Document XzN3ybL1dq09jwqwLRMMeZmvx

ABD00180107 HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDIES (HAZOPS) VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY Aberdeen, Mississippi WILLIAM F. EARLY, II JUNE 25, 1990 STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION HOUSTON, TEXAS (713) 492-4000 Copyright 1989 ABD00180108 INTRODUCTION ABD00180109 H Z LU RISK MANAGEMENT ABD00180110 MANAGEMENT PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT RISK ASSESSMENT - BACKGROUND CHEMICAL PROCESS INDUSTRY - CMA, CCPS oCoO X CO oI- LU 2 X < _J LU LU oX oo X LJLJ X L1J CL _ xm 5O GC CO GC 5 LU GC 0. LL CmO < CO _I a <* Z9 2< b< - H" XGC E LU LU h- oCL ~ < CO < g << 2 GC CO UJ CO X CD oLL CO >] < cq o . io &CQ i- O X X X LU $ oCO GC 2> O oCO LU LU X I- GZ LU Q_ UJ Od _J CO LU CO X < LU < LU O CO x x < LU CO X 5 tj LU Z> G < LU < oGC H * CO CO X I- Z LU O i LU GC ABD00180111 CURRENT REGULATORY PROGRAMS C a lifo rn ia H ealth and S a fe ty C ode (C h a p te r 6 .9 5 ) > 4> O CO UJ 4> LU -0 0) O 5 ifl Csl GO o 0>) o O 4w) H- D <0 o <0 < c o 4) ** CO c 3 o c E c E= 0>) 0) o oo CD it Uj +* 4) a o o CJ T-- to o (0 to CM CM -J 5s 4Q), > ow O4) 3 .is UJ Q o < > CO 4) UJ 15 H CO D 4) CQ O O) 0. o o _ 4> -- > 15 o g CO H o < X < X . c2 'E& 4> I- < X 1 CO o CO o o o z< O UJ CO. X X oo ABD00180112 CURRENT REGULATORY PROGRAMS O < o> CQ c 2 -X W ir ^ O) S 00 oo 2^ CO CF> .Q 3 -O CO o CO 0 o* ^ UJ CNB ^ X kS s S Q^-v x UJ o c O) c wo N X oc o a c < CO o < o P: "D C E i po 5* o t c CO CD Uj O -j * Q U| CO o <Q X Uj CO CO o. . O "O u. aj 01. O ct 0- RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT ELEMENTS OF RISK MANAGEMFNT PROGRAM ABD00180113 PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION -----------/ '------ RISK COMMUNICATION ABD00180114 Clean Air Act Amendment Senate Version 1. Chemical Safety Investigation Board 2. EPA Establish Requirements 3. Mandatory Hazard Assessments 4. Duty to Operate a Safe Facility ABD00180115 Clean Air Act Amendment Senate Version 1.Chemical Safety Investigation Board An independent agency with its own staff Three appointed members 'Powers to investigate serious accidents Conduct studies for potential hazards Make recommendations to EPA Administrator ABD00180116 Clean Air Act Amendment Senate Version 2.EPA Establish Prevention Requirements Applicable to Handlers of AH Ms Could include all elements of RMPs in practice New Jersey California Delaware Not preempt state requirements Potential elements Procedures Training Maintenance Emergency Planning Prevention systems Record Keeping Board recommendations trigger specific components ABD00180117 Clean Air Act Amendment Senate Version 3.Mandatory Hazard Assessments List of hazardous chemicals requiring an assessment Issue hazard assessment guidelines Completion deadline for hazard assessments Review hazard assessments every two years Hazard assessment results in written report Hazardous chemicals list must total 50 Hazardous chemicals list may be expanded EPA consider hazardous chemicals from -SARA Sec 302 New Jersey TCPA European community list Specific reference to AlChE - Guideline for Hazard Evaluation New Jersey - TCPA ABD00180118 Clean Air Act Amendment Senate Version 4.Duty to Operate a Safe Facility Must take reasonable mitigation steps Applies to Extremely Hazardous Substances Broad powers to remove imminent dangers Increase EPA response capability Fixes prime legal responsibility on plant operators ABD00180119 OSHA Process Hazards Management for Highly Hazardous Chemicals 1- Process safety information 2- Process hazard analysis 3- Operating procedures 4- Training 5- Contractors 6- Pre-startup safety review 7- Mechanical integrity 8- Hot work permits 9- Management of change 10- Incident investigations 11- Emergency response ABD00180120 Process Hazards Management for Highly Hazardous Chemicals 1-Process safety information Develop, maintain, and communicate certain process information 2- Process hazard analysis Perform a process hazard analysis. 3-Operating procedures Develop and implement written operating procedures. 4-Training Implement an effective training program. 5-Contractors Inform contractors of known potential hazards. 6- Pre-startup safety review Perform a pre-startup review. 7-Mechanical integrity Establish a program to assure mechanical integrity. 8-Hot work permits Issue a permit for hot work operations. 9-Management of change Establish and implement a written procedure to manage change 10- Incident investigations Implement an incident investigation program. 11-Emergency response Develop and implement an emergency response plan. PRESCREENING I HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ! HAZARD ANALYSIS RISK REDUCTION ABD00180121 ABD00180122 \ HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION ABDOO 1.80123 OC 4P 'Ml HAZARDS EVALUATION ABD00180124 PROCEED WITH SYSTEM DESIGN OR OPERATION MODIFY SYSTEM ABD00180125 06-40. 248 ABD00180126 D0W /M 0ND INDICES < o LU IJ. </) 0. LU < O ll LU N << 0) X ABD00180127 ubc bp y ABD00180128 LU O I- % zO LU O O H Eb CO DC 0. CO Q 3< LU 5 6 o LU LU LU D>< OPS woo LU Li. < CO Li. CO m LU OC 2Q Z LU CO Z 2o< CC CO Q oi DC < < N Z Q. (0 LU . LU o g; < s cc z J z- <C it < < (/> oGO tLUt UO 2\ O CO LU OC Q Li. 0. O < 0. ABD00180129 NO P R IO R ITIZA TIO N O F RESULTS co o UJ oz LU 2-Z o UJ 2ts<0 (0 CC Q UJ m 0. 2 P < eg So <0h 5CO Q3 --z oUJ CC " oo UL UJ 2< CC Eo CC h| o < UzJ is LU o o> a. uj o s5s| o. cc CO O 3520) UJ O < sg = i |_ OC < Q (0 UJ o o UJ 0) UJ Q s! = </> 111 o < UJ CO o3 o u. >: d QZ UJO >O K< _<o< z UJ JB I0UZUI O >5 O < Q CO <O ABD00180130 (/> Q D < 111 U. < (/) 85-44, 963 THE AUDITOR ABD00180131 pt>r a t a ABD00180132 NO P R IO R ITIZA TIO N O F RESULTS REQ UIRES TE A M O F PEO PLE (/> LU O (n 3 h t/5 O o LU oZ LU o Q 3 0) o zo <Q < LU < O > r1 O </> * *- LU Z Z 0) LL < </> LU o LU IU LU 0) o-- C0 LU 8 a </> LU s sg si O < O < 5 oz g o< 2 u. z (0 Q ABD00180133 ABD00180134 86-48, 254 ABD00180135 WHAT IF" ANALYSIS - TCPA REGULATIONS UESTION LIST MAY BE PREPARED IN CONFERENCE RINDEPENDENTLY LU O Q < < LU Q LU GC CC << 0. O LU </) < Ql OC u. 0- cc O O Lb CO CO LL </) Q O H Z Ui S 3 O ?g CO co Ui o o LU 2o p oo Q LU < 2 Z Ui UQ cc oLU h = ui q9z Li. CO U.-------_ OC > 0. D. Ui O LU CO I I I I I I I I 0. oo ABD00180136 CRITICALITY BASED ON POTENTIAL RELEASE RATE RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO MITIGATE HAZARD Q DC LU LU S^ oLU zz 2 < H 03 o S) LU Q UJ 03 < H m & LU < O O OC CQ < < Z Q OC < < * DC Q < LU 9 LU UJ N < Z 8|0. o CD 03 Q CC . Ul UJ O z (0 UJ UJ J_- 3 OC o Xg CL < UinJ (/) O Qu. UJ t z 20 ii 2< x <1 O 03 o 3 I- 0O Ho (0 2 UJ = 3O <1 {2 2$ s -i UJ K ^ I-- -I 3 02 :u. O& -- in H UJ 2< </) X LU s? 3 (0 UJ J 03 < < CC X CC r oo : O h- U. X H- 1 i i i ABD00180137 WHAT IF" ANALYSIS DATA o < 09 Ui CL CC h <n .. > Ui -i h< < z o< z o h CO CO Ui o ABD00180138 CRITICALITY RANKINGS AT VARIOUS PLACES ONSITE? HO W MANY ppb OF A CERTAIN TRACE IM PURITY W ILL CAUSE A PRODUCT TO BE DISCARDED? Q LU CO LU CQ o CO fUJsm <UJ ff O) > >>H CO z! <o 2 a< 511 CC UJ UJ iO-mtt 2 cc -I 3 Q o UJ OOox si UJ CC S OL a. c (/) O) CO <u 5 CO S uj cc UJ 3 CO HO UI LL LL UJ < s UJ X UJ CO UJ CO 3 < o UJ CO U<J < UJ X CO UJ CO 3 < o UJ CO U<J UJ UJ c cc o C" 0 55X<5Xo 2CQC 5XoI- O Q. u. Z O u. 5 CO 5 CO .Q A UJ " mUJ - Z = Z C <0 < UzJ j:uij :5 5 H lh X x< X m^ H UJ Q CM ABD00180139 0) cn ui UJ cn 2fl. O o Xlxj fc o *2 (/) oc LU lu oc u. 3 UJ <0 OC UJ SJ m cn (3 2 <> h- UJ OC CO Oh 0. (/) UocJ < Q. O S< -- UJ u. -J UJ Oo ujz conc z o < UJ < o oc in V Ui <0 Z UJ < oc OC UJ < UJ Ui (0 < < Ui UJ oc K- W O yin mO oc o u. * oUJ .J O VI Ui a * oc Al *- 8)2 X UJ CO in < 1 *RQ < NORMAL FUGITIVE RELEASE VALUES NO RELEASE ABD00180140 CRITICALITY RANKINGS (CONTD) 7. NO. OF RANKINGS W ILL EXPAND/CONTRACT WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL SITUATION (i.e. 4-5 AS SHOWN IN EX. IS NOT A STANDARD *) 4*U it x o 2 LU in Ui u. tn < (A o X(/> Wo^ UJ cos QO O XH in & CC uj Si <K 2 u. < UJ UJ CD < X UJ oz <. XQ O UJ o E QO 3 UJ e 2E Zw o< Q in zo> UI 0) UJ K H OS UJ X t UuJ. < < (0 CO X 2I- <- 2 X"l X ZS o 3O u. 55 55 UJ X oi IU >lLO UJ u. SSS u. to ABD00180141 o X <J z <cc r- <M CO ^ o < o o cc CO o o * < UJ ll cn < </> cc UJ X z cc o< < CO oo o5 cc 2 siUJ UJ co < CO h U UJ _ CO HI m O uj u. cc u3 a. kb _ Ew UJ mi UJ U. So uj z Z q* = Uj UJ CO o fo 5 " SoO ew O UJ o UJ oU.CC ifX IO |- UJ Al Oo V ABD00180142 O LU o z OC s 3 O z < oc LoUc >< oo LU oc (5 o < CM CO IT SUMMARY REPORT TO MANAGEMENT REQUIRED NO REPORT REQUIRED o LU a o pOC < oc o z uj UJ oc i- 3o 3 UJ OE ooc 51UJ 3 0CO 20. LU 5 OC X cc o 3 I- oz a uj O V) TT UJ UJ O LU oc < ABD00180143 WHAT IF" ANALYSIS S U B JE C T IV E , N O T A S S Y S T E M A T IC A S S O M E OTHERS (e.g. HAZOP) Q U A L IT A T IV E R E S U LT S O N LY W IT H NO N U M E R IC A L P R IO R IT IZ A T IO N Q UJ oc o 0. ui OC o UJ o3 Q z z UJ o I u. UJ r- j*l Quj 2< z2 N UJ q. Z X CO < O UJ UJ O Q 2 O uj uj > < CL CD j 0) z OC O<< Z U 11 ** UJ o UJ oc UI UJ Q. 0. X o* uj 2 o- < M UJ Ot mm CO UJ o< < C/) h- UJ oc o UJ UJ z Q oc oc < < CO 5 ABD00180144 CO Q CO < CO < LU a o CO LU OC 3 < Li ce O 36-48, 255 ABD00180145 FORMAT FOR FMECA TABLE 86*48, 256-1 FORMAT FOR FMECA TABLE ABD00180146 ABD00180147 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT TABLE 2 (Ref. 19) FAILURE MOOE ANO EFFECT TABULATION SHEET >'eM 1 | i 44lct3* :>WCNCHt | EMC*MCC OTMK 1 :0MWi)in [ **0U U** 4C*4 C*HTuC*Wf C-5 MA^.NA. *iC *S< KM CAN UCASLUt xc | o l+**sk' nucuc covuumatis HAfuUil I wMaCMAfc iui WM.A 1 9M|MOU llttl iN0<Ar.3W **irM ! 