Document ZJ5dg66y0DzpgeMXB6zDdLnLd
Region 6 - Enforcement & Compliance Assurance Division
INSPECTION REPORT
Inspection Date(s): Media Program: Regulatory Program(s)
Company Name: Facility Name: Facility Physical Location:
(city, state, zip code) Mailing address:
(city, state, zip code) County/Parish: Facility Phone Number Facility Contact:
FRS Number: Identification/Permit Number: Media Identifier Number: NAICS: SIC:
January 6 - 10, 2025
Air
Clean Air Act Section 112(r) and 40 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Part 68 Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions - Risk Management Program (RMP)
Deer Park Refining, LP
Deer Park Refinery
5900 Highway 225
Deer Park, Texas 77536
(same as above)
(same as above)
Harris County
(713)-245-7301
Calvin Greene
Environmental Manager
Calvin.greene@deerparkrefinery.com
110071434388
Air Permit ID: O-01669
RMP: 1000 0013 1653
32411 Petroleum Refineries
2911
Personnel participating in inspection:
Howard Cole
EPA Region 6
Aimee Boss
EPA Region 6
Charese Simpson
EPA Region 6
Calvin Greene
Deer Park Refining, LP
Phyllis Rodriguez
Deer Park Refining, LP
Michael Navarez
Deer Park Refining, LP
Jerry McGinnis
Deer Park Refining, LP
Greg Marino
Deer Park Refining, LP
Tim Bogle
Deer Park Refining, LP
Scott Elliot
Deer Park Refining, LP
Teresa Jones
Deer Park Refining, LP
Inspector Inspector Inspector Environmental Manager Environmental Engineer Sr. PSM Engineer Environmental Engineer Vice President of HSSE Vice President of Production Baker Botts - Counsel Baker Botts - Counsel
EPA Lead Inspector Signature/Date
Deer Park Refining, LP
Inspection Date: January 6 -10, 2025
Howard Cole Digitally signed by Howard Cole Date: 2025.08.27 11:15:42 -05'00'
Howard Cole
Date
Supervisor Signature/Date
Digitally signed by KAYLA
KAYLA BUCHANAN BUCHANAN
Date: 2025.08.27 13:41:35 -05'00'
Kayla Buchanan
Date
6ENFORM-019-R8.2 (02/12/2020)
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Section I - INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE OF THE INSPECTION
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 6 inspectors Howard Cole (I), Aimee Boss, and Charese Simpson, (we) arrived at the Deer Park Refining, LP (DPR) facility at 9:30 AM on Monday January 6, 2025, for an announced inspection. We met with Calvin Greene, Phyllis Rodriguez, and other facility representatives for an opening meeting. We presented credentials and informed DPR personnel that this was an EPA inspection to determine compliance with the federal Chemical Accident Prevention Program. The scope of the inspection was a partial compliance evaluation (PCE), which included an evaluation of the facility's compliance with the Clean Air Act (CAA) Section 112(r) and the Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions in 40 C.F.R. Part 68 and the General Duty Clause. I inquired if an employee representative was available pursuant to section 112(r)(6)(L) of the CAA to participate in this inspection and was informed that the DPR plant is a union facility, U.S. Steel Workers local 13-1.
FACILITY DESCRIPTION
DPR operates a refinery located at 5900 Highway 225 in Deer Park, Texas, 77536, along the Houston Ship Channel some 20 miles east of downtown Houston. DPR has a variety of processes which produce products such as gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene, diesel fuel, heating oil, propane, butane, asphalt, petroleum coke, and chemical feedstocks. DPR has more than the threshold quantities of nineteen (19) flammable regulated substances in its processes; therefore, the RMP regulations are applicable. The following is a list of RMP flammable substances stored in quantities above applicable threshold as designated in the RMP regulation: Hydrogen, Methane, Ethane, Ethylene [Ethene], Propane, Propylene [1-Propene], Isobutane [Propane, 2-methyl], Butane, 1-Butene, 2-Butene-cis, 2-Butene-trans [2-Butene, (E)], 1,3-butadiene, Isopentane [Butane, 2-methyl-], Pentane, Butene, 1-Pentene, cis-2-pentene, trans-2pentene, and 2-methyl-1-butene.
DPR has a CAA Title V permit, an Air Operating Permit, and is classified under the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) Code 32411 Petroleum Refineries. In addition, DPR is subject to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) Process Safety
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Management (PSM) Standard 29 C.F.R. 1910.119, and EPA regulations, which categorizes DPR as a Program 3 facility. Approximately 2,021 full time employees work at the site, in addition to the independent contractors that work at the plant.
Section II - OBSERVATIONS
On Monday January 6, 2025, DPR provided EPA with a tour of the facility and EPA conducted a walkthrough of the area at DPR where the October 10, 2024, incident occurred, accompanied by Phyllis Rodriguez (Environmental Engineer), Calvin Greene (Environmental Manager), and other DPR representatives. EPA observed the covered process, equipment, operations, and control rooms. EPA identified DPR employees and asked questions about their training, the management of change (MOC) process, process hazard analysis (PHA) process, mechanical Integrity, and the facility's normal operating and emergency procedures. EPA also interviewed DPR employees and a union representative addressing the October 10, 2024 incident.
Incident Summary - October 10, 2024
On October 10, 2024, an incident occurred at the DPR's Amine Regeneration Unit (ARU), where hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas is removed from the refining process. Hydrogen sulfide is transferred by process piping to the downstream Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU) to convert the hydrogen sulfide into sulfur. DPR operations requested assistance from contractors and issued permits allowing the contractors to isolate piping segments in Amine Regeneration Unit 6 and 7 (ARU 6/7). On the day of the incident, maintenance contractors were removing piping isolation devices, called slip blinds, from ARU 6, which was not in operation. Amine Regeneration Unit 7 (ARU 7) which was in operation, has piping located directly adjacent to ARU 6. On the day of the incident, while performing the task, workers inadvertently opened a flange on the ARU 7 piping, which had already been returned to normal operations, was pressurized and contained approximately 90% hydrogen sulfide. Approximately 27,000 pounds of hydrogen sulfide gas was emitted into the air, and to the flare, during this accidental release at the DPR. Two contract workers were fatally injured as a result of the H2S release.
Subpart A - General
40 C.F.R. 68.10 Applicability - DPR is the owner/operator of a stationary source that has more than the threshold quantities of nineteen (19) flammable regulated substances in its processes; therefore, the RMP regulations are applicable. DPR has a CAA Title V permit, an Air Operating Permit, and is classified under the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) Code 32511 Petroleum Refineries. In addition, DPR is subject to the OSHA PSM Standard 29 C.F.R. 1910.119, and EPA regulations, which categorizes DPR as a Program 3 facility. DPR submitted a Risk Management Plan (RMP) to EPA on December 3, 2021.
40 C.F.R. 68.12 General requirements - The owner or operator of a stationary source subject to this regulation must submit a RMP, as provided in 40 C.F.R. 68.150 to 68.185. The RMP plan must include a registration that reflects the covered processes. EPA reviewed DPR's RMP, and it lists the flammable regulated chemicals and the associated Program 3 processes.
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40 C.F.R. 68.15 Management - DPR developed a management system to oversee the implementation of risk management program elements, documented persons responsible for implementing the individual requirements of the risk management program and defined the lines of authority using its RMP Management Organizational Chart, which lists responsibilities.
Subpart B - Hazard Assessment
40 C.F.R. 68.20 Applicability - DPR is a Program 3 stationary source subject to this subpart; therefore, it is required to prepare a worst-case release scenario analysis and complete the five-year accident history.
40 C.F.R. 68.22 Off-Site Consequence Analysis Parameters - DPR employed the parameters specified by EPA in this rule by using the RMP*CompTM and MARPLOT software. EPA reviewed the offsite consequence analysis and supporting documentation to assure the data was accurate and correct.
40 C.F.R. 68.25 Worse-Case Release Scenario Analysis - DPR identified and analyzed worst-case scenarios for each flammable substance in its Program 3 process using the RMP*CompTM and MARPLOT software, thus meeting the requirements of the regulation. DPR identified and analyzed an additional worst-case scenario, after determining that a release from another covered process at the stationary source could potentially affect public receptors differently from those potentially affected by other scenarios identified.
