Document YD6pQnMxw7bqJKDNpmpQ0Zqj8

R&S 106738 r BIO-MEDICAL RESEARCH DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION FORM 63 68 69 76 Duplicate in all cards:--> WUM89 year as-1961- File number [Right justify [Numeric only] Author(s), as Last Name FS (No Punctuation) and coden for journal as JAMA preceeded by one blank space 1 ___________ 20 2140 JT /rA/hS 41 77 78 Sub-Index Code 60 61 62 Title of Report; end with space-hyphen-hyphen-space. Follow with Index Terms, separated from each other with comma-space. Avoid other punctuation; do not abbreviate, ^2 61 62 21 22 23 24 61 62 12 31 32 Brief Summary 12 10 SUMMARY: 61 62 61 62_ 63 64 7m 16 May 1975,.-Volume 188, Number 4189. , 000003 w H7f 106739 [Scientific Freedom and Responsibility Report of the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility. If.. John T. Edsall S. Problems of scientific freedom and re sponsibility arc not new; one need only nsider, as examples', the passionate con troversies that were stirred by the work of Js\Galileo and Darwin. In our time, however, Jfiisuch problems have changed in character, |gi.and have become far more numerous, iJgj-more urgent, and more complex. Science gfeand its applications have become entwined ;;with the whole fabric of our lives and ^thoughts. On the one hand, basic science fghas enlarged our intellectual horizons-- one need only mention as examples the vis'"" as opened up by the formulation of quan- S :um mechanics and the discovery of tfie ge- ja*netic code. Applied science has largely jSrtfrced mankind from the terrors of infecj|tious disease; but these terrors have been ^replaced by new terrors, also the fruits of Kgscience. These include not only nuclear yfvweapons with their incomparable powers i^wpf devastation but also such organic chem^K.icals as the dioxins, accidentally discovered as contaminants of certain herbicides, can kill guinea pigs at dosages as ^lw as 600 parts per trillion (/) and are v-S'1 perhaps comparably poisonous for human wd'.heings. The unprecedented rate of popu- lation growth in our time, largely a con sequence of advances in medical science, sanitary technology, and transportation, threatens the ecological balance of the earth and raises the specter of catastrophic famines. These and other problems have led to in tense and often bitter disputes among members of the scientific community, and between scientists and policy-makers. As examples we may recall the controversies over the biological hazards of nuclear weapons testing, over the use of defoliants and herbicides in the Vietnam War, over the effects of DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides, over the antiballistic missile program, over the supersonic transport, and over the extent of the haz ards from nuclear power plants. In these conflicts the contestants are often unevenly matched, with powerful industrial and gov ernmental forces on one side and a small group of critics on the other. There have been attempts to suppress important scien tific data that appeared unfavorable to the policies of some powerful organizations. If wise policy decisions are to be made amid such pressures, there is a compelling need ` This article is in abbreviated version of the report of the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responbility, prepared on behalf of the Committee by John T. Edsall. The members of the Committee, which was estab- lithed in 1970, arc Allen V. Aslin, Director Emeritus of the National Bureau of Standards and Home Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences, Chairman: John T. Edsall, Professor of Biochemistry Emeritus, Harvard Uni- Walter J. Hickcl, former Governor of Alaska and former U-S. Secretary of the Interior, John H, Knowles, V President of the Rockefeller Foundation; Earl Warren, former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (who died in July 1974); md Dorothy Zinbcrg, Lecturer in Sociology, Harvard University. Mary Catherine Bateson, Asso- L , aalt Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Northeastern University, served on the Commutce until early 1972. i-7 ,, Reprints of this article can be obtained from Dr. Edsall at the Biological Laboratories, Harvard University. Cambridge, Massachusetts02138. The full report of the Committee. Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, can be obtained from the Association at a cost of J2.95 for members and 13.45 for nonmembers. Checks should be made payable to the American Asso rr nation for the Advancement of Science and orders sent to the Association at 1515 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, for fair hearings, due process, and public access to all relevant information. The American Association for the Ad-'\ vancemenl of Science (AAAS) is deeply concerned that such issues should be dealt with, and resolved, in a responsible fash ion. It would of course be far beyond the capacity of the Association to act as a court of appeal in' such disputes, except in very rare and special cases. However, be cause of its concern with the policy issues involved, the Board of Directors of the AAAS charged this Committee to consider the following matters: 1) To study and report on the general conditions required for scientific freedom and responsibility. 2) To develop suitable criteria and pro cedures for the objective and impartial study of these.probiems. 3) To recommend mechanisms to enable the Association to review specific instances in which scientific freedom is alleged to have been abridged or otherwise endan gered, or responsible scientific conduct is alleged to have been violated. The full text of our report in response to this charge is being issued as a special pub lication of the AAAS. Here we set forth the major features of that report more briefly. The Scientific Community: Its Rights and Responsibilities The American scientific community, as we define it, includes a wide range of very diverse individuals--basic scientists in uni versities, research institutes, and govern ment laboratories; engineers; workers in medicine and public health; graduate stu dents and technicians working on scientific problems; and teachers of science in col leges and secondary schools. The dis cussion that follows applies primarily to scientists involved in basic or applied re search, but in large measure it is relevant to the whole scientific community. The Committee concluded, early in its deliberations, that issues of scientific free dom and responsibility are basically in separable. Scientific freedom, like aca demic freedom (2), is an acquired right, generally accepted by society as necessary for the advancement of knowledge from JQ I!8 687 !7 * r- .i. which society may benefit. Scientists pos- rwe ieeno justification 3s yet tor attein !. ' scss no rights beyond those of other citi- may involve risk to the experimental sub to impose restrictions on the* freedom of ] zens except those necessary to fulfill the re ject. With young children, informed con genetic research. We hold that the dangers sponsibilities arising from their special sent is impossible to obtain; parents or today are remote, and that they are deci knowledge; and from the insight arising guardians must take the heavy responsi sively outweighed by the great benefits that ; from that knowledge. bility of giving consent for the child. Some such research can bring. Later we shall have much to say of the experiments may endanger the health, or activities often referred to as "whistle even the lives, of the participants; some blowing" in which issues of freedom and psychological experiments could be re Restrictions on Needed Research: , responsibility are inextricably inter garded as morally degrading or psycholog Fetal Research as an Example mingled. Whistle blowing involves situ- ically damaging. In such cases, review of ; ations in which a scientist, engineer, physi the proposed experiments by a qualified As we have said above, the advancement cian, or other expert becomes aware of panel of experts may provide more effec of knowledge by research must often be ') hazards arising from some process, mate tive protection to the subjects than the at balanced against risks to experimental rial, or product, or becomes aware of pos tempt to obtain their informed consent, al subjects that may be involved in gaining sible improvements in technology or pro- though we would insist on the importance that knowledge. The complexity of the is !; cedure that deserve to be adopted but are of the latter. sues involved emerges from the diverse jj being neglected. Issues of public safety are Some experiments are justified, even if points of view that have been collected and ' frequently involved, and often the whistle they involve great risks. The experiments set forth in much recent discussion, nota , blower works for the marketer of the pro- that conclusively demonstrated the trans bly in a comprehensive book (4) and in a 3 cess or product. Some may argue that per- mission of yellow