Document ZBjbnRxZ4kykM079ZVNGXYnQJ

ABD00031318 Process Safety Management Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, Aberdeen Plant Utilities Area, Hazard and Operability Study Revalidation PHA Start Date: End Date: Issue Date: October 28, 2002 December 17, 2002 December 18, 2002 Issued By: Utilities Hazop Team Jeff Seaver =3 Ed Mize A __ rf David Roberts Nathaniel Wilson mmy Morgan ABD00031345 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 3. Propane storage tanks, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031. Type: Vessel Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane storage to 250 psig. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 3.5 cont'd 2. cont'd Consequences 3. Relief valve plugged under relieving condition 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4. Relief valve isolated under relieving condition 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 5. Manual activation of deluge system 6. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 7. Sloping ground beneath vessel to prevent flammables accumulating 8. Pressure relief valve 9. Pressure relief valve - isolation valve under relief valve is normally locked open EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Remote shutdown of three 5 actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 7 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 7 5 2. Remote shutdown of three 5 actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 3. Pressure relief valve - isolation valve under relief valve is normally locked open aoh- e ABD00031346 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 17, Instrument air compressors, CP-708 and CP-709, and discharge line to aftercoolers. Type: Centrifugal Compressor + Line Drawings: UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Compressor capacity 526 ICFM at 100 psig. Dev Causes Consequences 17.1 Low/No Flow 1. Compressor shutdown interlocks (High cooling water temperature, High outlet air temperature, Low oil pressure, Low water pressure) 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 2. Closed valve 1. Loss of Instrument Air 3. Compressor fail to run (motor, 1. Compressor shutdown internals, no power) 2. Loss of Instrument Air 4. Inlet air filter plugged 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 17 2 Low Pressure 1. Low air flow from compressors 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 2. Leak 1. Loss of Instrument Air 3 Compressor internals failure (valves, innercooler, etc.) 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 3 C 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure 4 alarm 2. Low sump level Alarm #2 cooling Tower 3. PM on #2 Cooling Tower Pumps and Tower 4. Routine cleaning of Y-strainer 5. Daily operator check of oil level 6. Oil pressure switch (shutdown switch) 7. Routinely change oil in compressors 11 30 31 32 S/E 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure 31 S/E 3 C 4 alarm 32 2. Daily operator check of oil level 3. Oil pressure switch (shutdown switch) 4. Routinely change oil in compressors 5. PM emergency generator S/E 4 B 5 1. PM inlet air filter regularly S/E 4 D 5 2. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 1 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure 5 alarm 2. PM inlet air filter regularly S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure 5 alarm 2. Daily operator check of oil level 3. Oil pressure switch (shutdown switch) 4. PM inlet air filter regularly 5. Routine cleaning of Y-strainer 6. Routinely change oil in compressors 1 1 1 QOS' 7 ABD00031347 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 35. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Cooling Towers #'s 2, 4, and 6. Type: Line Drawing: UT-090117-PID-D, 10/10/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Up to 500 Ib/day of chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before regulator and at 0 psig or below after regulator to ejector. Dev Causes 35.1 High Pressure 1. Water backing up into line through ejector. 2. Regulator relief (vent) valve failure under venting conditions 3. Regulator Failure to control flow/pressure 4. Liquid Chlorine in the line 35.2 Low/No Flow 1. Ruptured/cracked line 2. Blocked discharge 3. High upstream pressure 4. Chlorine cylinder is empty Consequences 1. Regulator malfunction 2. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Regulator malfunction 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2. Tubing rupture/leak 3. Tubing rupture/leak-E 4. Overfeed chlorine to cooling towers 1. Tubing rupture/leak 2. Tubing rupture/leak-E 3. Overfeed chlorine to cooling towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 D 5 1. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D 5 2. Daily visual checks 3. Eductor Vacuum indication S/E 4 D 5 1. Screen on vent line 43 43 S/E 4 D 5 1. Regular cooling tower checks S 3 C 4 2. Daily visual checks E 4 C 5 3. Eductor Vacuum indication S/E 4 C 5 4. Drip leg heater 5. Operating Procedures/ Training for cylinder valve alignment 6. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 7. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 8. Personal Protective Equipment S 3C E 4C S/E 4 C 4 1. Chlorine regulator located on 5 cylinder 5 2. Drip leg heater 3. Operating Procedures/ Training for cylinder valve alignment 4. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 5. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 6. Personal Protective Equipment 42 43 41 42 S/E 4 C 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 A 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 30f>-8 ABD00031348 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 35. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Cooling Towers #'s 2, 4, and 6. Type: Line Drawing: UT-090117-PID-D, 10/10/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Up to 500 Ib/day of chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before regulator and at 0 psig or below after regulator to ejector. Dev 35.2 cont'd 4. cont'd Causes Consequences 5. Plugged regulator inlet filter 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 35.3 Leak 1. Corrosion 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2. Chlorine release 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal at cylinder or rotameter failure 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2. Chlorine release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 3. Regular cooling tower checks 4. Chlorine cylinder scale 5. Spare chlorine cylinder S/E 4 B 5 1. Daily visual checks 2 Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks 1 S/E 4 D 5 1. Buddy system when hooking S/E 4 C 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 3. Personal Protective Equipment S/E 4 B S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 3. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed 4. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 5. Check packing on cylinder valves before use 6. Personal Protective Equipment 42 43 42 43 9 ABD00031349 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 36. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Water Plant Chlorination System. Type: Line Drawing: WP-090106-PID-D, 09/26/02 Design Conditions/Parameters 360 PPD at ambient chlorine vapor pressure and temperature. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 36.1 High Pressure 1. Water backing up into line through ejector. 2. Regulator relief (vent) valve failure under venting conditions 3. Regulator Failure to control flow/pressure 4. Liquid Chlorine in the line 36 2 Low/No Flow 1. Blocked discharge 2. Chlorine cylinder is empty 3. High upstream pressure 4. Plugged regulator inlet filter Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards 1. Regulator malfunction S/E 4 D 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Regular water plant checks 5 2. Daily visual checks 3. Eductor Vacuum indication Regulator malfunction S/E 4 D 5 1. Screen on vent line Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D Tubing rupture/leak S 3C Tubing rupture/leak-E E 4C Overfeed chlorine to water S/E 4 C plant 5 1. Regular water plant checks 4 2. Daily visual checks 5 3. Eductor Vacuum indication 5 4. Drip leg heater 5. Operating Procedures/ Training for cylinder valve alignment 6. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 7 Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 8. Personal Protective Equipment 1. Tubing rupture/leak 2. Tubing rupture/leak-E 3. Overfeed chlorine to water plant S 3C E 4C S/E 4 C 4 1. Drip leg heater 5 2. Operating Procedures/ 5 Training for cylinder valve alignment 3. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 4. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 5 Personal Protective Equipment 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 A 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3 Regular water plant checks 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 A 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular water plant checks 4. Chlorine cylinder scale 5. Spare chlorine cylinder 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular water plant checks 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular water plant checks Rec. 43 43 43 45 46 41 45 46 1 1 1 1 <3vGA- io ABD00031350 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 36. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Water Plant Chlorination System. Type: Line Drawing: WP-090106-PID-D, 09/26/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: 360 PPD at ambient chlorine vapor pressure and temperature. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev 36.2 cont'd 4. cont'd Causes 5. Ruptured/cracked line 36.3 Leak 1 Corrosion 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal at cylinder or rotameter failure 3. High pressure tubing crack/ rupture Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 4. Spare chlorine cylinder with regulator 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 C 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular water plant checks 4. Isolation valves 1 1 Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 2. Chlorine release S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 43 45 46 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 B 2. Chlorine release S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 3. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed 4. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 5. Check packing on cylinder valves before use 43 45 46 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 B 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 45 2. Chlorine release S/E 4 B 5 and unhooking chlorine 46 cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 3. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 4. Spare chlorine cylinder 5. Personal Protective Equipment <SCA-ii ABD00031351 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 40. Emergency response to a chlorine leak of Cooling Tower Chlorination System. Type: Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) UT-CT-003, 09/29/99 Design Conditions/Parameters: Steps 1.0 - 4.0 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 40.1 Other than specified action 1. Inadequate personal training 1. Interuption of plant operations EC 3 C 4 1. Annual training of ERT Team 2. Personal evacuation 3. Personal exposure S/E 3 C 4 S/E 3 c 4 Members 2. Emergency response material 1. Interuption of plant operations EC 3 c 4 1. Annual inventory of ERT not available 2. Personal evacuation S/E 3 c 4 Team "B" kit 3. Personal exposure S/E 3 c 4 13 47 12 Mr'2 ABD00031352 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 43. Emergency response to a chlorine leak of Water Plant Chlorination System. Type: Procedural Step Drawings: (OP) UT-WP-017, 07/20/00, (OP) UT-WP-018, 07/20/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: UT-WP-017 Steps 1-4; UT-WP-018 Steps 1.1-1.22, 2.0 Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 43.1 Other than specified action 1. Inadequate personal training 1. Interuption of plant operations EC 3 C 4 1. Annual training of ERT Team 2. Personal evacuation S/E 3 C 4 Members 3. Personal exposure S/E 3 C 4 13 47 2. Emergency response material 1. Interuption of plant operations EC 3 C not available 2. Personal evacuation S/E 3 C 3. Personal exposure S/E 3 C 4 1. Annual training of ERT Team 4 Members 4 2. Annual inventory of ERT Team "B" kit 12 C&A-13 ABD00031353 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 53. Regulator and line that supplies chlorine gas to chlorine ejector for Compound Cooling Tower #5 Type: Line Drawing: UT-090123-PID-D, 10/23/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Up to 10 Ib/day of chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before the regulator and at 0 psig or below after the regulator to the ejector. Dev Causes 53.1 High Pressure 1. Water backing up into line through ejector. 2. Regulator relief (vent) valve failure under venting conditions 3. Regulator Failure to control flow/pressure 4. Liquid Chlorine in the line 53.2 Low/No Flow 1. Ruptured/cracked line 2. Blocked discharge 3. High upstream pressure 4. Chlorine cylinder is empty 5. Plugged regulator inlet filter Consequences 1. Regulator malfunction 2. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Regulator malfunction 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2. Tubing rupture/leak 3. Tubing rupture/leak-E 4. Overfeed chlorine to cooling towers 1. Tubing rupture/leak 2. Tubing rupture/leak-E 3. Overfeed chlorine to cooling towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 D 5 1. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D 5 2. Daily visual checks 3. Eductor Vacuum indication S/E 4 D 5 1. Screen on vent line 43 43 S/E 4 D 5 1 Regular cooling tower checks S 3 C 4 2. Daily visual checks E 4 C 5 3. Eductor Vacuum indication S/E 4 C 5 4. Drip leg heater 5. Operating Procedures/ Training for cylinder valve alignment 6. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 7. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders S 3C E 4C S/E 4 C 4 1. Chlorine regulator located on 5 cylinder 5 2. Drip leg heater 3 Operating Procedures/ Training for cylinder valve alignment 4. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 5. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 42 43 44 41 42 44 S/E 4 C 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3 Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 A 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks 4. Chlorine cylinder scale S/E 4 B 5 1. Daily visual checks 1 1 1 1 1 50A-H ABD00031354 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 53. Regulator and line that supplies chlorine gas to chlorine ejector for Compound Cooling Tower #5 Type: Line Drawing: UT-090123-PID-D, 10/23/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Up to 10 Ib/day of chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before the regulator and at 0 psig or below after the regulator to the ejector. Dev 53.2 cont'd 5. cont'd Causes 53.3 Leak 1. Corrosion Consequences 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2. Chlorine release 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal at cylinder or rotameter failure 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2. Chlorine release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 S/E 4 B S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 3. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed 4. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 5. Check packing on cylinder valves before use 42 43 42 43 M-15 ABD00031355 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 57. Emergency Generator GN-001 that provides power for the OM & NM seal oil pumps, catalyst freezers, the instrument air compressors CP-708 & CP-709, the instrument air dryer DR-030, Pall air dryer, and the emergency cooling water pump PP-247. Type: Generator Drawings: MCC10A1-E-EL-D, 10/28/02, MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 08/24/ 94, GP-9721 -62-6D.08/23/83 Design Conditions/Parameters: Automatic start when power failure occurs. Provide 415kW Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 57.1 Low/No Power 1. Batteries/Starter Malfunction 1. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion 2. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion -E 3. Loss of power to seal oil pumps 4. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers 5. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers -E S 3 C 4 1. Annual PM of Generator 2. Weekly Operator Check of Generator E 4 C 5 3. Battery Charger 4. Engine Block Heater 5. Fire Protection System S/E 4 C 5 6. Fixed point monitor 7. Operating procedures/training S 3 C 4 8. Personal Protective Equipment E 4 C 5 9. Reactor pressure/temperature indication 10. Automatic/Manual Emergency Kill 11. Beacon Light for catalyst freezers 12. Blowout door for catalyst freezer 13. Camera for catalyst freezer 14. Door open/close indication - 84Z953/954 east. Similar west freezer 15. Floor grating and aisle promote air circulation for catalyst freezer 16. Hydrocarbon detector 84A962 east. Similar west freezer 17. Line in catalyst freezer showing max stacking height 18. High temperature Alarm and local temperature Indicator for catalyst freezer. 31 2. No fuel 1. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion 2. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion -E 3. Loss of power to seal oil pumps 4. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers 5. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers -E 3C 4C S/E 4 C 3C 4C 4 1. Annual PM of Generator 2. Weekly Operator Check of Generator 5 3. Fire Protection System 4. Fixed point monitor 5. Operating procedures/training 5 6. Personal Protective Equipment 4 7. Reactor pressure/temperature indication 5 8. Automatic/Manual Emergency Kill 9. Beacon Light for catalyst freezers 10. Blowout door for catalyst freezer 11. Camera for catalyst freezer 12. Door open/close indication - 84Z953/954 east. Similar 31 3oa- is ABD00031356 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 57. Emergency Generator GN-001 that provides power for the OM & NM seal oil pumps, catalyst freezers, the instrument air compressors CP-708 & CP-709, the instrument air dryer DR-030, Pall air dryer, and the emergency cooling water pump PP-247. Type: Generator Drawings: MCC10A1-E-EL-D, 10/28/02, MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 08/24/ 94, GP-9721-62-6D,08/23/83 Design Conditions/Parameters: Automatic start when power failure occurs. Provide 415kW Dev 57.1 cont'd 2. cont'd Causes Consequences 3. Transfer switch fails to switch 1. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion 2. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion -E 3. Loss of power to seal oil pumps 4. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers 5. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers -E 4. Generator Mechanical failure 1. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion 2. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion -E CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 12. cont'd west freezer 13. Floor grating and aisle promote air circulation for catalyst freezer 14. Hydrocarbon detector84A962 east. Similar west freezer 15. Line in catalyst freezer showing max stacking height 16. High temperature Alarm and local temperature indicator for catalyst freezer. S 3 C 4 1. Annual PM of Generator 2. Weekly Operator Check of Generator E 4 C 5 3. Fire Protection System 4. Fixed point monitor 5. Operating procedures/training S/E 4 c 5 6. Personal Protective Equipment S 3 c 4 7. Reactor pressure/temperature indication S/E 4 c 5 8. Automatic/Manual Emergency Kill 9. Beacon Light for catalyst freezers 10. Blowout door for catalyst freezer 11. Camera for catalyst freezer 12. Door open/close indication - 84Z953/954 east. Similar west freezer 13. Floor grating and aisle promote air circulation for catalyst freezer 14. Hydrocarbon detector84A962 east. Similar west freezer 15. Line in catalyst freezer showing max stacking height 16. High temperature Alarm and local temperature indicator for catalyst freezer. 31 S 3 C 4 1. Annual PM of Generator 2. Weekly Operator Check of Generator E 4 C 5 3 Engine Block Heater 4. Fire Protection System 5. Fixed point monitor 31 40 0A- 17 ABD00031357 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 57. Emergency Generator GN-001 that provides power for the OM & NM seal oil pumps, catalyst freezers, the instrument air compressors CP-708 & CP-709, the instrument air dryer DR-030, Pall air dryer, and the emergency cooling water pump PP-247. Type: Generator Drawings: MCC10A1-E-EL-D, 10/28/02, MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 08/24/ 94, GP-9721-62-6D,08/23/83 Design Conditions/Parameters: Automatic start when power failure occurs. Provide 415kW Dev 57.1 cont'd 4. cont'd Causes 5. Generator not in auto Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 3. Loss of power to seal oil pumps 4. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers 5. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers -E 1. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release Fire/Explosion 2. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion -E 3. Loss of power to seal oil pumps 4. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers 5. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers -E S/E 4 C S 3C E 4C S/E S E 5 6. Operating procedures/training 7. Personal Protective 4 Equipment 8. Reactor pressure/temperature 5 indication 9. Automatic/Manual Emergency Kill 10. Beacon Light for catalyst freezers 11. Blowout door for catalyst freezer 12. Camera for catalyst freezer 13. Door open/close indication - 84Z953/954 east. Similar west freezer 14. Floor grating and aisle promote air circulation for catalyst freezer 15. Hydrocarbon detector 84A962 east. Similar west freezer 16. Line in catalyst freezer showing max stacking height 17. High temperature Alarm and local temperature indicator for catalyst freezer. 1. Weekly Operator Check of Generator 2. Fire Protection System 3. Fixed point monitor 4. Operating procedures/training 5. Personal Protective Equipment 6. Reactor pressure/temperature indication 7. Automatic/Manual Emergency Kill 8. Beacon Liaht for catalvst freezers 9. Blowout door for catalyst freezer 10. Camera for catalyst freezer 11. Door open/close indication - 84Z953/954 east. Similar west freezer 12. Floor grating and aisle promote air circulation for catalyst freezer 13. Hydrocarbon detector 84A962 east. Similar west freezer 31 M- 18 ABD00031358 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 57. Emergency Generator GN-001 that provides power for the OM & NM seal oil pumps, catalyst freezers, the instrument air compressors CP-708 & CP-709, the instrument air dryer DR-030, Pall air dryer, and the emergency cooling water pump PP-247. Type: Generator Drawings: MCC10A1-E-EL-D, 10/28/02, MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 08/24/ 94, GP-9721-62-6D,08/23/83 Design Conditions/Parameters: Automatic start when power failure occurs. Provide 415kW Dev 57.1 cont'd 5. cont'd Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 14. Line in catalyst freezer showing max stacking height 15. High temperature Alarm and local temperature indicator for catalyst freezer 3oA' 19 ABD00031359 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 59. Chlorine Ton Cylinder Backup Chlorination System at Water Plant. Type: Tank Drawing: Design Conditions/Parameters: Chlorine at ambient temperatures and pressures. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 59.1 Leak 1. Corrosion 1. Chlorine release S/E 3 D 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Chlorine HB" kit located at 5 water plant 2. Emergency Response Procedures/Training 47 52 53 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal failure 1. Chlorine release S/E 4 C 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Personal Protective Equipment 3. Check packing on cylinder valves before use 4. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 5. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed 47 52 53 3. Fusible Plug blowout 1. Chlorine release S/E 2 D 4 1. Personal Protective 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 Equipment 2. Chlorine "B" kit located at water plant 3. Emergency Response Procedures/Training 47 52 53 4. Vehicle collision with cylinder 1. Chlorine release S/E 2 D 4 1. Chlorine "B" kit located at 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 water plant 2. Emergency Response Procedures/Training 47 52 53 54 <20A- 20 ABD00031360 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 60. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Backup chlorination at Water Plant. Type: Line Drawing: Design Conditions/Parameters: Chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before regulator and at 0 psig or below after regulator to ejector. Dev Causes 60.1 High Pressure 1. Water backing up into line through ejector. 2. Regulator relief (vent) valve failure under venting conditions 3. Regulator Failure to control flow/pressure 60.2 Low/No Flow 1. Blocked discharge 2. Chlorine cylinder is empty 3. High upstream pressure 4. Plugged regulator inlet filter 5. Ruptured/cracked line 60.3 Leak 1. Corrosion 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal at cylinder or rotameter failure Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Regulator malfunction S/E 4 D 5 1. Regular water plant checks 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 2. Daily visual checks 1. Regulator malfunction 2. Chlorine release S/E 4 D 5 1. Screen on vent line S/E 4 D 5 43 43 52 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 2. Tubing rupture/leak S 3C 3. Tubing rupture/leak-E E 4C 4. Overfeed chlorine to water S/E 4 C plant 5 1. Regular water plant checks 4 2. Daily visual checks 5 3. Drip leg heater 5 4. Operating Procedures/ Training for cylinder valve alignment 5. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 6. Personal Protective Equipment 43 52 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 C 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Regular water plant checks 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 B 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Regular water plant checks 3. Spare chlorine cylinder 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Regular water plant checks 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Regular water plant checks 3. Spare chlorine cylinder with regulator 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 C 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Regular water plant checks 3. Isolation valves 1 1 1 1 1 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 2. Chlorine release S/E 4 C 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 B 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 2. Chlorine release S/E 4 C 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed 3. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 43 52 43 52 fipA- 21 ABD00031361 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 60. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Backup chlorination at Water Plant. Type: Line Drawing: Design Conditions/Parameters: Chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before regulator and at 0 psig or below after regulator to ejector. Dev 60.3 cont'd 2. cont'd Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 4. Check packing on cylinder valves before use c20A- 22 ABD00031362 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP VIII. List of Recommendations A. Recommendations From Preliminary Hazard Review Evaluate need to replace corroded steam supply lines to propane vaporizers. B. Recommendations From Past Incidents Review Consider use of excess flow valves on pressure gauges in VCM and Propane service to prevent large leaks of liquid or vapor in the event of pressure gauge failure. Also consider minimizing the number or pressure gauges in VCM/Propane service. Consider implementing an operating practice of keeping pressure gauge block valves closed except when reading the gauge. Consider developing a standard specification for pressure gauges in Propane and VCM service. Consider permanent stamping of blinds used for blanking. C. Recommendations From Human Factors Review Audit all equipment, instrumentation, and process lines for necessary labeling. Consider requiring two operators on shift for start-up and continuous operation of propane system. Consider requiring a utility operator to remain with truck driver during unloading of propane. D. Recommendations From Facility Siting Review Evaluate appropriateness of number and location of Scott Air Packs in all utilities areas. Investigate ways to control vehicle and pedestrian access to road beside boilerhouse. A more detailed siting study is necessary on buildings inside the Dow Fire and Explosion Radius. See Appendix G. Evaluate suitability of control room construction during explosion, earthquake, tornadoes, chlorine leak, etc. 21 of26 ABD00031363 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP D. Recommendations From Facility Siting Review cont. Investigate appropriateness of having chlorine containers inside building. See facility siting checklist. Consider installing a horn and light for propane at LEL of 20%. Consider PM of chlorine detection systems. Consider installing light and horn for chlorine at the Vinyl cooling tower chlorine station and at the back up chlorine station at the water plant. Consider relocating propane tank farm fence outside of Dow Fire & Explosion Index circle. Consider relocating propane truck unloading valve shut-off to a remote location. Consider developing map of Scott Air packs, shut off valves, fire equipment, safety systems, etc. Consider locating the automatic switchover for the water plant chlorinator on the chlorine cylinder instead of at a location off of the cylinder to prevent a chlorine leak under pressure in the tubing to the switchover valve. Consider a surveillance system for propane tank farm, VCM storage areas, and rail storage areas. Consider ways to discourage/prevent cropdusters and other low flying aircraft from flying over the storage areas of the plant. Consider restricting contractor traffic in the plant. Consider rerouting contractor traffic around the water plant instead of between the water plant and the control room. Consider relocating all spare equipment behind barn to area behind contractor yard to improve fire fighting access to propane tank farm area. 22 of 26 ABD00031364 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP D. Recommendations From Facility Siting Review cont. Consider locating two Scott Air packs upstairs and two downstairs for boiler operator use in case of chlorine leak. Also consider locating the chlorine concentration indication in the control room. Consider checking glass on Control Room to determine if it is safety glass and consider replacing it if it isn't safety glass. Consider installing additional warning lights for chlorine leaks at more remote locations. Tie-in water plant and compound chlorine leak alarm to vinyl/compound control room. Consider PM of propane unloading valves to check functionality. Consider installing combustible gas indicators on the intake of the Emergency Generators to alarm or shut off generator in the event of a natural gas/VC M/propane leak. Evaluate the appropriate distance for storing kerosene and other materials incompatible with chlorine that are used at the Water Plant/Boiler House. Consider training all shift supervisors on chlorine/propane release/fire emergency handling. Consider relocating telephone/power lines on the South and West sides of the propane storage tanks to provide improved access for fire fighting. Consider periodic training of utility operators, utility supervisor, and shift supervisors on propane fire protection system. Consider marking propane storage area to indicate where hot work permits are required, entry, etc. Consider replacing corroded piping between the propane vaporizers and propane/air mixers. E. Recommendations From Site Specific Hazards Review No site specific hazards were identified. F. Recommendations Inadvertent Mixing Review Consider prohibiting storage of flammable materials in room next to chlorine cylinder room at the water plant. Evaluate the need for an Interaction Matrix for Propane. 23 of 26 ABD00031365 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP G. Recommendations From MOCA Review Consider reducing the number of backup chlorine cylinders at the water plant to one. The MOCA requested one backup chlorine cylinder. H. Recommendations From Safety Audits Review Include inadvertent mixing in PHA review. Consider making annual propane inspection reports available for HAZOP team review. An annual inspection is performed but reports are not readily available. 24 of 26 ABD00031366 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Recommendations RX Related Drawings 8. Evaluate need to replace old corroded steam supply lines to propane vaporizers. (No 0 Linked Items) 6. Evaluate need for emergency isolation valves on discharge of each propane storage tank. (See: 3.2.1, 3.4.2,3,4) 4 BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 11. Evaluate the need for a low oil pressure alarm, high water temperature alarm, or low water pressure alarm that may give operators time to avoid an instrument air compressor shutdown. (See: 17.1.1) 4 UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090109PID-D, 12/11/02 12. Evaluate need for developing program to annually inventory all chlorine leak response equipment. (See: 40.1.2, 43.1.2) 4 (OP) UT-CT-003, 09/29/99, (OP) UT-WP017, 07/20/00, (OP) UT-WP-018, 07/20/00 13. Evaluate need for annual chlorine A & B kit usage training for Utility Operators and Shift Supervisors (See: 40.1.1,43.1.1) 4 (OP) UT-CT-003, 09/29/99, (OP) UT-WP017, 07/20/00, (OP) UT-WP-018, 07/20/00 14. Consider installing deluge protection for propane delivery truck. (See: 1.1.4, 1.5.3) 4 BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 15. Consider additional safeguards to reduce severity of fire/explosion at the propane storage tanks. (See: 3.1.1,3.2.1,3.5.1) 4 BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 16. Consider fireproofing saddles for the propane storage tanks. (See: 3.1.1,3.2.1,3.5. 4 BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 D 30. Evaluate installation of remote start switches for the emergency generator, 4 UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090109- emergency cooling water pump, and CP-708 & CP-709 air compressor with remote PID-D, 12/11/02 run indication. (See: 17.1.1) 31. Consider providing an additional emergency source of air to operate critical valves in vinyl such as the reactor recovery valves and main charge and dump valves. (See: 17.1.1,3, 57.1.1,2,3,4,5) 4 GP-9721-62-6D,08/23/83, MCC10A1 -E-ELD, 10/28/02, MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 08/24/94, UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090109PID-D, 12/11/02 32. Consider regular PM of CP-708 & CP-709 Compressor instruments (See: 17.1.1,3) 4 UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090109PID-D, 12/11/02 40. Recommend audit of the catalyst material rotation practice to ensure that the procedure is sufficient in keeping material rotated in the walk-in freezers. (See: 57. 14) 4 GP-9721 -62-60,08/23/83, MCC10A1 -E-ELD, 10/28/02, MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 08/24/94 41. Consider regular PM of chlorine area monitors and alarms. (See: 35.1.4, 36.1.4, 38. 4 (OP) UT-CT-001, 09/29/99, (OP) UT-CT- 1.1,2, 39.1.1,2, 41.1.1,2, 42.1.1,2, 53.1.4) 002, 09/29/99, (OP) UT-WP-002, 07/20/00, (OP) UT-WP-003, 08/09/00, UT-090117- PID-D, 10/10/02, UT-090123-PID-D, 10/23/ 02. WP-090106-P1D-D, 09/26/02 42. Consider installing a light and horn to the chlorine area monitor at the Vinyl 4 (OP) UT-CT-001,09/29/99, (OP) UT-CT- chlorination station to alert local traffic of a chlorine leak/release. (See: 35.1.3,4, 35. 002, 09/29/99, UT-090117-PID-D, 10/10/ 3.1,2, 38.1.1,2, 39.1.1,2, 45.1.1,2,3, 53.1.3,4, 53.3.1,2) 02, UT-090123-PID-D, 10/23/02 43. Consider periodic PM of chlorine valves, regulator, tubing, rotameters, and ejectors including periodic replacement as appropriate. (See: 35.1.1,2,3, 35.3.1,2, 36.1.1,2, 3, 36.3.1,2, 38.1.1,2, 39.1.1,2, 53.1.1,2,3, 53.3.1,2, 60.1.1,2,3, 60.3.1,2) 4 (OP) UT-CT-001,09/29/99, (OP) UT-CT002, 09/29/99, UT-090117-PID-D, 10/10/ 02, UT-090123-PID-D, 10/23/02, WP090106-PID-D, 09/26/02 44. Consider tying local chlorine area alarm into compound control room. (See: 52.1.1, 2,3, 53.1.3,4) 4 UT-090123-PID-D, 10/23/02 45. Consider tying in water plant chlorine area alarm to the vinyl control room. (See: 36. 4 (OP) UT-WP-002, 07/20/00, (OP) UT-WP- 1.3,4, 36.3.1,2,3, 37.1.1,2,3, 41.1.1,2, 42.1.1,2) 003, 08/09/00, WP-090106-PID-D, 09/26/ 02 46. Consider installing signs and additional flashing lights to stop traffic from driving by 4 (OP) UT-WP-002, 07/20/00, (OP) UT-WP- the chlorine room when chlorine area alarm is on - as indicated by the flashing light. 003, 08/09/00, WP-090106-PID-D, 09/26/ Also consider using flashing light when unloading chlorine trucks. (See: 36.1.3,4, 02 ifA- 1 ABD00031367 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Recommendations RX Related Drawings 46. cont'd 36.3.1,2,3, 37.1.1,2,3, 41.1.1,2, 42.1.1,2) 47. Consider annual chlorine emergency response training for utility operators, utility supervisor, and compound and vinyl shift supervisors. Also annual employee/ contractor training as to hazards, warnings, and evacuation procedures for chlorine release. (See: 37.1.1,2,3, 40.1.1,43.1.1,45.1.1,2,3, 52.1.1,2,3, 59.1.1,2,3,4) 4 (OP) UT-CT-003, 09/29/99, (OP) UT-WP017. 07/20/00, (OP) UT-WP-018, 07/20/00, UT-090117-PID-D, 10/10/02, UT-090123PID-D, 10/23/02, WP-090106-PID-D, 09/26/ 02 52. Consider installing a chlorine leak detection and alarm at backup chlorination area at water plant. (See: 59.1.1,2,3,4, 60.1.2,3, 60.3.1,2) 4 53. Consider installing a cover or building over the backup chlorine cylinders to protect from direct sunlight and dampness. (See: 59.1.1,2,3,4) 4 54. Consider installing more substantial vehicle barriers to protect backup chlorine cylinders at the water plant from vehicle damage. (See: 59.1.4) 4 1. None (See: 1.1.3, 1.2.1,2, 1.3.1, 1.4.1,2,3, 1.5.1,2, 2 2.1,2,3, 2 4.1,2,3, 4 2.1,2,4.3. 5 (OP) UT-AS-001,05/29/02, (OP) UT-AS- 1.2.3.4.5, 4 4.1,2,3,4,5,6, 4.5.1,2,3,4, 5 2.1,2,3,4,5, 6.1.1,3,4, 6.2.1,6.3.1,2, 6.4.1,2, 009, 07/26/00, (OP) UT-PR-001.08/09/00, 7.1.1.2.3, 7.2.1,2, 8.1.1,2, 8.2.2,3,4, 8.3.1,2,3, 9.1.2,3,4, 9.3.1.2, 9.4.1,2, 10.1.1,2, (OP) UT-PR-002, 08/09/00, (OP) UT-PR- 10.2.1.2.3, 11.1.1,2,3, 11.2.1,2,3,4, 12.1.1,2,4, 12.2.1,2,4, 13.1.1,2,4, 14.1.1,2,4, 17. 003, 08/09/00, (OP) UT-PR-004, 08/09/00, 1.2,4, 17.2.1,2,3, 18.1.2,3,4,5, 18.2.1,2, 19.1.1,2, 19.2.1,2, 20.1.1,2,3,4,5, 21.1.1,2, (OP) VINYL-NM-E008, 05/01/99, (OP) 21.2 1,2, 22.1.1, 22.2.1,2, 22.3 2, 23.1.1,2,3, 23.3.1,2, 24.1.1,2, 24.2.1,2, 25.1.1,2, VINYL-NM-E013, 04/27/99, (OP) VINYL- 25.3.1,2,3,4,5, 26.2.1,2, 27.1.1,3, 28.1.1,3, 29.1.1,2,3, 30.1.1,2,3,4, 31.1.1,2, 31.2.1, NM-N475, 08/31/00, (OP) VINYL-OM- 2.3.4.5, 31.3.1,2,3, 31.4.1, 32.1.1,2, 32.2.1,2,3,4,5, 32.3.1,2,3, 32.4.1, 33.1.1,2, 33. E007, 05/01/99, (OP) VINYL-OM-E008, 05/ 2.1.2.3.4.5, 33.3.1,2,3, 33.4.1, 34.1.1,2,3,4, 35.2.1,2,3,4,5, 36.2.1,2,3,4,5, 44.2.1,2, 01/99, BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02, BP- 48.1.2.3, 48.2.1,2, 49.1.1,2,3,4,5,6.7, 50.1.1,2, 50.2.1,2,3,4,5, 50.3.1,2,3, 50.4.1, 51. 090101-PID-D, 12/11/02, BP-090102-PID- 1.1.2.3.4.5, 53.2.1,2,3,4,5, 54.1.1,2,3,4, 55.1.1,2,3,4, 56.1.1,58.1.1,3,4, 58.2.1,2,3, D, 12/11/02, NE-D606-57-4-D, 06/29/92, 60.2.1,2,3,4,5) UT-090102-PID-D, 2/25/94, UT-090108- PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/ 02, UT-090109A-PID-D, 10/15/02, UT- 090111-PID-D, 09/26/02, UT-090112-PID- D, 12/11/02, UT-090113-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090114-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090115- PID-D, 10/09/02, UT-090117-PID-D, 10/10/ 02, UT-090122-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT- 090123-PID-D, 10/23/02, WP-090106-PID- D, 09/26/02 2. Consider safeguards for blocked in thermal expansion. (See: 1.12,2.1.6) 5 (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00, BP-090100PID-D, 09/19/02 3. Evaluate sizing basis and calculations for propane pump relief valve as well as basis for set pressure. Consider lowering set pressure to be less than or equal to vaporizer MAWP. (See: 2.1.1,2,3,4,5,6, 4.1.1,2,3,4) 5 (OP) UT-PR-001, 08/09/00, BP-090100PID-D, 09/19/02, BP-090101-PID-D, 12/11/ 02 4. Consider LEL activated shutdown of propane transfer pumps and actuated block valves. (See: 2.1.1,2,3,4,5,6, 2.3.1,2,3,4,5, 2.5.1,2,3,4,5, 3.1.2,3,4,5) 5 (OP) UT-PR-001, 08/09/00, BP-090100PID-D, 09/19/02 5. Consider high pressure shutdown of unloading valves and transfer pumps and valves. (See- 3.1 2,3,4,5, 3.3.2) 5 BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 7. Consider placing a rain protection cover over the propane storage tank relief valve outlet stack to reduce the potential for plugging the stack during freezing weather (See: 3.1.5, 3.5.2,3.4) 5 BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 9. Evaluate unloading procedures and safeguards to prevent unloading liquid propane 5 (OP) UT-PR-001, 08/09/00, (OP) UT-PR- into the propane surge tank, the vent line, or the flare through the surge/storage tank 004, 08/09/00, BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/ vent line. (See: 9.3.3, 11.3.1) 02, BP-090102-PID-D, 12/11/02, NE-D606- 57-4-D, 06/29/92 10. Evaluate need to better label equipment, instrumentation, and process lines in all utilities areas. (See: 12.1.3, 12.2.3, 13 13. 14 13) 5 (OP) UT-PR-002, 08/09/00. (OP) UT-PR003, 08/09/00 2+A- 2 ABD00031368 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Recommendations RX Related Drawings 17. Evaluate current technology of propane storage tank level gauging devices with continuous level indication and high level alarm capability to replace existing gauging devices (See: 3.3.1,2,3) 5 BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 18. Evaluate requiring operator to double verify valve line up for unloading. (See: 3.3.2) 5 BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 19. Evaluate sizing basis for Vaporizer relief valve including the basis for blocked in vaporizer with the propane transfer pump running. (See: 4.1.1,2,4) 5 (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00, BP-090101PID-D, 12/11/02 20. Consider installing a pressure controller just upstream of the pressure tap for PIC 2706 that will control the pressure and flow to the vaporizers to 125 psig when the pressure in the storage tanks exceed 125 psig. (See: 4.3.6) 5 (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00, BP-090101PID-D, 12/11/02 21. Consider relocating the relief valve protecting the vaporizer steam tube to a location 5 (OP) UT-PR-001, 08/09/00, BP-090101- upstream of the tube bundle. (See: 5.1.1,2,3,4) PID-D, 12/11/02 22. Evaluate set up to determine if the vaporizer steam system is consistent with vaporizer manufacturer's recommendations and if high propane pressure in the absence of steam is a problem. (See: 6.1.2) 5 (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00, BP-090101PID-D, 12/11/02 23. Consider establishing a PM on inlet air filter for Propane/Air Mix Cabinet Inlet Air Filter. (See: 8.2.1) 5 (OP) UT-PR-001.08/09/00, BP-090102PID-D, 12/11/02 24. Consider installing a flame arrester on the propane surge tank relief header to prevent flash back during a relief condition with the flare lit. Or consider relocating the surge tank relief header stack to a location other than next to the flare stack. (See: 9.1.1) 5 (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00, BP-090102PID-D, 12/11/02, NE-D606-57-4-D, 06/29/ 92 25. Consider fireproofing the supports for the propane surge tanks (See: 9.2.1,2) 5 (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00, BP-090102PID-D, 12/11/02, NE-D606-57-4-D, 06/29/ 92 26. Consider marking area where propane lines run underground or restricting traffic in the area. (See: 10.2.4) 5 (OP) UT-PR-001, 08/09/00, (OP) UT-PR002, 08/09/00, BP-090102-PID-D, 12/11/ 02, NE-D606-57-4-D, 06/29/92, UT090102-PID-D, 2/25/94 27. Consider changing the pump run interlock to include a shutdown interlock when any 5 (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00, BP-090100- one of the actuated block valves loses an open indication. (See: 2.1.3) PID-D, 09/19/02 28. Evaluate adding instructions for manually setting off the deluge when a fire is observed or a vapor release is identified. (See: 15.1.1,2) 5 (OP) UT-PR-006, 08/09/00 29. Evaluate section 2 of UT-PR-006 for appropriate action. Should the manual valves under the propane storage tank be left open when the propane system is not in use to prevent thermal expansion of blocked in propane. (See: 16.1.1,2) 5 (OP) UT-PR-006, 08/09/00 33. Consider leaving the header valves on the #6 cooling supply and return header to CP-708&CP-709 OPEN for use during an emergency or consider installing a chain operator for the header valves with PM lubrication of chain operator. (See: 18.1.1, 48.1.1) 5 UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090113PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090115-PID-D, 10/09/ 02 34. Consider regular PM of instrument air coolers (See: 19.3.1) 5 UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090109PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090109A-PID-D, 10/ 15/02 35. Consider providing a DCS/boilerhouse alarm for Airtek malfunction (See: 22.3.1) 5 UT-090109A-PID-D, 10/15/02 36. Consider installing air line filter / moisture trap upstream of critical control valves. (See: 23.2.1,2, 25.2.1,2) 5 UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090109APID-D, 10/15/02, UT-090111 -PID-D, 09/26/ 02 37. Consider checking DM-300 and DM-810 for water on some regular basis. (See: 26. 1.1,2, 44.1.1,2) 5 UT-090111-PID-D, 09/26/02 3 ABD00031369 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Recommendations RX Related Drawings 38. Consider performing a lighting survey to determine if additional lights need to be installed. Consider encouraging operator to report lights that are not working and tag them for repair. (See: 27.1.2, 28.1.2) 5 (OP) UT-AS-001, 05/29/02 39 Determine source of emergency cooling water. P&ID shows that it is coming from process water loop. Procedure indicates that it is deluge water. Correct P&ID or procedure. (See: 46.1.1,2,3, 47.1.1,2,3) 5 (OP) VINYL-NM-E008, 05/01/99, (OP) VINYL-OM-E008, 05/01/99, UT-090112PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090113-PID-D, 12/11/ 02 48. Review current code requirements for propane liquid unloading line pressure ratings 5 BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 and determine if changes to line pressure class or pressure relief is warranted. (See: 1.1.1) 49. Determine the high pressure shutoff for the propane mixers - UT-PR-001 indicates 8.5 psi NE-D606-57-4-D indicates 9.5 psi. Update procedures or drawing as appropriate. (See: 9.1.1) 5 (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00, BP-090102PID-D, 12/11/02, NE-D606-57-4-D, 06/29/ 92 50. Consider placing all chlorine containers in an enclosure or consider installing additional chlorine area monitors at different wind directions where chlorine cylinders are located . (See: 38.1.1,2, 39.1.1,2, 41.1.1,2, 42.1.1,2) 5 (OP) UT-CT-001,09/29/99, (OP) UT-CT002, 09/29/99, (OP) UT-WP-002, 07/20/00, (OP) UT-WP-003, 08/09/00 51. Document loop information on pressure switch and actuted valve on Instrument Air Line from the West Joy at DM-175. (See: 58.1.2) 5 UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090109PID-D, 12/11/02 2+A- 4 ABD00031370 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP IX. Items Needing Further Review Relief valve discharge from the propane surge tanks are run along and discharge near the propane flare. The relief valve discharge line does not have a flame arrester on it. Update equipment files and P&ID with propane vaporizer information . PSV-PR-0035 is set at 375 psig. The A2-1 specification maximum pressure limit is 285 psig @ 100 F. Re-label FIC-2706 to PIC-2706 to match P&ID and operating procedures. Consider including steps for the lighting the propane flare in the appropriate propane system procedure. Determine the propane mixer shut off pressure and update the documentation. UT-PR-XXX indicates 8.5 psig and NE-D606-57-4-D indicates 9.5 psig. Determine if an adequate amount of firewater can be supplied to the Propane Tank Farm area with the existing equipment. The Firewater Hydraulic Analysis dated August 1998 (Rev. I) indicates that the maximum flow rate achievable with existing equipment is 1200 gpm at 100 psig. The Class ;`A" Design for the Propane Deluge System dated October 13, 1988 indicates that 2267 gpm is required. Consider installing automatic switchover for #2A cooling tower pumps or consider leaving Lukenheimer valve slightly open. Consider remote ON/OFF for the #2A cooling tower pumps and pump run indication/alarm. Consider developing a procedure for V-l 1 standby generator. Consider including in UT-CT-001 a reference to the PSM procedure that states the maximum intended inventory of chlorine in the plant. Update procedures which reference the location of the Chlorine "B" kits. The chlorine "Bv kits are currently located at the boilerhouse and the ERT team cart. Evaluate the appropriate size of the relief valve for DM-175 and verify that the correct size is installed. Consider improving the documentation of recommendation evaluation and action to allow future FIAZOP teams to know not only that the recommendation was addressed, but what was done. Consider revising procedure UT-CT-001 to include Cooling Tower #7. 25 of 26 ABD00031371 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Determine the relief valve sizing basis for relief valves where documentation is not available and determine if the installed valve is adequate. Determine the appropriate status for the valves downstream of the propane transfer pump relief valves. Evaluate the piping components on the propane transfer line to the propane vaporizers to determine if they are consistent with the B2-1 specification and/or the propane transfer pump relief valve setting. Determine the source of emergency cooling water and update the P&ID's as appropriate. Update procedure UT-AS-001 and UT-AS-009 to reflect aftercooler change. Update the P&ID's to include the Backup chlorination system at the water plant. Evaluate the condition of the storage location for the 150# cylinders to determine if it is appropriate for chlorine storage. 26 of 26 ABD00031372 ABD00031373 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix A. Marked Up P&ID's ABD00031374 12/18/02 Utilities Area (OP) UT-AS-001,05/29/02 (See: 27, 28) (OP) UT-AS-009, 07/26/00 (See: 29, 30) (OP) UT-CT-001, 09/29/99 (See: 38, 39) (OP) UT-CT-002, 09/29/99 (See: 38, 39) (OP) UT-CT-003, 09/29/99 (See: 40) (OP) UT-PR-001, 08/09/00 (See: 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) (OP) UT-PR-002, 08/09/00 (See: 10, 12, 13) (OP) UT-PR-003, 08/09/00 (See. 14) (OP) UT-PR-004, 08/09/00 (See: 11) (OP) UT-PR-006, 08/09/00 (See: 15, 16) (OP) UT-WP-002, 07/20/00 (See: 41,42) (OP) UT-WP-003, 08/09/00 (See: 41,42) (OP) UT-WP-017, 07/20/00 (See: 43) (OP) UT-WP-018, 07/20/00 (See: 43) (OP) VINYL-NM-E008, 05/01/99 (See: 34, 47) (OP) VINYL-NM-E013, 04/27/99 (See: 55) (OP) VINYL-NM-N475, 08/31/00 (See: 56) (OP) VINYL-OM-E007, 05/01/99 (See: 54) (OP) VINYL-OM-E008, 05/01/99 (See: 34, 46) BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 (See: 1,2, 3, 11) BP-090101-PID-D, 12/11/02 (See: 4, 5, 6) BP-090102-PID-D, 12/11/02 (See: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) GP-9721-62-6D,08/23/83 (See: 57) MCC10A1-E-EL-D, 10/28/02 (See: 57) MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 08/24/94 (See: 57) NE-D606-57-4-D, 06/29/92 (See: 9, 10) UT-090102-PID-D, 2/25/94 (See: 10) UT-090108-P1D-D, 12/11/02 (See: 17, 19, 20,21, 58) UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02 (See: 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 58) UT-090109A-PID-D, 10/15/02 (See: 19, 22, 23) UT-090111-PID-D, 09/26/02 (See: 25, 26, 44) UT-090112-PID-D, 12/11/02 (See: 31,46) UT-090113-PID-D, 12/11/02 (See: 32, 47, 48) 1 12/18/02 UT-090114-PID-D, 12/11/02 (See: 20, 33, 49) UT-090115-P1D-D, 10/09/02 (See: 20, 48, 49) UT-090117-PID-D, 10/10/02 (See: 35, 45) UT-090122-PID-D, 12/11/02 (See: 50, 51) UT-090123-PID-D, 10/23/02 (See: 52, 53) WP-090106-PID-D, 09/26/02 (See: 36, 37) ABD00031375 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA 2 ABD00031376 no. BP-090101-PID- ABD00031378 TO V -M OBttB BLOC. or-090i io-PC-o ABD00031379 ABD00031380 ABD00031382 no. UT-090109A-PID- ABD00031383 C T -0 0 4 WEST COOLING TOWER ? i511 C-W-M-B*00-W-H-3i -- - 9 I 9XI II ?$? I i i A AAA o i3 I3 AA r. - -? - 9 is Z 5 I ii AA fi s 5 8r si g3 I I 3 A Ar* CXP 5 I 8 0 S AI 1V N a A 4/ A OO O is 8*>1 rs. il s*5 A 1 1 ABD00031385 ABD00031386 ABD00031387 ABD00031388 ABD00031389 ABD00031390 n m n iiw e TOWER chlorination PAID # 5 COOLING TOWER CHLORINATION SYSTEM 7 CV-4Q4 V NOTCH CHIQR1NATQR * ft l SUES UM. FCQk M0#/tMV 9 POLYMER SKID UNIT ii ft a st ft MI-200 POLYMER FEED SYSTEM I m t - VCLD HCOa 4B-I00B a ai ii i V Is VA ot 93< I i 9 1 eft o i81 i ft ABD00031391 PAID ADOITIVE SYSTEM UMAWINU NUMbfcH UKWVINIj IMUMtfcH ABD00031392 --- UHWVffMU NUMMCtl Ape-rm UHWVN^b nUMOO ABD00031393 ABD00031394 .. *r i:i *i i.i t.i a i.i i .' : o c* o - J*' r> -. .! z\ i.: * 1* 11 ii o i - u ' LJ ' I.I ,t! i. 1,1 -:1 t ^ b ' 1*. :> U> o O '" is " LJ *i ; - in iTk ` ! !- (v o , * !r* ri !' !: Ml --, -J .n.. C"*l - >.,.. 1C** *--1 .; I.I O ,J CT o * > : i. i. a --a --o------------------------- \\ \\ .-- < ) L.J 4. n: a. ci 4 u CjM fll 'T 1 'l ; 1 >' -1 a Z)(=- 4t" 111 d: rl n. c1 1^ ci < u' 3 \z 0 1- n: <1. 1. {l -* 0 l_J .. (-- l.j (/)& .-- a: O' \* a - d 1/ 5- I/I Cl S-- Cl 4: lO I/O- - <3/i o: ... a-) 5n. :j: -4. c> '1 -- _ -- ,T rr s c> I.I *- - iZ) n, 1/1 -- u >}' itu.l ii. >- ft:. rr. < CO > t i ;j i vo i ; jn.i clnj a -- t j.i [xl -I [ LJ -rl' O ii.j r>: l.i.l 01 ii - Dw o" -siii -3c-o | |oOO |-jc~0] ,0 *_^rS,_i_l"'ioOOo j-3-n=i}-- 0 _ ; { |-oOO<>C j-3c"ia:-- <-<*0 0-+--I foOOo-------- -<*o~o-J--| | <00 Lr--l^/J I - lil.-.ori.: - LJ 0. Aii AA Cl Cl (_ t ABD00031395 OMINOUS ABD00031396 ABD00031397 appendix b ABD00031398 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix B. Copies of Operating Procedures Referenced ABD00031399 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: Vinyl Control Room Building PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Emergency Generator for Vinyl Control Room APPROVED BY: Unit Manager Resin DATE: I. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to describe the operation of the emergency generator supplying emergency power to vinyl control room. II. REFERENCES N/A III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS General N/A A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals N/A B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure CHEMICAL PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT ENGINEERING CONTROLS ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS N/A Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E007 Page 1 of 1 ABD00031400 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: Vinyl Control Room Building PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Emergency Generator for Vinyl Control Room C. Control Measures to be Taken if Exposed N/A D. Quality Control for Raw Materials and Control of Hazardous Chemical Inventories N/A E. Special or Unique Hazards N/A IV. DISCUSSION The power distribution system for the vinyl control room consists of two separate feeds from substation 7 480 volt AC switchgear (only one of these will be in use at a time). These feeds are fed into the normal line terminals of the automatic transfer switch. The feed from the emergency generator is fed into the emergency line terminal. The load side terminals are then connected to the motor control center, MCC7AB1-1. This motor control center supplies the 480-volt AC power to all loads in the control room. Examples of these loads are UPS, emergency lighting, power transformers, air conditioning units, 24-volt DC battery chargers, pressurization blowers, and the plant telephone system. V. OPERATING PROCEDURE ''NOTE" The emergency generator is a 450-kilowatt generator powered by a 643 horsepower detroit diesel engine. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E007 Page 2 of 1 ABD00031401 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: Vinyl Control Room Building PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Emergency Generator for Vinyl Control Room V. OPERATING PROCEDURE-Continued "NOTE" The automatic transfer switch is located on the west wall of the electrical equipment room (room 109). The electrical equipment room is located midway of the west side of the control room building. 1.0 Operation of Emergency Generator. 1.1 The emergency power system will be activated when power is interrupted on the lines coming in from Sub #7. When this occurs, the automatic transfer switch will switch from the normal line terminals to the emergency line terminals. This will place the emergency generator on the terminals that will be supplying power to MCC7AB1-1. This transfer will occur when the emergency generator's output frequency reaches 60 Hz (this typically takes about 10-15 seconds). During this time, the UPS will keep the 120 VAC loads from the DCS energized, and the 24 VDC battery system will keep the actuated valves and analog transmitters fully operational. Once the switchover occurs, the emergency generator will provide power to all loads that are attached to MCC7AB1-1. Now, the UPS and 24 VDC system will go back into the standby mode. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E007 Page 3 of I ABD00031402 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: Vinyl Control Room Building PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Emergency Generator for Vinyl Control Room V. OPERATING PROCEDURE-Continued 1.2 Once the cause of the power failure has been determined and corrected, the automatic transfer switch should automatically switch back to its normal operating position. If it does not, depress the "switch back" button on the automatic transfer switch. At this time, the automatic transfer switch will switchback to the normal line terminals, thus allowing the feed from Sub #7 to power the loads in the vinyl control room. *****************************^U'J'|Q^***********#************** The emergency generator has a starting mode switch labeled "run off auto". This switch must be in auto for generator to start during a power failure. "NOTE" The generator is tested weekly by electricians following the attached weekly test check, see attachment No. 1. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E007 Page 4 of 1 ABD00031403 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: Vinyl Control Room Building PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Emergency Generator for Vinyl Control Room VI. OPERATING LIMITS Critical Parameter Generator starting Mode switch Loop Number N/A Oper. Limit Consequence of Deviation Prevention or Corrective Action Switch must be in Auto. Generator would not start in power failure. No emergency power Insure switch is in automatic VII. SAFETY SYSTEMS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS Safety System Function Performed Halon System Used to extinguish fires in control room. VIII. REVISION HISTORY Description of the Change Updated procedure to reflect several changes Revision 1 05/01/99 Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E007 Page 5 of 1 ABD00031404 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Standby Generator Operation APPROVED BY:_______________________________ DATE: I. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to identify the equipment involved and describe the steps necessary to operate the Cooling Tower Standby Generator. II. REFERENCES: A. Aberdeen Safety and Health Manual B. Drawing SW-003120-EL-D, Phase 3 One Line Diagram (Cooling Tower Standby Generator) HI. SAFETY & HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS A. General There is potential for exposure to natural gas when performing this procedure. Refer to the MSDS for specifications. VSP 5, Respiratory Protection policy, must be followed as established in the Safety and Health Manual. There is potential for exposure to hazardous energy when performing this procedure. Extreme caution should be exercised at all times. VSP 32, Electrical Safe Work Practices policy, must be followed as established in the Safety and Health Manual. B. Properties/Hazards Of Chemicals Natural Gas - a transparent, colorless hydrocarbon vapor that is lighter than air, odorized to allow detection by smell. Flammable, asphixiant. Revision Date: 04/27/99 WRITTEN BY: Dan Miller PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-E013 PAGE 1 of 8 ABD00031405 CONDEA Vista Company Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Standby Generator Operation III. SAFETY & HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS (Continued) C. Precautions To Prevent Exposure CHEMICAL Natural Gas PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT N/A ENGINEERING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS CONTROLS Pressure safety valve No sources of ignition or open flames allowed in plant without Hot Work Permit. D. Control Measures To Be Taken If Exposed See MSDS for specifications E. Quality Control For Raw Materials And Control Of Hazardous Chemical Inventories N/A F. Special Or Unique Hazards N/A G. Safety Systems And Their Functions Safety Systems General Monitors Fixed Point Monitors Function Performed 1) Samples specific areas to analyze hydrocarbon concentration. 2) Activate the deluge system. 1) Samples specific areas to analyze hydrocarbon concentration. 2) Sends hydrocarbon sample analysis to the DCS. Revision Date: 04/27/99 WRITTEN BY: Dan Miller PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-E013 PAGE 2 of 8 ABD00031406 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Standby Generator Operation IV. DISCUSSION A. General Information The Cooling Tower Emergency Generator is a natural gas engine-driven generator which provides standby electric power to operate one cooling water pump on #7 Cooling Tower in the event of a power failure. When utility power to the MCC 17B1-1, 4160V Main Breaker 52-MI fails, a 15 second timer starts and when it times out the breaker (52-MI) opens. When the breaker opens the generator start cycle begins. When the generator voltage reaches approximately 90 percent of rated voltage and the frequency is 60 Hertz, the Generator Breaker (52-G1) closes, supplying power the MCC. The cooling water pump that is selected by the selector switch on Generator Breaker (52-G1) panel starts automatically. The Main and Generator breakers are interlocked so they cannot be energized at the same time. One cooling water pump is selected to operate by a selector switch. All other motors on MCC17B1-1 will not run while the generator is supplying power. Although the standby generator starts automatically and its operating status is monitored by DCS, it must be shut down manually from the local control panel since there are no remote controls provided. The control panel, located outside, displays the following operating variables: Engine oil pressure Intake manifold pressure Engine cooling water temperature Engine RPM & Hours per Operating Cycle Intake manifold temperature Note: The panel also has a pull to run & push to stop switch located on the east side of the generator The control panel located inside # 17 MCC building north wall, displays the following: Manual Stop Auto HRS run time Reset button Revision Date: 04/27/99 RPM Warning light PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-E013 WRITTEN BY: Dan Miller PAGE 3 of 8 ABD00031407 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Standby Generator Operation IV. DISCUSSION - Continued B. Location Codes Cooling Tower Emergency Generator GN-003 V. INSTRUCTIONS A. Normal Automatic Startup NOTE1 2 Standby Generator Normal Operating Conditions are as follows: 1. Substation 102, 15 KV Feeder Breaker to MCC17 4160Volt Transformer is CLOSED and utility power is present. 2. MCC 17 4160 V Main Breaker 52-MI is CLOSED, Switch in the RED position. 3. Generator Breaker 52-G1 is OPEN. Switch in the RED position 4. Generator Engine Control Switch is in AUTO position 5. Cooling Water Pump selected for Auto Start is RUNNING. 6. 543,5=N/A Switch Positions l=PP-540, 2=PP-541, 3=PP-542, 4=PP- 1. On loss of utility power to 4160 main breaker 52-M1, GN-003, Standby Generator starts. 2. When standby generator voltage reaches approximately 90% of rated voltage, the following actions occur: a. Cooling water pump power bus is isolated from normal feeder. b. Cooling water pump power bus is connected to standby generator terminals. c. Control power to the following motor breakers is interrupted: All three cooling water pumps except the one selected for emergency operation Reactors 746 & 747 agitators d. The selected cooling water pump starts. Revision Date: 04/27/99 PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-E013 WRITTEN BY: Dan Miller PAGE 4 of 8 ABD00031408 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Standby Generator Operation d. Verify that the ON/OFF switches located at the pumps for the pumps that are not running are switched to the OFF position Revision Date: 04/27/99 WRITTEN BY: Dan Miller PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-E013 PAGE 5 of 8 ABD00031409 CONDEA Vista Company Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Standby Generator Operation V. INSTRUCTIONS - Continued Return to Normal Utility Power NOTE Normal utility power is restored manually at the standby generator control panel. Initial Conditions are as follows: 1. The ON/OFF switches located at the pumps for the pumps that are not running are in the OFF position. 2. Engine control switch is in Auto position. 3. Sub 102,15 KV Feeder Breaker 52-A1 is CLOSED. 4. Voltage must be present on incoming line at 4160V Main Breaker 52- Ml. 5. 4160V Main Breaker 52-MI is OPEN. 6. Generator Breaker 52-G1 is CLOSED with generator running. Verify voltage is present on Incoming meter. Manually open Generator Breaker 52-G1. NOTE After tripping the generator, the Start/Run signal is maintained, and the generator continues running. After 5 second delay, manually close 4160 V Main Breaker 52-MI. NOTE Closing 4160V Main Breaker 52-MI enables the Auto-Start control, and begins the generator cool down time of approximately 1 minute. After the cooldown timer times out, the generator will shut down. Revision Date: 04/27/99 WRITTEN BY: Dan Miller PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-E013 PAGE 6 of 8 ABD00031410 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Standby Generator Operation V. INSTRUCTIONS - Continued Auto-Start Test Procedure CAUTION Performing this test will kill the #7 Cooling Tower & Reactor 746 & 747 agitator 4160V main bus until standby generator power is on line. Reactors 746 & 747, and the New Module Low Mole Stripper must be out of service during this test to avoid process upsets. NOTE Standby Generator Conditions for Auto Start testing are the same as for normal operation: 1. Sub 102, 15 KV Feeder Breaker 52-A1 is CLOSED, and utility power is present. 2. 4160 V Main Breaker 52-MI is CLOSED. 3. 4160 V Generator Breaker 52-GI is OPEN. 4. Generator Engine Control Switch is in AUTO. 5. Cooling Water Pump selected for Auto Start is running. 1. Notify the Shift Supervisor of intent to test Cooling Tower Standby Generator Auto-Start. 2. Manually OPEN Sub 102 15 KV Feeder Breaker 52-A1. 2.1 Loss of bus voltage for 15 seconds will trip Breaker 52-M1. 2.2 After Breaker 52-M 1 opens, the generator will crank and ramp to operating speed and voltage. 2.3 Generator Breaker 52-GI will close. 2.4 Selected cooling water pump will start. CAUTION If any cooling water pump other than the one selected for emergency operation, or a reactor agitator starts, the control circuit has malfunctioned. If this occurs, the generator will trip on overload. Revision Date: 04/27/99 WRITTEN BY: Dan Miller PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-E013 PAGE 7 of 8 ABD00031411 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Standby Generator Operation V. INSTRUCTIONS - Continued D. Maintenance Test Procedure NOTE A weekly generator test is necessary to ensure generator startup capability. This procedure only tests the standby generator, and can be performed without affecting the cooling water pump or reactor agitator operation. 1. Inform Lead Operator of intent to perform maintenance test on GN-003, Cooling Tower Standby Generator. 2. Turn engine control switch to Manual position. NOTE Turning the engine control switch to Manual position should start the generator. 3. Test run generator for 45 minutes. 4. Perform weekly PM checks. VII. OPERATING LIMITS Critical Parameter Loop Number Oper. Limit Consequence of Deviation Prevention or Corrective Action Revision Date: 04/27/99 WRITTEN BY: Dan Miller PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-EO13 PAGE 8 of 8 ABD00031412 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Standby Generator Operation VIII. REVISION HISTORY Description of the Change Added step to switch off the pumps that are not running prior to return to utility power, and other minor revisions. Ref.: 99-NM004 MOCA. Revision 04/27/99 Revision Date: 04/27/99 WRITTEN BY: Dan Miller PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-E013 PAGE 9 of 8 ABD00031413 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System General Information Page 1 of 5 08/09/00 UT-PR-001 APPROVED BY: Jimmy Autrey - Maintenance Manager Date: I. Purpose - To provide general information on the use & operation of the propane system. II. References- MSDS For Propane. Liquefied Petroleum Gas Plant Operators Manual, LP Gas Industrial Equipment Company. III. Safety and Health Considerations - General - Liquid propane may cause frostbite if contacted. Vapor has a natural gas odor. Propane is extremely flammable & heavier than air. A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals - Reference MSDS. B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure- Chemical Personal Protective Equipment Engineering Controls Administrative Controls Propane Nomex Deluge System General Monitors N/A C. Control Measures to be Taken if Exposed - Reference MSDS Inhalation- Remove to fresh air. Guard against self injury. Apply artificial respiration if breathing has stopped. 08/09/00 ABD00031414 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System General Information Page 2 of 5 08/09/00 UT-PR-001 IV. Discussion - The propane vaporization system is designed to provide propane as a fuel when natural gas is not available. This system provides a switch in fuel without altering existing equipment. The Utility Operator handles the fuel changes. Pure propane does not bum efficiently in systems designed to bum natural gas because the combustion of propane demands more air than the combustion of natural gas. In order to burn the propane in this system, the air demand is lowered to the same as natural gas by mixing the propane with air. The major pieces of equipment in the propane vaporization system are the transfer pumps, the steam fired vaporizers, and the propane-air mixers. There are two transfer pumps located at the south end of the center propane storage tank in the propane tank farm. Only one pump is ever used at any one time and the other pump is a spare. If there already is 125 psig in the feedline, there is enough pressure to sustain the vaporizers and the pumps may be bypassed. The propane feeds into three vertical steam-fired vaporizers which are located north of the propane storage tanks. The steam to each of the vaporizers is left on to provide immediate service in winter months. Each vaporizer's output capacity is 100,000 S. C. F. H. Vaporized propane is fed to one of the four venturi-type propane air mixers. The mixers are located between the vaporizers and the propane storage tanks. Each mixer contains 5 ventri mixer tubes that produce a 55% propane and a 45% air mixture. Each tube is controlled by individual regulators. The capacity of each mixer is 50,000 S. C. F. H. The propane-air fuel gas is stored in three surge tanks located between the mixers and the propane storage tanks. The tanks are fed by the steam-fired vaporizers and mixers. The propane mixture feeds directly from the surge tanks to the plant fuel lines. The propane fuel gas How is controlled manually by a valve north of the boiler house. Liquid propane is fed to each of the steam-fired propane vaporizers at approximately 6,700 pounds per hour. Steam is continually fed to each vaporizer at approximately 1. 500 pounds per hour. 08/09/00 ABD00031415 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System General Information Page 3 of 5 08/09/00 UT-PR-001 The steam pressure is reduced from 150 psig to approximately 25 psig by a regulator. This low pressure steam provides the heat required to vaporize the liquid propane. The propane is vaporized and mixed with ambient air in the Algas Venturi Mixers. This mixture is approximately 55% and 45% air and has a specific gravity of 1.3 with a heating value of 1425 BTU/SCF. This gas exits the mixtures and flows into two of the mixed gas surge tanks 45-032 and 45-034. The high output pressure alarm will shut off the mixer if high pressure (>8.5 psig) develops in the surge tank. Each of the three mixers will supply 50,000 SCFH of fuel gas to the plant. This fuel gas exits the surge tanks on demand through an existing 8 inch underground line and flows throughout existing lines to the plant at 8 psig. 08/09/00 ABD00031416 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System General Information Page 4 of 5 08/09/00 UT-PR-001 V. Operating Limits - Critical Parameter Loop Number Operating Limit Propane Mixers Low Temp. 02-TAL-410 30 F Propane Mixers Low Outlet Pressure 02-PAL-411 6.0 psi Propane Mixers High Output 8.5 psi Propane Mixers Low Inlet Pressure Propane Gas High LEL Propane Deluge System Low Air Pressure 02-AAH-402 02-PAL-402 60 psi 40% 20 psi Consequence of Deviation Incomplete vaporization of propane, Improper air/propane mixing. Low fuel gas pressure t boilers and dryers. Mixer shutdown /overload Mixer shutdown. Deluge system trip Deluge system trip Prevention or Corrective Action Increase steam flow to vaporizers. Check steam trap operation. Decrease boiler/dryer Firing rates. Check propane system for proper operation. Decrease boiler/dryer firing rates. Check mixer operation. Reset Mixer. Check Propane Transfer Pump operation. Check propane system for leaks Check instrument air pressure 08/09/00 ABD00031417 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System General Information Page 5 of 5 08/09/00 UT-PR-001 Safety Systems and Their Functions - Safety System Deluge System General Monitors Function Performed Floods area with water if: 1.) Excessive heat (160 F) is detected, or 2.) High hydrocarbon (approximately 40% hydrocarbon) concentrations are detected, or 3.) Loss of air pressure (approximately 25-35 psig) occurs. 1.) Samples specific areas to analyze hydrocarbon concentration. 2.) Activate the deluge system. Revision History Description of Change Reviewed - no changes made Company Name Change Revision Date 09/28/99 08/09/00 08/09/00 ABD00031418 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Start-Up & Operation of Propane System Page 1 of 7 08/09/00 UT-PR-002 APPROVED BY: Jimmy Autrey - Maintenance Manager Date: I. PURPOSE To provide the necessary information to start-up the propane vaporizers, switch the plant to propane and operate the propane system. II. REFERENCES MSDS for Propane. Liquefied Petroleum gas Plant Operators Manual, LP Gas Industrial Equipment Company. III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS General - Liquid propane may cause frostbite if contacted. Vapor has a natural gas odor. Propane is extremely flammable & heavier than air. A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals - Reference MSDS. B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure - Chemical Propane Personal Protective Equipment Nomex Engineering Controls Administrative Controls Deluge System General Monitors N/A C. Control Measures to be Taken if Exposed - Reference MSDS Inhalation - Remove to fresh air. Guard against self injury. Apply artificial respiration if breathing has stopped. 08/09/00 ABD00031419 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 2 of 7 Utilities Operation Manual 08/09/00 Start-Up & Operation of Propane System UT-PR-002 IV. OPERATING PROCEDURE 1.0 To Put Propane System Into Stand-by 1.1 Pressure Up Lines and Vaporizers 1.1.1 Contact the Vinyl Control Room and Compound and inform the supervisor that you are going to pressure up liquid lines and vaporizers. 1.1.2 Make sure steam is on to each vaporizer and turn the OFF/ON switch to the ON position for each vaporizer (EA-101,102,103). 1.1.3 Inlet valves to mixers (101A, I01B, I03A, I03B) and Inlet valves to vaporizers (EA-101, 102, 103) should initially be closed. This is important for stable operations. 1.1.4 With controller in automatic, set pressure controller (PIC 2706 setpoint at 0 PSIG. 1.1.5 Make sure isolation valves (CV2701, CV2702, and CV2705) are open. 1.1.6 Open the recirculation line valves and then slowly open the liquid valves on one large storage tanks (45-029 or 45-030) and open pump bypass valve. 1.1.7 Check pressure differential on pressure gauges that are on the inlet and outlet to the vaporizes the difference in pressure should not exceed 5 PSIG. 1.1.8 Open propane inlet valve to one vaporizer very slowly. The greater the pressure difference between the inlet and outlet of the vaporizer, the slower the inlet to the vaporizer should be opened. 1.1.9 Open propane inlet valves to the rest of the vaporizers. 1.1.10 Set pressure controller (PIC-2706) setpoint at 125 PSIG. 08/09/00 ABD00031420 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 3 of 7 Utilities Operation Manual 08/09/00 Start-Up & Operation of Propane System UT-PR-002 YV. OPERATING PROCEDURE - Continued 1.2 Pressure Up Mixers and Surge Tanks 1.2.1 Open inlet and outlet valves of each surge tank (45-032,034). 1.2.2 Open the five mixed gas valves in each mixer (101A, 10IB, I03A, 103B). 1.2.3 Open the five vapor valves in each mixer (101 A, 101B, 103A, 103B). 1.2.4 Open the mixer inlet valve very slowly trying not to cause drastic pressure changes at the vaporizer outlet. "NOTE" If the valve to the mixer inlet is opened too fast, the possibility of getting liquid Propane past the vaporizers exists. The liquid Propane may freeze some of the five solenoid valves of the mixer. 1.2.5 Open the rest of the mixer inlet valves slowly. 1.2.6 The Propane system is now in standby. 2.0 Start-up (Shifting Plant to Propane) Before shifting plant to propane, the natural gas pipeline operator must be informed so that the gas can be shut off at the pipeline after switch over. This information is located with \the key to the natural gas pipeline station. 2.1 Mixer Start-Up 2.1.1 Turn the Mixer Control Switch and the breaker at the Power Panel to the "ON" position for each mixer to be used. 2.1.2 If the voltage loss or overload light comes on, the mixers must be reset to operate. 08/09/00 ABD00031421 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Start-Up & Operation of Propane System Page 4 of 7 08/09/00 UT-PR-002 IV. OPERATING PROCEDURE - Continued 2.1.3 Make sure flare valve is closed. 2.1.4 For the first mixer to be started the reset button must be depressed until the overload light goes out. **************************************************************************** "NOTE" If the reset button is not released immediately after the overload light goes out, high discharge pressure can result. The unit will cease operation, and an indication of high output will appear on the Enunciator Panel. **************************************************************************** 2.1.5 Reset the rest of the mixers to be put into operation. The overload light should not light up, therefore it is not necessary to hold down the reset button when resetting second mixer. 2.1.6 Mixers can be reset at the boiler house or in the field. 2.2 Pump Start-Up Check the pressure controller gauge (PG-101) at the discharge of pumps (72312, 72-868) if pressure is less than 125 PSIG one pump must be started. Use the following procedure to start a pump: 2.2.1 Set pressure controller (PIC-2706) setpoint at 0 PSIG. 2.2.2 Select pump to be used and open the inlet and outlet valves. Make sure that inlet and outlet valves on pump not to be used are closed bypass valve. 2.2.3 Set pressure controller (PIC-2706) setpoint at 125 PSIG and start pump. 08/09/00 ABD00031422 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Start-Up & Operation of Propane System Page 5 of 7 08/09/00 UT-PR-002 IV. OPERATING PROCEDURE - Continued 2.2 Pump Start-Up - continued 2.2.4 The pressure should not be permitted to go above 150 PSIG. If the pressure goes above 150 PSIG turn off pumps. The automatic pressure controller will control the pressure. 2.3 Switch-Over 2.3.1 Make sure the mixers are operating and system pressure has stabilized. 2.3.2 Notify the Vinyl Control Room and Compound that you are going to switch the plant to propane. 2.3.3 Slowly open the propane valve at the fuel gas manifold located at north side of the boilerhouse. 2.3.4 Slowly close the natural gas valve while observing the gas pressure on the gas manifold gauge. Try to keep pressure as constant as possible. Pressure should not fall below 6 psig. 3.0 Normal Operation 3.1 Check operation and record readings on vaporizer run sheet three times a shift (See Appendix, Form PR-3). 3.2 Visually check the system for leaks or any abnormal operation. 3.3 Look for frosting as an indication of abnormal operation. 08/09/00 ABD00031423 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Start-Up & Operation of Propane System Page 6 of 7 08/09/00 UT-PR-002 V. OPERATING LIMITS Critical Parameter Loop Number Operating Limit Propane Mixers Low Temp. 02-TAL-410 30 F Propane Mixers Low Outlet Pressure 02-PAL-411 6.0 psi Propane Mixers High Output 8.5 psi Propane Mixers Low Inlet Pressure Propane Gas High LEL Propane Deluge System Low Air Pressure 02-AAH-402 02-PAL-402 60 psi 40% 20 psi Consequence of Deviation Incomplete vaporization of propane. Improper air/propane mixing. Low fuel gas pressure to boilers and dryers. Mixer shutdown/ overload Mixer shutdown. Deluge system trip Deluge system trip Prevention or Corrective Action Increase steam flow to vaporizers. Check steam trap operation. Decrease boiler/dryer Firing rates. Check propane system for proper operation. Decrease boiler/dryer firing rates. Check mixer operation. Reset mixer. Check Propane Transfer Pump operation. Check Propane system for leaks. Check instrument air pressure. 08/09/00 ABD00031424 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Start-Up & Operation of Propane System Page 7 of 7 08/09/00 UT-PR-002 VI. SAFETY SYSTEMS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS Safety System Deluge General Monitors Function Performed Floods area with water if: 1) Excessive heat (160 F) is detected, or 2) High hydrocarbon (approximately 40% hydrocarbon) concentrations are detected or 3) Loss of air pressure (approximately 25-35 psig) occurs. 1) Samples specific areas to analyze hydrocarbon concentration. 2) Activate the deluge system. VII. REVISION HISTORY - Description of Change Modified procedure to add isolation valve CV2705 to be open under Operating Procedure. 1.1.5. Changed section IV. Operating Procedure 1.1.6 Company Name Change Revision Date 10/10/97 09/28/99 08/09/00 08/09/00 ABD00031425 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System Shutdown Page 1 of 5 08/09/00 UT-PR-003 APPROVED BY: Jimmy Autrey - Maintenance Manager Date: I. Purpose - To provide the necessary information to shutdown the propane system and switch back to natural gas. II. References- MSDS for Propane. Liquefied Petroleum Gas Plant Operators Manual, LP gas Industrial Equipment Company. III. Safety and Health Considerations General - Liquid propane may cause frostbite if contacted. Vapor has a natural gas odor. Propane is extremely flammable & heavier than air. A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals - Reference MSDS. B. Precautions to Prevent exposure - Chemical Propane Personal Protective Equipment Nomex Engineering Controls Deluge System General Motors Administrative Controls N/A C. Control Measures to be Taken if Exposed - Reference MSDS Inhalation - Remove to fresh air. Guard against self injury. Apply artificial respiration if breathing has stopped. 08/09/00 ABD00031426 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System Shutdown Page 2 of 5 08/09/00 UT-PR-003 IV. Operating Procedure - 1.0 Propane System Shutdown Before shutdown of propane system, inform natural gas pipeline operator that we will be switching back to natural gas. 1.1 Switch from propane to natural gas. 1.1.1 Notify the Vinyl Control Room and Compound that you are going to switch the fuel from propane back to natural gas. 1.1.2 Slowly open natural gas valve on gas manifold north of boilerhouse. 1.1.3 Slowly close propane valve on gas manifold making sure to keep fuel gas pressure above 6 psig. 1.1.4 Turn off pumps {72-312, 72-868). 1.1.5 Close isolation valves (CV2701 & CV2702) and pump inlet control valve (CV2705). 1.1.6 Turn off mixers (MX-101A. 101B, 103A, 103B). 1.1.7 Close inlet valves to mixers. This is important to prevent freeze up of mixers. 1.1.8 Bleed pressure off surge tanks (45-032, 45-034) through Boiler #1. After # 1 shuts down on low gas pressure, light flare and bleed remaining pressure off surge tanks. 1.1.9 Notify the Vinyl Control Room and Compound that the switch from propane to natural gas has been made. 1.1.10 The system is now in stand-by. 08/09/00 ABD00031427 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System Shutdown Page 3 of 5 08/09/00 UT-PR-003 1.2 To take system out of stand-by. 1.2.1 Close inlet valve to vaporizers. 1.2.2 Turn off vaporizers (EA-101, EA-102, EA 103). 1.2.3 Close Tank (45-029, 45-030) re-circulation line valves. 1.2.4 Close Tank (45-029, 45-030) liquid discharge valves. 08/09/00 ABD00031428 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System Shutdown Page 4 of 5 08/09/00 UT-PR-003 V. Operating Limits - Critical Parameter Loop Number Propane Mixers Low Temp. 02-TAL-410 Propane Mixers Low Outlet Pressure 02-PAL-411 Propane Mixers High Output Propane Mixers Low Inlet Pressure Propane Gas High LEL 02-AAH-402 Propane Deluge System low Air Pressure 02-PAL-402 Operating Limit 30 F 6.0 psi 8.5 psi 60 psi 40% 20 psi Consequence of Deviation Incomplete vaporization of propane. Improper air/propane mixing. Low fuel gas pressure to boilers and dryers Mixer shutdown/overloa d Mixer shutdown Deluge system trip Deluge system trip Prevention of Corrective Action Increase steam How to vaporizers. Check steam trap operation. Decrease boiler/dryer firing rates. Check propane system for proper operation. Check Propane Transfer Pump operation. Check Propane Transfer Pump operation. Check propane system for leaks. Check instrument air pressure 08/09/00 ABD00031429 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System Shutdown Page 5 of 5 08/09/00 UT-PR-003 VI. Safety Systems and Their Functions - Safety System Deluge System Genera! Monitors Function Performed 1.) Excessive heat (160 F) is detected or 2.) High hydrocarbon (approximately 40% hydrocarbon) concentrations are detected, or 3.) Loss of air pressure (approximately 25-35 psig) occurs. 1) Samples specific areas to analyze hydrocarbon concentration. 2) Activate the deluge system. Revision History Description of Change Reviewed - no changes made Company Name Change Revision Date 09/28/99 08/09/00 08/09/00 ABD00031430 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane Truck Unloading Page 1 of 4 08/09/00 UT-PR-004 APPROVED BY: Jimmy Autrey - Maintenance Manager Date: I. Purpose - To provide the necessary information to off-load propane tank trucks. III. References - MSDS for Propane. Liquefied Petroleum Gas Plant Operators Manual, LP Gas Industrial E E Equipment Company. III. Safety and Health Considerations - General - Liquid propane may cause frostbite if contacted. Vapor has a natural gas odor, propane is extremely flammable & heavier than air. A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals - Reference MSDS. B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure- Chemical Personal Protective Equipment Engineering Controls Administrative Controls Propane Nomex Deluge System General Monitors N/A C. Control Measures to be Taken if Exposed - Reference MSDS Inhalation - Remove to fresh air. Guard against self injury. Apply artificial respiration if breathing has stopped. 08/09/00 ABD00031431 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane Truck Unloading Page 2 of 4 08/09/00 UT-PR-004 IV. Operating Procedure - 1.0 Propane Tank Truck Off-Loading Procedures 1.1 Guard will notify utility operator upon propane tank truck arrival. 1.2 Truck proceeds to truck scale (Operator must be familiar with weighing techniques in case a yard operator is not available). 1.3 Fill out scale ticket data. 1.4 Weigh truck, leave ticket in scale house. 1.5 Truck proceeds to unloading site. 1.6 Secure road south of boilerhouse with yellow Caution Tape and inform contractors in the contractor area that no hot work is allowed until offloading is complete. 1.7 Gauge tanks prior to unloading truck. Under normal operation, the East tank will not be loaded during this procedure and does not require gauging. Inlet to East tank must be closed prior to unloading. 1.8 Check gauging table to determine volume in tanks. Enter these values along with the date and time on the Propane Tank Differential Volume Record. 1.9 ensure Obtain tank truck capacity. If loading both west tanks, divide the capacity by two and add to each tank. Check gauging table to that tanks will safely hold entire volume of tank truck. Ensure that both west tanks are lined up to accept truck. Enter these values onto the Propane Tank Differential Volume record. (See Appendix, Form PR-1). 1.10 Proceed with unloading 1.11 Truck driver is to guard truck, hook up hoses, and open valves on truck and unloading station. 1.12 Utility operator must confirm that all connections are made correctly 08/09/00 ABD00031432 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 3 of 4 Utilities Operation Manual 08/09/00 Propane Truck Unloading UT-PR-004 and required valves are opened. 1.13 Truck driver will start truck pump and proceed to unload truck. 1.14 Truck driver is to remain with truck during entire unloading procedure. loading block 1.15 In the event of a line rupture during off loading, the remote valves (CV2703, CV2704) on the system can be closed from off the station hand switch. If possible, the liquid and vapor manual valves should be closed. 1.16 When tank is empty, the truck driver is to close valves on the unloading station and truck. 1.17 Utility operator must confirm that correct valves are closed. 1.18 The truck driver and utility operator will depressure through vent to flare discharge only and disconnect hoses. 1.19 Replace unloading station pipe caps. 1.20 Remove Caution tape from road. 1.21 Truck proceeds to truck scale. 1.22 Weigh out truck and keep weigh ticket. 1.23 Gauge tanks and along with time of completion, enter these values onto the Propane Tank Differential Volume Record. 1.24 Attach Propane Tank Differential volume Record and weigh ticket to morning report and give to the utility supervisor. 08/09/00 ABD00031433 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane Truck Unloading Page 4 of 4 08/09/00 UT-PR-004 V. Operating Limits - Critical Parameter Loop Number Propane Gas High LEL Propane Deluge System Low Air Pressure 02-AAH-402 02-PAL-402 Operating Limit 40% 20 psi Consequence of Deviation Deluge system trip Deluge system trip Prevention or Corrective Action Check propane system for leaks. Check instrument air pressure VI. Safety Systems and Their Functions - Safety System Deluge System General Monitors Function Performed Floods area with water if: 1) Excessive heat (160 F) is detected, or 2) High hydrocarbon (approximately 40% hydrocarbon concentrations are detected, or 3) Loss of air pressure (approximately 25-35 psig) occurs. 1) Samples specific areas to analyze hydrocarbon concentration. 2) Activate the deluge system. Revision History Description of Change Changed section IV Operating Procedure 1.9 Company Name Change Revision Date 09/28/99 08/09/00 08/09/00 ABD00031434 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System Emergency Procedures Page 1 of 4 08/09/00 UT-PR-006 APPROVED BY: Date: Jimmy Autrey - Maintenance Manager I. Purpose To provide the necessary information to operate or shut down the propane system in emergency situations. II. References MSDS for Propane Liquefied Petroleum Gas Plan Operators Manual, LP Gas Industrial Equipment Company. III. Safety and Health Considerations - General - Liquid propane may cause frostbite if contacted. Vapor has a natural gas odor. Propane is extremely flammable & heavier than air. A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals- Reference MSDS. B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure - Chemical Personal Protective Equipment Engineering Controls Administrative Controls Propane Nomex Deluge System General Monitors N/A C. Control Measures to be Taken if Exposed - Reference MSDS Inhalation - Remove to fresh air. Guard against self injury. Apply artificial respiration if breathing has stopped. 08/09/00 ABD00031435 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System Emergency Procedures Page 2 of 4 08/09/00 UT-PR-006 IV. Operating Procedure - 1.0 Fire or Vapor Release. In case of a fire or vapor release in the propane system, the utility operator is to press the emergency propane shutdown switch on the boiler control panel. This switch will shutdown the propane pumps (72-312, 72-868) and close isolation valves, CV2701, CV2702, and CV2705. Isolating the storage tanks (45-029, 45-030), pumps (72-312, 72-868) and vaporizers (EA-101, EA-102, EA-103). Call Vinyl Control Room to sound emergency alarm and get help to secure unit, then notify the Compound area. 2.0 Power Failure. 2.1 While plant is not on propane. 2.1.1 In the event of a power loss, the Propane Emergency switch is automatically activated. This in turn closes the three automatic control valves (CV-2701, CV-2702, CV-2705) in the system and shuts the propane pumps off. (72- 2.1.2 When power is restored simply re-open the valves (CV-2701, CV-2702, CV-2705) from either the boilerhouse panel or field controller. The field controller is located near the pumps (72312, 72-868). 2.1.3 The propane bullet storage tanks are manually blocked in , while the plant is not on propane. 2.2 If plant is on propane. 2.2.1 If plant is on propane, follow step 2.1 as stated above. 2.2.2 Reset Mixers. 2.2.3 Re-start pumps following Procedure # UT-PR-002 Operation & Start-up of Propane System. 08/09/00 ABD00031436 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System Emergency Procedures Page 3 of 4 08/09/00 UT-PR-006 V. Operating Limits - Critical Parameter Loop Number Propane Gas High LEL Propane Deluge System Low Air Pressure 02-AAH-402 02-PAL-402 Operating Limit 40% 20 psi Consequence of Deviation Deluge system trip Deluge system trip Prevention or Corrective Action Check propane system for leaks. Check instrument air pressure 08/09/00 ABD00031437 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Propane System Emergency Procedures VI. Safety Systems and Their Functions Page 4 of 4 08/09/00 UT-PR-006 Safety System Deluge System General Monitors Function Performed Floods area with water if: 1) Excessive heat (160 F) is detected, or 2) High hydrocarbon (approximately 40% hydrocarbon) concentrations are detected, or 3) Loss of air pressure (approximately 25-35 pisg) occurs. 1) Samples specific areas to analyze hydrocarbon concentration. 2) Activate the deluge system. Revision History Description of Change Added 2.1.3 Company Name Change Revision Date 09/28/99 08/09/00 08/09/00 ABD00031438 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Operation of the Instrument Air Compressors, CP-708 (North) and CP-709 (South). Page 1 of 7 05/29/02 UT-AS-001 APPROVED BY: Jimmy Autrey - Maintenance Manager Date: I. Purpose - The purpose of this procedure is to provide information on the operation of the plant instrument air compressors. II. References - Safety and Health Manual Utility Procedures III. Safety and Health Considerations - A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals-Hot, high-pressure air. Chemical Hot, High Pressure Air Personal Protective Equipment Hearing Protection and Leather Gloves Engineering Controls Safety Showers and Eye Wash Stations Administrative Controls Safety and Health Procedures B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure-Refer to Section VI, Operating Limits, this procedure. C. Control Measures to be Taken if Exposed *Cool burns under safety shower or eye wash station. D. Special or Unique Hazards-Extremely high noise area. 05/29/02 ABD00031439 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Operation of the Instrument Air Compressors, CP-708 (North) and CP-709 (South). Page 2 of 7 05/29/02 UT-AS-001 IV. Discussion Instrument air is very hot after it discharges the compressor. The mechanical friction and the action of compressing air will cause the air temperature, on the discharge header, to exceed 200 F. Coolers are supplied to lower that temperature before it reaches the Airtek air dryer. The air dryer operation will be covered in another procedure. V. Operating Procedure 1.0 Start-up Procedure for Instrument Air Compressors, CP-708 and CP-709. 1.1 Check to make sure electrical power is available. 1.1.1 Check that breaker is closed. dryer a. Breaker is located at the Emergency Generator Substation east of Substation #5 and south of building. 1.2 Open discharge block valve for compressor to be started. 1.2.1 6" discharge valve for #8 (north) compressor. 1.2.2 4" discharge valve for #9 (south) compressor. 1.2.3 Check that the instrument air to plant air to plant air interceptor valve is closed. a. May have to close manual valve until plant air compressors are started during a plant outage. 1.2.4 Check that all vents and drains are closed on the air and cooling water systems. 1.3 05/29/02 ABD00031440 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 3 of 7 Utilities Operation Manual 05/29/02 Operation of the Instrument Air Compressors, CP-708 (North) and CP-709 (South). UT-AS-001 1.3.1 North compressor, CP-708. a. Low cooling water pressure. b. High discharge temperature. c. High vibration shutdown. *f 1.3.2 South compressor, CP-709 a. Low cooling water pressure. b. High discharge temperature. c. High vibration shutdown. T 1.4 Place the LOAD/UNLOAD switch in the UNLOAD position. 1.4.1 Compressor will start easier, with less electrical demand, when started in the unload position. a. The selector switch is used to increase the discharge pressure from the compressor. b. In the unloaded position, the air is recycled back through the compressor. 1.5 Depress the start button or select start, depending on the switch supplied with the compressor. 1.5.1 Monitor the compressor, listening to unusual noises and vibrations. a. Check the oil pressure, should be approximately 40 PSIG. b. Check the innercooler pressure, should be on the plus side. 1.6 Select LOAD with the selector switch. 1.6.1 Instrument air pressure to the plant should begin to rise. a. Monitor the discharge pressure of the compressor. b. After a few minutes, under load monitor the compressor, looking for problems. 2.0 Aftercooler Operation. 05/29/02 ABD00031441 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 4 of 7 Utilities Operation Manual 05/29/02 Operation of the Instrument Air Compressors, CP-708 (North) and CP-709 (South). UT-AS-001 2.1 Aftercooler is a two pass heat exchanger. 2.1.1 Hot instrument air enters the cooler at approximately 200 F. 2.1.2 Cooling water passes over the internal header, shell side, and cools the air. 2.1.3 Hot cooling water is returned to the cooling water return header. 2.1.4 Air enters the second section of the aftercooler at approximately 83F. 2.1.5 Cooling water passes over the second section's internal header, cooling it. 2.1.6 Air is then routed to the Airtek air dryer at approximately 80F. a. A moisture trap is located on the outlet of the air header on the aftercooler, before the Airtek air dryer. b. A bypass header is provided to bypass the aftercooler in the event of a leak on the system 2.1.7 The second stream of cooling water is routed to the cooling water return. 3.0 Monitoring Operation. 3.1 The technician must make several passes around the air compressors through the shift looking for things out of the ordinary. 3.1.1 Listen to the compressor. a. Listen for unusual noises. b. Listen for leaks of air. 05/29/02 ABD00031442 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Operation of the Instrument Air Compressors, CP-708 (North) and CP-709 (South). Page 5 of 7 05/29/02 UT-AS-001 3.1.2 Look for water leaks. a. Check the packing on the heads for leakage. 3.1.3 Check the oil level in the compressor. a. Add oil if it is low b. Check for oil leaks. Swap compressors if the leak becomes a hazard or is excessive. c. Place a catch pan or bucket to catch the oil drips from the leak. 3.1.4 Monitor the temperature and pressure gauges on the entire system. a. Investigate and report unusual findings. t 3.1.5 Check the instrument air to plant air interceptor valve position, a. It should be closed. 3.1.6 Check the flows and temperatures through the aftercooler. a. Refer to procedure UT-002, section 2.0, concerning the operation of the aftercooler. 4.0 Shutdown of the Instrument Air Compressor. 4.1 Swapping compressors for rotation or maintenance. 4.1.1 Start up the standby compressor before shutting down the compressor scheduled to be repaired. 4.1.2 Follow steps in Section 1.0, this procedure, dealing with compressor start-ups. 05/29/02 ABD00031443 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Operation of the Instrument Air Compressors, CP-708 (North) and CP-709 (South). Page 6 of 7 05/29/02 UT-AS-001 4.1.3 After the other compressor is on the line and running smooth, shutdown the one scheduled to be repaired. a. Select UNLOAD on the selector switch for the compressor to be shutdown. b. Depress the STOP button or select OFF, depending on the type of switch supplied. c. Prepare the instrument air compressor for maintenance per procedure UT-AS-002, if work is to be performed. Follow existing plant procedures for tag out of energy sources. 4.2 Isolate the cooling water supply if the compressor will be down for an extended period of time. 4.2.1 Will prevent water buildup if a seal is leaking. a. Crack open a drain on the compressor head. Precautions must be taken due to extremely hot surfaces and high noises. 5.0 Safety 5.1 Compressors produce noises that can damage your hearing. 5.1.1 Wear hearing protection at all times in the area. 5.2 Some surfaces can exceed temperatures over 200F. 5.2.1 Wear leather gloves whenever operating valves or climbing in the piperack. your 5.2.2 Be careful where you place your hands or other parts of your body. 5.3 The compressors are driven by belts. Do not stick you hand or tools past the belt guard unless the equipment is isolated and tagged out. 05/29/02 ABD00031444 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Operation of the Instrument Air Compressors, CP-708 (North) and CP-709 (South). Page 7 of 7 05/29/02 UT-AS-001 VI. Operating Limits Critical Parameter Hot, High Pressure Air Hot Oil High Noise Area Loop Number N/A N/A N/A Operating Limit 100PSIG and < 140 F <100F <85 Decibels in an 8 Hour Period Consequence of Deviation Produces Hot Surfaces, Potential for Bums Oil Filter Changes Expose Personnel to High Temperature Oil Hearing Loss Preventive or Corrective Action Insulated Lines and Equipment Wear Protective Equipment. Proper Body Position Wear Hearing Protection VII. Safety Systems and Their Functions Safety Systems Function Performed Safety Showers/Eye Baths Provide Fresh Water in Case of Chemical Exposure or Dirt in Eyes REVISION HISTORY Description of Change Company Name Change Made changes per JAS Revision Date 08/02/00 05/29/02 05/29/02 ABD00031445 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Operation and Isolation of the Airtek Instrument, Preparation of Equipment For Maintenance (POEFM). APPROVED BY: Date: Jimmy Autrey - Maintenance Manager Page 1 of 10 07/26/00 UT-AS-009 I. Purpose - The purpose of this procedure is to provide information on the operation and isolation of the Airtek Instrument air dryer, located south of the Instrument Air Compressors. II. References - Safety and Health Manual ^Energy Lock Out Procedure *Confined Space Entry Procedure *Safe Work Permit Procedure Utility Procedures System Drawing in This Procedure III. Safety and Health Considerations A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals-Hot, high pressure air. Chemical Hot, High Pressure Air Personal Protective Equipment Leather Gloves Hearing Protection Engineering Controls Safety Shower Eye Wash Administrative Controls Safety and Health Procedures B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure-Refer to Section VI, Operating Limits, in this Procedure. C. Control Measures to be Taken if Exposed*Cool burns under safety shower or eye wash station. 07/26/00 ABD00031446 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Operation and Isolation of the Airtek Instrument, Preparation of Equipment For Maintenance (POEFM). Page 2 of 10 07/26/00 UT-AS-009 D. Special or Unique Hazards-Hot electric heating element, extremely hot surfaces. IV. Discussion The Airtek Instrument air dryer is used to dry the air on the discharge of the instrument instrument air compressors. Air from the instrument air compressor is routed to the plant for use in the control of air operated valves and other system controls. The air dryer consist of two separate vessels that contain a desiccant material used to trap moisture from the incoming air. Power lock switch off. After a set time has elapsed, four hours, the bed automatically goes into a regeneration cycle to remove the trapped water, while the other bed automatically goes in service. There is no disruption in flow. Power lock switch on. The bed will automatically switch when the dewpoint rises above -40. There is no disruption in flow. In preparing the equipment for maintenance, every effort must be made to insure that the dryer is safe for maintenance to work on. The plant tag out/lock out procedure must be followed and equipment must be isolated to insure safe work conditions exist. The plant procedure dealing with a confined space entry must be followed if, during the course of mechanical repairs or inspection, any opening of the dryer is entered. The insertion of a hand to loosen or remove something is classified as a physical entry. 07/26/00 ABD00031447 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 3 of 10 Utilities Operation Manual Operation and Isolation of the Airtek Instrument, Preparation of Equipment For Maintenance (POEFM). V. Operating /Isolation Procedures 07/26/00 UT-AS-009 1.0 Operation of the plant air Airtek Instrument air dryer. 1.1. Check that electrical power is available. 1.1.1 Breaker is located in the emergency generator substation, north of the plant air compressors. a. Breaker located at power panel MCC 10A1 -E, breaker IF. b. Refer to procedure UT-EL-001, Section 3.0 concerning energizing electrical breakers. c. A power on light, plus lights to indicate which bed is in service or regenerating, is located on the dryer indicator panel. 1.2 Check that the valving is correct to allow air to flow from the surge tank, through the dryer bed, and out to the plant air header. 1.2.1 Air discharges from the instrument air compressors and passes through an aftercooler. 1.2.2 From the aftercooler the air enters the bottom side of the surge tank. a. The surge tank collects any debris and moisture that may be carried in the air. b. Automatic Electric timed drain valves are installed to remove these contaminates from the surge tank. 1.2.3 Air leaves the surge tank, at the top east side and travels to the pre-filters. 1.2.4 These pre-filters are coulescers, they aid the dryer by removing some of the water vapor from the air. 07/26/00 ABD00031448 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 4 of 10 Utilities Operation Manual 07/26/00 Operation and Isolation of the Airtek Instrument, UT-AS-009 Preparation of Equipment For Maintenance (POEFM).________________________________ 1.2.5 Air enters the-tep-of the "in service" bed, flows through the desiccant, and out the -bottom, of the bed. V>p 1.2.6 Hot, dry air from the in service dryer bed flows through a particulate filler and enters an instrument air receiver. 1.2.7 Air leaves the receiver and passes to the instrument air header. Extremely high temperatures exist in the compressor and dryer areas. 2.0 Regeneration Cycle 2.1 A 5% flow of hot air enters a heating chamber. 2.1.1 Inlet temperature, at the heating chamber, is between 250-300 F, from the compressor. 2.1.2 The discharge air temperature, from the heating chamber, will be controlled between 400-450 F by an electric heating element. 2.1.3 The heating element will maintain a 400F temperature while the bed is in regeneration. 4t>) clajj-p^rct 2.2 The heated air enters the-botlom of the dryer bed, travels upward, out the top of the dryer as wet air. 2.3 Regeneration times are controlled by a timer, except for the heating element operation. 07/26/00 ABD00031449 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Operation and Isolation of the Airtek Instrument, Preparation of Equipment For Maintenance (POEFM). Page 5 of 10 07/26/00 UT-AS-009 3.0 In Service Operation. 3.1 All incoming air, to the dryer bed in service, will pass through a series of aftercoolers, surge tank, and a prefilter before entering the dryer bed. 3.2 The air flow to the in service bed is filtered at the prefilter, just east of the dryer beds. 3.2.1 An inline spare is provided to take the filter out of service for filter element replacement. 3.3 Air enters the top of the in service filter, flows through the hot, dry desiccant, and exits the bottom of the dryer. 3.4 The flow of dried air enters an afterfilter. 3.4.1 The afterfilter (particulate filter) removes any fines of desiccant that may have carried over in the air flow through the bed. 3.4.2 An inline spare is provided to take the filter out of service for filter element replacement. 3.4.3 A bypass is provided to take the dryer out of service if necessary for emergency. 4.0 Dryer Controls. 4.1 Dryer operations are controlled by a timer. 4.1.1 One bed will be in service, while the other bed is in regeneration. 4.2 Air flows through the beds are directed by bi-directional flow valves. 4.2.1 Air pressure is used to automatically operate and position valves. a. Depending on the step in regeneration or if the bed is in service, will determine the direction of flow past the valve. 07/26/00 ABD00031450 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 6 of 10 Utilities Operation Manual Operation and Isolation of the Airtek Instrument, Preparation of Equipment For Maintenance (POEFM). 07/26/00 UT-AS-009 4.3 Temperature of the heated air flow to the regenerated bed is controlled by a heating element. 4.3.1 Heating element heats air to 400-450F range. a. Heating element is turned on at the start of the regeneration step, by a timer, and will cycle on and off to control the temperature between 400-450 F. b. Heating element is turned off once the bed (regenerating) outlet temperature reaches 200 F. 4.4 The flow of air through the dryer bed is controlled by a hand operated valve with flowmeter located on the east side of the unit. 5.0 Isolation and Tag Out of the Instrument Air Dryer. Bypass the dryer before isolating the dryer. Disruption of instrument air flow must be avoided. 5.1 The dryer will have to be taken out of service for media changes or repairs. First stop will be to isolate the air dryer without disrupting the instrument air flow to the plant. The flow of air must be bypassed before isolating the dryer. 5.1.1 Open ball valve (N/S) after the surge tank. a. Tagging is not needed, as mentioned in the next step. It is done as an option to prevent accidental closure of the normally closed valves. Valve will still need to be operated. Attach a lock and a "Do Not Operate" tag to the operator. 5.2.2 Close the inlet and outlet valves to the dryer. a. Tagging is not needed, as mentioned in the next step. It is done as an option to prevent accidental closure of the normally closed valves. Valve will still need to be operated. 07/26/00 ABD00031451 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 7 of 10 Utilities Operation Manual Operation and Isolation of the Airtek Instrument, Preparation of Equipment For Maintenance (POEFM). 07/26/00 UT-AS-009 b. Attach a lock and a "Do Not Operate" tag to the operator. All energy sources must be tagged and locked. 5.2.3 Open electrical breaker for the control power to the dryer. a. Breaker located at the emergency generator substation, north of the plant air compressors. Power controls regeneration and heater element. b. Breaker is a breaker 1F. c. Attach a lock and a "Do Not Operate" tag to the opened breaker handle. 6.0 Isolation of the Surge Tank at the Dryer All energy sources must be tagged and locked. 6.1 Perform all of the steps in Section 5.0 to bypass the air dryer. Additional tagging and isolation is needed to work on the surge tank. 6.1.1 Close the 6" block valve at the surge tank to the instrument air header, a. Attach a chain, lock, and "Do Not Operate" tag to the valve. 6.1.2 Close the 6" block valve from the surge tank to the pre-filter a. Attach a chain, lock, and "Do Not Operate" tag to the valve. 6.1.3 Open the 6" ball bypass valve if air is needed to the plant a. Attach a chain, lock, and "Do Not Operate" tag to the valve. 6.1.4 Open the two 1/2" drain valves at the bottom of the surge tank, a. Attach "Do Not Operate" tags to the valves. 07/26/00 ABD00031452 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Operation and Isolation of the Airtek Instrument, Preparation of Equipment For Maintenance (POEFM). 7.0 Safety at the Dryers. Page 8 of 10 07/26/00 UT-AS-009 Extremely high temperatures exist in the dryer and compressor areas. Ear protection is required at all times in the area. 7.1 The compressors, at the dryers, produce noises that can damage your hearing. 7.1.1 Wear hearing protection at all times in the area. 7.2 Some surfaces have temperatures over 400 F. 7.2.1 Wear leather gloves whenever operating valves. 7.2.2 Be careful where you place your hands or other parts of your body. This page will be scanned. 07/26/00 ABD00031453 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Manual Operation and Isolation of the Airtek Instrument, Preparation of Equipment For Maintenance (POEFM). Page 9 of 10 07/26/00 UT-AS-009 VI. Operating Limits Critical Parameter High Noise Levels High Surface Temperatures Loop Number N/A N/A Operating Limit <80 Decibels >400 F Consequence of Deviation Hearing Loss Severe Bums Prevention Or Corrective Action Wear Hearing Protection Wear Protection Leather Gloves VII. Safety Systems and Their Functions Safety Systems Safety Showers/Eye Baths Function Performed Provide Fresh Water in Case of Chemical Exposure Revision History Description of Change Replaced procedure Revision Date 10/5/99 07/26/00 ABD00031454 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: Old Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System APPROVED BY: Unit Manager Resin DATE: I. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to describe the operation of the deluge water to emergency cooling water system. II. REFERENCES N/A III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS General The deluge water to emergency cooling water system supplies cooling water to the reactor during a power failure. This water is used to control reactor pressure and temperature to prevent reactor over pressure, causing possible relief valve discharge and VCM exposure. A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals N/A B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure N/A C. Control Measures to be Taken if Exposed N/A Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E008 Page 1 of 1 ABD00031455 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: Old Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS-Continued D. Quality Control for Raw Materials and Control of Hazardous Chemical Inventories N/A E. Special or Unique Hazards N/A IV. DISCUSSION During a power failure or loss of normal cooling water systems for any reason, cooling water will be needed to control the temperature and pressure on reactors in poly mode. This water can be supplied by the deluge water system. There are two emergency cooling water supply valves. One supplies water to D500, D600, and D700 but both valves have to be open to supply water to D300 and D400. Each of these valves has a manual bypass valve in case the automatic valves can not be opened. V. OPERATING PROCEDURE "NOTE" The deluge water cooling water system supplies 1500 - 1800 gpm to each module enough water for full cooling on one reactor in each module. If water is needed to fight an existing fire or needed in the other reactor module, cooling water may have to be closed to the new module to insure adequate water supply elsewhere. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E008 Page 2 of 1 ABD00031456 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: Old Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System V. OPERATING PROCEDURE-Continued 1.0 Deluge water to cooling water system. 1.1 Lead Operator will have to open emergency cooling water supply valves. 1.1.1 Old Module-(81HV086). 1.1.2 RX 300 / RX 400 - (81HV087). "NOTE" If lead operator cannot get emergency cooling water supply valves opened/closed, the field operator will have to be notified to open/close the valves. There are four (4) methods of doing so; 1) Open manual bypass valves, 2) Bypass versa valve with instrument air, 3) put bottled (compressed) air to versa valve, and 4) Bypass versa valve with bottled air. 2.0 If Lead Operator cannot operate valves, field operator should go to the valve. 2.1 Old module valve is located just north of cooling water towers and south of polyvic charge system, south of road. 3.0 When at the specified valve, one or all of the following can be tried to open the valve. 3.1 Open manual bypass valve. 3.2 Bypass versa valve with instrument air. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E008 Page 3 of 1 ABD00031457 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergencv PROCESS AREA: Old Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emersencv Cooling Water Svstem V. OPERATING PROCEDURE-Continued 3.2.1 Verify instrument air supply valve is open. 3.2.2 Close versa valve discharge valve. 3.2.3 Open bottled air supply valve. 3.2.4 Open bypass valve (The Lead Operator has no control of the valve). 3.3 Bottled air to versa valve. 3.3.1 Close instrument air supply valve. 3.3.2 Open bottled air supply valve. 3.3.3 Open versa valve discharge valve. 3.3.4 Close bypass valve. 3.3.5 Have Lead Operator give open command to valve. 3.3.6 Open bottle valve. 3.3.7 Regulate pressure to the valve until valve opens. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E008 Page 4 of 1 ABD00031458 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: Old Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System V. OPERATING PROCEDURE-Continued 3.4 Bypass versa valve with bottled air. 3.4.1 Close instrument air supply valve. 3.4.2 Open bottled air supply valve. 3.4.3 Close versa valve discharge valve. 3.4.4 Open versa valve bypass valve. 3.4.5 Open bottle valve. 3.4.6 Regulate pressure to the valve until valve opens (Lead Operator has no control over the valve). "NOTE" During a power failure, the DCS will apply emergency cooling water to the reactors in poly mode. This will take place 60-90 seconds after loss of power has been detected by DCS. The Lead Operator may have to close cooling water to some or all reactors to insure enough water gets to a reactor that will not control on temperature/pressure. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E008 Page 5 of 1 ABD00031459 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emereencv PROCESS AREA: Old Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System V. OPERATING PROCEDURE-Continued 4.0 The Lead Operator will determine whether or not a reactor needs more cooling water. 4.1 Check each reactor for water flow. 4.2 If reactor that has water flow is in recovery mode, select that reactor recovery page. 4.3 Select recovery cooling block, "OFF" and "ON" should appear at the bottom of the screen. 4.4 Select "OFF" and verify water flow drops. 4.5 If reactor is in poly mode, it will have water flow. Select reactor poly page. 4.5.1 Select emergency cooling water block "OFF" and "ON" will appear at the bottom of the screen. 4.5.2 Select "OFF" and verify emergency cooling water is off by emergency cooling block changing from "Green" to "Red". 