Document Yj5NQybN1qGE5k9d6OBbnkr8D

1996 CONSOLIDATED AUDIT REACTIVE CHEMICAL REVIEWS \ TEAM LEADER FUNCTIONAL LEADERS - 00 A 042935 CONFIDENTTAL Louisiana Division Consolidated Audit Process Guidelines Audit Process Before/After Audit 1. Deliver questionnaires on computer disk to plant superintendent for distribution to plant team. 2. Plant coordinator submit plant contact names and completed critical path check list to the Consolidated Audit department office professional. 3. Plant team member contact Functional Team Leader to help update questionnaires and identify needs. 4. Plant team member submit completed questionnaire to Functional Team Leader 5. LAD Auditors complete pre-audit inspections and interviews. 6. All audits/inspections completed. 7. Functional Team Leaders review recommendations (draft) with plant contact or superintendent. 8. LAD Audit Administrator conduct pre-audit conference with Plant Superintendent to answer questions and review agenda format for wrap-up session. 9. Plant Superintendent submit a copy of all completed questionnaires to the Consolidated Audit Department Office Professional, Safety Superintendent and Technology Center Representative. 4 months before 3 1/2 months before fi n n n 6-8 weeks before 4 weeks before 4 weeks before 3 weeks before 3 weeks before 2 weeks before rev./hrw 02/09/94 DO A 042936 CONFTDFNTTAl 10. One day audit wrap-up 11. Functional Audit Team Leaders submit recommendations to Audit Administrator. 12. LAD Audit Administrator consolidates separate reports into one report (draft) for the plant, (computer disk) 13. Plant superintendent/staff review draft report and comment to LAD Administrator. 14. Audit Administrator submit final report to plant superintendent. 15. Plant review report/actions plans with Major Manager and replies to Core Audit Team with implementation plans. 16. Audit Administrator issue one year status report reminder letter to the plant. 17. Plant issues follow-up status report and each one year following. 18. Technology Center review results of implementation plans at the next Technology Review. 19. Close-out action plans of previous audit. 7 calendar days after 10 calendar days after 14 calendar days after 15 calendar days after 60 calendar days after 11 months after 1 year after 1 year after 6 months before next audit rev./hrw 02/09/94 D0 A 047937 CONFIDENTIAL Consolidated Audit Guidelines Auditing Process 1. The Consolidated Audit Group will keep the overall Louisiana Division audit schedule, (plant/department is responsible for working out a swap if there is an unavoidable conflict and inform the Louisiana Division Audit Group, phone 8338 or 1883). 2. The Louisiana Division Audit Group will send to the plant/department the audit package questionnaires (computer disk) for the audit sections approximately 3-4 months in advance, (plant/department may request the package earlier.) 3. Questionnaires are to be completed by the plant/department being audited and returned to the Louisiana Division Audit Administrator and copied to the Safety Superintendent and Technology Center Representative at least 2 weeks in advance of audit "wrap-up". The plant contact will get the appropriate questionnaire to the leader of the Functional Audit Groups prior to pre-audit inspections. 4. For purposes of the consolidated audit process, the permanently assigned block maintenance personnel and the in-block maintenance shop facilities will be included in the scope of the audit. 5. The consolidated audit for each plant will be led by a team consisting of the Plant Superintendent/Department Head, the Safety Superintendent, a Technology Center Representative, and the Audit Administrator from the Louisiana Division Audit Group. This will be referred to as the Core Audit Team. The role of each Core Audit Team member is explained in detail by attachments. 6. All "OTHER" applicable audits and inspections that are to be included in the consolidated audit should be scheduled and completed 4 weeks in advance. A list of "OTHER" applicable audits should be made well in advance to allow time for completion. 7. All audit participants are required to follow the established schedule (arrange backups for vacation, conflicts, etc.). rev./hrw 02/09/94 0A? C 8. A short wrap-up session will replace the three day sessions that were held in the first round of consolidated audits. No plant overview or self evaluation questionnaire presentation will be required. The wrap-up sessions will focus on dialog and auditor's explanations. Timing will be set by the Plant Superintendent, Audit Administrator and each Functional Team Leader. 9. Each Functional Audit Team will be responsible to furnish the Consolidated Audit Department Office Professional a written (VAX) audit report of their recommendations seven days after the audit wrap-up date. If no wrap-up is necessary recommendations are due by the deadline date. Each recommendation must be identified as M = MUST DO, (based on compliance issues - government regulation, Dow policy or S&LP) and HR = Highly Recommended, (necessary to mitigate an anticipated or potential hazard). 10. The Audit Administrator will review the recommendations and submits a draft to the Plant Superintendent within fifteen days after the audit. 11. The Plant develops an implementation plan as a response to the recommendations. The plan should include the name(s) of the employee(s) assigned to each action item along with an estimate of the time required to complete. This plan is reviewed and approved by the Major Manager (or Section Manager) within 45 days of the audit. The approved implementation plans are sent to the Audit Administrator and then copied to each member of the Core Audit Team and the appropriate section to the Functional Audit Team Leader 60 days after the audit. 12. A follow-up status report will be issued by the plant 12 months after the audit to the Major Manager, Section Manager, and to the Consolidated Audit Department Office Professional for distribution to the other Core Audit Team Members and the appropriate section to the Functional Audit Team Leader. rev./hrw 02/09/94 Do 13. In keeping with the OSHA STAR Program and OSHA's PSM standard 1910.119 a close out status report will be due 6 months prior to the next audit. The Plant/Department will be required to send the close out status report to the Major Manager and the Consolidated Audit Department Office Professional for distribution to the other Core Audit Team members and the appropriate section to the Functional Audit Team Leaders. (To effectively close-out the prior audit action plans the Audit Administrator and Functional Team Leaders will work with the plant/departments to complete this task). 