Document ZnOMz2z1XgneMRqmR6Jdm88d0

to that tisse* i he sake any &Z#f of tetre*femori lema CO CO - OO1o.0 Vu X a? < Lowe & , uner &r. ffeogipsoa*s supervision* conducted certain N7411 h& w&s direcfeed feo keep v#py oreful sote occurred. He' res feoid feo exaaln* every m le&et orn e a weefc, and oftener i t &e#a look oufe for fcfce deftalte syMpfcbns febafe w tepisfelo of feble eesdltlQiu Q. Sr* Lowe ws on cufey &fc fefce ti tfeey beg thst is* aoved inte fehe nsw .plant? A I sssigne bis feo dufcy before feto* nove s feo feh# present planfe. X relieve* hi* fre subseotenfe feo fefee tXosln of ths planfe, b Q. After fclo aove vas nade feo tita na pXsab# yo personan? s#e th lay-out? A. 2,personallar, ras aot i fehe aew plaafe ua csloeed ife. Q. 2id 3>r. Sbeapson vlslfe tu# plaafef A. as visitad fehe planfe freqaejkfely, . , At any tins up feo fch* dafee you h&d fefce pi& meber of yoar deparfeaienfe# elfe&er JSr# tho otber doctor, consider aondltlens so sarl shuttlng down of fehe pX&nfe? A. ve 41b nofe faal thnfe a le^sedlafee e the laasedl&fe shutting down of febe pl&afe the MgnufaefeuriBg Comtfefeee feo do so, alfe X ver woprlad beeanse operafeiona rere fc that Sr. Theepeoit spoke frQuentiy to the these recommendations effective. Q. In brief* the suggestions m u e by the docto of preventive masures which you thought no as soon as they reasonably required it but to shut down a plant until they were instal a . I felt that a reasonable amount of tine, by weeks, asight fee permitted to elapse in orde sight carry out the above^menbioned reeooMR during this period, fey careful supervision fee kept at work with a reasonable degree of have Just a&id, we deplored the fact that equipment had not been Installed before ope scale were begun. Q. Did you personally talk so any of the Insur A. I nave talked to all of the, X feeH e w , -ex Q. Do you gather fro these conversations that while they 'were- working in. the plant they m dangerous ceasedIti*? ,. A* y conversations with them have not boon: al have talked to the with a view to- bringing to determine their physical conditions, t safety satter at all as X felt it was not a I was aware that it had already been fully of the Special Cosmittee. of August 20# 1924. They were also recommen the latter that was taken out, multlgr&phed, scanagement for the guidance of the head nan Q* Wes Dr. tow fully aware of the contents of August 20th? A. Ko, because safeguarding the employees was n He was assigned to study the cases from the standpoint. Moreover, the report was the pr dnsoline Corporation, and the few copies tha were subsequently recalled at the request of Whet, in brief, is your theory as to the cau five sen? A. rt is tsy belief that so unusual occurrence I believe from statements mad# by some of th occurrence of several ''blow-outs* released a poisonous gas unexpectedly* exposing the emp told of at least two sueh blow-outs, lip to October practically none of the employee ba serious enough to warrant their being placed is evident to me that there must have been a posure to poison suddenly superimposed upon existed end had been observed by &r. Lowe. q. Do you know of other plants where this tetra R f C 00C5742 s 1 li sg 1 I 3 jJOaS O %SS S U O * es 01a AS I IXrI* Investistien. Up to the ties tst you aad year inaptatlo&* m the result of which you assidei to shut m m the plant or reaovwm&e that it to shut down* Dr* tows was satisfied, so far as you fenew* that the sea had' Is 4. 5 31 :* J4 a 4 S ft 0 & I 4I ! *{ a. it *a* V?? A * *% 0 1s g 00 ** --O ooto '-U