40 C.F.R. 68.28 Alternative Release Scenario Analysis - DPR identified and documented the alternative release scenario to represent all flammable substances held in a covered process, using a scenario that is likely to occur. DPR utilizes the RMP* CompTM software, MARPLOT, and off-site consequences guidance calculations; they maintain aerial photos showing the alternative release scenario endpoint distance radius and a circle centered on the approximate location of the unit that is considered in the alternative release scenario, thus meeting the requirements of the regulation.
40 C.F.R. 68.30 Defining Off-Site Impacts - Population - DPR used the 2010 Census Bureau population data and the distances to endpoints, as specified in the regulation, to calculate the population numbers reported in their RMP. In addition, DPR utilizes the MARPLOT mapping program to define the affected off-site population. It was noted that the most current data is in the 2020 Census Bureau; however, MARPLOT has not been updated to reflect the most recent census data.
40 C.F.R. 68.33 Defining Off-Site Impacts - Environment - DPR identified environmental receptors in the distance to the endpoint or in the vicinity of the facility, as appropriate, in the area maps used for the modeling.
40 C.F.R. 68.36 Review and Update - DPR reviewed and updated the off-site consequence analyses at least once every five years, as required by this subpart.
40 C.F.R. 68.39 Documentation - DPR maintained records of the off-site consequence analyses in accordance with this subpart. These records included:
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a description of the vessel or pipeline and substance selected as worst case and alternate release scenarios, assumptions and parameters used, and the rationale for selection of specific substances;
documentation of estimated quantity released, release rate, and duration of release; methodology used to determine distance to endpoint; and, data used to estimate population and environmental receptors
40 C.F.R. 68.42 Five-year accident history - The regulation requires DPR to include all accidental releases from covered processes that resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage on site, or known off-site deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage. EPA reviewed DPR's five-year accident history and OSHA 300 Logs from 2020 to present. A reportable incident occurred at the site on October 10, 2024, which resulted in two (2) onsite fatalities and a shelter-in place order. DPR failed to update their RMP within 6-months of the October 10, 2024, incident (Appendix #1) see AOC 17- 40 C.F.R. 68.195(a).
Subpart D - Program 3 Prevention Program
40 C.F.R. 68.65 Process Safety Information - DPR compiled written process safety information, which includes information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substances used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information pertaining to the equipment in the process. Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) for the process chemicals were provided. EPA reviewed documentation concerning the technology of the process, which included a block flow diagram, process chemistry, maximum intended inventory, safe upper and lower limits for such items as temperatures, pressures, flows, or compositions and, an evaluation of the consequences of deviation for each covered process. EPA reviewed documentation pertaining to the equipment of the process including piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), electrical classification maps, relief system design and design basis, ventilation system design, design codes and standards employed, and safety systems.
DPR had multiple findings from a 2011 pressure relief study which were identified during this inspection and in the DPR 2024 compliance audit that were not addressed prior to December 2024. (Appendices #2 and #3) AOC 1 - 40 C.F.R. 68.65(d)(1)(iv).
DPR did not document the design basis for ventilation systems present in pressurized buildings, designated as shelter-in-place or safe havens, and/or in electrically classified (Class 1 Division 2) areas such as but not limited to the Platformer 2 Control Room and Hydro-Processing Control Room. Some of these buildings are intended to be occupied during release events and other emergencies. DPR failed to document the adequacy or effectiveness of ventilation systems in buildings located in Class 1 Division 2 areas (Appendix #3) AOC 2 - 40 C.F.R. 68.65(d)(1)(v).
During the walk-through, EPA observed that the facility was missing proper markings on piping in the ARU 6, ARU 7, SRU 6, and SRU 7 areas - e.g., direction of flow, color-coding to identify the hazardous material present, placement of pipe labels, and type and size of letters on pipe labels, as required by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard ANSI/ASME A13.1, Scheme for the Identification of Piping Systems. This standard is considered
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a recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice for above ground piping systems (see Photo Nos. 1-20, located in Appendix #4).
DPR's Document "Site Pipe Rack Piping O-101, Section 4.4 Cross-Sectional Audit Process Class 1 Lines", states the following requirements apply specifically to class 1 lines:
Line Identification: The same line identification should be maintained on all pipeline documentation and labeling. The line identification wording on the line labels, pipe rack cross-sectional drawings, and on the inspection report should be consistent. The cross-sectional drawings should be updated to correct any identified discrepancies.
Line Labels: The labels should be a maximum of 100 feet apart and should be closer as appropriate when necessitated by changes in direction, elevation, or position. The labels should have a yellow background with black letters and should meet the size requirements (length of label and size of letters) as given in ANSI A13.1 (1981), Scheme for the Identification of Piping Systems.
In addition, DPR has on site pressure vessels at the facility that have atmospheric pressure relief valves/devices, which have the potential to release flammable and toxic chemicals (hydrogen sulfide) into the environment. Based on their proximities within the covered process areas, DPR failed to ensure the relief devices vent to safe locations in accordance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices such as, but not limited to, American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 521, the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) Guidelines for Pressure Relief and Effluent Handling Systems, and recommendations from the Chemical Safety Board (CSB)'s March 6, 2023 Safety Alert: "Hazards Posed by Discharges from Emergency Pressure-Relief Systems". The following Columns in sour service have pressure relief valves that would release flammable hydrocarbons and hydrogen sulfide to the atmosphere: Catalytic Cracking Main Fractionator Column, Gas Fractionator Column, Catalytic Feed Hydrotreater Column, Diesel Hydrotreater Column, and the Sour Water Stripper Column (Appendix #5) AOC 3 - 40 C.F.R. 68.65(d)(2).
40 C.F.R. 68.67 Process hazard analysis (PHA) - DPR has a comprehensive program to help ensure that hazards associated with the various processes are identified and controlled. Within this program, each covered process is systematically examined to identify hazards and ensure that adequate controls are in place to manage these hazards. The DPR facility primarily uses the hazard and operability (HAZOP) technique to perform these evaluations. The analyses are conducted using a team of people who have operating, maintenance, and engineering expertise. The PHAs were performed by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations. The team included at least one employee who had experience and knowledge that was specific to the process being evaluated and one employee who was knowledgeable in the specific PHA methodology used.
EPA reviewed the following PHAs at DPR, including but not limited to: HDU-1, HDU-2, Amine Regeneration Unit 6, Amine Regeneration Unit 7, Sulfur Recovery Unit, Alkylation Unit, Benzene Extraction Unit, C4/C5 Storage, and the 2020 Facility Siting study.
DPR did not conduct an evaluation and analysis of the hazards associated with the release of hazardous chemicals (flammables and toxics) and hazardous energy sources (e.g. steam) relieving to atmosphere from atmospheric pressure relief devices and process vents, as was idnetifed in the EPA inspection and
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supported by findings identified in the 2024 Compliance Audit (Appendix #3) AOC 4 - 40 C.F.R. 68.67(a).
The 2020 Facility Siting Study identified buildings in which building occupants were exposed to substances which have fire, flammable and toxic impacts. An overall risk to building occupants was evaluated, which includes factors such as probability of fatality, building occupancy, weather, time of day, etc., and is based on a single scenario involving a 1" hole release of a flammable or toxic chemical from process equipment. The study does not address modifications of buildings required to protect building occupants from all hazards related to fire, flammable, and toxic release scenarios. Therefore, DPR failed to evaluate and control the hazards of the process identified in the 2020 Facility Siting Study (Appendix #6) AOC 5 - 40 C.F.R. 68.67(c)(1).
DPR utilizes Enablon, an Integrated Risk Management software platform, to address the team's findings and recommendations, to ensure the recommendations were implemented in a timely manner, and to ensure that the resolutions were documented. The findings in DPR's 2020 Facility Siting Study contained recommendations. DPR failed to address the recommendations. In addition, the buildings stated in table 4 are currently on DPR's "Deer Park HSSE Guidelines" (revised July 2021) that contains a map that includes the shelter-in-place (SIP) buildings (Appendix #7). In addition, EPA requested documentation of closed PHA action items for several units, including, but not limited to: Alkylation Unit, ARU, HDU-2, BEU-SSU, SR-4/5, SR-6/7, and SR-8. Several PHA action items were marked as closed without a documented resolution (see table 1). Additionally, some action items lack a recorded closure date, and others were closed after their respective due dates had passed (see Table 2 and 3) (Appendix #8) AOC 6 40 C.F.R. 68.67(e).