4.6 If reactor still has flow, select cooling water control valve target. 4.6.1 Select manual at the bottom of the screen. 4.6.2 Select valve position on the bottom of the screen. 4.6.3 Type in zero (0) to close the valve. 4.7 If another reactor has cooling water and needs to be turned off, follow steps in items 4.2 - 4.6.3. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. VinyI-OM-E008 Page 6 of 1 ABD00031460 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: Old Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System V. OPERATING PROCEDURE-Continued 'NOTE" When all reactors are under control, put emergency cooling water on each reactor that has been bumped/killed. To help control the reaction until power is restored. 5.0 Put Emergency cooling water on a bumped/killed reactor. 5.1 Select a bumped/killed reactor's poly page. 5.2 Select the "emergency cooling water" block. "OFF" and "ON" should appear on the bottom of the screen. 5.3 Select "ON" and verify by monitoring "emergency cooling water". Block changing from "Red" to "Green" and water flow indicators showing flow. 5.4 Repeat steps in items 5.1 - 5.3 until all bumped/killed reactors have cooling water flow. "NOTE" The "Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System" valves are tested weekly. VI. OPERATING LIMITS Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E008 Page 7 of 1 ABD00031461 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: Old Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: Old Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System Critical Parameter Loop Number Oper. Limit Consequence of Deviation Prevention or Corrective Action Air supply to cooling water valves N/A Enough air to Cooling water Compressed air operate cooling valves would not bottles as a back water valves. open, could not up air supply. control reactor pressure and temperature. VII. SAFETY SYSTEMS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS Safety System Function Performed Halon System Used to extinguish fires in control room. VIII. REVISION HISTORY Description of the Change Updated procedure to reflect changes. Revision 1 05/01/99 Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Johnson PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-OM-E008 Page 8 of 1________________ ABD00031462 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System APPROVED BY: Unit Manager Resin DATE: I. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to describe the operation of the deluge water to emergency cooling water system. II. REFERENCES N/A III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS General The deluge water to emergency cooling water system supplies cooling water to the reactors during power failures. Without this water the reactor temperature and pressure could not be controlled causing over pressure of reactors with possible relief valve discharge and VCM exposure. A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals N/A B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure N/A C. Control Measures to be Taken if Exposed N/A Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Langford PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-NM-E008 Page 1 of 2 ABD00031463 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS-Continued D. Quality Control for Raw Materials and Control of Hazardous Chemical Inventories N/A E. Special or Unique Hazards N/A IV. DISCUSSION During a power failure or loss of normal cooling water systems for any reason, cooling water will be needed to control the temperature and pressure on reactors in poly mode. This water can be supplied by the deluge water system. There are two emergency cooling water valves. One supplies water to all five (5) reactors, the other isolates cooling water to the recovery system. The recovery system isolation valve must be closed to insure full flow of water to the reactors and to block cooling water to the recovery condenser/heat exchangers. V. OPERATING PROCEDURE ''NOTE" The deluge water cooling water system supplies 1500 1800 gpm to each module enough water for full cooling on one reactor in each module. If water is needed to fight an existing fire or needed in the other reactor module, cooling water may have to be closed to the new module to insure adequate water supply elsewhere. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Langford PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-NM-E008 Page 2 of 2 ABD00031464 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System V. OPERATING PROCEDURE- Continued 1.0 Deluge Water to Cooling Water System. 1.1 Lead Operator opens new module supply valve (82HV086). 1.2 Close recovery system isolation valve (82HV087). 1.3 Start Emergency Generator for RX 746 and 747. "NOTE" If Lead Operator cannot get emergency cooling water valves opened/closed, the field operator will have to be notified to open/close the valves. There are three (3) methods of doing so; 1) bypass versa valve with instrument air, 2) put bottled (compressed) air to versa valve, and 3) bypass versa valve with bottled air. 2.0 If Lead Operator cannot operate valves, field operator should go to the valve. 2.1 New Module supply valve (82HV086) is located south of the cooling towers and east of the cooling tower pump for the new module. The compressed air bottle is located at the valve. 2.2 The recovery system isolation valve is located between the dump system and the recovery building in the pipe rack. The compressed air bottle is located on the ground level between the knock out tank recirculation pumps and the old PVA charge pumps on the west side of the recovery building. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Langford PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-NM-E008 Page 3 of 2 ABD00031465 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System V. OPERATING PROCEDURE- Continued 3.0 When at the specified valve, one or all of the following can be tried to open/close the valve. 3.1 Bypass versa valve with instrument air. 3.1.1 Verify instrument air supply valve is open. 3.1.2 Close versa valve discharge valve. 3.1.3 Open bypass valve (The Lead Operator has no control of the valve). 3.1.4 Open bypass valve around Actuator valve. 3.2 Bottled air to versa valve. 3.2.1 Close instrument air supply valve. 3.2.2 Open bottled air supply valve. 3.2.3 Open versa valve discharge valve. 3.2.4 Close bypass valve. 3.2.5 Have Lead Operator give desired command to the valve. 3.2.6 Open bottle valve. 3.2.7 Regulate pressure to the valve until valve operates. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Langford PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-NM-E008 Page 4 of 2 ABD00031466 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System V. OPERATING PROCEDURE- Continued 3.3 Bypass versa valve with bottled air. 3.3.1 Close instrument air supply valve. 3.3.2 Open bottled air supply valve. 3.3.3 Close versa valve discharge valve. 3.3.4 Open bypass valve. 3.3.5 Open bottle valve. 3.3.6 Regulate pressure to the valve until valve operates. (Lead operator has no control over the valve). "NOTE" During the power failure, the DCS will apply emergency cooling water to the reactors in poly mode. This will take place 60-90 seconds after loss of power has been detected by DCS. The Lead Operator may have to close cooling water to some or all reactors to ensure enough water gets to a reactor that will not drop in pressure or temperature. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Langford PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-NM-E008 Page 5 of 2 ABD00031467 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emereencv PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Oueration of Deluee Water to Emereencv Cooline Water Svstem V. OPERATING PROCEDURE-Continued 4.0 The Lead Operator will determine whether or not a reactor needs more cooline water. 4.1 Check each reactor for water flow. 4.2 If reactor that has water flow is in recovery mode, select that reactor recovery page. 4.3 Select recovery cooling block, "OFF" and "ON" should appear at the bottom of the screen. 4.4 Selected "OFF" and verify water flow drops. 4.5 If reactor is in poly mode, it will have water flow. Select reactor poly page. 4.6 Select emergency cooling water block "OFF" and "ON" will appear at the bottom of the screen. 4.7 Select OFF and verify emergency cooling water is off by Emergency Cooling Block turning from green to red. 4.8 If reactor still has flow, select cooling water control valve target. 4.9 Select manual at the bottom of the screen. 4.10 Select valve position on the bottom of the screen. 4.11 Type in zero (0) to close the valve. 4.12 If another reactor has cooling water flow and it needs to be turned off, follow steps in items 4.2 - 4.5.5. Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Langford PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-NM-E008 Page 6 of 2 ABD00031468 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System V. OPERATING PROCEDURE- Continued 'NOTE" When all reactors are under control, put emergency cooling water on each reactor that has been bumped/killed. To help control the reaction process until power is restored. 5.0 Put emergency cooling water on a bumped/killed reactor. 5.1 Select a bumped/killed reactor's poly page. 5.2 Select the "Emergency Cooling Water" block. "OFF" and "ON" should appear on the bottom of the screen. 5.3 Select "ON" and verify by monitoring "Emergency Cooling Water". Block changing from red to green and water flow indicators showing flow. 5.4 Repeat steps in items 5.1 - 5.3 until all bumped/killed reactors have cooling water flow. 5.5 If a reactor pressure starts to rise repeat steps in items 4.6 -4.11 on reactors that do not need cooling water at the present time. "NOTE" The "Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System" valves are tested weekly. VI. OPERATING LIMITS Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Langford PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-NM-E008 Page 7 of 2 ABD00031469 FOR FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Emergency PROCESS AREA: New Module PROCEDURE TITLE: Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System Critical Parameter Air supply to cooling water valves Loop Number N/A Oper. Limit Consequence of Deviation Prevention or Corrective Action Enough air to operate cooling water valves. Cooling water valves would not open, could not control reactor pressure and temperature. Compressed air bottles as a back up air supply. VII. SAFETY SYSTEMS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS N/A VIII. REVISION HISTORY Description of the Change Updated procedure to reflect several changes. Revision 1 05/01/99 Revision Date: 05/01/99 Reviewed By: M. Langford PROCEDURE NO. Vinyl-NM-E008 Page 8 of 2 ABD00031470 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorine System for CT-002, CT-004, and CT-006 Page 1 of 7 UT-CT-001 APPROVED BY: Maintenance Manager Date: I. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide the necessary information and detail the steps necessary to safely operate the cooling tower chlorination system for cooling towers CT-002, CT-004, CT-006. II. REFERENCES Harcross Chlorine Leak Response Team; Phone number 601-969-3177. MSDS - Chlorine MSDS - Aqua Ammonia Water Plant Daily Operation Manual, UT-WP-001 Chlorine Leak Response Procedure, UT-CT-003 III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS General - Do not use hydrocarbon oil, grease, etc. on the chlorine feed system since chlorine will react with these substances. Chlorine and water form a corrosive solution. A chlorine "B" kit is available at the water plant and in the chiller building in case of a container leak. A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals - Refer to MSDS Chlorine, Aqua Ammonia, Chlorine: greenish/yellow gas; clear amber colored liquid. Disagreeable and suffocating odor with irritating effect on nose and throat. III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS - Continued 09/29/99 ABD00031471 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Page 2 of 7 Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorine System for CT-002, CT-004, and CT-006 UT-CT-001 A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals - continued Boiling point: -29.3F, 2.5 times heavier than air. Aqua ammonia - 26F Baume Colorless liquid, pungent odor, boiling point: 81F, 1.7 times heavier than air. B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure: Chemical Chlorine Gas: Unknown concentration, no visible vapor cloud, no liquid leakage. Chlorine Gas: Unknown concentration, visible vapor cloud, liquid leak. Aqua Ammonia Personal Protective Equipment SCBA, Rubber Gloves Class "A" Suit - Total encapsulating suit SCBA, double gloves, hardhat, rubber boots. Rubber Gloves Engineering Controls Chlorine Detection Alarm Chlorine Detection Alarm N/A Administrative Controls Limited Inventory: No more containers than available trunnions. Limited Inventory: No more containers than available trunnions. Limit Inventory 3 Bottles C. Quality Control for Raw Materials and Control of Hazardous Chemical Inventories Refer to MSDS: Chlorine, Aqua Ammonia D. Quality Control for Raw Materials and Control of Hazardous Chemical Inventories No full chlorine for containers will be stored in the plant other than on trunnions. 09/29/99 ABD00031472 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Page 3 of 7 Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorine System for CT-002, CT-004, and CT-006 UT-CT-001 III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS - Continued E. Special or Unique Hazards Flexible tubing between the vacuum regulator and the chlorine eductor may rupture due to fatigue at any time. Leak check entire tube when a new container is placed in service. Replace tubing if leaking. Otherwise, replace as needed. IV. DISCUSSION The cooling tower chlorination system is designed to feed chlorine to the cooling towers 2, 4, and 6. The chlorination system and two sets of chlorine container trunnions are located on the south side of Third Street just south of cooling tower #2. The function of various chlorination system parts is briefly described below: 1. Chlorine Container Valve - Each container has two container valves. When in use, the valves must be aligned vertically. Only the top valve should be connected to the chlorination system. Never use the bottom valve as liquid chlorine may be fed. 2. Chlorination System - The chlorination system is comprised of (1) a vacuum regulator, (2) flow indicating/controlling rotameter, (3) a chlorine eductor, and (4) chlorine scales. The vacuum regulator has a capacity of 500 Ibs./day, and is mounted directly on the chlorine container valve by means of a yoke assembly. Chlorine gas is cpnveyed under vacuum from the regulator. From the regulator, the transfer tubing splits^ ways, each to a flow indicating/controlling rotameter. Here the chlorine flow to each cooling tower is set. From the rotameters, chlorine gas flows to a vacuum eductor where it is mixed with water that will flow into one of the t+wee cooling towers, "track ^<75 The vacuum regulator is equipped with its own rotameter and flow control valve. Since chlorine gas flow is not being controlled at the regulator, this valve shall remain 100% open. Vacuum is controlled by a spring opposed diaphragm which will close tight upon loss of vacuum. The vacuum regulator inlet is equipped with a drip leg heater and a gas filter to deflect, trap, and vaporize any liquid chlorine carried from the container. Pressure will be prevented from building in the system by means of a spring-loaded, diaphragm-actuated pressure relief valve located on the vacuum regulator. IV. DISCUSSION - Continued 09/29/99 ABD00031473 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorine System for CT-002, CT-004, and CT-006 Page 4 of 7 UT-CT-001 The vacuum created by the chlorine eductor opens a check valve in the eductor and pulls the chlorine gas into the water stream. The check valve prevents water from backing into the regulator. A set of scales measures the weight of 1 or 2 chlorine ton containers and their contents. V. OPERATING PROCEDURE 1.0 Connect Vacuum Regulator to Chlorine Container 1.1 Notify the Vinyl Department that a chlorine container is being put in service. 1.2 At least two people must be present to connect a chlorine container - one to connect and one to stand watch. If a container needs to be connected during off hours, the Vinyl Department must send someone to service as watch. 1.3 Remove the chlorine container valve protective cover and rotate the container until the container valves are aligned vertically. 1.4 Close the water supply valve to each chlorine eductor. There is an eductor for each cooling tower located on the panel west of the chlorine containers. 1.5. Inspect the chlorine tubing from the vacuum regulator to the chlorine eductor for damage. 1.6 Put on a full faceshield equipped with an approved chlorine canister and a pair of rubber gloves. Get some rags and aqua ammonia to check for leaks. WARNING If a chlorine leak develops during normal handling when Operators are protected only by a full faceshield and chlorine canister, leave immediately and follow Chlorine Leak Response *P*ro**c*e*d*u*re**U*T**-C**T*-0**0*3*. ********************************************************** 1.7 Confirm that the chlorine container valves are closed. V. OPERATING PROCEDURE - Continued 09/29/99 ABD00031474 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Page 5 of 7 Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorine System for CT-002, CT-004, and CT-006 UT-CT-001 1.0 Connect Vacuum Regulator to Chlorine Container - Continued 1.8 Wipe up any moisture on the container valves. 1.9 Loosen the TOP container valve cap nut and check for leaks. 1.10 If no leaks, remove cap nut. If a leak is detected, tighten the cap nut and tighten the container valve and packing. Repeat steps 1.8 and 1.9. If the leak can't be stopped, tighten the cap nut and call the chlorine supplier to come get the defective container. 1.11 Using a new lead gasket, connect the vacuum regulator to the Top container valve. 2.0 Put Chlorine Container in Service 2.1 Ensure drip leg heater on vacuum regulator is "ON". 2.2 Open container valve 1/4 turn, then close. Check for leaks. 2.3 If no leaks, open container valve 1/4 to 1/2 turn. If leaks are present, close container valve and replace lead gasket. 2.4 Open the water supply valve to the chlorine eductors. This should establish chlorine flow from the vacuum regulator to the chlorine eductors. Check for flow to each eductor by inspecting chlorine rotameters located on panel west of containers and on the rotameter located on the vacuum regulator. Check for leaks from the vacuum regulator to the eductors. 2.5 If no flow, close the container valve and check the following: a) Make sure all water valves are open. b) Make sure water supply strainers are clean, and c) Eductor is pulling a vacuum. 2.6 Using chlorine rate control valve located on each chlorine rotameter, set chlorine flow to maintain 0.2 and 0.4 ppm residual chlorine in the cooling towers. Refer to Procedure UT-WP-001 for testing procedure. V. OPERATING PROCEDURE - Continued ********************************:(:********************************************* 09/29/99 ABD00031475 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Page 6 of 7 Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorine System for CT-002, CT-004, and CT-006 UT-CT-001 WARNING Never use chlorine rate control valve to shut off gas supply. Damage to valve may occur. Use chlorine container valve to shut off gas supply. 3.0 Normal and Emergency Shutdown of Chlorination System 3.1 Close chlorine container valve. 4.0 Shut Down and Disconnection of Vacuum Regulator 4.1 Close the chlorine container valve. 4.2 Continue operation of eductors until rotameters show no flow and a vacuum on chlorine tubing from regulator exists. 4.3 Close the water supply valve to eductors. 4.4 Remove the regulator from the chlorine container. 4.5 Replace the container cap nut and protective cover. 4.6 Turn off the vacuum regulator drip heater. 4.7 Chlorine container may be switched at this time. VI. OPERATING LIMITS Critical Parameter Residual Chlorine in Cooling Tower Supply Water Pressure to Eductor Loop Number N/A N/A Operating Limit 0.4 - 0.8 ppm > 40 psig Consequence of Deviation Under or over feed condition. Eductor will not pull sufficient vacuum. Prevention or Corrective Action Adjust feed control knob on rotameter. Check/clean strainers. VII. SAFETY SYSTEMS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTION PERFORMED 09/29/99 ABD00031476 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorine System for CT-002, CT-004, and CT-006 Page 7 of 7 UT-CT-001 Chlorine Detector/Alarm Detect and warn of chlorine leak. VIII. REVISION HISTORY Description of the Change Revisions per Jon Cummins (Chlorine Feed) Reviewed - no changes Revision 02/12/98 09/29/99 09/29/99 ABD00031477 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorination System for CT-005 Page 1 of 7 UT-CT-002 APPROVED BY: Maintenance Manager Date: I. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide the necessary information and detail the steps necessary to safely operate the cooling tower chlorination system for cooling tower CT-005. II. REFERENCES Harcross Chlorine Leak Response Team; Phone number 601-969-3177. MSDS - Chlorine MSDS - Aqua Ammonia Water Plant Daily Operation Manual, UT-WP-001 Chlorine Leak Response Procedure, UT-CT-003 III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS General - Do not use hydrocarbon oil, grease, etc. on the chlorine feed system since chlorine will react with these substances. Chlorine and water form a corrosive solution. A chlorine "A" kit is available at the emergency supply room behind P-1. A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals - Refer to MSDS Chlorine, Aqua Ammonia, Chlorine: greenish/yellow gas; clear amber colored liquid. Disagreeable and suffocating odor with irritating effect on nose and throat. Boiling point: -29.3F, specific gravity 2.5. 09/29/99 ABD00031478 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorination System for CT-005 Page 2 of 7 UT-CT-002 III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS Continued A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals - Continued Aqua ammonia - 26F Baume Colorless liquid, pungent odor, boiling point: 81F, 1.7 times heavier than air. B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure: Chemical Chlorine Gas: Unknown concentration, no visible vapor cloud, no liquid leakage. Chlorine Gas: Unknown concentration, visible vapor cloud, liquid leak. Aqua Ammonia Personal Protective Equipment SCBA, Rubber Gloves Class "A" Suit - Total encapsulating suit SCBA, double gloves, hardhat, rubber boots. Rubber Gloves Engineering Controls Chlorine Detection Alarm & Beacon Chlorine Detection Alarm & Beacon N/A Administrative Controls Limited Inventory. Two 150 lb. con-tainers. Limited Inventory: Two 150 lb. con-tainers. Limit Inventory 3 Bottles C. Control Measures To Be Taken If Exposed: Refer to MSDS for: Chlorine, Aqua Ammonia D. Quality Control for Raw Materials and Control of Hazardous Chemical Inventories Limited storage of 150 lbs. chlorine containers (2). Limited storage at cooling tower 5 (2). III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS Continued 09/29/99 ABD00031479 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorination System for CT-005 Page 3 of 7 UT-CT-002 E. Special or Unique Hazards Flexible tubing between the vacuum regulator and the chlorine eductor may rupture due to fatigue at any time. Leak check entire tube when a new container is placed in service. Replace tubing if leaking. Otherwise, replace as needed. IV. DISCUSSION The cooling tower chlorination system is designed to feed chlorine to cooling tower #5. The chlorination system and scale for two 150# chlorine containers are located on the north side of cooling tower #5. The function of various chlorination system parts is briefly described below: 1. Chlorine Container Valve - Each container has a valve on top of the container. The container must be set on its end with the container valve on top. 2. Chlorination System - The chlorination system is comprised of (1) a vacuum regulator, (2) flow indicating/controlling rotameter, (3) a chlorine eductor, and (4) chlorine container scales. Chlorine gas is conveyed under vacuum from the regulator. From the regulator, the transfer tubing carries the chlorine gas through a flow indicating/controlling rotameter. Here the chlorine flow rate is set. From the rotameter, chlorine gas flows to a chlorine vacuum eductor where it is mixed with water that will flow into the cooling tower. The vacuum regulator has a capacity of 50 Ibs./day and it is mounted directly on the container valve by means of a yoke assembly. The vacuum regulator is equipped with its own rotameter and flow control valve. Since the chlorine gas flow is not being controlled at the regulator, this valve should remain 100% open and the rotameter will be used for flow indication only. Vacuum is controlled by a spring opposed diaphragm which will close tight upon loss of downstream vacuum. The vacuum regulator inlet is equipped with a drip leg heater and a gas filter to deflect, trap, and vaporize any liquid chlorine carried from the container. IV. DISCUSSION - Continued 09/29/99 ABD00031480 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Page 4 of 7 Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorination System for CT-005 UT-CT-002 Pressure will be prevented from building in the system by means of a spring-loaded, diaphragm-actuated pressure relief valve located on the vacuum regulator. The vacuum created by the chlorine eductor opens a check valve in the eductor and pulls the chlorine gas into the water stream. The check valve prevents water from backing into the regulator. A set of scales measures the weight of 1 or 2 150 lb. chlorine containers and their contents. V. OPERATING PROCEDURE 1.0 Connect Vacuum Regulator to Chlorine Container 1.1 Notify the Compound Department that a chlorine container is being put in service. 1.2 At least two people must be present to connect a chlorine container - one to connect and one to stand watch. If a container needs to be connected during off hours, the Compound Department must send someone to service as watch. 1.3 Remove the chlorine container valve protective cover. 1.4 Close the water supply valve to each chlorine eductor. 1.5. Inspect the chlorine tubing from the vacuum regulator to the chlorine eductor for damage. 1.6 Put on a full faceshield equipped with an approved chlorine canister and a pair of rubber gloves. Get some rags and aqua ammonia to check for leaks. * * * * * * * * * *** * * * * * * *** **** * ** * ** * ** * * * *** ***** * ****** * * ********** ****** * * 4c * * * WARNING If a chlorine leak develops during normal handling when Operators are protected only by a full faceshield and chlorine canister, leave immediately and follow Chlorine Leak Response P**ro**ce**d*u*re**U*T**-C**T*-*0*0*3*.********************************************************** V. OPERATING PROCEDURE - Continued 1.7 Confirm that the chlorine container valves are closed. 09/29/99 ABD00031481 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorination System for CT-005 Page 5 of 7 UT-CT-002 1.8 Wipe any moisture on the container valves. 1.9 Loosen, but do not remove, the container valve cap nut and check for leaks. 1.10 If no leaks, remove cap nut. If a leak is detected, tighten the cap nut and tighten the container valve and packing. Repeat steps 1.8 and 1.9. If the leak can't be stopped, tighten the cap nut and call the chlorine supplier to come get the defective container. 1.11 Using a new lead gasket, connect the vacuum regulator to the container valve. 2.0 Put Chlorine Container in Service 2.1 Ensure drip leg heater on vacuum regulator is "ON". 2.2 Open container valve 1/4 turn, then close. Check for leaks. 2.3 If no leaks, open container valve 1/4 to 1/2 turn. If leaks are present, close container valve and replace lead gasket. 2.4 Ensure all tubing connects are made and are in good shape. 2.5 Open the water supply valve to the chlorine eductors. This should establish chlorine flow from the vacuum regulator to the chlorine eductors. Check for flow to each eductor by inspecting chlorine rotameters located in panel box east of containers. Adjust if necessary. Check for leaks from the vacuum regulator to the eductors. 2.6 If no flow, close the container valve and check the following: a) Make sure all water valves to the eductor and cooling tower are open. b) Make sure water supply strainers are clean, and c) Eductor is pulling a vacuum. 2.7 Using chlorine rate control valve on rotameter, set chlorine flow to maintain 0.2 and 0.4 ppm residual chlorine in the cooling towers. Refer to Procedure UT-WP-001 for testing procedure. V. OPERATING PROCEDURE - Continued 09/29/99 ABD00031482 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Page 6 of 7 Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorination System for CT-005 UT-CT-002 WARNING Never use chlorine rate control valve to shut off gas supply. Damage to valve may occur. Use chlorine container valve to shut off gas supply. 3.0 Normal and Emergency Shutdown of Chlorination System 3.1 Close chlorine container valve. 4.0 Shut Down and Disconnection of Vacuum Regulator 4.1 Close the chlorine container valve. 4.2 Continue operation of eductors until rotameters show no flow and a vacuum exits on chlorine tubing from regulator exists. 4.3 Close the water supply valve to eductors. 4.4 Remove the regulator from the chlorine container. 4.5 Replace the container cap nut and protective cover. 4.6 Turn off the vacuum regulator drip heater. 4.7 Chlorine container may be switched at this time. VI. OPERATING LIMITS 09/29/99 ABD00031483 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Page 7 of 7 Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Operation of Chlorination System for CT-005 UT-CT-002 Critical Parameter Residual Chlorine in Cooling Tower Supply Water Pressure to Eductor Loop Number N/A N/A Operating Limit 0.4 - 0.8 ppm > 40 psig Consequence of Deviation Under or over feed condition. Eductor will not pull sufficient vacuum. Prevention or Corrective Action Adjust feed control knob on rotameter. Check/clean strainers. VII. SAFETY SYSTEMS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTION PERFORMED Chlorine Detector/Alarm Detect and warn of chlorine leak. REVISION HISTORY Description of the Change Revisions per Jon Cummins Reviewed - no changes Revision 2/12/98 09/29/99 09/29/99 ABD00031484 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Chlorine Leak Response for CT-002, CT-004, CT-005, and CT-006 Page 1 of 4 UT-CT-003 APPROVED BY: Date: Maintenance Manager I. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to detail how to respond to a chlorine leak on the CT002, CT-004, CT-006 cooling tower chlorination system or the CT-005 cooling tower chlori-nation system. II. REFERENCES Harcross Chlorine Leak Response Team; Phone number 601 -969-3177. III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS General - Do not use hydrocarbon oil, grease, etc. on the chlorine feed system since chlorine will react with these substances. Chlorine and water form a corrosive solution. A chlorine "B" kit is available at the water plant and in the chiller building in case of a container leak. A chlorine "A" kit is available in the emergency supply room behind the P-1 building. A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals - Refer to MSDS chlorine. Aqua Ammonia, Chlorine: greenish/yellow gas; clear amber colored liquid. Disagreeable and suffocating odor with irritating effect on nose and throat. Boing point: -29.3F, 2.5 times heavier than air. Aqua ammonia - 26F Baume Colorless liquid, pungent odor, boiling point: 81F, 1.7 times heavier 09/29/99 ABD00031485 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Chlorine Leak Response for CT-002, CT-004, CT-005, and CT-006 than air. Page 2 of 4 UT-CT-003 III. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS - Continued B. Control Measures to Be Taken if Exposed - Refer to MSDS chlorine. C. Quality Control for Raw Materials and Control of Hazardous Chemical Inventories - N/A D. Special or Unique Hazards - N/A IV. DISCUSSION See UT-CT-001 and UT-CT-002 V. OPERATING PROCEDURE 1.0 Chlorine Leak - Operator or Alarm Detected 1.1 No Visible Vapor Cloud - Notify Vinyl operations personnel (call 2200). Request assistance from person(s) equipped with SCBAs and rubber gloves. Obtain wind directions by calling the Security Guard or viewing wind socks. Visible Vapor Cloud - Call 2200 and indicate that there is a CHLORINE LEAK EMERGENCY. Obtain wind directions. Request assistance from persons equipped with SCBAs, class "A" suits (total encapsulating), rubber boots, rubber gloves, and hardhats. 2.0 Locate the Leak 2.1 If the location of the leak is not immediately apparent: 2.1.1 Apply some aqua ammonia to a rag and hold it under the chlorine gas lines beginning at the container valve/vacuum regulator and ending at the chlorine gas eductor. 2.1.2 Using the aqua ammonia and rags, check the chlorine container itself. 09/29/99 ABD00031486 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Chlorine Leak Response for CT-002, CT-004, CT-005, and CT-006 2.2 Respond to the leak depending on location and type. Page 3 of 4 UT-CT-003 V. OPERATING PROCEDURE - Continued 3.0 Leak in the Vacuum Regulator, Regulator Vent, or Supply Lines to Eductor 3.1 Close the container valve. 3.2 Allow the metering ball in the rotameter to fall to the bottom and remain there. 3.3 Disconnect damaged items and replace/repair as needed. 3.4 When repairs have been made, follow appropriate startup procedure to start chlorination system. 4.0 Leak at Container Valve. Fusible Plug, or Container 4.1 If the leak is in the container valve packing, tighten the packing nut without using excessive force. If this does not eliminate the leak, proceed to the next step. 4.2 Close the chlorine container valve. 4.3 Stop/contain leak as indicated in chlorine "B" kit manual. Chlorine "B" kit and manual is located in the chiller building and at the water plant. 4.4 Notify Harcross Chemical (or current chlorine supplier) of leaking container. See reference for phone number. Follow Harcross handling instructions until they are onsight. 4.5 Swap container using UT-CT-001 or UT-CT-002 as required. 09/29/99 ABD00031487 CONDEA Vista Company - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operation Procedures Manual Chlorine Leak Response for CT-002, CT-004, CT-005, and CT-006 Page 4 of 4 UT-CT-003 VI. SAFETY SYSTEMS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS SAFETY SYSTEM Chlorine Detection Alarm FUNCTION PERFORMED Detects and warns of chlorine leak. Chlorine "B" Kit and Manual Provides special tools and instructions for dealing with one-ton chlorine container leaks. Chlorine "A" Kit and Manual Provides special tools and instructions for dealing with 150 lb. chlorine container leaks. REVISION HISTORY Description of Change Changed format of revision history box Revision Date 09/29/99 09/29/99 ABD00031488 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Back-up System Operation Page 1 of 7 07/20/00 UT-WP-002 Approved: Date: Jimmy Autrey - Maintenance Manager I. Purpose - The purpose of this procedure is to detail the procedure for normal operation of the back-up chlorine system. II. References - The Chlorine Manual: Chlorine Institute, The Chlorine Handling Manual: Material Safety Data Sheet for Chlorine and Aqua Ammonia, Harcross Chemical chlorine training information sheet, and Chlorine "B" Kit Manual. III. Safety and Health Considerations - SEE UT-WP-003 IV. Discussion - The back-up chlorine system is meant to be used during a chlorine feeder system failure and repair period. The procedure to be described here is based on the assumptions that the main chlorine feeder has been properly shut down and the well pumps have been turned OFF. The chlorine feeder system feeds chlorine gas at a controlled rate into a water stream. This water stream is injected into the aerator 14" downcomer. The function of various chlorine system parts are briefly described below. 1. gas) Chlorine Container Valve - When the container is in use the valves MUST be aligned vertically. Only the top valve (the one used for supplying chlorine should be connected to the chlorine feeder system. NEVER CONNECT THE BOTTOM VALVE TO THE CHLORINE FEEDER SYSTEM AS LIQUID CHLORINE WILL BE FED. 07/20/00 ABD00031489 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Page 2 of 7 Utilities Operations Manual 07/20/00 Chlorine Back-up System Operation UT-WP-002 2. Vacuum Regulator - The vacuum regulator has a capacity of 200 pounds per day, and is mounted directly on the ton container valve by means of a yoke assembly. Therefore, chlorine gas is conveyed under vacuum from the regulator to the ejector/check valve assembly to ensure complete system safety. Vacuum is controlled by a spring-opposed diaphram which will close tight upon loss of vacuum. are set The regulator is equipped with an intergrally mounted rotameter. The rotameter indicates the rate at which chlorine gas is being fed. Feed rate adjustments manually and remain contstant until manually changed. Adjustments can be made by turning the adjustment knob clockwise (to reduce the feed rate) or counterclockwise (to increase the feed rate). The vacuum regulator gas inlet assembly is equipped with a drip leg heater and a gas filter to deflect, trap, and vaporize any liquid chlorine carried from the container. Pressure will be prevented from building in the system by means of a spring-loaded, diaphram-actuated pressure relief valve located at the vacuum regulator. The gas shall vent at the vacuum regulator. The chlorine ejector is where the chlorine gas is mixed with a water stream. A vacuum is created as high pressure water passes through a restriction, this vacuum opens a check valve (in the ejector) and pulls the chlorine gas into the water stream. The check valve prevents water from backing up into the vacuum regulator. A**w**a*te*r**************s*u*p*p*ly**lo*s*s**a*u*to*m**a*ti*c*a*ll*y*c*lo*s*e*s**th*e**ch*e*c*k**v*a*lv*e**a*nd**s*h*u*ts**o*f*f *th*e**ga*s**fl*o*w*.* NOTE: If the vacuum regulator is already connected to the ton container, put on a full face shield equipped with chlorine canister and some rubber gloves. Get some rags and aqua ammonia to check for leaks. Follow start-up procedures beginning with step 9 of START-UP PREPARATION. ********************************************************************************* 07/20/00 ABD00031490 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Page 3 of 7 Utilities Operations Manual 07/20/00 Chlorine Back-up System Operation UT-WP-002 ****************************************************************************** CAUTION: Even though the system was free of leaks during the previous shutdown, one should be aware of the possibility of a leak occurring when starting the system back up. Do no skip any leak checking steps in any part of the start-up procedure. V. Operating Procedure- START-UP PREPARATION !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! NOTE Always keep full chlorine containers on both back-up system trunions. !!!I!!!!!I!!!!!!!!!!!!!!I!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1.0 At least two people must be present to connect a chlorine container, one to connect and one to stand watch. If a container needs to be connected during off hours, vinyl must send someone to serve as a watch. 2.0 Put on a full face shield equipped with a chlorine canister and some rubber gloves. Get some rags and aqua ammonia to check for leaks. ****************************************************************************** WARNING: If a chlorine leak develops at any time during normal handling when operators are protected only by a full face shield and chlorine canister, leave immediately and follow *******c*h*lo*r*in**e*l*e*a*k*re*s*p*o*n*s*e*p*r*o*c*e*d*u*re**U*T**-W**P*-*0*1*7*. ********************************** 3.0 Remove the chlorine container valve protective cover and rotate the container until the container valves are aligned vertically. 4.0 Confirm that the chlorine container valve is CLOSED. 07/20/00 ABD00031491 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Page 4 of 7 Utilities Operations Manual 07/20/00 Chlorine Back-up System Operation UT-WP-002 5.0 Wipe up any moisture on the container valves. 6.0 Loosen the top container valve cap nut and check for leaks. 7.0 If no leaks, remove cap nut. If a leak is detected tighten cap and tighten container valve. Repeat step 5. If leak can't be stopped, tighten cap nut and call chlorine supplier to come get defective container. 8.0 using a new lead gasket, connect the vacuum regulator to the top container valve. START-UP 9.0 Plug in the drip leg heater. 10.0 Check ejector operation. Turn the back-up chlorine system water supply HOA switch to the HAND position and OPEN all water supply block valves except the and feel solenoid bypass valve. Put your finger over the vacuum connector opening the vacuum. A ctr/ing ^-Ann^t^r r^ning OfnA fool strong vacuum should exist. If not, refer to the Troubleshooting section of the vacuum regulator instruction manual. Leave ejector running. 11.0 With the chlorine container valve closed, connect the vacuum tubing to the vacuum regulator's upper outlet connection (lower connection is a vent). Remove the connector nut and slip it on the tubing. Push the tubing onto the connector and tighten HAND TIGHT. 12.0 Connect the vacuum tubing to the ejector vacuum connection. Remove the connector nut and slip it on the tubing. Push the tubing onto the connector and tighten HAND TIGHT. 13.0 there is With the chlorine container valve closed and the ejector running, the ball in the metering tube will drop to the bottom. If the ball does not drop or bounces, either a leak at the lead gasket or a loose connection in the system. Check and correct. NOTE: The supply indicator on the face of the vacuum regulator will show RED. Turning the indicator knob to RESET will not stop the movement of the indicator and it will return to RED. 14.0 Turn the water supply HOA switch to the AUTO position. 15.0 DISCONNECT the vacuum tubing at the vacuum regulator to allow air to enter the system. 07/20/00 ABD00031492 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Page 5 of 7 Utilities Operations Manual 07/20/00 Chlorine Back-up System Operation 16.0 RECONNECT the vacuum tubing. UT-WP-002 17.0 Open the container valve one quarter turn and close. 18.0 Check for leaks around the container valve yoke assembly and lead gasket. If gas is leaking, tighten yoke or replace lead gasket. 19.0 Test for leaks at other joints of the yoke assembly. 20.0 Open the container valve one-quarter turn and leave on. Check for leaks again. 21.0 Start the well pumps. 22.0 Adjust the chlorine feed rate to the required setting following procedure UT`rWP= UT-WP- 003. WARNING: NEVER use the rate valve to shut off the gas supply. If used for shutoff, the valve will be damaged. To shut off gas, close the chlorine container valve. SHUT-DOWN PROCEDURES PERIODIC AND EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN 1.0 Turn OFF the well pump. 07/20/00 ABD00031493 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Utilities Operations Manual Page 6 of 7 07/20/00 Chlorine Back-up System Operation UT-WP-002 2.0 CLOSE the chlorine container valve. LONG TERM SHUT-DOWN OR EMPTY CONTAINER REPLACEMENT 3.0 Continue ejector operation and CLOSE the chlorine container valve. 4.0 Watch the loss of gas supply indicator. When it shows RED, the gas flow will begin to decrease. The metering ball should drop to the bottom and remain there. If it does not or flutters, the container valve may not be completely shut. Attempt to reset loss of gas indicator. It should turn freely and always reset in the RED position. 5.0 After all the above steps have been taken, it is safe to remove the vacuum regulator from the ton container. DISASSEMBLY AND STORAGE 6.0 DISCONNECT the chlorine vacuum tubing from the ejector and the vacuum regulator outlet. 7.0 UNPLUG the drip leg heater. 8.0 DISCONNECT the vacuum regulator from the chlorine container valve. 9.0 DISCARD the lead gasket. 10.0 Replace the chlorine container valve cap nut. 11.0 Replace the chlorine container valve cover. ***#*****#*****************#**##*#*#**#*#*#***##**#****#*#****#****#**#***##***## NOTE: At this time, the ton containers can be swapped out and the system restarted. If long-term shut-down is desired, continue with step 12 of SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES. ** ** ** * ** *** *** *********** ******** * *** ****** ******* ***** ** *** ***** *** *** ** *** * 12.0 Store the vacuum regulator and vacuum tubing in a dry place. 07/20/00 ABD00031494 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Page 7 of 7 Utilities Operations Manual 07/20/00 Chlorine Back-up System Operation UT-WP-002 13.0 Plug the ejector vacuum tubing inlet. 15.0 CLOSE the block valve downstream of the ejector and the back-up chlorine system water supply block valve. 16.0 During cold weather, OPEN the drain valves downstream of the ejector and upstream of the solenoid valve. 17.0 Turn the back-up chlorine system water supply solenoid valve to the OFF position. VI, Operating Limits - Critical Parameter Oper. Limit Water Pressure < 40 psig Consequence of Deviation Insufficient vacuum to meet chlorine usage demand. Prevention or Corrective Action Boostwater pressure VII. Safety Systems and Their Functions - N/A REVISION HISTORY Description of the Change Committed to DMS Company Name Change Revision 1 - 12/02/98 07/20/00 07/20/00 ABD00031337 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP VI. Description of Covered Processes A. Propane System Process description for propane system is detailed in the Georgia Gulf, Utilities Operations Manual, Procedure # UT-PR-001, "Propane System General Information", "Discussion" section, October 09, 2000. See Appendix B. B. Instrument Air System Instrument air is supplied by the West Joy (CP-912) and CP-708/709. CP-708 and CP-709 supply air at a rate of 526 ICFM and a pressure of 100 psig (each). The West Joy provides both plant and instrument air. The West Joy can supply 3500 SCFM @ 100 psig. The compressors have an interstage cooler that reduce the temperature of the first stage air (first and second stage for the West Joy). The air exits the compressor at a temperature around 250 F. The hot air then flows through aftercooler EX-300 where its temperature is further reduced to about 80F. Water that has condensed is separated from the air in the air/water separator on the discharge of EX-300. The air then flows through surge tank, DM-813. Air exiting DM-813 then flows to the Airtek instrument air dryer. Before entering the Airtek, DR-030, the air is filtered. The air then enters one of two desiccant beds where the dew point is reduced to -40 F or less. The instrument air is then filtered again and distributed throughout the plant for use as instrument air. C. Emergency Cooling Water System Process description for the Emergency Cooling Water System is detailed in the Georgia Gulf, Vinyl Operations Manual, procedures # Vinyl-OM-E008 & VinylNM-E008, "Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System", "Discussion" section, May 5, 1999. See Appendix B. D. Cooling Tower Chlorination System Process description for the Cooling Tower Chlorination System is detailed in the Georgia Gulf, Utilities Operations Manual, procedure #'s UT-CT-001 & UT-CT002, "Operation of Chlorination System for CT-002, CT-004, and CT-006", Discussion section , 09/29/99 and "Operation of Chlorination System for CT005","Discussion" section, 09/29/99. See Appendix B. 18 of 26 ABD00031338 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP E. Water Plant Chlorination System Process description for the Water Plant Chlorination System is detailed in the Georgia Gulf, Utilities Operations Manual, procedure # UT-WP-002, "Chlorine Feeder System Operation", "Discussion" section, July 20, 2000. See Appendix B. F. Standby Generators There are three standby generators installed at the plant. GN-001 provides standby power to the Pall Air Dryer, the Airtek Air Dryer, CP708 and CP-709, the catalyst freezers, the emergency cooling water pump, and the seal oil pumps for the New and Old Module. See drawings MCC10A1-E-EL-D, 10/28/02 and MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 11/97. See Appendix A. GN-00^-provides standby power for MCC7AB1-1. This substation currently provides standby power to the Vinyl Control Room UPS, emergency lighting, power transformers, air conditioning units, 24-volt DC battery chargers, pressurization blowers, and the plant telephone system. See procedure Vinyl-OME007, May 01, 1999. See Appendix B. GN-00J provides standby power for one on the cooling water pumps supplying cooling water from Cooling Tower #7 to Reactors 745, 746, and 747. See procedure Vinyl-NM-E013, April 27, 1999. See Appendix B. VII. List of Hazards Identified A. Preliminary Hazards Review Steam piping to, in, and around vaporizers is badly corroded. Piping is potentially a burn hazard and could cause propane system downtime in the event of a piping failure. Equipment, instrument, and line labeling is insufficient in many areas under scope of Hazop. Special attention should be made to items the operating procedures make reference to. B. Past Incidents Review Failure of piping components such as pressure gauges in cyclical pressure VCM/Propane service. Installation of a blinding skillet that is not correct for the size and/or pressure rating of the pipe flange. 19 of 26 ABD00031339 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Operations not performed routinely. C. Human Factors Review Utilities operator is detached from other operations personnel. If the operator were to become injured and could not use his radio, it could be an extended amount of time before he was missed. Air compressor alarms, in many instances, do not give operators sufficient time to avoid a shutdown. D. Facility Siting Review Occasional low flying crop dusters fly over the plant. Access road by Boilerhouse is close to buildings and is also close to chlorine containers located outside by the coke trays. PA system is hard to hear in boiler house. Radios are unusable in some areas of the plant. One of the contractor sheds and the maintenance storage barn are inside the Dow Fire & Explosion radius. See Appendix G. for calculations and plot plan. Boilerhouse control room may be unsafe if an explosion, earthquake, tornado, chlorine leak, etc., occurs. If while in operation, the propane tanks or piping upstream of the emergency shut off valve were to develop a leak, both storage tanks would be in danger of releasing their contents. Chlorine containers are stored inside a building that is connected to the Boiler control room. One of the inside doors to the chlorine cylinder room is left open at times. Combustible liquids are stored at times in the storage room next to the water plant chlorine cylinder room. The door between these two rooms is left open at times. E. Site Specific Hazards Review No site specific hazards were identified. 20 of 26 ABD00031340 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 1 Propane storage tank, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031, liquid and vapor fill lines. Type: Line Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane Truck Unloading - Propane Vapor in Vapor lines. Propane Liquid in Liquid Lines. (Propane liquid transfer at approximately 225 gpm and 125 psid. Truck pump internal bypass set at 150 psi. - Dowdle Propane). Dev Causes Consequences 1.1 High Pressure 1. Blocked unloading line during unloading 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane leak 3. Propane release 2. Blocked in liquid line on thermal expansion case 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane leak 3. Propane release 3. Fire 1. Downtime/lost production 2. Explosion 3. Personnel Evacuation 4. Propane leak 5. Propane release 4. High upstream pressure (from truck pump) 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Fire/Explosion - E 3. Personnel Evacuation 4. Propane leak 5 Propane release 1.2 High Temperature 1. Fire 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 2. Hot work in close proximity 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release itOA- i CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 C 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment S 4 B 5 2. Following correct operating S/E 4 C 5 procedure. Making sure valves are lined up properly before unloading. 3. No Hot Work in Contractor Area, Propane Tank Farm, and Boiler Area while unloading S/E 4 C S 4B S/E 4 C 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. Following correct operating 5 procedure. Making sure valves are lined up properly after unloading. 3. No Hot Work in Contractor Area, Propane Tank Farm, and Boiler Area while unloading. EC 4 C S/E 4 C S 4C S 4B S/E 4 C 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. No Hot Work in Contractor 5 Area, Propane Tank Farm, 5 and Boiler Area while 5 unloading. S 3C E 4C S 4C s 4B S/E 4 C 4 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. Following correct operating 5 procedure. Making sure 5 valves are lined up properly 5 before unloading. 3. No Hot Work in Contractor Area, Propane Tank Farm, and Boiler Area while unloading. 48 2 1 14 S/E 4 C 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment S/E 4 C 5 2. Fire Watch 3. Hot work permits 4. No Hot Work in Contractor Area, Propane Tank Farm, and Boiler Area while unloading. S/E 4 C S/E 4 C 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. Fire Watch 3. Hot work permits 4. No Hot Work in Contractor Area, Propane Tank Farm, and Boiler Area while unloading. 1 1 ABD00031341 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 1. Propane storage tank, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031, liquid and vapor fill lines. Type: Line Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane Truck Unloading - Propane Vapor in Vapor lines, Propane Liquid in Liquid Lines. (Propane liquid transfer at approximately 225 gpm and 125 psid. Truck pump internal bypass set at 150 psi. - Dowdle Propane). Dev Causes 1.3 Low Temperature 1. Low Ambient Temperature 1.4 Low/No Flow 1. High downstream pressure Consequences 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Environmental - No Consequence 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Environmental - No Consequence 2. Low upstream pressure - truck pump outlet pressure low pump not running/worn out/ malfunction 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Environmental - No Consequence 3. Driver/Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Environmental - No Consequence 1.5 Reverse/Misdirected Flow 1. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane Release 2. Check valve failure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane Release 3. Truck unloading line rupture 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Propane Release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 D 5 1. Piping specification includes E 4D 5 expected ambient low temperature 1 EC 4 D E 4D 5 1. Operating procedures for 5 routing flows 2. Unique connectors for flexible lines 3. Valve position indicators EC 4 D E 4D 5 5 1 1 EC 4 D 5 1. Unique connectors for flexible E 4D 5 lines 2. Valve position indicators 3. Operating procedures for routing flows 1 EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. No Hot Work in Contractor 5 Area, Propane Tank Farm, 5 and Boiler Area while unloading. 2. Operating procedures on line routings 3. Unique connectors for flexible lines 4. Valve position indicators 5. Fire protection equipment EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. No Hot Work in Contractor 5 Area, Propane Tank Farm, 5 and Boiler Area while unloading. 2 Operating procedures on line routings 3. Unique connectors for flexible lines 4. Valve position indicators 5. Fire protection equipment EC 4 D 5 1. No Hot Work in Contractor S 3C E 4c S/E 4 c 4 5 5 Area, Propane Tank Farm, and Boiler Area while unloading. 1 1 14 2 ABD00031342 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 3. Propane storage tanks, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031. Type: Vessel Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane storage to 250 psig. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 3.1 High Pressure 1. Fire Consequences 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Propane release 2. Overfilling of vessel 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release Missaligned valves - Propane pump suction connected to one storage tank and recirculating (pressure control) to another storage tank (not equalized). 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Propane release 3. Fire/Explosion 4. Relief valve isolated (block valve under relief valve closed) under relieving condtions 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Propane release 3. Fire/Explosion 30A- 3 CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 D S 2D E 3D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 15 4 2. Fire monitors and hose 16 5 stations 5 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. Manual activation of deluge system 5. Pressure relief valve - isolation valve under relief valve is normally locked open 6. Sloping ground to prevent accumulation of flammables beneath vessel EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 3 D 5 1. Accurate tank gauging before 5 unloading 5 2. Deluge system 3. Fire monitors and hose stations 4. High pressure indication local pressure gauge 5. LEL detection activation of deluge system 6. Manual activation of deluge system 7. Pressure relief valve - isolation valve under relief valve is normally locked open 8. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4 5 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 3 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Fire monitors and hose 5 stations 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. High pressure indication local pressure gauge 5. LEL detection activation of deluge system 6. Manual activation of deluge system 7. Pressure relief valve - isolation valve under relief valve is normally locked open 4 5 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 3 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Fire monitors and hose 5 stations 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. High pressure indication local pressure gauge 5. LEL detection activation of deluge system 4 5 ABD00031343 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 3. Propane storage tanks, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031. Type: Vessel Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane storage to 250 psig. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 3.1 cont'd 4. cont'd Consequences 5. Relief valve plugged under relieving conditions. 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Propane release 3. Fire/Explosion 3.2 High Temperature Downtime/Lost Production Fire/Explosion Fire/Explosion - E Propane release 3.3 High Level Operator/truck driver overfill tank during filling 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release Recirculation valves misaligned to pull from one tank and return to another 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release Inaccurate tank gauging prior to unloading truck 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 6. Manual activation of deluge system 7. Plant sign in/sign out for key to locks on valves under relief valves EC 4 D 5 1. Deluge system S/E 3 D 5 2. Fire monitors and hose S/E 3 D 5 stations 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. High pressure indication - local pressure gauge 5. LEL detection activation of deluge system 6. Manual activation of deluge system 4 5 7 EC 4 D S 2D E 3D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 4 2. Fire monitors and hose 5 stations 5 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. LEL detection activation of deluge system 5. Manual activation of deluge system 6. Operating procedures 7. Pressure relief valve 8. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 9. Sloping ground beneath vessel to prevent flammables accumulating 6 15 16 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Level gauge dip tube (two 5 tanks) bleed gauge with rotary 5 dial (one tank). 2. Operating procedures 17 EC 4 D 5 1. Operating procedures S/E 3 D 5 S/E 4 D 5 5 17 18 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Level gauge - dip tube (two 5 tanks) bleed gauge with rotary 5 dial (one tank). 