14. The Technology Center will also review the status of approved implementation plan responses to the consolidated audit during its next plant technology review. rev./hrw 02/09/94 D0 A 042940 confidential DOW USA LOUISIANA DIVISION CONSOLIDATED AUDIT PROGRAM GUIDELINES LAD ORGANIZATION 1) LOUISIANA DIVISION AUDIT GROUP Louisiana Division Office Professional Connie Kalencki 504-353-8338 Louisiana Division Audit Administrator Howard Wilkinson 504-353-8338 2) CORE AUDIT TEAM Plant Superintendent Safety Superintendent Technology Center Representative Louisiana Division Audit Administrator 3) FUNCTIONAL AUDIT TEAM LEADERS Safety Chemical Exposure Index Hazardous Materials Transportation Review Occupational Health Reactive Chemicals Loss Prevention/Fire/ Burner Management Security Laboratory Process Control Network Electrical 5-Point Audit Don Jones Buck Bailey Dean Smith Ralph McLaurey Gerald Wagener Buck Bailey Charles Almond A1 Ribes Steve Villarrubia Mike Gee rev./hrw 02/09/94 DO A 042941 CONFIDENTIAL From: To: CC: Subj : LACSDC::MILES CONSAUD.DIS MILES Please review 8-JUL-1996 17:04:45.37 .dy Howard Troy Please review the minutes. Let me know if you want to make any changes before I send out the notes. cc: J.J. Hiemenz Brian Harris Scott Daigle John Williams Charles Douglas Hellen Causey Greg Schultz Steve Caldwell re: CONSOLIDATED AUDIT PLANS FOR OCT. 15, 1996 AUDIT Roddy, Howard, Troy, The following are the timing and issues that we agreed upon for the October 15, 1996 Consolidated Audit for Chlorine and Cell Service: Timing September 16 Questionaires completed with input from Functional Leaders September 16 - Oct.l Auditors complete inspections Troy to facilitate audits October 15 Consolidated Audit Wrap-up mtg. 2. The reactive chemical section of the Consolidated Audit will be eliminated. (The New Superintendent RC review will suffice) 3. The VPP inspection will replace the Consolidated Audit walk through inspection. 4. The VPP documentation inspection will replace the Consolidated Audit documentation review. 5. Howard will provide a list of the team leaders for the Consolidated Audit. Questionaire assignments: HMTR Lab NA Safety Hellen Causey Steve Caldwell Roddey - Troy Do A 042942 CNFrDFNTrAL Occ Health Greg Schultz - Charles Douglas Security Bruce Miles Loss Prev Scott Daigle, Brian Harris, Bruce Miles "rocess Control John Williams Please let me know if I have misinterpreted any of the agreements that were made for the audit or if we need to change any of the assignments. .nks, Bruce Miles DO A 043943 CONFTDFNTIAL March 1991 Louisiana Division LOUISIANA DIVISION GUIDELINES FOR REACTIVE CHEMICALS REVIEW The enclosed package contains guidelines to assist you in preparing for a productive and comprehensive Reactive Chemicals Review. It is important to realize that Reactive Chemicals considerations are YOUR responsibility. The Reactive Chemicals Committee is made up of people experienced in this area and helping you fulfill your reactive chemicals responsibility is our primary goal. Evaluation of past incidents shows that inadequate operating procedures, lack of positive raw material identification, critical instrument problems, and material of construction incompatibility cause serious concerns. Consider these items carefully. Attached is a Reactive Chemicals Review checklist which will guide you in preparing for your review. Please complete this checklist and include as the cover sheet for your review package. Attachments are also provided for updating Reactive Chemicals data and to assist you in developing "Worst Case" scenarios. A list of resources to help you prepare is included. The final attachment is a self evaluation questionnaire which we encourage you to fill out to help you recognize strengths and weaknesses of your program. We think this questionnaire will be an asset to you in further development of your Reactive Chemicals Program. The results of the self evaluation should be a topic of discussion at your review. Make every attempt to limit your review presentation to chemical reactivity. The Reactive Chemicals Committee does not deal with other problems unless they bear on chemical hazards. Do not review markets, costs, strategy, etc. The Plant should send one copy of the completed Questionnaire to the LAD Audit Facilitator 10 calendar days before the audit. Send 10 copies of the presentation packet to Cindy Gum (Reactive Chemicals Office Professional, Building 2510, Ext. 1601) at least 1 week prior to the review. Gerald Wagener, Chairman Reactive Chemicals Committee Building 2511, Ext. 1828 A 04;?944 CONFrDFNT.rAL CHLORINE / CELL SERVICE REACTIVE CHEMICALS REVIEW New Superintendent 01/31/97 DO A 0 4 P 9 4 5 C O N F ID E N T IA L 11-19-96 Reactive Chemicals review conducted on 11-13-96 Chlorine\Cell Service - New Superintendent\Consolidated Audit Review Attendees: Joe Schell, Don Jones, John Young, John Monroe, Buck Bailey, Dean LeBlanc, Bruce Miles, John Gross, Brian Harris, Scott Daigle, Dhaval Buch, Gerald Wagener, J.J. Hiemenz Review resultsVrecommendations Chlorine\Cell Service new superintendent has successfully demonstrated a high level of knowledge and sensitivity to reactive chemical hazards and controls in his new area of responsibility. The following recommendations resulted from this review: 1. Heavies Removals Scenario: Trays in ST-55 become dry and concentrate nitrogen trichloride to critical (explosive) concentrations. Calculate the maximum amount of NCI3 that can form on the trays under current conditions and determine if this is a credible scenario. Review the safeguards in place for keeping the trays wet to avoid this scenario. Review the Tech Center initiative in this area and ask them to review the Oxy Chem incident and make recommendations. 2. Taffy Pots: One of the lines of defense for safe operation of the taffy pots is to avoid "blocking in" the taffy pots. Review the taffy pot operating discipline and make sure it prevents "blocking in" scenarios. Add this safeguard to the list of preventive measures for avoiding an explosion the taffy pots. 3. Liquefaction Scenario: Hydrogen-chlorine explosion in tail gas. The preventive measures for avoiding a hydrogen explosion in the tail gas need to be modified to include the specific action to be taken if the hydrogen in the tail gas gets to 5%. Several safeguards were mentioned during the review such as keeping the concentration below 1% and injecting nitrogen into the chlorine to control hydrogen at or below 3.5% (C02 free basis), but there is no consensus on action to be taken if the hydrogen ever gets to 5%. 4. Plant Safety Requirement #11 (Sulfuric acid corrosive to carbon steel): Add concentration and velocity limits ie. "below 90% and above 3 ft/sec sulfuric acid is highly corrosive". Check with Tech Center and make sure these are the correct numbers. DO A 042946 CONFIDENTIAL 5. MDEA in mining water at Promix: As a result of Promix changing ownership, a review of their safeguards for avoiding MDEA in mining water should be conducted. A comment was made that Promix is considering installing an analyzer to detect this problem. Operating discipline needs tc be developed at the Chlorine Plant to insure that the Chlorine Plant is quickly notified whenever MDEA enters the mining water. Please respond within one month as to action taken or planned in regards to these concerns. Gerald Wagener, Chairman Reactive Chemicals Committee oo 4?94> CHLORINE/CELL SERVICE CONSOLIDATED AUDIT REACTIVE CHEMICALS SPOT CHECK OF PLANT PROCEDURES & IPT MODULES CRITICAL & EMERGENCY PROCEDURES (CONDITION, LIMIT, CONSEQUENCES OF DEVIATION, ACTION TO BE TAKEN) Chlorine /iron fire at 155 deg C, chlorine-organic reactivity, Chlorinetitanium reactivity in environmental scrubber, NC13 reactivity in evaporators, High hydrogen in chlorine, deadheaded pumps resulting in CWiron fires. REACTIVE CHEMICAL MODULES FOR EACH SECTION OF PLANT (POTENTIAL PROBLEMS & PREVENTIVE MEASURES) Nitrogen Trichloride explosion in Taffy Pot, Nitrogen Trichloride explosion in reboiler, Chlorine/organic reaction from lubricants, Hydrogen/chlorine explosion in tail gas. Dry chlorine/titanium reaction in brine scrubbers. IPT MODULES MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION C-100 A/B, C-100 A/B suction and discharge piping The different parts ofa cell -Cell body, Cell backboard. Anode, Cathode, Cell cover ,Identify What is considered dry chlorine and what metals will dry chlorine react with. What metal is good to use in wet chlorine. What effect does chlorine have on hydrocarbon based oils and grease? List the metals that are rapidly attacked by caustic. List what solvents are acceptable to clean chlorine equipment. Explain the reaction ofdry chlorine and hot steel. COMPREHENSIVE REACTIVE CHEMICALS TEST MODULE-draft DO A 04?948 CONFIDENTIAL Chlorine Plant Personnel Reactive Chemical Interview Questions 1. HOW DOES THE CHLORINE PUNT PREVENT HYDROGEN AND CHLORII MIXTURES IN THE CELL COVERS (ANOLYTE)? Correct Q3 SOS 1. Chlorine compressor low suction pressure trip at 1/1 2/2 10" of water vacuum. 