40 C.F.R. 68.69 Operating Procedures - EPA reviewed DPR's written procedures which addressed: the steps for each operating phase (initial and normal startup, normal operations, temporary operations, emergency operation and shutdown, normal shutdown, and startup following a turnaround or after emergency shutdown); the consequences of deviation and mechanisms to correct and/or avoid deviation; safety and health considerations; the properties of, and hazards presented by, chemicals used in the process; the precautions necessary to prevent exposure; quality control for raw materials; and, the safety systems and their functions. The covered units have a shared drive where operating procedures are stored electronically.
The regulation requires that operating procedures be reviewed to assure that they reflect current operating practices and any changes to the process. It is extremely important to the safe operation of covered processes that operating procedures remain current and accurate. Paragraph 68.69(c) has two sentences which are related to each other and should not be separated to produce a different interpretation. The intent is to assure that operating procedures at-all-times be current and accurate. The second sentence requires they be certified annually to assure that if any procedures have been changed, they would be identified in the annual certification. Annual is the "floor" when defining "as often as necessary" for reviewing and certifying procedures. If a procedure is changed during the year, a review and certification is necessary to ensure that the operating procedures are current and accurate. DPR reviews their procedures every three (3) years and certifies them annually. This results in operating procedures being certified that have not been reviewed. The precaution against the use of outdated or inaccurate operating procedures is for the employer to review and certify annually that the operating procedures are current and accurate (see Table 7) (Appendix #9) AOC 7 - 40 C.F.R. 68.69(c).
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During the inspection, EPA reviewed DPR's safe work procedures, including lock out/tag out procedures/energy isolation and opening process equipment procedures. The safe work procedures apply to both employees and contractors. However, the facility failed to develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations such as opening process equipment and lockout/tagout.
DPR H2S procedure (S-152) requires all employees, contractors and visitors to wear a portable personal H2S monitor placed in the breathing zone when entering the various process units. The DPR H2S procedure also requires that employees and contractor wear portable personal H2S monitors who perform line-opening of process equipment that may involve exposure to H2S.
However, S-152 requires employees and contractors working in process areas to remove their H2S monitors once they don supplied-air respirators or self-contain breathing apparatus (SCBA). This is not safe a work practice and is contrary to the basic principles of exposure monitoring. The OSHA standard 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) requires the employer to identify and evaluate the respiratory hazard(s) in the workplace; this evaluation shall include a reasonable estimate of employee exposures to respiratory hazard(s) and an identification of the contaminant's chemical state and physical form.
The purpose of the H2S portable device (or area fixed or portable monitors) is to monitor the concentration of H2S in the work area to determine the concentration of H2S in the employees' breathing zone. It is most necessary when employees are working in H2S environments which exceed the OSHA permissible exposure limit or National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) exposure limits, or in H2S environments which equal or exceed the H2S concentrations which are immediately dangerous to life and health level (IDLH). The use of respiratory protection such as supplied-air respirators does not eliminate the need for exposure monitoring. The effectiveness of respiratory protection is dependent on several factors, including failure of the respirator, and exposure of the wearer to a life-threatening H2S environment. Most importantly olfactory fatigue begins at approximately 100 ppm at which point the employee can no longer smell H2S, which could lead to additional exposure resulting in death. By removing the H2S monitor, the employee or contract employee cannot ascertain the threat of H2S exposure in the event respiratory protection fails, or is worn incorrectly, or if a significant H2S release is occurring during the work (Appendix #10) AOC 8 - 40 C.F.R. 68.69(d).
40 C.F.R. 68.71 Training - EPA reviewed DPR's training program and employee training records. The facility's training program ensured that each employee presently operating a covered process, and each employee newly assigned to a covered process trained or tested to qualify as competent in an overview of the process and in the operating procedures that pertain to their duties. DPR provides new operators initial training which includes an overview of the process and in the operating procedures as specified in 68.69. The training includes specific safety and health hazards, emergency operations including shutdown, and safe work practices applicable to the employee's job tasks.
During the inspection, EPA reviewed training records for five randomly selected employees to ensure that initial and refresher training were documented, that each employee involved in covered operations received and understood the training, and refresher training was administered at least every three (3) years.
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40 C.F.R. 68.73 Mechanical Integrity - EPA reviewed the documentation of DPR's mechanical integrity process and procedures, and inspection records. The mechanical integrity program ensures that processes continue to operate as designed. DPR has established practices and procedures to maintain pressure vessels, piping systems, relief and vent systems, controls, pumps and compressors, and emergency shutdown systems in a safe operating condition. The basic aspects of this program include: (1) conducting training, (2) developing written procedures, (3) performing inspections and test, (4) correcting identified deficiencies, (5) applying quality assurance measures, and (6) monitoring completion of required inspection and maintenance duties. In combination, these activities form a system that maintains the mechanical integrity of the process.
EPA reviewed the DPR 2024 Compliance Audit which identified several mechanical integrity items which were not compliant with API codes or the DPR mechanical integrity procedures (Appendix #3) AOC 9 - 40 C.F.R. 68.73(b).
EPA requested, and DPR provided, inspection and testing documentation for fixed equipment at the facility including pressure vessels, piping, pressure relief valve. EPA reviewed inspection and tests records (internal inspection, external inspection, inspection and test plan, ultrasonic testing) for thirty-five (35) pressure vessels. DPR failed to conduct internal inspections on nineteen (19) pressure vessels (see Table 8) in accordance with API 510 - Internal and On-stream inspection 6.5.1.1, which states "the period between internal or on-stream inspections shall not exceed one half the remaining life of the vessel or 10 years, whichever is less." The facility also failed to comply with its own DPR Risk Based Inspection procedure I-40 - "Inspection Schedule" which provides a maximum interval for inspection of 20 years (Appendices #11 - #14) AOC 10 - 40 C.F.R. 68.73(d)(3).
40 C.F.R. 68.75 Management of Change (MOC) - EPA reviewed DPR's MOC procedure. The written MOC procedure assured the facility managed changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, procedures, and changes to stationary sources that effect a covered process. The procedure assures that the following considerations are addressed prior to any change: technical basis for change, impact of change on safety and health, modifications to operating procedures, necessary time period for the change, and authorization requirements for a proposed change. EPA reviewed several MOCs that required such a change, and the information was updated as required by the regulation. However, DPR failed to implement procedures to manage changes involving the implementation and installation of pipe clamps (Appendix #15) AOC 11 - 40 C.F.R. 68.75(a) and 68.75(b).
40 C.F.R. 68.77 Pre-startup Safety Review (PSSR) - EPA reviewed DPR's selected PSSR's for the associated MOCs. DPR's PSSRs should document when an existing source is significantly modified, a review is conducted prior to the introduction of a regulated substance into the process to assure that the construction and equipment design is completed in accordance with design specifications, and the required safety, operating, and maintenance procedures. DPR utilizes Evotix, a compliance management platform, to house their MOCs and PSSRs. DPR failed to follow their MOC Work Process (TE-04) outlining the requirements of PSSR as required by this subpart. EPA identified PSSRs that were not completed in accordance with the procedure (Appendix #16) AOC 12 - 40 C.F.R. 68.77(a).
40 C.F.R. 68.79 Compliance Audits - EPA reviewed DPR's two most recent compliance audits, conducted April 5-18, 2021, and April 1-4, 2024. DPR certified compliance with the provisions of this subpart at least every three years to verify that procedures and practices developed under this subpart
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are adequate and are being followed. Both compliance audits were conducted by at least one person knowledgeable in the process. The audit team consists of DPR's employees and contractors from a process safety consulting firm. When conducting its RMP compliance audits, DPR uses procedural reviews, interviews, field verifications, and a representative sampling of records which provide insight into the adequacy of the design and implementation of the program relative to the requirements of EPA's RMP rule and OSHA PSM standards. DPR failed to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to the findings and document that the deficiencies have been corrected in the 2021 compliance audit. The 2024 compliance audit included a repeat finding (Action ID: 1287 and 1309) that had previously been identified in the 2021 compliance audit (ACTID: 086195, 087708, 087709, 087710, 087711, and 086191) (Appendices #3) AOC 13 - 40 C.F.R. 68.79(d).