2. Operating procedures 17 AOk-4 ABD00031344 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 3. Propane storage tanks, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031. Type: Vessel Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane storage to 250 psig. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 3.4 Leak 1. Corrosion and/or erosion Consequences 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 2. Flange, flange gasket, threaded fitting, and packing failure 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 3. Inadequate torquing of bolts 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 4. Relief valve or instrument failure to contain pressure 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 3.5 Rupture 1. Propane storage tank material failure due to fire 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Propane release 2. Overpressure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 2CA- 5 CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge 5 2. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 3. Maintenance & inspection procedures S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge 5 2. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 3. Maintenance & inspection procedures 4. Procedures fortorquing bolts S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge 5 2. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 3. Maintenance & inspection procedures 4. Procedures for torquing bolts S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge 5 2. Isolation valves on pressure gauges and relief valve 3. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 4. Maintenance & inspection procedures 5. Procedures fortorquing bolts 6 6 6 EC 4 D S 2D E 3D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 4 2. Fire monitors and hose 5 stations 5 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. LEL detection activation of deluge system 5. Manual activation of deluge system 6. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 7. Sloping ground beneath vessel to prevent flammables accumulating EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Fire monitors and hose 5 stations 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. LEL detection activation of deluge system 15 16 7 ABD00031319 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP I. II. III. IV. V. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. VI. A. B. C. D. E. F. VII. A. B. C. D. E. F. VIII. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. TABLE OF CONTENTS Purpose Rationale for Selecting Hazop for the Utilities Area PHA Scope Team Members & Qualifications Team Orientation Methodology Risk Ranking Hazop Execution Plan Human Factors Checklist Facility Siting Checklist Orientation Meeting Review Checklist Attendance Records Description of Covered Processes Propane System Instrument Air System Emergency Cooling Water System Cooling Tower Chlorination Systems Water Plant Chlorination Systems Standby Generators List of Hazards Identified Preliminary Hazard Review Past Incidents Review Human Factors Review Facility Siting Review Site Specific Hazards Review P&ID/Operating Procedure Review List of Recommendations Recommendations From Preliminary HazardReview Recommendations From Past Incidents Review Recommendations From Human FactorsReview Recommendations From Facility Siting Review Recommendations From Site Specific HazardsReview Recommendations Inadvertent Mixing Review Recommendations From MOCA Review 2 of 26 Page 4 4 5 7 8 8 8 9 10 12 17 17A 18 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20A 21 21 21 21 21 23 23 24 ABD00031320 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP TABLE OF CONTENTS H. Recommendations From Safety Audits Review I. Recommendations From P&ID/Operating Procedure Review IX. List of Items Needing Further Review APPENDICES A. Marked up P&IDs B. Copies of Operating Procedures Referenced C. Employee Participation Documentation D. List of Pre-Work Materials Used E. List of Updates and Revalidations F. Hazop Worksheets G. Dow Fire & Explosion Calculation & Plant Plot Plan H. Team Leader Training Documentation I. Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC, PSM-004 24 24A 25 3 of 26 ABD00031321 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP I. Purpose The Utilities area Hazop was conducted for the following purposes: Provide Management and Operations personnel with the knowledge of where potential hazards exist. Provide safe operation documentation for the system. Provide a quantitative assessment of the risks involved with the operation of the system. Provide documentation that risk management is taking place at the Aberdeen Plant. Provide training on Hazop methodology and techniques for Georgia Gulf personal. Make recommendations which the team feels should reduce the risks identified. Comply with the Process Hazard Analysis requirements, paragraph (e), of the OSHA Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals regulation, 29 CFR 1910.119. Performing a Hazop study is generally an assurance that if procedural and/or engineering modifications are implemented to mitigate risk, the area will then operate under some lower risk. It is not, however, a guarantee that hazardous events or operating problems will not be encountered. II. Rationale Hazop was chosen to fulfill OSHA's 29 CFR 1910.119 PHA requirement because of the size and complexity of the Aberdeen Plant's Utilities area, as well as the volume of chlorine and propane stored at the Aberdeen Plant. 4 of 26 ABD00031322 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP III. Scope The Utilities Area Hazop for the Aberdeen Plant covers the following specific systems: Propane Tank Farm, delivery system, and main supply header to the plant. Instrument air production and main supply header to the plant. Emergency cooling water supply system. Cooling Towers 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 chlorination systems. Water Plant chlorination system. Standby Generators, GN-001, GN-003, GN-004 The following P&ID's, Drawings, and Operating Procedures were examined during the Hazop study. : V "" 1 %P&ID)NiKflbeiiliiM^I! i||ssue;;Date.l BP-090100-PID-D 09/19/02 BP-090101-PID-D 12/11/02 BP-090102-PID-D 12/11/02 UT-090102-PID-D 02/25/94 UT-090108-PID-D 12/11/02 UT-090109-PID-D 12/11/02 UT-090109A-PID-D 10/15/02 UT-090111-PID-D 09/26/02 UT-090112-PID-D 12/11/02 UT-090113-PID-D 12/11/02 UT-090114-PID-D 12/11/02 UT-090115-PID-D 10/09/02 UT-090117-PID-D 10/10/02 UT-090122-PID-D 12/11/02 UT-090123-PID-D 10/23/02 WP-090106-PID-D 09/26/02 NE-D606-57-4-D 06/29/92 GP-972I-62-6D 08/23/83 MCC10A1 -E-EL-D 10/28/02 MCC101A-E1 -EL-D 11/97 UT-PR-001 UT-PR-002 UT-PR-003 UT-PR-004 UT-PR-006 VINYL-OM-E008 VINYL-NM-E008 UT-AS-001 UT-AS-009 UT-WP-002 UT-WP-003 UT-WP-017 UT-WP-018 UT-CT-001 UT-CT-002 UT-CT-003 VINYL-OM-E007 VINYL-NM-E013 VINYL-NM-N475 fTssiiepate.:08/09/00 08/09/00 08/09/00 08/09/00 08/09/00 05/01/99 05/01/99 05/29/02 07/26/00 07/20/00 08/09/00 07/20/00 07/20/00 09/09/99 09/29/99 09/29/99 05/01/99 04/27/99 08/31/00 5 of 26 ABD00031323 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP The Hazop study focused on the following potential hazards: personallnjury/Death, !^fluipmgrrt/PrW*yM Resulting From !gl|Mage|Resultj Fire Fire Explosion Explosion Toxic Exposure Corrosion Chemical Contact Misoperation Thermal Burns Overpressure Asphyxiation Overheating Impact Injury Freezing Equipment Damage Power Failure Maintenance Turnarounds Equipment Failure Instrument Failure Misoperation Environmental/Communi ty Impact Resulting From Spills Vapor Releases Emissions Fire Explosion -rv M : . ,,S* 8. -*;?*.. *` !, ,f, Human Factors Past Incidents Facility Siting 6 of 26 ABD00031324 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP IV. Team Members and Qualifications Selection of the Hazop team is consistent with OSHA requirements and the requirements outlined in the Aberdeen Plant, PSM-004, " Process Hazard Analysis", section 4.4.2, Revision 5. - 1 Hi) Erik Smith Jimmy Brewer David Nolen Facilitator Utility "A" Technician Instrument Technician Nathaniel Wilson Ed Mize Chief Lead Operator Maintenance "A" Mechanic Jeff Seaver Reliability Engineer Jimmy Morgan David Roberts Maintenance "A" Mechanic Maintenance "A" Electrician Engineering Utility Operations Instrumentation/ Maintenance Vinyl Operations Maintenance Engineering & Operations Maintenance Maintenance Erik has 11 years experience in the Aberdeen Plant. Erik has had formal Hazop team leader training (see Appendix H). Jimmy has worked in the Aberdeen Plant for 32 years. Of these years he worked 22 years in the Yard and 10 years in Utility Operations. David has worked in the Aberdeen Plant for 33 years. Of these years he spent 6 years in operations, 13 years general maintenance, and 14 years as an instrument technician. Nathaniel has worked in the Aberdeen Plant for 30 years in Vinyl Operations. Ed has worked in the Aberdeen Plant for 36 years. Of these he spent 9 years in Plasticizer and 6 years in Electrical Maintenance and 21 years in Mechanical Maintenance. Jeff has worked in the Aberdeen Plant for 6 years. Of these he spent 3 years as a Project Engineer and 3 years as a Reliability Engineer. While a Reliability Engineer he served as a Temporary Utilities Supervisor for one year. Jimmy has worked in the Aberdeen Plant for 29 years. Of these he spent 14 years in maintenance, 7 years in the Lab, and 8 years in Vinyl and Compound Operation. David has worked in the Aberdeen Plant for 32 years. Of these he spent 3 years in the Hose Department, 18 years in Mechanical Maintenance, and 11 years as Electrical Maintenance. 7 of 26 ABD00031325 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP V. Team Orientation A. Methodology The methodology used to perform the Hazop study is outlined in the Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls - Aberdeen Plant, PSM-004, " Process Hazard Analysis'', Revision 5, Section 4. B. Risk Ranking Tables Risk Ranking of identified process hazards was completed per the instructions and information provided in the Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls - Aberdeen Plant. PSM-004, " Process Hazard Analysis", Revision 5, Appendix D. 8 of 26 ABD00031326 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP C. Hazop Execution Plan Gather required pre-work material (Appendix D). Select appropriate team members Post memo to all employees stating that a Hazop study will be done. Memo includes what area or process the Hazop will focus on, team members, meeting place, and meeting times. Hold Team Orientation Meeting. The orientation meeting is used to set the tone for the Hazop. It includes a review of the following: Purpose and Scope of the Hazop Rationale for choosing Hazop for the PHA Hazop Execution Plan Methodology Process Description Pre-work material Site Specific Hazards of the Process Previous Incidents Human Factors Facility Siting Perform line by line analysis of process nodes. Includes P&lD's and operating procedures. Identify Hazards of the Process Rank Hazards By How Much Risk They Exhibit Recommend Actions to Mitigate Risks Compile all team findings during Hazop into a report. 9 of 26 ABD00031327 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP D. Human Factors Checklist Equipment + Labeling Access Operability Layout Uniqueness equipment clearly labeled immediately at hand power assisted operation well-planned, logical arrangement only component of its kind in area mislabeled or not labeled hard to reach or access difficult to operate/change confusing/inconsistent arrangement several components look similar Observed Practice + + 0 - - Controls Labeling Mode Involvement Displays Displays ,+ ' ": controls clearly labeled; uniform coding fully automatic; well-tuned operator continually involved clear, simple, representational immediate, unambiguous mislabeled or not labeled manual operation; many manual steps operator detached from process unclear, complex, nonrepresentational none or potentially misleading Observed Practice 0 - 0 0 Deviations + !' Alarms Coverage Time Preparedness Last-Resort first-out; safety critical alarms dual operator coverage at all times no time pressure for response periodic simulation exercises shutdown not discourage; fast access many simultaneous or false alarms operator not always present inadequate time for response no drills or simulation of scenarios Shutdown discouraged or unsafe Observed Practice 0 - 0 Transient Procedures Identifying Format Aids + complete, accurate, current, verified ID, location of devices/actions given graphical identification aids checklist or supervisory check Incomplete/too general/out of date Ambiguous device/action identification Confusing/inconsistent; difficult to read task sequence done by memory Observed Practice + 0 0 0 +" = FACTORS BEYOND STANDARD PRACTICE: MAY REDUCE HUMAN ERROR OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE LIKELIHOOD. = FACTORS THAT MAY TEND TO INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF HUMAN ERROR OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE. 10 of 26 ABD00031328 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Scheduling Overtime Consistency # of Tasks Task Frequency Intensity permanent shift assignments tasks, work force, and skills matched routine tasks regular tasks at normal pace ' - * 'A........1 . i * Extreme enough to affect performance Inconsistent shift rotations/schedules Tasked required exceed time available very infrequent; no expertise base differing tasks in rapid succession |pif0bserved li;iy-Practice : - 0 + + + - for Propane 0 Com m,, u' *>nic a.te/; ;5 Shift Changes Field/Control Supervision Emergency status communicated verbally, plus turnover sheet used constant communication with field operator frequent supervisory communication rapid, unambiguous plant alarm system ,r v" VI- m. Observed * : *f. v/ ,- 4 Practice;. .... Inadequate communication of + plant status between shifts no communication with field + operator little or no supervisory checks + no distinction between area/type + Environment ` "'f ' , i+ ' '' ' Noise Level Climate Visibility Lighting office environment noise level indoors, climate controlled visibility enhancement of some kind area where hearing protection required temperature/humidity/ precipitation/wind extremes visibility limitation of some kind inadequate lighting for task Observed Practice M - 0 - "+ ' = FACTORS BEYOND STANDARD PRACTICE; MAY REDUCE HUMAN ERROR OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE LIKELIHOOD. = FACTORS THAT MAY TEND TO INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF HUMAN ERROR OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE. 11 of 26 ABD00031329 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP E. Facility Siting Checklist REVIEWED YES NO X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X DISCUSSION TOPIC 1. Location of on-site populations relative to the unit. 2. Location of off-site populations relative to the unit. Location of environmentally sensitive areas. 3. Location of critical and safety systems. 4. Dominant Wind Direction. 5. Climate and water extremes: earthquake; flooding; hurricanes; tornadoes; windstorms. 6. Site topography 7. External hazards and threats (fire, explosion, toxic release from nearby process or facilities; aircraft, subsidence, sabotage). 8. On-site traffic flow patterns and clearances. 9. Security and reliability of all critical feeds, utilities, and safety systems. 10. Evacuation routes, emergency exits, safe rally spots. 11. Passive mitigation systems such as dikes, berms, (control spills and fires) and blast walls (protect against explosions). 12. Crane lifts over operating equipment and piping. 13. Barricades between traffic and equipment and piping. 14. Adequate lighting for normal operation, routine maintenance, power failure procedures, evacuation. 15. Communication systems. 16. House keeping - walkways, aisles, operating areas, evacuation routes. 17. Location of railroads to process equipment (derailment, access). 18. Open ditches, sumps, low points (collect toxic and flammable vapors). 19. Entry into confined spaces during emergencies- Trapped Gases, Hazards, Permit. 12 of 26 ABD00031330 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP REVIEWED YES NO X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X DISCUSSION TOPIC Buildings 20. Location of occupied building near process units. (Please note that the Dow Chemical Fire and Explosion Index will be used as a screening tool to determine if the building is located sufficiently remote from the process. If the building is not located sufficiently remote from the process, the team should suggest that a more detailed study be conducted.) Control Rooms 21. Minimum occupancy; only essential functions during emergencies. 22. Control Room Construction. 23. Fresh air intake locations/isolation; Temporary safe havens; Access during an emergency. 24. Control room location relative to unit, columns, and pipe bridges. 25. Supply of breathing air in control room. Sufficient for emergency shutdown. 26. Instrument labels up-to-date. Process Facilities 27. Area electrical classification. 28. Accessibility for mechanical integrity inspection and testing. 29. Protection of piping and vessels from vehicles and forklifts. 30. Protection of small bore lines. Fittings, from external impact, personnel. 31. Routing of process piping, critical controls cable trays, critical utilities. 32. Vent, drain, and relief valve discharge locations. 33. Remote shutoff valves for feed lines to the unit, accessible, functional in emergency. Loading, unloading, and storage facilities 34. Incompatible materials segregated; storage, dikes, sumps, drains, and waste. 35. Siting, labeling of unloading spots for incompatible materials. 36. Spacing consideration for flammable, combustible, and unstable liquid storage (note use the checklist - ''Hazardous Analysis Review for Spacing Considerations for flammable, combustible, and Unstable Liquid Storage") 39. Storage of flammable solids such as wood, paper, and rags. 13 of 26 ABD00031331 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP REVIEWED YES NO X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X DISCUSSION TOPIC Fire Protection 40. Access for fire fighting and other emergency services - trains, vehicle parking, and construction. 41. Ignition sources, continuous, intermittent, uncontrolled, hot surfaces. 42. Access to hydrants, monitors, and deluge valves. 43. Grading drains flammables away from storage. 44. Equipment spaced to minimize potential fire explosion damage. 45. Coverage of fire monitors/sprinkler systems. 46. Fire proofing of structures. Accident Mitigation 47. Detection of leaks and ruptures. 48. Emergency shutdown switch locations. 49. Accessibility of isolation valves, size. 50. Potential for fire/explosion in units affecting other equipment. 51. Critical control, mitigation, communication after initial explosion or release. Personnel Protection 52. Passageways, pedestrian traffic patterns vs. hazardous locations. 53. SCBA/respirators locations; accessibility on all shifts. 54. Sufficient escape routes from operating areas, shops, labs, and offices. 14 of 26 ABD00031332 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP HAZARDOUS ANALYSIS REVIEW FOR SPACING APPLICATIONS FOR FLAMMABLE, COMBUSTIBLE AND UNSTABLE LIQUID STORAGE Instructions: This checklist represents item #36 on the Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls Facility Siting Checklist. The hazard review team will review each item and mark to indicate a review was completed. Comments and findings are shown in a separate report. No scenario rankings are given to these findings. . , mpopimpi 'vREVEEWED^|| \S'-VES .: Not! X 1. Tanks accessible for fire fighting purposes. X 2. Minimum distance between tank and property line or building as defined in paragraph 2-3 of NFPA 30, attached. X 3. Outside base tank dike at ground level at least ten (10) feet from property line. X 4. Minimum distance between any two storage tanks one third (1/3) of adjacent tank diameters, but at least three (3) feet. If unstable, flammable, or combustible liquids are stored, distance shall be minimum of one half (1/2) the sum of the diameters. X 5. Inside base of tank dike at ground level at least five (5) feet from storage tank. X 6. Minimum distance between liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) container and storage tank twenty (20) feet. If storage tank operates above 2.5 psig, or is equipped with emergency venting that will permit pressures to exceed 2.5 psig, then Item 4. above applies. X 7. Storage tanks not permitted inside buildings. X 8. When a storage tank is located in an area subject to flooding, the following shall be observed. a. The provisions of Item 8. shall apply only if the maximum flood stage exceeds the elevation of the dike wall. b. Provisions to prevent tank, either full or empty, from floating during rise in water level to established maximum flood stage. c. Independent water supply facilities available for loading partially empty tanks with water. If filling with water is impractical or hazardous due to tank contents, tank shall be protected by other means against movement or collapse. d. Top of vertical tank extends above maximum flood stage by at least thirty (30) percent of its allowable storage capacity. e. In addition to Items a., b., c., and d. above, if tank is located such that seventy (70) to one hundred (100) percent of its allowable liquid storage capacity will be submerged at the established maximum flood stage, then the following also applies. 15 of 26 ABD00031333 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP REVIEWED YES NO DISCUSSION TOPIC ' ' ! i. Is tank raised, or height increased, until it extends above the level obtainable at maximum flood stage a distance equivalent to at least thirty (30) percent if its allowable liquid storage capacity. Submerged part of tank shall not exceed two and one-half (2 2) times its diameter. ii. As an alternate to Item i. above, adequate noncombustible structural guides, designed to permit tank to float vertically without loss of product may be provided. f. Horizontal tanks located such that more than seventy (70) percent of storage capacity will be submerged at the established flood stage attached to foundation of concrete, or of steel and concrete, of sufficient weight to provide adequate load for the tank when filled with flammable or combustible liquid and submerged by flood waters to the established flood stage. g. For tanks in Item f. above, are tank vents or other openings that are not liquid tight extended above the level obtainable by flood waters at maximum flood stage water level. Definitions: h. Spherical or spheroid tanks protected by applicable methods specified for either vertical or horizontal tanks as described above. Combustible Liquid. A liquid having a flash point at or above 100EF (37.8EC). Flammable Liquid. A liquid having a flash point below 100EF (37.8EC) and having a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 psia at 100EF (37.8EC). Unstable Liquid. A liquid that, in the pure state or as commercially produced or transported, will vigorously polymerize, decompose, undergo condensation reaction, or become self-reactive under conditions of shock, pressure or temperature. Reference Materials: NFPA (National Fire Protective Association) 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code OSHA 1910.106 16 of 26 ABD00031334 Georgia GulfChemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP F. Team Orientation Meeting Review Checklist X 1. Purpose of Hazop X 2. Rationale for choosing Hazop for the PHA X 3. Scope ofHazop X 4. Hazop Execution Plan X 5. Methodology X 6. Process Description X 7. Pre-work material X 8. Site Specific Hazards ofthe Process X 9. Previous Incidents X 10. Human Factors X 11. Facility Siting 17 of 26 ABD00031335 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA 5SIC Date Time (h) Comments 1 10/28/102 8.0 Team Orientation, Human Factors, Facility Siting, Preliminary Hazards Review 2 10/29/102 8.0 Facility Siting, Human Factors, Preliminary Hazards Review, P&ID and Operating Procedure Review 3 10/30/102 6.0 P&ID and Operating Procedure Review, Unit Tour 4 10/31/102 8.0 Team Orientation - New Member, P&ID and Operating Procedure Review 5 11/1/102 8.0 P&ID and Operating Procedure Review 6 11/4/102 8.0 P&ID and Operating Procedure Review 7 11/5/102 8.0 P&ID and Operating Procedure Review 8 11/6/102 4.0 P&ID and Operating Procedure Review 9 11/7/102 8.0 P&ID and Operating Procedure Review 10 11/8/102 8.0 Team Orientation - New Member, P&ID and Operating Procedure Review 11 12/16/102 8.0 P&ID and Operating Procedure Review 12 12/17/102 8.0 P&ID and Operating Procedure Review, Safety Audit Review, Moca Review, RecomendationsReview, Facility Siting Follow-up n A -1 12/18/02 BREWER, JIMMY MIZE, ED MORGAN, JIMMY NOLEN, DAVID ROBERTS, DAVID SEAVER, JEFF SMITH, ERIK WILSON, NATHANIEL ABD00031336 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA V&-1 ABD00031495 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation Page 1 of 20 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 Approved Jimmy Autrey, Maintenance Manager Date: I. Purpose - The purpose of this procedure is to provide the necessary information that, along with adequate training and responsible action, will enable safe operation of the chlorine feeder system. II. References- The Chlorine Manual: Chlorine Institute, The Chlorine Handling Manual: W&T, Wallace & Tieman Chlorine Feeder Manuals, Material Safety Data Sheet for Chlorine and Aqua Ammonia, Harcross Chemical chlorine training information sheet, and Chlorine "B" Kit Manual. III. Safety and Health Considerations - General- The fan and light for the chlorine container room should be turned on before entering the room (unless there is a leak in which case only the light should be turned on). A full face canister gas mask with approved chlorine gas canister and rubber gloves should be worn when connecting or disconnecting a chlorine container. All metal pie, metal tubing, plastic tubing, and the chlorine feeder equipment contains chlorine gas and may contain chlorine liquid. The chlorine feeder system (pipes, valves, fittings, feeder equipment, etc.) need to be evacuated before opening to atmosphere (which includes disconnecting chlorine containers). Don not use hydrocarbon oil, grease, etc. on the chlorine feeder system since chlorine will react with these substances. If chlorine gas is smelled while wearing the full face canister mask LEAVE the chlorine container room IMMEDIATELY. Follow the appropriate Emergency Operation Procedures. 08/09/00 ABD00031496 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 2 of 20 Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 Chlorine an water form a corrosive solution. A chlorine "B: kit is available in the Equipment Room for use in case of a container leak. A. Properties/Hazards of Chemicals 0 Reference MSDS 1. Chlorine Greenish/yellow gas; clear, amber colored liquid. Disagreeable and suffocation odor with irritating effect on nose and throat. Boiling Point: - 29.3 F Is 2.5 times heavier than air 2. Aqua Ammonia - 26 Baume Colorless liquid Pungent Odor (ammonia) Boiling Point: - 81 F Is 1.7 times lighter than air B. Precautions to Prevent Exposure - Chemical Chlorine Gas: Concentration does not exceed range on fixed chlorine monitor. (Less than 2 ppm) Personal Protective Equipment SCBA, Gloves Engineering Controls Ventilation Fan, Fixed Monitor and Alarm Administrative Controls Operation Procedures, Limited Inventory, and Preventative Maintenance 08/09/00 ABD00031497 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation Page 3 of 20 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 CHEMICAL Chlorine Gas: Unknown concentration, no visible vapor cloud, no liquid leakage. Chlorine Gas/ Liquid: Unknown concentration. Visible vapor cloud. Aqua Ammonia PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT SCBA, Gloves ENGINEERING CONTROLS Ventilation Fan, Fixed Monitor (gas) and Alarm Class "A" Suit -Totally Encapsulating Suit, SCBA, Double Gloves, Hardhat, Rubber Boats. Rubber gloves Ventilation Fan, Fixed Monitor (gas) and Alarm N/A ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS Limited inventory. No more containers than available trunions will allow. Limited inventory. No more containers than available trunions will allow. Limited inventory: 3 bottles C. Control Measures to be Taken if Exposed - Refer to MSDS D. Quality Control for Raw Materials and Control of Hazardous Chemical Inventories - No full chlorine ton containers will be stored in the water plant other than on trunions. No more than three bottles of aqua ammonia will be stored in the water plant equipment room. 08/09/00 ABD00031498 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Page 4 of 20 08/09/00 Chlorine Feeder System Operation UT-WP-003 E. Special or Unique Hazards Flexible tubing between the chlorine containers and the manifold may rupture due to fatigue at any time. Leak check entire tube when a new container is placed in service. Replace tubes immediately if leaking. Otherwise, replace at least once per year. IV. Discussion The chlorine feeder system feeds chlorine gas at a controlled rate into a water stream. This water stream is injected into the aerator 14" downcomer. The function of various chlorine system parts are briefly described below. 1. Tubing Yoke Valve - The tubing yoke valve isolates the chlorine gas in the chlorine feeder system at the closest possible point to the chlorine container valve (this ensures that a minimum of chlorine gas is released when disconnecting a chlorine container). The yoke is used to apply pressure to disposable lead gasket to seal the tubing yoke valve to the chlorine container valve. 2. gas) THE Chlorine container Valve - When the container is in use the valves MUST be aligned vertically. Only the top valve (the one used for supplying chlorine should be connected to the chlorine feeder system. NEVER CONNECT BOTTOM VALVE TO THE CHLORINE FEEDER SYSTEM AS LIQUID CHLORINE WILL BE FED. 3. Vacuum Regulator/Check Valve - the vacuum regulator/check valve functions as a check valve stopping chlorine gas flow to the feeder when no vacuum is present. This valve also enables automatic switch over from one chlorine container to another when the first becomes empty. Part of this unit is a drip leg heater (which should always be plugged in) which vaporizes liquefied chlorine gas.4 4. V-Notch Chlorine Feeder - The chlorine feeder contains four important parts. 08/09/00 ABD00031499 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 5 of 20 Utilities Operations Manual 08/09/00 Chlorine Feeder System Operation UT-WP-003 a. The rotameter - The rotameter indicates the rate at which chlorine gas is being fed to the water plant. Feed rate adjustments can be made by turning the red adjustment knob clockwise (to reduce the feed rate) or counterclockwise (to increase the feed rate). NOTE: Observe adjustment valve bushing (packing nut). Ensure that it doesn't rotate when adjusting the valve. Never close the adjustment knob tightly. b. pisg). c. reached. The feeder vacuum gauge and relief valve - The feeder vacuum gauge indicates the vacuum at the rotameter inlet. The relief valve relieves (opens) if the pressure upstream of the rotameter exceeds 10 to 20 inches of water (0.36 to 0.72 The High/Low vacuum switch - The High/Low vacuum switch triggers a control room panel alarm when a high or low vacuum upstream of the rotameter is d. The chlorine injector - the chlorine injector is where the chlorine gas enters and is mixed with a water stream. A vacuum is created as high pressure water passes through a restriction. This vacuum opens a diaphragm valve (in the injector) and pulls the chlorine gas into the water stream. A drain relief valves relieves (water, water/chlorine mixture, or chlorine gas) if the pressure in the injector becomes too high. This is to protect the feeder system from the back flow of water. 08/09/00 ABD00031500 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Page 6 of 20 08/09/00 Chlorine Feeder System Operation UT-WP-003 V. Operating Procedures - 1 0 TRANSPORTING TON CONTAINERS TO AN EMPTY CHLORINE FEEDER ROOM 1.1 Turn on the lights and ventilation fan for the chlorine container room. 1.2 Open doors of the chlorine container room wide open 1.3 Place barricades in the road with a sign indicating that chlorine transportation is in progress. 1.4 Enter tare weight of container put on scales. 1.5 Using the hoist, put a ton container on each scale trunion and one on the spare trunion. 1.6 Record the scale weight of the two containers on the log sheet. 1.7 Remove the barricades. 2 0 EVACUATE CHLORINE FEEDER SYSTEM BEFORE CONNECTING CHLORINE GAS CONTAINERS NOTE: Turn on the ventilation fan (if there is no leak) and lights. 2.1 Turn the chlorine feeder water supply solenoid HOA switch to HAND. Open all water supply block valves upstream and downstream of the chlorine feeder. The chlorine feeder water supply solenoid bypass globe valve and associated block valves should remain closed. 2.2 Verify that water is flowing through the injector and that the injector suction (vacuum) is greater than 25 inches of mercury. 2.3 Close the tubing yoke valves. 08/09/00 ABD00031501 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation Page 7 of 20 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 2.4 Open the following valves to evacuate the lines from the chlorine feeder to the chlorine container (for each container to be connected): a. The tubing/manifold valve b. The pressure gauge block valve c. The manifold valve d. The manifold yoke valve e. the vacuum regulator/check valve f. The plastic tubing valve. 2.5 Open the chlorine feed rate adjustment knob slightly (if closed) to allow the air to be evacuated. 2.6 Evacuate the chlorine system from the ejector to the container valves. Rotameter must show NO FLOW, and the supply pressure gauge must show greater than 100 inches of water. 2.7 Close both vacuum regulator/check valve units. 2.8 Close the following valves between the chlorine containers and the chlorine feeder injector: a. The tubing/manifold valve b. The plastic tubing valve c. The chlorine feed rate adjustment valve (Do Not Tighten). 3.0 CONNECT THE CHLORINE CONTAINERS 3.1 At least two people must be present to connect a chlorine container, one to connect and one to stand watch. If a container needs to be connected during off-hours, vinyl must send someone to serve as a watch. 3.2 Put on a full face canister gas mask with an approved chlorine gas canister. Put on some rubber gloves. WARNING: If a chlorine leak develops at any time during normal handling when operators are protected only by a full face shield and chlorine canister, leave immediately and follow chlorine leak response procedure UT-WP-018. 08/09/00 ABD00031502 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 8 of 20 Utilities Operations Manual 08/09/00 Chlorine Feeder System Operation UT-WP-003 II // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // //// //// // // // // // // // II // II // // // // // // NOTE Ensure that the drip leg heaters for both North and South vacuum regulator/check valves are plugged in and operating. // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // fl // // // // // // // // // // // / 3.4 Remove the chlorine container valve protection cover. 3.5 Verify that the tubing yoke valve is closed. Using the Standard Chlorine Container Wrench, make sure that the chlorine container valves are closed and that the valve packing nut is snug, but not too tight. 3.6 Align the chlorine container valves vertically. Rotate the container on the trunion as necessary. 3.7 Remove the container valve outlet cap from the TOP container valve (the valve used to supply chlorine gas). Inspect the face of the valve outlet to make sure it is clean, smooth and flat. Consult Harcross Chemical (or current chlorine supplier) if repairs are required. 3.8 Use a NEW lead gasket (yoke gasket) and connect the tubing yoke valve to the chlorine container valve. a. Back off the yoke screw using the standard valve wrench. b. Place a NEW lead gasket in the yoke c. Place the yoke over the valve. d. Properly align and engage the yoke inlet with the valve outlet. e. Tighten the yoke screw with the standard valve wrench. // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // it H 1/ // II II II //// // // // // // // 1/ H NOTE Avoid excessive tightening of the lead gasket since that may squeeze it out of the joint. // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // ii u if n h // u ii / 3.9 Using an approved chlorine container valve wrench open the container valve one quarter turn. Close again. 3.10 Apply some aqua ammonia to a rag an hold under the area to be tested for leaks. 08/09/00 ABD00031503 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 9 of 20 Utilities Operations Manual 08/09/00 Chlorine Feeder System Operation UT-WP-003 DO NOT allow liquid aqua ammonia to come in contact with container, piping, or tubing surfaces. 3.11 If no leaks are found open the chlorine container valve one complete turn. Close again. Check for leaks again. 3.12 If no leaks are found open the tubing yoke valve one quarter turn. Close again. Check for leaks. 3.13 If no leaks are found open the tubing yoke valve all the way. Check for leaks. 3.14 If no leaks are found open the manifold/tubing valve one quarter turn. Close again. Check for leaks. 3.15 If no leaks are found open the manifold tubing valve all the way. Check for leaks again. 3.16 If no leaks are found open the vacuum regulator/check valve until two clicks (close together) are heard. Check for leaks. 3.17 If no leaks are found open the plastic tubing valve. Check for leaks. 3.18 If no leaks are found slowly open the chlorine feed rate adjustment knob until the maximum flow is obtained. 3.18.1 Verify that the injector suction (vacuum) is greater than 6 inches of mercury at maximum flow. Less than 6 inches of mercury indicate a possible vacuum leak downstream of the rotameter. 3.18.2 Adjust the chlorine feed rate adjustment knob until the desired feed rate is obtained. 3.19 Check the chlorine feeder equipment for leaks (including the chlorine feeder relief valve and injector relief valve discharge tubes). 08/09/00 ABD00031504 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation Page 10 of 20 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 3.20 Close the vacuum regulator/check valve for the chlorine container just connected. 3.21 Repeat steps 3.4 through 3.19 to connect the second chlorine container. The second container should be feeding. 3.23 Open the container vacuum regulator/check valve on the first container connected. This container should be in standby. Standby container can not be hooked up before container in service is less than 5001bs. // // II II II 11// H 11 11 11 II II II II II 11 11 // II II 11 II II II II II II II II II II II II II II If NOTE The standby condition is indicated by the regulator's valve stem protruding up from the center of the open-close knob. // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // // / 3.24 Observe and record which container is feeding and which container is in standby. 4.0 WRAP UP PROCEDURE 4.1 Close the doors and turn off the ventilation fan and the lights. 4.2 Turn the chlorine feeder water supply solenoid valve HOA switch to AUTO. 4.3 Turn the well pumps ON at appropriate time in water plant start-up procedure. 5.0 CONTAINER CHANGE-OUT PROCEDURE 5.1 At least two people must be present to change-out a chlorine container, one to connect and one to stand watch. If a container needs to be changed-out during off- hours, vinyl must send someone to serve as a watch. 5.2 Turn off the well pumps. 5.3 Turn the chlorine feeder water supply HOA switch to HAND. 08/09/00 ABD00031505 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation Page 11 of 20 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 5.4 Close the vacuum regulator/check valve for the container which is NOT being disconnected. 5.5 Close the container valve for the container to be disconnected. 5.6 Evacuate the chlorine system from the ejector to the container valve of the container to be disconnected. Rotameter must show NO FLOW, and the supply pressure gauge must show greater than 100 inches of water. 5.7 Close the following valves on supply line to the empty container: a. Tubing yoke valve. b. Tubing manifold valve. c. Vacuum regulator check valve. d. Plastic tubing block valve. e. Chlorine feedrate adjustment valve. (Rotameter) 5.8 Disconnect the empty container, and replace the cap nut and protective cover. 5.9 Barricade the road that passes in front of the chlorine room. 5.10 Remove the empty container using the hoist, and transport it to an empty trunion. If no empty trunion is available, set the container on the ground and scotch until an empty trunion is available. 5.11 Transport a full container to the chlorine room. Using the hoist, lift the container and place it on the empty trunion. Record the new scale weight. 5.12 Follow steps 3.2 to 3.19 to connect the container. 5.13 Close the vacuum regulator/check valve for the container just connected. 5.14 Open the vacuum regulator/check valve for the container NOT disconnected. Re Re- establish appropriate chlorine feedrate. 08/09/00 ABD00031506 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation Page 12 of 20 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 5.15 Open the vacuum regulator/check valve for the container just connected. The container should be in standby. 5.16 Close the door and turn off the light. 5.17 Turn the water supply HOA switch to AUTO. 5.18 Turn on the well pumps. 6.0 HIGH/LOW VACUUM ALARM 6.1 If a HIGH/LOW VACUUM alarm is received without a CHLORINE LEAK alarm, check the reading of the chlorine feeder vacuum gauge. If at any time while in the chlorine room chlorine is smelled or chlorine leak alarm is heard, leave immediately and follow procedures for chlorine leak response (UT-WP-018). 6.1.1 If a positive pressure (or lack of vacuum) is indicated, follow Emergency Operation procedures for Chlorine Leak Cylinder Room (Alarm) 1.7 through 1.22. 6.1.2 If no leak is found and the chlorine feeder is still operating under alarm condition follow Chlorine Feeder Failure procedures 9.0 -9.10. 6.1.3 If a high vacuum is indicated by the feeder vacuum gauge check the weight on scale for a possible empty container(s). Also check to see if the proper valves are open so that both containers can feed chlorine. 6.1.4 If a high vacuum is due to one empty container and a closed vacuum regulator/check valve on the full container: Follow Start Up after Emergency or Normal Shutdown Procedures for the full container. 7.0 CHLORINE INTERLOCK FAILURE ALARM 08/09/00 ABD00031507 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 13 of 20 Utilities Operations Manual 08/09/00 Chlorine Feeder System Operation UT-WP-003 7.1 Check the position of the chlorine feeder water supply solenoid valve HOA switch. Turn HOA to AUTO and verify operation. 7.2 If the solenoid valve will not operate with the HOA in the AUTO position, operate the chlorine feeder water supply solenoid valve manually while the well pump is running. 7.3 Turn the HOA switch to HAND and verify operation. 7.4 If the solenoid will not operate with HOA switch in the HAND position bypass the solenoid valve by opening the bypass globe valve and closing the solenoid block valves. 7.5 Have the automatic water supply solenoid valve and/or loop repaired. 8.0 POWER FAILURE 8.1 After power is restored, verify that the chlorine feed rate is the same as last recorded. Adjust if necessary. 9.0 CHLORINE FEEDER FAILURE 9.1 Turn off well pump. 9.2 Close chlorine container valves. 9.3 Start up back-up chlorine feeder (follow start up procedures UT-WP-002). 9.4 Evacuate chlorine system following steps 2.0 - 2.8. 9.5 Turn the lights and the ventilation fan off when leaving the chlorine container room. 9.6 Turn the chlorine feeder water supply solenoid HOA switch OFF. 08/09/00 ABD00031508 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation Page 14 of 20 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 9.7 When the feeder is operable follow back-up chlorine feeder shut down procedures and chlorine feeder system start up procedures. 10.0 WATER SUPPLY SOLENOID FAILURE 10.1 Turn chlorine system water supply HOA switch to the OFF position. 10.2 CLOSE the chlorine system water supply block valves that are on either side of the solenoid valve. 10.3 OPEN the block valves that are one each end of the solenoid valve bypass line. 10.4 OPEN the globe valve on the solenoid valve bypass line fully. 10.5 Write a priority "A" work order to have the solenoid valve replaced. 11.0 CHLORINE FILTER REPLACEMENT/GENERAL REPAIR WORK 11.1 Turn off the well pumps. 11.2 Turn the chlorine feeder water supply HOA switch to HAND. 11.3 Close the vacuum regulator/check valve for the chlorine supply line which is NOT being repaired. 11.4 Close the container valve for the chlorine supply line to be repaired. 11.5 Evacuate the chlorine system from the ejector to the container valve of the line to be worked on. rotameter must show NO FLOW, and the supply pressure gauge must show greater than 100 inches of water. 08/09/00 ABD00031509 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation Page 15 of 20 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 11.6 Close the following valves on the chlorine supply line to be repaired: a. Tubing yoke valve. b. Tubing manifold valve. c. Vacuum regulator check valve. d. Plastic tubing block valve. e. Chlorine feedrate adjustment valve. (Rotameter) 11.7 Open the vacuum regulator/check valve for the container still in service and restore previous chlorine feed rate. 11.8 Turn the chlorine feeder water supply HOA switch to AUTO. 11.9 After repairs, open all valves on the chlorine supply line just repaired except the container valve. 11.10 Close the vacuum regulator/check valve for the container still in service. 11.11 Evacuate the chlorine system from the ejector to the container valve of the container just repaired. Rotameter must show NO FLOW, and the supply pressure gauge must show greater than 100 inches of water. 11.12 Close the following valves on the chlorine supply line just repaired: a. Tubing manifold valve. b. Vacuum regulator check valve. c. Plastic tubing block valve. d. Chlorine feedrate adjustment valve. (Rotameter) 11.13 Open the vacuum regulator/check valve for the container still in service and restore previous chlorine feed rate. 11.14 Open the following valves on the chlorine supply line just repaired: a. Tubing manifold valve. b. Vacuum regulator check vale. c. Plastic tubing block valve. 08/09/00 ABD00031510 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation Page 16 of 20 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 11.15 The container should be in standby. 12.0 CHLORINE ADDITION 12.1 The amount of chlorine that was found to be needed to oxidize raw coker water properly during the water plant start-up was approximately 12-13 ppm. 12.2 The chlorine feed rate is measured in pounds per day. Therefore, the water plant operator should set the chlorine feed rate to obtain a 12-13 ppm chlorine concentration in the coker water. ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////W^ NOTE The 12-13 ppm described in step 1.2 is not what the operator should expect to get during his regular checks of chlorine residual. The 12-13 ppm chlorine concentration is the desired concentration of chlorine immediately after injection in the coker tray downcomer, after that the chlorine is "used" to oxidize the iron. Any chlorine that is not "used" to oxidize iron will be detected with the operator's residual chlorine test. lllllllllllllllilllllllllltlltlllllililllilllllllllllllllilllllillllllilllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllillllllillllllliillllllllllllllHIIlli 12.3 To calculate the chlorine feed rate in pounds per day (lb/day) for any well water flow rate use the following equation: Chlorine Concentration (PPM) X Well Water Flow Rate (GPM) 83.27 = Chlorine Feed Rate (lb/day) X 83.27 12.4 EXAMPLE: Well Water Flow Rate = 1300 GPM Desired Chlorine concentration = 9.5 ppm Calculate what the chlorine feed rate in lb/day should be. 08/09/00 ABD00031511 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation Page 17 of 20 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 ANSWER: FR = C x WFv 83.27 FR = 9.5 x 1300- 83.27 FR = 148 lb/dav 13.0 NORMAL SHUTDOWN 13.1 Turn on the ventilation fan (if there is no leak) and the lights for the chlorine container room before entering the room. 13.2 Close the chlorine container valves. 13.3 EVACUATE CHLORINE FEEDER SYSTEM 13.4 Turn off the well pumps. 13.5 Turn the chlorine feeder water supply solenoid HOA switch to HAND. NOTE: The ventilation fan (if there is no leak) and lights should be turned on before entering the chlorine container room. 13.6 Verify that water is flowing through the injector and that the injector suction (vacuum) is greater than 25 inches of mercury. 13.7 Close the tubing yoke valves connected to the North and South chlorine container valves. 13.8 Open the following valves to evacuate the lines from the chlorine feeder to the chlorine container (for each container to be connected): a. The tubing/manifold valve b. The pressure gauge block valve c. The manifold valve d. The manifold yoke valve e. The vacuum regulator/check valve f. The plastic tubing valve 08/09/00 ABD00031512 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Feeder System Operation Page 18 of 20 08/09/00 UT-WP-003 13.9 Open the chlorine feed rate adjustment knob slightly (if closed) to allow the air to be evacuated. 13.10 Evacuate the chlorine system from the ejector to the container valves. Rotameter must show NO FLOW, and the supply pressure gauge must show greater than 100 inches of water. 13.11 Close both vacuum regulator/check valve units. 13.12 Close the following valves between the chlorine containers and the chlorine feeder injector. a. The tubing/manifold valve b. The plastic tubing valve c. The chlorine feed rate adjustment valve (Do Not Tighten). 13.13 Turn the chlorine feeder water supply solenoid HOA switch OFF. 13.14 Close the chlorine/water solution line block valve at the aerator downcomer injection point. (To prevent backflow into the chlorine injector). 13.15 Close the doors and turn off the fan and the lights. 13.16 The well pumps may be turned on at this time. The back-up chlorine feed system may also be used at this time. 08/09/00 ABD00031513 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 19 of 20 Utilities Operations Manual 08/09/00 Chlorine Feeder System Operation UT-WP-003 VI. OPERATING LIMITS Critical Parameter Oper. Limit Residual Chlorine ppm 0.05 to 0.5 ppm Consequence of Deviation Below 0.05 ppm: Insufficient oxidation of iron and Manganese Above 0.5 ppm: Corrosion potential increase, detrimental to pond Prevention or Corrective Action Check feed rate daily, check residual chlorine analyzer every four hours, calibrate as needed. Adjust chlorine feed rate in increments of 10 LbsTDay every four hours. Chlorine Feeder Pressure Chlorine injector pressure 10-400 inches water 0-39 inches mercury Tube feeder equipment failure for positive internal pressure Back flow of water into equipment and piping. Feeder Relief valve set to 10-20 inches water. Injector Relief valve relieves at some positive pressure in the injector. 08/09/00 ABD00031514 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Page 20 of 20 Utilities Operations Manual 08/09/00 Chlorine Feeder System Operation UT-WP-003 VII. Safety Systems and Their Functions - Safety System Fixed Point Chlorine Monitor Function Performed Monitors chlorine concentration in the chlorine container room. Triggers alarms (control panel alarm, flashing light and horn outside chlorine container room. REVISION HISTORY Description of the Change Committed to DMS Change per Terry Noland - 1.4 Change per Terry Noland - 3.23 Changes per TLN (I. Purpose) Company Name Change Revision 12/02/98 12/02/98 12/02/98 10/06/99 08/09/00 08/09/00 ABD00031515 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Leak Response-Backup System 1 of 3 07/20/00 UT-WP-017 ApprovedDate:. Jimmy Autrey, Maintenance Manager I. Purpose - The purpose of this procedure is to detail steps to be taken in the event of a chlorine leak in the chlorine back-up system. II. References - The Chlorine Manual: Chlorine Institute, Wallace & Tieman Manuals, Material Safety Data Sheet for Chlorine and Aqua Ammonia, Harcros Chemical training information sheet. Harcros Chlorine Leak Response Team, Phone 601-969-3177 (24 hrs.). III. Safety and Health Considerations - See UT-WP-003 IV. Discussion - See UT-WP-002 V. Operating Procedure - RESPONSIBILITY - UTILITY OPERATOR 1.0 CHLORINE LEAK - OPERATOR DETECTED 1.1 NO VISIBLE VAPOR CLOUD - Notify Vinyl operations personnel of the leak (CALL 2200). Request assistance from person (s) equipped with SCBA (s). Obtain wind directions. VISIBLE VAPOR CLOUD - Call 2200 and indicated that there is a chlorine leak EMERGENCY. 1.2 Turn off the well pumps. 07/20/00 ABD00031516 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant 2 of 3 Utilities Operations Manual 07/20/00 Chlorine Leak Response-Backup System UT-WP-017 ********************************************************************************* 1.3 You (person responsible) and one or more emergency respondents or other Vista employees must have on the required protective gear/clothing before attempting to stop a chlorine leak. The amount of protection depends on guidelines listed in the Health and Safety section of UT-WP-003 to determine what protective ***************************g*e*a*r/*c*lo*t*h*in*g**is*n*e*e*d*e*d**fo*r*a**p*a*r*tic*u*l*a*r*le*a*k*.******************** 2.0 LOCATE THE LEAK 2.1 If the location of the leak is not immediately apparent: a. Apply some aqua ammonia to a rag and hold it under the chlorine gas lines beginning at the chlorine gas container and ending at the chlorine gas ejector. b. Check the chlorine container if no leak is found in the vacuum regulator. 2.2 Respond to the leak depending on the location and type. 3.0 LEAK IN VACUUM REGULATOR VENT. 3.1 CLOSE the container valve. 3.2 Put the solenoid valve HOA switch in the HAND position. 3.3 Allow the metering ball to fall to the bottom and remain there. 3.4 Disconnect vacuum regulator and repair/replace regulator as required. 3.5 When the repairs have been made, follow the appropriate start up procedures to start chlorine feeder. 4.0 LEAK AT CONTAINER VALVE, FUSEABLE PLUG, OR CONTAINER. 07/20/00 ABD00031517 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Leak Response-Backup System 3 of 3 07/20/00 UT-WP-017 4.1 If the leak is in the container valve packing, tighten the packing nut without using excessive force. If this does not eliminate the leak proceed to step 4.2. 4.2 Close the chlorine container valve. 4.3 Stop/Contain leak as indicated in the Chlorine "B" Kit manual (Chlorine "B" kit and manual are located in the Equipment Room). 4.4 Notify Harcross Chemical (or current chlorine supplier) of leaking container (See references for phone number). 4.5 Swap out containers following procedure UT-WP-002. VI. Operating Limits SEE NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE UT-WP-002. VII. Safety systems and Their Functions - N/A REVISION HISTORY Description of the Change Committed to DMS Company Name Change Revision 02/01/99 07/20/00 07/20/00 ABD00031518 Georgia Gulf Chertiicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Leak Response Page 1 of 5 07/20/00 UT-WP-018 Approved Jimmy Autrey, Maintenance Manager Date: I. Purpose - The purpose of this procedure is to respond to emergency situations concerning the chlorine feeder system. They include: Chlorine Leaks, High/Low Vacuum larms, Chlorine Feeder Interlock Failures, Power Failures, Chlorine Feeder Failures, and ater Supply Solenoid Failures. II. References- The Chlorine Manual: Chlorine Institute, Wallace & Tieman Manuals, aterial Safety Data Sheet for Chlorine and Aqua Ammonia, Harcross Chemical training nformation sheet. Phone 601-9639-3177. III. Safety and Health Considerations - UT-WP-003. IV. Discussion - See UT-WP-003. V. Operating Procedure - 1.0 Chlorine Leak Cylinder Room (Alarm) 1.1 Notify Vinyl operations personnel of the leak (CALL 2200). Request assistance om person(s) equipped with SCBA(s). Obtain wind directions. 1.2 Turn off the well pumps. 1.3 You (person responsible) and one or more emergency respondents or other Vista employees must have on the required protective gear/clothing before attempting to stop a chlorine leak. The amount of protection depends on the type, location, and severity of the leak. Follow the guidelines listed in the Health and Safety section of UT-WP-003 to determine what protective gear/clothing is needed for a particular leak. 07/20/00 ABD00031519 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Leak Response Page 2 of 5 07/20/00 UT-WP-018 1.4 Before entering the room check the chlorine concentration indicated on the fixed chlorine monitor meter. If the chlorine concentration is less than 2 ppm, proceed with correcting the leak. If the fixed chlorine monitor meter indicate that there is an emergency chlorine leak situation. 1.5 Turn the chlorine feeder water supply solenoid valve HOA switch to HAND. 1.6 Turn on the light in the chlorine container room. DO NOT TURN ON THE FAN. 1.7 LOCATE THE LEAK 1.8 Close the chlorine container valves. 1.9 If the location of the leak is not immediately apparent: a. Apply some aqua ammonia to a rag and hold it under the chlorine gas lines beginning at the chlorine gas container and ending at the chlorine gas injector. b. Check the chlorine container if no leak is found in the piping. c. If still no leak is found, it may be necessary to open the chlorine container valve and recheck the piping and container until the leak is found. d. Verify the fixed chlorine monitor accuracy if leak cannot be found. 07/20/00 ABD00031520 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Leak Response Page 3 of 5 07/20/00 UT-WP-018 1.10 Respond to the leak depending on location and type. 1.11 Leak in tubing, manifold, feeder equipment, and valves. 1.12 Evacuate the chlorine feeder system. 1.12.1 Verify that water is flowing through the injector and that the injector suction (vacuum) is grater than 25 inches of mercury. 1.12.2 Close the tubing yoke valves connected to the North and South chlorine container valves. 1.12.3 1.12.4 Open the following valves to evacuate the lines from the chlorine feeder to the chlorine container (for each container to be connected): a. The tubing/manifold valve b. The pressure gauge block valve c. The manifold valve d. The manifold yoke valve e. The vacuum regulator/check valve f. The plastic tubing valve Open the chlorine feed rate adjustment knob slightly (if closed) to allow the air to be evacuated. 1.12.5 Allow the system to evacuate for 10 minutes (The feeder vacuum gauge should indicate a vacuum of greater than 100 inches of water ). If the rotameter float indicates flow after 10 minutes check for a vacuum leak upstream of the rotameter. the leak 1.13 Attempt if possible to isolate the area of the leak from the North or the South manifold so that chlorine can be fed from one container while is being repaired. 07/20/00 ABD00031521 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Leak Response Page 4 of 5 07/20/00 UT-WP-018 1.14 If chlorine system cannot be operated while leak is being repaired, switch over to the back-up chlorine feeder system (See back-up chlorine feeder operation procedures). 1.15 Repair/replace tubing, manifold, feeder equipment, and/or valves as required. 1.16 When the repairs have been made follow the appropriate start up procedures to start the chlorine feeder. 1.17 Leak at container valve, fusible plug, or container. 1.18 Close the chlorine container valve. 1.19 Stop/Contain leak as indicated in the Chlorine "B" Kit manual (Chlorine "B" kit and manual are located in the Equipment Room). 1.20 Notify Harcross Chemical (or current chlorine supplier) of leaking container (See references for phone number). 1.21 If it is necessary to continue to feed chlorine from the leaking container: a. Close both vacuum regulator/check valves. b. Open the container valve (or valve installed as part of "B" kit containment procedures) of the leaking container. c. Open the vacuum regulator/check valve of the leaking container. Verify that the feed rate is the same as last recorded. Adjust as necessary. d. Open the container valve of the other container. e. Open the vacuum regulator/check valve of the other container. This should be in stand by. 07/20/00 ABD00031522 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Utilities Operations Manual Chlorine Leak Response Page 5 of 5 07/20/00 UT-WP-018 1.22 When the leaking container is ready for shipment follow Normal Operation Procedures for disconnecting a chlorine container and transpiration. 