2. Vacuum relief seal pots in cell area. Seal pots are Y designed to relieve at 6" of water vacuum. 3. Monitor hydrogen in chlorine concentration Y YY continuously on each series with on-line GC's. 4. One head level transmitter with three bubblers. One Y high and one low level probe. (Note: As circuits are converted to Mod5 controls, level of redundancy is increased.) Three level extremes with deviation alarms. 5. Minimum operating head level is 6" of water. Trip Y YY at 4" of water. HOW DOES THE CHLORINE PUNT PREVENT A URGE HEAT OF REACT BETWEEN STRONG ACID AND MOISTURE IN THE T-103 STRONG H2S04 TOWER? Correct Q SOS 1/1 2/2 1. Use Carbon Steel vessel and piping. 2. Monitor tower, gas, and acid temperatures. (<=25 Y YY Degrees C. >=5 Degrees C.). 3. Monitor acid concentration. Y YY 4. Use Stainless Steel tray materials. 5. Monitor moisture out of D-103. 3. HOW DOES THE CHLORINE PUNT HANDLE AMMONIA CONTAMINATION MT-1 (INCOMING BRINE)? (AMMONIA FORMS NCI3 IN CELLS WHICH CONCENTRATES IN LIQUEFACTION.) Correct OS SOS 1. Sodium Hypochlorite added to achieve 170 ppm 1/1 2/2 excess. Hypos react with NH3. Y YY 2. Samples analyzed bi-weekly by R&D for Ammonia YY and Amines. Sodium Hypochlorite added to chlorinate amines. 10/96 DO A 042949 CONFIDENTIAL 4. HOW DOES THE CHLORINE PLANT PREVENT A CHLORINE-IRON REAC INSIDE THE HIGH STAGE COMPRESSOR? Correct 03 &QS 1. Monitor and alarm compressor discharge 0/1 2/2 temperature. YY 2. Trip compressor on high discharge temperature YY at 140 Degrees C. 5. HOW DOES THE CHLORINE PLANT PREVENT A H2-02 EXPLOSION/FIRE THE HYDROGEN AREA? Correct 03. BQ3 1. Trip system at 1/8" water at compressor suction 1/1 2/2 (2 seconds delay). Y 2. Redundant 02 analyzers, trip at 0.70% 02, (T-702-A). Y YY 3. Strict inert gas purging procedures with explosimeter checks at various points. 4. Automatic N2 purge on system trip to maintain a Y YY slight positive pressure. 5. H2 header pressure is controlled by recycle from discharge. 6. Explosimeter check to work/vehicle entry. No smoking, N2 purge analyzers. 7. Detailed procedures for H2 stack fires. Steam purge to maintain backpressure on stacks. 6. HOW DOES THE CHLORINE PLANT PREVENT A DRY CHLORINE-TITANIUN REACTION IN THE BRINE SCRUBBERS? Correct 03 SOS 1. Alarm low brine flow to scrubber. 1/1 2/2 2. Alarm low level in brine scrubber. 3. Inject water purge on brine scrubber inlet gas flow to Y YY protect Titanium. 7. IF A TITANIUM/CHLORINE REACTION DOES INITIATE, WHAT IS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY TO STOP THE REACTION FROM CONTINUING? Correct 03 SOS 1/1 2/2 1. Remove the source of chlorine. Y YY 10/96 DO A 042950 CONFIDENTIAL 8. HOW DOES THE CHLORINE PLANT PREVENT A NITROGEN TRICHLORL EXPLOSION IN THE TAFFY POT? Correct 03 SOS 1/1 2/2 1. Operate taffy pots at low temperatures. Y YY 2. Monitor and alarm temperature in each pot (redundant). Y YY 3. Alarm rate of temperature rise in pots. Y 4. Analyze brine for NH3 content bi-monthly (R&D). 5. Analyze taffy weekly for NCI3. 6. Monitor and alarm pressure on each taffy pot. 7. Lowered psv setting to 150# to catch overpressure. 8. Maintain 100 PPM Hypochlorite in the brine. 9. Maintain level below 66% to allow room for dilution should a reaction take place. 10. Maintain automatic dump valve from the control Y YY room to provide liquid Chlorine for the taffy pot in the event of a trip or pressure rise. 11. Register taffy pots with the Pressure Vessel Committee for yearly inspection and cleaning. 12. Carbon-tet injection system to dilute taffy from reboiler. Y YY 9. HOW DOES THE CHLORINE PLANT PREVENT A NITROGEN TRICHLORIDE EXPLOSION IN THE REBOILER? Correct OS SOS 1/1 2/2 1. Maintain a minimum 35% level. YY 2. Dump E-55/65 when temperature rises to 0 Deg C. Y YY 3. Alarm high tube side chlorine flow to reboiler. 10. HOW DOES THE CHLORINE PLANT CLEAN THEIR CHLORINE VESSELS T PREVENT A CHLORINE/ORGANIC CHEMICAL REACTION AFTER THEY ARE P BACK IN SERVICE? Correct 03 SOS 1. Prohibit use of hydrocarbon based compounds inside Chlorine vessels. 0/1 2/2 ? YY 2. Use only hot water for cleaning. YY The OS scored 80%. The SOS's averaged 100%. 10/96 DO A 042951 CONFIDENTIAL CHLORINE/CELL SERVICE REACTIVE CHEMICALS REVIEW NEW SUPERINTENDENT O O-f I> 1--tf v\O> ]> Ut REACTIVE CHEMICAL REVIEW AGENDA IMPROVEMENTS SINCE THE LAST REVIEW PROCESS SAFETY REQUIREMENTS RECOMMENDATIONS FROM PREVIOUS REVIEWS (1993 AUDIT) REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE BY EXCEPTION REACTIVE CHEMICAL INCIDENTS SINCE LAST REVIEW REVIEW PLANT SYSTEMS (SIMPLIFIED FLOWSHEETS, SCENARIOS & DEFENSE) REACTIVE CHEMICAL IMPROVEMENTS SINCE THE 93 REVIEW CELL AREA INSTRUMENT/MOD V UPGRADE DEDICATED N2 TO LIQUEFACTION LEAK REPAIR SEALANT DATABASE CRITICAL PROCEDURES REACTIVE CHEMICALS IPT C-550/650 & CHLORINE PUMP HAZOP WET & DRY COMPRESSOR COVERSION TO MOD V COMPATABILITY CHARTS W l-LNaaidNOO tV b Z P Q y Qn 10 PROCESS SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 1. CHLORINE REACTS WITH OIL, LUBRICANTS AND SEALANTS 2. DRY CHLORINE AND TITANIUM BURN 3. CHLORINE AND HYDROGEN CAN BE EXPLOSIVE AT > 3% HYDROGEN IN CHLORINE 4. CHLORINE AND WATER ARE CORROSIVE AT > 10 PPM WATER IN CHLORINE 5. CHLORINE AND CARBON STEEL BURN AT > 140 C 6. HYDROGEN AND AIR CAN BE EXPLOSIVE BETWEEN 5 AND 95 % 7. NITROGEN TRICHLORIDE (NCL3) CAN BE EXPLOSIVE AT > 30,000 PPM 8. CELL SALT CONCENTRATION AT > 300 GPL CAN CAUSE CELL ARCHING 9. CHLORINE CELLS OPERATE AT HIGH VOLTAGE POTENTIAL TO GROUND 10. BLOCKING IN LIQUID FULL CHLORINE LINES WILL CAUSE A LOSS OF CONTAINMENT. 11. SULFURIC ACID IS HIGHLY CORROSIVE TO CARBON STEEL. Oo CoMF f 042955 10/23/96 1:56 PM Dow Confidential Page # 2 of 2 S:\NEW MAIN HARD DRIVE\REACTTVE CHEMICALSU1 Process Safety Requirements.doc 1993 Reactive Chemical Followup RxChem committee does not feel comfortable with controlling hydrogen in tailgas at 3.8 mole %. Review this issue with the CATC. - Contacted CATC on 6/20/94 - Control is now at 3.5 mole% During startup of a chlorine circuit more frequent GC analyses of hydrogen in chlorine is recommended. - Issue is still be resolved by the CATC. When a final determination is made equipment will be installed as necessary to meet the requirements. DO A 0 4 2 9 5 6 CO NFIDENTIAL Chlor-Alkali Reactive Chemical Incidents 94 Thru 96 00 A 042957 CONFIDENTIAL DO A 04P958 CONFIDENTIAL DO A 0 4 2 9 5 9 C O N F ID F N T T A L Sodium Corbonato Production CHLORINE I BRINE TREATING PROCESS WATER AEATEO bRME FROM P4* '-400I SAT FROM CAUSTIC SAT FROM CAJ BALT SLURRY SYSTEM SAT TO 8 TRAM CELLS catsSAT TO TWUN B. Harris 10/25/96 CHLORINE I DC. Procedure / Description Steps List steps in procedure in order or the information! you want document to contain. REACTION CHEMICAL:BRINE EQUIPMENT___ POTENTIAL PROBLEMSPREVENTIVE MEASURES MT-1 