fever by mosquitoes in symposium (J). | sons with expert knowledge have a "right" volved the death of one subject. Dr. Jesse In some important instances we believe ) to release information in their possession, Lazear. Those who took part knew they that current restrictions on research have j if such release is in the public interest. Oth- were risking their lives. Such heroic experi gone too far. Thus the National Research ' ` ers would say that it is the responsibility of ments are fortunately seldom called for, Act of 1974 has, at least temporarily, such experts to release the information, but they may well be needed from time to banned research on any "living" human wen though they might prefer to remain time in the future. fetus, either before or after induced abor silent. Both rights and responsibilities are Recently, in a statement probably un tion, except in the very unlikely event that clearly involved here, but it seems clear to precedented in the history of science, a the experiment is intended to save the life R&S 106740 us that the responsibilities are primary. Presumably the potential whistle blower will begin by reporting his concern to his employer and urging that corrective mea sures be taken; if the matter can be settled without appeal to outside authority, so much the better. If this step fails, however, and the concerned employee decides that group of eminent molecular biologists, headed by Paul Berg of Stanford Univer sity, have deliberately renounced, for the time being, certain experiments on the transplantation of foreign genes into bac teria because of potential though as yet un proven hazards to human health (J). This group has spoken with authority as `the of that particular fetus (d). We strongly oppose such restrictions. Research on the human fetus, over the past two decades, has yielded major benefits for human health. Behrman (7) has pointed out how many diseases that we can now tdiagnose or treat, or both, would have been unmanageable if a ban on fetal research he has the responsibility to make the mat ter public, he faces obvious risks that may include the loss of his job. If whistle blow ers arc to be encouraged to take such Committee on Recombinant DNA Mole cules of the Assembly of Life Sciences of the National Academy of Sciences. Their views have received wide public attention; had been in effect. Especially notable is Rh disease, which is now totally preventable, thanks in considerable part to fetal re search. The human fetus is extremely sus risks--and we believe that they should be of course, this committee has no police ceptible to many drugs, as the thalidomide encouraged, when serious issues are in powers to enforce its recommendations, disaster dramatically demonstrated. Like volved--they must be assured of some but its influence is great and as yet appears wise, the fetus is far more susceptible to ra form of due process in passing judgment not to have been seriously challenged. The diation damage than the adult. Research on the issues that they raise. This would members of the committee are well aware on fetuses that do not survive abortions call for the presence of outside independent of the dilemma; the experiments that are, can help us to discover how to give protec members on any board that passes judg ment on the issues, and should also include some right of appeal. We return to these for the present, being renounced are not only of great scientific interest but also might make positive contributions to hu tion from such harmful agents to thou sands of other fetuses that are destined to reach full term and to grow into healthy .* matters later. Should There Be Forbidden Areas man health and well-being. The decision involves an expert balanced judgment of probabilities and risks (3a). The grounds cited for refraining from adults. We would urge that fetal research not only be permitted but intensified, sub ject to careful peer review of the research projects involved. in Basic Research? these experiments--to protect human beings from possible new and dangerous Those for whom the advancement of infections--are quite different from the The Conflict between Science and Secrecy knowledge is a supreme value might be ethical problems of present or future "ge lieve that, in basic research as distinct from netic engineering," as with the possible Many scientists, especially those em applied science and technology, no subject production of multiple copies of people ployed in industrial firms and in some gov should be declared off limits. Yet there are with identical genotypes by cloning. The ernment laboratories, spend much or most clear inhibitions on some kinds of research suggested threats here are not so much to of their time in work classified as secret. involving human beings, and indeed ani health as to human integrity, dignity, and Often the grounds for secrecy appear com mals. Today we are increasingly conscious individuality. It seems to us proper to be pelling. Nevertheless, science inevitably of the need for informed consent in studies on the alert for such possible threats, but suffers from the imposition of secrecy on a 688 SCIENCE. VOL. 188 ..- -- : ; irch project.' The reasons were well ated in the report of the AAAS Com mittee on Science in the Promotion of Hu nan Welfare (5. p. 177); ItFree dissemination of information and open aiscussion is an essential part of the scientific . Each separate study of nature yields an Approximate result and inevitably contains some ors and omissions. Science gets at the truth hy a continuous process of self-examination hich remedies omissions and corrects errors, his process requires free disclosure of results, nerat dissemination of findings, inter pretations, conclusions, and widespread veri fifct ation and criticism of results and conclusions. fcThat report provided specific examples |$o illustrate these general conclusions and howed that secrecy almost always imJes scientific progress; in applied science and technology it frequently permits haz ards to develop that could be eliminated if information were publicly available. We elieve that, with rare exceptions, data that ^provide a significant advance in fundamen tal science should not be kept secret, exept in a major war situation, as with the atomic bomb in World War II. Even in ssuch cases information should remain clas sified only for a limited and specified time; hjt should then be released automatically, unless a strong specific case can be made Mor withholding a particular piece of infor mation for a further limited lime. We ^should look at claims of ``national secu rity" with a very critical eye; such claims, kas we have good reason to know from re cent experience, often serve to cover up ^governmental ineptitude or corruption.' (T"Tlw echnology and Innovation: >Their Multiple and Complex Effects ;When we tum from the problems of ba sic science to those of applied science and technology, the problems of freedom and irresponsibility become even more formi dable. Whatever the intentions of tech- oiogical innovators, the results of in ovation arc always more complex than rthc innovators intended, and usually more Scomplex than they could even imagine. jjjQ'These facts, in our time, have created a ^ff^compelling need for the assessment of mai j-jr technological innovations, and for their critical evaluation and control. The so^Hed "side effects" of innovation are of:f, ten deleterious and not infrequently are so |;:|r pronounced that they dominate the priIfmary effect that was intended. The history of the use of DDT provides 1 an example of such complexity (9). Its use rought a dramatic halt to a cholera epi- emic in Naples in World War II; its inioal success in destroying agricultural pests MAY 1975 was spectacular. Pnly a few biological ex thcre is something inherently evil about^t*-* perts warned of trouble at that time. Grad technology: Technology has been indis- ^ ually problems appeared, as insect pests pensabie for the rise of all civilizations, and developed resistance to DDT; as, in many new technology is essential for the survival cases, the pesticide destroyed the natural of our own civilization. As an example we enemies of the pests; as the long per need only mention the need for the devel sistence of DDT in soil was discovered, and opment of new energy sources--solar and its progressive concentration in. food geothermal energy and nuclear fusion, for chains led to the killing of great numbers instance--that may be less polluting than of certain birds and fishes. All this has led, fossil fuels and less hazardous than nuclear in the United States, to the banning of fission. DDT for nearly all uses. Yet in countries Likewise we reject the notion of the so- where malaria is widespread, the spraying called "technological imperative"--the of house interiors with DDT has proved idea that we must pursue new tech the most effective antimalarial technique. nological possibilities, wherever they may available. In