2.0 Chlorine Leak - Operator detected. Follow the same procedures as Chlorine Leak Cylinder Room (Alarm). VI. Operating Limits - See UT-WP-003 VII. Safety Systems and Their Functions - See UT-WP-003 REVISION HISTORY Description of the Change Committed to DMS Company Name Change Revision 02/01/99 07/20/00 07/20/00 ABD00031523 ABERDEEN PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Normal PROCESS AREA: Distributive Control System PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Fan Control APPROVED BY: DATE: Unit Manager Resin I. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to describe the cooling tower fan control for Cooling Towers CT-006A/B, CT-007. II. REFERENCES: UT-090113, Cooling Water System, Sheet 2 of 4 UT-093122, Cooling Water System III. SAFETY & HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS Safety Systems And Their Functions Safety Systems Halon System Function Performed Used to extinguish fires in control room. Revision Date: 08/31/00 Reviewed By: Danny Hooper PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-N475 PAGE 1 of 4 ABD00031524 ABERDEEN PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Normal PROCESS AREA: Distributive Control System PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Fan Control IV. DISCUSSION A. General Information Cooling Tower fans are turned on and off by temperature control in the basins of the cooling tower. The fans will shut off at 50F and turn back on at 60F. The fans for CT-006B and CT-007B have a dual speed control and will turn on to low speed at 60F and high speed at 65F. B. Location Codes #6A Cooling Tower Fans(E&W) #6B Cooling Tower Fan #7A Cooling Tower Fan (E) #7B Cooling Tower Fan (W) CT-006A CT-006B CT-007A CT-007B V. INSTRUCTIONS 1. Control Scheme for CT-006A Fans: 1.1 DCS shuts fans off when basin temperature reaches 50F. Temperature element (82T097), Fan switches (82H071, 82H072). 1.2 DCS turns fan on when basin temperature reaches 60F. 2. Control Scheme for CT-006B/007A&B fans: 2.1 Senses cooling tower basin temperatures: 2.1.2 2.1.1 CT-006B Cooling Tower Temperature element (82T097) CT-007A/B Cooling Tower Temperature element (92T094) 2.2 DCS turns fans to low speed when basin temperature drops to 60F: 2.2.2 2.2.1 CT-006B Cooling Tower Fan switch (82H073) CT-007A/B Cooling Tower Fan switch (92H090A) 2.3 DCS turns fans off when basin temperature drops to 50F. V. INSTRUCTIONS - Continued Revision Date: 08/31/00 Reviewed By: Danny Hooper PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-N475 PAGE 2 of 4 ABD00031525 ABERDEEN PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Normal PROCESS AREA: Distributive Control System PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Fan Control 2.3.2 2.4.2 2.3.1 CT-006B Cooling Tower Fan switch (82H073) CT-007A/B Cooling Tower Fan switch (92H090B) 2.4 DCS turns fans to high speed when basin temperature increases to 65F. 2.4.1 CT-006B Cooling Tower Fan switch (82H073) CT-007A/B Cooling Tower Fan switch (92H090A) "NOTE" The Panel Operator has ability to run fans on and off manually, if necessary When cooling tower fans are on high speed, they must be turned off and their speed allowed to decrease below the low operating speed before being placed on low speed. VI. OPERATING LIMITS Revision Date: 08/31/00 Reviewed By: Danny Hooper PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-N475 PAGE 3 of 4 ABD00031526 ABERDEEN PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCESS: New Module PROCEDURE TYPE: Normal PROCESS AREA: Distributive Control System PROCEDURE TITLE: Cooling Tower Fan Control Critical Parameter Basin Temperature CT-006A CT-007 Basin Temperature CT-006A CT-007 Basin Temperature CT-006A CT-007 Loop Number 82T097 92T094 82T097 92T094 82T097 92T094 Oper. Limit Less than 60F Consequence of Deviation Excess electric power consumption. Prevention or Corrective Action Fan switches place fans on low speed: 82H073 Less than Freezing of 50F Cooling Tower. Greater than Insufficient 65F cooling. 92H090B Fan switches turn fans off: 82H071, 82H072, and 82H073 92H090A Starts/places fans on high speed. 82H071, 82H072, and 82H073 92H090A/B VII. REVISION HISTORY Description of the Change Cooling Tower 007 Installation. Reviewed procedure. Revision 01/06/98 08/31/00 Revision Date: 08/31/00 Reviewed By: Danny Hooper PROCEDURE NO. VINYL-NM-N475 PAGE 4 of 4 ABD00031527 APPENDIX C ABD00031528 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix C. Employee Participation Documentation ABD00031529 INTER Georgia Gulf OFFICE To: All Aberdeen Employees From: Erik Smith Date: October 23, 2002 Subject: Employee Participation in the Utilities Area HAZOP Revalidation To comply with OSHA regulations, the Utility Area HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) will be revalidated. HAZOP is a method of evaluating a process to determine potential hazards. The Utility Area includes the Propane Tank Farm, the Instrument Air compressors and dryer, the Vinyl Emergency Generators, the Chlorine gas feed systems, and the Vinyl Cooling Towers. Employee participation in the Revalidation of the HAZOP is required. The following employees are currently selected to be part of the Utility Area HAZOP team: Jimmy Brewer David Nolen Ed Mize Nathaniel Wilson Jeff Seaver Erik Smith All Aberdeen Plant employees are requested to inform the team members of potential safety or environmental issues related to the Utility area that they may be aware of. Meetings are schedule to be held in the plant's Training Conference Room. Meeting times are 7:00 a.m. - 3:30 p.m. daily beginning Monday, October 28, 2002. Posting Date L ^ Removal Oate,,! P ABD00031530 ] APPENDIX D ABD00031531 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 1 of 15 Process Safety Information Per OSHA CFR 1910.199 (d) I. Item Hazards Of The Highly Hazardous Chemicals In The Process Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) MSDS Toxicity Permissible Exposure Limits Physical Data Reactivity Data Corrosivity Data Thermal & Chemical stability Data Hazardous Effects of Inadvertent Mixing MSDS for Propane MSDS for Chlorine Aberdeen/Safety/General Plant/MSDS/Vendor/Fuels (Gases or Liquids) Aberdeen/Safety/General Plant/MSDS/Vendor/Water Treatment Chemicals II. Item Information On Technology of Process Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) PFD/Block Flow Diagrams Process Flow Diagram - Propane System Process Flow Diagram Cooling Tower Chlorination Process Flow Diagram Water Plant Chlorination System Process Flow Diagram - Cooling Tower #5 Chlorination System Plant Air Systems Maximum Intended Inventory Maximum Plant Inventory of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, HHC, Rev. 7 Process Chemistry No Information Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Engineering Drawings/Flow Diagrams/General (I It u Utility Hazop File Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Engineering Drawings/Flow Diagrams/General Aberdeen/Vinyl/General Plant/Process/Unit Information/Maximum Intended Inventory ABD00031532 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 2 of 15 II. Item Information On Technology of Process Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) Safe Upper/Lower Limits For Critical Parameters See Operating Procedures (See List) Evaluation of Consequence of Deviation See Operating Procedures (See List) III. Item Information on Equipment In Process Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) Materials of Construction See Equipment Files (See List) P&ID's BP-090100-P1D-D, 09/19/02 BP-090101-PID-D, 12/11/02 BP-090102-PID-D, 12/11/02 UT-090102-PID-D, 02/25/94 UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02 UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02 UT-090109A-PID-D, 10/15/02 UT-090111-P1D-D, 09/26/02 UT-090112-PID-D, 12/11/02 UT-090113-PID-D, 12/11/02 UT-090114-PID-D, 12/11/02 UT-090115-PID-D, 10/09/02 UT-090117-PID-D, 10/10/02 UT-090122-PID-D, 12/11/02 UT-090123-PID-D, 10/23/02 Aberdeen/--/--/Engineering Drawings/P&IDS/General Aberdeen/Utilities/Boiler House/Engineering Drawings/P&I DS/General U U Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Engineering Drawings/P&IDS/General f( u k u t( ii u u Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Engineering Drawings/P&I DS/General u It ABD00031533 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 3 of 15 III. Item Information on Equipment In Process Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) WP-090106-PI D-D, 09/26/02 MCC10A1-E-EL-D, 10/28/02 MCC10AI-E1-EL-D, 08/24/94 NE-D606-57-4-D, 06/29/92 GP-9721-62-6D, 08/23/83 Aberdeen/Utilities/Water Plant/Engineering Drawings/P&IDS/General Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Engineering Drawings/Electrical/One Line Diagrams U Aberdeen/Utilities/Boiler House/Engineering Drawings/Instrumentation/Ladder Diagrams Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Engineering Drawings/Electrical/Wiring Diagrams Electrical Classification See Equipment Files (See List Below) Plant Area Electrical Classifications GP-003000-EL-D, Issue 5 Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Engineering Drawings/Electrical/Area Electrical Classification Plan Relief System Design & Design Basis PSV-PV-029 PSV-PV-030 PSV-PV-03 1 PSV-PR-035 PSV-PR-036 PSV-PR-037 PSV-PP-312 PSV-PP-868 PSV-EX-811 PSV-EX-81 IT PSV-EX-812 PSV-EX-812T PSV-EX-813 PSV-EX-813T Aberdeen/--/--/(Safety/Environmental)/Relief Devices/(Specs/CaIcs/Design Basis) Aberdeen/Uti 1 ities/General Plant/(Safety/Environmental)/Relief Devices/(Specs/Calcs/Design Basis) U U Not Found Not Found Not Found Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/(Safety/Environmental)/Relief Devices/(Specs/Calcs/Design Basis) **This basis may need to be reviewed for installed pump** Not Found Not Found Not Found Not Found Not Found Not Found Not Found ABD00031534 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 4 of 15 III. Item Information on Equipment In Process Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) PSV-PV-032 PSV-PV-033 PSV-PV-034 PSV-DM-813 PSV-CP-708 PSV-CP-708A PSV-CP-709 PSV-CP-709A PSV-DM-838 PSV-DR-030N PSV-DR-030S PSV-UT-0111 PSV-DM-300 PSV-DM-810 Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/(Safety/Environmental)/Re!ief Devices/(Specs/Calcs/Design Basis) **Relief Basis/Size of relief valve needs review** **Relief Basis/Size of relief valve needs review** **Relief Basis/Size of relief valve needs review** Not Found Not Found Not Found Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/(Safety/Environmental)/Relief Devices/(Specs/Calcs/Design Basis) Not Found Files (781250) Not Found Not Found Not Found Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/(Safety/EnvironmentaI)/Relief Devices/(Specs/Calcs/Design Basis) Aberdeen/Vinyl/General Plant/(Safety/Environmental)/Relief Devices/(Specs/Calcs/Design Basis) Ventilation System Design Boilers/Propane/Water Plant Control Room Boiler/Water Plant Lab Room Not Found Not Found Design Codes/Standards See Equipment Files (See List Below) Material & Energy Balances Not Applicable ABD00031535 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 5 of 15 III. Item Information on Equipment In Process Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) Safety Systems Safety Interlocks, shutdowns, measurements, control, and alarm systems DMS/Procedures/PSM Compliance Manual/PSI See Loop Drawings listed below Gas Monitoring Systems NE-003254-IN-D,6/29/92 NE-003282-IN-D, 8/31/93 02A403 GP-F016-77-1-D, 4/11/83 DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files Deluge and Firewater Systems DWG# 09-VL-0002-GA-D, 10/01/98 Fire Water System Study, Webb, Murray & Associates, June 1998 Process Design For Deluge SystemPropane Tank Farm, Oct. 13, 1988 NE-003095-PI-D, 4/25/89 NE-003254-IN-D,6/29/92 NE-D667-42-1-D, 6/2/89 02X401 Utility Hazop File DMS/Files PSM File Room Utility Hazop File Utility Hazop File DMS/Files DMS/Files Utility Hazop File DMS/Files Fire & Explosion suppression systems See Deluge and Firewater Systems Safety Showers No Information Reviewed Breathing Air Systems No Information Reviewed Public Address System Conversation with plant personnel regarding functionality. Standby Generators GN-001 GN-003 MCC17B1-1-EL-D, 4/30/02 See Equipment References Below See Equipment References Below Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Engineering Drawings/Electrical/One Line Diagrams ABD00031536 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 6 of 15 III. Item Information on Equipment In Process Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) SW-003133-EL-D, 08/26/97 GN-004 MCC-7AB1 -1 -EL-D,2/23/93 SWG7AB1-EL-D, 6/98 Aberdeen/Vinyl/New Module/Engineering Drawings/Electrical/Wiring Diagrams See Equipment References Below Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Engineering Drawings/Electrical/One Line Diagrams Underground piping, utilities, and sewers No Information Reviewed IV. Other Information Used Item Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) Chemical Interaction Matrix Chemical Interaction Matrix for Chlorine Utility HAZOP File Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Process/Unit Information/Process Chemistry & Interaction Matrix Previous Incidents (Reviewed) 1. Catalyst Freezer Fire 3/18/98 2. VCM Release 4/6/98 3. TK 655 7/16/98 4. VCM Leak 1/5/99 5. Wastewater Line NM 1/11/99 6. 903 Compressor Breaker NM 1/26/99 7. Power Failure 2/3/99 8. Chris White 6/27/99 9. Process Water Loss 2/16/01 10. Compound Air Compressor Fire 2/16/01 (Report 2/18/02) 11. Process Water Line 7/22/02 12. 720836 Instrument Air Failure, 5/11/94 13. 1995 12/1 Near Miss Failure of Isolation Blind Safety Dept. Files U u (l It u u It (l (t u Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Rotating Equipment/Compressors/Maintenance Records Aberdeen/Safety/General Plant/(Safety/Health)/(Accident/Injury/Incident Repts)/Near Miss Incidents ABD00031537 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 7 of 15 IV. Other Information Used Item Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) 14. 1996 4/16 RX 745 Agitator Electrical Problem 15. 1996 6/28 Near Miss 744 Catalyst Pot 16. 1996 Vacuum Blower 17. 1997 NMD 745 Dump Line 18. Fire Old Module Recovery Aberdeen/Safety/General PIant/(Safety/Health)/(Accident/Injury/Incident Repts)/Incident Investigation Reports & Findings Aberdeen/Safety/General Plant/(Safety/Health)/(Accident/lnjury/Incident Repts)/Near Miss Incidents Aberdeen/Compound/General Plant/(Safety/Hea!th)/(Accident/Injury/Incident Repts)/Incident Investigation Reports & Findings Aberdeen/Vinyl/New Module/(Safety/Health)/(Accident/Injury/lncident Repts)/Near Miss Incidents Aberdeen/Vinyl/Old Module/(Safety/Health)/(Accident/Injury/Incident Repts)/Near Miss Incidents MOCA's Reviewed WP-001-92 UT-006-93 UT-011-93 UT-013-93 WP-001-93 OM-004-95 UT-007-95 UT-001-97 UT-002-97 99-UT-004 99-UT-005 00-UT-003 00-UT-004 00-UT-007 00-UT-009 Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Uti 1 ities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/--/Utilities/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Aberdeen/Utilities/--/MOCA/--/-- Safety Audits Reviewed Process Safety Management Compliance Audit - 1995 PSM File Room & Aberdeen/PSM/General Plant/PSM Compliance/Audit/Compliance Audit Findings Report ABD00031538 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List * Page 8 of 15 IV. Other Information Used Item Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) Process Safety Management Compliance Audit - 1998 Process Safety Management Audit, May 7-11,2001 PSM File Room & Aberdeen/PSM/Generat Plant/PSM Compliance/Audit/Compliance Audit Findings Report PSM File Room Facility Siting Facility Siting Process Hazard Analysis Report #42898, April 28, 1998 Dow Fire & Explosion Indices, 09-VL-0001 -GA-D - PSM File Room & Aberdeen/Vinyl/General Plant/PSM Compliance/Process Hazard Analysis/Facility Siting Utility Hazop File & Facility Siting Report #42898, April 28, 1998 Operating Procedures UT-PR-001,08/09/00 UT-PR-002, 08/09/00 UT-PR-003, 08/09/00 UT-PR-006, 08/09/00 UT-AS-001,05/29/02 UT-AS-009, 07/26/00 VINYL-OM-E008, 05/01/99 VINYL-NM-E008, 05/01/99 UT-CT-001,09/29/99 UT-CT-002, 09/29/99 UT-CT-003, 09/29/99 UT-WP-002, 07/20/00 UT-WP-003, 08/09/00 UT-WP-017, 07/20/00 UT-WP-018, 07/20/00 Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Procedures/Process Operation Procedures/Normal Operations (1 It tt tt U Aberdeen/Vinyl/Old Module/Procedures/Process Operation Procedures/Emergency Operation or Shutdown Aberdeen/Vinyl/New Module/Procedures/Process Operation Procedures/Emergency Operation or Shutdown Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Procedures/Process Operation Procedures/Normal Operations tt tt Aberdeen/Utilities/Water Plant/Procedures/Process Operation Procedures/Normal Operations (1 It Aberdeen/Uti 1 ities/Water Plant/Procedures/Process Operation Procedures/Normal Operations ABD00031539 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 9 of 15 IV. Other Information Used Item Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) VINYL-OM-E007, 05/01/99 VINYL-NM-E013, 04/27/99 VINYL-NM-N475, 08/31/00 Aberdeen/Vinyl/Old Module/Procedures/Process Operation Procedures/Emergency Operation or Shutdown Aberdeen/Vinyl/New Module/Procedures/Process Operation Procedures/Emergency Operation or Shutdown Aberdeen/Vinyl/New Module/Procedures/Process Operation Procedures/Normal Operations Other Information 450029 Plot Plan PV-029 Chlorine Handbook, OxyChem, 1991 Risk Management Program Guidance For Offsite Consequence Analysis, EPA 550B-99-009, April 1999. Estimating the Area Affected by a Chlorine Release, Chlorine Institute, Pamphlet #74, June 1982 Liquefied Petroleum Gases Handbook, 2nd Edition, 1989 edition of NFPA 58. Allgas Vaporizers Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Vessels/Drums/Drawings Engineering Book Shelf Utility Hazop File Fisher Controls, Bulletin LP-21, July 1969 Vessel Drawing for 45-031 720912 Performance Curve GP-9721-62-7-D, 10/2/84 NE-D606-57-3-D, 11/26/90 NE-D606-57-1-D, 5/20/87 NE-D667-57-1-B, 10/23/87 NE-D667-57-2-B. 10/23/87 NE-D667-57-3-D, 7/16/91 NE-D667-62-1-B, 10/29/87 NE-D667-62-2-B, 10/30/87 NE-D667-77-1-D, 01/08/90 NE-003295-IN-D, 8/1/91 Utility Hazop File Equipment Files Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Rotating Equipment/Compressors/Performance Curves Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Engineering Drawings/Electrical/Wiring Diagrams Aberdeen/Utilities/Boiler House/Engineering Drawings/Instrumentation/Ladder Drawings Aberdeen/Utilities/Boiler House/Engineering Drawings/I nstrumentation/(Elevations/Sections/Plans) Old Loop DWG File/ Utility Hazop File Old Loop DWG File/ Utility Hazop File Aberdeen/Utilities/Boiler House/Engineering Drawings/Instrumentation/Ladder Drawings Old Loop DWG File/ Utility Hazop File Old Loop DWG File/ Utility Hazop File Aberdeen/Utilities/General Plant/Engineering Drawings/Piping/(Piping Section/Details) Aberdeen/Utilities/Water Plant/Engineering Drawings/lnstrumentation/(Elevations/Sections/Plans) ABD00031540 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 10 of 15 IV. Other Information Used Item Location Site/Unit/Area/Category/Subcategory/Identifier (DMS) NE-003310-IN-D, 12/12/91 PP-312-EL-B, 11/23/02 PP-868-EL-B, 11/23/02 PT-274-62-31-D, 8/15/83 Applicability PSM-001, Revision 11 Employee Participation PSM-002, Revision 5 Process Safety Information PSM-003, Revision 8 Maximum Plant Inventories of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, HHC, Revision 7 Aberdeen/Utilities/Water Plant/Engineering Drawings/Instrumentation/(Elevations/Sections/Plans) Aberdeen/Utilities/Boiler House/Engineering Drawings/Electrical/Motor Diagrams Aberdeen/Vinyl/Utilities/Engineering Drawings/Electrical/Wiring Diagrams Aberdeen/PSM/General Plant/Procedures/PSM Compliance Manual/Process Safety Information Aberdeen/PSM/General Plant/Procedures/PSM Compliance Manual/Employee Participation Aberdeen/PSM/General Plant/Procedures/PSM Compliance. Manual/Process Safety Information Aberdeen/Vinyl/General Plant/Process/Unit Information/Maximum Intended Inventory PSM Covered Equipment Location Code Equipment Number Location For Equipment Information in DMS Search by Loop Number, Equipment Number, or Drawing Number. CV-2701 CV-2702 CV-2703 CV-2704 CV-2705 PIC-2706 PP-312 PP-868 PSV-PV-029 PSV-PV-030 PSV-PV-031 PSV-PP-312 PSV-PP-868 PSV-PR-0035 PSV-PR-0036 PSV-PR-0037 PV-029 PV-030 720312 720868 780457 781465 780458 781117 781118 450029 450030 DMS, See DWG# NE-D667-57-3-D DMS, See DWG# NE-D667-57-3-D DMS, DWG # CV-2703 NE-D667-57-1-B DMS, See DWG # CV-2703 NE-D667-57-1-B DMS, See DWG# NE-D667-57-3-D DMS, See DWG# PIC-2706 NE-D667-57-2-B Some Information Available but Equipment File Not in DMS Some Information Available but Equipment File Not in DMS DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files Equipment Number/File Not Found Equipment Number/File Not Found Equipment Number/File Not Found DMS/Files DMS/Files ABD00031541 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 11 of 15 PSM Covered Equipment Location Code Equipment Number PV-031 450031 Location For Equipment Information in DMS Search by Loop Number, Equipment Number, or Drawing Number. DMS/Files, Vessel Drawing Available, U1A Not Found EX-811 EX-812 EX-813 PSV-EX-81 IS PSV-EX-81 IT PSV-EX-812S PSV-EX-812T PSV-EX-813S PSV-EX-813T 551081 551082 551083 Name Plate Data Available, U1A Not Found Name Plate Data Available, U1A Not Found Name Plate Data Available, U1A Not Found Equipment Number/File Not Found Equipment Number/File Not Found Equipment Number/File Not Found Equipment Number/File Not Found Equipment Number/File Not Found Equipment Number/File Not Found MI-032 #1 #2 #3 #4 PSV-PV-032 PSV-PV-033 PSV-PV-034 PV-032 PV-033 PV-034 02PAL410 02PAL411 820007 820006 820008 820004 781286 781287 781288 45032 450033 450034 DMS, Some Information Available but Equipment File Not Found DMS, Some Information Available but Equipment File Not Found DMS, Some Information Available but Equipment File Not Found DMS, Some Information Available but Equipment File Not Found DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files, Vessel DWG Found, U1A Not Found DMS, See DWG# NE-D606-57-4-D DMS, See DWG# NE-D606-57-4-D EX-300 DM-813 PSV-DM-813 550300 450813 Equipment File Not Found DMS/Files Equipment Number/File Not Found 02P606 02UA629 02LA712 82P085 82P090 CP-708 CP-709 DM-838 FL-075 720708 72909 45052 640061 DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files ABD00031542 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 12 of 15 PSM Covered Equipment Location Code Equipment Number FL-076 FL-080 FL-081 PSV-CP-708 PSV-CP-708A PSV-CP-709 PSV-CP-709A PSV-DM-838 640062 640063 640064 781445 781446 781442 781250 Location For Equipment Information in DMS Search by Loop Number, Equipment Number, or Drawing Number. DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files Equipment Number/File Not Found DMS/Files Equipment File Not Found DMS/Files DR-030 PSV-DR-030N PSV-DR-030S DM-300 DM-810 PSV-DM-300 PSV-DM-810 PSV-UT-0111 560030 781489 781486 450302 452008 781036 781315 781461 Some Information Available in I/E Shop, U1A Available, Equipment File Not Found in DMS Equipment File Not Found DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files 81L049 81FI066 81H067 81H068 81H073 81H074 81H075A 81H076A 81P079 81H086 81H087 81L088 81L089 81T092 8IT097 92P075 PP-243 PP-281 720282 720281 DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files, Performance Curve Not Found ABD00031543 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 13 of 15 PSM Covered Equipment Location Code Equipment Number PP-955 720955 Location For Equipment Information in DMS Search by Loop Number, Equipment Number, or Drawing Number. DMS/Files 82H060 82H061 82H062 82H063 82H071 82H072 82H073A 82L079 82H086 82H087 82L088 82L089 82T097 82T099 92P076 PP-906 PP-907 PP-908 PP-1 16 720906 720907 721199 720146 DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files Equipment File Not Found Equipment File Not Found DMS/Files Equipment File Not Found 81H056 81T058 81H061 81H062 81H063 81H064 81H065 81H070 81H071 81H072 81L079 81P079 81L090 81L091 81T092 81T096 DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files ABD00031544 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 14 of 15 PSM Covered Equipment Location Code Equipment Number PP-247 PP-252 PP-253 PP-257 PP-258 PP-977 PP-978 720247 720252 720253 720257 720258 722505 722506 Location For Equipment Information in DMS Search by Loop Number, Equipment Number, or Drawing Number. DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files Equipment File Not Found Equipment File Not Found CV- ifoi 81A085 SC-121 5^10^3 961005 Equipment File Not Found DMS/Files Files 92N080 92L081 92L082 92T083 92H084 92X085 92X086 92X087 92X088 92X089 92H090 92V091 92V092 92P094 92ASH51120 99N257 GN-003 PP-540 PP-541 PP-542 PP-543 351002 721291 721292 721293 721294 DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files DMS/Files CV- i-ob 88AE5031 SC-122 5'HObz. 961000 Equipment File Not Found Information Not Found Files ABD00031545 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix D. HAZOP Pre-Work Material List Page 15 of 15 PSM Covered Equipment Location Code Equipment Number 02A808 CV-404 CV- lujtj PSHL-848 SC-015 SC-016 591060 tf\ 1DC\ 961035 961040 Location For Equipment Information in DMS Search by Loop Number, Equipment Number, or Drawing Number. DMS/Files DMS/Files Equipment Number/File Not Found DMS/Files Equipment File Not Found Equipment File Not Found GN-001 GN-004 99N002 351000 351003 DMS/Files Files DMS/Files ABD00031546 appendix e ABD00031547 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix E. List of Updates and Revalidations 1. Initial PHA 1997 2. Revalidation PHA. 2002 ABD00031548 APPENDIX F ABD00031549 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix F. Hazop Worksheets ABD00031550 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 1. Propane storage tank, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031, liquid and vapor fill lines. Type: Line Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane Truck Unloading - Propane Vapor in Vapor lines, Propane Liquid in Liquid Lines. (Propane liquid transfer at approximately 225 gpm and 125 psid. Truck pump internal bypass set at 150 psi. - Dowdle Propane). Dev Causes Consequences 1.1 High Pressure 1. Blocked unloading line during unloading 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane leak 3. Propane release 2. Blocked in liquid line on thermal expansion case 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane leak 3. Propane release 3. Fire 1. Downtime/lost production 2. Explosion 3. Personnel Evacuation 4. Propane leak 5. Propane release 4. High upstream pressure (from truck pump) 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Fire/Explosion - E 3. Personnel Evacuation 4. Propane leak 5. Propane release 1.2 High Temperature 1. Fire 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 2. Hot work in close proximity 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 1 CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 C S 4B S/E 4 C 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. Following correct operating 5 procedure. Making sure valves are lined up properly before unloading. 3. No Hot Work in Contractor Area, Propane Tank Farm, and Boiler Area while unloading. S/E 4 C 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment S 4 B 5 2. Following correct operating S/E 4 C 5 procedure. Making sure valves are lined up properly after unloading. 3. No Hot Work in Contractor Area, Propane Tank Farm, and Boiler Area while unloading. EC 4 C S/E 4 C S 4C S 4B S/E 4 C 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. No Hot Work in Contractor 5 Area, Propane Tank Farm, 5 and Boiler Area while 5 unloading. S 3 C 4 1. Fire Protection Equipment E 4 C 5 2. Following correct operating S 4C 5 procedure. Making sure S 4B 5 valves are lined up properly S/E 4 C 5 before unloading. 3. No Hot Work in Contractor Area, Propane Tank Farm, and Boiler Area while unloading. 48 2 1 14 S/E 4 C S/E 4 C 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. Fire Watch 3. Hot work permits 4. No Hot Work in Contractor Area, Propane Tank Farm, and Boiler Area while unloading. S/E 4 C S/E 4 C 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. Fire Watch 3. Hot work permits 4. No Hot Work in Contractor Area, Propane Tank Farm, and Boiler Area while unloading. 1 1 ABD00031551 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 1. Propane storage tank, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031, liquid and vapor fill lines. Type: Line Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane Truck Unloading - Propane Vapor in Vapor lines, Propane Liquid in Liquid Lines. (Propane liquid transfer at approximately 225 gpm and 125 psid. Truck pump internal bypass set at 150 psi. Dowdle Propane). Dev Causes 1.3 Low Temperature 1. Low Ambient Temperature 1.4 Low/No Flow 1. High downstream pressure Consequences 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Environmental - No Consequence 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Environmental - No Consequence 2. Low upstream pressure - truck pump outlet pressure low pump not running/worn out/ malfunction 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Environmental No Consequence 3. Driver/Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Environmental - No Consequence 1.5 Reverse/Misdirected Flow 1. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane Release 2. Check valve failure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane Release 3. Truck unloading line rupture 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Propane Release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 D 5 1. Piping specification includes E 4D 5 expected ambient low temperature 1 EC 4 D 5 1. Operating procedures for E 4D 5 routing flows 2. Unique connectors for flexible lines 3. Valve position indicators EC 4 D E 4D 5 5 1 1 EC 4 D 5 1. Unique connectors for flexible E 4D 5 lines 2. Valve position indicators 3. Operating procedures for routing flows 1 EC 4 D 5 1. No Hot Work in Contractor S/E 4 D 5 Area, Propane Tank Farm, S/E 4 D 5 and Boiler Area while unloading. 2. Operating procedures on line routings 3. Unique connectors for flexible lines 4. Valve position indicators 5. Fire protection equipment EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. No Hot Work in Contractor 5 Area, Propane Tank Farm, 5 and Boiler Area while unloading. 2. Operating procedures on line routings 3. Unique connectors for flexible lines 4. Valve position indicators 5. Fire protection equipment EC 4 D 5 1. No Hot Work in Contractor S 3C 4 Area, Propane Tank Farm, E 4C 5 and Boiler Area while S/E 4 C 5 unloading. 1 1 14 2 ABD00031552 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 2. Propane transfer pumps, PP-312 and PP-868, and transfer line. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawings: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02, (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane liquid flow at 125 psig, 6700 Ib/hr. Dev Causes 2.1 High Pressure 1 Fire Consequences 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Personnel Evacuation 5. Propane release 2. Pump driver overspeedingincorrect sheave 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3 Fire/Explosion - E 4 Personnel Evacuation 5. Propane release 3. Pressure control valve malfunction or block valves closed while pump is running 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Personnel Evacuation 5 Propane release 4. Valve closed on pump discharge when pump is running 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Personnel Evacuation 5. Propane release 5. Relief Valve failure or block valves closed downstream of 1. Downtime/Lost Production 3 CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 D S 3D EC 4 D S 4C S/E 4 c 5 1. Heat sensor activation of 5 deluge system 5 2. Manual activation of deluge 5 system 5 3. LEL detection activation of deluge system 4. Remote operation of transfer line actuated block valves and transfer pumps 5. Pressure relief valve on pump discharge (upstream of the first block valve after the transfer pump) 3 4 EC 4 D 5 1. Heat sensor activation of S 3D 5 deluge system E 4 D 5 2. LEL detection activation of S 4C 5 deluge system S/E 4 C 5 3. Manual activation of deluge system 4. Remote operation actuated block valves 5. Pressure relief valve on pump discharge (upstream of the first block valve after the transfer pump) 3 4 EC 4 D S 3D E 4D S 4C S/E 4 C 5 1. Heat sensor activation of 5 deluge system 5 2. LEL detection activation of 5 deluge system 5 3. Manual activation of deluge system 4. Pressure relief valve on pump discharge (upstream of the first block valve after the transfer pump) 5 Remote operation of transfer line actuated block valves and transfer pumps 3 4 27 EC 4 D S 3D E 4D S 4C S/E 4 C 5 1. Heat sensor activation of 5 deluge system 5 2. LEL detection activation of 5 deluge system 5 3. Manual activation of deluge system 4. Pressure relief valve on pump discharge (upstream of block valve) 5. Remote operation actuated block valves 3 4 EC 4 D 5 1. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 3 4 ABD00031553 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node : 2. Propane transfer pumps, PP-312 and PP-868, and transfer line. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawings: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02, (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane liquid flow at 125 psig, 6700 Ib/hr. Dev Causes 2.1 cont'd 5. cont'd relief valve under relieving conditions Consequences 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Personnel Evacuation 5. Propane release 6. Blocked in thermal expansion 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Personnel Evacuation 5. Propane release 2.2 Cavitation 1. Inlet filter/strainer plugs 1. Damage to pump 2. Downtime/loss of production 3. Low or no flow 2. Low level in propane storage tank supplying pump 1. Damage to pump 2. Downtime/loss of production 3. Low or no flow 3. Misaligned/closed valve 1. Damage to pump 2. Downtime/loss of production 3. Low or no flow 2.3 Leak 1. Corrosion/erosion 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane leak/release 2. High pressure 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane leak/release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S 3D E 4D S 4C S/E 4 C 5 2. LEL detection activation of 5 deluge system 5 3. Manual activation of deluge 5 system 4. Remote operation actuated block valves EC 4 D S 3D E 4D S 4C S/E 4 C 5 1. Heat sensor activation of 5 deluge system 5 2. LEL detection activation of 5 deluge system 5 3. Manual activation of deluge system 4. Pressure relief valve on pump discharge (upstream of block valve) 2 3 4 S/E 4 D EC 4 D S/E 4 D 5 5 5 S/E 4 D 5 1. Operator checking storage EC 4 D 5 tank level S/E 4 D 5 S/E 4 D 5 1. Following correct operating EC 4 D 5 procedure. Making sure S/E 4 D 5 valves are lined up properly 1 1 1 S/E 4 D S/E 4 B 5 1. Heat sensor activation of 5 deluge system 2. Inspection & maintenance program to detect corrosion/ erosion & replace affected components 3. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 4. Manual activation of deluge system 5. Remote shutdown of pump 6. Remotely operable Isolation valves one on pump suction, two on discharge.1 2 3 S/E 4 D S/E 4 B 5 1. Heat sensor activation of 5 deluge system 2. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 3. Manual activation of deluge system 4 4 4 ABD00031554 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 2. Propane transfer pumps, PP-312 and PP-868, and transfer line. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawings: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02, (OP) UT-PR-001, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane liquid flow at 125 psig, 6700 Ib/hr. Dev 2,3 cont'd 2. cont'd Causes Consequences 3. Improper maintenance 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane leak/release 4. Seal/packing failure 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane leak/release 5. Blown gasket 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane leak/release 2.4 High Temperature 1. Fire 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 2. Hot work in close proximity 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 3. Pump malfunction 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 4. Remote shutdown of pump 5. Remotely operable isolation valves one on pump suction, two on discharge. S/E 4 D 5 1. Heat sensor activation of S/E 4 B 5 deluge system 2. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 3. Manual activation of deluge system 4. Remote shutdown of pump 5. Remotely operable isolation valves one on pump suction, two on discharge. S/E 4 D 5 S/E 4 B 5 1. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 2. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 3. Manual activation of deluge system 4. Remote shutdown of pump 5. Remotely operable isolation valves one on pump suction, two on discharge. S/E 4 D 5 1. Heat sensor activation of S/E 4 B 5 deluge system 2. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 3. Manual activation of deluge system 4. Remote shutdown of pump 5. Remotely operable isolation valves one on pump suction, two on discharge. 4 4 4 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. Fire Watch 5 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. Hot work permits EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. Fire Watch 5 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. Hot work permits EC 4 D 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment S/E 3 D 5 2. Fire Watch 1 1 1 5 ABD00031555 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 2 Propane transfer pumps, PP-312 and PP-868, and transfer line. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawings: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02, (OP) UT-PR-001, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane liquid flow at 125 psig, 6700 Ib/hr. Dev 2.4 cont'd Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards 3. cont'd 3. Propane release S/E 4 D 5 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. Hot work permits 2.5 Low Pressure 1. Line Rupture/Leak 2. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 3. Transfer pump output pressure low 1. Downtime/Loss of production 2 Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 1. Downtime/Loss of production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 1. Downtime/Loss of production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. LEL detection activation of 5 deluge system & Alarm 5 2. Manual activation of deluge system 3. Remote shutdown of pump 4. Remotely operable isolation valves one on pump suction, two on discharge 5 1. Pressure indication 5 5 5 1. Pressure indication 5 2. Spare pump on standby 5 4. Low level in propane storage tank 1. Downtime/Loss of production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4 Propane release 5 Propane release - E 1. Bypass around control valve 2. Pressure indication 3. Spare pump on standby 5. Incorrect sheave installed on pump/motor 1. Downtime/Loss of production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Propane release 5. Propane release E 1. Bypass around control valve 2. Pressure indication 3. Spare pump on standby Rec. 4 4 4 4 4 6 ABD00031556 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 3. Propane storage tanks, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031. Type: Vessel Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane storage to 250 psig. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 3.1 High Pressure 1. Fire Consequences 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Propane release 2. Overfilling of vessel 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release Missaligned valves - Propane pump suction connected to one storage tank and recirculating (pressure control) to another storage tank (not equalized). 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Propane release 3. Fire/Explosion 4. Relief valve isolated (block valve under relief valve closed) under relieving condtions 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Propane release 3. Fire/Explosion 7 CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 D S 2D E 3D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 15 4 2. Fire monitors and hose 16 5 stations 5 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. Manual activation of deluge system 5. Pressure relief valve - isolation valve under relief valve is normally locked open 6. Sloping ground to prevent accumulation offlammables beneath vessel EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 3 D 5 1. Accurate tank gauging before 5 unloading 5 2. Deluge system 3. Fire monitors and hose stations 4. High pressure indication local pressure gauge 5. LEL detection activation of deluge system 6. Manual activation of deluge system 7. Pressure relief valve - isolation valve under relief valve is normally locked open 8. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4 5 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 3 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Fire monitors and hose 5 stations 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. High pressure indication local pressure gauge 5. LEL detection activation of deluge system 6. Manual activation of deluge system 7. Pressure relief valve - isolation valve under relief valve is normally locked open 4 5 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 3 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Fire monitors and hose 5 stations 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. High pressure indication local pressure gauge 5. LEL detection activation of deluge system 4 5 ABD00031557 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 3. Propane storage tanks, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031. Type: Vessel Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane storage to 250 psig. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 3.1 cont'd 4. cont'd Consequences 5. Relief valve plugged under relieving conditions. 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Propane release 3. Fire/Explosion 3.2 High Temperature Downtime/Lost Production Fire/Explosion Fire/Explosion - E Propane release 3.3 High Level Operator/truck driver overfill tank during filling 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release Recirculation valves misaligned to pull from one tank and return to another 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release Inaccurate tank gauging prior to unloading truck 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 6. Manual activation of deluge system 7. Plant sign in/sign out for key to locks on valves under relief valves EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 3 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Fire monitors and hose 5 stations 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. High pressure indication local pressure gauge 5. LEL detection activation of deluge system 6. Manual activation of deluge system 4 5 7 EC 4 D S 2D E 3D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 4 2. Fire monitors and hose 5 stations 5 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. LEL detection activation of deluge system 5. Manual activation of deluge system 6. Operating procedures 7. Pressure relief valve 8. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 9. Sloping ground beneath vessel to prevent flammables accumulating 6 15 16 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Level gauge - dip tube (two 5 tanks) bleed gauge with rotary 5 dial (one tank). 2. Operating procedures 17 EC 4 D 5 1. Operating procedures S/E 3 D 5 S/E 4 D 5 5 17 18 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Level gauge dip tube (two 5 tanks) bleed gauge with rotary 5 dial (one tank). 2. Operating procedures 17 8 ABD00031558 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 3. Propane storage tanks, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031. Type: Vessel Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane storage to 250 psig. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 3.4 Leak 1. Corrosion and/or erosion Consequences 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 2. Flange, flange gasket, threaded fitting, and packing failure 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 3. Inadequate torquing of bolts 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 4. Relief valve or instrument failure to contain pressure 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 3.5 Rupture 1. Propane storage tank material failure due to fire 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Fire/Explosion - E 4. Propane release 2. Overpressure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 9 CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge 5 2. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 3. Maintenance & inspection procedures S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge 5 2. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 3. Maintenance & inspection procedures 4. Procedures for torquing bolts S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge 5 2. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 3. Maintenance & inspection procedures 4. Procedures for torquing bolts S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge 5 2. Isolation valves on pressure gauges and relief valve 3. LEL detection activation of deluge system & Alarm 4. Maintenance & inspection procedures 5. Procedures for torquing bolts 6 6 6 EC 4 D 5 1. Deluge system S 2 D 4 2. Fire monitors and hose E 3D 5 stations S/E 4 D 5 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. LEL detection activation of deluge system 5. Manual activation of deluge system 6. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 7. Sloping ground beneath vessel to prevent flammables accumulating2 3 4 EC 4 D 5 1. Deluge system S/E 3 D 5 2. Fire monitors and hose S/E 4 D5 stations 3. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 4. LEL detection activation of deluge system 15 16 7 ABD00031559 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 3. Propane storage tanks, PV-029, PV-030, and PV-031. Type: Vessel Drawing: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane storage to 250 psig. UTIL_02A.PHA Dev Causes 3.5 cont'd 2. cont'd Consequences 3. Relief valve plugged under relieving condition 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4. Relief valve isolated under relieving condition 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 5. Manual activation of deluge system 6. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 7. Sloping ground beneath vessel to prevent flammables accumulating 8. Pressure relief valve 9. Pressure relief valve - isolation valve under relief valve is normally locked open EC 4 D 5 1. Deluge system S/E 3 D 5 2. Remote shutdown of three S/E 4 D 5 actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 7 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Remote shutdown of three 5 actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 3. Pressure relief valve - isolation valve under relief valve is normally locked open 7 10 ABD00031560 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 4. Propane transfer line to and from vaporizers. Type: Line Drawings: BP-090101-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) UT-PR-001, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane flow at 125 psig to 6,700 Ib/hr. Dev Causes 4.1 High Pressure 1. Blocked in liquid line with thermal expansion (from vaporizer or solar radiation) Consequences 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 2. Fire 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 3 High upstream pressure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4. Pressure control valve (PCV 2706) failure to maintain pressure at set point 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4.2 High Temperature 1. Fire Downtime/Lost Production Fire/Explosion Propane release 11 CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 D 5 1. Operating procedure S/E 4 D 5 2. Pressure control valve (PCV S/E 4 D 5 2706) 3. Relief valve on vaporizer - sizing basis unknown 4. Relief valve on propane transfer pump 5. Fire Protection equipment EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Relief valve on vaporizer 5 sizing basis unknown 5 2. Relief valve on propane transfer pump 3. Deluge system 4. Fire monitors and hose stations 5. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 6. Manual activation of deluge system 7. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 8. Sloping ground beneath vessel to prevent flammables accumulating EC 4 D 5 1. Pressure control valve (PCV S/E 4 D 5 2706) S/E 4 D 5 2. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 3. Fire Protection equipment EC 4 D 5 1. Relief valve on vaporizer - S/E 4 D 5 sizing basis unknown S/E 4 D 5 2. Relief valve on propane transfer pump 3. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 4. Fire Protection equipment 3 19 3 19 3 3 19 EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. Hot work permits 5 3. Deluge system 4. Fire monitors and hose stations 5. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 1 ABD00031561 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node. 4. Propane transfer line to and from vaporizers. Type: Line Drawings: BP-090101-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane flow at 125 psig to 6,700 Ib/hr. Dev Causes 4.2 cont'd 1. cont'd Consequences 2. Hot work in close proximity 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4.3 High Flow 1. High upstream pressure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2 Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4. Liquid exiting vaporizer 2 Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1 Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 3 Pressure control valve (PCV 2706) fails to maintain pressure at or below set point 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2 Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 12 CAT S | L RR Safeguards Rec 6. Manual activation of deluge system 7. Sloping ground beneath vessel to prevent flammables accumulating EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire Protection Equipment 5 2. Hot work permits 5 3. Deluge system 4. Fire monitors and hose stations 5. Heat sensor activation of deluge system 6. Manual activation of deluge system 7. Sloping ground beneath vessel to prevent flammables accumulating 8. Fire Watch 1 EC 4 D 5 1. Fire Protection equipment S/E 4 D 5 2. Operating procedure S/E 4 D 5 3. Pressure control valve (PCV S 4C 5 2706) 4. Level control solenoid valve on vaporizer shuts when level in the vaporizer is high 5. Annual PM on Propane System 6. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire Protection equipment 5 2. Operating procedure 5 3. Pressure control valve (PCV 2706) 4. Level control solenoid valve on vaporizer shuts when level in the vaporizer is high 5 Annual PM on Propane System 6. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump EC 4 D 5 1. Fire Protection equipment S/E 4 D 5 2. Operating procedure includes S/E 4 D 5 control valve set point 3. Level control solenoid valve on vaporizer shuts when level 1 1 1 ABD00031562 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 4. Propane transfer line to and from vaporizers. Type: Line Drawings: BP-090101-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane flow at 125 psig to 6,700 Ib/hr. Dev Causes 4.3 cont'd 3. cont'd Consequences 4. Line leak 5. Both pumps running Downtime/Lost Production Fire/Explosion Propane release Downtime/Lost Production Fire/Explosion Propane release 6. High pressure in storage tanks 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4.4 Low/No Flow High downstream pressure Low upstream pressure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 1. Downtime/Lost Production CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec 3. cont'd in the vaporizer is high 4. Annual PM on Propane System 5. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire Protection equipment 5 2. Annual PM on Propane 5 System 3. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 1 EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire Protection equipment 5 2. Operating procedure indicates 5 that only one pump is to be run at a time 3. Pressure control valve (PCV 2706) 4. Level control solenoid valve on vaporizer shuts when level in the vaporizer is high 5. Annual PM on Propane System 6. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 1 EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire Protection equipment 5 2. Level control solenoid valve 5 on vaporizer shuts when level in the vaporizer is high 3. Annual PM on Propane System 4. Remote shutdown of three actuated propane transfer valves and pump transfer pump. 5. Operating procedure indicates that only one pump is to be run at a time 20 EC 4 D 5 EC 4 D 5 1. Pressure controller (PCV 2706) and pressure indication 1 1 13 ABD00031563 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 4. Propane transfer line to and from vaporizers. Type: Line Drawings: BP-090101-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane flow at 125 psig to 6,700 Ib/hr. Dev Causes Consequences 4.4 cont'd 3. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Downtime/Lost Production 4. Plugged strainer/filter 1. Downtime/Lost Production 5. Pump failure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 6. Pressure control valve failure to maintain pressure at set point 1. Downtime/Lost Production 4.5 Leak 1. Corrosion 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal failure 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 3. Inadequate torquing of bolts 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 4. Line overstressed 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 D 5 1. Operating procedures for routing flows 2. Valve position indicators EC 4 D 5 EC 4 D 5 1. Spare pump on standby EC 4 D 5 1 1 1 1 S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Annual PM on Propane 5 System 2. Maintenance & inspection procedures 3. Water monitors & deluge system 4. Flammable gas detection & alarm S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Annual PM on Propane 5 System 2. Maintenance & inspection procedures 3. Water monitors & deluge system 4. Flammable gas detection & alarm S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Annual PM on Propane 5 System 2. Maintenance & inspection procedures 3. Water monitors & deluge system 4. Flammable gas detection & alarm 5. Maintenance procedures for torquing bolts4 S/E 4 D 5 1. Maintenance & inspection S/E 4 D 5 procedures 2. Water monitors & deluge system 3. Flammable gas detection & alarm 1 1 1 1 14 ABD00031564 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 5. Steam supply to vaporizers. Type: Line Drawings: BP-090101-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Steam supply at 150 psig then reduced to 25 psig. Flow to 1500 Ib/hr. Dev Causes 5.1 High Pressure 1. Blocked discharge 2. High upstream pressure 3. Regulator malfunction 4. Regulator bypass open 5.2 Low/No Flow 1. High downstream pressure Consequences 1. Blow gasket 2. Blow gasket E 3. Lift relief valve 1. Blow gasket 2. Blow gasket E 3. Lift relief valve 4. Lift relief valve - E 1. Blow gasket 2. Blow gasket - E 3. Lift relief valve 4. Lift relief valve - E 1. Blow gasket 2. Blow gasket - E 3. Lift relief valve 4. Lift relief valve - E 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Liquid exiting vaporizer 2. Low upstream pressure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Liquid exiting vaporizer 3. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Liquid exiting vaporizer 4. Plugged strainer/filter/trap 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Liquid exiting vaporizer 5. Line rupture 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Liquid exiting vaporizer CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S 4 C 5 1. Pressure relief valve on steam 21 E 4D 5 outlet line S/E 4 C 5 S 4 C 5 1. Pressure relief valve on steam 21 E 4D 5 outlet line S 4 C 5 2. Steam pressure regulator on E 4D 5 line to vaporizer S 4 C 5 1. Pressure relief valve on steam 21 E 4D 5 outlet line S 4C 5 E 4D 5 S 4 C 5 1. Pressure relief valve on steam 21 E 4D 5 outlet line S 4C 5 E 4D 5 EC 4 B S 4B 5 1. Level control solenoid valve 5 on vaporizer shuts when propane level in the vaporizer is high 2. Relief valve on the steam outlet from vaporizer EC 4 B 5 1. Level control solenoid valve S 4B 5 on vaporizer shuts when propane level in the vaporizer is high EC 4 B S 4B 5 1. Level control solenoid valve 5 on vaporizer shuts when propane level in the vaporizer is high 2. Operating procedure for routing flows EC 4 B S 4B 5 1. Level control solenoid valve 5 on vaporizer shuts when propane level in the vaporizer is high 2. Relief valve on the steam outlet from vaporizer 3. Bypass valve around trap/ strainer EC 4 B 5 1. Level control solenoid valve S 4B 5 on vaporizer shuts when propane level in the vaporizer is high 1 1 1 1 1 15 ABD00031565 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL_02A.PHA Node: 6. Propane vaporizers, EX-811, EX-812, and EX-813. Type: Heat Exchanger Drawings: BP-090101-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Capacity: Vaporize 100,000 scfh propane each. Dev Causes Consequences 6.1 High Pressure 1. Blocked-in condition (Propane) thermal expansion 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane leak/release 2. Tube rupture 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane leak/release 3. Discharge line closed 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane leak/release 4. Relief valve malfunction 6.2 Low Temperature 1. Low steam flow 6.3 Tube Leak 1. Corrosion 2. Overpressure 6.4 Shell Leak 1. Corrosion 2. Overpressure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane leak/release 1 Downtime/Lost Production 2 Liquid exiting vaporizer 3. Liquid exiting vaporizer - E 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Liquid exiting vaporizer 4. Propane release 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Liquid exiting vaporizer 4. Propane release 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Liquid exiting vaporizer 4. Propane release 1. Downtime/Lost Production CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire detection & prevention 5 2. Pressure relief valve on 5 propane side of vaporizer 3. Pressure indication on vaporizer 4. Operating Procedure proper valve alignment EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire detection & prevention 5 2. Pressure relief valve on outlet 5 steam line 3. Pressure indication on vaporizer 4. Operating Procedure proper valve alignment EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire detection & prevention 5 2. Pressure relief valve on 5 propane side of vaporizer 3. Pressure indication on vaporizer 4. Operating Procedure proper valve alignment EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire detection & prevention 5 2. Pressure indication on 5 vaporizer 1 22 1 1 EC 4 B 5 1. Operating procedures S 4 B 5 2. Steam regulator E 4 D 5 3. Strainers 1 EC 4 D 5 1. Inspection/PM program S/E 4 C 5 2. Fire detection & protection S 4D 5 S/E 4 D 5 EC 4 D 5 1. Fire detection & protection S/E 4 C 5 2. Relief Valve on vaporizer S 4D 5 steam outlet line S/E 4 D 5 1 1 EC 4 D 5 1. Inspection/PM procedures S/E 4 D 5 2. Fire detection & protection S/E 4 D 5 S/E 4 C 5 EC 4 D 5 1. Fire detection & protection 1 1 16 ABD00031566 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 6. Propane vaporizers, EX-811, EX-812, and EX-813. Type: Heat Exchanger Drawings: BP-090101-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Capacity: Vaporize 100,000 scfh propane each. Dev 6.4 cont'd 2. cont'd Causes Consequences 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Liquid exiting vaporizer 4. Propane release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 D S/E 4 C S/E 4 D 5 2. Pressure relief valve located 5 on vaporizer shell 5 17 ABD00031567 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL_02A.PHA Node : 7. Propane transfer lines thru propane/air mixers, MI-032, mixers 1,2,3,and 4. Type: Line Drawings: BP-090102-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane flow: 5500 scfh, Air flow: 4500 scfh Per individual mixer. Dev Causes 7.1 High Pressure 1. Blocked discharge 2. Regulator malfunction 3. Fire 7.2 High Temperature 1. Fire 2. Hot work in close proximity Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2 Fire/Explosion 3. Incorrect air propane mixture 4. Propane release 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Pressure switch (located on 5 the inlet/outlet of the mixer 5 cabinet) activated shutdown and alarm 2. Fire detection & prevention EC 4 D S/E 4 D S 4D S/E 4 D 5 1. Relief valve on surge tank 5 2. Fire detection & prevention 5 3. Pressure switch (located on 5 the inlet/outlet of the mixer cabinet) activated shutdown and alarm EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire detection & prevention 5 2. Pressure switch (located on 5 the inlet/outlet of the mixer cabinet) activated shutdown and alarm 3. Hot work permits 4. Fire Watch 1 1 1 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release EC 4 D 5 1. Fire detection & Protection S/E 4 D 5 Equipment S/E 4 D 5 2. Hot work permits 3. Fire Watch EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Hot work permits 5 2. Fire detection & Protection 5 Equipment 3. Fire Watch 18 ABD00031568 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 8. Air supply line to propane/air mixer. Type: Line Drawings: BP-090102-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: 4500 scfh to each individual mixer. Dev Causes 8.1 High Temperature 1. Fire 2. Hot work in close proximity 8.2 Low/No Flow 1. Plugged strainer/filter 2. No propane flow 3. Check valve malfunction 4. Line plugged 8 3 Reverse/Misdirected Flow 1. Discharge of mixer plugged 2. Eductor malfunction 3. Check Valve Failure Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release EC 4 D 5 1. Hot work permits S/E 4 D 5 2. Fire detection & Protection S/E 4 D 5 Equipment 3. Fire Watch EC 4 D 5 1 Hot work permits S/E 4 D 5 2. Fire detection & Protection S/E 4 D 5 Equipment 3. Fire Watch 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Environmental - No consequence 3. Incorrect air/propane mixture 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Environmental - No consequence 3. Incorrect air/propane mixture 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Incorrect air/propane mixture 3. Propane Release 4. Fire/Explosion 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Environmental - No consequence 3. Incorrect air/propane mixture EC 4 C E 4D 5 5 S 4C 5 EC 4 C 5 1. Pressure switch (located on E 4D 5 the inlet/outlet of the mixer cabinet) activated shutdown S 4C 5 and alarm EC 4 C 5 1. Annual PM on Propane S 4c 5 System S/E 4 D 5 2. Fire detection & prevention S/E 4 D 5 EC 4 C E 4D 5 5 S 4C 5 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Annual PM on Propane 5 System 5 2. Fire detection and protection system 1. Downtime/Lost Production EC 4 D 5 1. Annual PM on Propane 2. Fire/Explosion S/E 4 D 5 System 3. Propane release S/E 4 D 5 2 Fire detection and protection 4. Incorrect Air/Propane Mixture S 4D 5 system 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4. Incorrect Air/Propane Mixture EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D S 4D 5 1. Annual PM on Propane 5 System 5 2. Fire detection and protection 5 system Rec. 1 1 23 1 1 1 1 1 1 19 ABD00031569 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 9. Propane surge tanks, PV-032, PV-033, and PV-034. Type: Vessel Drawings: BP-090102-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) UT-PR-001, 08/09/00, NE-D606-57-4-D, 06/29/92 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane/Air mixture to 9.5 psig. Dev Causes Consequences 9.1 High Pressure 1. Blocked in condition with liquid present 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 2. Fire 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 3. Overfilling of vessel 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4. Plugging of pressure relief valve under relieving condition 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 9.2 High Temperature 1. Fire 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 2. Hot work in area 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 9.3 High Level 1. Mixer solenoid valve fails open 1. Downstream equipment damage 2. Downtime/Lost Production 3. Fire/Explosion 20 CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Pressure relief valve on surge 5 tank 3. Pressure switch (located on the inlet/outlet of the mixer cabinet) activated shutdown and alarm 24 49 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Fire Watch 5 3. Hot work permits 4. Pressure relief valve on surge tank 5. Pressure switch (located on the inlet/outlet of the mixer cabinet) activated shutdown and alarm 1 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Pressure relief valve on surge 5 tank 3. Pressure switch (located on the inlet/outlet of the mixer cabinet) activated shutdown and alarm 1 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Deluge system 5 2. Pressure regulator 5 3. Pressure switch (located on the inlet/outlet of the mixer cabinet) activated shutdown and alarm 4. Routine PM on Pressure Relief Valves. 1 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire detection & Protection 5 Equipment 5 2. Fire Watch 3. Hot work permits E 4 D 5 1. Fire detection & Protection S/E 3 D 5 Equipment S/E 4 D 5 2. Fire Watch 3. Hot work permits 25 25 S/E 3 D 5 1. Operating procedures 2. Pressure relief valve on surge EC 4 D 5 tank S/E 3 D 5 3. Fire detection and protection equipment 1 ABD00031570 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 9. Propane surge tanks, PV-032, PV-033, and PV-034. Type: Vessel Drawings: BP-090102-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) UT-PR-001,08/09/00, NE-D606-57-4-D, 06/29/92 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane/Air mixture to 9.5 psig. Dev 9.3 cont'd 1. cont'd Causes Consequences 4. Overpressure system 5. Propane release 2. Liquid exiting vaporizers 1. Downstream equipment damage 2. Downtime/Lost Production 3. Fire/Explosion 4. Overpressure system 5. Propane release 3. Vent valve on surge tank and vent valve on unloading line left open or leaking while unloading truck into storage tank. 1. Downstream equipment damage 2. Downtime/Lost Production 3. Fire/Explosion 4. Overpressure system 5. Propane release 9.4 Rupture 1. Material fatigue due to fire 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 2. Overpressure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S 4 C 5 4. Pressure switch (located on S/E 4 D 5 the inlet/outlet of the mixer cabinet) activated shutdown and alarm 5. Low Temperature Alarm (probe located at surge tank inlet) S/E 3 D EC 4 D S/E 3 D S 4C S/E 4 D 5 1. Operating procedures 2. Pressure relief valve on surge 5 tank 5 3. Fire detection and protection 5 equipment 5 4. Pressure switch (located on the inlet/outlet of the mixer cabinet) activated shutdown and alarm 5. Low Temperature Alarm (probe located at surge tank inlet) S/E 3 D 5 1. Pressure relief valve on surge tank EC 4 D 5 S/E 3 D 5 S 4C 5 S/E 4 D 5 1 9 EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire detection and protection 5 equipment 5 2. Pressure relief valve on surge tank EC 4 D S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Fire detection and protection 5 equipment 5 2. Pressure relief valve on surge tank 1 1 21 ABD00031571 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 10. Propane supply line to plant. Type: Line Drawings: BP-090102-PID-D, 12/11/02. UT-090102-PID-D, 2/25/94, (OP) UT-PR-001, 08/09/00, (OP) UT-PR-002, 08/09/00, NE-D606-57-4-D, 06/29/92 Design Conditions/Parameters: Propane/Air mixture at 6 to 9.5 psig and varying flows. Dev Causes 10.1 High Temperature 1. Fire Consequences 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 2. Hot work in close proximity 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 10.2 Leak 1. Corrosion 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4. Propane release - E 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal failure 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4. Propane release - E 3. Inadequate torquing of bolts 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4. Propane release - E 4. Line overstressed from vehicle traffic on ground over pipe. 1. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Fire/Explosion 3. Propane release 4. Propane release - E CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D EC 4 D S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Hot work permits 5 2. Fire detection & Protection 5 Equipment 3. Fire Watch 4 Some of piping is underground 5 1. Hot work permits 5 2. Fire detection & Protection 5 Equipment 3. Fire Watch 4. Some of piping is underground 1 1 EC 4 D 5 1. Isolation valves S/E 4 D 5 S 4C 5 E 4D 5 EC 4 D 5 1. Isolation valves S/E 4 D 5 2. Maintenance procedures for S 4C 5 torquing bolts E 4D 5 EC 4 D S/E 4 D S 4C E 4D 5 1. Isolation valves 5 2. Maintenance procedures for 5 torquing bolts 5 EC 4 D 5 1. Isolation valves S/E 4 D 5 S 4C 5 E 4D 5 1 1 1 26 22 ABD00031572 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 11. Propane storage/surge tank vent line. Type: Line Drawings: BP-090100-PID-D, 09/19/02, BP-090102-PID-D, 12/11/ 02, (OP) UT-PR-004, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Vent low pressure propane vapor to flare stack for burning before release to the atmosphere Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec 11.1 Low/No Flow 1. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Can't burn off propane storage/surge tanks 2. Can't depressurize truck unloading lines prior to disconnecting S/E 4 D 5 1. Storage and Surge tank pressure indication S/E 4 D 5 1 2. Line plugged 1. Can't burn off propane storage/surge tanks 2. Can't depressurize truck unloading lines prior to disconnecting S/E 4 D 5 1. Storage and Surge tank pressure indication S/E 4 D 5 1 3. Valve closed 1. Can't burn off propane storage/surge tanks 2 Can't depressurize truck unloading lines prior to disconnecting S/E 4 D 5 1. Storage and Surge tank pressure indication S/E 4 D 5 1 11.2 Leak 1. Corrosion 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 3. Propane release - E S/E 4 D S 4C E 4D 5 1. Isolation valves 5 2. Fire detection and protection 5 equipment 1 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal failure 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 3 Propane release - E S/E 4 D 5 1. Isolation valves S 4 C 5 2. Fire detection and protection E 4D 5 equipment 1 3. Inadequate torquing of bolts 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Isolation valves 5 2. Maintenance procedures for torquing bolts 3. Fire detection and protection equipment 1 4. Line overstressed 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Isolation valves 5 2. Fire detection and protection equipment 1 11.3 Reverse/Misdirected Flow 1. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Downtime/Lost Production EC 4 D 2. Fire/Explosion S/E 3 D 3. Propane release S/E 4 D 4. Unload truck into surge tank or S 3 D out flare 5 1. Fire detection and protection 5 equipment 5 2. Pressure relief valve on surge 5 tank 3. Pressure switch (located on the inlet/outlet of the mixer cabinet) activated shutdown and alarm 9 23 ABD00031573 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 12. Put propane system into standby. Type: Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) UT-PR-002, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Steps 1.1.1 thru 1.1.10 & 1.2.1 thru 1.2.6 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 12.1 No execution of step 1. Insufficient knowledge Consequences 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Operator omits step 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production 3. Poor labeling 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production 4. Procedure deficient or missing 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production 12.2 Other than specified action 1. Insufficient knowledge 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Operator omits step 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 C 5 1. Training/qualification of S/E 4 C 5 personnel EC 4 C 5 2. Mixer Temperature and Pressure Alarms 3. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks 1 S/E 4 C S/E 4 C EC 4 C 5 1. Mixer Temperature and 5 Pressure Alarms 5 2. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks 3. Training/qualification of personnel 4. Indication of block valve position (CV 2701, CV 2702, CV 2705) 1 S/E 4 C S/E 4 C EC 4 C 5 1. Training/qualification of 5 personnel 5 2. Mixer Temperature and Pressure Alarms 3. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks 4. Indication of block valve position (CV 2701, CV 2702, CV 2705) 10 S/E 4 C S/E 4 c EC 4 c 5 1. Training/qualification of 5 personnel 5 2. Mixer Temperature and Pressure Alarms 3. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks 4. Indication of block valve position (CV 2701, CV 2702, CV 2705) 5. Regular review of propane operating procedures 1 S/E 4 C 5 1. Training/qualification of S/E 4 c 5 personnel EC 4 c 5 2. Mixer Temperature and Pressure Alarms 3. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks S/E 4 c 5 1. Mixer Temperature and S/E 4 c 5 Pressure Alarms EC 4 c 5 2. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run. Mixer pressure interlocks 3. Training/qualification of personnel 24 ABD00031574 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 12. Put propane system into standby. Type: Procedural Step Drawing: {OP) UT-PR-002, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Steps 1.1.1 thru 1.1.10 & 1.2.1 thru 1.2.6 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev 12.2 cont'd 2. cont'd Causes 3. Poor labeling Consequences 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production 4. Procedure deficient or missing 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 C S/E 4 C EC 4 c S/E 4 c S/E 4 c EC 4 c 4. Indication of block valve position (CV 2701, CV2702, CV 2705) 5 1. Training/qualification of 5 personnel 5 2. Mixer Temperature and Pressure Alarms 3. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks 4. Indication of block valve position (CV 2701, CV 2702, CV 2705) 5 1. Training/qualification of 5 personnel 5 2. Mixer Temperature and Pressure Alarms 3. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks 4. Indication of block valve position (CV2701.CV 2702, CV 2705) 5. Regular review of propane operating procedures 10 1 25 ABD00031575 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 13. Start-up of propane system. Type: Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) UT-PR-002, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Steps 2.0; 2.1 1-2.1.6; 2.2; 2.2.1-2.2.4; 2.3.1-2.3.4 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 13.1 Other than specified action 1. Communication failure between operators Consequences 1. Lost production/downtime 2. Overpressure system 3. Put liquid to surge tanks 2. Operating procedure does not reflect latest changes to propane system 1. Lost production/downtime 2. Overpressure system 3. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Poor labeling 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production 4. Operator omits step 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 C S/E 4 C S/E 4 C 5 1. Use of portable phones/two 5 way radios 5 2. Safety interlocks Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks 1 EC 4 C S/E 4 C S/E 4 C 5 1. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ 5 run, Mixer pressure interlocks 5 2. Training/qualification of personnel 3. Mixer Temperature and Pressure Alarms 1 S/E 4 C S/E 4 C EC 4 C 5 1. Training/qualification of 5 personnel 5 2. Mixer Temperature and Pressure Alarms 3. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks 4. Indication of block valve position (CV 2701, CV 2702, CV 2705) 10 S/E 4 C S/E 4 C EC 4 C 5 1. Mixer Temperature and 5 Pressure Alarms 5 2. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks 3. Training/qualification of personnel 4. Indication of block valve position (CV 2701, CV 2702, CV 2705) 1 26 ABD00031576 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 14. Shutdown of propane system. Type: Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) UT-PR-003, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Steps 1.0; 1.1.1-1.1.10; 1.2.1-1.2.4 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 14.1 Other than specified action 1. Insufficient knowledge Consequences 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production 2. Operator omits step 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production 3. Poor labeling 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production 4. Procedure deficient or missing 1. Overpressure system 2. Put liquid to surge tanks 3. Downtime/Lost Production CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 C S/E 4 C EC 4 C 5 1. Training/qualification of 5 personnel 5 2. Mixer Temperature and Pressure Alarms 3. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks 1 S/E 4 C S/E 4 C EC 4 C 5 1. Mixer Temperature and 5 Pressure Alarms 5 2. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run. Mixer pressure interlocks 3. Training/qualification of personnel 4. Indication of block valve position (CV2701, CV 2702, CV 2705) 1 S/E 4 C S/E 4 C EC 4 C 5 1. Training/qualification of 5 personnel 5 2. Mixer Temperature and Pressure Alarms 3. Safety interlocks - Pump start/ run, Mixer pressure interlocks 4. Indication of block valve position (CV 2701, CV 2702. CV 2705) 10 S/E 4 C S/E 4 C EC 4 C 5 1. Training/qualification of 5 personnel 5 2. Mixer Temperature and Pressure Alarms 3. Safety interlocks Pump start/ run. Mixer pressure interlocks 4. Indication of block valve position (CV 2701, CV 2702, CV 2705) 5. Regular review of propane operating procedures 1 27 ABD00031577 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 15. Emergency response to a propane system fire or vapor release. Type: Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) UT-PR-006, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Step 1.0 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 15.1 Other than specified action 1. Confusion in emergency situation Consequences 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 2. Operator not trained properly 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release CAT S L RR Safeguards S/E 3 D S/E 3 D 5 1. Specific guidance in 5 procedures 2. Training/qualification of personnel S/E 3 D 5 1. Specific guidance in S/E 3 D 5 procedures 2. Training/qualification of personnel Rec. 28 28 28 ABD00031578 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 16 Response to propane system power failure. Type. Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) UT-PR-006, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Step 2.1, 2.1.1 thru 2.1.3 and 2.2, 2.2.1 thru 2.2.3 UTIL_02A.PHA Dev Causes 16.1 Other than specified action 1 Confusion in emergency situation Consequences 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release 2. Operator not trained properly 1. Fire/Explosion 2. Propane release CAT S L RR Safeguards S/E 4 C S/E 4 C 5 1. Specific guidance in 5 procedures 2. Training/qualification of personnel S/E 4 C S/E 4 C 5 1. Specific guidance in 5 procedures 2. Training/qualification of personnel Rec. 29 ABD00031579 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 17. Instrument air compressors, CP-708 and CP-709, and discharge line to aftercoolers. Type: Centrifugal Compressor + Line Drawings: UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Compressor capacity: 526 ICFM at 100 psig. Dev Causes Consequences 17.1 Low/No Flow 1. Compressor shutdown interlocks (High cooling water temperature, High outlet air temperature, Low oil pressure, Low water pressure) 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 2. Closed valve 1. Loss of Instrument Air 3. Compressor fail to run (motor, 1. Compressor shutdown internals, no power) 2. Loss of Instrument Air 4. Inlet air filter plugged 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 17.2 Low Pressure 1. Low air flow from compressors 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 2. Leak 1. Loss of Instrument Air 3. Compressor internals failure (valves, innercooler, etc.) 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 3 C 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure 4 alarm 2. Low sump level Alarm #2 cooling Tower 3. PM on #2 Cooling Tower Pumps and Tower 4. Routine cleaning of Y-strainer 5. Daily operator check of oil level 6. Oil pressure switch (shutdown switch) 7. Routinely change oil in compressors 11 30 31 32 S/E 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure 31 S/E 3 C 4 alarm 32 2. Daily operator check of oil level 3 Oil pressure switch (shutdown switch) 4. Routinely change oil in compressors 5. PM emergency generator S/E 4 B S/E 4 D 5 5 1. PM inlet air filter regularly 2. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure S/E 4 B 5 alarm 2. PM inlet air filter regularly S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure 5 alarm 2. Daily operator check of oil level 3. Oil pressure switch (shutdown switch) 4. PM inlet air filter regularly 5. Routine cleaning of Y-strainer 6. Routinely change oil in compressors 1 1 1 30 ABD00031580 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 18. Cooling water supply and return lines to instrument air compressors, CP-708 and CP-709. Water is to the compressor's internal aftercooler which is part of the compressor itself. Type: Line Drawing: UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Cooling water flow of 9 gpm @ 68 F each (Randy Bird, Power & Equipment Co., 11/27/02). (This is approximately equivalent to 20 gpm @ 85 F). Outlet water temperature between 100-120 F (Joy Operators Manual). Dev Causes 18.1 Low/No Flow 1. Low cooling water supply pressure Consequences 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 2. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 3. Plugged strainer/filter 4. Pump failure including emergency cooling water pump 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 5. Water line freeze up 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 18.2 High Temperature 1. Cooling Tower fan not running 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 2. High ambient temperature 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 31 CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Three sources of cooling 5 water to CP-708 &CP-709 2. Check valve to separate emergency cooling water supply from normal cooling tower 2 supply. 3. Operating procedure for routing flows. S/E 4 B 5 1. Operating procedures for S/E 4 B 5 routing flows 2. Low water pressure compressor shutdown switch 3. High temperature compressor shutdown switch S/E 4 B 5 1. Routine cleaning of Y-strainer S/E 4 B 5 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Operating procedures for 5 routing flows 2. Three sources of cooling water to CP-708 &CP-709 3. Check valve to separate emergency cooling water supply from normal cooling tower 2 supply. 4. Low water pressure compressor shutdown switch 5. High temperature compressor shutdown switch S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Operating procedures for 5 routing flows 2. Leave water circulating 3. Run all compressors when the ambient temperature falls below 28 F* 2 33 1 1 1 1 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Cooling fan run indication and 5 alarm 2. Cooling Tower Sump Temperature indication and alarm S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Cooling Tower Sump 5 Temperature indication and alarm 2. Ambient temperature indication 1 1 ABD00031581 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 19. Instrument air aftercooler EX-300, and discharge line through knockout tank, DM-813, and Airtek inlet filter. Knockout tank is not included in node. Type: Heat Exchanger + Line Drawings: UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/ 02, UT-090109A-PID-D, 10/15/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Air flow to 2960 SCFM @ 250 F inlet/2560 SCFM @ 350 F inlet with 10 F approach to cooling water, pressure 150 psig. MAWP EX-300 150 psig @ 200 F/350 F (Shell/Tube);MAWP DM-813 156 psig/FV @ 450 F; MAWP FL-075/076 150 psig @ 200 F. Dev Causes Consequences 19.1 High Temperature 1. High compressor discharge air 1. Water in the air temperature 2. Loss of cooling water to Aftercooler 19.2 Low Pressure 1. Low/No flow 2. Line leak 19.3 Tube Leak 1. Corrosion 1. Water in the air 1. Loss of instrument air 1. Loss of instrument air 1. Water in air CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 D 5 1. High temperature compressor shutdown 2. Coelescing inlet air filter for Airtek 3. Inlet air temperature indication S/E 4 D 5 1. Outlet Air temperature indication 1 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 1 1 S/E 4 D 5 1. Trap on Aftercooler 2. Knock-out Drum 3. Coelescing air inlet filters for Airtek 34 32 ABD00031582 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 20. Cooling water supply lines to and from aftercooler EX-300. Type: Heat Exchanger + Line Drawings: UT-090115-PID-D, 10/09/02, UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/ 02, UT-090114-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Cooling water of 100 gpm @ 85 F (Estimate based on 2560 SCFM @ 350 F inlet, 100 F outlet). Dev Causes Consequences 20.1 Low/No Flow 1. Low upstream pressure 1. Hot, wet air 2. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Hot, wet air 3. Pump failure 1. Hot, wet air 4. Line leak 1. Hot, wet air 5. Cooling water control valve failure 1. Hot, wet air CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 D 5 1. Water temperature indicator S/E 4 D 5 1. Water temperature indicator 1 1 S/E 4 D 5 1. Water pressure indicator 2. Water temperature indicator S/E 4 D 5 1. Water pressure indicator 2. Water temperature indicator S/E 4 D 5 1. Water temperature indicator 2. Water pressure indicator 1 1 1 33 ABD00031583 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 21. Knockout tank, DM-813. Type: Vessel Drawings: UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Air flow to 2960 SCFM @ 100 F, pressure to 150 psig. MAWP: 156/FV psig at 450 F. Remove water from air. 120 gallon capacity. Dev Causes ' Consequences 21.1 High Level 1. Water carryover from aftercooler or compressor 1. Downstream instrument malfunction 2. Water in air system 2. Malfunction of automatic drain valve 1. Downstream instrument malfunction 2. Water in air system 21.2 High Pressure Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Loss of air supply 2. Overpressure vessel Relief Valve Plugged under relieving condition 1. Loss of air supply 2. Overpressure vessel 3. Overpressure vessel CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Operating procedures 2. Automatic actuated drain 5 valve for knock-out tank S/E 4 B 5 S/E 4 B 5 1 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Pressure relief valve S/E 4 D 5 S/E 4 C 5 1. Pressure relief valve S 4 C 5 2. Pressure vessel inspection E 4D 5 program 3. Relief valve PM 1 1 34 ABD00031584 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL_02A.PHA Node 22. Airtek Air Dryer Package, DR-030. Type: Air Dryer Drawing: UT-090109A-PID-D, 10/15/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Air flow to 2200 SCFM @ 80 psig & 100 F. Outlet dewpoint -40 F. Pressure to 150 psig. MAWP DR-030 150 psig @ 575 F. Dev Causes Consequences 22.1 High Flow 1. Line leak on discharge 1. Downstream instrument malfunction 2 High dew point 22.2 High Pressure 1. Valve blocked on discharge/ check valve malfunction 1. Lift relief valve 2. No air usage 1. Lift relief valve 22 3 High Temperature 1 Airtek Instrument/heater malfunction 1. Airtek shutdown on high temperature - moisture in air 2. Air cooler EX-300 fails to cool 1. Downstream instrument air malfunction due to wet air CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B 5 1. Dew point indication 2. Air flow recorder downstream S/E 4 B 5 of the Air Dryer 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Relief Valve PM program S/E 4 D 5 1. Relief Valve PM program 1 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Dewpoint indication 2. Temperature indication S/E 4 B 5 1. Dew point indication 2. Temperature indication 35 1 35 ABD00031585 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 23. Airtek discharge line to process. Includes Airtek outlet filters. Type: Line + Vessel Drawings: UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090109A-PID-D, 10/15/ 02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Air flow to 2200 SCFM @ 80 psig & 100 F. Outlet dewpoint -40 F. Pressure to 150 psig. MAWP FL-080/ 081 150 psig @ 200 F. Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 23.1 Low/No Flow 1. Low upstream pressure 1. Loss of instrument air S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 1 2. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Loss of instrument air S/E 4 B 5 1. Operating procedures for routing flows 2. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 1 3. Plugged outlet filters 1. Loss of instrument air S/E 4 B 5 1. Spare strainer/filter 2. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 3. Daily operator check of filters 1 23.2 Contamination 1. Failure of upstream separation 1. Loss of instrument air supply S/E 4 B equipment (dessicant/water) 2. Downstream instrument failure S/E 4 B 5 1. Airtek outlet filters 5 2. Knock out drums DM-813 (Airtek inlet) and DM-838 (Airtek outlet) 36 2. Rust in process lines 1. Downstream instrument failure S/E 4 B 5 1. In-line filters 36 23.3 Leak Corrosion 1. Loss of air supply S/E 4 B 5 1. Corrosion allowance 2. Low instrument air indication and alarm 82PI090/82PA085 1 Drain or vent valve open/ malfunction 1. Loss of air supply S/E 4 B 5 1. Daily operator inspection 1 Gasket, packing, or valve seal 1. Loss of air supply failure S/E 4 B 5 1. Daily operator inspection 2. Spare filter (FL-080 or FL-081) 3. Maintenance procedures for torquing bolts 36 ABD00031586 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 24. Instrument air surge tank, DM-838. Type: Vessel Drawing: UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Air pressure to 150 psig. Inlet dew point -40 F. MAWP: 150 psig at 566 F. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 24.1 High Level Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards 1. Moisture in the inlet air 1. Downstream instrument S/E 4 B 5 1. Drain valve malfunction due to water in air 2. Loss of air supply S/E 4 D 5 2. Plugged drain valve 1. Downstream instrument S/E 4 B 5 1. Daily operator check malfunction due to water in air 2. Loss of air supply S/E 4 D 5 24.2 High Pressure Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Loss of instrument air 2. Overpressure vessel S/E 4 B 5 1. Pressure relief valve S/E 4 D 5 2. Relief valve PM Relief Valve Plugged under relieving condition 1. Overpressure vessel S/E 4 B 5 1. Pressure vessel inspection program 2. Relief valve PM Rec. 1 1 1 1 37 ABD00031587 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 25. Instrument air supply line to plant. Type: Line Drawing: UT-090111-PID-D, 09/26/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Air flows to 2200 SCFM at 80 psig and dew point -40 F. Air pressure to 100 psig. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 25.1 Low/No Flow 1. Low upstream pressure Consequences 1. Loss of Instrument Air 2. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Loss of Instrument Air 25.2 Contamination 1. Failure of upstream separation 1. Loss of instrument air supply equipment (dessicant/water) to some equipment 2. Rust in process lines 1. Loss of instrument air supply to some equipment 25.3 Leak 1. Corrosion 1. Loss of Instrument Air 2. Drain or vent or sample valve leak 1. Loss of Instrument Air 3. Gasket, packing, or valve seal 1. Loss of Instrument Air failure 4. Inadequate torquing of bolts 1. Loss of Instrument Air 5. Line overstressed 1. Loss of Instrument Air CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S/E 4 B 5 1 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Airtek outlet filter S/E 4 B 5 1. Airtek outlet filter 36 36 S/E 4 B 5 1. Adequate corrosion allowance 2. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S/E 4 B 5 1. Maintenance procedures for torquing bolts 2. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S/E 4 B 5 1. Maintenance procedures for torquing bolts 2. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S/E 4 B 5 1. Line adequately supported and guided 1 1 1 1 38 ABD00031588 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 26. Instrument air surge drum, DM-300. Type: Vessel Drawing: UT-090111-PID-D, 09/26/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Air pressure to 100 psig. MAWP: 150 psig @ ambient temperature UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards 26.1 High Level 1. Moisture in the inlet air 1. Downstream instrument S/E 4 B 5 1. Drain valve malfunction due to water in air 2. Loss of air supply to some S/E 4 B 5 equipment 2. Plugged drain valve 1. Downstream instrument S/E 4 B malfunction due to water in air 2. Loss of air supply to some S/E 4 B equipment 5 5 26.2 High Pressure 1. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Loss of instrument air to some S/E 4 B equipment 2. Overpressure vessel S/E 4 B 5 1. Pressure relief valve 2. Relief valve PM 5 2. Relief Valve Plugged under relieving condition 1. Overpressure vessel S/E 4 B 5 1. Pressure vessel inspection program 2. Relief valve PM Rec. 37 37 1 1 39 ABD000315894 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 27 Start-up of instrument air compressors, CP-708 and CP-709. Type: Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) UT-AS-001,05/29/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Steps 1.1 -1.6 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 27.1 Other than specified action 1. Confusing piping configurations 2. Inadequate lighting 3. Communication failure between operators Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Damage to compressor 2. Failure to get compressor running 3. No instrument air supply 1. Damage to compressor 2. Failure to get compressor running 3. No instrument air supply 1. Damage to compressor 2. Failure to get compressor running 3. No instrument air supply S/E 4 B S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Specific guidance in 5 procedures 2. Training & qualification of 5 personnel 3. Tagging of valves closed for maintenance helps identify valves to be opened. 4. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 5. Compressor protection shutdown switches (low Oil pressure, low Cooling water pressure, high water temperature, and high air temperature) S/E 4 8 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Training & qualification of 5 personnel 2. Low instrument Air pressure 5 alarm 3. Compressor protection shutdown switches (low Oil pressure, low Cooling water pressure, high water temperature, and high air temperature) S/E 4 B S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Specific guidance in 5 procedures 2. Training & qualification of 5 personnel 3. Tagging of valves closed for maintenance - helps identify valves to be opened. 4 Low instrument Air pressure alarm 5. Compressor protection shutdown switches (low Oil pressure, low Cooling water pressure, high water temperature, and high air temperature) 1 38 1 40 ABD00031590 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 28. Shut down of instrument air compressors, CP-708 and CP-709. Type: Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) UT-AS-001,05/29/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Steps 4 1,4.2 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 28.1 Other than specified action 1. Confused piping configurations Consequences 1. Damage to compressor 2. No instrument air supply 2. Inadequate lighting 1. Damage to compressor 2. No instrument air supply 3. Shut wrong compressor down 1. No instrument air supply CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Compressor protection 5 shutdown switches (low Oil pressure, low Cooling water pressure, high water temperature, and high air temperature) 2. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 3. Specific guidance in procedures 4. Tagging of valves closed for maintenance - helps identify valves to be opened. 5. Training & qualification of personnel S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Compressor protection 5 shutdown switches (low Oil pressure, low Cooling water pressure, high water temperature, and high air temperature) 2. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 3. Specific guidance in procedures 4 Tagging of valves closed for maintenance - helps identify valves to be opened. 5. Training & qualification of personnel3 S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 2 Specific guidance in procedures 3. Training & qualification of personnel 1 38 1 41 ABD00031591 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 29. Isolation and Tag Out/Lock Out of Airtek Air Dryer. Type: Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) UT-AS-009, 07/26/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Step 5 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 29.1 Other than specified action 1. Insufficient knowledge 2. Operator omits step 3. Poor labeling Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Possible personal injury 2. Possible plant loss of instrument air supply 3. Possible personal injury 1. Possible plant loss of instrument air supply 2. Possible personal injury 3. Possible personal injury 1. Possible personal injury 2. Possible plant loss of instrument air supply 3. Possible personal injury S 4B S/E 4 B E 4D 5 1. Specific guidance in 5 procedures 2. Training/qualification of 5 personnel 3. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S/E 4 B S 4B E 4D 5 1. Specific guidance in procedures 5 2. Training/qualification of 5 personnel 3. Low instrument Air pressure alarm S 4 B 5 1. Specific guidance in S/E 4 B 5 procedures 2. Training/qualification of E 4D 5 personnel 3. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 1 1 1 42 ABD00031592 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 30. Start-up/Returning the Airtek Air Dryer back to service. Type: Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) UT-AS-009, 07/26/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Stepl.1 and 1.2 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 30.1 Other than specified action 1. Insufficient communication between operators 2. Insufficient knowledge 3. Operator omits step 4. Poor labeling Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Possible personal injury S 4B 2. Possible personal injury E 4D 3. Possible plant loss of S/E 4 B instrument air supply 4. Downstream instrument S/E 4 B malfunction due to water in air 5 1. Process paramter indication 5 dew point temperature, air 5 pressure, air temperature, air flow rate 5 2. Specific guidance in procedures 3. Training/qualification of personnel 4. Lockout/Tagout procedure 1. Possible personal injury S 4B 2. Possible personal injury E 4D 3. Possible plant loss of S/E 4 B instrument air supply 4. Downstream instrument S/E 4 B malfunction due to water in air 5 1. Process paramter indication 5 dew point temperature, air 5 pressure, air temperature, air flow rate 5 2. Specific guidance in procedures 3. Training/qualification of personnel 4. Lockout/Tagout procedure 1. Possible personal injury S 4B 2. Possible personal injury E 4D 3. Possible plant loss of S/E 4 B instrument air supply 4. Downstream instrument S/E 4 B malfunction due to water in air 5 1. Process paramter indication 5 dew point temperature, air 5 pressure, air temperature, air flow rate 5 2. Specific guidance in procedures 3. Training/qualification of personnel 4. Lockout/Tagout procedure 1. Possible personal injury S 4B 2. Possible personal injury E 4D 3. Possible plant loss of S/E 4 B instrument air supply 4. Downstream instrument S/E 4 B malfunction due to water in air 5 1. Process paramter indication 5 dew point temperature, air 5 pressure, air temperature, air flow rate 5 2. Specific guidance in procedures 3. Training/qualification of personnel 4. Lockout/Tagout procedure 1 1 1 1 43 ABD00031593 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 31. Cooling Tower #4 fans, cooling water pumps, PP-243, PP-281, and PP-955, and supply line to Old Module Reactors. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawing: UT-090112-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Flow rates up to 10500 gpm @ 100 pslg Pressure to 175 pslg can be achieved at lower flow rates including dead head condition. Dev Causes 31.1 Cavitation 1. Low sump level Consequences 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 2. Plugged inlet pump screen/ sump screen 31.2 Low/No Flow 1. Sump empty/sump screens plugged 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 2. Cooling water pressure control valve or controller fails CV opens 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 3. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 4. Pump failure 1. No cooling water supply 5. Line leak/rupture 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 31.3 High Temperature 1. Fan not running 2. High ambient temperature 1. Reactor temperture control problems 1. Reactor temperture control problems CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Cooling tower sump low level 5 alarm 2. Emergency cooling water 3. Automatic sump level control S/E 4 B 5 1. PM of cooling towers every S/E 4 B 5 two years 1 1 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. Automatic sump level control 3. Cooling tower sump low level alarm S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. High temperature alarms on reactor 3. Reactor cooling water flow indication S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. High temperature alarms on reactor 3. Reactor cooling water flow indication 4. Operating procedures/training S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 2. High temperature alarms on reactor 3. Reactor cooling water flow indication S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. Automatic sump level control 3. Cooling tower sump low level alarm 4. High temperature alarms on reactor 5. Reactor cooling water flow indication 1 1 1 1 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Reactor high temperature alarms 2. Fan run indication S/E 4 B 5 1. Reactor high temperature alarms 2. Fan run indication 1 1 44 ABD00031594 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 31. Cooling Tower #4 fans, cooling water pumps, PP-243, PP-281, and PP-955, and supply line to Old Module Reactors. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawing: UT-090112-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Flow rates up to 10500 gpm @ 100 psig Pressure to 175 psig can be achieved at lower flow rates including dead head condition. Dev Causes Consequences 31.3 cont'd 3. Poor distribution of water over 1. Reactor temperture control cooling tower problems 31.4 Low Temperature 1. Low ambient temperature 1. Cooling tower structural damage CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B 5 1. Routine operator checks 1 EC 4 C 5 1. Automatic cooling tower fan control 2. Cooling tower sump temperature indication 3. Routine operator checks 1 45 ABD00031595 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 32 Cooling Tower #6 fans, cooling water pumps, PP-906, PP-907, PP-908, and PP-116, and supply lines to New Module Reactors. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawing: UT-090113-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Flows to 18,000 gpm @ 100 psig. Pressures to 125 psig at lower flow rates. Dev Causes 32.1 Cavitation 1. Low sump level Consequences 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 2. Plugged inlet pump screen/ sump screen 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 32.2 Low/No Flow 1. Cooling water pressure control valve or controller fails CV opens 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 2. Line leak/rupture 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 3. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 4. Pump failure 1. No cooling water supply 5. Sump empty/sump screens plugged 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 32 3 High Temperature 1. Fan not running 1. Reactor temperture control problems 2. High ambient temperature 1. Reactor temperture control problems 3. Poor distribution of water over 1 Reactor temperture control cooling tower problems 46 CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Cooling tower sump low level 5 alarm 2. Emergency cooling water 3. Automatic sump level control S/E 4 B 5 1. PM of cooling towers every S/E 4 B 5 two years 1 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water S/E 4 B 5 2. High temperature alarms on reactor 3. Reactor cooling water flow indication S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. Automatic sump level control 3. Cooling tower sump low level alarm 4 High temperature alarms on reactor 5. Reactor cooling water flow indication S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. High temperature alarms on reactor 3. Reactor cooling water flow indication 4. Operating procedures/training S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 2. High temperature alarms on reactor 3. Reactor cooling water flow indication S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. Automatic sump level control 3. Cooling tower sump low level alarm 1 1 1 1 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Reactor high temperature alarms 2. Fan run indication S/E 4 B 5 1. Reactor high temperature alarms 2. Fan run indication S/E 4 B 5 1. Routine operator checks 1 1 1 ABD00031596 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 32. Cooling Tower #6 fans, cooling water pumps, PP-906, PP-907, PP-908, and PP-116, and supply lines to New Module Reactors. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawing: UT-090113-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Flows to 18,000 gpm @ 100 psig. Pressures to 125 psig at lower flow rates. Dev Causes 32.4 Low Temperature 1. Low ambient temperature Consequences 1. Cooling tower structural damage CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. EC 4 C 5 1. Automatic cooling tower fan control 2. Cooling tower sump temperature indication 3. Routine operator checks 1 47 ABD00031597 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 33. Cooling Tower #2 fans, cooling water pumps, PP-252, PP-253, PP-977, PP-978, PP-257, and PP-258 and supply line to air compressors, Old Module Recovery, ERS, Dryers, OM Strippers and can supply OM Reactor cooling water. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawing: UT-090114-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Flows to 11,000 gpm @ 100 psig. Pressures up to 125 psig at lower flow rates.2 Dev Causes 33.1 Cavitation 1. Low sump level Consequences 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 2. Plugged inlet pump screen/ sump screen 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 33.2 Low/No Flow 1. Cooling water pressure control valve or controller fails CV opens 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 2. Line leak/rupture 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 3. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 4. Pump failure 1. No cooling water supply 5. Sump empty/sump screens plugged 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 33.3 High Temperature 1. Fan not running 2. High ambient temperature 1. Reactor temperture control problems 1. Reactor temperture control problems CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Cooling tower sump low level 5 alarm 2. Emergency cooling water 3. Automatic sump level control S/E 4 B 5 1. PM of cooling towers every S/E 4 B 5 two years 1 1 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. High temperature alarms on reactor 3. Reactor cooling water flow indication S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. Automatic sump level control 3. Cooling tower sump low level alarm 4. High temperature alarms on reactor 5. Reactor cooling water flow indication S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. High temperature alarms on reactor 3. Reactor cooling water flow indication 4. Operating procedures/training S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 2. High temperature alarms on reactor 3. Reactor cooling water flow indication S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. Automatic sump level control 3. Cooling tower sump low level alarm 1 1 1 1 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Reactor high temperature alarms 2. Fan run indication S/E 4 B 5 1. Reactor high temperature alarms 2. Fan run indication 1 1 48 ABD00031598 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 33. Cooling Tower #2 fans, cooling water pumps, PP-252, PP-253, PP-977, PP-978, PP-257, and PP-258 and supply line to air compressors, Old Module Recovery, ERS, Dryers, OM Strippers and can supply OM Reactor cooling water. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawing: UT-090114-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Flows to 11,000 gpm @ 100 psig. Pressures up to 125 psig at lower flow rates. Dev Causes Consequences 33.3 cont'd 3. Poor distribution of water over 1. Reactor temperture control cooling tower problems 33.4 Low Temperature 1. Low ambient temperature 1. Cooling tower structural damage CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B 5 1. Routine operator checks 1 EC 4 C 5 1. Automatic cooling tower fan control 2. Cooling tower sump temperature indication 3. Routine operator checks 1 49 ABD00031599 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 34. Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System. Type: Procedural Step Drawings: (OP) VINYL-NM-E008, 05/01/99, (OP) VINYL-OM-E008, 05/01/99 Design Conditions/Parameters: Steps 1 thru 5 Dev Causes 34.1 Other than specified action 1. Communication failure between operators 2. Confusion in emergency situation 3. Insufficient training 4. Operator omits step Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B 5 1. Deluge system overpressure 2. Automatic Emergency kill 2 Loss of cooling Reactor S/E 4 B 5 system overheat 3. Manual emergency kill system 3. Loss of cooling Reactor S 3 D 5 4. High pressure alarms on overpressure relief valve lifts reactor - VCM Release 5. High temperature alarms on 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 4D 5 reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts 6. Emergency operating - VCM Release procedures/training/ 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S 3D 5 qualification overpressure relief valve lifts 7. Gaitronics system - alternative - VCM Release - Ignition communication system source Fire/Explosion 6. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 3D 5 overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overpressure 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overheat 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor S 3D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 4D overpressure - relief valve lifts VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 1. Deluge system 2. Manual emergency kill system 5 3. High pressure alarms on reactor 5 4. High temperature alarms on reactor 5. Emergency operating 5 procedures/training/ qualification 6. Gaitronics system - alternative 5 communication system 7. Automatic Emergency kill system 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overpressure 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overheat 3. Loss of cooling Reactor S 3D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 4D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 1. Deluge system 2. Automatic Emergency kill 5 system 3 Manual emergency kill system 5 4. High pressure alarms on reactor 5. High temperature alarms on 5 reactor 6. Emergency operating procedures/training/ 5 qualification 7. Gaitronics system - alternative communication system 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor overheat S/E 4 B 5 1. Deluge system 2. Automatic Emergency kill S/E 4 B 5 system 3. Manual emergency kill system 50 ABD00031600 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 34. Operation of Deluge Water to Emergency Cooling Water System. Type: Procedural Step Drawings: (OP) VINYL-NM-E008, 05/01/99, (OP) VINYL-OM-E008, 05/01/99 Design Conditions/Parameters: Steps 1 thru 5 Dev 34.1 cont'd 4. cont'd Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor S 3D overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 4D overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 4. High pressure alarms on reactor 5. High temperature alarms on 5 reactor 6. Emergency operating procedures/training/ 5 qualification 7. Gaitronics system - alternative communication system 51 ABD00031601 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 35. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Cooling Towers #'s 2, 4, and 6. Type: Line Drawing: UT-090117-PID-D, 10/10/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Up to 500 Ib/day of chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before regulator and at 0 psig or below after regulator to ejector. Dev Causes 35.1 High Pressure 1. Water backing up into line through ejector. 2. Regulator relief (vent) valve failure under venting conditions 3 Regulator Failure to control flow/pressure 4. Liquid Chlorine in the line 35.2 Low/No Flow 1 Ruptured/cracked line 2. Blocked discharge 3. High upstream pressure 4. Chlorine cylinder is empty Consequences 1. Regulator malfunction 2. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Regulator malfunction 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2. Tubing rupture/leak 3. Tubing rupture/leak-E 4. Overfeed chlorine to cooling towers 1. Tubing rupture/leak 2. Tubing rupture/leak-E 3. Overfeed chlorine to cooling towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Regular cooling tower checks 5 2. Daily visual checks 3. Eductor Vacuum indication S/E 4 D 5 1. Screen on vent line 43 43 S/E 4 D S 3C E 4C S/E 4 C 5 1. Regular cooling tower checks 4 2. Daily visual checks 5 3. Eductor Vacuum indication 5 4. Drip leg heater 5. Operating Procedures/ Training for cylinder valve alignment 6. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 7. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 8. Personal Protective Equipment S 3C E 4C S/E 4 C 4 1. Chlorine regulator located on 5 cylinder 5 2. Drip leg heater 3. Operating Procedures/ Training for cylinder valve alignment 4. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A065 5. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 6. Personal Protective Equipment 42 43 41 42 S/E 4 C 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 A 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 52 ABD00031602 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 35. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Cooling Towers #'s 2, 4, and 6. Type: Line Drawing: UT-090117-PID-D, 10/10/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Up to 500 Ib/day of chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before regulator and at 0 psig or below after regulator to ejector.3 4 5 6 Dev 35.2 cont'd 4. cont'd Causes Consequences 5. Plugged regulator inlet filter 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 35.3 Leak 1. Corrosion 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2. Chlorine release 2 Gasket or packing or valve seal at cylinder or rotameter failure 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2. Chlorine release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 3. Regular cooling tower checks 4. Chlorine cylinder scale 5. Spare chlorine cylinder S/E 4 B 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks 1 S/E 4 D S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 3. Personal Protective Equipment S/E 4 B S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 3. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed 4. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 5. Check packing on cylinder valves before use 6. Personal Protective Equipment 42 43 42 43 53 ABD00031603 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 36. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Water Plant Chlorination System. Type: Line Drawing: WP-090106-PID-D, 09/26/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: 360 PPD at ambient chlorine vapor pressure and temperature. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 36.1 High Pressure 1. Water backing up into line through ejector. 2. Regulator relief (vent) valve failure under venting conditions 3. Regulator Failure to control flow/pressure 4. Liquid Chlorine in the line 36.2 Low/No Flow 1. Blocked discharge 2. Chlorine cylinder is empty 3. High upstream pressure 4. Plugged regulator inlet filter Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Regulator malfunction S/E 4 D 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Regular water plant checks 5 2. Daily visual checks 3. Eductor Vacuum indication 1. Regulator malfunction S/E 4 D 5 1. Screen on vent line 43 43 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 2. Tubing rupture/leak S 3C 3. Tubing rupture/leak-E E 4C 4. Overfeed chlorine to water S/E 4 C plant 5 1. Regular water plant checks 4 2. Daily visual checks 5 3. Eductor Vacuum indication 5 4. Drip leg heater 5. Operating Procedures/ Training for cylinder valve alignment 6. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 7. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 8. Personal Protective Equipment 1. Tubing rupture/leak 2. Tubing rupture/leak-E 3. Overfeed chlorine to water plant S 3C E 4C S/E 4 C 4 1. Drip leg heater 5 2. Operating Procedures/ 5 Training for cylinder valve alignment 3. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 4. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 5. Personal Protective Equipment 43 45 46 41 45 46 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 A 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular water plant checks 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 A 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular water plant checks 4. Chlorine cylinder scale 5. Spare chlorine cylinder 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular water plant checks 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular water plant checks 1 1 1 1 54 ABD00031604 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 36. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Water Plant Chlorination System. Type: Line Drawing: WP-090106-PID-D, 09/26/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: 360 PPD at ambient chlorine vapor pressure and temperature. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev 36.2 cont'd 4. cont'd Causes 5. Ruptured/cracked line 36.3 Leak 1. Corrosion 2 Gasket or packing or valve seal at cylinder or rotameter failure 3. High pressure tubing crack/ rupture Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 4. Spare chlorine cylinder with regulator 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 C 5 1 Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular water plant checks 4. Isolation valves 1 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 2. Chlorine release S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 43 45 46 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 B 2 Chlorine release S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system.when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 Use new washer every time cylinder is changed Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed Check packing on cylinder valves before use3 4 43 45 46 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 B 5 2. Chlorine release S/E 4 B 5 1. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 3. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 4. Spare chlorine cylinder 5 Personal Protective Equipment 45 46 55 ABD00031605 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 37. Chlorine one ton container. Water Plant in Room Type: Vessel Drawing: WP-090106-PID-D, 09/26/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Chlorine at ambient vapor pressure and temperature. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 37.1 Leak 1. Corrosion 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal failure 3. Fusible Plug blowout Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Chlorine release S/E 3 D 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Inside building 5 2. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 3. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 4. Personal Protective Equipment 45 46 47 1. Chlorine release S/E 4 C 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 3. Personal Protective Equipment 4. Check packing on cylinder valves before use 5. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 6. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed1 2 3 4 5 45 46 47 1. Chlorine release S/E 3 D 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm AAH808 3. Personal Protective Equipment 4. Chlorine "B" kit located at water plant 5. Emergency Response Procedures/Trai ning 45 46 47 56 ABD00031606 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL_02A.PHA Node: 38. Start-up of Cooling Tower Chlorination System. Type: Procedural Step Drawings: (OP) UT-CT-001, 09/29/99, (OP) UT-CT-002, 09/29/99 Design Conditions/Parameters: UT-CT-001 Steps 1.0 & 2.0; UT-CT-002 Steps 1.0 & 2.0 Dev Causes 38.1 Other than specified action 1. Inadequate operator training Consequences 1. Chlorine leak/release 2. Equipment shutdown 3. Personal exposure 2. Operator doesn't adhere to procedure 1. Chlorine leak/release 2. Equipment shutdown 3. Personal exposure CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B S 4C 5 1. Chlorine leak detection device 41 5 81AA085 42 5 2. Personal protection equipment 43 3. Specific guidance in 50 procedures 4. Training & qualification of personnel 5. More than one Chlorine "B" kit in plant for emergency use. 6. Chlorine regulator located on cylinder which requires vacuum for flow. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B S 4C 5 1. Chlorine leak detection device 41 5 81AA085 42 5 2. Personal protection equipment 43 3. Specific guidance in 50 procedures 4. Training & qualification of personnel 5. More than one Chlorine "B" kit in plant for emergency use. 6. Chlorine regulator located on cylinder which requires vacuum for flow. 57 ABD00031607 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 39. Shut down of Cooling Tower Chlorination System. Type: Procedural Step Drawings: (OP) UT-CT-001,09/29/99, (OP) UT-CT-002, 09/29/99 Design Conditions/Parameters: UT-CT-001 Steps 3.0 & 4.0; UT-CT-002 Steps 3.0 & 4.0 Dev Causes 39.1 Other than specified action 1. Inadequate operator training Consequences 1. Chlorine leak/release 2. Equipment shutdown 3. Personal exposure 2. Operator doesn't adhere to procedure 1. Chlorine leak/release 2. Equipment shutdown 3. Personal exposure CAT s L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B S 4C 5 1. Chlorine leak detection device 41 5 81AA085 42 5 2. Chlorine regulator located on 43 cylinder which requires 50 vacuum for flow. 3. More than one Chlorine "B" kit in plant for emergency use. 4. Personal protection equipment 5. Specific guidance in procedures 6. Training & qualification of personnel S/E 4 B 5 1. Chlorine leak detection device 41 S/E 4 B 5 81AA085 42 S 4 C 5 2. Chlorine regulator located on 43 cylinder which requires 50 vacuum for flow. 3. More than one Chlorine "B" kit in plant for emergency use. 4. Personal protection equipment 5. Specific guidance in procedures 6. Training & qualification of personnel 58 ABD00031608 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 40 Emergency response to a chlorine leak of Cooling Tower Chlorination System. Type: Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) UT-CT-003, 09/29/99 Design Conditions/Parameters: Steps 1.0 - 4.0 UTIl_02A.PHA Dev Causes 40.1 Other than specified action Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Inadequate personal training 1. Interuption of plant operations EC 3 C 4 1. Annual training of ERT Team 2. Personal evacuation S/E 3 C 4 Members 3. Personal exposure S/E 3 C 4 13 47 2. Emergency response material 1. Interuption of plant operations EC 3 C 4 1. Annual inventory of ERT not available 2. Personal evacuation S/E 3 C 4 Team "B" kit 3. Personal exposure S/E 3 C 4 12 59 ABD00031609 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 41. Start-up of Water Plant Chlorination System Type: Procedural Step Drawings: (OP) UT-WP-002, 07/20/00, (OP) UT-WP-003, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: UT-WP-002, Start-up Steps 1-22; UT-WP-003, Steps 2.0, 2.1-2.8, 3.1-3.24, 4.1-4.3 Dev Causes 41.1 Other than specified action 1. Inadequate operator training Consequences 1. Chlorine leak/release 2. Equipment shutdown 3. Personal exposure 2. Operator doesn't adhere to procedure 1. Chlorine leak/release 2. Equipment shutdown 3. Personal exposure CAT s L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B S 4C 5 1. Chlorine leak detection device 41 5 02A808 45 5 2. Personal protection equipment 46 3. Specific guidance in 50 procedures 4. Training & qualification of personnel 5. More than one Chlorine "B" kit in plant for emergency use. 6. Chlorine regulator located on cylinder which requires vacuum for flow - Back-up chlorination system only. 7. Chlorine room ventilation fan S/E 4 B 5 1. Chlorine leak detection device 41 S/E 4 B 5 02A808 45 S 4 C 5 2. Personal protection equipment 46 3. Specific guidance in 50 procedures 4. Training & qualification of personnel 5. More than one Chlorine "B" kit in plant for emergency use. 6. Chlorine regulator located on cylinder which requires vacuum for flow - Back-up chlorination system only. 7. Chlorine room ventilation fan 60 ABD00031610 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 42. Shut down of Water Plant Chlorination System Type: Procedural Step Drawings: (OP) UT-WP-002, 07/20/00, (OP) UT-WP-003, 08/09/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: UT-WP-002, SHUTDOWN Procedure Steps 1-5; UT-WP-003 Steps 13.1-13.16 Dev Causes 42.1 Other than specified action 1. Inadequate operator training Consequences 1. Chlorine leak/release 2. Equipment shutdown 3. Personal exposure 2. Operator doesn t adhere to procedure 1. Chlorine leak/release 2. Equipment shutdown 3. Personal exposure CAT s L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B S 4C 5 1. Chlorine leak detection device 41 5 02A808 45 5 2. Chlorine regulator located on 46 cylinder which requires 50 vacuum for flow - Back-up chlorination system only. 3. Chlorine room ventilation fan 4. More than one Chlorine "B" kit in plant for emergency use. 5. Personal protection equipment 6. Specific guidance in procedures 7. Training & qualification of personnel S/E 4 B 5 1. Chlorine leak detection device 41 S/E 4 B 5 02A808 45 S 4 C 5 2. Chlorine regulator located on 46 cylinder which requires 50 vacuum for flow - Back-up chlorination system only. 3. Chlorine room ventilation fan 4. More than one Chlorine "B" kit in plant for emergency use. 5. Personal protection equipment 6. Specific guidance in procedures 7. Training & qualification of personnel 61 ABD00031611 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 43. Emergency response to a chlorine leak of Water Plant Chlorination System. Type: Procedural Step Drawings: (OP) UT-WP-017, 07/20/00, (OP) UT-WP-018, 07/20/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: UT-WP-017 Steps 1-4; UT-WP-018 Steps 1.1-1.22, 2.0 Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 43.1 Other than specified action 1. Inadequate personal training 1. Interuption of plant operations EC 3 C 4 1. Annual training of ERT Team 2. Personal evacuation S/E 3 c 4 Members 3. Personal exposure S/E 3 c 4 2. Emergency response material 1. Interuption of plant operations EC 3 c 4 1. Annual training of ERT Team not available 2. Personal evacuation S/E 3 c 4 Members 3. Personal exposure S/E 3 c 4 2. Annual inventory of ERT Team "B" kit 13 47 12 62 ABD00031612 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 44. DM-810 Instrument Air surge tank at VCM tank farm Type: Vessel Drawing: UT-090111-PID-D, 09/26/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Pressure to 100 psig. Dew point -40 F . MAWP 100 psig @ 175 F UTIL_02A.PHA Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards 44.1 High Level 1. Moisture in the inlet air 1. Downstream instrument S/E 4 B 5 1. Drain valve malfunction due to water in air 2. Loss of air supply to some S/E 4 B 5 equipment 2. Plugged drain valve 1. Downstream instrument S/E 4 B malfunction due to water in air 2. Loss of air supply to some S/E 4 B equipment 5 5 44.2 High Pressure 1. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Loss of instrument air to some S/E 4 B equipment 2. Overpressure vessel S/E 4 B 5 1. Pressure relief valve 2. Relief valve PM 5 2. Relief Valve Plugged under relieving condition 1. Overpressure vessel S/E 4 B 5 1. Pressure vessel inspection program 2. Relief valve PM Rec. 37 37 1 1 63 ABD00031613 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 45. Chlorine Ton Cylinder for Cooling Towers Vinyl Area Type: Tank Drawing: UT-090117-PID-D, 10/10/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Chlorine at ambient vapor pressure and temperature. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 45.1 Leak 1. Corrosion 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal failure 3. Fusible Plug blowout Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Chlorine release S/E 3 D 2. Loss of chlorine to #2, #4, #6, S/E 4 D and #7 Cooling Towers as well as Centrate 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 3. Personal Protective Equipment 1. Chlorine release S/E 4 C 2. Loss of chlorine to #2, #4, #6, S/E 4 D and #7 Cooling Towers as well as Centrate 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 3. Personal Protective Equipment 4. Check packing on cylinder valves before use 5. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 6. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed 1. Chlorine release 2. Loss of chlorine to #2, #4, #6, and #7 Cooling Towers as well as Centrate S/E 3 S/E 4 D D 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 3. Personal Protective Equipment 4. Chlorine "B" kit located at water plant 5. Emergency Response Procedures/Training 42 47 42 47 42 47 64 ABD00031614 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL_02A.PHA Node: 46. Emergency cooling to #4 cooling tower supply line Type: Line Drawings: UT-090112-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) VINYL-OM-E008, 05/ 01/99 Design Conditions/Parameters: 1500 to 1800 gpm of firewater from deluge system to cooling water supply header Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 46.1 Low/No Flow 1 Actuated valve 81H086 does not open 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overheat 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overpressure 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor S 3D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 4D overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 1. Automatic Emergency kill system 5 2 Manual emergency kill system 3. Deluge system 5 4. Emergency operating procedures/training/ qualification 5 5. Gaitronics system - alternative communication system 6. High pressure alarms on 5 reactor 7. High temperature alarms on reactor 2. Bypass valve won't open and 81H086 is closed 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor overheat 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure 3 Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion S/E S/E S E S/E 4B 4B 3D 4D 3D 5 1. Automatic Emergency kill system 5 2. Manual emergency kill system 3. Deluge system 5 4. Emergency operating procedures/training/ qualification 5 5. Gaitronics system alternative communication system 6 High pressure alarms on 5 reactor 7. High temperature alarms on reactor 39 3. Low firewater pressure/flow 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor overheat 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5 Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion S/E S/E S E S/E 4C 4C 3D 4D 3D 5 1. Automatic Emergency kill system 5 2 Manual emergency kill system 3. Emergency operating 5 procedures/training/ qualification 4. Gaitronics system - alternative 5 communication system 5. High pressure alarms on reactor 5 6. High temperature alarms on reactor 39 65 ABD00031615 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 47. Emergency cooling water to #6 cooling tower water supply Type: Line Drawings: UT-090113-PID-D, 12/11/02, (OP) VINYL-NM-E008, 05/ 01/99 Design Conditions/Parameters: 1500 to 1800 gpm of firewater from deluge system to cooling water supply header Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 47.1 Low/No Flow 1. Actuated valve 82H086 does not open 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overheat 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overpressure 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor S 3D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 4D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 1. Automatic Emergency kill 39 system 5 2. Manual emergency kill system 3. Deluge system 5 4. Emergency operating procedures/training/ qualification 5 5. Gaitronics system - alternative communication system 6. High pressure alarms on 5 reactor 7. High temperature alarms on reactor 2. Bypass valve won't open and 82H086 is closed 1 Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overheat 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overpressure 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor S 3D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling Reactor E 4D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 1. Automatic Emergency kill system 5 2. Manual emergency kill system 3. Deluge system 5 4. Emergency operating procedures/training/ qualification 5 5. Gaitronics system - alternative communication system 6. High pressure alarms on 5 reactor 7. High temperature alarms on reactor 39 3. Low firewater pressure/flow 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor overheat 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion S/E 4 S/E 4 S3 E4 S/E 3 C C D D D 5 1. Automatic Emergency kill system 5 2. Manual emergency kill system 3. Emergency operating 5 procedures/training/ qualification 4. Gaitronics system - alternative 5 communication system 5. High pressure alarms on reactor 5 6. High temperature alarms on reactor 39 66 ABD000316162 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 48. Cooling water line from #6 Cooling Tower Supply to Air compressors. Type: Line Drawings: UT-090113-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090115-PID-D, 10/09/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: 140 gpm of cooling water @ 85 F Dev Causes 48.1 Low/No Flow 1. Low cooling water supply pressure Consequences 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 2. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 3. Water line freeze up 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 48.2 High Temperature 1. Cooling Tower fan not running 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 2. High ambient temperature 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Three sources of cooling 5 water to CP-708 &CP-709 2. Check valve to separate emergency cooling water supply from normal cooling tower 2 supply. 3. Operating procedure for routing flows. 33 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Operating procedures for 5 routing flows 2. Low water pressure compressor shutdown switch 3. High temperature compressor shutdown switch 1 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Operating procedures for 5 routing flows 2. Leave water circulating 3. Run all compressors when the ambient temperature falls below 28 F 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Cooling fan run indication and S/E 4 B 5 alarm 2. Cooling Tower Sump Temperature indication and alarm S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Cooling Tower Sump 5 Temperature indication and alarm 2. Ambient temperature indication 1 1 67 ABD00031617 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 49. Emergency Cooling Pump and line for #2 Cooling Tower emergency cooling water supply to CP-708 & CP-709 Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawings: UT-090114-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090115-PID-D, 10/09/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: 600 gpm @ 100 psig Dev Causes Consequences 49.1 Low/No Flow 1. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 2. Pump failure (mechanical/ electrical) 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 3. Water line freeze up 4. Leak/rupture 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 5. Low sump level 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 6. Pump suction screen plugged 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air 7. Check valve failure 1. Compressor shutdown 2. Loss of Instrument Air CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Operating procedures for 5 routing flows 2. Low water pressure compressor shutdown switch 3. High temperature compressor shutdown switch 1 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Operating procedures for 5 routing flows 2. Three sources of cooling water to CP-708 &CP-709 3. Check valve to separate emergency cooling water supply from normal cooling tower 2 supply. 4. Low water pressure compressor shutdown switch 5. High temperature compressor shutdown switch 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Leave water circulating S/E 4 B 5 1 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Operating procedures for 5 routing flows 2. Low water pressure compressor shutdown switch 3. High temperature compressor shutdown switch 4. Three sources of cooling water to CP-708 &CP-709 1 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Low water pressure 5 compressor shutdown switch 2. High temperature compressor shutdown switch 3. Three sources of cooling water to CP-708 &CP-709 4. Cooling tower sump low level alarm 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Low water pressure S/E 4 B 5 compressor shutdown switch 2. High temperature compressor shutdown switch 3. Three sources of cooling water to CP-708 &CP-7097 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Low water pressure S/E 4 B 5 compressor shutdown switch 2. High temperature compressor shutdown switch 3. Three sources of cooling water to CP-708 &CP-709 1 68 ABD00031618 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 49. Emergency Cooling Pump and line for #2 Cooling Tower emergency cooling water supply to CP-708 & CP-709 Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawings: UT-090114-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090115-PID-D, 10/09/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: 600 gpm @ 100 psig Dev 49.1 cont'd 7. cont'd Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 4. Isolation valve downstream of check valve 69 ABD00031619 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 50 Cooling Tower #7 Pumps PP-540, PP-541, PP-542, PP-543, and line to supply cooling water to the large reactors in the New Module. Tower also supplies water to the LM stripper and NM recovery system. Can provide water to other NM reactors and HM stripper. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawing: UT-090122-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Flow rate up to 18,000 gpm @ 100 psig. Pressures to 125 psig at lower flows. Dev Causes 50.1 Cavitation 1. Low sump level Consequences 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 2. Plugged inlet pump screen/ sump screen 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 50.2 Low/No Flow 1. Cooling water pressure control valve or controller fails CV opens 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 2. Line leak/rupture 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 3. Operator fails to align correct lines/valves 1. Equipment damage 2. No cooling water supply 4. Pump failure (mechanical/ electrical) 1. No cooling water supply 5. Sump empty/sump screens plugged 1. Equipment damage 2 No cooling water supply 50.3 High Temperature 1. Fan not running 2. High ambient temperature 1. Reactor temperture control problems 1. Reactor temperture control problems CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Cooling tower sump low level 5 alarm 2. Emergency cooling water 3. Automatic sump level control S/E 4 B 5 1. PM of cooling towers every S/E 4 B 5 two years 1 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water S/E 4 B 5 2. High temperature alarms on reactor 3. Reactor cooling water flow indication S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. Automatic sump level control 3. Cooling tower sump low level alarm 4. High temperature alarms on reactor 5. Reactor cooling water flow indication S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. High temperature alarms on reactor 3. Reactor cooling water flow indication 4. Operating procedures/training S/E 4 B 5 1. High temperature alarms on reactor 2. Reactor cooling water flow indication 3. Emergency Power from GN003 S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. Emergency cooling water 5 2. Automatic sump level control 3. Cooling tower sump low level alarm 1 1 1 1 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Reactor high temperature alarms 2. Fan run indication S/E 4 B 5 1. Reactor high temperature alarms 1 1 70 ABD00031620 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 50. Cooling Tower #7 Pumps PP-540, PP-541, PP-542, PP-543, and line to supply cooling water to the large reactors in the New Module. Tower also supplies water to the LM stripper and NM recovery system. Can provide water to other NM reactors and HM stripper. Type: Centrifugal Pump + Line Drawing: UT-090122-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Flow rate up to 18,000 gpm @ 100 psig. Pressures to 125 psig at lower flows. Dev Causes Consequences 50.3 cont'd 2. cont'd 3. Poor distribution of water over 1. Reactor temperture control cooling tower problems 50.4 Low Temperature 1. Low ambient temperature 1. Cooling tower structural damage CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 2. Fan run indication S/E 4 B 5 1. Routine operator checks 1 EC 4 C 5 1. Automatic cooling tower fan control 2. Cooling tower sump temperature indication 3. Routine operator checks 1 71 ABD00031621 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 51. Emergency Generator GN-003 supplies power to one cooling tower pump for #7 Cooling Tower. Type: Generator Drawing: UT-090122-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Automatic Start-up in case of power failure. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec 51.1 Other than Start-up/Shutdown 1. Pump not in Auto 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor overheat 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion S/E S/E S E S/E 4B 4B 3D 4D 3D 5 1. Automatic Emergency kill system 5 2. Deluge system 3. Emergency operating 5 procedures/training/ qualification 4. Gaitronics system - alternative 5 communication system 5. High pressure alarms on reactor 5 6. High temperature alarms on reactor 7. Manual emergency kill system 8. Cooling Pump run indication 9. Reactor cooling water flow indication 10. Annual PM of Generator 1 2. Batteries/Starter Malfunction 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor overheat 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion S/E S/E S E S/E 4B 4B 3D 4D 3D 5 1. Automatic Emergency kill system 5 2. Deluge system 3. Emergency operating 5 procedures/training/ qualification 4. Gaitronics system - alternative 5 communication system 5. High pressure alarms on reactor 5 6. High temperature alarms on reactor 7. Manual emergency kill system 8. Weekly start check of generator 9. Generator trouble alarm 1 3. Generator in Stop position (Local hand switch) 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overheat 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overpressure 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor S 3D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 4D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 1. Automatic Emergency kill system 5 2. Deluge system 3. Emergency operating 5 procedures/training/ qualification 4. Gaitronics system - alternative 5 communication system 5. High pressure alarms on reactor 5 6. High temperature alarms on reactor 7. Manual emergency kill system 8. Cooling Pump run indication 9. Reactor cooling water flow indication 1 4. No fuel 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor overheat S/E 4 B 5 1. Automatic Emergency kill system 1 72 ABD00031622 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 51. Emergency Generator GN-003 supplies power to one cooling tower pump for #7 Cooling Tower. Type: Generator Drawing: UT-090122-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Automatic Start-up in case of power failure. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 51.1 cont'd 4. cont'd 5. Generator not in auto Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overpressure 3. Loss of cooling Reactor S 3D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 4D overpressure - relief valve lifts VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure - relief valve lifts VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 2. Deluge system 3. Emergency operating 5 procedures/training/ qualification 4. Gaitronics system - alternative 5 communication system 5. High pressure alarms on reactor 5 6. High temperature alarms on reactor 7. Manual emergency kill system 8. Cooling Pump run indication 9. Reactor cooling water flow indication 10. Gas supply line is tagged to stay open 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overheat 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overpressure 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor S 3D overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 4D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 1. Automatic Emergency kill system 5 2. Deluge system 3. Emergency operating 5 procedures/training/ qualification 4. Gaitronics system - alternative 5 communication system 5. High pressure alarms on reactor 5 6. High temperature alarms on reactor 7. Manual emergency kill system 8. Cooling Pump run indication 9. Reactor cooling water flow indication 73 ABD000316233 4 5 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 52. 150 Lb Chlorine Cylinder for Compound #5 Cooling Tower Type: Tank Drawing: UT-090123-PID-D, 10/23/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Chlorine at ambient temperatures and pressures. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 52.1 Leak 1. Corrosion 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal failure 3. Fusible Plug blowout Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Chlorine release 2. Chlorine release-E 3. Loss of chlorine to #5 Cooling Tower S 3D E 4D S/E 4 D 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine 5 cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 88AE5031 3. Personal Protective Equipment 44 47 1. Chlorine release 2. Loss of chlorine to #5 Cooling Tower S/E 4 C S/E 4 D 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Personal Protective Equipment 3 Check packing on cylinder valves before use 4. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 5. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed 6. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 88AE5031 44 47 1. Chlorine release 2. Loss of chlorine to #5 Cooling Tower S/E 3 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 44 5 and unhooking chlorine 47 cylinders 2. Personal Protective Equipment 3. Chlorine "A" kit located nearby 4. Emergency Response Procedures/Training 5. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 88AE5031 74 ABD00031624 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 53. Regulator and line that supplies chlorine gas to chlorine ejector for Compound Cooling Tower #5 Type: Line Drawing: UT-090123-PID-D, 10/23/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Up to 10 Ib/day of chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before the regulator and at 0 psig or below after the regulator to the ejector. Dev Causes 53.1 High Pressure 1. Water backing up into line through ejector. 2. Regulator relief (vent) valve failure under venting conditions 3. Regulator Failure to control flow/pressure 4 Liquid Chlorine in the line 53.2 Low/No Flow 1. Ruptured/cracked line 2. Blocked discharge 3. High upstream pressure 4. Chlorine cylinder is empty 5. Plugged regulator inlet filter Consequences 1. Regulator malfunction 2. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Regulator malfunction 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2. Tubing rupture/leak 3. Tubing rupture/leak-E 4. Overfeed chlorine to cooling towers 1. Tubing rupture/leak 2. Tubing rupture/leak-E 3. Overfeed chlorine to cooling towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 1. Loss of chlorine to towers CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 D S/E 4 D 5 1. Regular cooling tower checks 5 2. Daily visual checks 3. Eductor Vacuum indication S/E 4 D 5 1. Screen on vent line 43 43 S/E 4 D S 3C E 4C S/E 4 c 5 1. Regular cooling tower checks 4 2. Daily visual checks 5 3. Eductor Vacuum indication 5 4. Drip leg heater 5. Operating Procedures/ Training for cylinder valve alignment 6. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 7. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders S 3 c 4 1. Chlorine regulator located on E 4c 5 cylinder S/E 4 c 5 2. Drip leg heater 3. Operating Procedures/ Training for cylinder valve alignment 4. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 5. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 42 43 44 41 42 44 S/E 4 C 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 A 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks 4. Chlorine cylinder scale S/E 4 B 5 1. Daily visual checks 1 1 1 1 1 75 ABD00031625 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 53. Regulator and line that supplies chlorine gas to chlorine ejector for Compound Cooling Tower #5 Type: Line Drawing: UT-090123-PID-D, 10/23/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Up to 10 Ib/day of chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before the regulator and at 0 psig or below after the regulator to the ejector. Dev 53.2 cont'd 5. cont'd Causes 533 Leak 1. Corrosion Consequences 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2. Chlorine release 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal at cylinder or rotameter failure 1. Loss of chlorine to towers 2 Chlorine release CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 2. Eductor Vacuum indication 3. Regular cooling tower checks S/E 4 D S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 S/E 4 B S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Chlorine area monitor and alarm 81A085 3. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed 4. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 5. Check packing on cylinder valves before use 42 43 42 43 76 ABD00031626 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 54. Operation of Emergency Generator GN-004 for Vinyl Control Room Type: Generator Drawing: (OP) VINYL-OM-E007, 05/01/99 Design Conditions/Parameters: Step 1.1 and 1.2 of Operating Procedure (Automatic Operation) UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 54.1 Low/No Power 1. Batteries/Starter Malfunction 1. DCS loses power after UPS runs down 2. Plant Telephone system power failure 3. Control Room Pressurization failure 4. Control Room Pressurization failure-E 5. Vinyl Unit and VCM Tank Farm instrument/valve power failure S/E 4 B S/E 4 B S 3D E 4D 5 1. UPS Power supply 2. Weekly Check of Generator- 5 Fuel,water,belts, oil, indicator lights, 15 min. run test, 5 voltage, battery charger, engine block. 5 3. Manual valves in field S/E 3 D 5 2. No fuel 1. DCS loses power after UPS runs down 2. Plant Telephone system power failure 3. Control Room Pressurization failure 4. Control Room Pressurization failure-E 5. Vinyl Unit and VCM Tank Farm instrument/valve power failure S/E 4 B S/E 4 B S 3D E 4D S/E 3 D 5 1. UPS Power supply 2. Weekly Check of Generator 5 3. Manual valves in field 5 5 5 1 3. Generator not in auto 1. DCS loses power after UPS runs down 2. Plant Telephone system power failure 3. Control Room Pressurization failure 4. Control Room Pressurization failure-E 5. Vinyl Unit and VCM Tank Farm instrument/valve power failure S/E 4 B S/E 4 B S 3D E 4D S/E 3 D 5 1. UPS Power supply 2. Weekly Check of Generator 5 3. Manual valves in field 5 5 5 1 4. Transfer switch fails to switch 1. DCS loses power after UPS runs down 2. Plant Telephone system power failure 3. Control Room Pressurization failure 4. Control Room Pressurization failure-E 5. Vinyl Unit and VCM Tank Farm instrument/valve power failure S/E 4 B S/E 4 B 5 1. UPS Power supply 2. Weekly Check of Generator 5 3. Manual valves in field S 3D 5 E 4D 5 S/E 3 D 5 1 77 ABD00031627 12/18/02 Node: 55. Cooling Tower #7 Standby Generator Operation Type: Procedural Step Design Conditions/Parameters; Step A and B Utilities Area Drawing: (OP) VINYL-NM-E013, 04/27/99 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes 55.1 Other than specified action 1. Communication failure between operators 2. Confusion in emergency situation 3. Operator omits step 4. Insufficient training Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overpressure 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overheat 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor S 3D overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling * Reactor E 4D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 1. Deluge system 2. Automatic Emergency kill 5 system 3. Manual emergency kill system 5 4. High pressure alarms on reactor 5. High temperature alarms on 5 reactor 6. Emergency operating procedures/training/ 5 qualification 7. Gaitronics system - alternative communication system 1 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure 2. Loss of cooling Reactor overheat 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor overpressure - relief valve lifts VCM Release Ignition source - Fire/Explosion S/E 4 S/E 4 S3 E4 S/E 3 B B D D D 5 1. Deluge system 2. Automatic Emergency kill 5 system 3. Manual emergency kill system 5 4. High pressure alarms on reactor 5. High temperature alarms on 5 reactor 6. Emergency operating procedures/training/ 5 qualification 7. Gaitronics system - alternative communication system 1 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overpressure 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overheat 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor S 3D overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 4D overpressure - relief valve lifts VCM Release-E 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 1. Deluge system 2. Automatic Emergency kill 5 system 3. Manual emergency kill system 5 4. High pressure alarms on reactor 5. High temperature alarms on 5 reactor 6. Emergency operating procedures/training/ 5 qualification 7. Gaitronics system - alternative communication system 1 1. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overpressure 2. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 4 B overheat 3. Loss of cooling - Reactor S 3D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release 4. Loss of cooling - Reactor E 4D overpressure - relief valve lifts - VCM Release-E 5 1. Deluge system 2. Automatic Emergency kill 5 system 3. Manual emergency kill system 5 4. High pressure alarms on reactor 5. High temperature alarms on 5 reactor 6. Emergency operating procedures/training/ 1 78 ABD00031628 12/18/02 Node: 55. Cooling Tower #7 Standby Generator Operation Type: Procedural Step Design Conditions/Parameters: Step A and B Utilities Area Drawing: (OP) VINYL-NM-E013, 04/27/99 UTIL 02A.PHA Dev 55.1 cont'd 4. cont'd Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 5. Loss of cooling - Reactor S/E 3 D overpressure relief valve lifts - VCM Release - Ignition source - Fire/Explosion 5 6. cont'd qualification 7. Gaitronics system - alternative communication system 79 ABD00031629 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 56 Cooling Tower Fan Control Type: Procedural Step Drawing: (OP) VINYL-NM-N475, 08/31/00 Design Conditions/Parameters: Step 1 and 2 (DCS Operation) UTIL_02A.PHA Dev Causes 56.1 Other than specified action 1. Manual overide of DCS Controls Consequences 1. High cooling water temperature CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B 5 1. Cooling tower temperature indication 1 80 ABD00031630 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 57. Emergency Generator GN-001 that provides power for the OM & NM seal oil pumps, catalyst freezers, the instrument air compressors CP-708 & CP-709, the instrument air dryer DR-030, Pall air dryer, and the emergency cooling water pump PP-247. Type: Generator Drawings: MCC10A1-E-EL-D, 10/28/02, MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 08/24/ 94, GP-9721-62-6D,08/23/83 Design Conditions/Parameters: Automatic start when power failure occurs. Provide 415kW Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 57.1 Low/No Power 1. Batteries/Starter Malfunction 1. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release Fire/Explosion 2. Loss of instrument airReactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion -E 3. Loss of power to seal oil pumps 4. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers 5. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers -E S 3C E 4C S/E 4 C S 3C E 4C 4 1. Annual PM of Generator 2. Weekly Operator Check of Generator 5 3. Battery Charger 4. Engine Block Heater 5. Fire Protection System 5 6. Fixed point monitor 7. Operating procedures/training 4 8. Personal Protective Equipment 5 9. Reactor pressure/temperature indication 10. Automatic/Manual Emergency Kill 11. Beacon Light for catalyst freezers 12. Blowout door for catalyst freezer 13. Camera for catalyst freezer 14. Door open/close indication - 84Z953/954 east. Similar west freezer 15. Floor grating and aisle promote air circulation for catalyst freezer 16. Hydrocarbon detector84A962 east. Similar west freezer 17. Line in catalyst freezer showing max stacking height 18. High temperature Alarm and local temperature indicator for catalyst freezer. 31 2. No fuel 1. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release Fire/Explosion 2. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure VCM Release - Fire/Explosion -E 3. Loss of power to seal oil pumps 4. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers 5. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers -E S 3C E 4C S/E 4 C S 3C E 4C 4 1. Annual PM of Generator 2. Weekly Operator Check of Generator 5 3. Fire Protection System 4. Fixed point monitor 5. Operating procedures/training 5 6. Personal Protective Equipment 4 7. Reactor pressure/temperature indication 5 8. Automatic/Manual Emergency Kill 9. Beacon Light for catalyst freezers 10. Blowout door for catalyst freezer 11. Camera for catalyst freezer 12. Door open/close indication 84Z953/954 east. Similar 31 81 ABD00031631 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 57. Emergency Generator GN-001 that provides power for the OM & NM seal oil pumps, catalyst freezers, the instrument air compressors CP-708 & CP-709, the instrument air dryer DR-030, Pall air dryer, and the emergency cooling water pump PP-247. Type: Generator Drawings: MCC10A1-E-EL-D, 10/28/02, MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 08/24/ 94, GP-9721-62-6D,08/23/83 Design Conditions/Parameters: Automatic start when power failure occurs. Provide 415kW Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 57.1 cont'd 2. cont'd 12. cont'd west freezer 13. Floor grating and aisle promote air circulation for catalyst freezer 14. Hydrocarbon detector84A962 east. Similar west freezer 15. Line in catalyst freezer showing max stacking height 16. High temperature Alarm and local temperature indicator for catalyst freezer. 3. Transfer switch fails to switch 1. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion 2. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion -E 3. Loss of power to seal oil pumps 4. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers 5. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers -E S 3C E 4C S/E 4 c S 3c S/E 4 c 4 1. Annual PM of Generator 2 Weekly Operator Check of Generator 5 3. Fire Protection System 4. Fixed point monitor 5. Operating procedures/training 5 6. Personal Protective Equipment 4 7 Reactor pressure/temperature indication 5 8. Automatic/Manual Emergency Kill 9. Beacon Light for catalyst freezers 10. Blowout door for catalyst freezer 11. Camera for catalyst freezer 12. Door open/close indication - 84Z953/954 east. Similar west freezer 13. Floor grating and aisle promote air circulation for catalyst freezer 14. Hydrocarbon detector 84A962 east. Similar west freezer 15. Line in catalyst freezer showing max stacking height 16. High temperature Alarm and local temperature indicator for catalyst freezer.4 31 4. Generator Mechanical failure 1. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion 2. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion -E S 3 C 4 1. Annual PM of Generator 2. Weekly Operator Check of Generator E 4 C 5 3. Engine Block Heater 4. Fire Protection System 5. Fixed point monitor 31 40 82 ABD00031632 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 57. Emergency Generator GN-001 that provides power for the OM & NM seal oil pumps, catalyst freezers, the instrument air compressors CP-708 & CP-709, the instrument air dryer DR-030, Pall air dryer, and the emergency cooling water pump PP-247. Type: Generator Drawings: MCC10A1-E-EL-D, 10/28/02, MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 08/24/ 94, GP-9721-62-6D,08/23/83 Design Conditions/Parameters: Automatic start when power failure occurs. Provide 415kW Dev 57.1 cont'd 4. cont'd Causes 5. Generator not in auto Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 3. Loss of power to seal oil pumps 4. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers 5. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers -E S/E 4 C 5 6. Operating procedures/training 7. Personal Protective S 3C 4 Equipment 8. Reactor pressure/temperature E 4C 5 indication 9. Automatic/Manual Emergency Kill 10 Beacon Light for catalyst freezers 11. Blowout door for catalyst freezer 12. Camera for catalyst freezer 13. Door open/close indication - 84Z953/954 east. Similar west freezer 14. Floor grating and aisle promote air circulation for catalyst freezer 15. Hydrocarbon detector - 84A962 east. Similar west freezer 16. Line in catalyst freezer showing max stacking height 17. High temperature Alarm and local temperature indicator for catalyst freezer.5 * * * 9 10 11 12 13 1. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release Fire/Explosion 2. Loss of instrument air Reactor Overpressure - VCM Release - Fire/Explosion -E 3. Loss of power to seal oil pumps 4. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers 5. Loss of power to Catalyst Freezers -E S/E S E 1. Weekly Operator Check of Generator 2. Fire Protection System 3. Fixed point monitor 4. Operating procedures/training 5. Personal Protective Equipment 6. Reactor pressure/temperature indication 7. Automatic/Manual Emergency Kill 8. Beacon Liaht for catalvst freezers 9. Blowout door for catalyst freezer 10. Camera for catalyst freezer 11. Door open/close indication 84Z953/954 east. Similar west freezer 12. Floor grating and aisle promote air circulation for catalyst freezer 13. Hydrocarbon detector84A962 east. Similar west freezer 31 83 ABD00031633 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 57. Emergency Generator GN-001 that provides power for the OM & NM seal oil pumps, catalyst freezers, the instrument air compressors CP-708 & CP-709, the instrument air dryer DR-030, Pall air dryer, and the emergency cooling water pump PP-247. Type: Generator Drawings: MCC10A1-E-EL-D, 10/28/02, MCC10A1-E1-EL-D, 08/24/ 94, GP-9721-62-6D,08/23/83 Design Conditions/Parameters: Automatic start when power failure occurs. Provide 415kW Dev 57.1 cont'd 5. cont'd Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 14. Line in catalyst freezer showing max stacking height 15. High temperature Alarm and local temperature indicator for catalyst freezer. 84 ABD00031634 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 58. Air line from DM-175 (West Joy) to EX-300 including local control actuated valve at DM-175 Type: Line Drawings: UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Air flow up to 3500 SCFM @ 100 psig. Pressures to approximately 115 psig. (Performance curve for 720912 08/14/73) Dev Causes Consequences 58.1 Low/No Flow 1. Compressor shutdown - local interlocks 1. Loss of Instrument Air 2. Valve failure - closes 1. Loss of Instrument Air 3. Compressor fail to run (motor, 1. Loss of Instrument Air internals, no power) 4. Inlet air filter plugged 1. Loss of Instrument Air 58.2 Low Pressure 1. Low air flow from compressors 1. Loss of Instrument Air CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 82PA085 and Instrument Air pressure indication 82PI090 2. Low sump level Alarm #2 cooling Tower 3. PM on #2 Cooling Tower Pumps and Tower 4. Routine cleaning of Y-strainer 5. Daily operator check of oil level 6. Oil pressure switch (shutdown switch) 7. Routinely change oil in compressors 8. Standby instrument Air Compressors CP-708 & CP709 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 82PA085 and Instrument Air pressure indication 82PI090 2. Standby Instrument Air Compressors CP-708 & CP709 51 S/E 4 B 5 1. Daily operator check of oil level 2. Oil pressure switch (shutdown switch) 3. Routinely change oil in compressors 4. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 82PA085 and Instrument Air pressure indication 82PI090 5. Standby Instrument Air Compressors CP-708 & CP709 6. Routine cleaning of Y-strainer 7. PM inlet air filter regularly 8. Regular PM of West Joy 1 S/E 4 D 5 1. PM inlet air filter regularly 2. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 82PA085 and Instrument Air pressure indication 82PI090* 1 1 S/E 4 B 5 1. PM inlet air filter regularly 1 85 ABD00031635 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 58. Air line from DM-175 (West Joy) to EX-300 including local control actuated valve at DM-175 Type: Line Drawings: UT-090109-PID-D, 12/11/02, UT-090108-PID-D, 12/11/02 Design Conditions/Parameters: Air flow up to 3500 SCFM @ 100 psic Pressures to approximately 115 psig. (Performance curve for 720912 08/14/73) Dev 58.2 cont'd 1. cont'd Causes Consequences 2.Leak 1. Loss of Instrument Air 3 Compressor internals failure (valves, innercooler, etc.) 1. Loss of Instrument Air CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 82PA085 and Instrument Air pressure indication 82PI090 Standby Instrument Air Compressors CP-708 & CP709 S/E 4 B 5 1. Low instrument Air pressure alarm 82PA085 and Instrument Air pressure indication 82PI090 Standby Instrument Air Compressors CP-708 & CP709 S/E 4 B 5 1. Daily operator check of oil level 2. Oil pressure switch (shutdown switch) PM inlet air filter regularly Routine cleaning of Y-strainer Routinely change oil in compressors Low instrument Air pressure alarm 82PA085 and Instrument Air pressure indication 82PI090 Standby Instrument Air Compressors CP-708 & CP709 1 1 86 ABD00031636 12/18/02 Utilities Area Node: 59. Chlorine Ton Cylinder Backup Chlorination System at Water Plant. Type: Tank Drawing: Design Conditions/Parameters: Chlorine at ambient temperatures and pressures. UTIL 02A.PHA Dev Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 59.1 Leak 1. Corrosion 1. Chlorine release S/E 3 D 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Chlorine "B" kit located at 5 water plant 2. Emergency Response Procedures/Training 47 52 53 2. Gasket or packing or valve seal failure 1. Chlorine release S/E 4 C 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Personal Protective Equipment 3. Check packing on cylinder valves before use 4. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 5. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed 47 52 53 3. Fusible Plug blowout 1. Chlorine release S/E 2 D 4 1. Personal Protective 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 Equipment 2. Chlorine "B" kit located at water plant 3. Emergency Response Procedures/Training 47 52 53 4. Vehicle collision with cylinder 1. Chlorine release S/E 2 D 4 1. Chlorine "B" kit located at 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 water plant 2. Emergency Response Procedures/Training 47 52 53 54 87 ABD00031637 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL 02A.PHA Node: 60. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Backup chlorination at Water Plant. Type: Line Drawing: Design Conditions/Parameters: Chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before regulator and at 0 psig or below after regulator to ejector. Dev Causes 60.1 High Pressure 1. Water backing up into line through ejector. 2. Regulator relief (vent) valve failure under venting conditions 3. Regulator Failure to control flow/pressure > 60 2 Low/No Flow 1. Blocked discharge 2. Chlorine cylinder is empty 3. High upstream pressure 4. Plugged regulator inlet filter 5. Ruptured/cracked line 60.3 Leak Corrosion Gasket or packing or valve seal at cylinder or rotameter failure Consequences CAT S L RR j Safeguards Rec. 1. Regulator malfunction S/E 4 D 5 1. Regular water plant checks 2. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 2. Daily visual checks 1. Regulator malfunction 2. Chlorine release S/E 4 D 5 1. Screen on vent line S/E 4 D 5 43 43 52 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Regular water plant checks 2. Tubing rupture/leak S 3 C 4 2. Daily visual checks 3. Tubing rupture/leak-E E 4 C 5 3. Drip leg heater 4. Overfeed chlorine to water S/E 4 c 5 4. Operating Procedures/ plant Training for cylinder valve alignment 5. Buddy system when hooking and unhooking chlorine cylinders 6. Personal Protective Equipment 43 52 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 c 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Regular water plant checks 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 B 5 1. Daily visual checks 2 Regular water plant checks 3. Spare chlorine cylinder 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Regular water plant checks 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Regular water plant checks 3. Spare chlorine cylinder with regulator 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 C 5 1. Daily visual checks 2. Regular water plant checks 3 Isolation valves 1 1 1 1 1 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 D 2. Chlorine release S/E 4 C 1. Loss of chlorine to water plant S/E 4 B 2. Chlorine release S/E 4 C 5 1. Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 5 1 Buddy system when hooking 5 and unhooking chlorine cylinders 2. Use new washer every time cylinder is changed 3. Leak check cylinder connection with amonia every time cylinder is changed 43 52 43 52 88 ABD00031638 12/18/02 Utilities Area UTIL_02A.PHA Node: 60. Chlorine supply line from chlorine container to ejector. Backup chlorination at Water Plant. Type: Line Drawing: Design Conditions/Parameters: Chlorine gas at ambient vapor pressure before regulator and at 0 psig or below after regulator to ejector. Dev 60.3 cont'd 2. cont'd Causes Consequences CAT S L RR Safeguards Rec. 4. Check packing on cylinder valves before use 89 ABD00031639 APPENDIX G ABD00031640 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix G. DOW FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX CALCULATION Attached information is from: Facility Siting Process Hazard Analysis Report For Condea/Vista Aberdeen Chemical Plant, April 28, 1998 ABD00031641 FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX MATERIAL FACTOR (See Table t or Appendices A or B) Note requirements when unit temperature over 140 F (60 C) 1. General Process Hazards Penalty Fac tor Range Base Factor...................................................................................................... A. Exothermic Chemical Reactions B. Endothermic Processes C. Material Handling and Transfer D. Enclosed or Indoor Process Units E. Access F. Drainage and Spill Control ^ . M m (qal)or cu.m. 1.00 0.30 to 1.25 0.20 to 0.40 0.25 to 1.05 0.25 to 0.90 0.20 to 0.35 0.25 to 0.50 General Process Hazards Factor (Fi)...................................................................................... 2. Special Process Hazards Base Factor...................................................................................................... A. Toxic Material(s) B. Sub-Atmospheric Pressure (< 500 mm Hg) C. Operation In or Near Flammable Range Inerted y Not Inerted 1. Tank Farms Storage Flammable Liquids 2. Process Upset or Purge Failure 3. Always in Flammable Range D. Dust Explosion (See Table 3) E. Pressure (See Figure 2) Operating Pressure *1CO Dsia or kPaaauae Relief Settina 'l.5o osig or kPa gauge F. Low Temperature G. Quantity of Flammable/Unstable Material: Quantity 2l?.2Atf0orka Ho = /?/?0i?BTU/!b or kcal/kq 1. Liquids or Gases in Process (See Figure 3) 2. Liquids or Gases in Storage (See Figure 4) 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust In Process (See Figure 5) H. Corrosion and Erosion 1. Leakage - Joints and Packing J. Use of Fired Equipment (See Figure 6) K. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (See Table 5) L. Rotating Equipment 1.00 0.20 to 0.80 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.80 0.25 to 2.00 0.20 to 0.30 0.10 to 0.75 0.10 to 1.50 0.15 to 1.15 0.50 x\ Penalty Fac tor Used(i) 1.00 O.S- 0.2~ 0,5" * 21.00 0.2. 0, 03 0, LiS0.1 0,1 Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) ........................................... ........................... Process Unit Hazards Factor (Fi x F2) = F3 . ........... ............................. <OiO} Fire and Explosion Index (F3 x MF = F&EI)....... ....................................................... (1) For no penally use 0.00. 5 / 2-7 fWn-o* ABD00031642 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT CONDEA VISTA, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES HAZOP DOW FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX CALCULATION PROPANE TANK FARM, PV-029 & PV-030 Basic Material(s) for Material Factor (MF) PV-029 & PV-030 contain up to 25,800 gallons of Propane at ambient temperature and ambient temperature vapor pressure (200 psig at 120 F). Note: PV-031 is out of service. Propane has the following NFPA Classification and properties. Health =1, Fire = 4, Reactivity = 0 Flash point: Gas Boiling Point:-44 F Heat of Combustion: 19,900 Btu/lb Material Factor (MF) 21 General Process Hazards BASE FACTOR 100 A. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor .30 to 1.25) 0.00 Penalty applies only to reactors where a reaction takes place. B. Endothermic Processes (Factor .20 to .40) 0.00 Penalty applies only to reactors where a reaction takes place. C. Material Handling and Transfer (Factor .25 to 1.05) 0.50 Propane is loaded into tanks from tanker truck via connection hose. Penalty = 0.50 D. Enclosed or Indoor Process Units (Factor .25 to .90) 0.00 This penalty does not apply to outdoor processes. E. Access (Factor .20 to .35) 0.20 Propane tank farm has access on one side from a gravel road off Matuby St. and from the within plant. It also has three adjacent fire monitors, one of which is on the same side as the road. However, since the monitors are close to the tanks, an intense fire may affect one's ability to man a monitor. In addition, one or two monitors will be shielded from a single burning tank depending on the burning tank's location. F. Drainage & Spill Control (Factor .25 to .50) 0.50 Process area is flat which will allow a spill to spread and expose a larger area to fire. Penalty = 0.50. Drainage is calculated as the liquid contents of PV-029 and 10% of PV-030 (about 28.4 M gallons) and 30 minutes of firewater accumulation "V for area or 68 M gallons in 30 minutes. Total = 96.4 M gallons. General Process Hazards Factor (FI) (Sum of base factor plus penalties listed for A through F) 2.20 ABD00031643 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT CONDEA VISTA, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES HAZOP Special Process Hazards BASE FACTOR A. Toxic Material(s) (Factor .20 to .80) Propane has a health factor of 1. Penalty = 1 * 0.2 = 0.2 B. Sub-Atmospheric Pressure (<500 mm Hg) Factor 0.5 PV-029 & PV-030 operate under pressure. Penalty = 0.00 C. Operation In or Near Flammable Range 1. Because PV-029 & PV-030 operate under positive pressure, no air is admitted during normal operation. Penalty = 0.00 2. PV-029 & PV-030 do not have an inert purge to keep it out of the flammable range. Penalty = 0.00 3. The air-free vapor space is above the upper flammable limit. Penalty = 0.00 D. Dust Explosion (Factor .25 to 2.00) Dust handling is not applicable. E. Relief Pressure: Fig.2, pg 23 Operating Pressure is 200 PSIG (Max.); Penalty 0.43 Relief Setting is 250 PSIG; Penalty 0.47 Penalty = .43 * (.43/.47) = 0.39 F. Low Temperature (Factor .20 to .30) No MOC data (other than CS) or design temperature data exists for PV-029 & PV-030. Therefore, since default temp, for ductile/brittle transition for CS is 50 F and operating temp, is ambient, the vessels will receive a penalty for low temp, operation. G. Quantity 219.2 M lbs., HC = 19.9 M BTU/Ib. 1. Liquids, Gases and Reactive Materials in Process Not an issue. 2. Liquids or Gases in Storage Total BTU in storage = 4,360 MM BTU, Penalty = 0.65 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust in Process Not an issue. During normal operation, both PV-029 & PV-030 are open to a header via manual valves. In case of a spill, location of each tank's isolation valve may prohibit access. Therefore, the quantity in process must be considered the entire contents of PV-029 & PV-030. Figure 4, Liquids and Gases in Storage, will be used instead of Fiqure 3, Liquids and Gases in Process, because PV-029 & PV-030 are in a storage "setting" and location. H. Corrosion and Erosion (Factor .10 to .75) No apparent external corrosion from atmospheric corrosion and no internal corrosion is known to occur. Penalty = minimum = 0.10 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.30 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.10 ABD00031644 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT CONDEA VISTA, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES HAZOP I. Leakage Joints and Packing (Factor .10 to 1.50) Historically, leakage has never been a problem. Penalty = 0.00 J. Use of Fired Heaters (Factor .10 to 1.00) Boilers are located aproximately 200 feet away. K. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (Factor .15 to 1.15) Not an issue. L. Rotating Equipment (Factor .50) There are no large pieces of rotating equipment (pumps larger than 75 HP or compressors larger than 600 HP). Penalty = 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) (Sum of base factor plus penalties listed for A through L) Unit Hazard Factor [(FI) * (F2) = (F3)] Fire and Explosion Index [(F3) * MF] = F&EI A Dow Fire and Explosion Index of 127 is considered to represent a "Intermediate" degree of hazard according to Table 6, p.38, 7th Edition Dow F&EI Classification Guide. Radius of Exposure, ft Radius emulating from the outer edges of PV-029 & PV-030. 2.74 6.03 127 107 ABD00031645 LOSS CONTROL CREDIT FACTORS 1. Process Control Credit Factor (tCi) Feature a. Emergency Power Credit Factor Ranae 0.98 b. Cooling 0.97 to 0.99 c. Explosion Control 0.84 to 0.98 d. Emergency Shutdown 0.96 to 0.99 e. Computer Control 0.93 to 0.99 Credit Factor Used(2) .99 Feature f. Inert Gas g. Operating Instructions/Procedures h. Reactive Chemical Review i. Other Process Hazard Analysis 2. Material Isolation Credit Factor (C2) Feature a. Remote Control Valves Credit Factor Range 0.96 to 0.98 b. Dump/Blowdown 0.96 to 0.98 Ci Value(3) | 0,^1 Credit Factor Used(2) Feature c. Drainage d. Interlock Credit Factor Range 0.94 to 0.96 0.91 to 0.99 0.91 to 0.96 0.91 to 0.98 Credit Factor Range 0.91 to 0.97 0.98 Credit Factor Used(2) .99 Credit Factor Used<2) 0, 95 3. Fire Protection Credit Factor (C2) Feature a. Leak Detection Credit Factor Range 0.94 to 0.98 b. Structural Steel 0.95 to 0.98 c. Fire Water Supply 0.94 to 0.97 d. Special Systems 0.91 e. Sprinkler Systems 0.74 to 0.97 C2 Value(3) | o, Credit Factor Used(2) 0.?M (Mi o.<n Feature f. Water Curtains g. Foam h. Hand Extingulshers/Monitors I. Cable Protection Credit Factor Range 0.97 to 0.98 0.92 to 0.97 0.93 to 0.98 0.94 to 0.98 Credit Factor Used<2) CjValuew | 0,V\ Loss Control Credit Factor = Ci X C2 X C3P) = P,U8 (Enter on line 7 below) PROCESS UNIT RISK ANALYSIS SUMMARY 1. Fire & Explosion Index (F&EI)....................... . (See Front) 2. Radius of Exposure....................................... 3. Area of Exposure.......................................... 4. Value of Area of Exposure............................ 5. Damage Factor............................................ ....(Figure 8) in 107 r2 ... ... 6. Base Maximum Probable Property Damage - (Base MPPD) [4 x 5]................. 7. Loss Control Credit Factor............................ (See Above) 0.1*$ 8. Actual Maximum Probable Property Damage - (Actual MPPD) (6x7)............. 9. Maximum Probable Days Outage - (MPDO). ....(Figure 9} 10. Business Interruption - (Bl)....... (ft))r m (H3^r m2 days $MM $MM $MM $MM (2) For no credit factor enter 1.00. (3) Product of all factors used. Refer to Fire & Explosion Index Hazard Classification Guide for details. 