Document Zn59KvEayEYXvB7KeyMzy25jY

I THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, Oet. 2, 1974 C? 30 CD ealth Hazards Vinyl-Chloride Risks Were Known by Many Before First Deaths Hindsight Shows Weakness In Firms' Systems Aimed At Protecting Workers The Tip of a Large Iceberg By Barry Kramer Staff Reporter of The Wall Stheet Journal A few weeks before Christmas in 1948, Earl Parks, then 26 years old, signed on as a helper-trainee at the large B. F. Goodrich Co. plastics factory in Louisville, Ky. The plant had been making polyvinyl-chloride plastic from vinyl-chloride gas since before the war, using a process developed by Good rich in 1937. It was a growing industry that Mr. Parks ped. Polyvinyl chloride--dubbed PVC for irt--had found special, but limited, appli cations in the war years, especially as a fireproof coating for electric wiring in fighter planes and ships. But in the late 1940s, so-called vinyl consumer products, made from PVC, began coming into vogue; and by the time the 1950s were under way polyvinyl-chloride products such as contain ers, phonograph records and curtains were staples in American households. The basic Goodrich process, still in use today, pipes vinyl-chloride gas into large re- This is the first of two stories con cerning implicatioiis of the discovery that vinyl chloride can cause cancer. actor vessels; there, the gas is agitated to gether with a liquid and catalysts. The pro cess causes polymerization, a linking to gether of the molecules of the gas (a mon omer) into the long chains that give PVC (a polymer) its strength and other desired characteristics. fa >1 vl | The First Tears In his first years with Goodrich, it was Earl Park's job to crawl inside the reactors after each batch of PVC was drained off and to chip away that portion of the poly mer that had congealed. During the hour- long task, re'peated several times in the 1 course of an eight-hour shift, Mr. Parks and other workers who performed the same function would unavoidably Inhale the heavy, sweet-smelling fumes of vinyl- chloride gas that had escaped polymeri sation. ' .. . As the 1950s went by and the 1960s began, Earl Parks was working his way up to the job of foreman, a post that he had attained by the time that ill health forced his early retirement in the late 1960s. In the years that he had worked with Goodrich, the PVC industry flourished as thousands of new uses were discovered for the polymer. On March 3, 1973, at the age of 50, Earl Parks died of angiosarcoma of the liver, a ;type of cancer that is invariably fatal. His death attracted scant public attention at the time, but today the significance of Mr. Park's illness is unquestionable and shatter ing in its implications. For Earl Parks came . to be one more statistic in turning a hypoth esis into a reality*. Vinyl chloride can cause cancer. Deadly Statistics *1 The link between angiosarcoma and vinyl chloride is further buttressed by other deadly statistics. Seven of Mr. Park's fellow workers at the Goodrich plant also contraded the disease, and five have died. In all, there have been 16 documented angios arcoma cases in the U.S. in recent years, all of them linked to vinyl chloride. In addition, 10 other cases have been reported in Eu rope. While the total number of cases is small, the industry has been shaken to its roots. The disease now is known to work insidi ously, slowly, during decades of exposure, the implications being that the cases thus far are quite likely only the tip of an ice berg. Nine companies, with 14 plants and 940 employes, currently produce vinyl chlor ide monomer from ethylene, a petrochemi cal. The monomer, in turn, is used by 21 companies operating 36 major plants and employing 5,000 workers, to make more than five billion pounds of PVC normally. (World-wide production is some 18 billion pounds annually.) Even the five billion pounds of PVC an nually produced in this country isn't enough to meet the domestic demand for the plastic into which PVC is formed. From 3,000 to 4,- 000 processors, employing an estimated 700,000 workers, fabricate the plastic into a wide variety of products ranging from vinyl floor tiles to shower curtains. According to a study done for the Society of the Plastics In dustry by Arthur D. Little Inc., as many as 2.2 million jobs depend on polyvinyl-chloride! plastic. If PVC were banned, the study says,' the annual loss to industry in sales and pro duction would be some 865 billion to 590 bil lion. (The Manufacturing Chemists Associa tion estimates the wholesale annual value of all PVC products is 83 billion.) Emergency Decree At