Sri Lanka (Ceylon) malaria lead. Thousands of projects may be techni had almost disappeared by 1963, when the cally feasible, including the destruction of DDT program was stopped. Then, in 1968 all human life on Earth. Even among those and 1969, there was an explosive increase projects that appear attractive at first in the number of infections. In 1967 only sight, careful appraisal may lead to the 3,465 cases had been reported; in 1968 the conclusion that they will do more harm number rose to 425,937, and in early 1969 than good. The U.S. Congress drew such a the rate of infection was even higher (/O). conclusion in 1971, when it voted to cut olT Other factors were at work, of course; the funds for the supersonic transport pro World Health Organization attributed the gram, which it had been generously fund rise in the incidence of malarja in large ing a few years earlier. part to conditions that were unusually fa In summary, the development of new vorable to the breeding of the Anopheles technologies is indispensable; the training mosquito and to unusual human popu and encouragement of gifted and imagina lation movements that helped to spread the tive technologists deserves a high priority infection (//). Nevertheless, until we have among our national needs, but the multiple something belter, DDT appears to be an repercussions of new technology need to be essential component of any major program critically evaluated before they are in of malaria control. troduced and constantly monitored after Other complexities have arisen in con their first introduction. Many schemes that nection with programs for international are technically brilliant must be rejected development. Dams and ` irrigation because their wider impact would, on the schemes have vastly increased the in whole, be more damaging than bene cidence of bilharziasis (schistosomiasis), a ficial. In some cases it would be prefer debilitating disease for which there is as able, in the eyes of some thoughtful sci yet no effective cure {12). The disastrous entific policy advisers, not to carry a effects of the recent catastrophic droughts project from the stage of research even in the Sahel region, south of the Sahara, into preliminary development, lest pres have been accentuated by some tech sures would then arise that would lead to nological innovations, notably, for ex its full development. ample, by the drilling of thousands of deep boreholes which have tapped the abundant water far below the surface. The resultant Conflicts Involving Scientific Freedom wells encouraged a great increase in the and Responsibility size of the cattle herds; pasture instead of water; became the limiting factor in num We turn now to the second item in the bers of cattle. As pasture dried up in the charge to this Committee, which calls for. drought, countless thousands of dead and us "to develop suitable criteria and proce dying cattle were clustered around the dures for the objective and impartial study boreholes, while the surrounding land, for of these problems." The conflicts that call miles around, was ravaged by trampling for such study generally lie in the realm of and overgrazing. These wells, drilled by applied science and technology, including men of good will and technical skill in or medicine and public health. In most in der to bring more water to the people and stances they involve the right, and the re cattle of the Sahel, became a major factor sponsibility, of an employee to warn con in intensifying a great human and natural cerning the dangers inherent in some prod disaster {IS). uct or process with which he has become These illustrations could be multiplied a familiar in the course of his work; that is, hundredfold. Let us add at once that we the "whistle blowing" activity of which we arc not among those who consider that have spoken earlier. The employer may 689 R&S 106741 put intense pressure on the employee to keep quiet; the employee may be fired, or life may be made so uncomfortable that he decides to resign. Interested parties may seek to suppress scientific data that are vi tal for the proper resolution of a con troversy. On the other hand, the employee may be acting not in the public interest but out of prejudice or spite against the em ployer. To be an "objective and impartial" judge in such circumstances is not easy; one person's "objectivity" looks like bias to another. In all these cases scientific evi dence is an essential part of the whole situ ation, but wise decisions involve complex human factors, ethical judgments, and standards of value that go far beyond purely scientific argument. We consider briefly a few specific cases, before dis cussing criteria and procedures.. The problem of standards for exposure to radiation. A few years ago, Drs. J. W. Gofman and A. R. Tamplin, who worked at the laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in Livermore, Califor nia, claimed that existing standards for ex posure to ionizing radiation were far too tolerant, and would permit a large increase in the number of deaths from cancer if ex posures rose to the allowed levels. They publicized their views widely. The chief au thorities in the AEC sharply opposed these views and held them to be invalid. Gofman and Tamplin eventually left the AEC, after what they believed to be considerable ha rassment, and eventually the AEC did im pose considerably stricter radiation stan dards for the protection of workers within its jurisdiction. A committee appointed by the National Academy of Sciences, after intensive study, produced a report, com monly known as the BEIR (Biological Ef fects of Ionizing Radiation) Report (14), which stands at present as the most author itative statement on the hazards of ionizing radiation. In our full report we consider this controversy at somewhat greater length. The case of the BA R T engineers. A ma jor feature of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system in the San Francisco Bay area was to be the Automated Train Con trol (ATC) system, for which a contract was awarded to the Westinghouse Electric Corporation in 1967, Beginning in April 1969, three of the engineers on the project became increasingly concerned about what they saw as serious defects in the system. They expressed their concerns to the man agement but drew no significant response except vague warnings not to be "trouble makers." Late in 1971 the three engineers decided to take their case to the Board of Directors; this led to a public hearing in February 1972, after which the Board voted 10 to 2 in favor of the management and against the engineers. The managers then told the three engineers^that they could choose between resigning and being fired; they refused to resign and were sum marily dismissed. Subsequent events vindi cated their concern. The ATC system failed on several occasions; the failures were so dangerous that the system could not be used, and it became, necessary to control the trains in the traditional man ner. The California Society of Professional Engineers (CSPE) initiated an inquiry. However, BART's top management refused to meet with them, or to offer ex planations to anyone. Then CSPE under took a full investigation of the firings, which brought out much disturbing infor mation, and the California State Legisla ture set in motion a study, resulting in a re port (the "Post Report") which essentially confirmed the warnings of the three engi neers. Although CSPE took tentative steps toward a court action on behalf of the engi neers, the society did not follow through on this. The engineers themselves launched a suit agaifist BART for $885,000, the out come of which we have not yet learned m The case of data suppression concerning the carcinogenicity of vinyl chloride. In May 1970 an Italian investigator. Dr. P. L. Viola, reported at a cancer congress that high concentrations of vinyl chloride caused cancer in rats. Up to that time there had apparently been no research in the plastics industry concerning the possible hazards of vinyl chloride, although tens'of thousands of workers were exposed to it. More than a year later, the Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA) in the United States initiated its own research and in October 1972 entered into an agree ment with the plastics manufacturers, who sponsored the European research, to share information but not to reveal it without the consent of the European manufacturers. In August 1972 Dr. Cesare Maltoni of Bo logna found angiosarcomas and various tumors in experimental animals exposed to vinyl chloride concentrations as low as 250 parts per million (ppm). At that rime the allowed exposure limit for workers in the United States was 500 ppm. In January 1973 U.S. scientists visited Dr, Maltoni and learned of his findings. However, they did not notify the National Institute of Oc cupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) concerning these extremely ominous find ings, nor did they make any attempt to warn the public or the workers exposed to vinyl chloride. In late January 1973 NIOSH requested information on possible hazards associated with occupational ex posure to 23 chemical substances, includ ing vinyl chloride. On 7 March, MCA re- v , . -4 sppnded by. recommending -a ^prekau.