6 SW)1-4 | | | ABD00031646 LOSS PREVENTION PRINCIPLES ftPPN0'x CORPORATE LOSS PREVENTION PACE 2 OF RcviM/Ervition Date AUGUST 1990 2 2.2.6 Use of Table I A reduction of up to 30% is acceptable on distances outlined when a small scale plant is being evaluated, or when the total insurable value (Property Damage and Business Interruption) does not exceed $20MM. table I NOTES: GENERAL 1. KMAAHOM MtTMCU CAM It MOVCtO OTTV L ABD00031647 APPENDIX E i General Recommendations fo r Spacing in Petrochemical Plants ABD00031648 APPENDIX F LIGHT HYDROCARBON PLANT LAYOUT Block Limit E 12050.00 ABD00031649 Appendix G MANUFACTURING UNIT RISK ANALYSIS SUMMARY AREA/COUNTRY North America / USA SITE Midland PREPARED BY JFM Process Unit Major Material Cracked Gas Compressor DIVISION LOCATION MANUFACTURING UNIT Light Hydrocarbon TOTAL MFG. UNIT REPLACEMENT VALUE $ 1 Billion Material Factor 24 F&EI 114.3 Value of Area of Exposure $MM Base MPPD1 $MM 14.64 11.52 TYPE OF OPERATION Chemical Processing DATE 11/01/94 Actual MPPD1 $MM 5.04 Days Outage MPDO2 55 Bl3 Loss C2 Compressor 24 96 19.22 14.04 7.41 69 C2 Splitter 24 154.4 19.16 16.25 8.48 74 C2H2 Reactor 24 103.4 5.24 3.94 2.12 33 C3 Compressor 21 82.4 14.77 9.79 5.17 56 Furnace 29 100.93 23.84 18.38 10.97 45 Storage (C2C3) 24 95.95 5.88 4.29 2.17 33 1 Maximum Probable Property Damage 2 Maximum Probable Days Outage 3 Business Interruption FORM C-50010 REV/10-93 270 ABD00031650 >- 09-VL-0001-CA-D ABD00031651 APPENDIX H ABD00031652 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix H. Team Leader Training Documentation ABD00031653 ABD00031654 U H ' B I O S 5) ABD00031655 ABD00031656 APPENDIX T ABD00031657 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, ABERDEEN PLANT UTILITIES AREA HAZOP Appendix I. Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC, PSM-004 ABD00031658 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinvls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 1 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 Approved Electronically by the Engineering Manager 1.0 SCOPE This document applies to the Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls. LLC processes located at Aberdeen, MS as defined in Aberdeen PSM Compliance Manual PSM-001. The Process Hazard Analysis for the process units is conducted per the OSHA regulation for Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals - 1910.119(e) Process Hazard Analysis. 2.0 PURPOSE This standard defines the minimum requirements for complying with the Process Hazard Analysis requirements, paragraph (e), of the OSHA Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (PSM) regulation, 29 CFR 1910.119. 3.0 DEFINITIONS 3.1 Catastrophic Release or Incident - Means a major uncontrolled emission, fire, or explosion, involving one or more highly hazardous chemicals (HHC), that presents a serious danger to employees in the workplace. 3.2 Covered Process - This is the group(s) of equipment and systems to which all PSM elements except for the Mechanical Integrity element (which is a subset of the Covered Process) apply. It is possible to have one or more covered process equipment group. 3.3 Process - Refers to any activity involving a highly hazardous chemical (HHC) including any use, storage, manufacturing, handling, or the on-site movement of chemicals, or combination of these activities. For purposes of this definition, any group of vessels which are interconnected and separate vessels which are located such that a highly hazardous chemical could be involved in a potential release shall be considered a single process. 3.4 Process Hazards - For purposes of clarification for this standard only, the term "process hazards" means findings resulting from a Process Hazard Analysis that have safety (on site or offsite), environmental, or community consequences having a scenario ranking requiring mitigation as determined by this standard. 3.5 Flammable Gas - Means (a) a gas that, at ambient temperature and pressure, forms a flammable mixture with air at a concentration of thirteen (13) percent by volume or less; or (b) a gas that, at ambient temperature and pressure, forms a range of flammable mixtures with air wider than twelve (12) percent by volume, regardless of the lower limit. (29 CFR 1910.1200, Hazard Communication). ABD00031659 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 2 of34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 3.0 DEFINITIONS - Continued 3.6 Flammable Liquid - Means any liquid having a flashpoint below 100F, except any mixture having components with flashpoints of 100F or higher, the total of which make up 99 percent or more of the total volume of the mixture. (29 CFR 1910.1200, Hazard Communication) Refer to 1910.1200 for definitions of flashpoint. 3.7 HAZOP - A Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) study is a systematic method to identify hazards and operability problems. A HAZOP study involves a systematic, methodical examination of design documents that describe a process. The study is performed by a multi-discipline team. Deviations from the design value of key parameters are studied using guidewords to control the examination evaluation. This presumes that the design values of flows, temperatures, and other process variables are inherently safe and operable. 3.8 Highly Hazardous Chemical (HHC) - A Highly Hazardous Chemical (HHC) means a substance possessing toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive properties and specified in Appendix A of the OSHA PSM Standard or a flammable liquid or gas on site in one location, in a quantity of 10,000 pounds or more. See 1910.119 (a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) of the OSHA PSM standard for exceptions. 3.9 PHA - Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a thorough, orderly, systematic approach for identifying, evaluating and controlling the hazards of processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. 3.10 Threshold Quantity (TO) - Quantity at or above which the OSHA PSM Standard applies. The threshold quantities listed in Appendix A of the standard apply only to pure (or "commercial grade") chemicals unless otherwise specified. 4.0 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA) METHODOLOGY Each covered facility shall conduct Process Hazard Analyses (PHAs) on each of its existing covered processes. PHA methods used will depend on the nature and complexity of the process under consideration. 4.1 Each covered facility shall perform an initial process hazard analysis (hazard evaluation) on each of its existing covered processes as soon as possible but not later than the following schedule: 4.1.1 No less than 50 percent of the initial PHAs will be completed by May 26, 1995. 4.1.2 No less than 75 percent of the initial PHAs will be completed by May 26, 1996. 4.1.3 No less than 100 percent of the initial PHAs will be completed by May 26, 1997. ABD00031660 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 3 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 A PHA on a process or part of a process should not be delayed even if it is of a lower priority than one where records and documentation are still being generated. 4.0 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA) METHODOLOGY 4.2 The initial process hazards analyses were conducted using the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) methodology and reviews of human factors, facility siting and other hazards common or specific to the location. All initial HAZOP studies have been completed at the Aberdeen facility. Except as limited by Section 9 (PHA Revalidation), subsequent process hazard analyses may utilize any of the hazard evaluation techniques accepted by OSHA. 4.3 The priority order for the initial PHAs was east module, west module, utilities & VCM sphere & tank farm. The priority order for conducting the initial process hazard analyses was based on a rationale which included as a minimum such considerations as: a. The extent of the process hazards, b. The number of potentially affected employees, c. The age of the process, and d. The operating history of the process. 4.4 Process Hazard Analysis Requirements Except as provided in this standard, all Process Hazard Analyses of covered processes in Georgia Gulf`s Aberdeen Plant require: 4.4.1 Specifically including and addressing each of the following elements: a. The hazards of the process. b. Previous incidents which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences in the workplace. c. Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies (acceptable examples include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms and hydrocarbon or inorganic vapor detection systems) to provide early warning of releases. Other controls include inventory reduction, substitution of less hazardous materials, protective systems (deluges, monitors, foams, etc.), increased separation distances, modification of process temperatures or pressures, redundancy ABD00031661 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 4 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 in instrumentation, etc. d. Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls. 4.0 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA) METHODOLOGY 4.4 Process Hazard Analysis Requirements - continued e. Facility Siting. An example includes taking into consideration safe distances for locating control rooms based on evaluations of the individual characteristics of equipment involved such as types of construction of the room, types and quantities of materials, types of reactions and processes, operating pressures and temperatures, presence of ignition sources, fire protection facilities, capabilities to respond to explosions, drainage facilities, location of fresh air intakes, etc. Other relevant siting factors such as equipment spacing, equipment spacing from potential ignition sources, and the potential of an incident spreading from one unit to another should also be considered. f. Human factors (the interaction between the process and the employees on the scenarios being evaluated). Examples may include review of operator-process and operator-equipment interfaces, the number and frequency of tasks operators must perform, the evaluation of extended or unusual work schedules, the clarity and simplicity of control displays, operator feedback and communications, clarity of signs and codes, etc. g. A qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls on employees in the workplace. 4.4.2 The PHA must be conducted by a team of at least two individuals. The team members must have the following expertise: a. Engineering - An engineer must have a minimum of four (4) years of engineering experience. b. Process Operations - The individual filling this requirement shall have at least four (4) years of plant experience. c. Knowledge specific to the process being evaluated. It is recommended that the individual with this expertise be from the unit Operations group. The individual should have at least four (4) years of experience with the unit's operation. d. The team leader must have formal class room training in the PHA ABD00031662 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 5 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 methodology being used. On-the-job training or participation in PHAs is not considered formal training. 4.0 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS fPHA) METHODOLOGY 4.4 Process Hazard Analysis Requirements - continued e. The scope and type of process being studied will determine the make-up and number of the remainder of the team. Typically, representatives from the Mechanical Maintenance group will participate in evaluating processes involving mechanical equipment or piping and those from the Instrument Maintenance group will help evaluate processes involving instrumentation or electrical equipment. Safety Department repre sentation is also typical. Members may be full-time or may participate only on a part-time, as-needed basis as determined by the full-time members of the team. 4.5 Process Hazard Analysis Pre-work Requirements The following information must be available to the PHA team when they conduct the PHA: 4.5.1 The information requirements contained in 1910.199 (d) - Process Safety Information. 4.5.2 A chemical interaction matrix. 4.5.3 Documentation of any previous incidents that had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences in the work place being evaluated. 4.5.4 Documentation of relevant safety audits or studies in the facility's files that addressed the potential for catastrophic consequences in the work place. 4.5.5 Facility siting information. At a minimum, this will include calculations for occupied plant buildings using the Dow Fire and Explosion Index. 4.5.6 Shutdown, startup, and emergency operating procedures. 4.5.7 Plant Safety & Health Manual. ABD00031663 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 6 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 4.6 Process Hazard Analysis Team Orientation The orientation of the PHA team is a critical step in obtaining a good quality PHA. This is used to set the tone for the PHA and to meet some of the OSHA requirements that are not a direct result of some PHA methods. Attendance records must be kept. All full-time (or core) team members must attend an orientation that includes the following elements: 4.6.1 A review of the purpose and scope of the PHA. 4.0 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA) METHODOLOGY 4.6 Process Hazard Analysis Team Orientation - continued 4.6.2 A review of why the PHA method chosen is appropriate for the PHA. Currently, only the HAZOP method is approved for Georgia Gulfs Aberdeen Plant's initial PHAs. Unlike most of the other methods, the HAZOP method was developed specifically for chemical plants and processes. In particular, it is an appropriate method for complex processes and when operating conditions are important. 4.6.3 A review of the PHA methodology that the team will use. 4.6.4 A review of all pre-work information. This is not intended to be a detailed review. The intent is to make the team members aware of the resources available to the team. 4.6.5 A review of the process description. 4.6.6 Process or Unit tour (if necessary to ensure all team members are physically oriented and familiarized with the process or unit being evaluated). 4.6.7 A review of the process chemistry description, chemical interaction matrix, and the hazards of the process. The review of the hazards of the process consists of identifying the process chemicals or streams and reviewing the chemical hazards, physical hazards, and corrosion potential for each. This review may result in recommendations to reduce the hazards of the process. These should be listed but no scenario ranking should be assigned. 4.6.8 A review of previous incidents that had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences in the work place. 4.6.9 A review of human factors. If a separate human factors study has not been conducted, the human factors list in Appendix B will be used as a checklist of items that the team should discuss. This review may result in recommendations to reduce the risks associated with the operation of the process. These should ABD00031664 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 7 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 be listed but no scenario ranking should be assigned. 4.6.10 A facility siting review. The primary intent is to determine if there are process hazards (as defined by this standard) associated with the facility location/layout that should be examined in detail. If a separate facility siting study has not been conducted, an evaluation of occupied plant buildings utilizing the Dow Fire and Explosion Index as required by 4.9.5 and the facility siting checklist contained in Appendix C will be used to conduct the facility siting study. This review may result in recommendations to reduce the risks associated with the operation of the process. These should be listed but no scenario ranking should be assigned. 4.0 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA) METHODOLOGY - Continued 4.6 Process Hazard Analysis Team Orientation - continued 4.6.11 A review of the site-specific hazards. This review may result in recommendations to reduce the risks associated with the operation of the process. These should be listed but no scenario ranking should be assigned. This review may also highlight specific areas of focus for the PHA. 5.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY FOR PROCESS OR UNIT PHAs 5.1 Scenario Ranking The team will use the Consequence Rating Table, Likelihood of Occurrence Rating Table, and the Scenario Ranking Matrix included in Appendix D to rate each scenario. Each scenario can receive three (3) separate ratings - Safety (on-site), Economic, and Environmental/ Community (including off-site safety). Each scenario must receive a safety and environmental/community rating. 5.2 Team Responsibility The team's responsibility is to define deviations from normal operating conditions that may represent an unacceptable risk level and to identify the problems. The team does not have the responsibility to engineer the solutions; however, it may recommend actions or solutions for consideration in remedying the hazard/risk identified for correction. 5.3 Process Parameters Common process parameters are listed below. The team should review the list and select those appropriate for the process being evaluated. Other deviations may be added by the team, if necessary. Flow Pressure Temperature ABD00031665 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 8 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 Level Reaction Frequency Information Separation Corrosion Tube Leak Time pH Viscosity Mixing Startup Fouling Tube Rupture Composition Speed Voltage Addition Shutdown Atmospheric Temperature Leak Utilities Electricity Fuel Gas Nitrogen Steam Instrument Air Cooling Water 5.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY FOR PROCESS OR UNIT PHAs - Continued 5.4 Guide Words and Phrases 5.4.1 Common guidewords and phrases for process design and operations are given below: Guide Word/Phrase Meaning No Less or Lower More or Higher Part Of As Well As Reverse Other Than or Sooner/Later Negative of the design intent Quantitative decrease Quantitative increase Qualitative decrease Qualitative Increase Logical opposite of intent Complete Substitution 5.4.2 Common guide words and p for procedures are given below: Guide Word/Phrase Meaning Missing A step is missing from the written procedure at, or just before, the step being examined. Skip/Part of The operator skips this step (or some part of it) and performs the rest of the procedure correctly. More The operator does too much of the specified action or does it too quickly. ABD00031666 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 9 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 Less The operator does too little of the specified action or does it too slowly. Out of Sequence / As well as The operator performs the steps in a different order than specified by the procedure, possibly as a short cut. Other Than/Reverse The operator performs some action other than the one specified in the procedure, usually because of confusion or haste. 5.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY FOR PROCESS OR UNIT PHAs - Continued 5.5 Study Nodes - P&I Diagrams Each P&I Diagram is divided into study nodes. The study nodes should be as large as possible without the team having to apply the guide words to the parameters for parts of the study node. Most utility connections are handled as one part of the study node if the utility is selected as a process parameter. The exception is process-generated fuel gas, which may involve multiple nodes. These nodes are reviewed as part of the HAZOP. 5.6 Study Nodes - Operating Procedures Emergency, startup (initial introduction of HHC into the unit), and shutdown operating procedures are divided into nodes which are normally defined as the group of sequential steps with one intent. These nodes are reviewed as part of the HAZOP. Other operating procedures are covered as part of the P&I Diagram node. These operating procedures are reviewed when the team believes that it is appropriate. 5.7 Team Process The team will use the following process: 5.7.1 The team selects a study node and reviews the design intent of the study node. ABD00031667 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 10 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 5.7.2 5.7.3 If the design intent is not documented, the team can develop it. The team applies the first guide word to the first process parameter to form a deviation. Guide words and process parameters that have no meaning (such as reverse temperature) are ignored. The team defines the consequences associated with the deviation assuming that all equipment and procedural protection systems fail. 5.7.4 The team lists all possible causes of the deviation. 5.7.5 5.7.6 The team identifies all safeguards that prevent the deviation. The team uses the tables found in the Appendix D to define the consequence rating, likelihood of occurrence rating, process hazards scenario ranking. a. Economic scenario rankings can also be generated using the same process. 5.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY FOR PROCESS OR UNIT PHAs - Continued 5.7 Team Process - continued b. If information necessary to define scenario ranking is missing, then the scenario can not be ranked. The team will define an action step to obtain the missing information. If the information can not be found during the HAZOP, then the team will recommend an action step to obtain the information and for the scenario to be ranked at that time. c. The team should not over-state or under-state the risk of the scenario. Making scenarios greater than reality as a method to get faster action or being conservative and playing it "safe" is unacceptable. Down playing the scenario because the solution may be perceived to be politically unacceptable is equally unacceptable. d. To highlight the risk reduction afforded by existing safeguards and/or to evaluate the impact of any additional safeguards, teams should first identify the scenario ranking without (or "before") considering the effects of safeguards and then arrive at a final (or "after") ranking considering all existing safeguards. The final (or "after") ranking will be the ranking reported for mitigation as appropriate. e. In each scenario where various combinations of consequences and probability are possible, only the consequence and corresponding probability yielding the maximum scenario ranking will be reported for mitigation. ABD00031668 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 11 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 5.7.7 5.7.8 If there are scenarios that result in catastrophic consequences even though some of the safeguards work properly, these scenarios should be risk ranked. If the team has a recommendation to mitigate the risks, the team should recommend that the person or team responsible for mitigation evaluate that option. Since the team does not take the time to evaluate all options, the team should phrase recommendations as "consider" or "evaluate" rather than "do" or "install". 5.7.9 Repeat the process for each deviation until all deviations have been applied to the node. Then repeat the process for each node. 5.8 Scenarios with a Ranking of 1 or 2 Any scenarios with a ranking of 1 or 2 shall be reported to the managers having engineering and operations responsibility for the process being evaluated as soon as possible but not greater than 24 hours of the determination. ABD00031669 n Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 12 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 6.0 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS REPORT The report shall contain sufficient detail such that a second PHA team can understand the findings and conclusions of the first team. At a minimum, the report shall contain the following items: 6.1 A table of contents. 6.2 Start and end date of the PHA teamwork covered by the report. 6.3 Issue date. 6.4 The distribution of the report. Please note that either a paper copy or electronic copy must be available to employees affected by the findings and conclusions of the PHA. 6.5 The signatures of the team members and/or the team leader. 6.6 PHA methodology used. This shall include a rationale for the selection of the PHA method. 6.7 Description ofthe process evaluated. 6.8 The scope of the PHA. This will include a listing of the P&I Diagram(s) and operating procedures that were reviewed. The listing shall include the diagram or procedure number and issue date. 6.9 A listing of the team members and their qualifications. The documentation shall specify those individuals meeting the expertise requirements of Section 4.7.3 of this standard. 6.1 OAttendance records. 6.11 Team orientation. This documentation should identify the steps covered in the PHA orientation and copies of any completed checklists. 6.12Listing of updates and revalidations to the PHA report. 6.13Copies of the P&I Diagrams with the study nodes marked and identified. 6.14Work sheets from the team meetings. 6.15A listing or index of resources utilized that were not included in the process safety information such as a list of previous incidents considered, technical experts who may have been consulted, research and engineering reports, etc. 6.16A listing of actions steps requiring further evaluation including identifying nodes which require further evaluation due to missing process safety information. ABD00031670 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 13 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 6.0 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS REPORT - Continued 6.17Separate listings of the team's process hazards (as defined by this standard) findings and recommendations. This should include any recommendations or findings resulting from the review of human factors, facility siting, previous incidents, or hazards of the process. If economic or operability findings or recommendations are made, then these should be listed separately from the process hazards findings. 7.0 SYSTEM FOR ADDRESSING PHA TEAM'S FINDINGS As clarified in Appendix E, the Georgia Gulf Aberdeen Plant Management shall address the PHA Team's process hazards (as defined by this standard), findings and recommendations, as follows: 7.1 Mitigation Requirements 7.1.1 1 Ranked Scenarios A written schedule for responding to a scenario ranked 1 shall be completed within five (5) working days of the managers having engineering and operations responsibility for the process being evaluated being made aware of the finding. If the unit is shut down at the time, the schedule must be completed prior to the unit resuming operations. The written schedule shall include a plan for sufficient mitigation to drop the scenario ranking to at least a 3 level. The schedule shall include major milestones and responsibilities. This schedule will be updated monthly. Within ten (10) working days of the managers having engineering and operations responsibility for the process being evaluated being made aware of a 1 ranked scenario, the ranking level must be reduced to a 2 level or that portion of the process must be shut down. Items can not be deleted from the schedule until all appropriate paperwork has been placed in the PHA file. A copy of each schedule shall be placed in the PHA file. 7.1.2 2 Ranked Scenarios A written schedule for scenarios ranked 2 shall be completed within ten (10) working days of the managers having engineering and operations responsibility for the process being evaluated being made aware of the team's findings. The written schedule shall include a plan for sufficient mitigation to drop the scenario ranking to at least a 3 level. The schedule shall include major milestones and responsibilities. This schedule will be updated monthly. ABD00031671 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 14 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 7.0 SYSTEM FOR ADDRESSING PHA TEAM'S FINDINGS - Continued A 2-ranked scenario shall be mitigated sufficiently to obtain a 3 ranking within sixty (60) working davs of the managers having engineering and operations responsibility for the process being evaluated being made aware of the item. Exceptions must be approved by the facility S.H.E. Manager and the managers having engineering and operations responsibility for the process being evaluated. Items can not be deleted from the schedule until all appropriate paperwork has been placed in the PHA file. A copy of each schedule shall be placed in the PHA file. 7.1.3 3 Ranked Scenarios A written schedule for all 3 ranked scenarios must be completed within two (2) months of the issuance of the PHA report. Scenarios initially ranked 1 and 2 that have been mitigated to a 3 level should be incorporated into this schedule. The schedule shall include major milestones and responsibilities. This schedule shall be updated each quarter. Scenarios ranked 3 should normally be mitigated to at least a 4 ranking within twelve (12) months unless significant engineering design work or a turnaround is required to make revisions. Items can not be deleted from the schedule until all appropriate paperwork has been placed in the PHA file. A copy of each schedule shall be placed in the PHA file. 7.1.4 4 Ranked Scenarios Within two (2) months of the issuance of the PHA report, all 4 ranked scenarios must be evaluated to determine whether mitigation is required, and a written schedule for all 4 ranked items requiring mitigation must completed. Scenarios initially ranked 1 and 2 that have been mitigated to a 4 level should be incorporated into this schedule. The schedule shall include major mile stones and responsibilities. This schedule shall be updated each quarter. Mitigation action steps shall be completed within two years of issuance of the report. Extensions to the next scheduled shutdown are permissible if a shutdown is required to implement. Items can not be deleted from the schedule until all appropriate paperwork has been put in the PHA file. A copy of each schedule shall be placed in the PHA file. ABD00031672 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC -- Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis 7.1.5 5 Ranked Scenarios Scenarios ranked 5 do not require mitigation. Page 15 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 7.0 SYSTEM FOR ADDRESSING PHA TEAM'S FINDINGS - Continued 7.2 Documentation of Resolution of Team Findings The PHA file will include documentation of the resolution of each team's findings or recommendations. At minimum, there will be a typed page (or electronic equivalent) summarizing the corrective action taken in sufficient detail that the next PHA team can understand the corrective action that was taken and how the corrective action impacted the scenario ranking. This document can refer to other attached papers such as a Process Design. However, the design alone is not acceptable documentation. 7.3 Tracking System The Georgia Gulf Aberdeen Faciltiy must have a documented system to track the status of each team's findings. 8.0 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS COMMUNICATIONS 8.1 Determination of Affected Employees An affected employee is any operator, maintenance employee, contractor, or other employee whose: 8.1.1 Normal work assignment can significantly affect the likelihood of occurrence or consequences of the 1, 2, and 3 ranked scenarios; or 8.1.2 Normal work assignment in occupied buildings takes them within a Dow Fire and Explosion Index radius for more than 2 hours per week. NOTE: The immediate Supervisor of those individuals defined by items 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 above are also affected employees. 8.2 Pre-Process Hazard Analysis Communications Prior to each process or unit PHA, affected employees and their representatives shall be provided notice of the scheduled PHA. The notice shall indicate the unit or process being analyzed, the team leader and other team members who will be conducting the PHA, the scheduled meeting place/dates/times, etc. The notice shall also solicit input from affected employees who have concerns or knowledge of issues that the team should consider in its analysis. ABD00031673 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 16 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 8.0 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS COMMUNICATIONS - Continued 8.3 Post-Process Hazard Analysis Communications 8.3.1 Process or Unit PHA findings and mitigation plans shall be reviewed with affected employees within one month of the issuance of the PHA report. Meetings for this purpose are required if scenarios ranked 1 or 2 were identified; otherwise, written communications to affected employees are acceptable. 8.3.2 The affected employees shall have access to a copy of the PHA and the latest mitigation plan. 8.3.3 Documentation including lists of affected employees, date(s) of reviews, meeting attendance records, etc. shall be prepared and placed in the PHA file. 8.3.4 Updates on the status of the mitigation plans for scenarios with rankings of 1, 2 or 3 can be handled through meetings or written communications as deemed appropriate by the facility management. Updates on scenarios ranked 4 or 5 are not required. 8.3.5 Where written communications are used or PHAs are provided to employees, management shall take measures if necessary to make sure recipients understand the information being communicated. 9.0 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS REVALIDATION 9.1 At least every five (5) years after the completion of the initial process hazard analysis, the process hazard analysis shall be updated and revalidated by a team meeting the requirements of Section 4.4.2 to assure that the process hazard analysis is consistent with the current process. 9.2 Until another methodology is approved, the HAZOP methodology shall be used for the revalidation. 9.3 PHAs Revalidation Schedule - The schedule per PHA revalidation at the Georgia Gulf Aberdeen facility is: VCM Sphere and Tank Farm West Module East Module April/2004 July / 2005 April/2006 ABD00031674 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Utilities May / 2003 Page 17 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 10. RECORDS RETENTION Process Hazard Analyses (report and other documentation generated by the team) and updates or revalidations for each covered process and documentation of the resolution of process hazards identified by each shall be retained for the life of the process. ABD00031675 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 18 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 Appendix A PHA ORDER ANALYSIS MATRIX Each facility shall determine and document the priority order for conducting the initial process hazard analyses based on a rationale, which includes as a minimum such considerations as: A - the extent of the process hazards, B - the number of potentially affected employees, C - the age of the process, and D - the operating history of the process. E - other as determined by facility A matrix similar to the one presented below may be useful in documentation of the rationale. The documentation of this chart alone does not satisfy the narrative documentation required by Section 4.4 of this standard. By force ranking the criteria above (and others the facility feel are appropriate) for each of the Processes (or Sub-Processes) for the Unit or Facility and comparing the composite scores, a PHA order may be established. Criteria are ranked from Highest Risk (1) to Lowest Risk (# of Processes being ranked). E XAMPL E Unit/Facility Process A Process B Process C Criteria A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E Rank 2 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 3 Total Order 8 10 2 12 3 Comments/Remarks ABD00031676 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis APPENDIX B HUMAN FACTORS CHECKLIST Page 19 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 EQUIPMENT + Labeling equipment clearly labeled, uniform coding mislabeled or not Labeled Access Immediately at hand hard to reach or access Operability power-assisted operation difficult t to operate/change position Layout well-planned, logical arrangement Confusing/inconsistent arrangement Uniqueness only component of its kin in area Several components look similar OBSERVED PRACTICE CONTROLS Labeling Mode Involvement Displays + controls clearly labeled; uniform coding fully automatic; well-tuned Operator continually involved clear, simple, representational Immediate, unambiguous - mislabeled or not labeled OBSERVED PRACTICE manual operation; many manual steps operator detached from process unclear, complex, nonrepresentational none or potentially misleading DEVIATIONS Alarms Coverage Time Preparedness + first-out; safety-critical alarms dual operator coverage at all times no time pressure for response Periodic simulation exercises Last-Resort shutdown not discouraged; fast access - OBSERVED PRACTICE many simultaneous or false alarms operator not always present inadequate time to respond no drills or simulation of scenarios shutdown discouraged or unsafe "+" = FACTORS BEYOND STANDARD PRACTICE; MAY REDUCE HUMAN ERROR OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE LIKELIHOOD. - FACTORS THAT MAY TEND TO INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF HUMAN ERROR OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE ABD00031677 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Appendix B (continued) HUMAN FACTORS CHECKLIST Page 20 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 TRANSIENT + Procedures complete, accurate, current, verified Identifying ID, location of devices/ Actions given Format Graphical identification aids Aids checklist or supervisory check incomplete/too general/out of date ambiguous device/action identification confusing/inconsistent; difficult to read task sequence done by memory OBSERVED PRACTICE SCHEDULING + OBSERVED PRACTICE Overtime extreme enough to affect performance Consistency Permanent shift assignments inconsistent shift rotations/schedules # of Tasks tasks, work force, and sills matched tasks required exceed time available Task Frequency routine task very infrequent; no expertise base Intensity regular task at normal pace differing tasks in rapid succession "+" = FACTORS BEYOND STANDARD PRACTICE; MAY REDUCE HUMAN ERROR OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE LIKELIHOOD. = FACTORS THAT MAY TEND TO INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF HUMAN ERROR OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE ABD00031678 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC -- Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis APPENDIX B (continued) HUMAN FACTORS CHECKLIST Page 21 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 COMMUNICATE + - Shift Changes Field/Control Supervision Emergency Status communicated verbally, plus turnover sheet used Constant communication with field Frequent supervisory communication Rapid, unambiguous plant alarm system inadequate communication of plant status between shifts no communication with field operator little or no supervisory checks no distinction between area, type OBSERVED PRACTICE ENVIRONMENT Noise Level Climate Visibility Lighting + Office environment noise level Indoors, climate controlled Visibility enhancement of some kind OBSERVED PRACTICE area where hearing protection required temperature/humidity/precipitati on/wind extremes often foggy or other visibility limitation inadequate lighting for task = FACTORS BEYOND STANDARD PRACTICE; MAY REDUCE HUMAN ERROR OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE LIKELIHOOD. - FACTORS THAT MAY TEND TO INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF HUMAN ERROR OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE ABD00031679 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 22 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 APPENDIX C FACILITY SITING CHECKLISTS AND MITIGATION GUIDANCE Instructions: The team will review each item on the checklist. After evaluation, each item is marked to indicate that the item has been reviewed. Comments and findings are attached on a separate sheet. No scenario rankings are given to the findings. REVIEWED YES NO DISCUSSION TOPIC 1. Location of on-site populations relative to the unit. 2. Location of off-site populations relative to the unit. Location of environmentally sensitive areas. 3. Location of critical and safety systems. 4. Dominant Wind Direction. 5. Climate and water extremes; earthquake; flooding; hurricanes; tornadoes; windstorms. 6. Site topography 7. External hazards and threats (fire, explosion, toxic release from nearby process or facilities; aircraft, subsidence, sabotage). 8. On-site traffic flow patterns and clearances. 9. Security and reliability of all critical feeds, utilities, and safety systems. 10. Evacuation routes, emergency exits, safe rally spots. 11. Passive mitigation systems such as dikes, berms, (control spills and fires) and blast walls (protect against explosions). 12. Crane lifts over operating equipment and piping. 13. Barricades between traffic and equipment and piping. 14. Adequate lighting for normal operation, routine maintenance, power failure procedures, evacuation. 15. Communication systems. 16. House keeping - walkways, aisles, operating areas, evacuation routes. 17. Location of railroads to process equipment (derailment, access). ABD00031680 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 23 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 18. Open ditches, sumps, low points (collect toxic and flammable vapors). 19. Entry into confined spaces during emergencies- Trapped Gases, Hazards. Permit. Buildings 20. Location of occupied building near process units. (Please note that the Dow Chemical Fire and Explosion Index will be used as a screening tool to determine if the building is located sufficiently remote from the process. If the building is not located sufficiently remote from the process, the team should suggest that a more detailed study be conducted.) Control Rooms 21. Minimum occupancy; only essential functions during emergencies. 22. Control Room Construction. 23. Fresh air intake locations/isolation; Temporary safe havens; Access during an emergency. 24. Control room location relative to unit, columns, and pipe bridges. 25. Supply of breathing air in control room. Sufficient for emergency shutdown. 26. Instrument labels up-to-date. Process Facilities 27. Area electrical classification. 28. Accessibility for mechanical integrity inspection and testing. 29. Protection of piping and vessels from vehicles and forklifts. 30. Protection of small bore lines, fittings, from external impact, personnel. 31. Routing of process piping, critical controls cable trays, critical utilities. 32. Vent, drain, and relief valve discharge locations. 33. Remote shutoff valves for feed lines to the unit, accessible, functional in emergency. Loading, unloading, and storage facilities ABD00031681 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 24 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 34. Incompatible materials segregated; storage, dikes, sumps, drains, and waste. 35. Siting, labeling of unloading spots for incompatible materials. 36. Spacing consideration for flammable, combustible, and unstable liquid storage (note use the checklist - "Hazardous Analysis Review for Spacing Considerations for flammable, combustible, and Unstable Liquid Storage") 39. Storage of flammable solids such as wood, paper, rags. Fire Protection 40. Access for fire fighting and other emergency services - trains, vehicle parking, construction. 41. Ignition sources, continuous, intermittent, uncontrolled, hot surfaces. 42. Access to hydrants, monitors, and deluge valves. 43. Grading drains flammables away from storage. 44. Equipment spaced to minimize potential fire explosion damage. 45. Coverage of fire monitors/sprinkler systems. 46. Fire proofing of structures. Accident Mitigation 47. Detection of leaks and ruptures. 48. Emergency shutdown switch locations. 49. Accessibility of isolation valves, size. 50. Potential for fire/explosion in units affecting other equipment. 51. Critical control, mitigation, communication after initial explosion or release. Personnel Protection 52. Passageways, pedestrian traffic patterns vs. hazardous locations. 53. SCBA/respirators locations; accessibility on all shifts. 54. Sufficient escape routes from operating areas, shops, labs, offices. ABD00031682 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 25 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 HAZARDOUS ANALYSIS REVIEW FOR SPACING APPLICATIONS FOR FLAMMABLE, COMBUSTIBLE AND UNSTABLE LIQUID STORAGE Instructions: This checklist represents item #36 on the Appendix C Facility Siting Checklist. The hazard review team will review each item and mark to indicate a review was completed. Comments and findings are shown in a separate report. No scenario rankings are given to these findings. REVIEWED YES NO DISCUSSION TOPIC 1. Tanks accessible for fire fighting purposes. 2. Minimum distance between tank and property line or building as defined in paragraph 2-3 of NFPA 30, attached. 3. Outside base tank dike at ground level at least ten (10) feet from property line. 4. Minimum distance between any two storage tanks one third (1/3) of adjacent tank diameters, but at least three (3) feet. If unstable, flammable, or combustible liquids are stored, distance shall be minimum of one half (1/2) the sum of the diameters. 5. Inside base of tank dike at ground level at least five (5) feet from storage tank. 6. Minimum distance between liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) container and storage tank twenty (20) feet. If storage tank operates above 2.5 psig, or is equipped with emergency venting that will permit pressures to exceed 2.5 psig, then Item 4. above applies. 7. Storage tanks not permitted inside buildings. 8. When a storage tank is located in an area subject to flooding, the following shall be observed. a. The provisions of Item 8. shall apply only if the maximum flood stage exceeds the elevation of the dike wall. b. Provisions to prevent tank, either full or empty, from floating during rise in water level to established maximum flood stage. c. Independent water supply facilities available for loading partially empty tanks with water. If filling with water is impractical or hazardous due to tank contents, tank shall be protected by other means against movement or collapse. d. Top of vertical tank extends above maximum flood stage by at least thirty (30) percent of its allowable storage capacity. ABD00031683 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 26 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 e. In addition to Items a., b., c., and d. above, if tank is located such that seventy (70) to one hundred (100) percent of its allowable liquid storage capacity will be submerged at the established maximum flood stage, then the following also applies. i. Is tank raised, or height increased, until it extends above the level obtainable at maximum flood stage a distance equivalent to at least thirty (30) percent of its allowable liquid storage capacity. Submerged part of tank shall not exceed two and one-half (2 2) times its diameter. ii. As an alternate to Item i. above, adequate noncombustible structural guides, designed to permit tank to float vertically without loss of product may be provided. f. Horizontal tanks located such that more than seventy (70) percent of storage capacity will be submerged at the established flood stage attached to foundation of concrete, or of steel and concrete, of sufficient weight to provide adequate load for the tank when filled with flammable or combustible liquid and submerged by flood waters to the established flood stage. g. For tanks in Item f. above, are tank vents or other openings that are not liquid tight extended above the level obtainable by floodwaters at maximum flood stage water level. Definitions: h. Spherical or spheroid tanks protected by applicable methods specified for either vertical or horizontal tanks as described above. Combustible Liquid. A liquid having a flash point at or above 100F (37.8C). Flammable Liquid. A liquid having a flash point below 100F (37.8C) and having a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 psig at 100F (37.8C). Unstable Liquid. A liquid that, in the pure state or as commercially produced or transported, will vigorously polymerize, decompose, undergo condensation reaction, or become self reactive under conditions of shock, pressure or temperature. Reference Materials: NFPA (National Fire Protective Association) 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code OSHA 1910.106 ABD00031684 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 27 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 List of Short-term Mitigation Steps for Consideration for Normally Occupied Buildings Inside the Dow F&EI Radius This list is intended to serve as a guide for measures to be considered as short-term mitigation steps for facility siting issues identified. It is not an all inclusive list. MITIGATION STEP 1. Provide a system on the buildings' fresh air intake to detect and alarm when hydrocarbons, smoke, or toxic chemicals are present above acceptable levels. 2. Provide the means to quickly shutdown the building's ventilation system to prevent entry of contaminated air. Locate this control inside the building at a readily accessible location and clearly mark its function. 3. All sewers, except sanitary sewers, leaving a building shall be sealed by installing a break tank or equivalent in the sewer system. The break tank shall be located outside the building, and must be between the building and any other inlet into the sewer line. There shall be no additional inlets into the sewer between the building and the break tank. Additional inlets into the break tank or into the sewer after the break tank are acceptable. Venting of the break tank shall be routed away from the building to an appropriate place. 4. The exterior surface of the building, at risk including its roof, shall be constructed of fire resistant materials, or a fire suppression system shall be provided to protect these exterior surfaces. 5. All office equipment, supplies, and other materials located within the building, which could fall over or become mobile should be removed, relocated, or secured. This applies to ail areas except for designated store rooms. Samples, office, janitorial supplies, and other liquids should be evaluated for potential hazards from spills. 6. Interior fixtures, such as ceiling lighting fixtures, wall mounted video monitors, other wall-mounted equipment, etc., shall be attached to a building structural member. 7. Exterior windows shall not be permitted unless required for safety or regulatory compliance. If required, windows shall meet these criteria: a. Strength equivalent or better than the building wall, and safe construction that fails in a manner that minimizes risk to building occupants. Examples are 3/8" minimum thickness polycarbonate, toughened glass, laminated glass with internal catch bars. b. Window area is minimized. 8. Provide clearly marked utility (gas, electric, steam, etc.) shut-offs inside the building. APPLICATION Fire Explosion Toxic Fire Explosion Toxic Fire Explosion Fire Explosion Explosion Explosion Fire Explosion ABD00031685 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC - Aberdeen Plant Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 28 of 34 Revision: 5 PSM-004 9. Occupant assignments should be reviewed to determine if individuals can be relocated to buildings that do not fall within the radius defined by the Dow Fire and Explosion Index, unless the building is blast resistant design (BRD). Develop a policy to minimize the use of conference areas in non-BRD buildings located within the radius of concern defined by the Dow Fire and Explosion Index. Non-BRD buildings within the radius of concern defined by the Dow Fire and Explosion Index shall not be used as shelter-in-place facilities for non operating personnel when there is a potential for fire or explosion impacting such buildings. 10. The building should be equipped with sufficient exits to allow personnel to exit in a direction away from potential fire and explosion sources. Doors shall open to the outside and be capable of resisting at a minimum the same external pressure as the building. The door frame shall support the door on all four sides. The door shall be weather stripped, and have a door closer of sufficient strength such that the door will remain closed and sealed against any positive pressure system that may be present in the building. 11. Other openings in a building shall be sealed to prevent flammable or toxic gases and smoke from entering the building. An opening is defined as penetration of the walls, roof, or floor by a system component. Any system component penetrating the wall, roof, or floor, shall be capable of resisting the same external pressure as the building until the system component is inside the building. Examples of system components that require openings include, but are not limited to, the following: 1) Pipes 2) Conduits 3) Cable trays 12. Each building shall have an emergency response plan for fire, explosion, and toxic release situations. The normal occupants shall be trained in the plan. A brief summary of actions to take in the event of an emergency (evacuation, shelter-in-place, etc.) shall be posted in common areas, such as hallways, and conference or training rooms, so visitors can quickly see what they need to do in the event of an emergency. 13. Occupied temporary buildings will not be located within the radius calculated by the Dow Fire and Explosion Index. Explosion Fire Explosion Explosion Toxic Fire Explosion Toxic Fire Explosion ABD00031686 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis DEFINITION: Normally Occupied Building Page 29 of 34 Revision 5 PSM-004 The primary function is to house people on a routine basis. Examples of normally occupied buildings include: 1. Control rooms that are staffed during emergencies 2. Offices 3. Laboratories 4. Maintenance shops 5. Buildings designated as gathering points for emergencies Examples of buildings that are not normally occupied buildings include: 1. Motor control centers 2. Electrical substations 3. Temporary operator shelters 4. Compressor sheds, etc. ABD00031687 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Appendix D Page 30 of 34 Revision 5 PSM-004 If information necessary to define scenario ranking is missing, the scenario can not be ranked. The team should not over-state or under-state the likelihood of occurrence or consequence of the scenario. Making scenarios greater than reality as a method to get faster action or being conservative and playing it "safe" is unacceptable. Down playing the scenario because the solution may be perceived to be politically unacceptable is equally unacceptable. ABD00031688 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis APPENDIX D (continued) CONSEQUENCE RATING Page 31 of 34 Revision 5 PSM-004 EXPECTED RESULT OR IMPACT CONSEQUENCE LEVEL SAFETY (ON-SITE) ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTAL AND COMMUNITY (OFF-SITE SAFETY) 1 MAJOR LOSS OF LIFE PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY OR PARTIAL DISABILITY. HOSPITALIZATION OF 5 OR MORE PEOPLE. EQUIPMENT DAMAGE IN EXCESS OF $1,00,000 HOSPITALIZATION OF ONE COMMUNITY MEMBER RAW MATERIAL OR PERMANENT SIGNIFICANT PRODUCT LOSSES IN DAMAGE TO AN EXCESS OF ENVIRONMENTALLY $1,000,000 SENSITIVE AREA SIGNIFICANT PROPERTY DAMAGE. II m HIGH MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR FIVE OR MORE PEOPLE. HOSPITALIZATION OF TWO OR MORE PEOPLE. EQUIPMENT MINOR DAMAGE TO DAMAGE IN EXCESS OFF-SITE STRUCTURES. OF $100,000. INJURY TO ONE OR MORE RAW MATERIAL OR COMMUNITY MEMBERS. PRODUCT LOSSES IN EXCESS OF $500,000 MINOR DAMAGE TO AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE AREA. III MEDIUM MINOR INJURY OR HEALTH EFFECTS. MEDICAL TREATMENT OF ONE PERSON. MULTIPLE EXPOSURES ABOVE OSHA LIMITS. EQUIPMENT , DAMAGE IN EXCESS OF $10,000. RAW MATERIAL OR PRODUCT LOSSES IN EXCESS OF $100,000 SHELTER IN PLACE REQUIRED. EVACUATION OF COMMUNITY REQUIRED. IV LOW TO NONE FIRST AID TREATMENT EQUIPMENT ONLY DAMAGE LESS THAN 10,000. SINGLE EXPOSURE ABOVE THE OSHA LIMITS RAW MATERIAL OR PRODUCT LOSSES NO IMPACT LESS THAN $100,000. NO IMPACT ABD00031689 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis APPENDIX D (continued) Page 32 of 34 Revision 5 PSM-004 LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE RATINGS RATING A B C D DESCRIPTION FREQUENT PROBABLE POSSIBLE REMOTE LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE EXPECTED TO OCCUR ONE OR MORE TIMES WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR EXPECTED TO OCCUR ONCE WITHIN THE NEXT TEN (10) YEARS EXPECTED TO OCCUR ONCE WITHIN THE NEXT 100 YEARS EXPECTED TO OCCUR LESS FREQUENTLY THAN ONCE EVERY 100 YEARS OR IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE SCENARIO RANKING MATRIX ABC I 1 2 "> II 2 2 3 III 3 3 4 IV 5 5 5 D 4 4 5 5 ABD00031690 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis APPENDIX D (continued) Page 33 of 34 Revision 5 PSM-004 RESPONSE/MITIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL RANKED ITEMS (See Section 7.1 of this Standard for expanded detail) SCENARIO RANK WRITTEN SCHEDULE MITIGATION REQUIREMENT 1 COMPLETE WITHIN 5 DAYS OF MITIGATE TO SCENARIO RANK 2 OR LOWER NOTIFICATION OF THE MANAGERS WITHIN 10 DAYS OF NOTIFICATION OF THE HAVING ENGINEERING AND MANAGERS HAVING ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATIONS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE UNIT THE UNIT BEING EVALUATED (SEE BEING EVALUATED (SEE NOTE BELOW) OR NOTE BELOW) SHUT DOWN UNIT 2 COMPLETE WITHIN 10 DAYS MITIGATE TO SCENARIO RANK 3 OR LOWER NOTIFICATION OF THE MANAGERS WITHIN 60 DAYS OF NOTIFICATION OF THE HAVING ENGINEERING AND MANAGERS HAVING ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATIONS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE UNIT THE UNIT BEING EVALUATED (SEE BEING EVALUATED (SEE NOTE BELOW) NOTE BELOW) 3 COMPLETE WITHIN 2 MONTHS OF MITIGATE TO RISK RANK 4 OR LOWER ISSUANCE OF PHA REPORT WITHIN 12 MONTHS OF ISSUANCE OF PHA REPORT 4 COMPLETE WITHIN 2 MONTHS OF MITIGATE ( IF REQUIRED) WITHIN 2 YEARS ISSUANCE OF PHA REPORT OF ISSUANCE OF PHA REPORT 5 NOT REQUIRED NO MITIGATION REQUIRED NOTE: SCENARIOS RANKED "1" OR "2" REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF THE MANAGERS HAVING ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE UNIT BEING EVALUATED WITHIN 24 HOURS OF DETERMINATION. IF MITIGATION REQUIRES MORE TIME THAN DEFINED ABOVE, A MOCA EXTENSION IS REQUIRED. ABD00031691 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis APPENDIX E Page 34 of 34 Revision 5 PSM-004 OSHA GUIDELINES ON ADDRESSING PHA TEAM FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Paragraph (e) of the OSHA PSM standard requires that a team with expertise in engineering and process operations conduct a process hazard analysis, containing specific findings and recommendations for each covered process. The employer is then required to promptly "address" and resolve[ ]" the team's findings, document the actions taken, and communicate these actions to the affected employees. 29 CFR 1910.119(e)(5). OSHA considers an employer to have "resolved" the team's findings and recommendations when the employer either has adopted the recommendations, or has justifiably declined to do so. Where a recommendation is rejected, the employer must communicate this to the team, and expeditiously resolve any subsequent recommendations of the team. An employer can justifiably decline to adopt a recommendation where the employer can document, in writing and based upon adequate evidence, that one or more of the following conditions is true: 1. The analysis upon which the recommendation is based contains material factual errors; 2. The recommendation is not necessary to protect the health and safety of the employer's own employees, or the employees of contractors; 3. An alternative measure would provide a sufficient level of protection; or 4. The recommendation is infeasible. ABD00031692 Georgia Gulf Chemicals & Vinyls, LLC Process Safety Management Manual Process Hazard Analysis Page 35 of 34 Revision 5 PSM-004 11.0 REVISION HISTORY Description of Change Word Changes Format to DMS Match Corporate Standard Reference Corporate Standard/ Change Document Approver Revised procedure to reflect several changes. Revision 1 2 3 4(3-26-1998) 5 (3-13-2001)