0 iTueonn NOM nOm( NCM 1 DOTH } AluCilC MClkiAnS nO* 1 NOTMMUi TiMOuOMUe 1 * ftiSM HONt NM Wl 1! ' 1 UXUSlWiT ; ucr0 C9U.0 MOlfvtb b*U *ul I C9TAMH*TT 004*0*, !i M* 1 WTUASS MM <o* CAMTMtAlUfll AGO MOCMl 5**.u*; i , >0 > 9in:oi MftfCCS i csm('*sa* -.c | c-i.Ms* | '.*>**i J-. * ?,r S.. 0**A*0* 4 t* -4S. f . OOHVATO#.| M'Wru.Wit 0H*T3* . i* Mtc.** '** ! S-U* 0* Su**i1 MUN j kiCv^u; 1 MUTCNC* **4*T 1 . <0 UMt* *1 1*ft j W 0f 0**lT U0 j 4CU**9n* o < * OtuavATiOM MOW 3'SCOMC * <MlCW4lMk l 10* i e OttCMATtOR OTCMMTO* MUTC** SO**.? iCUAMVAWn t OlSWitoi rr 9*UT3*U<4T VUMflO*. 4*l*Cl SICMT *U4 VAtVI 'MlOfll MOMkVOvfft 9***U Mif** i. - OMIUtCw 0 MTCHfUMl nukiM MUl $ OMMM titm CMlfUTM tM na* *U9K H4MA* 'Mtoni MMl kMtfl < W**t*VCMT KwCCID OMi VMM aOHTMIlO I M'll *vue9 UN*4* 11 n TOMiuifoi OUtatOAUMt 4 NMh| l <0* l< OUIMTCW MOwOtKOMSCT SWltCH 4 VMt J4^4tt <*4 1 .10 OOSMTIQM MN|41 fM V MrowswMwr VO*" 64404 M44 3*n "t* -- MMO C8NCK**r*TtD ww em. __ ccnnjn~t MIT: O*: * STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION FAILURE MOOES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS ABD00180148 Oz 3 6lii u > Ul c s2 SUK(><A/J) O Q a&< 2 u>j UJ UJ a 0x & UJ x r1t o< ao<. UJ s 3 X< < 8t X <s a UJ H 8 uj UJ s (>0 O C 0) h a 2 UJ UJ O sa (0 P P O az IUkJ Ik UJ << UJ UJ aa 69 s u. 1 ts e aa ABD00180149 EQUIPMENT HISTORY DATA 111 oz < z LU CO z o 0 1 cc < 0. UJ cc LU uj ss <a LU m 20 UJ 3 I cc uj > ui </> CO z O CO |s Oo s o LU .3 oc UJ 0. oc UJ a > UJ u UJ o j CO a - CO <o UJ UJ H OC Z o < UiiJi Cl O OC </) (0 >o oc oc 33 oo UJ LU CD O Oo oo LUZ UI UI r-' CC CC t 3-- 3_ zUI h- LU < < UI U. u. (/) d) a> LU < 22 I < o nr-. CO -- ti CO yj 2?* CC LU < CO < UI z o ss o LU <, CC J LU g siS g co LU CO z o o do <S LL.* LU o 1" < u. 2 liTZ m< i- a o ll zo 2> CO LU 32 t < LU CC l-2|- LU El b < x CO CC < CO LU D O ABD00180150 z D OESN'T ANALYZE SYSTEM DEPENDENCIES D OESN'T LOCATE CO M BINATIO NS OF FAILURES D OESN'T INCLUDE OPERATOR-INDUCED FAILURES < < (/) o UJ LL LL UJ </) O2 Q e UJ <z </> o< (/> UJ a ui o uiwa: (/> >go UJ (Ont O ZUJ zl UoeJ </) UJ O < UJ cc o o w uj < < (0 5 D < UL ABD00180151 <24j DISADVANTAGES: DOES NOT PROVIDE CAUSE/EFFECT ANALYSIS DOES NOT PROVIDE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS SUBJECTIVE C/> LU Ui o 3 Q < > < (A Z o (A s</) llj xd LU Z < CL S Ou. o 0 cc Ua.I 1 o o h- U i =</> K O gK> K is 2 2 Em 0) z a< o- </> UJ ZUi H 5TO OZ Q (A CaC. xui < ABD00180152 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT FIGURE 6 (Ref. 2) FIRE AND EXPLOSION INOEX r.s< MATE Rl AlS ANQ PROCESS MATERIAL ACTO (SEE TABLE AR*E*OlI Ai 1 CtNCMAC PROCESS MAjAftOS (SEE TaSlE 111 I4fl *C*0* A |0*"** t*C''ONl **C*0 )>' moo'- *i e*'0t 70 * *o c Ok |* I*{'0* 7t I* It s c sCkOMe *ociit .*eo so *o i c:iu pa*.M*ei ts < w e *t *. ecm Mins *c*o ,. 2 SPECIAL PROCESS MA2AROS *1 MCTOI * **OCtU t|wtltwit iwll Oil* Ml *09vf <.*t ] IOvl lO'v'MC IQ'*** 3 *19*1 wO.C*-TiO** hO**lSv<M (two *T0W9#*<*>C> C 0*1 1 T**a i*lM|to**9i te*M*AOk| hiOwe* 7 iOeillu*tr 0**WI6I (*<ttfi< 3 i**t i*vMNi*l*l li*6l 0 Out' I awQ0<9 *CT9* 7t*> MiiUI t*#v MM * tOWIM|i*1vl|H*r9 Ww.ORi C OWINtit* 9MuM*l*l I'OmiQI 90 6IIM II MOtmull 'tt II 7n e 4i 3 eomowll.ovl l9t>9><*9R*CI IUI lit, > m ee*lOU9 4N9 I 9K9* il M194 0i klA*Ct - mOIKI'MC ll*C*9* HwiNi i uti 9* '<Mo*uruimi i< ii i. 9T on 4 i>ca*et TTiMiereA to i.hmmi v*ii m m aOTATiMC fOw*w**t tgMt C9M*ISMt *44CtU M|MO UC19* t* y> , ' **9al90>9*94a f n. wit c ABD00180153 Q >- Z < Q CD Q CC < < CC h N LU CO < 0. XO 66-48 ?S7 COMPARISONS ABD00180154 (0 Q CC < N < o cc u. o a> X oc UJ < CO Q. o UJ oc CO cc < o Q. UI 2 UJ K UI Q u_ 5 co < Q. Li. oO CO UJ O rU ^ 2=0 o < O < oc co 0. CO UJ <0 3o o Hz Oo Ic-o UIQ O 00 5 I II < UJ co IS o o (O o <0 UJ u. < CO CO I W HAT IF -- INNOVATIVE IM AGINATION -- ENGINEERING ANALYSES OF PLANT DESIGN -- GROUP EFFORT IN CONFERENCE o COMPARISONS a. ABDOO180155 u. UJ O OE c/> UuJ. UJ </> o cc UJ UJ o UJ I UJ o z O ZQ --Q Vi ui = H </) UJ a HAZOP -- ANALYSES OF M ULTI-COM PONENT FAILURES -- MORE STRUCTURES IN IDENTIFICATIO N -- GROUP EFFORT IN CONFERENCE ABD00180156 o (0 J h LU << Sli er LU ZQ occ > LU < QC LU Q LU O Q UJ IT O < N oo << X cc LU X I- < oQ. Q QC < N Ik < ui Q OPERABILITY: ANYTHING THAT CAUSES THE OPERATOR TO IMPROVISE IN HIS A C T IO N S 9 'J ABD00180157 O (3 ^ OZ a LL oCL LU NO <o O u. X LU CC < CD O gS< 2^ LU N Q LU 0. LU (0 < O_ 5 g< uj LU Q CD 2 < > -I O CD LU LU CC < < 2 lo o o DC o < E <f</> i- 0. ot P LA N T D O C U M E N TA TIO N IS T O T A LLY O U T O F DATE AND THERE ARE NO PLANS TO UPDATE IT. B A S IC SAFETY R EQ U IR EM EN TS ARE IG N O R ED . <r** S IT IS DONE TO FIND THE WEAK LINK" A PLANT. ABD00180158 a o a O N << Xo < <5! UJH < N< X CL < X CO ABD00180159 co i u 0. LU z o o Q DURING PLANT OPERATION. O <0 co <2 ui. On ui s IQ = lil cc z CL (D ABD00180160 z (RECOMMEND SITE BECAUSE OF OPERATIONS INPUT) ABD00180161 PROVIDES A BASIS FOR RISK ANALYSIS/ASSESSM ENT WORK. (O X LLi Lil < CC Z -J h" < XH I- Z SZ LU o UJ o occ a. oo CC Q. I-- LU Q < CC -1 ui < cc < o < n < o lL a. Z X Ml < UJ --j Scco cc o u. LU x ^ 5 X uj (0 H>> UJ U. < ooo) >Ulg oo9 CC Q > 0- HI O moo gss Q <0 <Q opt Pzg <--o fcts UJ UJ 22 3 0- UJ X O O o o UJ o UJ u. o tt o E uj >S UJ CC CD < -I O <UJ (0 z dO (o 3 9 cc 5 UJ ABD00180162 GC LU LU O Z LU LU X <z/) to si =o LU </) 2-J O< Og h- uj 50 <o lu ce I- Q. WHAT IT IS NOT: GENERALLY A GUARANTEE THAT IF LATER, MODIFICATIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED, THEN TH PLANT WILL BE OPERATING UNDER SOME LOWER RISK. ABD00180163 _ CD P< < UL X UJ o ABD00180164 O cc Q (/> UJ RECOMMENDATIONS PROCEDURAL VS. CAPITAL HAZOP GUIDE WORD APPROACH ABD00180165 UJ CO oUJ cc 2 Q. cc UJ CO cc LL H LU 2 < cc < Q. o o<3 UJ UJ H CC < 3 CC UJ (C CO cc UJ UJ CO UJ UJ cc cUcJ J<- 3 OE u. a. CO i oZ o oI<- CC UJ So s! oQ. 3 = 5 w CO UJ a. |- o O 2 ui cc 2 ui < UJ U. Q. I- cc OQaa cojo O u2. cwc a 2 iu-j < uccj u. cc UJ < 2 t< < o ip o giu! O UJ O UJ UJ UJ UI CO CO CO CO <<<< UJ UJ UJ UJ cc cc cc cc oooo aaaa UJ UJ UJ UJ oooo 3333 Q3Qa UJ UJ UJ UJ UJ o z < X UJ cc UJ UL LL z< Ui 5 u. O u. z z cc z cc cc cc cc o UJ occ CO CO 2 UI o ABD00180166 Flooding Sabotage Safety Corrosion Maintenance Grounding/static ca E o "O co o 2S S a> a QO QC LU I oI- &2 o o c o oe ca 3 ? O c ca 6 o "O ca CO 92 c 2 o ca LU CO LU o 2"ca 3 c a? "O$o r -c2a xE: ^ .2 a> c CD E 3 k. o5 O) c IMP Q. E ca CO CO cc CO FIGURE 1.0 HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY ACTION REPORT CRITICALITY RATING F - FREQUENCY RATING R - HAZARD RANKING ABD00180167 UJ Q Ui i GUCi Ui _ GQ CO 23 2 ui Z CD !o< O oz Ui 5 3> CO 0- CD o GC Ui E CO s o CO UQi H Ui Ui Ui 2 2 CL CL 53 oo Ui Ui Ui Ui CO O oc 5 u. z < GC O o Ui CO Ui o a3 CO CO Uoi z Ui a UI CO z oa Ui -J Ui OQ CO 35 2 o CL a OGC Z $O Ui t is aa a O ABD00180168 ELECTRICAL SAFETY/FIRE PROTECTION LU o UJ < cc CC HI UJ CL 0. LU X O LU O 0. O LU < < S0c N CO Q. X I UJ H o CC C0 LU >- <0 <a CO <0 LU CO CO LU 0(L0U 5 < O CC cc O uj o. CaC. a o 2 ABD00180169 ABD00180170 GETTING STARTED a LU LU co LU CO < z OC < o LU CO OC o LU CO 2 _ > o o 2<l D >- Q <h D Z h 0) -- CL I I I ABD00180171 EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS SPECS </> LU oc oz co LU h- (/> Q_ 111 O O u. O OC D. <0 << CO LU LU X I- (0 < ^ oc 0. < 111 Ez< co o < s 0) (/> oX LU o o CD o Q I- LU I *\CO ___ (/) V) 0) V) LU < 111 (0 O OC O 9o o o iu. oocO8 u. oc 0 CL O Q. Q. O Q. ABD00180172 HAZOP PREPLANNING ISSUES Preplanning issues addressed in a recent refinery unit HAZOP performed by Stone and Webster include: Verification of as-built conditions of P&IDs Line segment boundaries set - markup of P&IDs List of support documents compiled: P&IDs - this is the base study document PFDs Process description Operating manuals/procedures Processing materials information Equipment and material specifications Tentative schedules of time per P&ID are set PCHAZOP computer program set up List of standard abbreviations and acronyms compiled Criticality rankings devised HAZOP training given to all team members (1 day) Arrange for system/process briefings for team before work begins ABD00180173 HAZOP STUDY LOGISTICS Logistical development of a recent refinary unit HAZOP performed by Stone & Webster included: Preplanning issues were addressed the prior week The team included 3 core team members and 4 part-time members The study included 16 moderately busy P&IDs The study took 3 1/2 weeks The team met 4 hours/day in morning review sessions and spent 2 hours/day in individual effort for reviews, followups, and field checks Dedicated space was required due to the large amount of documents The study resulted in 170 data sheets The team recorder used a PC to record, sort and retrieve data on PCHAZOP The plant operator was the key contributing member of the team Key operating procedures were reviewed relative to the P&ID's and safe engineering practices ABD00180174 HAZOP SUMMARY O PTION: DO A LL CONDITIONS (e.g. PRESSURE) TOGETHER INSTEAD OF ALL GUIDEWORDS (e.g. NONE, MORE) TOGETHER. OPTION: DO EQUIPMENT FIRST. o o o< Q OC Lii 0z) 2 . 0 H UJ oc LU Lii p 3 LJU OQ LU > m g 8> O LU Q 5 o. o 0) o z oc O O0C. < Ui CD 1 o O - * 05 o H o " o(/) U. (/) OQ CC 5o N< I-- ^ < LU Z CC CQ < 5w 8o s; -I LU ds < CC o< Z CL O Ou. I LU Q. O CD 5 0. 