergized. This message is reinforced whenever the affected employees work in an area where energy control procedures are being implemented, because paragraph (c](9) of the standard requires that such employees be notified before the energy control devices are applied. Further, when a lockout device is attached to a piece of equipment by an authorized employee, an affected employee should not be able to remove the lock, and thus will not have the potential of placing the authorized employee in danger. By contrast however, paragraph (c)(7)(iv) of the Final Rule requires that when tagout is used, both authorized end affected employees must be retrained annually in the use of the tagout system. This additional training is necessary because of the inherent difficulties of tagout systems ae opposed to lockout: The use of tags relies uniquely upon the knowledge and training of the employees involved, and the continued reinforcement of the meaning of the tags. In a lockout system, even if an affected employee has not been adequately trained, the lock will prevent that employee from reenergizing the equipment. Tags, on the other hand* can be inadvertently or intentionally bypassed or ignored by an affected employee* because the tags do not actually prevent the activation of the tagged and equipment. Employees operating under a tagging system must be constantly vigilant, and their awareness of the importance of the tagout device must be frequently reinforced. OSHA believes that when tagout is used, retraining must be provided on at least an annual basis, in order to maximize its effectiveness. Paragraph (c)(7)(v) requires that employers certify that the training required by this standard has been provided. This requirement is unchanged from the proposal. Certifications are intended to cover both the initial training and the periodic retraining. In addition to certifications, the employer must he able to demonstrate that the training includes all elements of the energy control procedure which are directly relevant to the duties of the employee. The adequacy of the training can be evaluated by the employer, employee, and OSHA alike, by comparing the elements of the training tu the elements of the procedure, which is required to be in written form. Several commented* recommended that there be a '`record," rather than a "certification.'' that training has been performed (cf. Ex. 2-39, 2-62 and 2-69). QSHA believes that a written certification serves the same purpose, while nypQri*iPg the paperwork burden on employers. It should be noted that the certification is not intended as a means of evaluating the completeness or efficacy of the training; it only provides an indication that training has been performed. The quality and content of the training are not evaluated through the certification of performance. As noted earlier, the standard sets forth the elements which must be included in the training for the employees. In evaluating whether an employee has been adequately trained. OSHA will examine the employee's responsibilities under the energy control program in relation to the elements of the standard. OSHA proposed in paragraph (c)(6), that energy isolating devices used for the control of potentially hazardous energy sources, including valves, be marked or labeled to identify the equipment supplied and the energy type and magnitude, unless they are positioned and arranged so that these elements are-evident and that the devices only be operated by authorized employees. OSHA reasoned that employees working with energy control procedures need adequate information about the hazards of the equipment that they are servicing, and they must be certain that the equipment they are working on b the same equipment that was intended to be disabled. They should feel confident that they have secured the correct energy control devices and are protected from the hazards of inadvertently, working on energized equipment The proposed identification requirement of parafpaph (c)(fl)(i) would have applied to all energy isolating devices, including devices which control hydraulic, pneumatic, steam, and similar energy sources by the use of valves or similar devices to isolate and black energy flow. It would also have applied to the valves used in pipeline network process operations, such as those found in petroleum and chemical operations. The proposed requirement for marking or labeling energy isolating devices to identify the equipment supplied and the type and magnitude of the energy, received considerable comment. Eleven commenters (Ex. 2-14. 2-20. 2-28, 2-32, 2-39, 2-51, 2-52.2-53. 2-58. 2-68 and 270) questioned the need to specify the magnitude of the energy while two commenters (Ex- 2-32 and 2-34} questioned the ability to mark valves, etc. when the material and the magnitude of the energy contained in the material conveyed could be almost continuously variable. Seven commenters (Ex. 2-21, 2-34, 2-3S, 2-46, 9-6-89 Occupational Safety A Health Reporter WV 000014020 670 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY A HEALTH REPORTER 2-61. 2-69'and 2-70) suggested removing the requirement Five commenters (Ex. 2-22, 2-44, 2-52, 2-58 and 2-50) proposed allowing the uae ofdrawings, schematics, temporary tags or work permits to serve as an alternative-to marking or labeling energy isolating devices. Two commenters (Ex. 2-39 and 2-82) recommended that training of qualified persons would supply the information rather than marking the energy isolating devices. OSHA hat determined that the marking or labeling of energy isolating devices is not reasonably necessary for the effectiveness of the energy control program. When employees need to know details on energy sources for protection under the standard, the energy control procedure is required to spell out this information, and the training must incorporate it as well. For example, authorized employees, in order to perform their servicing or maintenance duties under the energy control procedure, are required to know the type and magnitude of the energy sources which must be eohtroHed. The marking or labeling of the sources themselves wiU not provide the authorized employees with any additional information. Second, as for as affected or other employees are concerned, their rale in the energy control program is essentially to understand what the program is deigned to accomplish, and to recognized that when they see an energy isolating device with a tog and/or lock on it they are not to touch the equipment, regardless of what the type a od magnitude of the energy might be. OSHA believes that marking the equipment with this information would ro* enhance the protection of these employees, because their compliance v. iih the energy control procedure does net depend upon knowledge of these details. Accordingly. OSHA has eliminated e proposed requirement for marking or labeling energy isolating devices. In its F lace. OSHA is incorporatfifa a specific requirement in paragraph fdnFHlHA) that authorized employees ormmned fn the recognition of applicablehazardous energy sources, the type and magnitude of the energy available in the workplace, and In the methods end means necessary for energy Isolation and Luutrol. OSHA further requires in paragraph (c)(7)(vi) that authorized employees must know the type and magnitude of the energy, the hazards of the energy to be controlled and the method or means to control the energy even before the machine or equipment is turned off. OSHA believes that employee knowledge of this information is essential to ensure that the correct energy control devices are used on the proper energy Isolating devices and in the proper manner. This provision requires the employee to have that specific Information priorto deenergising the equipment in order to control the energy and render the machine or equipment safe to work on. OSHA does recognize that the physical shutdown of the machine or equipment can be accomplished by either the authorised or affected employee. The new paragraph (c)(8) requires that lockout or tagout be performed only by authorized employees. These are the only employees who are required to be trained to know In detail about the types of energy available in the workplace and how to control die hazards of that energy. Only properly trained and qualified employees can be relied on to deenergize and to-properly lockout or tagout machines or equipment which are being serviced or maintained, in order to ensure that the work will be accomplished safely. In paragraph (c)(9), OSItA requires that whenever lockout or tagout control might directly affect another employee's work activities, the employer or authorized employee-must notify the affected employee beforetaking any action to apply or to remove lockout or tagout devices. There were four commenters (Ex. 2- 20.2-21.2-84 and 2-74) who discussed this provision. One commenter (Ex. 2- 20) recommended that the notification occur after Removal of the energy control device while one person (Ex. 2-21) suggested that the "qualified*' persons not be required to notify affected employees of die energy control dev^e removal, particularly in emergency repair conditions. Finally, two commenters (Ex 2-64 and 2-74) insisted that the requirement was unnecessary, especially since employees must be trained arid the lockout or tagout effectively prevents machine or equipment energization. OSHA believes that this requirement is an essential component of the total energy control program. Notification of affected employees when lockout or tagout is going to be applied provides the perfect opportunity for the employer or authorized employee who notifies them of the impending interruption of the normal production operation to remind them and reinforce the importance of the restrictions imposed upon them by the energy control program. OSHA believes that these measures are important to ensure that employees who operate or use machines or equipment do not unknowingly attempt to reenergize those machines or equipment that have been taken out of service and deenergized for the performance of activities covered by this standard. The lack of information regarding the status of the equipment could endanger both the servicing employees and the employees attempting to reenergize or operate the equipment. Such notification is also needed after servicing is completed to assure that employees know when the control measures heve been removed. Without such information, employees might mistakenly believe that a system is still deenergized and that it is safe to continue working on or around it. This standard for the control of hazardous energy is a "generic" standard, and is written largely in terms of the procedures and performance to be achieved-OSHA (foes not consider it practical to prescribe specific definitive criteria-for each possible use of energy control measures in such a wide ranging standard. However, the Agency believes that the standard will enable the useeto make a choice of the most effective control measure involving die use of locks or tags*or a combination of the.:two devices-for securing energy isolating devices. (As discussed above, paragraph (c) of the standard provides criteria for the selection of such devices.) The main thrust of die standard is to mandate the development, documentation and implementation of control procedures, and this is to be accomplished aS outlined in paragraph (a) of the standard. The employer is given considerable flexibility in developing a control program, and each a program will be evaluated by OSHA compliance officers to determine whether it meets all the criteria in this standard. Although the Final Rule notes the Agency preference for lockout, this standard does not impose lockout requirements in all cases for reasons discussed earlier. OSHA intends to address the need for and die feasibility of more specific lockout or tagout requirements for particular types of equipment or processes on an individual basis, as appropriate, in future rulemakings. This will involve revision of existing standards and promulgation of new ones, as necessary. (Examples of current provisions in the OSHA standards which contain specific lockout/tagout requirements can be found in the previous discussion of proposed paragraph (a)(3)(iii)-) Paragraph (d) of both the proposal and Final Rule provides that five 9-6-89 Published by THE BUREAU Of NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D C 20037 vvv OOOQI4031 CURRENT REPORT 671 separate and distinct steps be followed in meeting the procedural requirements of paragraph (c)(1) (Procedure) and the application of energy control (lockout or tagout) measures, and that the actions be taken in the sequence presented. Paragraph (d)(1) requires that in preparation for shutdown of machinery or equipment, the authorized employee must know about the type and magnitude of the.energy. the hazards involved, and the means of controlling them. Paragraph (d)(2) then requires that the machine or