^* lionary label that made no mention *\ of toxic effects on animals or people; in * other words, it appears to have deliberately 1 deceived NIOSH regarding the true facts. Apparently MCA has claimed that the withholding of data was due to their agree ment with the European manufacturers to keep the data confidential until an agree ment for their release could be worked out. k[>* 44 C The fact remains that, because of the sup pression of these data, tens of thousands of workers were exposed without warning, for perhaps some 2 years, to toxic concentra tions of vinyl chloride. On 22 January 1974, B. F. Goodrich announced that three polyvinyl chloride workers, in just one of their plants, had died of angiosarcoma of the liver since 1971. On the same day MCA revealed the Maltoni data to NIOSH. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, on 5 April, in an ft emergency action lowered the permissible exposure level from 500 to 50 ppm; drastic further lowering, to 1 ppm or less, is in prospect (16). The evidence here seems clean a consid erable number of scientists were aware of the hazards of vinyl chloride long before the facts were made available to NIOSH or to the public; yet they kept quiet and gave no warning. As the Federation of American Scientists states, ".,, industrial scientists who fail to challenge conspiracies of silence within their firms are not re buked; rather, they are often quietly re warded for their loyalty." -7-' In industrial medicine and public health similar situations often arise. In recent books Paul Brodeur (17) and Rachel Scott (18) have described the medical problems of workers exposed to asbestos particles, beryllium dust, and other hazards. Many of these workers develop cancer, or fatal respiratory or other diseases, over the hi course of 10 or 20 years; the risk is high. Yet the company physicians who look af ter the workers sometimes join their em ployers in minimizing the need for more rigorous standards of health protection. This appears to be a clear abdication oT the prime responsibility of physicians or public health workers to place the health of the Mr h- people for whom they are responsible be nc- fore all other considerations. Obviously a doctor who is paid by a commercial enter prise will find it very difficult to act con trary to the policy of the company. The doctor who works for an independent in specting agency will be in a much stronger position. Even so, we know from experi ence that regulatory agencies often become the subservient allies of the organizations that they are supposed to regulate and ma> collaborate with the commercial organiza tion in concealing the hazards. R&S 106742 690 R&S 106743 (Criteria and Procedures for * -_ he Resolution of Conflicts * sional standards and by presenting clearly the-consequences to be expected if his/her professional judgment is not followed" (19, members of the societies, when their con cern is aroused, should deal with these matters by other mechanisms. However, in u-Having now indicated the character of p. 59). matters directly related to the professional ic problems, we now turn to criteria and The formulation of such a declaration is competence of members of the society, Iroccdures that may aid in resolving them, a significant event. How much it means de where the public interest is clearly in e approach the problem of establishing pends, of course, on the effectiveness with volved, we believe that the societies can iteria by asking questions rather than by which it is applied. Moreover, these guide and should play a much more active role Bering answers. How will the proposed lines, like most such codes of ethics that we than they have in the past. They can deal Eecision or procedure affect human health have seen, lack a very important in with such issues by setting up committees nd safety, and the general quality and gredient, namely, a provision for the arbi of inquiry in cases where a serious viola mcnities of life, for all the people con- tration of disputes. The protection of indi tion of scientific freedom or responsibility rned? Will a decision to require a drastic viduals from arbitrary action by authority is suspected; by publicizing the results of leanup of operating conditions in a cer is deeply ingrained in English common the inquiry in professional journals, and, if tain industry cause much of the industry to law, and the U.S. Constitution provides necessary, in the more popular journals :close down, with loss of jobs and produc that "no person shall ... be deprived of and in the news media; and by calling the tion? How should such risks be balanced life, liberty, or properly without due pro matter to the attention of governmental ^gainst considerations of safety and cess of law." We believe that some form of bodies, as with the California Legislature ealth? What are the possible large-scale due process should be an essential part of in the BART case. They can on occasion^ vironmental effects of the present opera- any employer-employee agreement or con launch lawsuits on behalf of their members ons and of the proposed changes? Have tract, to protect the employee from arbi who have apparently suffered injustice ible future effects been carefully con trary action by the employer, allegedly when acting on behalf of the public inter sidered, as, for instance, with the widely based on professional or personal miscon est. used aerosols, which liberate Freons that, duct. A minimum requirement for such In stating this, our major new proposal iin a decade or two, might (but again per due process would involve a hearing by a for dealing with "the objective and impar haps might not) destroy much of the ozone board, including independent members, tial study of these problems," we are aware ?in the stratosphere? These are some of the with the right of appeal to some reasonably of the difficulties that the proposal will i-problems that will have to be faced in the neutral but professionally qualified higher face. The most serious problems arc those ^formulation of criteria. Obviously it is far authority. Codes of professional ethics are of time and money. Most professional so ^/easier to impose suitable regulations on a likely to be ineffective unless some type of cieties have limited funds; many operate ^new enterprise than on a powerful industry due process is provided for the resolution more or less on a shoestring. They keep J&that is already established, with a huge of disputes. Without this, scientific free members' dues fairly small; otherwise ^icapital investment and with faults of oper- dom is likely to be abridged. We therefore members drop out, particularly in times of .J^ation and production that arc already strongly recommend that all employment economic hardship. The fighting of diffi rdeeply entrenched. Thus the peed for fore contracts involving scientific or profes cult cases, on behalf of members involved sight in technology assessment is over- sional employees include such provisions in controversies, can be a very expensive ^whelming; yet foresight is always imperfect for the review of disputes through hearing business, especially if the case goes into the SjKand needs constantly to be corrected by and appeal processes. Provision for neutral courts. In any event, responsible scientists /.further experience. or third-party participation is important, would be required to spend substantial Q We turn now to procedures: how is the particularly when issues of public interest amounts of precious time serving on hear histle blower to be assured of a fair hear are involved. ing panels, studying large bodies of evi ing, without fear of reprisals, and with a dence, and preparing reports. : good prospect that his recommendations, nl if they are found to be sound, will actually Professional Societies as When a professional society does fight for the rights of its members, it is more ;be put into practice? Many scientific and Protectors of the Public Interest engineering societies have developed codes likely to be concerned with defending their status and pay than to be acting primarily ^of ethics relating to the responsibility of How active can, and should, profes on behalf of the public interest as its pri ^employers and to the professional and per sional societies be in actively fighting on mary motive. The impetus to take actions sonal conduct of scientific and technical behalf of their members who arc attempt of the latter sort is likely to be much less ^employees. A highly articulate expression ing to defend the public interest? Most strong than the desire to provide direct of such concerns is to be found in a statc- such societies have in the past remained help to members of one's