A&B RAW BRINE Ammonia contamination as well as other naturally occurring Nitrogen based compounds can react and form Nitrogen Tri-chloride (NCl^) in the chlorine cells and then be concentrated to explosive levels in the Purification and Liquefaction Processes. Sodium Hypochlorite added to achieve a minimum of 100 ppm excess in Treated Brine. Hypochlorites react and destroy nitrogen based compounds. Samples analyzed weekly by the Chlor-Alkali Consolidated Lab for Ammonia and other Amines. Sodium Hypochlorite added to chlorinate amines. Brine Production in the process of adding an onstream ammonia analyzer. RL000129.D0C 49-13-17-00 11/11/96 Dow Confidential DO A 042961 CONFIDENTIAL Page # 2 of 2 AC So 2-t\ O X> So Trr to HYDROGEN COLLECTION CHLORINE TRAIN EFFLUENT HYDROGEN COLLECTION CHLORINE TRAIN Series Block Diagram ToCI2 Dow Confidential 00 A 0429A3 C O N F ID E N T IA L VI. CELL OPERATION Figure 1 (10% CAUSTIC) COMING ON-LINE, POTENTIAL PROBLEMS CHLORINE I PREVENTIVE MEASURES HYDROGEN AND AIR MIXTURE IN THE HYDROGEN HEADER OF SERIES COMING OFF-LINE. HYDROGEN AND AIR MIXTURES IN CELL COVERS OF OFF-LINE SERIES. HYDROGEN AND AIR MIXTURES IN THE HYDROGEN HEADER OF ON-LINE SERIES. DISINTEGRATION OF M-83 CELL TITANIUM ANODES OPERATING AT 5 VOLTS OR HIGHER. HYDROGEN PRODUCTION CAUSED BY REACTION OF IRON AND CELL EFFLUENT AT HIGH TEMPERATURES. INCREASED PRODUCTION OF NITROGEN TRI-CHLORIDE USING AMMONIA CONTAMINATED CELL EFFLUENT FROM CAUSTIC PLANT. PROCESS CHANGE CAUSES SALT STRENGTH TO INCREASE 1. Purge series Hydrogen header with C02 after coming off-line. CA2 uses N2. 1. Keep minimum 6-inch head on off-line series 2. Double block and bleed on series Hydrogen header. 3. Purge off-line series with N2 under covers and C02 in the Hydrogen header. CA2 uses only N2. 1. The Hydrogen headers and Hydrogen stacks are run at a slight pressure. 2. 02 in H2 analyzers at Hydrogen Collection Trains. 1. Monitor series and individual cell voltages. Alarms on series voltage. 2. Clip drop profiles once per quarter. 3. Guidelines for operating high voltage series/cells. 1. Purging of lines and equipment when welding and burning. 1. Closely monitor Ammonia levels in treated brine to the cells when using this cell effluent stream 1. Sampling of the anolyte salt strength twice per shift. Salt is taken off if over 305 gpl for one round or over 300 gpl for two rounds. 2. Visual inspection of the causitc outlets and radial feeder twice per shift for signs of salting up. 2. Alarm for high series voltage and voltage increase. DO A 042965 CONFIDFNTIAL 10/28/96 2:47 PM Dow Confidential Page # 3 of 4 J:\24 Personal Folders\CL2 StaffNJJ. HiemenzVREACTTVE CHEMICALS\09 Reactive Chemical\REACnVE CHEMICAL CELL AREA.DOC POTENTIAL PROBLEMS CHLORINE I PREVENTIVE MEASURES LEAVING SALT ON OFF-LINE SERIES PLUGGING OF INDIVIDUAL RADIAL FEED LOW anolyte CIRCULATION. BOILING OFF OF THE WATER IN THE ANOLYTE AND/OR THE CELL EFFLUENT. 1. Automatic block on salt slurry with brine flush upon a rectifier trip. 1. Salt density controller. 2. Visual inspection of radial feeders. 3. Velocity is maintainedby design. 4. Rock salt screen on column at CA2. 5. Screens in feed lines. 6. Cover salt profiles once per qtr. 7. Sample 2 cells at least 2 covers apart on each round. 1. Operate at lower salt strength at lower loads. 1. Monitor cell temperature and volts with increased frequency on hi-volt cells. RL000125.DOC 49-13-09-00 RL001103.DOC 55-01-27-03 DO A CONFT Off NTT AL 10/28/96 2:47 PM Dow Confidential x age # 4 of 4 J:\24 Personal Folders\CL2 StaffU.J. Hiemenz\REACTTVE CHEMICALS\09 Reactive ChemicalVREACTIVE CHEMICAL CELL AREA.DOC CIRCUIT SHUTDOWN Condition Limit Consequences Action(s) to be taken Blocking in the cell effluent manual valve when the Rectifier is running. During running Elimination of diff ` 1 conditions this across diaphragm will cause valve must remain hydrogen to back up into the wide open. anolyte. The H2 gas will mix with the C12 gas and could cause an explosion. Leave valve in wide open position until Rectifier is down and ready to be bottled. Low anolyte head when the 4" Mod trip 5" Rectifier is energized. Mod alarm Hip to prevent H2 from backing up into anolyte side of cell and into Chlorine gas. AC12 /H2 explosion could result. Mod will trip Rectifier ifhead less than 4". Mod will alarm at 5" - Ensure main brine, side feed and/or temp, brine control valves are open. - Open bypass(es) if necessary High Chlorine pressure when Rectifier is energized. 0" Mod alarm 2 stages of tap backs 2" and not rapidly coming down or 2.8" for 5 sec Mod trip Chlorine spill and Rectifier trip if condition does not correct itself in preset limit. - Check start up blower valve - Check start up blower - Look at train stability - High initial current in-rush Low Chlorine pressure when the Rectifier is energized. -1.7" and Pull Hydrogen across -2.5" Mod alarms diaphragm and possibly cause H2/C12 explosion - Check start up blower valve - Check start up blower - Look at train stability - Open air dilution valve Rapid corrosion of cathodes while off-line. M/B and HC1 double blocked and bled. M/B degas valve closed, if appropriate High hydrogen on next start up which could lead to explosion. Always block or double block and bleed without delay as per procedure. Ensure cathodes are flooded while circuit is off line. Failure to manually block hydrogen header. Manually close Hydrogen leaking by AOV valve in field into hydrogen log and cells after Ckt is down. creating an explosive mixture. Always close manual hydrogen valve after Ckt is deenergized as per procedure. Not bottling cell effluent log after shutdown. Manually close C.E. outlet valve(s) Hydrogen is not displaced from cell which could lead to an explosion. Always close manual C.E. valve(s) within 5 minutes after Ckt is deenergized. A 04?967 confidential HYDROGEN AREA OVERVIEW VENT T up CHLORINE I CT-7B1 A PC I j UNDER. GROUND PIPING PCV -Shi-- LShi^J D-7B4 FL-7R2 WS-711 EBV DISTRIBUTION MANIFOLD 00 A 042968 C O N F ID E N T IA L . LiiLUJun^ x IX. Procedure / Description Steps List steps in procedure in order or the information! you want document to contain. HYDROGEN AREA POTENTIAL PROBLEMS PREVENTIVE MEASURES H2-02 EXPLOSION/FIRE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Trip system at 1/8" water at compressor suction (2 seconds delay). Redundant 02 analyzers, trip at .70% 02, (T-702-A). Strict inert gas purging procedures with explosimeter checks at various points. Automatic N2 purge on system trip to maintain a slight positive pressure. H2 header pressure is controlled by recycle from discharge. Explosimeter check to work/vehicle entryntrinsically safe, no smoking, N2 purge analyzers. Detailed procedures for H2 stack fires. Steam purge to maintain backpressure on stacks. RL000124.DOC 49-13-07-00 10/03/96 Dow Confidential 00 A 042969 CONFTDETNTTA1. Page #2 of 2 n o 2 T1 O O 2m *o>. -i \> > OS&) Chilled Brine T wer To 0-1*0* ft P-31 JUS Sulfuric Acid Drying S>*tem { --a JtsL ft i -ft Dry Brinks Demister CHLORINE I IX. Procedure / Description Steps List steps in procedure in order or the information! you want document to contain. DRYING TRAINS EQUIPMENT-------- POTENTIAL PROBLEMSPREVENTIVE MEASURES E-100 RIVER WATER HEAT EXCHANGER TITANIUM TUBES IN EXCHANGER REACTING WITH DRY CHLORINE. 1. 2. Have exchanger in wet Chlorine service. Water purge on gas out line. C-100 WET CHLORINE COMPRESSOR TITANIUM WHEEL IN COMPRESSOR 1. REACTING WITH DRY CHLORINE. HIGH DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE. 1. 