5 CC o LU LzU a z LU O h X O az 2 3 z < o 1 0) LU <a z 3 CD O z LU 0) LU H SE 5 u- Z ch O 4) o cn z- >2 LU < z< z< OC CC LU LU hh XX LU LU -* CC LU S Qajj x G 0) < I- LU C/> 3 X |n > PH X ^ O g X O ABD00180175 CD Q uz DC >< -J N 00 < > LU o o<c 3 o o < oos LU OC o < LU LU I- I- < U. OC Qz Ow o z <z (/> H LU i- uj o (0 O CO = z< ooLU * CO LU 0) oS < o * oo2 0 O ^ S LU GO 00 o o I- < < ABD00180176 CO 1- 4 UX WK < H LU LU X H I CO LU X LU h o X h- LL O < X < X LU 2 I< 2sx o LU < O zXnu >- o CO 0) LL >- %t LU X 1- LU J< X CQXO <0 OuCj >< Q1 UJ X CO OQ H1 I- LL Eg o IEO LU luS Qz o5Do -J < LU 2 iff *4 >:< <" LU i\,t I o LU CO 1- < X ABD00180177 \ EXAMPLE PROBLEMS ABD00180178 HAZOP NO. 1 *\ ABD00180179 HAZOP AGENDA WITH EXAMPLES A typical HAZOP agenda is presented below, with expanded explanations and examples following: 1. Introduce team members 2. HAZOP Methodology 3. AHM (EHS) Properties 4. Identify Hazards 5. Purpose or goal of HAZOP 6. Scope the HAZOP 7. Establish Criticality and Frequency Codes 8. Define Dispersion Models 9. Process Description 10. PCHAZOP Online 11. Plant Walk Through 12. HAZOP Team Meetings 13. Interim Report 14. HAZOP Report * PCHAZOP is a proprietary program ABD00180180 Introduce Team Members: 0 1 CO 0) (0 n OE 0) E E CO 0) o o CG CO 0) ..2c? oa> <S0 H c g & ,2 3 CO E "? 8 JI 4^ m ft CM ABD00180182 oc c oO) o 4) E 4) co s o o N co "O c co "O +* a CO co o aaj 2 2 cI o< IC-O <D 4a) ^ ABD00180183 2 o (0 o cc 0) .a (0 o > 2 oX E(5E0 -2aoXCO LL UJ ABD00180184 CO CO ooo a a c >* *o * 3 "5 C o<D CL CO aN a< co "2 <D co N CO CO 3 O CO O O g CO N CO CO .<a5 E 21 CO o > > a E CD CO c E CO , 0) co TJ x UL ww Oo-- P" 9xa- .xo CO ^ LL LU h 2 a to co *2 co N CO ABD00180186 CO o "OCO E CO oQ. N < > "O O q. -a a2 0) co o a> co ABD00180187 CuD. CO CO "O CO N CO O 00 < CO CD 0) Oc aao a co a. O oGL N < N <a o a a a0) o c oa W "O U Za) a QC CL ua QC U o> LD -i LD Ld z Ld >_l HXU bJ <C X u Q_ a M < X ABD00180188 oc Lu CL fy u> f-- (XI a CJ 9es1 CQ N LU LD DATE X 1--4 od QC -- LU < LU LU <<W4 Xe t--i LD dz OO X LU aa t 3Hn aueo o & X fl Id m. 9a an Xe > -m iat 5 S K 5 (o3 W s --o 58 id -- ao --xwc>>--xe"* Um 3C ABD00180189 CO N CO 4) CO .Q o CL O N o 09 < oc>*3mCO o2 o" -2 oo * O o> o o =i CO a o CO >1 X c +"* %m 0) 75 J 3O" 4^2 .2 E 0) CO 5| 2 3 g j2 JC "<o CO . TJ .2 ~ o 32 .Q *C3O 2 oo E_ co i2 LU O (0 o o -5 ABD00180190 CRITICALITY E a> CO .a 03 > 2 3 3a CI2 IS 5 5 ' 0) `5 | o ! J^ 4a-^ CocO oc a Q. M E V O) a O c 8 c as 3 E c c c 03 a> co) oc ?.= 4-* 4- ~ c 3 3 3_ aCOs CaO CO a) , as co oo & a o9. k. CO a> Q. CO 03 as o oc O ca o > oo oofc "a o a ooc 5 z HI => o UJ c as c 0w3 "a c as c "a c as O c c as O O c c as 4-* acs o as 0) 03 a: Li a%% o E a -Q <13 -Q 03 JQ CO 0) CO 3 oO CO o3 a CO 3l. O O CO 3 O O OOOO 3 < m o Q uj K H H ^yO H H H IO n ABD00180191 Risk Matrix 7R8Q0BHCY ABCD 2 z zz zzz zv r\ ABD00180192 Mitigate the hazard within six months o> c OS v .OE) .E D) C cas n*s- o .2 "O c a as as > as o to Ui %00 ia_> (0 C 5- E a as wo o 00 c oo O o> c a(5s aass > c as s O) c c as Ui .= o CO I! as P <d as as o 3 <d 2 li "aOs o C0aO0s E to iom. to o CO O^M) I0rB- *c* as 0 4B 2 5: o o o % MB as Ui CO c ^Bt E a as co as 2 a (0 o N (0 J= a a . S (0 >2 S >a ooc o> as 3S a o~ (0 (0 .2 ~ "2 as n o2 as c -c O) "a c as 3 cas uaas. "a CO as as as JQ as .o -O OS -2 44 CO a a as as as "O o o c oo 3 << OJ 00 Critical ABD00180193 CO a CO <a o c o "O c 2 Ea CC "O a <D a H o co oCO 2 c5 <5 c ao CO o a CO ac) o CO (d <D O a 00 o c a E E (0 a Q_ O N < X O) ABD00180194 Process Description: A detailed process discussion is presented by the Process Engineer to familarize the HAZOP team with process scenarios which may o 0 CO 0 <0 O 00 s CO 0 0 CO 0 A E 0 E E 00 0O 2 0a 00 00 A O T3 0 0 0 Urn 3 0 C 0 0 0 o 0 ETHYLENE GLYCOL PRODUCTION ABD00180195 PCHAZOP online: Load the PCHAZOP computer ABD00180196 CO o> c 9 mm *o o a o g a E 03 a> a. O N < Oc) E o a a o ABD00180197 SCREEN l Of 8 J HAZAIRD ANO OPERABILITY STUDY ACTION REPORT COMPANY: MOJAVE ANTIFREEZE CORPORATION STUDY TITLE: ETHYLENE SLYCOL PRODUCTION JOB NO.: 13426 PUD NO.: I8426-A REV.: 194 DATE: 04/91/89 EQUIPMENT / PROCEDURE ID:-LINE SEGMENT 1 DESCRIPTION: PUMP SUCTION LINE PREPARED BY: BCL PREP. DATE : 86/82/89 0PERATIN6 DEVIATION : NO FLON CRITICALITY: 4 ASSIGNED: CAUSE : PUMP TRIP OR NOV SHUT OR LON LEVEL IN TANK TK-l CQNSEQ. : LOSS OF PRODUCTION, QPERATIN6 PROBLEM ACTION : RESPONSE: IV-A OPERATIMS DEVIATION: REVERSE FLQU CRITICALITY: 1 ASSIGNED: CAUSE : PUMP TRIP St PIC PAILS 6 MS NOT CLOSED CONSEQ. : HATER IN TANK, AUTO-OECONP RIM, CATASTROPHIC TANK FAILURE ACTION : RESPONSE: 1-9 OPERATING DEVIATION: INCREASED aOH CAUSE : NOT A PROBLEM (MAP) CONSEQ. : ACTION : RESPONSE: CRITICALITY: ASSIGNED: OPERATING DEVIATION: REDUCED FLON CRITICALITY: 4 ASSIGNED: CAUSE : PARTIAL VALVE CLOSURE CQNSEQ. : REDUCED PRODUCTION. NOT A HAZARD ACTION : RESPONSE: IV-B OPERATING DEVIATION: AS HELL AS CRITICALITY: CAUSE : HATER IAOCFLOH. SAME AS REVERSE FIOH. CQNSEQ. : ACTION : RESPONSE: ASSIGNED; APPEND |<0:>|PCHAZQP |Rtc: 1/2 | |NuaC*ps Figure 8 ABD00180198 O) 2 CO o o <d c CO a o c 3 12. HAZOP Team Meetings: A systematic segment by ABD00180199 *0 ca is c o o CO a> *0 " 5 O fi a o co 5 a >o 5o co E -a aj o 4) 0) c - EJ O) 5 0) CO ABDOO180200 Ur) a Id a -i QC CL Q_ C X Ld a u ac u a> L3 _l a CL a n c Ui z u ->J hI- U (Z u I-- c/i CL fY a CJ > s m u u z V Ui ai--* < o<3 cz u Ld z u z < c a }-- (/) 1--( a T LJ az aa a waz tl lo aa n Xe *> u -a mO ee WOE ax ae e _ !* --xa** Li -- US ABDOO180201 1 1 bi ? 3v CM U H bOl f<t* 5OuS cii vMs 3oa O ObSl Z H HVCO) CM 2 3CbJ 4 o2 Cal 2 OHv) N4a*- m05 2 o M 6 < > Q <n.eco o Su. Z Kg b) St a* <-4 Cat cn b) a H> OS DM MU iMJ DU fi s U & o o s & scn Z O Z0* ft. O cn cn < N 0 M s ^6 s1 aa9 bl *M m cn 2NZ Z V3 Z cn p wd *zo* MH c2n 5x So HOgMXo* S < Hcn 0 sti Z > 8 cn u o ft* Oft IS ecn sp \ bl Z a e< 3a o oz ucn Xbl 3 3 x u. i b2 Cal cn i c<n bl 5 cn cn 3 P bl a s i M i aui o Pobl 235 Z ft. cn < -bJl 3 cn < C R IT IC A LIT Y RATING F FREQUENCY RATING- R HAZARD RANKING- I CJ ABDOO180202 SI 1 fij C9 bb fib VN a 3 fid O Saa H 3ii i si fid ao a* CO 82CO S3- x 2 K 1ooa ss 22aOHS 32Coa3Oa <o uH K5g 5*38 2220c s I2 8a HaZO] V) a4* SBOS aaH Z co O M bb SB sCO < co fCluO 5 * b_b S 3Q M*H Z f--2lM_S f--SlUHi SSS5 3888" e* n CO 8 fHid fit Z aaJ hza tt a> a< 83 a a. gg 33 czo CO bb a z5 2Sh < a H cj S2 JSh OH- 2a5 as >haDd aaa>mafid ao "z aa 2h ar H a Eb M ah aa Q vO.5(Q H> ODOMbS. HHJMn ffoildu az< ao ObI-- i 2 3 Ho aa* aa -E3 CfidO I i hSS 2s ax az -1" 8zCO 6T M B M H H lO a bb 0 3 CO 1 z bb z O a SB si IE Hbb U b2cbo bZaob 9aa EH< is-ai as a* aa Ha 3 2z 5H <a az bb s CO aa8 itNUUel o 3 fid bwsb C2sO CO a Ioa fa S S B fid o S S >S o fc '* *aZs'zb' *2 ao BS3 zo a-HbHJb & bb' M 3z 2 1 1 S3 S Eco HbZ3b ZbJb Zb-Jb si a aa 5H a< 2a aa is --H C R IT IC A LIT Y RATING F FREQUENCY RATING- R HAZARD RANKING- I U ABDOO180203 11 hi 3sO c4s a 5 0 aaa 5 a aa* si co CO oa Haaas Sc4Os (U 5a Oa3B *2 1Z ga 2 >a Pd PS o 5Z c aa HZ 22 ACoO* se i< aa < 3 MOaS* > 0>za zo 5 " 2co a2 a< S aa 2a I< a**o **S 3 UhU 1-23> s >M 6wZo a s< o 3 a z3 .pr* eo Pd > O3OS Mb. HmH03 3aMna4 Puaw4 za5 Mo uH Hh Za a a o W ao 22 a a a o 1 a uh a a< a au a Q sS i c NHH a a8 1 i zO a CO ao H SQ Ja> zuz > iCO 3H H >? aau _ ia. aa9aaau aasaaaaa CO ao a 1za 3aa en* ga u au "n iz HPea gJNz P "B Z C9 E2E2 sa ea easa H> AaSa N> ?5ao I aa* Ss 58 e% ga a g 53 o a* 5 aa . J a a <2z paz aao ha aaa a<a a u o. 0aaa* ao< a 82 18 3e2l 3s 2g 33 o H ao i 3 5 C R IT IC A L IT Y RATING P FREQUENCY RATING- R HAZARD RANKING- I U ABDOO180204 SCREEN t OF 3 j HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY ACTION REPORT j COMPANY: HOJAVE ANTIFREEZE CORPORATION STUDY TITLE: ETHYLENE 6LYC0L PRODUCTION JOB NO.: 19428 PUD NO.: 1842S-A REV.: 904 DATE: 34/01/80 EQUIPMENT / PROCEDURE ID: PUMP 1 A/B DESCRIPTION: ETHYLENE OXIDE FEED PUMPS PREPARED 3Y: NCI PREP. OATE : 38/92/8? OPERATING DEVIATION : NO ROM CRITICALITY: 1 ASSIGNED: CAUSE : DISCHARGE NOV CLOSED CONSEO. : PUMP DEADHEAD,HEAT TO AUTO-DECOMP,CATASTROPHIC PUMP FAILURE ACTION : RESPONSE: !1 !~C OPERATING DEVIATION: REVERSE FLQH CRITICALITY: I ASSIGNED: CAUSE : PUMP TRIP 8 CKVLV FAILS k PIC FAILS 8 HS NOT CLOSED CONSEO. : HATER IN TANK, AUTO-OECGNP RIN, CATASTROPHIC TANK FAILURE ACTION : RESPONSE: OPERATING DEVIATION: INCREASED TEMPERATURE CRITICALITY: t ASSIGNED: CAUSE : EXTERNAL HEAT SOURCE, SUNSHINE ON OFFLINE PUMP? CONSEO. : HEAT TO AUTO-OECOMP TEMP, CATASTROPHIC PLUMP FAILURE I-C ACTION : VERIFY DSTAN08Y ISOLATION PROCEDURE, 2)0EC0MP INITIATION TEMP RESPONSE: OPERATING DEVIATION: REDUCED FLOU CRITICALITY: ASSIGNED: DIZ CAUSE : SUCTION MOV PINOED CONSEO. : CAVITATION, POSSIBLE AUTO-OECOMP RIN, CATASTROPHIC PUMP FAILURE ACTION : VERIFY AUTO-DECQKP PHASE ENVELOPE RESPONSE: OPERATING DEVIATION: REDUCED PRESSURE CRITICALITY: CAUSE : UU LEVEL TA* ! QR SUCTION NOV PINCHED CONSEO. : SEE REDUCED FlOU ACTION : RESPONSE: ASSIGNED: DIZ OPERATING DEVIATION: MAINTENANCE CRITICALITY: 2 ASSIGNED: CAUSE : IMPROPER MAINTENANCE PREPARATION I IMPROPER PROTECTIVE GEAR CONSEO. : RESIOUAL EO IN PUMP CASE, CATASTROPHIC TOXIC EXPOSURE ACTION : RESPONSE: l-D Figure 9 m COal m s Vi CD Cal 5 sg 04* >A X as o 8 < >a -z H 00 ABDOO180205 R HAZARD RANKING- P FREQUENCY RATING- C R IT IC A L IT Y RATING <3 ABDOO180206 a. oO CQ N >. <XOmam T3 CO O o "S EEc -o o "a 0) O) O) | E E "3 >-o a c "2 2 Cc^fCMMOfB X +CuO4. 