equipment be turned off or shut down by an authorized employee according to the established procedures. This is the starting point for all subsequent actions necessary to put the machine or equipment in a state that will permit employees to work on it safely. In many operations, activation of an electrieal push-button control or the movement of a simple throw switch (electricalshydraulic, or pneumatic) to the "stop'* or "off" mode is sufficient to meet this provision. In other cases, however, such as those found typically in a refining or chemical process, there are control devices that do not necessarily address an "off-on" or "start-stop" condition (i.e., level controls, pressure controller!, etc.). In these instances, a series of predetermined steps may be necessary to achieve a shutdown of the machine or equipment One commenter (Ex. 2-28) suggested that any qualified (trained) employee be allowed to shut down or turn off machines or equipment. Another commenter (Ex. 2-41) suggested allowing machine operators to shut down or turn off the equipment. OSHA is aware that although an authorized employee would usually have the necessary knowledge and capability to shut down machines or equipment a machine or equipment operator or user should also be in a position and know how to shut down the machine or equipment he/she is utilizing. In many, cases, allowing a machine or equipment operator or user toahufUtdown when something goes ugQpgjppy save time and money, and may possibly avoid an accident. In many cases, the affected employee may be infinitely more familiar with the shutdown procedure for a machine or equipment, and would be able to accomplish the shutdown more rapidly arid safely than an authorized person who does not work with that particular machine or equipment every day. In the event that a machine or . equipment malfunctions, the wise and prudent thing to do in most cases is to require that the machine or equipment be immediately shut down. Shutting down a machine or equipment is analogous to stopping the production operation. Contrary to the opinion of one commenter (Ex. 2-71) who stated that OSHA should not mandate equipment shut down as the mandatory first step of the procedure, OSHA believes that stopping the machine's production function is the necessary and appropriate first step in. the procedure. This commenter suggested that some machinery should have components moved to a safe position before shutting off the power. OSHA believes that the necessary first step is to interrupt the production process to allow non servicing (affected) personnel tamove clear of the machinery or equipment. Once this is done and employees are not exposed to a hazard, the machine or equipment can be restarted by the authorized employee under the guidelines of paragraph (f)(1) when necessary to allow positioning of the machine or equipment, or components thereof. Following shutdown of the machine or equipment as putiined in (d)(2), paragraph (d)(3), at the next step in the procedure, provides that energy isolation devices be physically located and operated in such a manner as to isolate the machine or equipment from the energy source^. For example, once an electrical push-button control has been utilized to stop the movement of machine, or equipment parts as the first step of .die shutdown procedure, isolation can then be accomplished by ensuring that the push-button circuitry cannot be supplied with additional electrical energy. For such equipment, the isolation requirement can be accomplished by the employee's actions in tracing the path, from the control toward the energy source until he/she locates the energy isolating device, and moving the energy isolating device control lever to the "safe," "off," or "open'' position. Performing these actions will prevent the reintroduction of energy to the push-button circuitry and will isolate the operating control and the machine or equipment from the energy source. One commenter (Ex. 2-41} suggested that OSHA add the restriction that only authorized employees be allowed to either locate and operate or supervise the operation of energy isolating devices. Instead of adding individual restrictions to each of the procedural steps of the standard. OSHA has added a new paragraph (c)(8) to the final standard which requires that all steps of the procedure except initial shutdown of the equipment as provided in paragraph (d)(1) be performed only by authorized employees. Since the use of lockout or tagout is presumed by OSI LA to be individual protection, identification and operation of the energy isolating devices must be done only by the authorized employees who are applying the locks or tags under the procedures. As the fourth step in the procedure, paragraph (d)(4) provides that action be taken to secure the energy isolating devices in a "safe" or "off" position. This paragraph requires that appropriate and effective lockout or tagout devices be affixed to each energy isolating device by the authorized employee, and that they be attached so as to prevent reactivation of the machine or equipment Where no specific standard presently requires the use of lockout versus tagout paragraph (d)(4) requires the employer to select an appropriate and effective method, in accordance with the criteria set forth in paragraph (c)(2) above. OSHA is of the opinion that as a general rule, when it is feasible, the physical protection offered % the use of a lock, when supported by ttainforination provided on a tag used in conjunction with the lock, pfcvidea the greatest assurance of employee protection from the release of hazardous energy. OSHA has discussed in the section entitled "Major Issues" the arguments for the use oflockout and tagout. Paragraph (d)(5) provides that the next step taken in the energy control procedure is to determine the-presence of, and relieve, disconnect and/or restrain all potentially hazardous, stored or residual energy in the machine or equipment. Up to this point the purpose of following all the steps of the procedure has been to enable the employee to isolate and block the source of energy feeding the machine or equipment to be worked on. at a point beyond which it can not be bypassed. However, energy can very easily be trapped in a system downstream from an energy isolating device, or can be present in the form of potential energy from gravity or from spring action. Stored or residual energy of this sort cannot be turned on or off: it must be dissipated or controlled. When energy may still be present in a system that has been isolated from the energy source, this paragraph requires that energy to be controlled before an employee attempts to perform any work covered by the scope of the standard. Compliance with this provision might require, for example, the use of blocks or other physical restraints to immobilize 9-6-69 Occupations) Safety & NaaJth Rsponar VW 000014022 672 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER the machine, machtoe components, or equipment where necessary for control of the hazard. In die case of electrical circuits, grounding might be necessary to discharge hazardous energy-Hydrsofec or pneumatic system* might eaaaaeitate the use of bleed valves to raUhne the pressure. There were four commenter# (Ex. Z32. 2-71,2-74 and 2-40) who discussed the requirement for the release or restraint of stored or residual energy. One commenter (Ex. 2-71) pointed out that there are several types of stored or potential energy which only the concept of zero mechanical state (ZMS) adequately coven. Examples of these hazards ase machinery components which run oa a cam or other concentric. For this type of machinery, the cam or concentric dictates the motion of the componentor pivotal machine components which could be set in motion by inadvertent employee contact. ZMS is the concept which was originally developed to simplify the requirements for disabling sophisticated machines and processes by.reducing the possibility ofmechanical movement to a minimum. The concept of ZMS is spelled out in toe ANSI ZZ41.1-1975'Americaa_ National Standard Safety Requirements 1 for Sqjod Preparation. Molding and Corcm&kingin the'Sdnd Foundry Industry. (Ex: 2-71J. ZMS specifies that every powdr source that can produce movement of a machine member must' be locked out OSHA has reviewed this aforementioned consensus standard and believes that adoption of this OSHA standard will better effectuate the purposes of the OSH Act The OSHA standard requires the adoption and utilization of a complete program for the control of hazardous energy, including energy sources cot specifically addressed by the ANSI Z241.1 standard.-1 Further. OSHA believes that die energy control procedures established in this final rule are consistent in most respects with those of ANSI Z241.1. The Final Rufeadcbssses titoiw endnther hazards of stored orresflftit energy in a performance maBjjsjK Rather than trying to determine altofwtopotential manners in which this energy can be stored or retaffted In machines, equipment and the materials being utilized in the production process, as noted earlier, OSHA requires in paragraph (d)(1) that the authorized employee must have knowledge of the energy, its hazard and bow to control it (including stored or residual energy). This paragraph (d)(4) requires the stored or resktou energy to be relieved, disconnected, restrained or otherwise rendered safe as part of the energy control procedure. One commenter (Ex. 2-74) suggested adding the phrase, "mdese stored mechanical energy is a necessary element to the equipment or process." OSHA has answered this objection by requiring In this provision that stored or residual energy must be rendered safe before the servicing or maintenance may be conducted. OSHA believes that if stored or residual energy is hazardous, something must be dose to protect the employee#. One commenter (Ex. 2-80) said that OSHA should consider a block, chain or other instrument used for restraining stored or residual energy to be a type of energy isolating device which does not require a lock or tag. Although OSHA defines a block as a form of energy isolating device, the requirement-for the use of locks or tags is separate and? distinct horn the requirement for restraining stored or residual energy and, the addition of a lock-or tag, to most cases, would not materialiy add to-the -r effectiveness of the block. ' One commenter (Ex. 2-22) suggested making it clear that tea stored or residual energy is only Ihaiwhiq^i* downstream from mi.energy isc&ling , device. OSHA acknowledge that ihe standard to intandecLtd<Sitrol energy at it relates.to the.ener^isdating ,, rj device and the j&aGhineOT equipment being serviced and that the only stored or residual energy addressed by the standard is that which could reenergize that equipment or be released while the servicing operation is being performed. In paragraph (dj(4)(ii) the standard requires that verification of isolation shall be continued until the servicing or maintenance ts completed when the possibility of file reaccumulatioa of stored energy exists. There was one commenter (Ex. 2-32) who stated that no work should be allowed to proceed until there to assurance that reaccumulatioa of stored energy cannot occur. OSHA behaves*that this requirement of toe standard should remain a* proposedsince there is no maimer to ensure that some leakage or drainage of energy or energy containing substances, such as supercooled or cryogenic fluids, can occur. In the case of one of those substances being present in a piping, containment or transport system, a certain amount of leakage may occur without endangering employees. However, if servicing or maintenance must be performed on such a system, the standard requires the employer to continue to verify the teototfcm of energy sources which may be hazardous, in order to assure that such leakage doe* not approach a dangerous level. This may involve means such as continuous monitoring for the displacement of oxygen or the buildup of the concentration of the substance toward toe lower explosive limit of toe substance, such as could occur with a hydrogen system. In paragraph (d)(6). as the sixth step in the energy control procedure, the authorized employee must ensure tbat the previous steps of the procedure have been taken to isolate the machine or equipment effectively. This must be done prior to starting the servicing or maintenance work. The authorized employee needs to verify that the machine or equipment has been turned off or shut down properly as required by paragraph (d)(2) orf this standard; that all energy isolating devices were identified, located and operated as required by paragraph (d)(3); that the lodcoul or tagout device* have been attached to energy isolating devices as required by paragraph fdR4); and that stored energy ha* been rendered safe ds required by paragraph (d)(9)r This step df Oft procedure may invdfre a rfatibertrte attempt to start up` equipment Which should not be