2. Have compressor in wet Chlorine service. Have H20 purge directly on compressor. Record this in control room (low alarmed). High discharge temperature trip, 90 Deg C. E-101 RIVER WATER EXCHANGER TITANIUM TUBES REACTING WITH 1. DRY CHLORINE. 2. Have exchanger in wet chlorine service. H20 purge on C-100 inlet until saturated on discharge T-101 TITANIUM TRAY SUPPORTS 1. Brine recycle, keep tower wet CHILLED REACTING WITH DRY CHLORINE. BRINE TOWER 2. Water purge on C-100 inlet. E-104A/B FREON HEAT EXCHANGER HASTELLOY C-276 TUBES, FREON 1. Chlorine comes into 123 AND CHLORINE exchanger in the brine, so it is always wet. 2. Chlorine in Freon has alarms that are checked once per day. 10/2S/96 Dow Confidential DO A 04?971 CONFIDENTIAL Page # 2 of 3 CHLORINE I EQUIPMENT----------POTENTIAL PROBLEMSPREVENTIVE MEASURES T-102 WEAK SULFURIC ACID TOWER HEAT OF REACTION: STRONG ACID/MOISTURE 1. Use PVC lined FRP vessel, trays. 2. Monitor acid concentrations. 3. Monitor tower temperatures, gas temperatures, and acid temperatures. (shutdown at 50 Deg C.) T-103 STRONG SULFURIC ACID TOWER HEAT OF REACTION: STRONG ACID/MOISTURE 1. Use Carbon Steel vessel and piping 2. Monitor tower temperatures, gas and acid. (<=25 Deg C. >=5 Deg C.). 3. Monitor acid concentration. 4. Use Stainless Steel tray materials. 5. Monitor moisture out of D-103. DO A 047972 CONFIDENTIAL 10/2 j 4:17 PM Dow Confidential Page # 3 of 3 J:\24 Personal Foldere\CL2 StaffJJ. Hiemenz\REACTIVE CHEMICALS\09 Reactive Chemical\REACTTVE CHEMICAL DRY1NG.DOC HE,.VIES REMOVAL SCRL. >ER E^54 LIQUEFACTION .... ...... --............. -- HIGHPRESL USERS . 8 CDC ETCV o oo zo n M 3> O mo z^ --i \) ?--( sO X> Nf 00 CCL4 LIQUID FROM STORAGE & CL2 RETRIG L-- O SOLVENTS TIIROX UQUID FROM STORAGE CHLORINE I IX. Procedure / Description Steps List steps in procedure in order or the information! you want document to contain. CL2 CELL AREA EfllEMlAL PROBLEMSPREVENTIVE MEASURES HYDROGEN AND CHLORINE MIXTURES IN THE CELL COVERS (ANOLYTE) 1. Chlorine compressor low suction pressure trip at 10" of water vacuum. CA2 - 9.5". 2. Vacuum relief seal pots in cell area. Seal pots are designed to relieve at 7.5" of water vacuum. 3. Monitor hydrogen in chlorine concentration continuously on each series with on-line GC's. 4. 3 level xtrmrs with deviation alarms. One high and one low level probe. CA2 has 2 xtrmrs and one low level probe. 5. Minimum operating head level is 6" of water for a flooded cell with a trip at 4" of water. Minimum operating head level is 4" of water for a non-flooded cell with a trip at 2" of water. LOSS OF HEAD ON OPERATING SERIES. 1. 3 level xtrmrs with deviation alarms mid select. Shutdown at 2" non -flooded & 4"for flooded cells. CA2 as described above. 2. Conductance probe alarms at 5 inches for flooded and 3 inches for non-flooded cells. 3. Backup side feed level controller. LOSS OF HEAD ON NON-OPERATING SERIES; CHLORINE DAMPER VALVE ISOPEN, AND HYDROGEN BLOCK VALVE LEAKS THROUGH. BAD DIAPHRAGM (HOLES, RUST) HYDROGEN AND AIR MIXTURES IN THE HYDROGEN HEADER OF SERIES COMING ON-LINE. 1. Double block and bleed on series Hydrogen header. 1. Cell treating 2. Good operational care of on-line and offline cells. 3. Series on-line G.C. 4. Guidelines for operating high hydrogen series. 1. Purge series hydrogen header with C02 before coming on-line. CA2 uses N2. 11/11/96 Dow Confidential A 04P974 Page # 2 of 4 CONFIDENTIAL CHLORINE I IX. Procedure / Description Steps List steps in procedure in order or the informatiom you want document to contain. HIGH STAGE COMPRESSION AREA EQ1ENTIAL PROBLEMS EXPLOSIVE LIMITS PREVENTIVE MEASURES CHLORINE-IRON REACTION INSIDE COMPRESSOR 155-165 DEG C. 1. Monitor and alarm compressor dis-charge temperature. 2. Trip compressor on high discharge temperature at 140 Deg C. CHLORINE-LUBE OIL REACTION 1. Bearing housings separated from compressor seals by an air gap. 2. Compressor seals are Nitrogen purged LUBE OIL FIRE 1. Installed sprinkler system at compressor and lube oil console. NITROGEN TRICHLORIDE EXPLOSION IN E-52/62 SHELL SIDE 1. Dump to taffy pot each 48 hours operation. 2. Inspected during outages. CHLORINE-ORGANIC CHEMICAL REACTION RL000123.DC0 49-13 05-00 same as HEAVIES REMOVAL SYSTEM. 10/28/96 Dow Confidential DO A 04?97S CONFIDENTIAL Page # 2 of 2 CHLORINE I DC. Procedure / Description Steps List steps in procedure in order or the information! you want document to contain. HEAVIES REMOVAL AREA POTENTIAL PROBLEMS NITROGEN TRICHLORIDE EXPLOSION IN TAFFY POT NITROGEN TRICHLORIDE EXPLOSION IN REBOILER CHLORINE-ORGANIC CHEMICAL REACTION lubricant PREVENTIVE MEASURES 1. Operate taffy pots at low temperatures 2. Monitor and alarm temperature in each pot(redundant) 3. Alarm rate of temperature rise in pots. 4. Analyze brine for NH3 content once/wk (CA Consol. Lab). 5. Analyze taffy weekly for NC13. 6. Monitor and alarm pressure on each taffy pot. 7. Lowered psv setting to 150# to catch overpressure. 8. Maintain 100 PPM Hypochlorite in the brine. 9. Maintain level below 66% to allow room for dilution should a reaction take place. 10. Maintain automatic dump valve from the control room to provide liquid Chlorine for the taffy pot in the event of a trip or pressure rise. 11. Register taffy pots with the Pressure Vessel Committee for yearly inspection and cleaning. 12. Carbon-tet injection system to dilute taffy from reboiler. 1. Maintain a minimum 35% level. 2. Dump E-55/65 when temperature rises to 0 Deg C. 3. Alarm high tubeside chlorine flow to reboiler. 1. Prohibit use of hydrocarbon based compounds inside Chlorine vessels and piping. Use Fluorolube as gasket and D/P cell fill fluid. 2. Use only hot water for cleaning exchanger tube bundles. 3. Training of operators, material controller, craftsmen, and instrument personnel. 10/28/96 Dow Confidential DO A 042976 CONFIDFNTIAL Page # 2 of 2 ^nLiUium^ i IX. Procedure / Description Steps List steps in procedure in order or the information! you want document to contain. Dry Chlorine Compressor Start-up. Operation, and ShutDown Condition High 1* stage or 2nd stage temperature Compressor surge Loss of nitrogen seal purge flow Loss of lubricant flow to Compressor, Gearbox, or Motor Chlorine-organic contact Limit 140C 0.95 operating point (where 1 is surge) 3 lbs/hr Oil header pressure 8psig No organic used in process Consequences of Action(s) to be taken Deviation C12/iron fire will start Mod5 automatically trips at temperature of 155C compressor -165C Increase inner-stage cooling Decrease suction temp to compressor Machine surge, Mod5 automatically controls possible mechanical compressor at a predefined point damage which may away from surge lead to an Increase recycle to the compressor environmental release Oil/C12 reaction due to Increase seal purge flow to seals chlorine flow out of the (use control valve bypass if compressor seals into the bearings necessary) If seal purge cannot be re established the compressor should be shutdown Mechanical failure of Mod5 trips compressor rotating equipment Check lube oil skid for possible which could result in a problems chlorine/iron fire Mod5 starts auxiliary pump Possibility of a reactive Prohibit use of hydrocarbon based chemical incident compounds in chlorine service vessels and piping Ifreaction occurs, trip compressor and stop chlorine flow to affected area C-52 OPERATION PROCEDURE A) START UP C-52 AUXILLARY SYSTEMS: 1) Start up seal purge system, see SA-52 operating procedure. 