2 CXO a be SEo M- CO 3 a o o - o CO *- E `55 .2 _i o u- .j2 CO ffl o 2 <MDB 20); ^C4O ac ToO33 >o "3O ^m O) CO AOCCOO o mm a a "O o co E .22 o u. 04 a M CCO CO -CkaO. CNO -o 0) c <D "O Oc) ^M o a(D -o co o u. < ABDOO180208 FIGURE 8. BO 8AMPLE PROBLEM MOJAVE ANTIFREEZE CORPORATION ETHYLENE GLYCOL PLANT APRIL 1, 1989 RAZOR SUMMARY 07 CRITICAL IDENTIFIED HAZARDS CRITICAL RANK: Critical aust be improved I-B, l=death Bsoccurs between i and 10 yrs DEVIATION Reverse Flow EQUIPMENT NUMBER: Line Segment 1 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: Pump (PI A/B) Suction Line CAUSE: Pump trips and PIC valve fails to shut (provide tight shutoff) and board mounted HS fails to shut (provide tight shutoff) CONSEQUENCE: More than 5 gallons of water backflows into storage tank, initiating autodecomposition reaction, causing catastrophic tank failure. SUGGESTED MITIGATION: 1. Add primary sensor to close board mounted HS valve on low pressure. 2. Verify all backflow prevention devices are tight shutoff type. 3. Add primary sensor to shut FRC valve on low flow. 4. Consider complete review of backflow instrumentation to determine best method for backflow prevention. 5. Perform hasard analysis to determine if final mitigation steps reduce frequency to an acceptable level. RESOLUTION: (To be added in follow up) All suggested mitigation actions were done including interconnecting the primary sensors to provide redundant backflow protection. ABDOO180209 "O o | OT S 2 sEa a aa S(oi 2 co E ~ a ^B ~ >? Si <D c EoH o" E o 2 5 co 0 * 0) .. o a <D * 1 E 0) oa 0) CC E a O h. CL O <a o B* N< <D 0) 8 5 P (Q ABD00180210 HAZOP EVALUATION The 'HAZOP Report Evaluation Criteria' has been developed to assure there is documented evidence that the key elements have been followed in conductiong a HAZOP study. The criteria ia as follows: 1. Key members present 2. Documentation available 3. Proper form used 4. Thorough questioning * 5. Open participation 6. Preliminary hazard identification 7. Criticality evaluation * 8. Documentation used 9. Procedures addressed 10. Ahm MSDS addressed 11. Spill size quantified/evaluated 12. Instrumentation addressed 13. Documentation up-to-date 14. Thorough cause investigation 15. Define purpose/scope * Can be evaluated only from actual observation ABDOO180211 FINAL HAZOP REPORT Define Purpose and Scope: The HAZOP Report should include a statement as to the purpose and the scope of the HAZOP study. Key Members Present: The HAZOP Report should include a list of participants in the team meetings, their qualifications, and the attendance roster. Documentation available: The HAZOP report should list the documentation which was the basis for the team review. The list should also include reference documentation available outside of the team meeting required to support the study. ABD00180212 FINAL HAZOP REPORT (CONTINUED) Proper Form Used: THe HAZOP tam data should be recorded on standardized forms containing the key question and answer elements of the HAZOP one form for each line segment investigated, one form for each equipment item investigated. Thorough Questioning.All segments of the HAZOP forms should be filled out to indicate the HAZOP team executed a thorough study of the system under investigation. Open Participation: Although open participation is desirable, this can only be evaluated by actual observation of the HAZOP team in action. ABD00180213 FINAL HAZOP REPORT (CONTINUED) Preliminary Hazard Identification: The HAZOP report should include the preliminary list of hazards identified at the onset of the HAZOP study. Criticality Evaluation: The HAZOP report should include the basis for the screening matrix that was used during the HAZOP study. Documentation Used: Although thiscan only be evaluated by actual observation of the HAZOP team in action, the assimilated documentation should be used in this study. Procedures Addressed: The HAZOP report should include a list of the procedures reviewed including their revision number and date. ABD00180214 FINAL HAZOP REPORT (CONTINUED) AHM MSDS Addressed: The HAZOP Report shoul include a list of the acutely hazardous materials (AHMs) and their hazardous properties and a statement that these were included within the scope of the HAZOP study. Spill Size Quantified/Evaluated: The HAZOP report should include a list of any spill size quantification and consequence evaluation that was prepared for use as a basis for criticality ranking during the study. Instrumentation Addressed: The HAZOP report should include ample references to the examination of the effects of instrumentation to establish criticality rankings and probability rankings of identified hazards. ABD00180215 FINAL HAZOP REPORT (CONTINUED) Documentation Up-to-Date: The HAZOP Report should include a list of revision numbers and issue dates of the actual documents used as the HAZOP study basis. Thorough Cause Investigation: For critically identified hazards, the HAZOP study, and hence the report, should include a multiple cause investigation for use in mitigation efforts. Additional Items: The HAZOP Report should have a list of abbreviations and acronyms added for clarification. ABD00180216 HAZOP NO. 2 SIMPLE SYSTEM - HAZOP EXAMPLE ABD00180217 ABD00180218 R HAZARD RANKING- FIGURE 1 .0 HAZARD AND O PER ABILITY STUDY ACTION REPORT F FREQUENCY RATING- ObX J UOOtb HMOOfib oDs 05 o sO>aoa-s*u2aax*. COSJ9U03OX OCO Om <<O0>flS2SteU0< 3O3 Ul oX H '3 -3 3 cxn 8 A 0 V OMJ VD -J a 701 pu03ao1 0 J 3 4 QJ ! a 3M hi M CO U*< 1\ N > a H hi hi 9 hi E cn 2 2 X -J X 1 C9 a < o MUM 9UC0 JmQ << J >*o o tu e OO mAO 05 flU 05 x!aS flu X WO< OsonfSt flu < 05 05 gsccMAuu cpMXu 0 05 9& 32 a. u C R IT IC A LIT Y RATING ABD00180219 *fid Iu < sM 1Vw) o n sf K OMB m Hn . . s (A OtObOZJ* H5<o2sggmHa rciaMOsOa* aoOSSJ..omaRz.zU2m2Q*m>^u>* fot* HM>*SO2 3aEubSu2 5 .2 m<i SPSS o R HAZARD RANKING- FIGURE 1 .0 HAZARD AND O P E R A B ILITY STUDY ACTION REPORT F FREQUENCY RATING- 3os cn i"5 0/ j 8 "2 O 5 ci 0 A 6 9 -t a iaj * X U2 a. < PI o s E3 a 3 am ft* CA OS S "s5 Ezwm(fiM MZ<f MJ * a M CO ZM< q2m SJON> ft* ASM 3*5S OHn oaoos x"ES5 II! M as H 3333S: 5S"3 UhH 3S8 523 to S mi H M M 9M I I Si S H> V. ft* M fid SM e i Z Z <9 0 to 5 M U 9Q Q ttt Ik ax flU M tS**3Ua. a<* OoS fot** l u C R IT IC A LIT Y RATING A X C l ^ E ^STUDY T IT LE :_________ FIGURE 1 .0 HAZARD AND O P E R A B ILITY STUDY ACTION REPORT STONE & WEBSTER JOB NUMBER: 'M n 5a to) V) 'SN OS 1 i u I oz o4* :r01 5 0 tOo) <O* Q i I ws 5zo p. -r p H z \u a j 0 I 8sa I i aao=3s*3xoc u u ABDOO180220 ssto) sm M 3 mNos 3u a s i i n i to) CpO ICuII Q l u CRITICALITY RATING -F FREQUENCY RATING -R HAZARD RANKING 'I'i ABDOO180221 S c oS S3 5aMHnM zo M &< z Oz o ** K CL SS UXMxfxUiO.oON<MZoOMZEHSh OQ<< HO < R HAZARD RANKING- FIGURE 1 .0 HAZARD AHD O P E R A B ILIT Y STUDY ACTION REPORT F FREQUENCY RATING- a a a n \u ui ~2 -4 2 0 <2 0 A i F. J 2Q & a & Ja (L t x P- U <t Cl * 0 J z o ss ia a M aAM bO)l ma "s 3 s H su?XAam4 xQMafatJr* oo9s zMo ssshs e u az z j z j oa DZ3fiU OZtM-3 <3MS 3a* <890B(O 0s1 8J<o sASM n . >NZ0M8O >3310 POb 20 3 25 m SOb aM&KS0* 09 H CO ^!S!X<jBW<OHz&oXO oSo woqzcbO-- ZQOO< o2 zosMoflU* "2g ego. sSsi<zcOouho<m2 UOOi<H I w C R ITIC A LITY RATING ABD00180222 ~\ CALIFORNIA PROCEDURES ABDOO180223 PREPARATION OF A RISK MANAGEMENT AND RELEASE PREVENTION PROGRAM IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA W. F. Early R. W. Myers Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation ABSTRACT The statutory requirements for risk management and prevention programs (RMPPs) were established in the California Health & Safety Code, Chapter 6.95, Article 2, Division 20 by Assembly Bill 3777 and were further modified by Assembly Bills 1059 and 3205. California's state legal requirements provide local governmental agencies with the responsibility for implementation of hazardous materials/waste programs and the authori ty to mandate the development of an RMPP by a facility operator. In Southern California, the administering agency with responsibility for program administration is usually the fire department within the local jurisdiction. The statutory requirements for RMPP development and approval by the administering agency are discussed in this paper. INTRODUCTION To appreciate the nature or requirements of the risk management and prevention program (RMPP), one must understand the way in which Califor nia agencies implement the statutory requirements of the program. Unlike many states, California has historically administered public health and safety-related programs from county or city jurisdictional levels, and this decentralization of program administration is the case in the implementation of Chapter 6.95 of Division 20 of the California Health and Safety Code. Under the authority of the statute, the Governor's Office of Emergency Services is authorized to promulgate regulatory requirements for the implementation of RMPPs. Irrespective of this authority, the Office's current approach focuses upon the development of a guidance document to assist the local administering agencies in the implementation of the statutory requirements within their respective jurisdictions. Administra tion of the program varies throughout the state as a result of different administering agencies being assigned programmatic responsibilities within the various jurisdictions. For example, each city and county has statutory authority to implement the program within its respective jurisdictional boundaries. Therefore, within the boundary of a large metropolitan county many different incorporated cities may have individu alized programs in addition to the county program which provides for the administration of the law for the unincorporated areas of the county and for cities which contract for county services. 