capabM' of activntidlttHfeatue ofthe application of the energy uunirai devtees. It is an- * action inferdWto assure the employee?0 that energy from themain power source has been effectively Isolated, tiftl residualorstored energy has been blocked and that injury could net result from inadvertent activation of the operating controls. Another means of testing the machine or equipment is by the use of appropriate test instrumentation. This method would be appropriate for use in cases involving electrical circuits and equipment for example, where verification of isolation could be accomplished by using a voltmeter to determine that there is no electrical energy available to toe machine. Similar test equipment can be utilized to test for the presence of other energy types and sources. OSHA also considers the use of visual inspection procedures to be ofcritical importance throughout the lockout or tagout procedure*. Visual Inspection can confirm that swiidies, valves, breakers, etc. have been properly moved to and secured in the "off** or "safe" position. Observing the position of the electrical main power disconnect switch can. for example, confirm that the switch is either in the "off" (open) or "on" (closed) positions Visual inspection can also verify whether or not locks and other protective devices have been applied to the control points to a manner that would present the unsafe movement of the switches or valves. Finally, a 9-S-89 PubliSfted by THE BUREAU Of NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Wellington, O.C. 20037 wv 000014023 "0 >0 CURRENT REPORT 673 visual inspection can be used to verify that isolation has taken place by determining that all motion has stopped and that all coasting parts such as flywheels, grindingwheels, saw biedes. etc., have come to rest OSHA emphasizes that in order to verify that hazardous energy hat been isolated, the authorized.employee may need to use a combination of the above methods. The appropriate combination will depend upon the type of machinery or equipment involved, the complexity of the system, and other factors. Paragraph (e) requiree that certain actions be taken by authorized employees before lockout or tagoui devices are removed from energy isolating.devices. These actions are intended to ensure that: (l).The machine or equipment has been returned to an effective operating condition; (2) any employees who might be exposed to injury due to the process of restoring, energy are made aware that such process is to begin; and (3] those employees having the responsibility for removal of the devices have been identified together with the specific conditions necessary for the procedures to take place. One commenter (Ex. 2-70) contended that the requirements of paragraph (e) were unduly burdensome and impractical in large plants where numerous employees may be working. OSHA does not believe that this is the case. When servicing or maintenance is done on a large machine or complex system of equipment by a large number of employees, the machineor equipment would probably be operationally intact before the work begins. When the work is completed, paragraph (c)(1) merely requires that before the equipment is reenergized, the employees who did the s ervicing or maintenance work complete the job by replacing guards and other machinery components and cleaning up nfer themselves. Paragraph (e)(2} then requires a check for safe location of employees and notification that the equipment is to-be reenergized. A simple procedure to foUusplu verify that the work area and the machinery it ready to be used forits predication function-is for a foreman, supervisoror feadman (whoever is in charge) to ask die workmen if they are done and then to spot check to ensure that all appears ready to resume normal operations. Because each servicing employee will have his/her own lockout or tagout device attached to the energy isolating device during the servicing operation, the person in charge of the servicing operation will first determine whether all such devices have been removed by the servicing employees. This is an essential step in the procedure, and paragraph (e) requires that a final verification be performed to ensure that it is safe to reenergize the equipment after servicing is completed. Further, a check on the satisfactory completion of the work can also ensure that the machine or equipment will not be damaged by its start up. Although the purpose of the final check is to protect employees, it can also prevent needless downtime of the machine or equipment because the servicing or maintenance was not done correctly and/or completely the first time. Paragraph (e)(1) requires that tha workplace area around the machine or equipment be inspected to ensure that nonessential items have been removed and that equipment components are operationally intact This step ensures that tools, machine parts and materials have been removed, and that mechanical restraints, guards and other machine parts have been replaced before returning the machine or equipment to its operational mode. Depending on the complexity of the machinery and the type end degree of servicing performed, visual inspection alone might be suffideatta meet this requirement or there might have tu be additional measures such as check lists and other administrative-procedures.- . One commenter (Ex. 2-28) suggested' the elimination of die words "nonessential items" from this requirement and to substitute words which indicate that the only things that must be removed are those machines which could cause injury to employees or damage .to items. OSHA believes that the cleanup requirement must of necessity be a broad one. since virtually any extraneous item in the servicing area could cause injury to employees if the machinery or equipment were to be reenergized before such items are removed. Further, OSHA believes that the cleanup process should not involve an evaluation of whether each item in the area could or could not cause injury. If an item does not have to be in the servicing area after tha servicing is completed, OSHA believes that the prudent step is to assure that it is removed before the equipment Is reenergized. Accordingly, paragraph (e)(1) is not being changed from the proposal. In paragraph (e)(2)* OSHA proposed that the work area be checked to be sure that employees are dear of the machine or equipment before energy la restored to it This determination will usually include avisual inspection, and depending on the scope of the operation and the equipment involved, may involve the use of administrative procedures and warning devices such as horns, bells or buzzers. There was one commenter (Ex. 2-26] who discussed this requirement. This commenter suggested that the terms "work area" and "all employees" were vague and misleading. OSHA believes that the "work area" for servicing will depend upon many factors, such as the type of equipment being serviced, the type of energy involved, and the extent of the servicing operation. OSHA'a intent is that the work area include any area in the immediate vicinity of the machine or equipment being serviced, in which employees might be endangered by the startup process. Because of the broad scope of this standard, it is not possible to define with greater specificity what this area will encompass for any given workplace or servicing-operation. The employer is in the best position to evaluate the equipment in the workplace, and to make a determination of areas where employees may be exposed to the hazards of tha machinery or equipment. It cannot be overemphasized that employees performing tasks- deenergized equipment mayjte exposed to hazards involving seriousinjury or. death If the status of the lockout or tagout control can be-changed without their knowledge. For this-raason. OSHA require* in paragraph (e)(3) that lockout or tagout devicsi.be removed by the employees who applied them. IIia proposal considered whether an exception should ba provided for two types of situations in which the device may be removed-under the direction of an authorized employee using specific procedures. Paragraph (e)(3)(i), as proposed, would have permitted other ,'mhorized employees to remove a lockout or tagout device when the employee who applied the lockout or tagout device is not available to. remove it. This pru\ision was intended to cover situations such as those that might arise from the sudden sickness or injury of an employee, key loss, or other emergency conditions. Proposed paragraph (e)(3](ii) would have permitted use.of the exception for unique operating activities involving complex systems, where the employer could demonstrate that it was not feasible to have the device removed by the employee applying it This was intended to provide flexibility in operations similar to that where the removal of a lockout or tagout device at a remote electrical tranamission or distribution system location was required and the process was controlled by a written procedure that uses an authorized employee operating from a centralcontrol point to communicate 9-6-89 Occupational Safety a Hearth Reporter. VVV 000014024 674 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER instructions to employees working in the Held. There were 9 commenters (Ex. 2--29, 2-32. 2-44,2-50. 2-57. 2-56, 2-00. 6-63 and 2-70) who discussed allowing exceptions to the rule requirjnraat lockout devices have to be removed by the employees who applied the devices. Two commenters (Ex. 2-29 and 2-44) stated that the exceptions as written were too broadly drawn and would nullify the standard. Several commenters (Ex. 2-32, 2-57 and 2-63) claimed that allowing any exceptions would be unsafe. In contrast there were four commenters (Ex. 2-50, 2-58, 2-59 end 2-7C; who suggested that the exception should be more flexible so tN.t the employer has more leeway, such as allowing the existence of either, rather than both, of the two conditions spelled out in proposed paragraphs (e)(3)(i) and (e)(3)(ii) to trigger the exception. In paragraph (e)(3) of this Final Rule. OSHA is requiring that as a general rule, the authorized employee who affixes a lockout or tagout device is the only one allowed *o remove it. OSHA believes that each such employee must have the assurance that the device is in his/her control, and that it will not be removed by anyone else except in an emergency situation. The entire energy control program in this standard depend; upon each employee recognizing and respecting another employee's lockout ui tagout device. The servicing employee reties upon the fact that be/ she applied the device, and assumes that it will remain cn the equipment while he/she is exposed to the hazards of the servicing operation. OSHA can envision very faw instances which would justify one employee's removal of another's lockout oi tagout device. However, in a tree emergency, end not merely because the employee not available, the employer may be able to demonstrate a need to remove an employee's lockout or tagout device. An exception to paragraph (e)(3) of the final rule is being provided to allow for such situations, aadls discussed further below. OStlA emphasizes that removal or* persona) lockout or tagout device by another person may not be based on convenience or simple unavailability of the employee. If a lockout or tagout device is-attached. it is assumed that the employee who attached that device is engaged in servicing the equipment to which the device is attached, and that person is exposed to the hazards of recnergization. Therefore, as a general matter, the protection of that employee requires that he/she havecomplete control over his/her lockout or tagout device. Some modification of the general nde is warranted in the case of transfer of authority between shifts, as discussed in paragraph (f)(4) below, and to a limited extent in group lockout or tagout, as discussed in paragraph (f)(3) below, both of which involve coordination of activities between servicing employees. Under the exception to paragraph (a)(3), the employer may direct the removal of a lockout or tagout device by another employee only if the energy control program incorporates specific procedures and training for that purpose, and only where *he employer can demonstrate that th* alternative procedure will provide equivalent safety to having the employee remove his/her own device. The procedure must include, at a minimum, the following items: First verification that the authorized employee is not at the facility; second, making all reasonable efforts to contact- that employee to inform him/her that his/her device has been removed: and third, ensuring that employee knows of that device-rcmoval before he/she resumes work at the facility. Thesesteps are necessary to ensure that die employee who is protected by the device is not exposed to energy hazards either at the time of its removal or afterwards. Paragraph (f)fl) requires that the employer develop and utilize a procedure that establishes