own professional Snnent on "Employment Guidelines," which aloof from conflicts of this sort and have group. ,,E?has now been adopted by at least 20 engi- often taken the attitude that the purity of These are powerful obstacles to our pro ^neering and scientific societies. For the their devotion to the advancement of their posals, but they are not insuperable. So j&i most part, it is concerned with the general respective sciences would somehow be con cieties that share common interests, but Principles that should govern relations be- taminated if they entered the public arena which may be individually too weak finan '*' tween employers and employees, but it also to contest such issues. We believe that such cially to support such activities, may band iO contains the significant statement: "The attitudes are no longer appropriate. The together in groups to finance the necessary iY" professional employee should have due re- scientific community can no longer remain operations. There are increasing pressures i/- ^ard for the safety, life and health of the apart from the conflicts of our time, where upon scientists, engineers, and other mem s"' public and fellow employees in all work for so many technological decisions are being bers of the scientific community to face which he/shc is responsible. Where the made that vitally affect the well-being of these public issues and deal with them ef technical adequacy of a process or product society. We are not proposing that profes fectively. These pressures come both from is involved, he/she should protect the pub- sional societies should take public stands the public and from within the ranks of the *'c ad his/her employer by withholding of on large general political issues, such as the scientists themselves. We arc well aware of plans that do not meet accepted profes- legitimacy of the Vietnam Wan individual the mistrust and hostility toward science May 1975 691 R&S 106744 STTTTesFin many quarters; one re flection of this attitude- is the decline in government support of scientific research in recent years. Such hostility will almost certainly grow unless scientists exhibit greater concern for preventing the misuse of science and technology. As these con cerns become more intense, it should be come easier for the professional societies to obtain additional funds to finance the expenses of lawsuits, hearing panels, and other activities undertaken in the defense of the public interest. Whether government funds could or should be available for such purposes is open to question; but it is likely that some of the major private founda tions, either those now in existence or those yet to be created, will see the urgency of supporting such public service activities. The need for these activities may also lead to the creation of other social mechanisms for dealing with these problems, of a sort that wc cannot now foresee. We look to^increased activity of the professional so cieties as the most hopeful approach to the problem in the immediate future. The Role of the AAAS in the Defense of Scientific Freedom and Responsibility We now consider the third charge from the AAAS to this Committee: "To recom mend mechanisms to enable the Associa tion to review specific instances in which scientific freedom is alleged to have been abridged or otherwise endangered, or re sponsible scientific conduct is alleged to have been violated." The domain of the AAAS is very broad, including all of the sciences and a large number of profes sional societies which belong to it as affili ates. Hence, by its nature the AAAS can not undertake the role that we have envisaged for the professional societies in the preceding section. The number of pos sible appeals to the AAAS, if it were to un dertake the responsibility of reviewing par ticular instances of alleged threats to scientific freedom and responsibility, would be immense. If it were to agree to handle some such cases, it would have to be rigorously selective and deal only with those that were at once so important and so broad in scope that they would fall out side the domain of any individual society. Because of its multiple affiliations with the professional societies, the AAAS can play an important part in coordinating many of the activities of the societies. A number of the societies, for example, are now formulating, or revising, codes of eth ics for their members, which will involve policies for dealing with issues such as we have been discussing here. The AAAS can help to provide an exchange of information on these matters among the different so cieties and thereby promote a more unified approach to these complex issues. The AAAS is already playing a signifi cant role in dealing with alleged abridg ments of scientific freedom, and alleged vi olations of responsible scientific conduct, through active discussion of such matters in Science, chiefly.in the News and Com ment section, but also in some of the lead articles and in the Letters section.-.Since Science is so widely read, both inside and outside the scientific community, this is one of the most important channels now available for bringing such problems to the attention of the public. To focus public at tention on such problems, of course, is not to resolve them, but it is an essential step toward such resolution. We recommend that Science, without any drastic change of its present editorial policies, enhance its coverage of such matters, particularly by inviting distinguished academic, industrial, and government scientists who are well in formed on some of these controversial is sues to set them forth in its pages. In some cases, it will be desirable to present two or more articles by different authors, ex pressing more or less contradictory points of view. In scientific controversies, it should not be necessary for the champions of different views to operate like adver saries in a court of law, the opposing sides presumably should be able to find a large area of agreement about scientific facts that are not in dispute. The real dis-" agreements in such cases usually turn not on the scientific facts but on the relative weight to be given to different kinds of sci entific facts, and on extrascientific issues involving political judgment and broad general perspectives on human nature and human motives. These factors always enter into the practical decisions that must be made in applications of science and tech nology. When a scientist or technologist slates a case for action of a certain sort on such an issue, it is important that he make clear the general presuppositions from which he starts. He may, of course, be un conscious of these presuppositions; if so. Science should as a matter of editorial pol icy bring them to the surface. This is im portant, both for the rational discussion of the issues involved and for' the main tenance of public confidence in the honesty and objectivity of scientists. On rare occasions the AAAS may and should become actively involved in broad issues that are important and con troversial, as it did when it decided to con duct an investigation of the effects of defoliants and herbicides in Vietnam, This was an important attempt to obtain scien tific evidence on an issue that had aroused. passionate controversy (20). The NationalAcademy of Sciences, at the request of Congress, later undertook a more exten sive study of the same problems, with in creased financial support provided by the Department of Defense. The resulting re port of the National Academy committee | {21) greatly extended and amplified the AAAS report; the findings of both are for the most part reasonably concordant, but some discrepancies have given rise to con troversy (22). These disagreements can be resolved later, when it is possible to con duct studies of the Vietnamese forests on the ground in a peaceful setting; as long as war continues, only aerial observations are possible. In any case the AAAS study per formed a valuable service and was in no way rendered superfluous by the later study of the National Academy of Sci ences. This raises the more general question: What should be the relation between the AAAS and the National Academy in mat ters such as we have considered in this re port? The National Academy has special prestige and a unique relation to the U.S. government. It, and its committees, can speak on many issues with far more au thority than the AAAS, and it can gener ally command much more financial sup port for its investigations. However, the AAAS. with its much broader member ship, is more widely representative of American science in general, and its greater independence from governmental ties gives it a greater freedom of action. Both organizations clearly have very im portant and somewhat different roles to play in the maintenance of scientific free dom and responsibility; The problems we have been considering here will certainly continue and will prob ably become more numerous and more acute in the years to come. We hope that