24789-4810-HC2 1 1889 STO STER 1989 ABDOO180224 In California, there is diversity in program implementation due to differences in the types of administering agencies. Southern California administering agencies are predominantly local fire departments, while Northern California jurisdictions tend to assign this responsibility to branches or divisions of health departments. Also, more highly populated counties tend to exercise their statutory authority by developing addi tional requirements through their larger, frequently more highly trained staffs. It is common for northern, rural counties, for example, to develop joint programs, with two or three counties participating. Each administering agency has authority under the statute to define more stringent requirements for programmatic implementation than that which is spelled out in the California Health and Safety Code. For the purposes of this paper, the focus is solely on those requirements spelled out in the state statute* STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS California's RMPP requirements are as follows (Citations shown after most of the requirements refer to the appropriate section of Chapter 6.95 of Division 20 of the California Health and Safety Code): 1. The RMPP should provide a clearly worded statement of purpose and objectives. 2. The RMPP should provide an organization chart showing the lines of responsibility and authority with respect to RMPP matters. Written job descriptions should also be included, in particular for the person or persons who wiLl have interface responsibili ty with the administering agency (25534(g)). 3. The RMPP should provide a facility description specifying the nature, age, and condition of the equipment used to handle acutely hazardous materials (AHMs) at the facility and any schedules for testing and maintenance. It is recommended that this document contain or reference appropriate information (including P&IDs and PFDs) to enable it to serve as the base reference document for analytical work performed on facility systems (25534(c)(2)). 4. A nonquantitative threshold inventory should be compiled, identifying the materials in the facility to which the RMPP applies. The California RMPP uses the same list of substances as the federal SARA Title III Program. The subject list currently contains more than 360 substances. 5. A hazard and operability (HAZOP) study should be performed for units affected by the RMPP. Procedures should be written to provide guidance in the following areas (25534(d)(1)): 24789-4810-HC2 2 ABDOO180225 HAZOP team composition HAZOP Ceam leader qualifications and responsibilities Procedural policy for study administration (documents needed, duration, frequency, reports required, etc.) HAZOP study data management 6. A consequence analysis should be performed for affected units and respective chemicals* Written procedures should be provided to address the following areas (25534(d)(2)): Release race (quantity calculations) Dispersion model usage and assumptions (e.g*, how many weather conditions should routinely be analyzed for each release scenario?) Input data sources (weather, population, material proper* ties, etc*) Fire and explosion models Toxicological databases 7. The RMPP should provide accident investigation procedures and a description of each accident involving AHMs which has occurred at the facility within 3 years prior to the date of the request made pursuant to Subdivision (a) of Section 25534, together with a description of the underlying causes of the accident and the measures taken, if any, to avoid a recurrence of the accident (25534(c)(1)). 8. The RMPP should provide a written description of the controls, both hardware and administrative, which have been incorporated into the facility's design, operating, and maintenance crite ria. This document should also describe ail of the safety equipment interlocks, safety relief valves, and ocher devices serving as safety equipment (25534(c)(3)(4)). 9. The RMPP should provide a method or procedure for generating, reviewing, and implementing risk reduction measures when required. These measures would be derived from the HAZOP study and consequence analysis work and should cover both hardware and operating/maintenance procedures. A schedule for imple menting these additional steps should be included; however, this aspect of the RMPP should be an ongoing program (25534(c)(5)(f),(g)). 10. The RMPP should contain an audit program (25534(c)(6)). 11. The RMPP should provide procedures which carefully control changes in facility systems, process parameters, operating and maintenance procedures, and the RMPP itself (25534(c)(5)(c), 25535(c)). 24789-4810-HC2 1889 STO STER 1989 3 ABDOO180226 12. The RMPP should contain a training program covering the sys tem's operating/emergency procedures and analytical work performed for affected units (e.g., HA20P), and should identify by title all personnel at the facility who are responsible for carrying out the specific elements of the RMPP and their respective responsibilities (25534(f),(g)). 13. The RMPP should provide administrative procedures covering the following areas: Certification Requirements. The RMPP must be certified by a "qualified person" and by the facility operator (25534(j)). Frequency of RMPP Review. The RMPP must be reviewed trienniaiiy at a minimum and within 60 days of a signifi cant change that affects any AHM (25534(h)). Initial implementation of the RMPP (25533(h)). RMPP-related records management and retention (25534(c)(7) (f. Initial and subsequent registration of AHMs (25533(a)(b) (c)). COORDINATION AND PHASED DEVELOPMENT Close coordination between the administering agency and the RMPP develop ment team is recommended. It is exceedingly critical that agreement with the administering agency regarding the following issues be obtained early in the project: Project plan Project schedule Basis for prioritization of units or processes to be studied Clarification of policy/guidance concerns Periodic progress review briefings Periodic progress reports Method of handling trade secrets Content of RMPP report versus RMPP program Seismic analysis, if any Human factor analysis, if any Early agreement on the preceding items will encourage a more cooperative relationship with the administering agency's staff. Additionally, this approach will tend to enhance the facility operator's reputation as a conscientious corporate citizen of the local community and region. 24789-4810-HC2 1839 STO STER 1989 4 ABDOO180227 Host large industrial facilities have existing plans and procedures which address most or all of the foregoing items. It is probable that these existing plans and procedures are not integrated or do not meet all of the California Health and Safety Code requirements; however, with some revision, they should suffice. California's regulations are not highly prescriptive in most areas; therefore, some latitude is generally avail* able to allow adaptation of existing work that will fully comply with the applicable requirements. Close coordination with the administering agency will result in early incorporation of any concerns the agency might have, resulting in less confusion and a more timely acceptance of the RMPP following submittal. In the Los Angeles area, the county and city fire departments are utilis ing set questionnaires as a coordination tool and to provide a clear basis for RMPP development. Other areas of Southern California and certain jurisdictions within the Los Angeles basin are not as prescrip tive in their approach. In order to develop a clear understanding of the RMPP process, the following phased approach has been outlined: Phase 1 1. Project Plan Coordination with Administering Agency a. Develop briefing materials of the proposed project scope, prioritization, and schedule for presentation to the adminis tering agency. This may be the completed questionnaire if deemed sufficient. b. Develop briefing materials for the hazards evaluation process: (1) HAZOP Studies (a) Process Units (b) Utilities/Offsites (c) Current Documentation: Piping and Instrumentation Drawings Process Flow Diagrams Procedures Engineering Design Guides Materials Specifications (2) Consequence Analysis (a) AHM Release Quantification (b) Meteorological Input: Source Validation (c) Population Input: Temporal Distribution Spatial Distribution 24789-4810-HC2 5 ABDOO180228 (d) Dispersion Model: Algorithm Characteristics Parameters Variables Validity for Specific AHM (3) Seismic Analysis (If Applicable) (a) Original versus present uniform building code as appropriate to each unit (b) Unit spacing relative to adjacent units 2. Facility Assessment a* Perform preliminary assessment of existing safety-related plans, procedures, and programs to identify the items which could or will be used to satisfy California's statutory re quirements and any additional requirements of the administering agency* This assessment will include: (1) Brief interviews of selected department managers, superin tendents, supervisors, and foremen (2) Verification of AHM inventory records (3) Confirmation of unit prioritization scheme for HAZOP analysis (4) Preliminary document and records assessment (5) Data collection activities b. Utilize the information obtained from this assessment to refine and/or revise the project scheme and project schedule and to focus the effort* Agreement with the administering agency at this stage on scope, approach, and schedule issues will enhance the review and acceptance of the final program document* Phase 2: RMPP Development Phase 2 will commence after approval of the project plan and schedule with the administering agency* Four major functions of evaluation are noted: l* Consequence Analysis This evaluation phase will involve dispersion model selection appropriate to the AHMs of concern* Meteorological data will be obtained, and the validity of site-specific considerations will be ensured. Population data, including spatial and temporal variation patterns, and toxicological data will be obtained* Analyses of AHM release scenarios will be performed based upon the preceding data and the results of the HAZOP studies. 