40 C.F.R. 68.81 Incident Investigation - DPR is required to investigate each incident which resulted in or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a regulated substance. EPA reviewed the DPR incident investigation procedure to ensure that if such an incident occurred, the facility would initiate the investigation, prepare the report, and document, correct, and communicate the incident investigation findings according to the RMP regulations. However, DPR failed to determine a start date and time when three (3) incident investigations began (Appendices #3 and #17) AOC 14 - 40 C.F.R. 68.81(b).
40 C.F.R. 68.83 Employee Participation - DPR developed a written plan of action regarding the implementation of the employee participation required by this section, which is integrated into the program elements. DPR's written plan describes how they consult with employees on the performance and development of process hazard analyses, and on the development of other elements of RMP rule. The action plan provides employees access to process hazard analyses and to all other information that must be developed under this rule.
40 C.F.R. 68.85 Hot Work Permit - EPA reviewed hot work permits issued by DPR. Each permit that was reviewed documented that fire prevention and protection requirements were implemented prior to beginning hot work operations. The permits indicated the dates authorized for hot work and identified the object on which the hot work was performed.
40 C.F.R. 68.87 Contractors - EPA reviewed DPR's contractor procedure. DPR utilizes the Avetta contractor database to evaluate information regarding a contractor's safety performance and programs. Contractors subscribing to the Avetta system are graded on the following components within the database: OSHA citation verification status, safety records, insurance verification status, and deficiencies. All contractors must go through the site-specific training through the Houston Area Council. However, DPR failed to implement safe work practices for contractor employees when conducting work while using supplied-air respirators See AOC 7 - 40 C.F.R. 68.87(b)(4).
Subpart E - Emergency Response
40 C.F.R. 68.90 Applicability - DPR is designated as a responding stationary source in case of an accidental release of a regulated substance, therefore, the facility must comply with the requirements of part 68.93, 68.95, and 68.96.
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40 C.F.R. 68.93 Emergency Response Coordination Activities - DPR maintains an emergency response program to protect employees, the public, and the environment in the event of loss of containment of hazardous materials or any other adverse consequences. The program consists of a highly trained contingent of emergency responders, fixed and mobile equipment, and arrangements with community and private organizations to either support or coordinate response and recovery. The location emergency response program is coordinated with three (3) area Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC).
40 C.F.R. 68.95 Emergency response program - EPA reviewed DPR's emergency response plan. The plan includes procedures for informing the public and local emergency response agencies about accidental releases; documentation of proper first aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures; and procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release of a regulated substance. The plan also includes procedures for the use of emergency response equipment, for its inspection, testing, and maintenance, and for training for employees in relevant emergency response procedures. EPA reviewed inspection and testing records for various emergency response equipment and training records for those who serve on the Emergency Response Team (ERT). EPA requested inspection records from January 2024 to January 2025 for SCBAs, specifically in the ARU 6 and ARU 7 Units. DPR failed to provide SCBA inspections for March 2024 through January 2025. According to DPR, SCBAs are inspected monthly. DPR failed to maintain seven (7) fixed water pumps, considered critical equipment (Appendices #3 and #18) AOC 15 - 40 C.F.R. 68.95(a)(2).
40 C.F.R. 68.96 Emergency Response Exercises - DPR conducts periodic emergency drills in cooperation with the area LEPC, local municipal fire departments, and the Channel Industries Mutual Aid Organization (CIMA). DPR coordinates response needs with local emergency planning and response organizations to ensure that they are aware of the regulated substances at the stationary source, their quantities, the risks presented by covered processes, and the resources and capabilities at the stationary source to respond to an accidental release of a regulated substance. As a part of coordination with local emergency response officials required by 40 C.F.R. 68.93, DPR will be required to conduct an emergency response tabletop exercise before December 21, 2026, and at a minimum of at least once every three years thereafter.
Subpart G - Risk Management Plan
40 C.F.R. 68.115(a) Threshold determination and 40 C.F.R. 68.160(a) Registration
DPR did not consider H2S as a regulated toxic substance in their process and failed to list or update December 3, 2021, RMP to include H2S as a toxic substance present above the threshold quantity. According to 40 C.F.R 68.3, the definition of process means any activity involving a regulated substance including any use, storage, manufacturing, handling, or on-site movement of such substances, or combination of these activities. For the purposes of this definition, any group of vessels that are interconnected, or separate vessels that are located such that a regulated substance could be involved in a potential release, shall be considered a single process (Appendix #1) AOC 16 - 40 C.F.R. 68.160(a).
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Inspection Date: January 6 -10, 2025
40 C.F.R. 68.190 Updates - DPR's RMP was re-submitted on December 3, 2021.
40 C.F.R. 68.195 Required corrections - DPR's next RMP registration re-submission is due by December 3, 2026, unless an update or correction is required by 40 C.F.R. 68.190 or 40 C.F.R. Section 68.195 required an update prior to the five-year renewal deadline. DPR failed to submit the data required under 68.168, 68.170(j), and 68.175(l) within six months of the accidental release of a regulated substance and extremely hazardous substance which occurred on October 10, 2024. Additionally, DPR failed to report the October 10, 2024, incident in their 2024 OSHA 300 Log. However, it was documented on a spreadsheet provided to EPA during the inspection (Appendices #1 and #19) AOC 17 - 40 C.F.R. 68.195(a).
40 C.F.R. 68.210 Availability of information to the public - DPR is required to hold a public meeting to provide information required under 68.42(b), no later than 90 days after any RMP reportable accident at the stationary source with any known offsite impact (e.g. known evacuations or sheltering in place), specified in 68.42(a). During the inspection, EPA requested information documenting whether DPR held a public meeting regarding the October 10, 2024, incident. DPR failed to provide any information asserting that a public meeting had been held AOC 18 - 40 C.F.R. 68.210.
CAA Section 112(r)(1) General Duty Clause: "Section 112(r)(1) states: Prevention of Accidental Releases (1) Purpose and General Duty - It shall be the objective of the regulations and programs authorized under this subsection to prevent the accidental release and to minimize the consequences of any such release of any substance listed pursuant to paragraph (3) or any other extremely hazardous substance.
DPR failed to properly implement their own procedures S-102, S-104, and S-114, and developed a procedure S-152, representing an unsafe work practice, which failed to identify hazards and did not minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur" (Appendix #20) AOC 19 - General Duty Clause.
Section III - AREAS OF CONCERN
AOC 1 - Process Safety Information - 40 C.F.R. 68.65(d)(1)(iv) requires information pertaining to the equipment in the process to include relief system design and design basis.
i. Prior to 2025, DPR failed to address and document findings from a 2011 pressure relief study that identified sizing issues for twenty-one (21) pressure relief devices which needed to be analyzed, risk assessed and given due dates for strategies and implementation of mitigation as identified in the 2024 compliance audit.
ii. DPR failed to document mitigation of multiple relief system gaps, concerns, and unresolved data identified in 2011 SR8 Safeguarding Revalidation Study by 120 days post turnaround.
iii. DPR failed to document the installation of thermal expansion relief valve RVN94956 to protect the shell side of E-99608 to mitigate a finding identified in the 2011, Sulfur Recovery Unit 8, pressure relief valve safeguarding revalidation study.
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Inspection Date: January 6 -10, 2025
AOC 2 - Process Safety Information - 40 C.F.R. 68.65(d)(1)(v) requires information pertaining to the equipment in the process shall include the ventilation system design.
i. DPR failed to document the design process safety information for ventilation systems present in pressurized buildings, designated as shelter-in-place or safe havens, and/or in electrically classified (Class 1 Division 2) areas such as but not limited to the Platformer 2 Control Room and Hydro-Processing Control Room. Some of these buildings are intended to be occupied during release events and other emergencies. This was an audit finding in the 2024 Compliance Audit.
ii. DPR failed to document the adequacy or effectiveness of ventilation systems in buildings located in Class 1 Division 2 areas. Inspection and testing to ensure sufficient ventilation, proper sealing of doors and windows, monitoring and alarms to confirm that positive pressure for the building is maintained; in accordance with good engineering practices recognized in NFPA 496. This was an audit finding in the 2024 Compliance Audit.