the concern of the AAAS will continue. We suggest that, not more than 5 years hence, the AAAS should reexamine the whole problem, perhaps by setting up a committee similar to this one, to see where we stand at that time. Alternatively or in addition, it might set up a committee to re ceive complaints concerning violations of scientific freedom and responsibility and refer them, when possible and desirable, to appropriate bodies for further study and possible action. Such a committee should not itself serve as a judicial body; its func tions should be to refer complaints for pos sible action elsewhere and to analyze the information received, with an eye to pos sible recommendations concerning future policy initiatives by the AAAS in the light of this information. The terms of reference a >> e. 692 SCIENCE VOL. IS8 'e lor [of such a committee would need to be very [carefully drawn, to prevent the committee jifrom being overwhelmed by a mass of un manageable complaints. Rtfftttico ind Notes I. Perspective on Chlorinated Dibenzodiox'tns and Dibenzofurans (Environmental Health Per* : spectives. Experimental Issue No. 5* Department of Health. Education, and Welfare Publication No. NIH 74-128. National Institute of Environ mental Health Sciences, Box 12233, Research Tri angle Park, N.C* September 1973). Several arti* * cles deal with the toxicity of the dioxins. See , particularly table 4 in the article by R. Baughman and M. S. Meselson, pp. 27-35, which summarizes the results of earlier workers. !. V. Earle, Ed., On Academic Freedom (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1971), 1. P. Berg et aL Science 185, 303 (1974); N. Wade, ibid., p. 332, i. In February 1975, an international conference of experts at the Asilomar Conference Center in Cali fornia devoted several days of intensive discussions to this problem and concluded with a recommen dation to lift the voluntary moratorium on most of these proposed genetic experiments. However, such experiments were to be done only subject - to rigorous precautions for containment of the possibly hazardous organisms, the stringency of the precautions increasing with the estimated risk in different categories of experiments. Indeed, for many of the possible experiments, the required conditions cannot be met without the development of new organisms and new techniques, so that the moratorium is in effect being continued for such experiments. See N. Wade, Science 187, 931 (1975). 4. J. Katz, Ed.. Experimentation with Human Beings (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1972). 5. "Clinical Studies in the Human: The Ethicat and Scientific Problems," symposium by A. C. Barnes, R. Q. Mansion, B. Barber, and J. Katz [Fend, Sterii. 23,593 (1972)]. 6. B. J. Culliton, Science 185,426 (1974), 7. E. F. Bchrman, Hew York Times (9 June 1974), opposite editorial page. 8. AAAS Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare, "The integrity of science," Am, $ci. 53,174(1965). 9. For a useful short history of the use of DDT, see G. Mclntire, Environment (St, Louis) 14 (No, 6), 14 (1972). 10. These figures are from World Health Organization Releve Eptdemiologique Hebdomadaire (8 August 1969). 11. R, Garcia, Environment (St, Louis) 14 (No, 5), 2 (1972). 12. For numerous examples of this and many other problems in international development schemes, see The Careless Technolog)': Ecology and Inter national Development. M. T. Farvar and J. P. Mil- ton. Eds. (Natural History Press, Garden City, N.Y., 1972). 13. C. Sterling. Atlantic Monthly (May 1974), p. 98; N. Wade, Science 185,234 (1974). 14. Report of the Advisory Committee on the Biologi cal Effects of Ionizing Radiations, The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels ofIonizing Radiation (Division of Medical Sciences, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council Washington, D.C,, 1972). 15. Our description is taken from a more detailed re port by S. H. Unger ("The BART Case: Ethics and the Employed Engineer." Inst. Electr. Elec tron. Eng. Comm. Soc. Implications Teehnnl. News!. No. 4 (Sept. 1973), p. 6 (V. Klig. Ed,, 497 Park Avenue. Lconia. NJ. 07605)]. 16. Our discussion is based on Fed. Am. Sri. Prof. Bull. 2 (No. 8). 1 (1974). 17. P. Brodeur, Expendable Americans (Viking Press, New York, 1974). Concerning the hazards of as bestos, and steps taken to control them, sec also: A. K. Ahmed, D. R. MacLeod, J. Carmody (Envi ronment fSt. Louis) l4(No. 10), 16(1972)]. 18. R. Scott, Muscle and Blood (Dutton, New York, 1974). 19. Statement on "Employment Guidelines," Insi. Elect. Electron. Eng. Spectrum 1973. 57 (Apnl 1973). The statement has been adopted by at least 20 engineering and scientific societies. 20. M. S. Meselson, A. H. Westing, J. D. Constable Herbicide Assessment Commission of the Ameri can Association for the Advancement of Science, Background Material Relevant to Presentations at the 1970 Annual Meeting of the AAAS (reprinted in the Congressional Record 118 (No. 32), S3226S3233 (3 March 1972)]. 21. Committee on the Effects of Herbicides in Viet nam, The Effects of Herbicides in South Vietnam (National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1974). 22. Concerning this controversy, see, for instance. D. Shapley [Science 183, 1177 (1974)] and C. No' ' man [Nature (Lone/. / 24.5, 186(1974)]. 33 W O with origins deep in the social structui O) and from the ambience of the early Job ^ son Administration which encompassed CJ7 If Social Indicators commitment to the idea that the benef and costs of domestic social programs r subject to measurement and to the beliei that each newly perceived, albeit ancient, wf Social science researchers are developing concepts inadequacy in the society should, and and measures of changes in society. would, call forth a corrective response from a federal government whose efficacy would be assisted by social measurement, Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Robert Parke planning, and new management analytical techniques. Impetus was provided by a handful of social scientists and public ad ministrators. The enthusiasm elicited re sponses from economists who saw a role A statistical report entitled Social In- ography were issued in 1970, 1971, and for their skills as theorists and measurers %gcdicaiors, 1973 was published last year by 1972. Government agencies both in the of welfare, sociologists who saw the rele ^jr -the U.S. Office of Management and Bud- United States and abroad (5), as well as vance of their own research tradition in the 1jl-get (/). Social Indicators contains charts private scholars and research institutes, arc measurement of social trends, political sci 'and tables presenting statistical lime series concerning themselves with social in entists who sought ways to rationalize gov selected and organized around eight "so dicators, as are international organizations ernment programs, social workers, public cial concerns," namely, health, public such as the Conference of European Statis administrators, and a broad array of social gjliSj-safety, education, employment, income, ticians (4), the Organization for Economic researchers and practitioners. Out of this housing, leisure and recreation, and popu- Cooperation and Development (J), the emerged what came to be known qs the j;-- lation. The report is the first of its kind to United Nations Research Institute for So "social indicators movement," an apt des be issued by the U.S. government. Its pub cial Development (<5), the United Nations ignation in that, as in all movements in lication is symptomatic of the widespread Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga their initial stages, the participants were interest in social indicators. nization (7), and the United Nations Food ill-defined as to membership, had little or This interest is further reflected in a so and Agriculture Organization (8). ganization, and shared few specific objec cial indicators bibliography that was pub "Social indicators," and allied phrases, tives, but sensed great needs and opportu lished in late 1972 (2). More than half of "social accounting," "social reporting," nities for change, celebrated shared but the 1000 or more items listed in the bibli- and "monitoring social change" came into necessarily ambiguous symbols, and were use by social scientists, commentators, and led by able and articulate idealists. Dr. Sheldon is president of the Sochi Science Re2 *oarch Council. 605.Third Avenue. New York, N.Y. lh 10016. Mr. Parke is director of the Council's Center T.Sf.'r 'or Coordination of Research on Social Indicators. Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. -20036. policy-makers in the mid-1960's. These phrases and the ideas- they represented emerged from an awareness of rapid social change, from a sense of emerging problems From the ambiguity of the early dis cussions several distinguishable types of research activities have emerged. Social indicators. Conceptual, method- i 16 MAY 1975 693 f !