Document VG3OmjnvanLqB3DygEBLvX2RZ

wOes/risi*- &nra!&a* Office of the Coanlssloner -- -- " '. Addrese Reply To CoaBietioBtr of Cuetoau TREASURT BEPARTUEBT Barton Of OurtoM Washington a hZ^e' V? , *rer To 2S364 Peb. 24. 1931 lead Industrie* JUioolotloa. 420 Lexington Avenue, How fork. Hot Toric. Otntlonoat Fleaae rtftr to previous oorresoondeao* In regard to toot Ion 313 (h) of the Tariff Act of 1930. Station 313 (h) provide* thotl "Bo drewt>*etr ahall bo allowed undar the provlalone of this Section or of taction 6 of tha Act antltlad "An Act teaporsrlly to provide revenue for tht Philippine Island*, tad for other purpose*, " approved lurch 4, 1902 (relating to drawback on shipments to the Philippine Islands), unless tha completed articla Is exported, or shipped to tha Philip* pint Itlaadt. within thiee years after laportntJc* of tha iaportad merchandise." In several brlafa which hart bean filed la the Bureau la behalf of . tha eeraral partita Interacted sany court decisions art cited and such argument praaaatad la an effort to eatabliah that there exists confusion and uncertainty in reapeot to tha Bearing of the word "importation"* that tha tera hat bean uaad la tariff legislation with different mecalaga and that Congress doea not regard importation aa complete eo long aa goode rea*In In tha custody and eoetrol Of tha Ooverruaant. Tha content ioa la made, baaed on tha abort prsalaes, that for the purposes of aaotloa 313 (h) Congress did cot regard acrcnghdlaa la outtom* custody aa Iaportad and that tha phrase "within three year# after Importation of tha iaportad merchandise" ahould be interpreted aa nearing throe yeare after actual withdrawal of the imported merchandise from tha euatody and control of the Oerernaest, The Bureau haa erajaiaed all of the eaeea cited la the eereral brief* on file aa well aa tuny others, end la able to find little. If anything, which would support any of the premises relied upon. Wills there it found in aeverskl decisions expreaalont te the general effect that Congress doea not regard importation as oottplete eo long aa goods remain la the euatody and control of the Government aa was stated la the e'aae of Man* at al , United State* (12 Court of Oustem* Appeal*, 290), "the rtetutee passed upon and held applicable la rich eases, provided in tens* that the duties therwundar should apply to merchandise la custom* euatody and the eblter dissuasion, therefore, euat be understood with that llaltatloa," Will* it is true that la the eaae of Usadowe, ttys 4 Coopsay . United States (J. B. 39342), the Board of Oeneral Appraiaer* held, with reapeot to oertaia merchandise inport*d for experiaeatal purposes, that the deto of importation contemplated by subsection 4, paragraph J, section 4 of the TerIff Act of 1913 wee the date ea which the Importer le allowed by law aad regulations to take possession of the property, la the eaae of United 'Urgin'wi.*i.y-iy; sSPsfew. * "a J5 N16911 mw States v. Istate of Bothell (14 Duet. Appls. 273), the Appellate Court dltoussed tho eu of Meadows, Bye ft Company r. Unit*4 States, and tteted that It was unable to agree with tho interpretation of the otatuto in that oaao. In thia oase alao tho court analyte* tho oaao* in which aueh erproaaion* a* "importation la not ooaplot* until entry ia node", and point* out that ia every auoh inttanoo tho atatuto invoked plainly declared that the duties provided thereunder ahould be applicable to merchandise already imported. In none of the above caaea waa tha meaning of the word "importat ion* an la rue, nor waa the tine or date when the merchandise waa imported mate* rial to the proper oor.atruction of the etetute under oorvaidoration, in viaar of which aueh judicial expressions aa tho** we are con*tiering ouat be re garded a* obiter dictum and, whan underatood with the limitation* by the court* intended, create no uncertainty in retpeot to the meaning of the term "importation" uhereever wiployed in tariff legislation. On the other hand thara exiata a long line of deciaIona of the federal Court*, extending far back into the history of tariff legislation in this country, defining the term "importation" and fixing tha time of Importation aa the day of the vessel** arrival at the pert of entry with intent to unlade. But oven if It were established that for eeao purpose* Congresa re gards importation aa incomplete o long aa goods remain in tha custody and under the control of the Government there la nothing In tha eases cited or the record before the Bureau supporting the contention that Congress so re garded Importation for the purposes of section 313 (h). On the other hand, in construing legislation, similar in saaeetial respects, section SOS of the Tariff Act of 1922, exempting articles imported for various purposes from tha payment of duty if exported within six months from tho date of im portation, the Court of Customs Appeals has held that tha date of import ation is the date on which the merchandise is brought within the limits of the port of entry with intent to unlade, United States t . let at* of Bo*hell, (14 Court Oust. Appls, 215), end the Bureau feel* Itself bound by that dee is ion in this ease. In view of the foregoing, the Bureau la constrained to adhere to its original ooneluslon that by the word importation, a* u*ed in aection 313 (h) of the Tariff Act of 1930, Coegreat meant "importation" In the ordin ary end well understood sense in which it Is employed generally in tariff legislation and that the limitation upon the payment of drawback in the said section 313 (h) begins bo run from the date on whleh the merchandise is brought into a port of entry with intent to there unlade the same. Bespectfully, (Signed) T. Z. A, mi Coaalssiou*.* of Customs* T//~ <