the moment, no one believes the in dustry will suddenly come to a screeching halt. However, after the first human cases of vinyl chloride-induced angiosarcoma were disclosed, the Labor Department's Oc cupational Safety and Health Administra- tion imposed a temporary emergency stan dard for PVC factories; thenceforth, OSHA decreed, the permissible level of vinyl chlor ide in the air of such factories would be 50 parts per million. That level was far below the industry standard, in effect for years, of 500 parts per million. OSHA's emergency decree was made last May, Since then, animal research found that tumors develop at 50 parts per million. Yesterday, OSHA issued a new permanent standard requiring employers after Jan. 1, 1975, to reduce exposure to one part per mil lion in factory air, averaged over eightj hours, and five parts per million averaged over any period no longer than 15 minutes. (See story on page 14.) While considerably more stringent than the emergency decree, tucky occupational-health officials also were Health Hazards: Many Knew Risks informed and Goodrich made its first public announcement. Of Vinyl Chloride Before Deaths Almost since Its first commercial intro duction, there have been reports that vinyl chloride is toxic above certain levels. In <s>-------------- ------------------ :-------- deed, during World Wax n, vinyl chloride Continued From First Page the new permanent standard--particularly with its five-parts-per-milllon provision and its allowance of averaging--nevertheless falls short of the "no detectable" limit advo cated by unions, many medical experts and such groups as the National Institute for Oc cupational Safety^ and Health, and the American Chemical Society. This no-detect able limit would have constant, not average, adherence to one-part-per-mlllion levels. Therefore, It seems certain that the argu ment won't abate. As the controversy continues. It Is reveal ing to examine how the link between vinyl chloride and cancer was established. If nothing else, such an examination points out the grave weaknesses of the present system --or lack thereof--of protecting workers and others from industrial hazards. The judgment is made In hindsight, but the history of vinyl chloride shows that evi dence of Its toxicity was often ignored. What's more, the chemical companies knew, hut kept secret for at least six months, the fact that Italian researchers had shown that rats develop tumors, includ ing angiosarcoma, when exposed to low levels of vinyl chloride monomer. European companies, which paid for the animal releearch, knew of these research findings for Rnore than a year before the first human cases were reported but didn't reduce the exposure of their workers to vinyl chloride. But Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, an expert on surgeons, instead of finding an ulcer, found instead that Mr. Parks's problem resulted from severe liver damage, . which had caused blood to back up In the portal vein leading into the liver. The surgeons cor rected the vein problem with a shunt and took a sample of liver tissue for analysis. The analysis showed that the liver had been damaged by exposure to "chemicals.'' Can cer wasn't mentioned. (According to testimony at OSHA's hear ings on vinyl chloride, held last June and July, Mr. Parks received a total of almost 56,000 in workman's compensation from Goodrich before he died, but only after Goodrich protested that his Illness couldn't have resulted from exposure to the chemi cal.) It was an alert Louisville doctor who first made the connection between angiosarcoma and vinyl chloride. Dr. John L, Creech, who jfor years has treated workers sent to him | by Goodrich on a fee-per-patient basis, had followed Earl Parks's case for some time, even though he wasn't treating Mr, Parks. [Dr. Creech says he had been concerned about an abnormally high number of Good rich workers who had liver disease. When he heard that Mr. Parks had died, he re calls, he asked to see the autopsy report. It was in August 1973 that Dr. Creech learned that Mr. Parks had died the pre vious March of angiosarcoma of the liver. The doctor says he then realized that some thing was seriously wrong, since another was rejected as a surgical anesthetic be cause animals developed heart irritation when exposed to it In 1949, Russian scien tists reported "hepatitis-like changes'' in the livers of 25% of the workers in a small PVC plant. Then, in the late 1950s, research toxicolo gists at Dow Chemical Co. showed that ani mals exposed to as few as 100 parts per mil lion of vinyl chloride (or 100 molecules of