24789-4810-HC2 1889 198 9 ABDOO180229 2. HAZOP Studies The HAZOP studies will include a review of piping and instrumenta tion diagrams as well as procedures. These studies are performed by a multidisciplinary team and led by a facilitator who has extensive HAZOP experience. The methodology should follow the AIChE-CCPS' "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures." 3. Safety Review This activity, which is a detailed review of the documentation of safety-related programs, includes, for example, a review of safety manuals, audit programs, surveillance programs, and preventive maintenance programs to meet the requirements of Section 25534 of Chapter 6.95, California Health & Safety Code. 4. Procedural and Regulatory Review A detailed review of training programs, accident reports, emergency and security plans, and audit programs is performed. This review considers both regulatory requirements and program adequacy as measured against "best industrial practices" known to the program developers by virtue of corporate experience as well as industry standards. IMPLEMENTATION Inherent to the implementation process is the creation of an administra tive procedure set for program administration during the RMPP developmen tal phase. As discussed previously in the statutory requirements, it is apparent that this procedure set should include and adequately address the following issues: Engineering design change control Evaluation of significant change(s) to the analytical bases of the program Information/recordkeeping requirements Training requirements Auditing requirements Review and certification requirements Notification and communication requirements BENEFITS AND CONCLUSIONS Several benefits can be realized from the implementation of an RMPP for an existing facility which handles, manufactures, or stores AHMs, among which are the following benefits cited by the California Office of Emergency Services* draft guidelines: 24789-4810-HC2 1889 STO STER 1989 7 ABDOO180230 Positive social impact Reduced AHM accidents Reduced injury and death potential Reduced need to evacuate or hospitalize Reduced product costs through higher on-stream factors Reduced material losses Reduced severity of incidents Reduced unscheduled downtime Reduced environmental releases Enhanced emergency response Quicker and less costly environmental cleanup Reduced and fewer legal claims Additional benefits which have been identified include: Greater level of process knowledge obtained from the hazard identification step Enhanced training Increased production within specifications Potential for reduction of liability insurance premiums As shown, many benefits can be derived from the development and implemen tation of an RMPP. Societal benefits will be realized through the reduc tion of the number of AHM releases as well as a reduction in the severity of those releases. The effectiveness of an RMPP will depend upon both the quality of the original program, plus a commitment to continued program review, auditing, and ongoing development of engineering controls. Several of the benefits to the facility operator represent tangible payouts. The additional benefit of meeting regulatory and statutory requirements is achieved within this framework of reduced societal risk and a safer workplace. BIOGRAPHIES Mr. William F. Early is Manager of Safety and Risk Management for Stone & Webster*s Process Technologies and Project Services Division in Houston, Texas. Mr. Early has an MS in Chemical Engineering from the University of Mississippi and a broad process background covering many refining, chemical, and petrochemical designs. His present responsibility includes program management for hazards analyses, risk management programs, and general safety considerations in support of process designs. He also conducts training programs for industry in hazards identification tech niques, risk management programs, and other related services. Recently, he was responsible for the engineering aspects of the first risk manage ment and prevention program developed for an existing facility in the State of California. Mr. Early is also a member of AIChE. Mr. Robert W. Myers is Environmental Program Manager for Stone & Webster*s Pleasanton, California office and also has West Coast marketing responsibilities for water resources, plant safety, and environmental services. Mr. Myers has an MS from Louisiana State University and a BS from California Polytechnic - San Luis Obispo and is a registered envi ronmental assessor for the State of California. He has a broad background in the areas of emergency preparedness/response as well as programmatic 24789-4810-HC2 iss9 STO STER / 939 ABDOO180231 regulatory compliance review and direction of multidisciplinary projects* He is also involved in industry training programs directed toward emer gency response and preparedness, development of risk management programs, and consequence analyses* Mr* Myers was project manager for development of the first risk management and prevention program for an existing facility in the State of California* 24789-4810-HC2 9 ocToaeii. , A ABD00180232 TEXAS AIR CONTROL BOARD PERMIT REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR DISASTER REVIEWS Susan E. Feltch Texas Air Control Board Austin, Texas March 1988 ABDOO180233 TEXAS AIR CONTROL 30ARO PERMIT REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR DISASTER REVIEWS Tne Texas Air Control Board (TACB) is tne governing autnority over the regulation of air pollution control in the State of Texas. The Texas Clean Air Act (TCAA) empowers tne TACB to remedy and prevent conditions of air pollution. Regulation VI requires owners or operators of new or modified facilities wnicn may emit air contaminants to ootain a permit to construct. This enaoles the TACB to conduct a pre-construc tion review to ensure that operation of the proposed facilities will comply with all the Rules and Regulations of the TAC3 and the intent of the TCAA and will not cause or contribute to a condition of air pollu tion. In order to obtain a permit, the permittee must demonstrate that the facility will utilize best available control technology {BACT) taxing into account the technical practicaoi1ity and economic reason ableness. Once BACT has been determined, the off-property impacts from normal operation emissions will be reviewed to determine if the facility will comply with all the TACB Rules and Regulations and the intent of tne TCAA or cause or contribute to a condition of air pollution. Depending on the chemicals handled, the location of the facility and the processes involved, a permit application may require a third type of review - the disaster review. In those cases, tne permit engineer will be concerned with not only the usual emissions of air contaminants from a permitted facility, out also the emissions that may occur during a catastropne, such as a tank rupture or line failure. 1 ABDOO180234 2- - A disaster review is a combination of a healtn effects review of tne predicted impacts due to a catastrophic release and an engineering analysis of tne'process design, operation and redundancies employed at the facility. Not all permitted facilities will undergo a disaster review. Proposed projects which involve toxic cnemicals that are know or suspected to nave potential for life threatening effects off-plant in tne event of a disaster and involve process features wnicn may contriaute to tne potential for disastrous events are candidates for disaster reviews. Altnougn it may not always be possible to eliminate tne potential for disaster, tne TAC3 Permits Oivision oelieves a reasonaole engineering analysis of process design operation ana control redundancies may reduce tne possibility of a catastrophic release and will result in minimizing the effects caused by a disaster event. The decision to require a disaster review is based on consideration of tne cnemicals handled, tne process involved ano tne facility loca tion. The TAC8 does not calculate tne prooaoility of a catastrophic event occurring. Attacnment A lists those chemicals whicn the TAC3 presently considers to have "disaster potential." This list is not all inclusive but is based on current permitting experience. These cnemi cals are reviewed because of their nign toxicity to human life, moderate to high vapor pressure or volatilization Dy fire and high vapor density or otner property that would cause a release to disperse as a cense cloud. Use of one of these cnemicals at a proposed facility does no: necessarily mean that tne unit must have a disaster review. If the cnemical is handled in sufficient volume to support a life threatening ABDOO180235 -3- off-plant impact or the process equipment ana procedures used could increase tne probability of life threatening emission