a sequence of actions to be taken in situations where energy isolating devices are locked cut or tagged out and there is a need for tcriing or positioning of the machine or equipment or components thereof. These actions are required in order to maintain the integrity of any lockout or tagout protection for the servicing employees. It is also necessary in order to provide optimum safety coverage for employees when they have to go from a deenergized condition to an energized one and then return the system to lockout or tagout control. It is during these,transition periods that employee exposure to hazards Is high, and a sequence of steps to accomplish the:>s tasks safely is needed. Para^aph (f)(1) prescribes a logical sequence of steps to be followed in situation where energy isolating devices are locked out or tagged out. and when there is a need to test or position the machine,, equipment or components thereof. The steps offer necessary protection to employees when they are involved in this activity. The procedure is dear-cut and should-require tittle or no explanation other than the contents of the standard itself. It should be pointed out that OSHA is allowing the removal of the lockout or tagout devices and the reenergization of the machine or equipment only during the limited time necessary for the testing or positioning of the machine, equipment or component thereof. This paragraph does not allow the employer or employee to disregard the requirement for locking out or tagging out during the other portions of the servicing or maintenance operation. TTiis exception is only a temporary measure to be used only to accomplish a particular task for which energization is essential. In paragraphs lf)(2) (i) and (ii), the fine! standard requires that whenever outride servicing personnel are engaged to perform any of the activities covered by this standard at a plant or facility. ti:e employer at that facility must inform the authorized representatives of the servicing organizations (contractors, service representatives, etc.) of the lockout or tagout procedures used by the facility. The standard also requires the plant or facility employer to verify that (he procedures to be used by outside service representatives are at least as ' protective of his/her employees as the ' procedures used in the plant or facility*, and that the employees in the plant or facility understand the restrictions or prohibitions of the contractor's procedure and the energy control program of the outside servicing organizations. These requirements are necessity when outside personnel work on machines or equipment because their activities have the same or greater potential for exposing employees to servicing hazards as would exist if the employer's own employees were performing the work. These hazards-can pose a threat to both the outside service representatives and the employees in the plant or facility. The outside servicing personnel would certainly be expected to know about the specific equipment being serviced, but they not be familiar with the energy control procedures being used in the particular workplace. Similarly, the employees at the worksite might be familiar with the procedures being used by their own employer, bat they might not know what to do if the contractor has a procedure which differs from their own. If such procedures were not coordinated, each group of employees might be endangered by the action* oi the other, even if each one follow ed its own procedures. This standard is intended to ensure that both the employer and the outside service personae) ore aware that their interaction in be a possible source of 9-6-89 PuMsnad by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D C. 20037 VVV 00001^025 "0 > CURRENT REPORT 675 injury to employees and that the-close coordination of their activities is needed in order to reduce the likelihood of such injury. OSHA sees the proper utdization of these provisions, when they are understood and agreed upon, as a way to prevent misunderstandings by either plant employees or outside service personnel regarding the use of lockout or tagout procedures in general, and with regard to the use of specific lockout or tagout devices that are selected for a particular application. There were several commenters (Ex. 2-3, 2-41, 2-6Q and 2-67) who suggested OSHA require outside contractors to use the same procedures as used in the plant or facility that the work is being done. OSHA believes that it might adversely affect the safety of employees if the standard were to require them to comply with a procedure which is unfamiliar to them and differs from their usual practices under their ownemployer's energy control program. Further, by allowing each employee to use the procedure that he/she is familiar with, there is greater assurance that the employees will willingly uae the procedure. - When different procedures are being used by the contractorand the facility employer, the standard requires each employer to determine the impacts of ths other employer's procedure on his/ her own emfkoyees. and to assure that those employees are protected as effectively under the other procedure as they would be under their own procedure. For example, if there are elements of the contractor's procedure which need to be explained to the facility employee, or if there are other steps needed to assure their safety under that procedure, the facility employer must provide these employees with adequate support and information to provide the necessary protection. Several commenters (Ex. 2-35, 2-30.240, and 2-09) recommended specifying that the plant or facility employer require compatibility etf procedures. Because of the wide range of potential programs and procvdnfee to be developed under tfe standard. OSHA considers that a requirement for full compatibility of procedures would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement with any degree of consistency. However. OSHA believes that if each employer provides the necessary information on his/her energy control procedure to the other employer whose employees are affected by that procedure, both employers will be able to evaluate the different procedures and determine what information needs to be provided to their respective employees. Accordingly, paragraph (f)(3) of the Final Rule requires that the plant or facility manager inform the outside contractor about the lockout or tagout procedures used in the facility; that the plant or facility employer assure that the contractor's procedure provide equivalent protection to the plant employees; and that the employees in the facility understand and comply with the instruction and prohibition of the procedures. The requirement for coordination between the contractor and the on-site employer is intended to deal with the potential for either one's employees to create or compound the hazards to which the other s employees are exposed. Regardless of the degree of coordination required by paragraph (f)(2). each covered employer, whether contractor or on-site employer, has an independent obligation under the OSHA Act to provide the protection under the standard for his/her own employees. The facility owner must look at various aspects of the contractor's energy control program to assure that his/her employees are not placed at an increased risk. For example, is the contractor's means of notifying the affected employees of the pending lockout or tagout as thorough as toe facility employer's? Is the procedure for identifying the energy isolating devices as exhaustive or complete as toe facility employer's? Is the method of lockout or tagout used by the contractor recognized and respected by the facility's employees? Does the contractors procedure take into account toe possibility of reaccumulation of stored energy (if that is a potential problem}? Does the contractor's procedure for removal of lockout or tagout devices and reenergizetion and startup of the machine or equipment provide for employee notification and ensuring the equipment is safe before startup? if any of the steps in the contractor's procedures fail to cover significant or essential conditions of the workplace which could adversely affect the safety of the facility employees, action must be taken by the facility employer to minimize the potential for injury to his/ her employees. Proposed paragraph (f)(3) contained a series of provisions dealing with group lockout. In brief, group lockout involves the performance of servicing or maintenance activities when more than one employee is engaged in the servicing operation, using a group lockout device, with ao authorized employee directly responsible for the performance of the overall servicing. The proposed requirement for group lockout specified that the authorized employee would have a primary lock, which is affixed when the equipment is deenergized, and is removed when the job is completed It did not provide for the use of individual locks or tags by the individual employees in the group. The proposal would have allowed this system, with the authorized employee being responsible for the safety of all the employees in the group, if that program provided the same degree of safety as personal Lockout or tagout. Based on the record (Ex. 2-27, 2-29. 2- 32.2-44. 2-63. 2-99. 2-106. 51. 56. 60. Tr. pg. Wl-142), OSHA has reexamined the issue of group lockout and has concluded that an additional element is necessary for the safety of toe servicing employees: each employee in the group needs to be able to affix his/her personal lockout or tagout system devices part of the group lockout This is necessary for several reasons: first the placement of a personnel lockout or tagout system device enable that employee to have a degree of control over his/her own protectiotuxather than having to depend corapletely-upon other people; second, the use of a personal device will enable each servicing employee to verify that the equipment has been properly deenergized in accordance with toe energy control procedure, and to affix his/her device to indicate that verification; third, the presence of an employee's lockout or tagout system device will inform all other persons, including the other servicing employees and supervisors, that the employee is still working on toe equipment; fourth, as long as that device remains attached, the authorized person in charge of the group lockout or tagout knows that the job is not completed and that it is not 9afe to reenergize the equipment; and, fifth, the servicing employee will continue to be protected by the presence of his/her device until he/she removes it. The authorized employee in charge of the group lockout or tagout does not remove the group lockout device until each employee in toe group has removed his/her personal device, indicating that employees are no longer exposed to the hazards from the servicing operation. OSHA is convinced that toe use of individual lockout or tagout system devices to supplement the group lockout device is necessary for the safety of toe servicing employees. The proposed rule contained several general elements for group lockout, including provision on primary responsibility and coordination of work forces. These elements are carried forward in toe Final Rule. The requirement for the use of personal 9-6-89 Oocupsttonal Safety a Heetth Reporter Wv 000i4026 r" 676 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER lockout or tagout devices will only enhance the overall effectiveness of these provisions, because the authorized employee in charge of the group lockout will be better able ta evaluate the status of the servicing operation, as weR-asto determine which, If any, of thservicing employees are working on the equipment at a particular time. OSHA requires in paragraph (f)(3) that when a crew, craft department or other group lockout or tagout device is used, it must provide the authorized and affected employees with a degree of protection that is equivalent to the u9e of personal lockout or tagout procedures. As in the case of other forms of lockout or tagout protection, the employer who uses a group lockout or tagout system must develop a procedure which encompasses the elements set forth in paragraph (e)(4). Paragraph (f)(3) identifies requires several key provisions which must be included in all group lockout or tagout procedures. If a single lockout device or set of lockout devices (often referred to as "operations locks") are utilized to isolate the machine or equipment from the energy sources, each authorized employee is afforded a means to utilize his/her personal lockout or tagout devices so that no single employee has control of the means to remove the group lockout or tagout devices while employees are still servicing or maintaining the machine or equipment. This can be accomplished by the use of a lockout or other similar appliance. Once the machine or equipment is locked out the key is placed Into the lockbox and each authorized employee places his/her lockout