vinyl chloride in every'-one minion mole cules of air) developed slight liver damage. Based on its research, Dow began a pro gram in the 1960s to reduce the level of vinyl chloride monomer in the air of its plants to below 50 parts per million, j Dow published its results in 1961. But the | rest of the industry chose to rely on a Yalei [University study that recommended 500 parts per million as a safe level. This same level had been recommended by .the Manu facturing Chemists Association since 1954, was affirmed in 1962 by the American Conjferenee of Governmental Industrial Hygien ists and was given the force of.law by OSHA in 1971. However, evidence at the OSHA hearings indicates that this level was regu larly exceeded until this year in many plants. (The hygienists' group didn't recom mend lowering the level to 200 parts per million until 1972, four years after Dow con cluded from further tests that repeated ex posure by workers to vinyl-chloride mon omer at an average of 300 parts per million or above for a working lifetime could cause environmental carcinogens, or cancer-caus- Goodrich PVC worker,, a private patient of changes in the liver.) ing agents, claims that blame placed at industry's door alone. shouldn't be "We're all a Dr. Creech, had type of cancer in succumbed to the same 1971. Dr. Creech says he Another Disease During the 1960s, there were reports of a bit responsible," he says. "None of us did knew that liver angiosarcoma is exceedingly disease called acroosteolysts among vinyl- our homework." Culpability, he says, should rare and that two cases among such a small chloride workers. The disease consists of be shared by scientists, government agen plant population was abnormal. (In fact, skin lesions and changes in the blood ves cies and labor unions. medical men estimate that fewer than' 30 sels, leading to degeneration of the bones at The case of Earl Parks is illustrative. cases occur each year In the U.S, striking the tips of the fingers and toes in those ex Mr. Parks first came to the attention of only one in 900,000 persons.) posed to high levels of the. monomer. (Emis Goodrich medical people in 1964, when the Dr. Creech met with Goodrich's occupa sions of vinyl chloride are generally lower company,- concerned about the known liver tional health director, Dr. Maurice N. John at plants where the monomer, or gas, is toxicity of ethylene dichloride (a chemical son, who subsequently decided to ask Taber- made, since the process is less complex, from which vinyl chloride is made) tested shaw-Cooper Associates Inc,, a Berkeley, and there i9 less chance for leaks than at the liver function of workers in the Louis Calif., epidemiological-studies concern, to the polymerization plants; none of the re ville plant, do a survey of Goodrich death records. But ported angiosarcoma cases in this country Mr. Parks's readings were abnormal. the study was hardly needed; on Dec. 19, a has occurred among workers making vinyl- Nevertheless, he continued to work at the third PVC worker at the Louisville plant chloride monomer, and only one of the 10 same job. In October 1964, however, he was died at the age of 58; he had been at the deaths in Europe was in a monomer plant.) hospitalized with what was initially diag plant for 28 years. In early 1967, the Manufacturing Chem nosed as a bleeding ulcer. Doctors treated Public Announcement ists Association arranged with the Univer the ``ulcer'' without surgery, and Mr. Parks On Jan. 22 of this year, Goodrich officials sity of Michigan to study acroosteolysis was released. ' met in Washington with officials of the Na among vinyl-chloride workers, particularly He was readmitted to the hospital the fol tional Institute for Ocupational Safety and those who cleaned the reactor vessels and lowing May, and the decision was made to Health and informed them of the three an others who were exposed to large concentra operate. But when the operation was begun. giosarcoma deaths. The following day, Ken tions of vinyl chloride in the air. The Michi gan scientists reported in 1970 that although they couldn't pinpoint vinyl chloride as the cause of the disease, worker exposure to the monomer should be cut to 50 parts per mil lion or below. ,, 104478 30 0 u> Other than Dow, which had already insti tuted reductions In air level of the mon omer, the rest of the industry in the U.S. ig nored the recommendation. Nor was there any significant reaction to findings by Euro pean industry that animals developed ad verse effects from vinyl chloride. This was at least partly because the Europeans down graded the importance of some of