releases during a disaster, the review is considered appropriate. Also, tne facility's proximity to populated areas may influence tne depth of tne review. A disaster review requires the submittal of specific information in addition to tnat normally supplied with a permit application. Attach ment 3 defines TAC3 disaster guidelines and lists information required for a disaster review. Once the disaster chemicals are selected and the process areas where disasters are most likely and/or most severe are identified, several worst-case scenarios are defined. These scenarios are usually associated with tne rupture of a tank or a hole in transfer piping. Tne effect of abatement equipment or other emergency response measures in selecting worst-case scenarios are not considered because in the worst-case abatement equipment and response to the release may not be effective. These scenarios are site-specific and should be discussed with tne TACB Permits Oivision prior to modeling. Pull dispersion modeling must be performed to predict downwind, off-plant impacts in the event of a disaster. An Effects Evaluation Section (EES) review of tne impacts will determine if tne predicted concentrations would be expected to be immediately dangerous to life and health (I01H). Their review is not a comparision of tne maximum predicted concentration to a single IDLH level, as a maximum 30-minute concentration is compared to a short term health effects screening level. Rather, isopleths of predicted concentrations are evaluated relative to tneir movement in areas of ABDOO180236 -4- public access. The TAC8 floes not perform a quantitative risk analysis. Tne TAC3 Modeling Section and EES should also be consulted prior to mooeling. In addition to tne dispersion modeling, a comprehensive discussion of the disaster prevention ana mitigation plans employed at the facility neeos to oe presented. The engineering analysis focuses on the proposed process cesign, ooeration ana reounaancies that would prevent a catastroone ana tne planned course of action in tne event of one. Preventive process design considerations such as substituting a less toxic chemical for use of a highly toxic chemical, protection against mechanical or corrosion failure of equipment, minimization of process upset and equip ment damage potential, monitoring for equipment integrity and safety control redundancies should be addressed. Operational procedures and practices should follow recommended industry guidelines: for example, tne procedures presented by the Chlorine Institute for nandling cnlorme at transfer stations. Any otner factors particular to the process that would minimize the probability of a disaster release should also be presented. The mitigation plan in the event of a release is tne next area of review. Additional controls for abatement such as excess flow valves, automatic shut-offs and interlocks, flares, scrubbers, deluge systems and/or containment devices should be analyzed for their effectiveness. The ability to isolate the area of release also is important to con sider. Ambient air monitoring systems witn alarms are sometimes effective in detecting a release in the early stages. A contingency ABDOO180237 -3- olan is crucial in planning the course of action in the event of a catastrcone. Participation in an area response program is preferreo. If an organizes program is not available, then the applicant may be requested to provide their own response program to notify the community in order to minimize the population that could oe adversely affected by a release. The Environmental Protection Agency has recently publisneo guidance manuals entitled "Control 1 mg Accidental Releases of Air Toxics." The manuals cover controls for specific chemicals sucn as chlorine, hydrogen fluonoe, nydrogen cyanide, ammonia and sulfur dioxide, as well as general topics like prevention and protection technologies. These manuals provide a definition of what areas need to be evaluated ana what types of controls can be employed. Altnougn these manuals are not to be used to define specific TAC3 requirements, they provide good guidance, are considered valuable tools in reviewing disaster control application ano should be referenced whenever appropriate. Tne permit engineer will review tne information discussed above to determine if the facility is properly equipped to minimize the proba bility of a catastrophic event. If the EES review determines that offplant impacts from tne disaster release are acceptable, then no further disaster review is necessary. If tne EES review determines that the imoacts are unacceptable, then the permit engineer must determine if the proposed controls are sufficient to minimize the likelihood of a ABDOO180238 6- - disaster event and if the proposed protectionary measures will reduce tne magnitude and duration of the off-property impacts. If tne controls are considered inadequate to reduce the impacts, then further process design cnanges, control redundancies and aDatement equipment are negotiated with the applicant. After a determination of the appropri ateness of controls has been made, the permit engineer will incorporate special provisions in the permit which will ensure the operaoility of tne disaster response ana prevention program. The disaster review program is a response to tne concern of air contaminant emissions resulting from catastrophic releases. It is not expected to eliminate the prooability of a disaster in every case, but it is expected to provide reduced prooability, magnitude and duration of a catastrophic release. Attachment C describes the suggested procedure to follow when preparing a disaster review package for TAGS review. Attacnment 0 presents several examples of prevention ana protection controls employed in different type of facilities. The TAC3 believes that the effects incurred in a disaster event can be greatly minimized tnrougn an intensive engineering analysis of a facility's disaster control capabilities. ABDOO180239 ATTACHMENT A Texas nir Control Board's Current List of "Disaster Potential" Chemicals. acrolein ammonia {anhydrous) arsine boron trifluorioe bromine caroon disulfide Chlorine chlorine dioxide chlorine trifluoride cnloroacetaldehyoe cnorooicrin cnloroprene diazometnane diborane dimetnyl hydrazine ethyl mercaptan fluorine formaldehyde (annyorous) nyarogen oromiae hydrogen chloride hydrogen cyanide hydrogen fluoride hydrogen selenide hydrogen sulfide ketene methyl amine methyl bromide methyl hydrazine methyl isocyanate methyl mercaotan mcxel carbonyl nitric oxide nitrogen dioxide oxygen difluonoe ozone pentaoorane perchloromethyl mercaptan percnlorofluoride phosgene pnospnine phosphorus trichloride selenium nexafluoride stibine sulfur dioxide (liquified) sulfur pentar'luoride tellurium hexafluoride ABDOO180240 ATTACHMENT B DISASTER EVALUATION GUIDELINES FOR PERMIT REVIEWS IN TEXAS Your proposed project may have the potential for a catastrophic emission release of. Please provide an assessment of the disaster potential using tne following guidelines: 1. Identify any cnemicals, in addition to that named above, that have reasonable potential in the event of a disaster to cause off-plant concentrations that are immediately dangerous to life and health. 2. For the selected chemicals, provide the chemical and physical characteristics of each chemical including put not limited to? Chemical formula. Molecular weight, Ibs/mo. Vapor pressure, psia at 63*F and at maximum operating temperature, *F. Vapor specific gravity (relative to air) at o3*F and at disaster release temperature, `F. Initial boiling point, *F. Provide Material Safety Oata Sheet for each.selected chemical. 3. For these cnemicals, identify the proposed process features, equipment design, instrumentation, safety redundancies, operating procedures and other factors tnat would minimize the probability of a disaster and would minimize the rate, quantity and duration of emissions in the event of a release. If the applicant concedes that off-plant disaster impacts could be above levels that are immediately dangerous to life and health, proceed to Step 7 on this page. Otherwise, for eacn chemical, identify several worst-case disaster scenarios. Usually, the worst-case scenario is associated with the rupture of a tank or piping or a fire. Do not consider the effect of abatement equip ment or otner emergency response measures in selecting worst-case scenarios because, in tne worst case, abatement equipment and responses to the release may not be effective. 5. For each disaster scenario, provide the emission rates, duration, rate cnanges witn time, etc. Include the rationale for this estimate. 6. Provide emission modeling to predict maximum downwind, off-plant emission impacts {concentrations and durations). All modeling tecnniques must be approved by the TACB Modeling Section. Draft guidelines for the modeling are available. 7. If predicted off-plant concentrations would oe expected to be immediately dangerous to life and health as determined by the TACB Effects Evaluation Section, be prepared to consider additional changes or additions to tne process, equipment design, instrumenta tion or operating procedures. Negotiate details witn tne permit reviewer. 