AOC 3 - Process Safety Information (Information pertaining to the equipment in the process) - 40 C.F.R. 68.65(d)(2) requires the owner or operator to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice.
i. DPR failed to properly label process equipment piping (see Photo Nos. 1-20, located in Appendix #4). During the walk-through, EPA observed that the facility was missing proper markings on piping in the ARU 6, ARU 7, SRU 6, and SRU 7 areas - e.g., direction of flow, color-coding to identify the hazardous material present, placement of pipe labels, and type and size of letters on pipe labels, as required by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard ANSI/ASME A13.1, Scheme for the Identification of Piping Systems. This standard is considered a Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice for above ground piping systems.
ii. DPR has on site pressure vessels at the facility that have atmospheric pressure relief valves/devices, which have the potential to release flammable and toxic chemicals (hydrogen sulfide) into the environment. Based on their proximities within the covered process areas, DPR failed to ensure the relief devices vent to safe locations in accordance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices such as, but not limited to, American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 521, the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) Guidelines for Pressure Relief and Effluent Handling Systems, and recommendations from the Chemical Safety Board (CSB)'s March 6, 2023 Safety Alert: "Hazards Posed by Discharges from Emergency Pressure-Relief Systems". The following Columns in sour service have pressure relief valves that would release flammable hydrocarbons and hydrogen sulfide to the atmosphere: 1. Catalytic Cracking Main Fractionator Column 2. Gas Fractionator Column 3. Catalytic Feed Hydrotreater Column 4. Diesel Hydrotreater Column 5. Sour Water Stripper Column
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Inspection Date: January 6 -10, 2025
AOC 4 -Process Hazard Analysis - 40 C.F.R. 68.67(a) requires that the process hazard analysis shall be appropriate to the complexity of the process and shall identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process.
DPR failed to perform a process hazard analysis that was appropriate to the complexity of the process. DPR did not conduct an evaluation and analysis of the hazards associated with the release of hazardous chemicals (flammables and toxics) and hazardous energy sources (e.g. steam) relieving to atmosphere from atmospheric pressure relief devices and process vents. This was discovered by EPA during the inspection and identified as a finding in the 2024 Compliance Audit.
AOC 5 - Process Hazard Analysis - 40 C.F.R 40 C.F.R. 68.67(c)(1) requires that the process hazard analysis shall address the hazards of the process.
The PHA shall address the hazards associated with facility siting and be appropriate to the complexity of the process and shall identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process. DPR failed to evaluate and control the hazards of the process identified in the Deer Park 2020 Facility Siting Study. The facility siting study included major findings:
1. FN Curve for CB 84 OP-Ill Control Room (Board-Field) crosses the intolerable line
2. Flammable and fire impact assessment shows that: a. Nineteen (19) occupied buildings are in the flammable gas impact area. b. Sixteen (16) occupied buildings are in the 9.5 kW /m2 fire heat impact area. c. Seventeen (17) occupied buildings are in the 6.3 kW /m2 fire heat impact area. (This includes the sixteen (16) buildings above).
3. Toxic impact assessment show that: a. Twenty-six (26) occupied buildings are in the H2S toxic impact area. b. About one hundred thirty-nine (139) occupied buildings are in the H2S toxic impact area. c. RB 120 SHCU Control Room (Field) is in the NH3 toxic impact area. d. Aromatics Training Blast Resistant Modules is in the Benzene toxic impact area.
4. Third party toxic impact assessment show that: a. The whole Deer Park site is in the OXY chlorine (Cl2) toxic impact area. b. There are sixty-six (66) occupied buildings are in the HEXION (Methyl Mercaptan) (MESH) impact zone for F2 (with sixteen (16) buildings having occupants during nighttime) & sixty (60) occupied buildings for D5. c. There are eight (8) occupied buildings are in the OXY (ethylene dichloride) EDC impact zone for F2 (with three (3) buildings having occupants during nighttime) & five (5) occupied buildings for D5. d. There are six (6) occupied buildings are in the OXY hydrogen chloride (HCI) impact zone for F2 (with three (3) buildings having occupants during nighttime) & two (2) occupied buildings for D5.
5. Fire and toxic impacts are present in the emergency plan Assembly Areas.
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Inspection Date: January 6 -10, 2025
AOC 6 - Process Hazard Analysis - 40 C.F.R. 68.67(e) requires that the owner or operator shall establish a system to promptly address the team's findings and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed; communicate the actions to operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions.
DPR failed to establish a system to promptly address the team's findings and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; and develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed. EPA requested documentation of closed PHA action items for several units, including, but not limited to: Alkylation Unit, ARU, HDU-2, BEU-SSU, SR-4/5, SR6/7, and SR-8. Several PHA action items were marked as closed without documented resolution (see Table 1). Additionally, some action items lack a recorded closure date, and others were closed after their respective due dates had passed (see Table 2 and 3).
Action ID 123 171 366 451 453 499 500 501 502 932 933
Table 1 - Action items closed without documented resolution
Assessment Type
Date Closed
2022 Alky PHA
4/6/2023
2018 Alky PHA
1/15/2023
2022 Alky PHA
8/14/2023
2023 ARU PHA
1/15/2024
2023 ARU PHA
1/15/2024
2022 Alky PHA
7/19/2024
2022 Alky PHA
8/5/2024
2022 Alky PHA
5/21/2024
2022 Alky PHA
8/7/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
4/11/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
3/20/2024
Action ID ACTID-084301 ACTID-084299 ACTID-084300 ACTID-084303 ACTID-084301 ACTID-084299 ACTID-084300
Table 2 - Action items closed after due date
Assessment Type
Due Date
2021 BEU-SSU PHA
3/23/2023
2021 BEU-SSU PHA
3/23/2023
2021 BEU-SSU PHA
3/23/2023
2021 BEU-SSU PHA
3/23/2023
2021 BEU-SSU PHA
3/23/2023
2021 BEU-SSU PHA
3/23/2023
2021 BEU-SSU PHA
3/23/2023
Date Closed 3/29/2023 3/30/2023 3/30/2023 3/30/2023 3/29/2023 3/30/2023 3/30/2023
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Inspection Date: January 6 -10, 2025
ACTID-084303 ACTID-200108 ACTID-200108 ACTID-200193 ACTID-200176
2021 BEU-SSU PHA 2022 ALKY PHA 2022 ALKY PHA 2023 SR-4 PHA 2023 SR-5 PHA
3/23/2023 4/3/2023 4/3/2023 10/15/2023 10/28/2023
3/30/2023 4/6/2023 4/6/2023 10/16/2023 11/16/2023
Action ID ACTID-200205 933 934 935 937 939 941 942 944 947 941 ACTID-200190 ACTID-200195 ACTID-200111 915 917 921 922 924 926 932 ACTID-200113
Table 3 - No closing date
Assessment Type
Due Date
2023 SR-8 PHA
2/20/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
4/5/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
4/5/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
4/5/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
4/5/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
4/5/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
4/5/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
4/5/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
4/5/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
4/5/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
4/5/2024
2023 SR-4 PHA
4/15/2024
2023 SR-4 PHA
4/15/2024
2022 ALKY PHA
8/15/2024
2023 SR-6/7 PHA
5/28/2024
2023 SR-6/7 PHA
5/28/2024
2023 SR-6/7 PHA
5/28/2024
2023 SR-6/7 PHA
5/28/2024
2023 SR-6/7 PHA
5/28/2024
2023 SR-6/7 PHA
5/28/2024
2023 HDU-2 PHA
6/5/2024
2022 ALKY PHA
8/15/2024
Date Closed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed None listed
In addition, the DPR 2020 Facility Siting Study findings contained the following recommendations (see Table 4). These recommendations were not addressed. The buildings stated in the table below are currently on DPR's "Deer Park HSSE Guidelines" (revised July 2021) that contains a map that includes the SIPs.