their find ings. For example, Prof. Pier Luigi Viola, a |medical director employed'by Solvay &. jCie., the Belgian chemicals company, found jbone changes in rats exposed to air levels of 130,000 parts per million of vinyl chloride: even more important, he found that vinyl; chloride at that level caused malignant tu mors in the ear canals, lungs and bones of rats. Prof, Viola reported his findings before an international cancer congress in Houston in 1370. It was the first reported link be tween cancer and vinyl chloride. But the professor expressed doubt about the purity of the vinyl-chloride gas he had used and stated that the rat cancer findings, because they occurred at such high levels of the monomer, had no human implications. (Prof. Viola subsequently found tumors in rats exposed to 500 parts per million; but ! this fact wasn't revealed until Well after'the 1 first human angiosarcoma cases were re- i vealed.) i The Research Goes On ! Based on Prof. Viola'.s early .cancer find- j ings in rats, Montedison S.p.A,, the huge Italian chemicals company, in 1970 asked I Cesare Maitoni, a respected researcher at j : the Institute of Oncology in Bologna, Italy, . to do more extensive animal studies. By Oc- ; i tober 1972. Prof. Maitoni says, he had found that 250 parts per million of vinyl chloride I produced tumors in rats in three parts of the body: the ear canals, kidneys and the liver. Tile liver tumors included angiosar- 1 coma. The professor immediately informed j his sponsors. The Europeans offered their information to the Manufacturing Chemists Association in the U.S., but only If the Americans guar anteed confidentiality. With great reluc tance, the association says. It finally agreed . to the secrecy condition "because of the vital importance of learning of any indica tions from the European research . . . with out the delays which could-have--resulted--; 'from duplication of effort." On Jan. 30, 1973, a year before the first human angiosarcoma cases were reported by B. F. Goodrich, the MCA finally got the Maitoni data. For five months, the secrecy- restrictions were such that government agencies, PVC workers exposed to .vinyl chloride and even company doctors were - kept in the dark. Then, in the late spring, the Europeans agreed that the Chemists As sociation could pass the information on to the U.S. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the Labor Department agency that monitors worker safety. On July 17. 1973, representatives of the associa tion and the agency met. 'One Certainty There is some dispute as to what tran spired at the meeting. The Labor Depart ment agency claims it wasn't.given the full story; the chemists' association claims that the agency misunderstood the findings. But one thing is certain;_.The agency, and! OSHA, made no move to change the stan dard of 500 parts per million and didn't do so until after the human angiosarcoma cases were announced. In Europe, by con trast, Great Britain had lowered the maxi mum level to 200 parts per million following the cases of acroosteolysis in the '60s; and West Germany had set a level of 100 parts per million in 1970, based on Dow's 1961 re sults with animals. According to New Scien tist, the British science journal. "No other section of the U.S. or European industry fol lowed Dow's lead. The reasons for this in ternational confusion are obscure." i This all changed quickly, of course, once j the first human cases of angiosarcoma were 1 reported by Goodrich. Indeed, the swiftness with which new* research has been carried out since Jan. 23 is perhaps without prece dent in the world of medicine and science. 1 Much of this recent research is con- :cemed with studies of the incidence of dis ease of all types among vinyl-chloride work- j ers. Thus far, some studies show that work ers exposed to high levels of vinyl chloride show greater than expected incidences not only of angiosarcoma but certain other can- j cers as well. The ramifications of these find ings for the future of the industry and its workers remain to be seen. However, for the veteran PVC workers, whatever changes the findings produce will be useless in counteracting the .Insidious effects of working day after day, year after year, in what now is generally viewed as a contami nated atmosphere. - 'f R&S 104479 \Sharp Drop in Vinyl Chloride Exposure Is Ordered by Labor Agency for Workers R&S 104480 By a R'AI.U Steeet Jocbxjll Staff Reporter WASHINGTON--The Labor Department ordered a sharp reduction in workers' expo-' sure to vinyl chloride, a widely used indus trial gas that has been linked to liver can