ortagout device on the box. When each individual completes his/her portion of the work, that person removes his/her lockout or tagout device from the lockbox. Once all personal lockout or tagout devices have been removed, the key for the group lockout devices for the machine or equipment can be used to remove that group lockout device. This method provides protection for all employees working under the protection bfa particular group lockout or tagout device. When more than onegrtfpik involved, another authorized person might need to maintain responsibility for coordination of the various lockout control groups in order to ensure continuity of protection and to coordinate workforces. In addition to designating and assigning responsibility to authorized employees, paragraph (f)(3) requires the employer to develop and implement procedures for determining the exposure status of individual crew members and for taking appropriate measures to control or limit that exposure. These provisions are seen by OSHA as requiring at least the following steps: 1. Verification of shutdown and isolation of the equipment or process before allowing a crew member to place a personal lockout or tagout device on an energy isolating device, or on a lockout box, board, or cabinet: 2. Ensuring that all employees in the crew have completed their assignments, removed their lockout and/or tagout devices from the energy isolating device, the box lid or other device used, and are in tbe clear before turning the equipment or process over to the operating personnel or simply turning the machine or equipment on. 3. Providing the necessary coordinating procedures for ensuring the safe transfer of lockout or tagout control devices between other groups and work shifts. The special coverage of paragraph (f)(3) recognizes the importance of group lockout and/or tagout devices used under conditions in which the safety of all employees working in the group ia dependent on how those devices are used. For that reason, it involves a closer examination of the conditions, methods and procedures needed for effective employee protection. OSHA also believes that by requiring each servicing employee to attach his/ her own device in group servicing operations, it becomes possible to extend coverage of group servicing activities under paragraph(f)(3j beyond' lockout as envisioned by the proposal to cover tagout as well. This would primarily involve equipment which has not been designed to accept a lockout device. OSHA believes that when a group lockout or tagout procedure is properly implemented; U adds an additional element of protection to servicing employees: the authorized employee in charge of the group servicing operation applies a group lockout or tagout device to the equipment being serviced, and each servicing employee attaches a personal lockout or tagout device to the group device. These individual devices are removed by the employees who applied them, leaving the group device attached. These employees, by clearing-the equipment and removing their own devices, indicate that they are no longer exposed to the hazards of the servicing operation. The authorized employee in charge of the group servicing operation then verifies that all elements of the group servicing have, in fact. been completed, and that it is safe to reenergize the system, before he/she removes the group device. Thus. t`>e additional dt3p provides further assurance that reenergizing the equipment will not endanger employees. Expanding group procedures iO encompass tagout as well as lockout will extend the additional protection to operations which would otherwise be permitted under this standard to use tagout devices instead of lockout. One of the most difficult problems to be dealt with by this standard involves the servicing and maintenance of complex equipment, particularly when the work extends across several workshifts. Under the basic approach taken by this standard, each servicing employee is responsible for the application and removal of his/her own lockout or tagout device. However, the record indicates that the servicing of some complex equipment may take days or weeks, and that in some cases, hundreds of lockout or tagout devices may be necessary. EE} (Ex. 56) noted that in some major maintenance operations, it can take day or more just to apply lockout/tagout devices to all energy isolating devices. CMA (Ex. * 56) explained that in a chemical plant, certain ``tiHU-aroand" jobs may require the locking or tagging ef a hundred or momenergy isolation devices and require 25 or more employees to perform the servicing. Paragraph (f)(4) of this-Final Rule requires that specific procedures bo utilized to ensure continuation of ' lockout or tagout protection for employees during shift or personnel changes in order to provide for an orderly transfer of control measures, and to be certain that the machine or equipment iB continuously maintained in a safe condition. As with group lockout or tagout, this task is accomplished as part of the procedures that are defined in performance language in paragraph (c)(4). Paragraph (f)(4) requires specific procedures whenever transfer of control measures is necessary. The underlying rationale for these provisions, whereby hazardous energy control responsibility is transferred, is for the maintenance of uninterrupted protection for the employees involved-11 is therefore considered essenti.il that lockout or tagout devices be maintained on energy isolating devices throughout the transition period. Basically, the transfer of responsibility can be accomplished by the on-coming shift employees accepting control of the system involved prior to the release of control by the off-going employees. Also, the procedures, whether they necessitate the use of simple control measures or the more 9-6-89 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D C 20037 wv 000014037 CURRENT REPORT 677 > 0 Q detailed use of logs and check lists to accomplish an orderly transfer, are to be followed by an assurance that the system is indeed safe for employees to continue working.This asiurenna involves action by tfc* authorised or supervisory employee responsible for the transfer to verify the continued isolation of energy in the system. There was considerable discussion at the hearings with regard to proposed paragraph (f)(4). concerning the need to ensure continued protection during shift or personnel changes. This paragraph was intended to provide protection for servicing operations which extend over more than one shift, usually involving from a few to large numbers of employees on each shift OSHA attempted to provide a means of assuring that there is no gap in coverage between the off-going employee's removal of hie/her lockout or tagout device and the on-coming employee's attachment of his/her own device. Several participants at the hearings testified as to methods used in their facilities to deal with this situation, bh, for example. (Tr. pg. WZ-2Z-2-28) testified that for complex jobs involving large numbers of energy control devices and many employees on different shifts, member companies use work permits which must be reauthorized at the beginning of each shift. The lockout/ tagout devices which are attached to the energy control means at the start of the job are not removed between shifts. Before beginning work, the on-coming shift employees walk through the equipment and verify that the equipment has been deenergized and that proper procedures have been followed. Another system, involving an "operations lock,"was endorsed by representatives of AP! (Ex. 57, Tr. pg. H 40) and OCAW (Tr. pg. HS9-7Q). An "operations lock.1' essentially a type of group lockout device, is the first lode attached to the equipment when the equipment is deenergized. and it is the last lock removed when the job is completedc Each servicing empfayre attaches hisf' her personal loekoert/tagout device while working on th-aqmpment. and removes the devicawhen the job ie. completed, or when leaving for the day. OSHA believes that when properly implemented either of these methods can provide adequate assurance to the.on coming employee that the equipment is safe to work on. Perhaps the most critical element of assuring continuity of protection is providing the individual employee with an opportunity to verify that the equipment has been deenergized. Even more than in the case with individual lockout or tagout, the on-coming employee should not have to depend on the actions of another employee or supervisor, particularly one who has left the workpiece for the day. for assurance that it ia safe to work on the machinery or equipment The group lockout provisions in paragraph (f)(4) of the Final Rule contain what OSHA believes to be the necessary safeguards for these situations. To the extent that the procedures described by EEI. APL and OCAW provide for individual verification that the equipment has been properly deenergized ami to the extent that the procedures allow for the servicing employee to attest to that verification in accordance with the standard OSHA believes that such procedures would comply wth the Final Rule. In the case of the type of complex servicing operation described by EEZ, involving large numbers of energy isolation devices, large numbers of servicing employees, and multiple shifts, OSHA acknowledges that the removal and replacement of the lockout/!agout devices each shift could be overly burdensome. In these situations, the use of the work permit, with each employee signing on and off the equipment, ~ combined with the employeet-walking down the equipment to ensure continued deenergixation prior to beginning work, would be an acceptable approach to compliance with group lockout/tagout and shift transfer provisions of the standard. Because the person applying the lockout or tagout device is generally the one being protected by that device, it is essential that the device not be removed by anyone else except in emergencies. When an employee transfers servicing duties to an employee on the next shift and the equipment is to remain deenergized throughout the shift change, it should not be an undue burden to establish a procedure under paragraph (f)(4) for the off-going employee to transfer his/her authority to the on coming employee. In situations whore the offrgoing employee removes his/her lockout or tagout device before the on coming employee arrives, the procedure could allow for the off-going employee to apply a tagout device at the time he/ she removes his/her device, indicating that the lock had been removed, but that the machine or equipment hud not been reenergized- The au-commg employee would verity that ;he system was sail deenergized, and would remove the interim tag and substitute his/her lockout device. This would assure that the continuous protection is maintained from one shift to another. When tagout devices are used, it would be possible to use a tag with space for the off-going employee to sign off. giving the date and time, and for the on-coming employee to sign on, also giving the date and time. Each employee would verify the deenergization and energy isolation for his/her own protection before signing onto the tag. VO. Regulatory Impact Analysis Introduction Executive Order 12291 (4ft FR 13193. February 17.1961} requires that a regulatory analysis be conducted for any rule potentially having major economic consequences on the national economy: geographical regions, individual industries, or levels of government Consistent with these requirements. (OSHA) has prepared a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for this Final Rule. The analysis includes: A profile of the potentially affected firms and employees; a description of regulatory and nonregulatnry alternatives: an analysis of th technological feasibility of rale; and a study of the potential socl^beaefim, economic coats, and envirahjperitai impacts that may result froqffull compliance with the rule. . The complete analysis, as summarized in this sectioiL'is based oh (feta and information provided by the Eastern Research Group (ERGT fn a study entitled. "Industry Profile Study of a7 Standard for Control of Hazardous Energy Sources Including Lockout/ Tagout Procedures'' (Ex. 15J. Additional information was obtained from comments submitted to OSHA in response to the proposed rule and a supplemental ERG report (Ex. 21). The Secretary has determined that this action is a "major action" as defined by section 3(b) of Executive Order 12291 as it will have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more. The Regulatory Impact Analysis is available for inspection and copying in the rulemaking docket Affected Industries The Final Rule wall affect most employment covered by OSHA under Part 1910 except: (l) Those activities that are specifically excluded from coverage such as certain work on plug and cord type electrical equipment; and (2) employment for which OSHA has or is in the process of providing separate