>.' >V y R&S 106746 Agency'for Resi'Jrch onCanccr (of which ! 1 John" T,'Edsulfcminj:crcdi(ing " Vinyl Chloride and DDT: Environmental Effects The report of the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, ab breviated as an article by John T. Edsall (16 May, p. 687), requires comment. The section entitled "The case ofdata suppres sion concerning the carcinogenicity of vi nyl chloride'' (p. 690) contains omissions and errors that are inconsistent with the committee's concern for scientific freedom and responsibility. Since so much pertinent information has been omitted concerning this matter, readers may be misled into believing the report. Edsall states that, until May 1970, "there had apparently been no research in the plastics industry concerning the pos sible hazards of vinyl chloride...This is untrue. In fact, the basic published data on vinyl chloride toxicity came from Ameri can industry (/, 2). The information in (2) had been publicly disclosed and presented before their publication dates. Further more, the investigations of Viola and of Maltoni have been supported by European industries. Edsall correctly states that Manufac turing Chemists Association (MCA) mem ber companies entered into an agreement with the European sponsors of Maltoni's work not to reveal preliminary Italian data. The agreement was not dissimilar to those commonly made between American sponsors (government, industry, and aca demic) and research institutions that new data remain the property of the institution and that final results be disclosed through proper scientific channels when a study is completed and evaluated. There was no in tention of withholding adverse data. Under MCA rules, all data developed under its auspices must be promptly reported pub licly. Without exception, this has been done with all data on vinyl chloride. U.S. government scientists knew of Maltoni's preliminary results early in 1973 but considered them to be as preliminary as did U.S, industry. At the Second Inter national Symposium on Cancer Detection and Prevention in Bologna, Italy. 9 to 12 April 1973, Maltoni showed a tabic of pre liminary results linking vinyl chloride with cancer formation (which was not published until 1974) (3). Umberto Saffioui. asso ciate director of carcinogenesis at the Na tional Cancer Institute, was present at the meeting and Subsequently discussed the re sults with Maltoni at his Italian laboratory (4). SalTioui felt that the work should be included in "a well documented report" to be assessed by a review panel of the World Health Organization's International the United States1 is a member). This panel 1J with halting a choIcriFepidemii in Naples"*1 also considered Maltdni's data to be pre- ` during World War 'll.''A' National Acad- ' liminary at that time and "decided to post emy of Sciences committee slated in 1970 pone compilation of the definitive review (/) that "DDT has prevented 500 million to the next meetini* of the committee" (4). deaths due to malaria that would otherwise After a period m which epidemiological have been inevitable." However, the and animal studies were being established, Naples miracle involved typhus rather MCA, on 17 April 1973, asked the Euro than cholera or malaria. peans to jointly make presentations to It is unfortunate that Edsall selected an U.S. and- European government author undergraduate student's term paper (2) as ities. The Europeans readily agreed, and "a useful short history of the use of DDT," on 15 June 1973, MCA called the National for several well-informed scientists have Institute for Occupational Safety and written articles and books on DDT which Health (NIOSH) and requested an oppor would be more appropriate sources for tunity to bring new information to that AA AS articles. He also refers to "the long agency's attention. The appointment was persistence of DDT in soil," perhaps being set by NIOSH for 17 July. Five European unaware that Stringer et al. (J) found the and American industry representatives half-life of DDT to be only 3 years in presented to NIOSH the information that orchard soil after 17 successive years of tumors had been found in animals exposed heavy spraying. Edsall cites DDT's "pro to vinyl chloride concentrations below gressive concentration in food chains" as those that Viola had reported caused can having "led to the killing of great numbers cer in rats. At that time, no human cancer of certain birds and fish"; however, the cases had been reported; therefore, no spe lack of food chain magnification, espe cial significance could be attached to the cially in marine environments, has been types of tumors observed by Maltoni. pointed out by Moriarty (4), Humelink et The precautionary label suggested by al. (J), Harvey (6). and in two committee MCA and referred to by Edsall was illus draft reports of the National Academy of trated in MCA's Chemical Safety Data Sciences (7). Sheet (SD56) on vinyl chloride, revised in While Edsall did not recommend halting April 1972. Section 10.1 on "Health haz DDT use for malaria control, some "envi ards" refers to Viola's published studies. ronmentalists" are again seeking to halt all The Data Sheet states, "Recent research DDT exports from the United Slates. It is studies reported from Italy indicate that encouraging to see no such proposals in the repeated, long-term high level exposures of AAAS committee report. rats to vinyl chloride monomer vapor can J. Gordon Edwards result in the development of malignant tu Department ofBiological Sciences, mors. However, many years of industrial San Jose Stale University, experience with human exposures to con San Jose, California 95192 centrations frequently far above current standards have not demonstrated any car cinogenicity to humans." Thus the state ment by Edsall that MCA "... appears to have deliberately deceived NIOSH regard ing the true facts" is inaccurate and mis leading. Albert C. Clark Manufacturing Chemists Association, 1825 Connecticut Avenue. NW. Washington. D.C. 20009 References 1. T. R. Torkclson, F, 0>cn, V. K. Rowe, Ant. Ind. lf\g Assoc,J 22, 354 (1961); R.H. Wilson, W. E. McCormick, C. F. Tatum, J, L, Creech, J. Am Med Assoc. 201, 577 (1967); E. D. Baretta. R, D. Sicwarl. J. E. Mutehlcr, Am. ind. flyg. Assoc. J 30,537 (1969). 2. B D Dinman, W, A. Cook, W. M Whitchousc. H. J. Mugnuson, T, Dilchcck, Arch. Environ. Health 22, 61 (1971); W. A, Cook. P. M. Gicver, B. D. Dinman. H. J. Magnuson, ibid,, p, 74; V. N, Dodson. B. D. Dinman, W, M. Whitchousc, A. N. M. Nasr, H. J. Magnuson, ibid., p. 83; C. G. Kramer, and J, , Mulchlcr, Am. ind. iiy%. Assoc. J. 33, 19 (1972) 3. C. Maltoni, Excerpta Med Int. Congr. Ser. No. 275(1974). p. 4, 4. G SafFiotti. in U.S. Senate, Committee on Com merce. Subcommittee on Environment, Vinyl Chloride (93rd Congress* 2nd session, 1974), pp. 54-56, References 1. Committee on Science and Public Policy, The Life Sciences (National Academy of Sciences, Wash ington, D.C., 1970). p. 432. 2. G. Mclniire, Environment (St. Louts) 14 (No. 6), 14(1972). 3. A. Stringer. J. A. Pickard, C. H. Lyons, Pestic. Sci. 5. 587(1974). 4. V. Moriarty, New Sci. 53. 594 (1972). 5. J. L. Hamclmk. R . Waybrunl, R, C. Bull, Trans. Am, Fish.Soc 100.207(1971). 6. G. R. Harvey. Oceanus IK. 19(1974), 7. J. W. Kanwishcr, "DDT in the marine environ ment4' (chairman's draft of an ad hoc committee report. National Academy of Sciences. Washing ton, D,C, 1973). G. R. Harvey. "DDT in tne marine environment-A review of present under standing" (draft of an ad hoc committee report, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1973). I am glad to note that, as Clark's letter points out. there was research by Ameri can industry on the toxicity of vinyl chlo ride, beginning several years before 1970. In this work, however, what have proved to be the major hazards were not discovered; if they had been, the later story would have been very different. I am obliged also for Clark's correction regarding the pre cautionary label, which did in fact make reference to malignant tumors in'rats pro- 174 SCIENCE, VOL. 189 R&S 106747 ' ^i;Y- '-i. - y`i" V^` i~i'y'. '*" --**v v^-' yuccd;^> .."rqwiicUrJilfea^g^glijU^i 'Thc.jjogl v/, %rfrL*'fft IW.HTW* w^dcr.',,, exposures.". The alliluile;1cxpres.soiJ.ript;w/rel()ij).kxs,persLsteiilt.;uul inore.specilie pcs-/, Clark's leuer, however, illust rates,ilie nia-. ^lieides tliui can be directed against a nar- jor point tlial caused concern to the Coni-. .../ow./ange [Of target species, .while doing . . millee on Scientific Freedom and Kc.s|H>n- little or no damage l<> others. .... sibility. The extremely ominous findings in John T. Eusai.i. the animal studies did not trigger any ma Biological Laboratories. jor alarm until cases of cancer in factory Harvard University. workers exposed to vinyl chloride began to Cambridge. Massachusetts 02138 he reported. This has been in the past the general attitude regarding such problems; 1 believe that it is now out of date. New re agents introduced into industry on a large References 1. B. Ames. F. D, Lee. W. E- Durston, Proc. NatL Sci. VS.A. 70.782 (1973). 