cer. . The ruling', which' comes, afteranine months of_ controvetsyT brought' a ` lawsuit from the plastics industry, wflrich contends the standard can't be met, and protests Ifrom organized labor, which contends the rule has too many loopholes. Vinyl chloride is a basic ingredient in making many every- jday plastic products. I The new standard, issued by the Labor 'Department's Occupational Safety and ! Health Administration, requires that, start ing Jan, l, vinyl chloride levels int he air that workers breathe be held to one part vinyl chloride per million parts of air, averjaged over an eight-hour period. Actual levels may exceed one part per million for 1 short periods, but they must average out to no more than five parts per million for any 15-minute period within the eight-hour time span. .................. ` Since last April,, companies handling vinyl chloride have been under an emer gency restriction of 50 parts per million, without any time period. The emergency standard was issued ^ter the discovery, beginning last January, | cases of a rare and fatal liver cancer, an- tosarcoma, amon workers exposed to vinyl chloride. Nineteen deaths among such workers in the U.S, and other countries have been attributed to liver cancer caused by long exposure to the chemical. Vinyl chloride Is a gas that is processed to form a powdery sustance known as poly vinyl chloride. Polyvinyl chloride, in resin or pellet form, is then fabricated into a wide variety of finished plastic products. ___ Coverage for Workers Though only about 6,500 workers are em ployed in plants that make vinyl chloride' and polyvinyl chloride, about 350.000 others, who work in facilities that create finished products from the polyvinyl chloride, will also be covered by the new ruling. Workers who handle only finished products, and don't have any chance of contact with ``raw' vinyl chloride or polyvinyl chloride, are the only ones exempted. The Labor Department Initially proposed that exposure be limited to "no detectable level," without any averageing over time. This proposal pleased organized labor and some key researchers In the field of occupa tional health. But the Society of the Plastics Industry, a trade group, and many compa nies using the chemicals, denounced it as teclinologically impossible and warned it would drive, the industry out cf business. In selecting as its final standard one part million over eight hours and five parts VH million over 15 minutes, the department apparently was trying to reach a compro mise between its original idea- and the toughest proposal offered by the industry, which would have-left exposures as high as 10 parts per million in some plants and 25 parts per million in qthers. \ Discretion in'Enforcement ' The-department sought to smooth further the adjustment for industry by delaying until next January the drop from the pres ent 50 parts per million. Also, it .gave its en forcement staff discretion to determine how the companies must meet the standard. | While the goal is to reach the new levels j through "engineering and work practice : controls," such controls must be deemed ! "feasible," and companies can deal with any exposures produced by inadequate con* trols by giving workers respirators. A date wasn't set in the ruling for im proving plant engineering and practices to tthe point where respirators won't be needed, i What's more, until January 1976 workers may refuse to wear the respirators when ex posures don't exceed 25 parts per million, even if they exceed the one part per million over eight hours specified in the regulation. Despite this attempt at compromise, however, the Society of the Plastics Indus try and some producers sued the Labor De partment to overturn the ruling only mo-j ments after it was issued yesterday. And ! Firestone Plastic Co., a unit of Firestone j Tire & Rubber Co., said it will ask a court to | stay enforcement of the standard while the! 'suits are being tried. Ralph Harding, president of the industry1 group, said the standard is "unrealistic, probably will be impossible for most, if riot all, of the industry to meet and appears to have been developed on some basis inconsis tent with recorded facts." The job-safety : agency "may believe that it has adopted a compromise position," but the result is un acceptable to the industry, he added. Todd C. Walker, president of the Fire stone unit, asserted that the standard "puts the vinyl plastic industry on a collision course with economic disaster." He said it "is comparable to a law aimed at stopping automobile deaths by lowering the speed i limits to one mile per hour."