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Table 4
Gaps
Recommendations
Buildings Impacted
Shelter-In-Place cannot meet SIP conditions even with improved air tightness
Delist the SIP from the List
(1) RB 64 Automotive Garage (SIP) (2) RB 72 CCU CR (SIP Field) (3) CB 42 Chemical Distribution Office
(CDO)
Notes for each building
(1) RB 64 Automotive Garage (SIP): This building is not a suitable SIP for Flammable Gas impact. High H2S toxic impact during daytime is unlikely; improve the airtightness (Door/ceiling sealing) of the SIP room designate it for Toxic SIP only (not for fire and flammable gas impact) and if it is occupied at night.
(2) RB 72 CCU CR (SIP Field): Current building status cannot maintain a safe environment with the flammable liquid release from CCU. So, the SIP should be removed from SIP list, or at most be designated for H2S Toxic impact only with significant improvement on the ceiling and vent sealing of the SIP room.
(3) CB 42 Chemical Distribution Office (CDO): Impacted by H2S high concentration toxic cloud both in daytime and nighttime. Toxic H2S can infiltrate into the building in minutes or less. Escape pack should be provided for safe evacuation.
AOC 7 -Operating Procedures - 40 C.F.R. 68.69(c) requires that the operating procedures shall be reviewed as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice, including changes that result from changes in process chemicals, technology, and equipment, and changes to stationary sources. The owner or operator shall certify annually that these operating procedures are current and accurate."
i. DPR failed to ensure that operating procedures were certified annually in 2021 and 2022; as identified in the 2024 compliance audit.
ii. DPR failed to ensure that operating procedures are reviewed annually. DPR conducts a review of operating procedures every three (3) years.
iii. DPR failed to review the following standard operating procedures (SOPs) annually:
Unit
SOPs:
Table 5
Review date:
ARU
- Testing of H2S Monitors
12/26/2021
SRU 3/4 SR-5
- Testing of H2S Monitors - Thermal Reactor Acid Gas to Hot Standby - SCOT Blower KO Pot Decon - SCOT Unit Decontamination - CAG KO Pot Decontaimination
- Testing of H2S Monitors - SRS SIS Bypass Procedure and Mitigation Plan
12/26/2021 12/22/2021 12/23/2021 12/21/2021 12/21/2021
12/26/2021 12/26/2021
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Inspection Date: January 6 -10, 2025
SR6/7 SR-8
- Testing of H2S Monitors
- NSU-SUL-020 23 Type Seal Startup - Testing of H2S monitors
12/26/2021
10/10/2021 12/26/2021
iv. DPR failed to certify the following operating procedures are current and accurate annually: DPR certified operating procedures in the COKER sub-units on April 17, 2024. However, the next review date for thirty-four (34) operating procedures was after April 17, 2024; therefore, these operating procedures were certified as current before they were reviewed. DPR certified operating procedures in the Catalytic Cracking Unit and Alky/sub- units-units on April 8, 2024. However, the next review date for approximately 260 operating procedures was after April 8, 2024; therefore, these operating procedures were certified as current before they were reviewed. DPR certified the following operating procedures in the Distilling and subunits on April 24, 2024. However, the next review date for the following operating procedures was after April 24, 2024; therefore, these operating procedures were certified as current before they were reviewed. Table 6
Distilling/sub-units: SOPs:
Review date:
CPOP-044
RC-36200 and RC-36201 Compressor Packing Seal Drips
8/4/2024
D2SD-057
DU2 Crude Steam Out/Decontaminate 8/4/2024
DU7 Naphtha System DU7 Naphtha System
7/7/2024
OPl60HVl
HVI Seal Oil Tank Filling
10/26/2024
VF-3 Start-up Tracking VF-3 Start-up Tracking
10/25/2024
v. DPR certified the following operating procedures in the Dispatching SIS on April 18, 2024. However, the next review date for the following operating procedures was after April 18, 2024; therefore, these operating procedures were certified as current before they were reviewed (see Table 7, below).
Table 7
Procedure number:
Procedure name:
Next review date:
Logistics-SIS-I40
Sphere R314 I-40 SIS Mitigation Plan
10/19/2024
Logistics-SIS-I41
Sphere R315 I-41 SIS Mitigation Plan
10/19/2024
Logistics-SIS-I42
Sphere R319 I-42 SIS Mitigation Plan
10/19/2024
Logistics-SIS-I43
Sphere R321 I-43 SIS Mitigation Plan
10/6/2024
Logistics-SIS-I44
Sphere R322 I-43 SIS Mitigation Plan
10/10/2024
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Logistics-SIS-I45 Logistics-SIS-I46 Logistics-SIS-I47 Logistics-SIS-I49
Sphere R324 I-45 SIS Mitigation Plan
Sphere R325 I-46 SIS Mitigation Plan
Sphere R342 I-47 SIS Mitigation Plan
Sphere R344 I-49 SIS Mitigation Plan
10/17/2024 10/17/2024 10/19/2024 10/19/2024
AOC 8 - Operating Procedures - 40 C.F.R. 68.69(d) requires that the owner or operator shall develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations such as lockout/tagout; confined space entry; opening process equipment or piping; and control over entrance into a stationary source by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel. These safe work practices shall apply to employees and contractor employees.
Contractors (Owner or operator responsibilities) - 68.87(b)(4) requires that the owner or operator shall develop and implement safe work practices consistent with 68.69(d), to control the entrance, presence, and exit of the contract owner or operator and contract employees in covered process areas.
DPR failed to develop and implement safe work practices for employees and contractor employees to provide for the control of hazards during operations such as opening process equipment and lockout/tagout. DPR requires that all personnel wear portable H2S monitors positioned in their breathing zone when entering the various process units. However, Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) Procedure (S-152 Section 3.2 and 4.2) states and requires that employees and contractor employees utilize the following unsafe work practice which requires the worker to discontinue the use of the personal H2S monitor when supplied-air respirators (SAR) or self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) are in use:
DPR procedure S-152 3.2 Maintenance: Job activities that are likely to involve an H2S hazard:
Wear respiratory protection Discontinue the use of personal H2S monitor if SAR or SCBA are in use
4.2 Determining the Presence of H2S:
In non-exempted work areas, wear a personal H2S monitor. In situations where a SAR or SCBA is required, such as investigating an H2S leak, discontinue the
use of personal H2S monitor and upgrade to a pumped multi-gas detector to find the leak.
In situations where concentrations of H2S may exist at 0.1% or greater, such as in process equipment, or where decontamination activities were likely not effective or cannot be attempted, utilize colorimetric sampling tubes to measure H2S concentrations.
Once the personal H2S monitor is removed, the worker cannot determine the concentration of H2S in the work area and is then unaware of the risk and consequences posed by H2S exposure in the event respiratory protection fails, is worn incorrectly, or if a significant H2S release is occurring during the work.
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AOC 9 - Mechanical Integrity- 40 C.F.R. 68.73(b) requires the owner or operator shall establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment.
i. DPR failed to perform forty-three (43) Pressure Equipment Integrity audits at the intervals prescribed in the mechanical integrity procedure as identified in their 2024 compliance audit.
ii. DPR failed to perform eleven (11) Category 1, Corrective Action Inspection Requests and eighteen (18) Category 2, Corrective Action Inspection Requests which were overdue in accordance with DPR procedure O-154. A documented deferral must be in place when inspections have exceeded their assigned due dates as identified in their 2024 compliance audit.
iii. DPR failed to establish a procedure to mitigate or escalate the risk to management for two (2) pressure vessels classified as" Extreme Risk", according to the DPR Risk Based Inspection matrix as identified in the 2024 compliance audit.
iv. DPR failed to establish inspection procedures addressing approximately 126, Class 1 piping circuits with soil-air interface as identified in the 2024 compliance audit.
v. DPR failed to establish an ITPM, and necessary inspection and testing tasks, for three (3) instrumented systems: LC21138, TI89180- TI89189, LC89430 as identified in the 2024 compliance audit.
vi. DPR failed to develop a written procedure establishing an interval to monitor the pressure in the interstitial space between the rupture disk and a pressure relief valve, in accordance with ASME, API 576 and S-122; and as identified in the 2024 compliance audit.
vii. DPR failed to implement DPR's procedure I-28: a. Wet H2S Phase 4 and 5 evaluate the results of the inspections and to plan/initiate required mitigations and corrective actions. b. Underground Piping Phase 3 and 4: Establish inspection strategies and intervals. Inspection strategies will be established using BP&G 33, underground piping inspection, as a guide and entered IMS. Phase 4: Develop mitigation or replacement guidelines.