2. T. Jukes, NaturwUstnjchofien 61,6 (1974). scale should be regarded as dangerous un til proved safe. Precautions to protect workers from inhaling or absorbing them should be built in from the very start, rath er than being superimposed later, after damage has become apparent. Carcino genic substances usually take years to pro duce cancers; we should not wait for the cancers to appear in human subjects before taking action. Fortunately the- work of Ames et al. (I) and others has shown that carcinogens are generally mutagens. Screening of chemicals for mutageni city can be carried out fairly rapidly. With the techniques available today we can thus often obtain an early warning of danger, but negative results on mutagenicity tests should not be cause for complacency. Highly toxic substances may be nonmuta- genic. I thank Edwards and others for correct ing the erroneous statement that DDT brought a halt to a cholera epidemic. It was of course a typhus epidemic that was halted by DDT. How this error slipped through I do not know; the error is in any case mine, not that of the committee. This point will be corrected in ail reprints. One can add to the references cited by Edwards a recent review on insecticides by Jukes (2) which contains a vigorous de fense of the value and safety of DDT. Some of the environmental damage that has been charged to DDT was probably unreal or greatly exaggerated; some was probably due to other substances, such as the polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's), which most analysis long failed to distin guish from DDT and its breakdown pro ducts. Nevertheless the olticiul decision to ban DDT for nearly all uses in the United Slates was not arbitrary or capricious; it was taken after prolonged hearings, with presentation of a profusion of evidence by both sides. The case for using DDT in countries where malaria is a serious prob lem is far stronger. To my knowledge there is no adequate substitute for the spraying of interior walls of houses with DDT solu tions as an essential element in a malaria control program. I would oppose any poli cy of denying such countries the ability to purchase and use DDT for these purposes. Itt JULY 1975 Copied by foj Milton Freifeld 7/15/75 - i Oil **iU. _* n';tl t *' ' iya; I ifT '  3 iiiir 9 ,975 MANUFACTURING CHEMISTS ASSOCIATION 1825 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20009 (202) 483-6126 ALBERT C. CLARK VICE PRESIDENT technical director June 2, 1975 R&S 106748 Philip H. Abelson, Editor "Science" 1515 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20005 Dear Dr. Abelson: The Edsall article, "Scientific Freedom and Responsibility" (J. T. Edsall, "Science," May 16, 1975) requires comment. I presume Dr. Edsall is not responsible for the content of the arti cle, but merely prepared it from the AAAS committee report. How ever, scientific freedom and responsibility are as important for AAAS committees as they are for other scientists. The "case of data suppression concerning the carcinogenicity of vinyl .chloride" (pg. 690) is a melange of omissions and untruths inconsistent with scientific freedom and responsibility. Since so much pertinent information has been omitted concerning this matter readers may be misled into believing Dr. Edsall's report. Edsall states that, "up to that time (May 1970) there had apparently been no research in the plastics industry concerning the possible hazards of vinyl chloride...". This is untrue. In fact, the basic published data on vinyl chloride toxicity came from American industry.(references 1-7) The information in refer ences 4, 5, 6, and 7 had been publicly disclosed and presented prior to their publication dates. Furthermore, the investigations of Dr. P. L. Viola and Dr. Maltoni have been supported by European industries. Edsall correctly states that Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA) member companies entered into an agreement with the European sponsors of Maltoni's work not to reveal preliminary Italian data. The agreement was not dissimilar to that between American sponsors (Government, Industry, and Academic) and research institutions that new data remain the property of the institution and not be disclosed until the study is completed and evaluated prior to disclosure of final results in proper scientific channels. There was no intention to withhold adverse data. Under MCA rules, all data developed under its auspices must be promptly reported publicly. Without exception, this has been done with all data on vinyl chloride. Philip H. Abelson, Editor Science" June 2, 1975 page 2 U. S. Government scientists knew of Maltoni's preliminaryresults early in 1973 but considered it as preliminary as did U. S. industry. At the Second International Symposium on Cancer Detection and Prevention in Bologna, April 9-12, 1973, Dr. Maltoni showed a table of preliminary results linking vinyl chloride with cancer formation^ (not published until 1974) . Dr. Umberto Saffiotti, Associate Director of Carcinogenisis, National Cancer Institute, was present at the meeting and subsequently discussed the results with Maltoni at his Italian laboratory.^ Saffiotti felt that the work needed to be included in "a well documented report" to be assessed by the World Health Organization (Review Panel of the International Agency for Research on Cancer of which the United States is a mem ber) . This committee also considered Maltoni's data preliminary at that time and "decided to postpone compilation of the definitive review to the next meeting of the committee. Following a period in which epidemiological and animal studies were being established, MCA on April 17, 1973 asked the Europeans to jointly make presentations to United States and European Govern ment authorities. The Europeans readily agreed, and on June 15, 1973 MCA called the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and requested an opportunity to bring new information to that agency's attention. The appointment was set by NIOSH for July 17. Five European and American industry representatives presented to NIOSH the information that tumors had been observed at concentra tions below that reported by Viola. At that time, human cases had not been reported; therefore, no special significance could be attached to the types of tumors observed by Maltoni. The MCA suggested label referred to by Edsall was illustrated in the Chemical Safety Data Sheet (SD56) on vinyl chloride, revised April 1972. Section 10.1 on Health Hazards refers to Viola's pub lished studies. The Data Sheet states "Recent research studies reported from Italy indicate that repeated, long-term high level exposures of rats to vinyl chloride monomer vapor can result in the development of malignant tumors. However, many years of in dustrial experience with human exposures to concentrations frequently far above current standards have not demonstrated any carcinogenicity to humans." Thus the statement by Edsall that MCA "...appears to have deliberately deceived NIOSH regarding the true facts." is inac curate and misleading. Sincerely, c/) o O-4) (0 References: (1) Torkelson, T. R., F. Oyen, and V. K. Rowe. The toxicity of vinyl chloride as determined by repeated exposure of laboratory animals. American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal, 22(5), 35/1-361. 1961. (2) Wilson, R. 11., W. E. McCormick, C. F. Tatum, and J. L. Creech. Occupational Acroosteolysis, report of 31 cases. The Journal of the American Medical Association, 201(8), 577-581. 1967. (3) Baretta, E,, D., R. D. Stewart, and J. E. Mutchler. Monitoring Exposure to vinyl chloride vapor: breath analysis and continuous air sampling. American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal, 30, 537-544. 1969. (4) Dinman, B. D., W. A. Cook, W. M. Whitehouse, H. J. Magnuson, and T. Ditcheck. Occupational Acroosteolysis: I. An Epidemio logical Study. Archives of Environmental Health, 22, 61-73. 1971. (5) Cook, W. A., P. M. Giever, B. D. Dinman, and H. J. Magnuson. Occupational Acroosteolysis: II. An Industrial Hygiene Study. Archives of Environmental Health, 22_, 74-82. 1971. (6) Dodson, V. N., B. D. Dinman, W. M. Whitehouse, A. N. M. Nasr, and H. J. Magnuson. Occupational Acroosteolysis: III. A.clinical study. Archives of Environmental Health, 22_, 83-91. 1971. (7) Kramer, C, G., and J. E. Mutchler. The correlation of clinical and environment measurements for workers exposed to vinyl chloride. American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal, 33(1), 19-30. 1972. (8) Maltoni, C. Occupational Carcinogenisis. Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Cancer Detection and Prevention. Bologna, April 9-12, 1973. Excerpta Medica, Amsterdam. 1974. (9) Hearing before the Subcommittee on Environment of the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, August 21, 1974, (Serial No. 93-110) on Dangers of Vinyl Chloride, pages 54-56. R&S 106750