3. In any permit review, wnere a disaster potential exists off-plant, provide a disaster contingency plan in support of the permit review. For each scenario, describe any abatement equipment or other emergency response action that may reduce tne off-plant impacts. ABDOO180241 ATTACHMENT C Suggested Proceoure for Preoaring a Disaster Review Submittal Contact tne TACB Permits Division to determine disaster review applicaolity and what disaster scenarios would be appropriate: 1. by phone 2. setup a pre-permit meeting Consult TACB Modeling Section to determine wnicn dispersion model snould be used. Consult TACB Effects Evaluation Section to obtain the current nealtn effects information for tne cnemical(s) of concern. Perform a literature search for oocuments which discuss tne recommenced practices ano procedures for hazardous prevention and protection. Check the disaster review guideline worksheet to be sure all areas nave been covered. Submit tne information with a modeling summary and analysis of tne facility's disaster controls. / ABDOO180242 ATTACHMENT 0 Cases Studies - Disaster Review Examples The following examples illustrate different aspects of the disaster review in relation to various industrial processes, but are not intenoed to identify every specific of our disaster review for these type pro cesses. Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) Alkylation Facilities An analysis of the preventative measures employed at these facilities mignt include: minimization of equipment in HF service to reduce tne chances of an HF release due to mechanical equipment failure, protection against corrosion with material selection or monitoring of equipment, restriction of heavy equipment usage in the HF area to avoide possible damage to equipment in HF service during maintenance and detailed per sonnel training specific to HF. Mitigation plans mignt include: a large caustic scurooer to neutralize HF releases, design of an effective containment area and water deluge system, ability to isolate leaks, an emergency transfer system ana a contingency plan. Agricultural Chemicals Manufacturinq Facilities Some general preventative measures that might be employed at these facilities include: storage tanks and reactors equipped with dual inde pendent level alarms to prevent overfilling, the pressure in the reactor monitored for flucuations and tne scrubber equipped with a spare circu lation pump and two pH monitors with continuous recorders and alarm to be sure tne pH does not drop below 13. Mitigation plans might include: excess flow valves, flow control valves fail in closed position and construction of tne railcar station on a private siding away from the public rail. Chlorine (C12) Railcar Unloading Facilities In addition to following Chlorine Institute recommended guidelines, preventative measures at these facilities might include: minimizing storage of CIj and feeding it directly from tne railcars to the process area, daily fugitive leak monitoring program to reduce the potential of release due to an unattended fugitive source, closed dome unloading, tank cars supplied with excess flow valves and CU storage and process vessels equipped with a pressure controller with high and low alarms. The response plan might include: a caustic scrubbing system equipped to handle emergency releases, area amoient air detectors with alarms and a directed maintenance program to repair a fugitive leak immediately after being detected. Anhydrous Ammonia Terminal Prevention controls at these facilities might include: a double walled storage tank, a refrigeration system witn 100 percent excess capacity and 24 hour surveillance capabilities. Mitigation plans might include: a contingency plan, automatic shut-off valves in the transfer piping in the event of a leak, an emergency diesel powered generator for use during electrical outages ana an emergency flare system for use during refrigeration outages. ABDOO180243 REFERENCES 1. S. reltcn and A. Velasquez, "TACB Procedure for Determining tne Application of Control Technology." TACB, January 1987. 2. <. Horne, S. Keil, .< Neumann and J. Panketn, "Case Studies of TAC8 Permit Reviews in Which Potential for Catastropmc Releases was Consioereo." TAC3, Octooer 1986. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to tnan* the Chemical Section of the TACB Permits Division for their contrioution to this paper. ABDOO180244 Disaster Emission Evaluation Guidelines for Permit Reviews Texas Air Control Board - Permits Division January 51, 1'5S5; Revised $4-53-33 CWP3J Some projects under our review will involve toxic chemicals known or suspected to have potential for serious off-plant imoacts that may be lmmeaiately dangerous to life or health in the event of a disaster of any kind. Uhen.sucn disaster potential exists, follow the guidelines below: l. Identify the chemicals having potential for serious off-plant impacts in the event of a major process upset or a disaster (sabotage.aircraft crash, act of war, earthquake, tornado, fumes from fires, etc.) 5. Characteristics of disaster chemicals: A. High toxicity to human life. B. Moderate to high vapor pressure or easily volatilized by fire. C. High vapor density or other property that causes the vaoor to resist dispersion and to hug the ground. D. Chemical is handled in sufficient volume to support an offolant impact that would be immediately dangerous to life or health. E. Serious off-olant imoacts during a disaster could be increased if process equipment malfunctions or procedural errors are made. 5. Examples of candidate disaster chemicals and related processes are as follows: High volume chemicals: HYDROGEN SULFIDE - Refineries, oil and gas processing CHLORINE, - Caustic-chlorine, chlorinated hydrocarbons AMMONIA - Fertilizer, nylon intermediates, amines, specialty chems PHOSGENE - Pesticides, chloroformates Moderate volume chemicals: METHYL ISOCYANATE, HYDROGEN CYANIDE- Pesticides, intermediates HYDROGEN FLUORIDE -Refinery alkylation units SULFUR DIOXIDE -Sulfur recovery, specialty chemicals ACROLEIN - Herbicides, pharmaceuticals Low volume chemicals: BROMINE, CARBON DISULFIDE, MERCAPTANS, METHYL BROMIDE, HYDROGEN BROMIDE - Specialty chemical manufacture 4. Define, with applicant the worst case disaster scenarios - These are most often a rupture of a tank or other vessel or piping or a fire 5. Applicant must supply characteristics of a disaster release including emission rate, duration, rate changes with time, etc. ?. Applicant must provide modeling (acceptable to TAGS Modeling tOCtlOflJ to predict off-plant concentrations and durations of concentrations. 7. Obtain Effects Evaluation Section appraisal of the impacts. 3. If the impacts are unacceptable, define, with applicant, further process changes or redundancies or abatement approaches. ?. Negotiate appropriate changes or abatement to remove or minimize the serious impacts if possible as shown by modeling. 1$. Where disaster potential still exists, require applicant to submit a disaster contingency plan. NOTE: It mav not always to possible to eliminate disaster potential, but reasonable engineering analvsis ano process design/abatement redun dancies will alwavs result in miniminnn imnart*. ABDOO180245 HAZOP GUIDE WORD APPROACH U0J) UJ OQC. o G&fr--UC Usi <oc <a. (9 iSi< GC 1|U0OJ. 0) GC U. uoci <IHII UI . 3oc <2 eO UI H Ou2. auoci &SUI H- <ui OC UI UocI t<- 3 OC Ui H z *co|o o2 oUc Sui u<i UHocJ < IOL o p < GC UJ CO UocJ Ql CO < UJ I<- 2 CzO o p 5 p H< Sffi a! o HQQ a a u. a. h GC UL ui^IUO OO g5 3 3 3 3 oO E ou. GuCi m UI UI UI III CO <0 <0 <0 <<<< UI UI UI UI oc oc OC OC oooo QQQQ Ui UI UI UJ oooo UQI QUI QUI QUI z < ZUI OC IULI IL z< rUrI 5 m OC LL Z C<O Q IL -I OC O UzJ o z oUcJ o s CO CO UI o fr- OC -1 UI * oc UJ x < CL CO < o1- OTHER: Different Plant Conditions From Normal Operation -- <p o^ O 03 5 0) ABDOO180246 O 03 25 }- C 2 o u(0 3= u 55 a?oc c o Caos= Coo-= lil CO LJJ I h < U. O "O 03 O dj O) o Maintenance Grounding/static Sabotage Safety ABDOO180247 HAZOP AGENDA WITH EXAMPLES A typical HAZOP agenda is presented below, with expanded explanations and examples following: 1. Introduce team members 2. HAZOP Methodology 3. AHM (EHS) Properties 4. Identify Hazards 5. Purpose or goal of HAZOP 6. Scope the HAZOP 7. Establish Criticality and Frequency Codes 8. Define Dispersion Models 9. Process Description 10. PCHAZOP Online 11. Plant Walk Through 12. HAZOP Team Meetings 13. Interim Report 14. HAZOP Report PCHAZOP is a proprietary program ABDOO180248 HAZOP GUIDE WORD APPROACH OC UJ h UJ 2 < cc < UJ UceJ t<- 3 CC UJ UJ I- oc < 2oQ. UJ H Z 3 CC UJ < z ^ U) uj i- e2 H< oCC UJ Q. CO ^ O O uj S < _uJ. aCC Ul h Uccl QQQQ uj H 9 CO O 2u. UJ cac. 2 UI-J < UccJ o UJ O og<CC uj O UJ ou= UJ cc UJ UJ UJ UJ CO CO CO CO <<<< UccJ UccJ cUcJ cUcJ oooo aaaa UJ UJ UJ UJ o o oo 3 a 3 a 3 a 3 a UJ UJ UJ UJ o2 cc oCzO p Q El Hz <cc < UJ a! o H rr * Sm oOC UL Z o oOC Ul 5 UJ <n CO Ul (0 < OC zUl Ho ABDOO180249 Sabotage Safety Maintenance Grounding/static OTHER: Different Plant Conditions From Normal Operation CO <C c o o55 oo 0) 2ca aD <cD 03 O o "O 03 5 s= vo. co 03 Oc) "a eo uj <z> iS o = -- h- < Li. c c Q- $ J?-' 2o .2 S o o 13 c 5 o) '<5 ^> E= <a ^ O co O k. o C0 CO cc CO 3 O ABDOO180250 HAZOP AGENDA WITH EXAMPLES A typical HAZ^P agenda is presented below, with expanded explanations and examples following: 1. Introduce team members 2. HAZOP Methodology 3. AHM (EHS) Properties 4. Identify Hazards 5. Purpose or goal of HAZOP 6. Scope the HAZOP 7. Establish Criticality and Frequency Codes 8. Define Dispersion Models 9. Process Description 10. PCHAZOP Online 11. Plant Walk Through 12. HAZOP Team Meetings 13. Interim Report 14. HAZOP Report * PCHAZOP is a proprietary program