AOC 10 - Mechanical Integrity (Inspection and testing) - 40 C.F.R. 68.73(d)(3) requires that the frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers' recommendations and good engineering practices, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience
i. DPR failed to conduct internal inspections on multiple pressure vessels. According to API 510 - Internal and On-stream inspection, "unless justified by a Risk-based assessment (RBI), the period between internal or on-stream inspections shall not exceed one half the remaining life of the vessel or 10 years, whichever is less. However, DPR procedure I-40, "Risk Based Inspection-
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Inspection Schedule, sets a maximum interval of 240 months (20 years). The following pressure vessels are overdue for an internal inspection.
Pressure Vessels: V-5607 DIB
VN05605 Depropanizer Column
VN0570/05071/5072/5073 Propane Bullet NW Bank VN05082/5083/5084/5085 Propane Bullet SE Bank VN05074/5075/5076/5077 Propane Bullet SW Bank
VN05112 DIH Column V-93505 Amine Regenerator
Reflux Drum E-93001A ARU 6 Heat
Exchanger E-93001 Sour Water Flash
Drum V-93101 Sour Water Flash
Drum
Table 8 Last Internal Inspection Date:
2001 1/27/1999
4/2001
4/2001
4/2001
3/31/2013 2/2001
2/2007
2/2001
2/1999
Overdue: 24+ years 26+ years
24+ years
24+ years
24+ years
12+ years 24+ years
18+ years
24+ years
26+ years
ii. DPR failed to conduct maintenance in response to a Corrective Action Inspection Request addressing the West Property Flare Tip by the due date of April 21, 2024
iii. DPR failed to conduct a corrosion and non-destructive examination/ultrasonic thickness inspection and testing on the Number 2 Reactor 4 by the due date of August 22, 2024. DPR is currently using a Risk Based Inspection interval of 30 years, although the DPR RBI procedure sets a maximum interval for pressure vessels of 20 years. The last inspection for this pressure vessel was prior to 1995.
iv. DPR failed to conduct an inspection and non-destructive examination/ultrasonic thickness testing on the 2nd Stage Settler Overhead piping by the due date of August 7, 2024.
v. DPR failed to conduct an external infra-red scan on the H-1000 Platformed Heater Furnace by September 13, 2024.
AOC 11 -Management of Change - 40 C.F.R. 68.75(a) requires that the owner or operator shall establish and implement written procedures to manage changes (except for "replacements in kind") to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures; and, changes to stationary sources that
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affect a covered process. 40 C.F.R 68.75(b) requires that the procedures shall assure that the following considerations are addressed prior to any change: the technical basis for the proposed change, the Impact of change on safety and health, modifications to operating procedures, necessary time period for the change; and, authorization requirements for the proposed change.
DPR failed to implement procedures to manage changes of equipment including piping systems and pressure vessels. A management of change was not implemented for the installation of pipe clamps. Pipe clamps were installed on the following piping systems without documenting the date of installation (labeled in the pipe clamp spreadsheet as "undetermined"); hence, the following documentation could not be established: impact of change on safety and health, modifications to operating procedures, necessary time period for the change, and authorization requirements for the proposed change.
Piping: 1. PO86109 7. P355302A 13. P802317 19. P355312 25. PB17012
2. PO86302 8. P355309 14. P802331 20. PB49199
3. PO8303 9. P355315 15. PB17013 21. PB24863
4. PO86317 10. P355318 16. PB29371 22. P331203
5. P300304 11. P360311 17. PB66637 23. NSPCFH
6. P303303 12. P363301 18. PB37288 24. PO83301
Pressure Vessel: TNG00324-R1 - Sour Crude External Floating Roof VN00546 - R-316 Volatiles KO to Sphere
AOC 12 - Pre-startup Safety Review (PSSR) - 40 C.F.R. 68.77(a) requires that the owner or operator shall perform a pre-startup safety review for new stationary sources and for modified stationary sources when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the process safety information.
DPR failed to follow their MOC Work Process (TE-04) outlining the requirements of prestartup safety review as required by this subpart. EPA reviewed MOC-63510 which required a PSSR. EPA reviewed the OPS Rep Copy of #5473_PSSR checklist, and it was missing the Person Executing the Change (PEC) information and signature.
EPA reviewed MOC-63562. EPA requested the PSSR for this MOC, and it was unavailable at the time of inspection. The Evotix checklist indicated "Yes" that the PSSR was completed. Startup for this MOC was on July 11, 2024. The MOC procedure, MOC Work Process (TE-04), requires 180 days to complete B actions (post start-up action) from this date, which would be January 7, 2025.
AOC 13 - Compliance Audits - 40 C.F.R. 68.79(d) requires that the owner or operator shall promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that deficiencies have been corrected.
DPR failed to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to the findings and document that the deficiencies have been corrected in the 2021 and 2024 Compliance Audits. The 2024 Compliance Audit included repeat findings (Action ID: 1287 and 1309) that had previously been identified in the 2021 Compliance Audit (ACTID: 086195, 087708, 087709, 087710, 087711, and 086191).
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AOC 14 -Incident Investigation - 40 C.F.R. 68.81(b) requires that an incident investigation shall be initiated as promptly as possible, but not later than 48 hours following the incident.
DPR failed to determine a start date and time when the following incident investigations began, hence it cannot be determined that the following incident investigations were initiated within 48 hours as was identified in the 2024 compliance audit.
1. 2830416 - A310 venting due to SHCU upset causing product on roof 2. 2967432 - Leak on sour naphtha line from CFH/DHT tops to DU-2 3. EIMS 393 - DU-1 E-7400/01 fire
AOC 15 -Emergency Response Program - 40 C.F.R. 68.95(a)(2) requires that the owner or operator shall develop and implement an emergency response program for the purpose of protecting public health and the environment. Such program shall include the following elements: Procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing, and maintenance.
i. DPR failed to provide SCBA inspections for March 2024 through January 2025. EPA requested inspection records from January 2024 to January 2025 for SCBAs, specifically in the ARU 6 and ARU 7 Units. According to DPR, SCBAs are inspected monthly.
ii. DPR failed to inspect, test, or maintain, seven (7) fixed water pumps, considered critical equipment, which had not passed the annual performance tests for the past three (3) years (2022, 2023, and 2024). These fire water pumps were either not tested, out of service, or received an unsatisfactory rating as identified in the 2024 compliance audit.
AOC 16 - Threshold determination - 40 C.F.R. 68.115(a) states a threshold quantity of a regulated substance listed in 68.130 is present at a stationary source if the total quantity of the regulated substance contained in a process exceeds the threshold. Registration - 40 C.F.R. 68.160(a) requires that the owner or operator shall complete a single registration form and include it in the RMP. The form shall cover all regulated substances handled in covered processes.
DPR did not consider H2S as a regulated toxic substance in their process and failed to list or update their December 3, 2021, RMP, to include H2S as a toxic substance present above the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds. On October 10, 2024, DPR had an accidental release of approximately 27,000 pounds of hydrogen sulfide from the Amine Recovery Units and Sulfur Recovery Unit.
AOC 17 - Required corrections - 40 C.F.R. 68.195(a) requires the owner or operator of a stationary source for which a RMP was submitted shall correct the RMP as follows: for any accidental release meeting the five-year accident history reporting criteria of 68.42 and occurring after April 9, 2004, the owner or operator shall submit the data required under 68.168, 68.170(j), and 68.175(l) with respect to that accident within six months of the release or by the time the RMP is updated under 68.190, whichever is earlier. Five-Year accident history - 40 C.F.R. 68.42(a) requires that the owner or operator shall include in the five-year accident history all accidental releases from covered processes that resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage on site, or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations,
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sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage." Five-year accident history - 40 C.F.R. 68.168 requires that he owner or operator shall submit in the RMP the information provided in 68.42(b) on each accident covered by 68.42(a).