coverage under a different Subpart or Part such as the oil and gae field services industry. OSHA has estimated that the rule will affect activities in some 1.7 nufilon establishments 9-S-69 Occupational Sataty a Health Reporter vvv 000014028 678 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER employing approximately 39 million workers. To analyze the differing effects of the rule, OSHA has divided the affected industries into a high-impact group, a low-impact group, and a zero or negiigible-impact group. The high-impact group consists of ail manufacturing industries. In 1984, approximately 20 million workers were employed in 340,451 high-impact establishments. Firms classified as low-impact include those in transportation; utilities; wholesale trade: retail food stores; and several service industries, including personal services*business services, automotive repair, miscellaneous repair, and amusement services. OSHA has estimated that approximately 19 million workers were employed in 1.4 million low-impact establishments in 1964. The negligible-impact group consists of industries that ERG determined had little potential for a lockout or tagoutrelated accident. Retail trade, finance, insurance, real estate, service, and public administration firms not classified in the high or low-impact sectors were included in this group. The Agency's analysis focuses on the potential regulatory effects to high- and low-impact firms. Population at Risk As noted, some 39 million workers are employed in industries that may be affected by the Final Rule. All such workers have the potential for being injured due to inadequate or non existent use of lockout or tagout In estimating the number of workers at risk from exposure to hazardous energy. OSHA classified "at-risk" occupations in l!:-j Final Rule as those being held by individuals who would actually perform lockout or tagoul activities. Although t -.Is approach tends to underestimate '.'.3 number of workers who could benefit from promulgation of a lockout or tagout rale, it does provide a good measure of the number of workers who will have to alter their work patterns to comply with the rule. Thus, it is an expropriate method for estimating the ccst3 of the rale. Based on the ERG study [Ex. 15. p. 3-3o], OSHA"has determined that two millionworkers in high-impact industries, and one million workers in low-impact industries, are employed in occupations where the unexpected energization or start-up of machines or equipment or release of stored energy could cause injury to employees. The risk appears to be the greatest for those workers employed as craft workers, machine operators, and laborers. Certain types of machinery, such as packaging and wrapping equipment, along with printing presses and conveyors, are associated with a high proportion of the accidents. Significance ofRisk The installation, assembly, service, repair, maintenance, change over, and disassembly of machines, equipment, and systems are activities integral to most industrial processes. During these activities, however, accidents often result from the inadvertent energization or movement of machinery or equipment. The ERG study (Ex. 15. p. 6-27.6-48] estimated that two percent of all workplace injuries, and 7.1 percent of all fatal occupational accidents, occur as a result of inadequate or nonexistent lockout or tagout procedures in industries regulated under this Final Rule. Based on these percentages, the Agency has estimated that in 1S84 there were 144 fatalities, 33,432 lust workday injuries, and 37,561 non-lost workday injuries that occurred due to inadequate lockout or tagout procedures in the affected industries. Assuming that these types of accidents grow proportionately with the average level of employment, approximately 1,530 fatalities. 352.SU5 lost workday injuries, and 396,560 nenlost workday injuries would occur during the dext 10 years in the absence of a lockout or tagout standard. The accidents commonly resulting From inadequate or nonexistent lockout or tagout activities tend to be significantly more severe that the average occupational injury. Injuries typically include fractures, lacerations, contusions, amputations, and puncture woi;nd3. The ERG study [Ex. 13. p. 6-52] estimated that such inju.-ius cause workers to lose an average of 21 workdays. By way of corr.pariccn, the 196t Bureau of Labor Statistics' Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Study [F.x. 18j reports that the average lost time occupational injury involves 1<J lost workdays. Based upon the aforementioned evidence, OSHA has determined that the failure to control hazardous energy results in a significant risk to employees. Since the private market fails to provide an adequate level of safety for workers servicing and maintaining equipment, the Agency has examined various regulatory and nonregulatory alternatives, including tort litigation, distribution of information, workers' compensation, and industry self regulation. The Agency has concluded that the standard would reduce risk in an optimal manner. Technological Feasibility The Final Rule is written in performance-based language that permits firms to develop lockout or tagout procedures that are most appropriate for their specific machines and equipment. Based on data gathered during ERG site visits, OSHA has determined that some firms of ail sizes and types are already in full compliance with the Final Rule. As this rule would not require the development of new technologies or significant equipment modifications, OSHA has determined that all provisions of the standard are technologically feasible. Costs of Compliance with the Rule OSHA has estimated the cost of full compliance with the standard based on the most cost-effective methods of implementing the Final Rule. The Agency estimates that 72.5 percent of all energy isolating devices are lockable (90 percent of the electrical disconnects and 66.7 percent of the valves) and will be locked out under the Final Rule, while the remaining 27.5 percent are not lockable and will be tagged out. Thus, the Agency has concluded that promulgation of the rule will cost 631.000 establishments a total of $214.3 million during the first year of implementation, and $135.4 million in subsequent years- The costa of complying with the standard can be briefly summarized by category. For locks, tags, and other hardware, the first-year cost is estimated to be $18.5 million, and the annual recurring costs amount to $8 9 million. For voluntary equipment modification to facilitate lockout or tagout, the first-year cost is estimated at $27.0 million, with r,o annual recurring costs. In terms of work practice modifications, the firat-yecr cot ar.J me annual recurring costs are 5102.7 mull each. For planning end implementing lockout or tagout procedures, tha firstyear cost is calculated at $35.2 million, and the annual recurring costs are estimated at $21.0 million. For employee training, the first-year cost is $31.0 million, and the annual recurring costa are $3.6 million. OSHA also has estimated the average costs per establishment for firms not currently using adequate lockout or tagout procedures. First-year compliance costs for establishments in manufacturing industries, which are classified as high-impact firms, would range from $120 per firm for very small establishments (those having less than 20 employees) to $28,172 for large establishments (those having more than 250 employees). Industries categorized as low-impact would incur first-year costs of approximately $160 per firm. First-year costs of the standard by SIC code for the high and low-impact 9-6-89 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.. Washington. D.C. 20037 VVV 000014029 CURRENT REPORT 679 industries ere summarized in Table XXIV. Table XXIV.--First Year Cost of the Stanoaro for the Control of Haz ardous Energy Sources by SIC fmMortt t] SIC code Industry name Cost High impact industries 20 Food and kaxtiwd product*.-........... 21 Tobacco mamriacanra. ... 22 Taxtta mi product*.--------- --_____ 23 Apparel and other Mahed prod- ucta................ --..... ................... 24 Lumper and wood products. except fymrtwe............... 25 Furnace and fixtures__ -................ 26 Paper and allied product*___ ___..... 27 Printing, publishing, and allied in- 28 Chsrncais and alfiad product*____ 29 Petroleum, refining, and related In- dustrie*..... .............. .. .......... 30 Rubber and miacaUaneous pi**- 31 Leather and leather product*.____ j 32 Stone, day. glass, and concrete 33 Primary m*W MueMea................. 34 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment.----------- --..--...... 35 Machinery, except electrical-.......... 36 Electrical end electronic maehirv cry, equipment and auppOe*____ 37 Transportation equipment . 38 Measuring, analysing, and control- flng Instruments__________ ___ 39 Miscellaneous manufacturing in- dustries________ 10.8 0.5 7.2 2.0 3.6 2.4 5.9 14.1 8.2 1.4 6.0 M 10-1 13.3 T6.1 13.3 14.9 2.9 23 Low impact Industrie* Drv. 6.. Transportation............................... Oiv. ,. Communications............ ................ Oiv. E.. Utilities.......................................... Div. F.. Whotaaai* trad*.............. .. ............ Oiv. G.. Retail trad*...................................... Dtv. 1.... Service*.......................... ....... 9.5 23.7 4.4 13.7 1.2 19.0 Total cost to high and low impact industries. *214.3 'Total may not add due to roundmg. Source, OSHA, ORA, April, 1968. Benefits of the Finai Rule OSHA has estimstMHha total number of accidents that thB'RhSl Rule would have prevented in f9M, amuming full compliance by all affected firms and workers. As as conservative estimate, the Agency assumed that only 89 percent of those accidents identified as caused by inadequate or nonexistent lockout or tagout procedures would actually be prevented under this rule. It was assumed that 15 percent of the noted accidents may still occur even if both employees and employers are complying fully with the rule (e.g., a block used to hold the weight of a suspended machine component may fail). Based on the above assumptions. OSHA has estimated that the Final Rule would have prevented approximately 122 fatalities. 28.416 lost workday injuries, and 31.926 non lost workday injuries in 1984. Cost-Effectiveness OSHA has calculated the cost per fatality avoided by the standard as one measure of its efficacy. Overall, for both low-impact and high-impact industries, the compliance costs of the standard ate estimated to amount to about 1.2 million per fatality avoided. If compliance costs are further adjusted to reflect the additional economic benefits expected to accrue to employer^ (e.g.. less lost production time, less administrative preparing insurance claims and accident reports, and less inefficiency related, to replacing Injured workers), the cost per fatality avoided falls to $0.19 mUfion. However, this calculation only includesiatalffies, and does not take into account the costs or benefits for the avoidance of employee injuries. If injuries were include^ in the calculations, cost per injury prevented, would be extremely low- 'Hius. the , Agency has concluded that the lockout or tagout rule wifi reduce the number of occupational fatalities and injuries in a cost-effective manner.. Economic Effects ' OSHA has determined that full compliance with the standard wifi have a minor negative impact on the profits of the affected firms because, on average, compliance costs will equal no more than 0.05 percent of operating costs and 2.2 percent of net income for any site establishment. Neither the gross national product (GNP), the level of international-trade, the price of consumer goods, nor the level of employment will be significantly affected. Based on these estimates, the Agency.has concluded that the economic effects of the rule will be negligible, and thus neither the stability nor the profitability of any particular industry or size firm will he at issue as a consequence of the promulgation of the final standard. VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification In accordance with'the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), OSHA must assess the potential economic impact of its standards to determine whether they will impose significant costs upon a substantial, number of small entities. "Significance" is determined by the impact upon small firms' profits, market share, and ' financial viability. In particular. OSHA must determine whether ita rules will have a relatively greater negative effect n small entities than on large entities. To assess tjie impact of this rule on small entities, the Agency has estimated the total cost of compliance per establishment for firms not currently practicing lockout or tagout First-year costs would range from $120 for very small firms (those having fewer than 20 employees; to $1,737 for small firms (those having 20 to 99 employees) to $28,172 for large firms (those having 250 employees or more) [Ex. No. 17, p. VI43). The cost of compiling with the Final Rule will depend primarily on the number of workers employed by a firm and the number of maintenance and servicing tasks required annually-- factors that typically depend upon the scale of operation of a company. Thus, based on the above estimates, the costs of the Final Rule will be proportional to the size of the firm and no significant differential impact is expected. OSHA also1 has compared the costs of compliance with small entities' total' costs of production. The Agency has determined that the cost of ful) compliance with the rule will equal no more than 0.05 percent of an average . small or very,small firm's operating costs, and no more than Z2 percent-of an average small firm's net income [Ex. 17. p. vn-ej. As the costs of compliance for small and very small firms are proportional to the size of the firm, and would represent such a small component of the overall cost of.the facilities, OSHA certifies that the Final Rule will not have a significant impact upon a substantial number of small entities. The Regulatory Flexibility Assessment of this rule is available for inspection and copying in the rulemaking docket. IX. Environmental Assessment This Final Rule has been reviewed in accordance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA] of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.). the Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) (40 CFR part 1500), and Department of Labor NEPA Procedures (29 CFR part 11). As a result of this review, the Acting r Assistant Secretary-for OSHA has determined that the rule will have no significant environmental impact. The Final Rule focuses on the reduction of accidents and injuries by means of the utilization of specific work practices, procedures, and training. This proposal would not have an impact on air, water, or soil quality, plant or animal life, the use of (and, or any other aspects of the environment. As such. 9-6-89 Occupational Salary a Health Reporter vvv GOG01403C 80 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER this proposal can therefore be categorized as an excluded action according to subpart E i 11.10, of the DOL NEPA regulations. X. Paperwork Reduction Act This section contains a collection of information requirements in paragraphs 1310.147(c)(4), (c)(7) and (f)(2) which pertain to the development and utilization of a written energy control procedure and the training of employees in that procedure. The paperwork requirements contained in this rule will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval. XI. International Trade Increases in the price of domestically manufactured goods in general result in an increase in the demand for imports, and s decrease in the demand for . ports. The magnitude of this impact depends on the relevant demand elasticities and the magnitude of the price changes. While the final standard may result in slightly higher prices of manufactured goods, the estimated magnitude of this increase is so small that the Agency has concluded that any resultant impact on foreign trade will be negligible. XII. Federalism This Final Rule has been reviewed in accordance with Executive Order 12612 [52 FR 41685. October 30,1987), regarding Federalism. This Order squires that agencies, to the extent possible, refrain from limiting State policy options, consult with States prior to taking any actions which would restrict State policy options, and take such actions only when there is clear constitutional authority and the presence of a problem of national scope. l'he Order provides for preemption of State law only if there is a clear Congressional intent for the Agency to do so. Any such preemption is to be limited to the extent possible. Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) expresses Congress' clear intent to preempt State laws telating to issues on which Federal OSHA has promulgated occupational safety and health standards. Under the OSH Act a State can avoid preemption only if it submits, and obtains Federal approval of. a plan for the development of such standards and their enforcement Occupational safety and health standards developed by such Plan-States must among other things, be at least as effective in providing safe and healthful employment and places of employment as the Federal standards. Where such standards are applicable to products distributed or used in interstate commerce, they may not unduly burden commerce and must be justified by compelling local conditions (see section 18(c)(2) of the OSH Act). The Federal standard on control of hazardous energy sources addresses hazards which are not unique to any one State or region of the country. Nonetheless, States with occupational safety and health plans approved under Section 18 of the OSH Act will be able to develop their own State standards to deal with any special problems which might be encountered in a particular State. Moreover, because this standard is written in general performanceoriented terms, there is considerable flexibility for State plans to require, and for affected employers to use, methods of compliance which are appropriate to the working conditions covered by die standard. In brief, thfe Final Rule addresses a clear national problem related to occupational safety and health in general Industry. Those States which have elected to participate tinder Section lSof the OSH Act-are not preempted by ihis-standarri, and wtil be able to deal with any special conditions within the framework of the Federal Act. while ensuring that th'e State standards are at least as effective as that standard. XUL State Plan Standards The 25 States and territorids with their own OSHA-approved occupational safety and health plans must adopt a comparable standard within six months of tiie publication-date of the final standard. These States and territories are: Alaska. Arizona* California, Connecticut (for State end local government employees only), Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan. Minnesota. Nevada. New Mexico, New York (for state and local government employees only). North Carolina,-Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina. Tennessee, Utah, Vermont Virginia. Virgin Islands. Washington, and Wyoming. Until such time as a State standard is promulgated, Federal OSHA will provide interim enforcement assistance, as appropriate, in these States. XIV. Effective Date Ih developing the Final Rule, OSHA has considered whether a delayed effective date is necessary for any of the provisions of the standard. Since the Final Rule does not require extensive retrofitting or major modifications of existing equipment the Agency believes that 60 days is adequate time for employers to obtain the necessary hardware (primarily lockout and tagout devices). This amount of time should also be adequate for the development of the energy control program and procedures required by the standard. The record indicates that many industries with highly complex equipment, such as the automotive, chemical, and petroleum industries, have already implemented lockout or tagout procedures which would need to be modified little, if at all to meet the standard. For those employers who will need to develop new procedures to comply with the standard, the standard provides considerable guidance to assist in that development process. Appendix A to the Final Rule sett forth an example of a simple procedure which can be tailored to the individual workplace in situations involving a single energy source. OSHA believes that many employers, particularly small businesses, will be able to use this procedure by filling in the blanks with the necessary information. For more complex situations, a mors complex procedure may be necessary. During this rulemaking, interested parties submitted a wide range of procedures and information on their implementation to the rulemaking record, and these materials are available for review and copying in OSHA'a Docket Office. XV. List of Subjects in 29 CFR Part 1918 1910 Lockout; Tagout; Control of hazardous energy sources: Deenergize; Training; Occupational safety and health; Occupational Safety and Health Administration; Safety, XVI. Authority This document was prepared under the direction of Alan C. McMillan. Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor 200 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington. DC 20210. Accordingly, pursuant to sections 4, 6(b). 8(c) and 8(g) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 653. 855.857), Secretary of Labor's Order No. 9-83 (48 FR 35738), and 29 CFR part 1911,29 part 1910 is hereby amended as set forth below. Signed at Washington. D.C.. this 28th day of August 1969. Alan C. McMillan, Acting Assistant Secretary ofLabor. 9-4-69 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.. Washington. D.C. 20037 000014031 4 CURRENT REPORT OSHA NOTICE EXTENDING ADMINISTRATIVE STAY OF FORMALDEHYDE HAZARD WARNING PROVISIONS [54 FR 35639, August 29, 1989] 681 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Occupational Safety and Health Administration 29CfH Part 1910 RIN1218-AA *2 Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde agency: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor. ACTION: Extension of administrative stay. ______________ SUMMARY: On December 4,1987. the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published a final rule in the Federal Register on occupational exposure to formaldehyde (29 CFR 1910.1C48. 52 FR 48168). In response to numerous public comments which Indicated confusion about the hazard warning provisions of the newly revised Formaldehyde Standard, on December 18.1988, OSHA announced an administrative stay of paragraphs (m)[i){i) through (tn)(4)(ii) for a period of nine mouths. OSHA also .announced its intention to revoke paragraphs (m)(l)(i) through (m)(4)(ii) and invite comments on replacing them with the Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) or another equally protective alternative which would be less confusing to the public (53 FR 50198). OSHA has not yet completed work on certain proposed amendments to the Hazard Communication Standard (see 53 FR 29822. 8/8/88). These amendments are relevant to the decision as to whether it would be appropriate to substitute the amended Hazard Communication Standard for stayed paragraph (m](l)(i) through (m)(4}(ii) of the Formaldehyde Standard. Consequently OSHA is extending the stay an additional nine months and will consider further developments in the Hazard Communication rulemaking in determining what regulatory action to propose on formaldehyde. While this stay is in effect affected employers must continue to comply with the provisions of OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard. effective DATE: The administrative stay of 29 CFR 1910.1048 (m)(l)(t) through (mK4)(ii) will be effective until June 13. 1990. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. James Foster. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Office of Information and Consumer Affairs. U S. Department of Labor, Room N-3847. 200 Constitution Avenue NW.. Washington, DC 20210. Telephone (202) 523-8151. Authority and Signature This document was prepared under the direction of Alan C. McMillan, Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health. 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington. DC 2C210. This action is taken pursuant to section 4(b), 6(b). and 8(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (84 Slat. 1593.1597,1599: 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 057): Secretary of Labor's Order No. 9-83 (48 FR 35733) and 29 CFR part 1911. List of Subjects in 29 CFR Part 1910 Formaldehyde, Occupational safety and health. Chemicals. Cancer. Health. Risk assessment. } 1910.1048 (Stayed in parti Therefore. 29 CFR 1910.1048 fmKl)(i}, through (m)(4j(ii) is stayed until June 13, 1990. Signed at Washington. DC Ihis 22nd dey of August, 1989. Alan C. McMillan. Acting Assistant Secretary ofLaborfor Occupational Safety and Health. OSHA FINAL RULE GRANTING PETITIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THREE LIMITS AND PARTIAL STAYS OF EFFECTIVE DATES FOR FOUR SUBSTANCES [54 FR 36765, Sept. 5,1989] DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Occupational Safety and Health Administration 29 CFR Part 1910 BIN 1218-A026 Air Contaminant* AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Labor. ACTION: Final rule: Grant of petition* for reconsideration of three exposure limits and partial stays of effective dates for four substances. summary: OSHA reduced exposure limits for 375 air contaminants on January 19.1989 at 54 FR 2332. OSHA is granting a petition for reconsideration of the Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL)) for acetone of 1000 ppm for the cellulose acetate fiber industry and it I* not in effect for that industry. The STEL remains In effect for all other industries except the cellulose acetate fiber industry. The Time Weighted Average (TWA) of 750 ppm for acetone is stayed until September 1,1990 for one operation in the cellulose acetate fiber industry. OSHA is also granting a petition for reconsideration of the new limit of 5 mg/ m* for calcium hydroxide and it is not in effect The prior limit of S mg/m* respirable dust and 15 mg/m* total dust as a particulate not otherwise regulated remains in effect OSHA will also reconsider the limit of 5 mg/m* for. calcium oxide but the prior limit which was also 5 mg/m* will remain in effect A stay of the ceiling limit for carbon monoxide is granted for three operations in the steel industry. A stay of the new limits for nitroglycerin and ethylene glycol dinitrate is granted to the explosives industry until October 1, 1989. A stay until October 1,1989 is granted to the drycleaning industry for the new limit for perchloroethylene. date: These actions take effect on September 1.1989. 