10/03/96 Dow Confidential DO A 047977 CONFIDENTIAL Page # 2 of 9 LIQUEFACTION OVERVIEW HEAVIES TtTOVAL D0 A 04297a C O N F ID E N T ! At- TAILGAS SCR WIDER LIQUEFACTION & LIGHTS REMOVAL DISTRIBUTION MANIFOLD CHLORINE I IX. Procedure / Description Steps List steps in procedure in order or the infonnatiom you want document to contain. LIQUEFACTION AREA EXPLOSIVE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS LIMITS HYDROGEN-CHLORINE >5% HYDROGEN EXPLOSION IN TAIL GAS PREVENTIVE MEASURES 1. Monitor Hydrogen in cell gas continously and keep below 1.0%. 2. Monitor Hydrogen in tail gas at inlet to brine scrubber with triple redundant thermal conductivity detectors. 3. Inject nitrogen into the chlorine stream upstream of the secondary condensers to control hydrogen in inerts in the tail gas at or below 3.5%. DRY CHLORINE-TITANIUM REACTION IN BRINE SCRUBBERS 1. Alarm low brine flow to scrubber. 2. Alarm low level in brine scrubber. 3. Inject water purge on brine scrubber inlet gas flow to protect Titanium. 10/28/96 Dow Confidential DO A 042979 GONFTDFNTIAl, Page # 2 of 2 LIQUEFACTION AREA Condition Highstage terrperatne Unit 140C Compressor surge Lr^ofniiDgenseaJdiflfercntiJ pressure 0.95 opening point (where 1 is surge) 1.5 psi Lowbafeme pistonfbw 1900 Mr LossofLhricantfbw to Compressor, Gearbox,orMotor 6fl header pressure Highmachhe vtaatnns or terrpcuiue Orient tnfc set by MTS Chbrre-organfccortact Thermalexpainonofliquki dibrine Noorg3ncusedn process Nolqsidfvfldionne lies Consequences of Action(s) to be taken Deviation QZfron firewilstart at tenpeniture of Mod5 automatkaiyfrpiBconpressor 155C-165C Increase nxr-stagecoolrig Decreasesuction tenp to compressor Machinesag^ posdbfcmechanical damage whichmaybad to sn Mod5 autornatka^cortrokcccjiEStorat apredefined poit awayfromsurge environmental release hxreaserecjcfcto thecampiesaor 03CQreactiondue to chbrineflow out ModSalam ofthe corrpresgor seals ito the bearigs Increase sealpurge fbw to seals(usecontrolvahe bjpassifnecessaty) Ifsealpixge camotbe re-estabfished (he compressor shoiddbe shtdown Pte#ifervBcharacalfelLxe,dibrTe/Ton ModS automaticallytrpsoonpresaor at bwfcw fire, and envromwialrelease Ifreactionoccurs, manuallyadivde sjstemEBV^ and evacuate alchbrine Somsystem Mechanic fojre ofrotathg equipment ModS tripscompressor whichcould rest* h adibriiefcmfre Oedckheolskilferposshfe problems ModS starts auxiliaryptirp Pos.'ifemotor, gearbox, oroonpnssor ModS ajtnmattalytrps compressor based on Bertiey- mechanical feiire Nevadarfamation Ifnudihewreddfeibreoau^evaa^alcHoaB fromsystemaid stopoiflow to equipment h question PosMtyofareactivechemicalindent Rohhituseoftyhocahonbased compoundsin dibrreservice \esseb andpiping Ifreactionoccur, trpconpessor and stopdfcrneItaw to affected area possihfc ireorequipment fillre Always isolateequpmert^ifxng hsudi awayasnotto have Squid fuipipmg Ifalhe fiiiiie doesoccur, isohtesystem asdose tothe faikie asreasonaHypossUe andevacuate Qioifh snflfand dumpheaders I(. STORAGE & DISTRIBUTION OVERVIEW DO A 0 4 2 9 8 1 O O N F T D F N T T A l. CHLORINE I IX. Procedure / Description Steps List steps in procedure in order or the information! you want document to contain. STORAGE AREA miENIJAL PRQP LEMSPREVENTIVE MEASURES CHLORINE/IRON FIRE FROM TEIKUKO PUMPS OVERHEATING 1. Pumps trip on low cooling flow. 2. Minimum flow lines are provided on all pumps, preventing pumps from dead-heading. NC13 BUILD-UP IN EVAPORATORS 1. Evaporators are dumped every 48 hours. Internal in-spection per pressure vessel schedule. CHLORINE/ORGANIC CHEMICAL REACTION 1. Prohibit use of hydrocarbon based compounds inside Chlorine vessels. 2. Use only hot water for cleaning. LIQUID CHLORINE REACHING USER PLANTS 1. Superheat Chlorine gas 35 Deg C. (65#) and 60 Deg C.120 # 2. Alarm high pressure/low temperature on 100% lines. 3. All users except CPE and Solvents have knock-out pots. RL000121.DOC 49-13-01-00 10/28/96 Dow Confidential On A 0429B? CONFrOENTTAl Page # 2 of 2 REFRIGERATION OVERVIEW r> 2o o^ & \> ~n u01>50 T-54 EC-55 EC-195 REFRIGERATION AREA Condition Hgh stagetemperature Limit | 1 140C Corrpressor surge L^ssofrirogeiisEaltMiiatial pressure 0.95 cpaatrig port (where 1 is surge) 1.5 psi Lowbalance piston Bow 19C0Iwhr Loss ofUbricart fbwto Conpressor, Gearbox or Motor CS headerpressure <5psg HighnrediieviTatkTBcr temperature Current firritsset by MTS ChbnriMxgarac contact Thermal expansion ofiquid dibrine No agaricused h process ffo (quid fill cttbrihe fries Consequences of Action(s) to be taken Deviation G2/ironfirewiIl start at tenperafareof 155C-165C Machkie surge, possfcbmechaiBcal damagewhich maylead to an environmcrtalrefcase OK22reactiondue to dixbe fbwcut ofthecorrpressor seals rto (he bearngs Fosafcb mechanical faibre, chbme/ion fine, andenvirorrrertal release Mecfaracal Mieofrotating equpmert wlidiccuUrcsufthachbrrafron&e PbssHemotor, geartx,oroonpressor nxxhanfcallaJure PossMtyofa reactive chemical rrdert possbfeIbeorequpmert &flure Mod5 automaticallytipscompressor Increase 'mar-stagecooiig Decreasesuction terrp to oortpresrx Mod5 automatical^control corrpressor at apreddhed port awayfromsurge Increaserecedeto thecompressor ModSatem Increase sealpurge flowto seals (use oortrolvalve bypass ifnecessary) IfsealpurgecamX bere-estaHidiedthecompressor dnuilbe shutdown Mod5 autonreticallytipsooirptessorat bw flow Ifreactionoccurs, mamalyactivatesystemEBV^and evacuate alcbbrine fioms^stem Mod5 tripscoripresCT Chock bbeofldcid forpossibleprobfems Mod5 starts auxSarypump Mod5 automaticallyUps corrpressorbasedonBertley- NevadartrrmtBr Ifrnadmewredcf&lireoccur, evacuatealcbbrine fiomsjstemand stopoi flowto equpmert to questbn Ptohbi useofhjthxarbonbasedcnrepowdsb chbrtoeservice^vessels andpptog Ifreactionoocus; tipcompressorandstopdiorineflaw toaBbctedarea Always isolate equpmert^pirg itsudi away as not to haveIquid ill ppng Ifa fre faibredoes occur, holatesystemasebse to the faibre as reasonaMypossfcb and evacuate through mUTand dump headers 00 A 042904 C.ONFTDFNTT A1 CHLORINE I ENVIRONMENTAL SUPER SCRUBBERS To MT-1A/6 (or removal of Tanr.'iis O Oo 2O ti o l> 2^ o H \) T->I 0o0 On WASTE WATER (HYPO) STORAGE h ilfilipl -p) LJ P-1 A "TV P-1 B r 1 B. Harris 10/25/96 CHLORINE I IX. Procedure / Description Steps List steps in procedure in order or the informatiom you want document to contain. SCRUBBER AREA REACTIVE CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT______ POTENTIAL PROBLEM AT-200 DRY CHLORINE/TITANIUM REACTION CHLORINE/CAUSTIC REACTION (EXOTHERMIC) PREVENTIVE MEASURES Titanium wetted with cell effluent. Water purge on Chlorine into AT-200 with low flow alarm in control room. Temperature is recorded and alarmed PRECAUTIONS FOR TITANIUM WELD1NG/CT JTTING Since AT-200 A/B and PT-200 A/B are made of titanium, any future modifications to the vessels that would require welding and/or cutting on or near the vessels should consider the following: Titanium is very sensitive to oxygen, nitrogen, water or hydrogen under high temperature condition, such as found when welding and/or cutting on the metal. If proper precautions are not taken during these high temperature operations, the metal can be severely damaged. For this reason, Welding and Cutting on Titanium metal is to be completed only with very specific written procedures approved by Welding Technical Services. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO A TITANIUM/CHLORINE REACTION It is known that titanium and dry chlorine react violently in the presence of each other. This reaction is prevented by ensuring that the chlorine that comes in contact with titanium is passivated by "wetting" the chlorine with water vapor. If a titanium-chlorine reaction does initiate, the only effective way to stop that reaction from continuing is to REMOVE THE SOURCE OF CHLORINE. This can be accomplished by stopping all chlorine flow and re-routing to the opposite scrubber tower. The deluge guns in the scrubber area located next to T-250 A/B are to be used to protect the adjacent equipment from heat damage. RL000122.DOC 49-13-01-00 10/28/96 Dow Confidential DO A 04P986 confidential Page # 2 of 2 CHLORINE I Environmental Scrubber Critical Procedures Condition Dry Chlorine entering Environmental Scrubbers, AT-200 A&B Limit No Dry Chlorine Flow Consequences Titanium / Chlorine reaction resulting in chlorine release. Action(s) to be taken Titanium normally wetted with cell effluent. Additional water purge on Chlorine into AT-200 with low flow alarm in control room. If reaction starts, stop all chlorine flow into scrubber. Re-route chlorine flow to other scrubber if needed. Flood column with water. Protect adjacent equipment from heat damage using the fire water stations located next to the caustic storage tanks T-250 A&B. High temperature in AT-200 A&B due to exothermic reaction of caustic and chlorine 90 deg C Damage to fiberglass internal parts. Temperature is recorded and alarmed. Route chlorine flow to alternate scrubber. 10/03/96 1:16 PM Dow Confidential T:\0SChlorincLibraiy\64 Super Scmbber\01 AT-200A-B\05 StanupVAT-200 A STARTUP.DOC Do CQt^pr A ?987 Page # 5 of 5 Cell Service Gas Turbine Block Diagram Gas Air Control Power for Plant Equipment Bonded Diaphragms * Cell Service has two turbines (GT-501A and GT-501B) in this part of the process. Only one turbine is operating at any given time; the other serves as a spare. Dow Confidential DO A 0 A 7 A 8 8 C O N F ID E N T IA L V-, x MATERIAL METHYL ETHYL KETONE 'EROXIDE 'J.N-DIMETHYLANILINE DMA ZOBALT NAPTHENATE 3ERAKANE PROMOTED DERAKANE ND-NOT DESIRED MIX 02/15/93:DW CELL SERVICE BLOCK COMPATIBILITY CHART ^EKP DMA COBALT MAPHTHENATE DERAKANE PROMOTED 3ERAKANE JNSTABLE ABOVE 60 C. EXOTHERM AT HIGHFIRE POTENTIAL EXOTHERM AT EXOTHERMS MIX EXOTHERM AT 100 F MO MO THERMAL Keep apart NO THERMAL 60 C wn FLAMMABLE DNLY BY RECIPE MP :LAMMABLE 100 F Mn ACTIVITY ACTIVITY Mn EXOTHERM ABOVE i cn r Mn EXOTHERM ABOVE i cn r rv RPriPP wn TIGHFIRE POTENTIAL MO THERMAL MO THERMAL :LAMMABLE :LAMMABLE CEEP APART ACTIVITY Mn ACTIVITY EXOTHERM ABOVE i cn r rv pcnor EXOTHERM ABOVE i cn r wn EXOTHERM AT :LAMMABLE FLAMMABLE :LAMMABLE :LAMMABLE 50 C Mn. EXOTHERM ABOVE iqnr Mn EXOTHERM ABOVE i cn r ry RFriPF EXOTHERM ABOVE i cn r ry RFriPF EXOTHERM ABOVE t cn r Mn EXOTHERMS MIX . :LAMMABLE :LAMMABLE :LAMMABLE :LAMMABLE ONLY BY RECIPE EXOTHERM ABOVE EXOTHERM ABOVE EXOTHERM ABOVE EXOTHERM ABOVE LSnC BY RECIPE_____ l.SQ-C-BY.RFCIPE_____ 150 IT RY-REaPE_______ LSOJC_______________ o oo zn o o mo z .p* --i \> hH sD 3> 00 r jo Process Chemicals REACTIVE CHEMICAL MATRIX 00 A 042990 c o n f id e n t ia l Dow CorfKfefltMt 1 FWv D*U PrmlDjfa IlflWW LAD CHLOR-ALKALI Process Materials 1=Not Known to be reactive |2=Reactive (Potentially hazard under some circumstances) 3=Pqtentja| Hazard(FjaRfl Reaction Wjjh HiaTl Energy Release) , PROCESS CHEMICALS r> o z T? o o o^ z5 & -) v 3> *0 Carbon Tetrachloride Caustic 50% < 120 degrees Caustic 50% >120 degrees Celt Effluent <120 degrees Cell Effluent >120 degrees Chlorine-DRY Chlorine-WET Freon 11 Freon 12 Freon 123 Hydrochloric acid Hydrogen Methane Oils (all) Sodium Bisulfite Sodium Carbonate Sodium Hypochlorite Sodium Thlosulfate30% Sulfuric Acid (weak<90%) Sulfuric Acid (strong>s90%) r x1 X X X X X ~x1 X X x1 X X X X X X X X X X *TW* raaetlva chemical matrix was craatad using tha knowladga ot process engineers, procesa tschnologlsts, chemists, and MSD ahaats *TWa gulda summarized tha potent)a) reactivity hazards of mixtures of chemicals. The Information herein does not constitute or by any means suggest suitable material compatabllfty lor the chemicals mid materials Hated. Consult piping/instrument specifications for material I construction application. Reactive Chemicals: Process Materials Dow Confidential Page:1 Rev. Date: 0/7/96 Print Date. 11/8/DG CHLORINE I IX. Procedure / Description Steps List steps in procedure in order or the information! you want document to contain. COMPATIBLE FITTINGS COMPATIBLE TUBING & INSTRUMENT FITTINGS CODE 1. PVC 2. TEFLON 3. MONEL -P -T -M 4. BRASS - B 5. COPPER - C 6. TITANIUM -Ti SERVICE TUBINGFITTINGS WET CHLORINE DRY CHLORINE HYDROCHLORIC ACID SULFURIC (ALL) CAUSTIC CARBON TETRACHLORIDE HYDROGEN SODIUM THIOSULFATE FREON TAFFY CHLORINATED BRINE OIL T, Ti M, T Tor P T MorT M M T M or C M MorT C T, Ti M, T Tor P T MorT M M T M or B M M or T B RL000130.DOC 49-13-19-00 11/11/96 Dow Confidential D A 04?9o, C0^lOFNTrA( ,* Cj Page #2 of 2 Title File Name (RL#) CHLORINE I REACTIVITY OF SEALANT RLOQ5273.DOC Author Approved By Revision Number Review Group Reviewed Date File Description File Path Scott Daigle Date Created 5/14/96 Robert Politz 2 Rev. Approved By N/A Staff 4/6/96 Reviewed By Robert Politz REACTIVITY OF SEALANT WITH PROCESS CHEMICAL (SORTED PROCESS CHEMICAL! T:\08 Chlorine Librarv\49 Chlorine Plant Qverview\09 Reactive Chemical .REACTIVITY OF SEALANT.doc Area Chlorine Plant Equipment N/A Type Procedure I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. IX. Steps Objective To inform plant personnel ofthe correct type sealant Frequency When using sealant Responsibility Operations and Staff Operating Limits ______ Consequences of deviation of Operating Limits : Chemical reaction Revisions Date ______ Revised By N/A Comments Procedure changed from T-13 to T-10. new sludge treatment tank Date Revised By N/A Comments N/A Date Revised By N/A Comments N/A References N/A Requirements Notification N/A Documentation N/A Regulations N/A Preparation Safety Equipment Block Safety Equipment Hazards N/A Precautions N/A Equipment N/A Important Notes N/A Procedure / Description List steps in procedure in order or the information you want document to contain. 10/03/96 1:05 PM Dow Confidential T:\08 Chlorine Libr*ry\49 Chlorine Plant Overview\09 Reactive Chemical\REACTTVITY OF SEALANT.doc 0A?993 DO A CONFI dfntiai Page # 1 of 14 TEAM a TEAM LEAK REPAIR INC REACTIVITY OF SEALANT WITH PROCESS CHEMICAL (SORTED BY PROCESS CHEMICAL) PROCESS CHEMICAL SEAUNT PUNT REF. NO. TEST REACTIVITY ACETYLENE ACID GAS BLEND ACID GAS BLEND ACID GAS BLEND AIR AIR AIR AIR AIR AIR AIR TEAM VALVEPACK B LHC 2 86223C STEAM & PROCESS SP-1011 LGTI 4791-42A STEAM & PROCESS SP-60 STEAM & PROCESS SP-CM LGTI LGTI 4791-42A 4791-42A SP-1011 (30 MIN CURE 1ST RUN) CHLOR-ALKAU 2 4791-35A SP-1011 (30 MIN CURE 2ND RUN) CHLOR-ALKALI2 4791-35A SP-1011 (30 MIN CURE 3RD CHLOR-ALKAU 2 4791-35A RUN) SP-1011 (UNCURED SAMPLE) CHLOR-ALKALI 2 4791-35A SP-102 (CURED 300 C / 48 HR) POWER 2 4791-43B TEAM SEAUNT 2W POWER 2 92320 TEAM SEAUNT 2X POWER 2 92320 DTA DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC NO EXO TO 210 C EXOAT 45 C NO EXO TO 300 C EXO AT 50 C EXO AT 160 C EXO AT 60 C EXO AT 273 C EXO AT 178 C EXO AT 420 C NO EXO TO 500 C NO EXO TO 500 C AIR (INSTRUMENT) AIR (INSTRUMENT) AMMONIA(15%)-D-270 AMMONIA (15%) -D-270 AMMONIA (20% IN H20) AMMONIA (AQUEOUS) AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE ANHYDROUS AMMONIA ANHYDROUS AMMONIA ANHYDROUS AMMONIA ANHYDROUS AMMONIA ANHYDROUS AMMONIA ANHYDROUS AMMONIA ANHYDROUS AMMONIA AT-200 SCRUBBER EFFLUENT AT-200 SCRUBBER EFFLUENT BENZENE BENZENE BENZENE (CRUDE) BENZENE(CRUDE) BENZENE PUNT PYROLYSIS GAS BENZENE-TOLUENEXYLENE (T-1602) BENZENE-TOLUENEXYLENE (T-1602) BENZENE-TOLUENEXYLENE (T-1602) BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETA-TRICHLOROETHANE BETZ BAUNCED POLYMER 68701 BETZ BALANCED POLYMER 68701 50% BETZ BP-P-1B + 60% COR-TROL 778P STEAM & PROCESS SP-102 STEAM & PROCESS SP-60 STEAM & PROCESS SP-60 STEAM & PROCESS SP-102 TEAM SEAUNT #6 TEAM PTFE SEAUNT TEAM SEAUNT IX DOW CORNING 44 LUBRICANT FEL-PRO HI-TEMP NICKEL EASE STEAM & PROCESS SP-1015 TEAM PTFE SEAUNT TEAM SEAUNT #16 TEAM SEAUNT #6 TEAM VALVEPACK B STEAM & PROCESS SP-2000 STEAM & PROCESS SP-CM ROYAL PURPLE BARRIER FLUID 22 ROYAL PURPLE BARRIER FLUID 22 STEAM & PROCESS SP-1011 STEAM & PROCESS SP-103 TEAM VALVEPACK B FURMANITE FSC-5B FURMANITE FSC-6B TEAM SEAUNT #6 & F-14 FIBERS FURMANITE FSC-44D FURMANITE FSC-44D FURMANITE FSC-5B FURMANITE FSC-5B STEAM & PROCESS SP-289 STEAM & PROCESS SP-289 STEAM & PROCESS SP-3100 STEAM & PROCESS SP-3100 TEAM SEAUNT #2X TEAM SEAUNT #2X TEAM SEAUNT #6 TEAM SEAUNT #6 TEAM VALVEPACK A FURMANITE FSC-6B FURMANITE FSC-6B TEAM SEAUNT #6 & F-14 FIBERS LGTI LGTI LGTI LGTI LGTI DOWANOLS DOWANOLS DOWANOLS DOWANOLS DOWANOLS DOWANOLS CAUSTIC CAUSTIC CAUSTIC CHLORINE CHLORINE LHC 3 LHC 3 BENZENE BENZENE BENZENE LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 VINYL 2 VINYL 2 VINYL 2 VINYL 2 VINYL 2 VINYL 2 VINYL 2 VINYL 2 VINYL 2 VINYL 2 VINYL 2 VINYL 2 VINYL 1 LHC 3 LHC 3 POWER 1 4791-42A 4791-42A 4791-5A 4791-5A 89336 RCL 1039 91239 93121 93121 RCL 1232 RCL 1038 RCL 1010 RCL 1007 RCL 1181 91296 91296 92169 92169 8.40E+33 8.40E+32 85053A 92199 92199 92199 93154 93154 93154 93154 93154 93154 93154 93154 93154 93154 93154 93154 8.40E+191 94092 94092 92175 DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DTA DSC DSC DSC DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DSC DSC DSC HOM DTA DTA DTA DSC DSC DSC DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC HOM DTA HOM DSC DSC NO EXO TO 300 C NO EXO TO 300 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 235 C NO EXO TO 300 C NO EXO TO 175 C NO EXO TO 130 C NO EXO TO 155 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 320 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 300 C EXO AT 40 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO AT 22 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 300 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 250 C EXO AT 269 C NO EXO AT 22 C NO EXO TO 350 C NO EXO AT 22 C NO EXO TO 350 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 253 C NO EXO AT 22 C NO EXO TO 350 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 284 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 275 C SL. EXO AT 22 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 335 C 11/11/96 3:27 PM Dow Confidential Page # 2 of 14 J:\24 Persona] Folders\CL2 StaffUJ. Hiemenz\REACTIVE CHEMICALS\09 Reactive Chemical\REACnVITY OF SEALANT.doc 00 A 04^994 CONFIDENTIAL CELL EFFLUENT (10% SODIUM HYDROXIDE) CHLORINE ' CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLORINE (TRACE WATER, HCBD) CHLORINE VENT GAS CHLORINE VENT GAS CHLORINE VENT GAS CHLORINE VENT GAS CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM STEAM & PROCESS SP-60 CHLORINE 92180 ANCHOR VALVE PACKING 375 CHLORINE 8.40E+140 ANCHOR VALVE PACKING 4205 CHLORINE 8.40E+07 BELZONA CERAMIC-R METAL CHLORINE 85172D BELZONA E-METAL CHLORINE 8.40E+186 BELZONA SUPER METAL CHLORINE 85172A CELL PUTTY CHLOR-ALKALI2! ARC 91-647 CHRYSOTILE ASBESTOS FIBER CHLORINE 90022 GASKET CONLEY TEFLON PASTE CHLORINE RCL 83-004 FELPOXY STEEL GARLOCK VALVE PACKING 6130 GARLOCK VALVE PACKING 7130 GORE PACKING PTFE W/ GRAPHITE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE 8.40E+185 8.40E+09 8.40E+10 86206A GORTEX PTFE SOLVENTS/EDC 85136A GORTEX SEALANT (TEFLON) JOHN CRANE VALVE PKG C-1050 JOHN CRANE VALVE PKG C-60 JOHN CRANE VALVE PKG C-7762 CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE ARC 91-616 8.40E+143 8.40E+142 8.40E+0S JOHN MANSVILLE VALVE PKG AF-5331 CHLORINE 8.40E+146 LOCT1TE #56747 PST LOCTITE #59231 (WITH TEFLON) LOCTITE 271 ADHESIVE/SEALANT CHLOR-ALKALI 2 90282 CHLOR-ALKALI 2 90282 CHLOR-ALKAU 2 89071 PARKER HANNIFIN VALVE PKG CHLORINE 2287-BR 8.40E+144 F'ARKER HANNIFIN VALVE PKG CHLORINE . 2287-GL 8.40E+145 PTF E/KEVLAR SEAL-ITT #34 SILASTIC 732-RTV SILICONE RUBBER CHLOR-ALKAU 2 89322 CHLORINE 90277 CHLOR-ALKALI 2 8.40E+102 STEAM & PROCESS SP-1011 TEAM SEALANT #11 TEAM SEALANT #6 + F-14 FIBER CHLOR-ALKALI 2 89322 VINYL 1 RCL 83-093 VINYL 1 RCL 83-095 UNCURED EPDM RUBBER CHLOR-ALKALI 2 ARC 91-648 CASTROL BRAYCOTE 1728 COPALT1TE HIGH CHLORINE CHLORINE ARC 91-585 ARC 94-851 TEMPERATURE SEALANT DOW CORNING 3120 RTV SEALANT CHLORINE ARC 94-848 GARLOCK900 GASKET GOR-TEX GR GASKET GRAFOIL GHE KADEL SN N-75 SEALANT CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE ARC 92-737 ARC 93-771 ARC 91-586 RCL-93-9809 KLINGER K-61 GASKET CHLORINE ARC 92-738 PERMATEX FORM-A-GASKET 2 CHLORINE (CURED) ARC 94-855 SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON METHANES 94060 STEAM & PROCESS SP-2026 STEAM & PROCESS SP-292 STEAM & PROCESS SP-300D CHLORINE ARC 92-692 CHLOR-ALKALI 2 RCL-93-9831 CHLORINE ARC 92-711 STEAM & PROCESS SP-375 STEAM & PROCESS SP-CM STEAM & PROCESS SP-TFLO TEAM VALVEPACK OX (TEFLON) TORLON SN T210 SEALANT CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLORINE CHLOR-ALKAU 2 CHLORINE RCL-93-9830 ARC 92-708 ARC 92-715 RCL-92-9764 RCL-93-9799 USADURIAN SBR RUBBER CHLORINE ARC 94-853 CPE-TAC CHLORINE 8.40E+213 DERAKANE 470 (CURED 6/14/88) CHLORINE IPI EPOXY (CURED) CHLORINE RED PRIMER (CURED) CHLORINE WHITE DURDICK 800 G CHLORINE SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON METHANES SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON METHANES SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR METHANES CARBON CO GRAFOIL) SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR METHANES CARBON CO GRAFOIL) SAFE SEAL MULTIPAK (JOHN METHANES CRANE 6KB) SAFE SEAL MULTIPAK (JOHN METHANES 4792-21A 4792-21A 4792-20A 4792-20A 94060 94060 94060 94060 94060 94060 DSC DSC DTA DTA DTA DTA ARC DSC DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA ARC DSC DSC DTA DTA DSC ARC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DTA DSC DTA DTA ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC ARC DTA DSC DSC DSC DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC SL EXO AT 194 C 0(0 < 30 C EXO AT 136 C EXO AT 35 C EXO <25 C EXO AT 30 C EXO AT 86 C NO EXO TO 250 C EXO AT 100 C EXO < 25 C EXO AT-83 C EXO AT-76 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 200 C EXO AT 36 C EXO AT 46 C EXO AT 102 C EXO <30 C EXO AT 115 C EXO AT 33 C EXO AT *5 C EXO < 30 C EXO AT 38 C EXO AT 48 C EXO AT 90 C EXO AT 160 C EXO AT 40 C EXO AT 90 C EXO ATI 30 C EXO AT 98 C EXO AT 167 C EXO AT 113 C EXO AT 36 C EXO AT 26 C NO EXO TO 175 C EXO AT 104 C EXO AT 182 C EXO AT 27 C EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 8 C EXO AT 20 C NO EXO TO 250 C EXO AT 20 C NO EXO TO 250 C EXO AT 20 C NO EXO TO 175 C NO EXO TO 250 C EXO AT 109 C EXO AT 59 C EXO AT 135 C EXO AT 30 C NO EXO TO 250 C EXO AT 40 C EXO AT 35 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 310 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 200 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 224 C 11/11/96 3:27 PM Dow Confidential Page #4 of 14 J:\24 Personal Folders\CL2 Staff\J.J. Hiemenz\REACTIVE CHEMICALS\09 Reactive Chemical\REACTrVITY OF SEALANT.doc DO A 04?9<?5 confidential.