A reportable incident had occurred at the site on October 10, 2024, which resulted in two onsite fatalities and a shelter-in place order. DPR failed to update their RMP within 6-months of an incident that occurred on October 10, 2024.
AOC 18 - Availability of information to the public (Public Meetings) - 40 C.F.R. 68.210 requires that owner or operator of a stationary source shall hold a public meeting to provide information required under 68.42(b), no later than 90 days after any RMP reportable accident at the stationary source with any known offsite impact specified in 68.42(a).
DPR failed to hold a public meeting to address the October 10, 2024, accidental release of H2S which necessitated a shelter-in-place order issued for Deer Park and Pasadena, Texas. DPR failed to provide any information addressing the requirement for a public meeting being held relating to the incident.
AOC 19 - Clean Air Act (CAA) 112(r)(1) - General Duty Clause - "Section 112(r)(1) states: Prevention of Accidental Releases (1) Purpose and General Duty - It shall be the objective of the regulations and programs authorized under this subsection to prevent the accidental release and to minimize the consequences of any such release of any substance listed pursuant to paragraph (3) or any other extremely hazardous substance. The owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing, handling or storing such substances have a general duty, in the same manner and to the same extent as section 654, title 29 of the United States Code, to identify hazards which may result from such releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and to minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur."
On October 10, 2024, an incident occurred at the DPR's Amine Regeneration Unit (ARU), where hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas is removed from the refining process. Hydrogen sulfide is transferred by process piping to the downstream Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU) to convert the hydrogen sulfide into sulfur. DPR operations requested assistance from contractors and issued permits allowing the contractors to isolate piping segments in Amine Regeneration Unit 6 and 7 (ARU 6/7). On the day of the incident, maintenance contractors were removing piping isolation devices, called slip blinds, from ARU 6, which was not in operation. Amine Regeneration Unit 7 (ARU 7) which was in operation, has piping located directly adjacent to ARU 6. On the day of the incident, while performing the task, workers inadvertently opened a flange on the ARU 7 piping, which had already been returned to normal operations, was pressurized and contained approximately 90% hydrogen sulfide. Approximately 27,000 pounds of hydrogen sulfide gas was emitted into the air, and to the flare, during this accidental release at the DPR. Two contract workers were fatally injured as a result of the H2S release.
A contract worker performing the work, employed by Repcon, died due to exposure to H2S. Another contract employee, who was at the site, employed by Isc Constructors, LLC., but not involved in the work performed, and located approximately 250 feet away from the point of the release, also died because of their exposure to H2S.
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Based on interviews, photos, and documents collected, including, but not limited to, procedures S-102, S-104, S-114, EPA concluded and asserts the following:
i.
DPR failed to maintain a safe facility by not using appropriate hazard assessment techniques
to identify hazards resulting from the release of hydrogen sulfide, preventing the accidental
release of H2S and not minimizing the consequences of any such release of H2S.
DPR included in Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) procedure (S-152 Section 3.2 and 4.2) an unsafe work practice which requires that a worker discontinue the use of their personal H2S monitor (a hazard assessment technique) if supplied-air respirators (SAR) or SCBA are in use.
The procedure indicates when conducting maintenance (job activities that are likely to involve an H2S hazard): Wear respiratory protection, discontinue the use of personal H2S monitor if SAR or self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) are in use, and follow the respiratory protection requirements as indicated by the operator and/or work Permit. In addition, during first openings of a line or equipment that contains H2S, personnel must use respiratory protection (minimum full face supplied air respirator or a full face SCBA).
Contract employees performing the work involving the slip blinds were wearing supplied air respirators but were not wearing H2S monitors. There was no air monitoring performed for H2S in and around the work area of pipes containing 90% H2S. Without an H2S monitor, the contract employees were unaware of the presence of H2S, as they began removing the slip blind from the live pipe containing H2S, until most of the flange bolts were loosened or removed. This resulted in a concentration of H2S above levels immediately dangerous to life and health. In addition, DPR failed to provide clear instructions for contractors to safely isolating piping segments in ARU 6.
ii.
DPR failed to control the entrance and presence of contract employees in covered process
areas and failed to prevent the accidental release and minimize the consequences of any
such release.
a) The contractor employees performing the work did not sign in on the unit log prior to
entering the ARU 6/7 unit to conduct work. According to DPR's S-102 procedure, "A Unit
Entry Log (UEL) is used to account for people that are in an operating unit at any given time.
All persons entering an operating unit other than Operations or OnShift PTLs' assigned to
that operating unit must sign the UEL for accountability purposes and obtain authorization
to enter the unit."
b) DPR procedure S-104 states that, "The Permit Issuer (PI) confirms that maintenance
personnel (with tools and safety equipment) are present and ready to start. During the Joint
Jobsite Inspection with craftworkers, confirms craftworkers know the work location and
equipment to be worked on and all other relevant parties have been consulted and have
provided their input and/or signatures authorizing the work, if applicable."
c) In addition, DPR procedure S-114 procedure describes the process of isolation and the lock-
out/tag-out (LOTO) of process energy from plant equipment and piping. The procedure
applies to the isolation of process energy before maintenance work begins on plant
equipment and piping where the accidental release of process energy or the accidental
activation of equipment could result in injury. S-114 states (steps 14-15), "If the task was to
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remove slip blinds, the Designated Craftworker and the Equipment Owner shall visit each blind point and remove the Energy isolation tag that corresponds to the updated Energy Isolation Folder (EIF) and initial that the blind(s) is out." d) DPR did not ensure an operator was available to confirm with the contractor the correct piping equipment to be worked on prior to the incident. e) DPR failed to implement safe work practices by not ensuring that the operator and contractor employees walked the job after shift change. f) DPR failed to implement their S-114 procedure on October 10, 2024, to ensure safe work practices in the covered process area. g) DPR failed to label piping no more than 50 feet apart on straight sections or 25 feet apart in congested areas and place labels near all valves and flanges.
iii. DPR failed to design and maintain a safe facility by not taking such steps as are necessary to prevent H2S from releasing into the ambient environment resulting in fatalities and injuries. DPR did not ensure that prior to the contractors performing maintenance activities that the line was properly isolated which could have prevented the hazardous chemical from releasing. In addition, DPR failed to implement safe work practices. Supporting documentation for this area of concern is provided in Appendix 20.
Closing Meeting - EPA Region 6 inspectors Howard Cole, Aimee Boss, and Charese Simpson conducted a closing conference at Deer Park Refining, LP on January 10, 2025. During the closing conference, Howard Cole reviewed the area of concerns that were noted during the inspection. Additionally, there were several AOCs identified after the conclusion of the inspection and were not included in the closing conference.
Section IV - FOLLOW UP
Additional documents were provided by Deer Park Refining, LP via SharePoint post inspection.
Section V - LIST OF APPENDICES (Confidential Business Information (CBI) appendices is not included in published version of the report)
Appendix 1 - RMP Appendix 2 - 2011 SR8 Revalidation Study Appendix 3 - RQ2-01 RMP Compliance Audits Appendix 4 - Photos Nos. 1-20 Appendix 5 - Standard Operating Procedures for CCU Appendix 6 - 2020 Facility Siting Study Appendix 7 - Deer Park HSSE Guidelines Appendix 8 - PHA Action Items and All PHAs Appendix 9 - RQ3-8 Operating Procedures Appendix 10 - S-152 Procedure Appendix 11 - Procedure I-40 Appendix 12 - Heat Exchanger Procedure Appendix 13 - RQ6-1 to RQ6-23 Mechanical Integrity Appendix 14 - RQ3-03 Equipment Inspections
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Appendix 15 - RQ3-05 Pipe clamps Appendix 16 - RQ7-01 Management of Change Appendix 17 - Incident Investigation Appendix 18 - RQ5-02 SCBA inspections Appendix 19 - OSHA 300 logs Appendix 20 - GDC Supporting Documents Note: The maintenance activities on process equipment in ARU 6 were not part of the work the contractors were performing for the turnaround.
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