9-4-89 Occupational Safety 4 Health Reporter Wv 000014032 682 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. fame* F. Foster. OSHA Office of Public Affairs. Room N-3647, Department of Labor. 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210, Telephone (202) 523-6151. SURRIEMENTARV INFORMATIOaC. On January 19.1989 at 54 FR 2332 OSHA issued a final standard setting new or more protective exposure limits for 375 substances. The new limits are to be achieved with any reasonable combination of controls including engineering controls and respirators by September 1.1980, and with a preference for engineering controls by December 31.1992. Individual companies or trade associations representing industry brought 28 law suits challenging approximately 15 of these new limits. The AFL-CIO also challenged a number of exposure limits as not sufficiently protective. The objective of this regulatory effort is to create major improvements in occupational health by lowering exposures of 4.5 million workers to many toxic substances. OSHA concludes that the commitments obtained from industry as part of the settlements of individual law suits described in this notice will lead to improved health protection to workers, or will maintain protection while resolving complex legal issues or leading to the resolution of complex technical issues, consistent with statutory requirements. 1. Acetone In the case of acetone. OSHA lowered exposures from a 1000 ppm 6 hour TWA to a 750 ppm TWA and issued a new 1000 ppm STEL The cellulose acetate fiber industry consisting of two companies. Tennessee Eastman and Hoechsl Celenese. petitioned the Court ' of Appeals to review the standard challenging both the health need for the STEL. and the feasibility of the STEL for their industry only. They are challenged the practicality of respirator use in some areas and administratively petitioned OSHA to reconsider the ssftfak OSHA reviewed the iiifliiwnUuii submitted and continues to iwiu hull there is a health need for tisiTEL to prevent moderate irritation and that it is generally feasible. OSHA carefully reviewed feasibility of the STEL for this sector. Based upon its review the cellulose acetate fiber industry's agreement to under take certain specific measures to protect the health of its employees, OSHA agreed to settle the law suit challenging the acetone standard. The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, which represents workers in that industry, supported the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement is available in the OSHA Docket Office (Room N2625 at the above address. (202) 5237894. Ex. No. 221-67 in Docket H-020). It provides that the two companies and three plants which make up the entire industry will commence now on a schedule over the next three years to install an extensive series of engineering controls to reduce employee exposure to acetone. OSHA believes these controls will generally succeed in bringing employee exposures below the 1000 ppm STEL. In addition the companies will install airline respirators at locations where they are needed and feasible. The companies will also maintain a medical program and transfer workers who demonstrate irritation to lower exposure areas. The petitioners have withdrawn their law suit. OSHA concludes, in light of this extensive worker protection program and the additional feasibility data it will provide, to grant the petition for reconsideration of the STEL only for the cellulose acetate fiber industry while the industry is installing these extensive controls. As e result the decision on the STEL is no longer final for the industry and it is not in effect for this industry. When the program is complete, but no later than June 30,1993, OSHA will commence reviewing its results and issue a new final rule regarding the STEL for acetone in this industry after an opportunity for notice and comment. The finaLdecision will be subject to judicial review under section 6(f) of the Act OSHA concludes that this wifi result in better protection for workers in the industry than continuing with lengthy and complex litigation. The STEL remains m effect for all other industries. In addition. OSHA pursuant to the settlement agreement is also authorizing a stay of enforcement until September 1,1990 of the start-up date of the new TWA for a limited group of workers, certain "doffers," in this sector in limited circumstances. Doffers are those workers who remove and transport bobbins containing cellulose acetate thread after it emerges from the fiber extrusion and spinning process. The employer will immediately commence installation of engineering controls necessary to achieve compliance and not wait to compl :'.e them by the December 31.1992 date which would be permitted by the regulation. 2. Calcium Oxide and Calcium Hydroxide OSHA's prior limit for calcium oxide was 5 mg/ra3. The final air contaminant Btandard retained the preexisting 5 mg/ m3 standard for calcium oxide. Calcium hydroxide was not a listed air contaminant, it was regulated as a nuisance dust (particulate not otherwise regulated--PNOR) at 5 mg/m3 respirable dust and 15 mg/m* total dust. The final rule set a 5 mg/m3 limit for calcium hydroxide. These two substances are irritants. Lime is the common name for calcium oxide and is sometimes used as the common name for a combination of the two. The National Lime Association contended that the calcium oxide level should be raised to 10 mg/m3 and that the calcium hydroxide level should be left at the PNOR level. It petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of the standard and filed a petition for * reconsideration with OSHA. OSHA has concluded that a major r additional study on the health effects tof calcium oxide and calcium hydroxide would be of considerable benefit in refining the exposure limit for these substances. Accordingly OSHA entered into a settlement agreement with the National time Association that provides for such a study. The settlement - agreement which OSHA believes will better protect employees than continuation of the litigation, is available in the Docket Office as Ex. 221-68. Specifically, the National Lime Association has agreed to perform a study pursuant to a protocol reviewed by OSHA. That study has commenced and is intended to be completed by December 31,1990. The Association has withdrawn its law suit OSHA concludes in light of the commencement of the study to grant the petition for reconsideration. As a result of this action the decision on the exposure limits for calcium hydroxide and calcium oxide in the Final Rule Limits column is no longer final and those exposure limits are no longer in effect. Upon completion of the study and no later than the deadline date specified ia the agreement or June 30,1991. OSHA will commence reconsidering the 9-6-89 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC., Washington. D.C. 20037 vvv 000014033 CURRENT REPORT 683 exposure limits for calcium oxide and calcium hydroxide and reach final decisions. Comments will be requested in the Federal Register and judicial review will be available under section For the reasons stated in OSHA's letter of July 17.1989 available in the Docket Office as Ex. 221-65, OSHA has partially granted that stay. Specifically OSHA has stayed the September 1,1989 6(f)of the Act of the final rule. Btart-up date of the ceiling limit for The Transitional Limits column of Table Z-l-A exposure limit of S mg/mJ carbon monoxide for the steel industry (SIC 33) pending die outcome of for calcium oxide remains in effect. It Is litigation in the court of appeals for the limit which is to be followed by employers and is to be achieved with the preference for engineering controls three operations only: blast furnaces, vessel blowing at basic oxygen furnaces and sinter plants. as specified in 29 CFR 1910.1000(e). The Institute oFMakers of Explosives Also as a result of the reconsideration, calcium hydroxide remains regulated as a particulate not otherwise regulated (PNOR) at the exposure limit of 5 mg/m* respirable dust and 15 mg/m* total dust as petitioned OSHA to administratively stay the new exposure limits for nitroglycerin and ethylene glycol dinitrate for the explosives industry. OSHA has stayed the September 1.1989 start-up date of the Final Rule Limits specified in the Transitional Limits column [new) exposure limits for those column. Employers are to limit employee substances pending settlement exposure to calcium hydroxide to those negotiations until October 1.1969. This levels following the methods of is discussed in OSHA's letter of July 17. compliance specified in 29 CFR 1989. Ex. 221-64 in the Docket Office. 1910.1000(e). 3. Additional Actions OSHA is staying the September 1. 1989 start-up date of the new 28 ppm The American Iron and Steel institute TWA exposure limit for petitioned OSHA to administratively perchloroethylene for the drycleaning stay the TWA and ceiling limits for industry until October 1,1989. OSHA carbon monoxide far the steel industry. has sent a letter of interpretation to the International Fabricare Institute indicating that air-purifying respirators may be used in certain circumstances. Ex. 221-69. This delay will permit a more orderly notification of the interpretation. The following amendments to $ 1910.1000 Table Z-l-A effectuate the above OSHA discussions and settlement agreements. This document was prepared under the direction of Alan C. McMillan. Acting Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor. 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington. DC 20210. It is issued pursuant to secion 6 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C 655). section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 553, 29 CFR part 1911 and Secretary of Labor Order 9-63 (48 FR 35736). Signed at Washington. DC this 29 day of Atfgust, 1989. Alan C McMillan, ActingAsaiatont Secretary. Journal CONFERENCES SCHEDULED Sept. 27-29 -- Third Annual Rocky Mountain Health and Safety Conference. Denver, Colo. (Colorado Safety Associ ation. 707 17th St., Suite 3220, Denver, Colo. 80202; (303) 297-2111). Sept. 28-29 -- National Petroleum Refiners Association's Fire and Accident Prevention Conference, Houston, Texas (National Petroleum Refiners Association, 1899 L St,, N.W., Suite 1000, Wash., D.C. 20936; (202) 457-0480). Sept. 29 -- The Nets OSHA Permissible Exposure Limits, Atlanta, Ga. (Dave Jacobs, Georgia Tech, American Indus trial Hygiene Association, Atlanta, Ga. 30332; (404) 894-3808). Oct. 3 -- New Directions in Industrial Hygiene, Farmington Hills, Mich. (NTH Consultants, Ltd., A Neyer, Tiseo and Hindo Co., 38955 Hills Tech Drive, Farmington Hills, Mich 48331-3432; (313) 553-6300). Oct. 9-13 -- 11th Annual Industrial Ventilation Confer ence, Birmingham. Ala. (David Eckhoff, The University of Alabama/Birmingham, 1919 University Blvd., Birmingham, Ala. 35294; (205) 934-7451). Oct. 10-11 -- The American Conference on Chemical Labeling, Orlando, Fla. (Lena Meek, Suite A5, Hamilton Office Campus, 1700 Whitehorse, Hamilton Square Road, Hamilton Square, N.J. 08690; (609) 890-7277). Oct. 10-11 -- The American Conference on Chemical Labeling, Orlando, Fla. (1225 19th Street, N.W., Suite 300, Wash., D.C. 20036; (202) 223-5904). Oct. 10-22 -- Environmental Hazards Conference and Exposition, Hartford, Conn. (Robert L. Myhelic, Tower Con ference Management Co., 800 Roosevelt Building E--Suite 408, Glen Ellyn, 111. 60137-5835; (312) 469-3373). Oct. 10-13 -- Northwest Occupational Health Confereuce--Legislative and Political Directions for the 90`s. Seat tle, Wash. (Northwest Center for Occupational Health and Safety, Dept, of Environmental Health, SC-34, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash. 98195; (206) 543-1069). Oct. 12-14 -- 11th Annual Lead Industries Association Conference, Chicago, 111. (J. Smith, Lead Industries Associ ation. 292 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017; (212) 578-4750). s-s-es Occupational Safety A Haafth Reporter 0095-3237/S9/M+.50 00014034