Document V3w5n3REYm9V8xMO5jkOZ4G28

FILE NAME: Wagner (WAG) DATE: 0000 DOC#: WAG033 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Barry Castleman Book Excerpt, 4th Edition FOURTHm m 'U Baiw UCasteiian ivith a conrljulmn by Stephen L Denser ASPEN LAW & BUSINESS A vision o Aspen Publishers, Inc. A - 3 91 Asbesto prehensi asbesto! resarc involved disease Asbeste publish develop informa piis de As Co oc Th or W( C( irr in Asbestos' Medical and Legal Aspects (I)n the practice of American and Canadian life insurance companies asbestos workers are generally declined on account of the assumed health-injurious conditions of the industry. That 3 of these asbestos workers' deaths were r< portedly caused by tuberculosis and 2 were reported!}- cruscd :v pneumonia raised concern o\er the possible role cf r-sbrstrs trapped in the lungs in causing these deaths The cat i pointed to one or more c.f th: folio'...ng cs pcss.ble roles fo" as ru-Tcs i) asbestos dust m the lungs might reduce ? person's res stance -o tuberculosis and/or pneumonia infections, 2) asbcsli s oust m the lungs might reduce a person's resistance to the progress cf such infections, once they are contracted; 3) asbestos pneumo coniosis might be a serious disease m itself and be misdiag nosed as tuberculosis and/or pneumonia. Although these me snail numbers, it is highly significant that life insurance companies were already refusing to insure asbestos wor.-ony and that Murray had identified a distinct disease as the cause cf death in an asbestos worker. Hoffman repeatedly urged rcsea-ch into the health hazards m the growing asbestos mdustr}, decnnng the lack of medical literature cn the subjec" Case Reports in Medical Journals Though the English had so far taken the greatest interest in the problem of asbestosis, the}'had published practically nothing in the medical literature. Starting in 1924, a number of important papers on asbestosis were published m the B n h ' k M cd:cal Journal. Nov; that asbestosis was discussed in a prominent medical journal, the word spread quickly and was p'cked up m journals in the United States and other countries. When reports later started to come in from many countries m the 1930s, the authors usually demonstrated an impressive awareness of previous work, which they cited. The first detailed case report of asbestosis in ar individual worker, published in the general medical literature, was by the British pathologist W.E. Cooke in 1924. Dr. Cooke described his patient as having tuberculosis and also "Fibrosis of the Lungs Due to the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust" (the Ttle of the A -192 The Development of Knowledge About Asbestosis / paper).2' Cooke's report v.-s noted by radiologists Pancoast 2nd Pendergrass in Philadelphia, who also commented on 17 asbestos workers with pneumoconiosis they had examined. "Thus is another very dusty industry," they wrote.20 Tne subject of Cooke's case report was Nellie Kershaw, who had worked for Turner Brothers Asbestos Company from the age of 13, intermittently after age 26, until she was totally disabled at the ege of 31. The Newbola Approved Society arproachc-d Turner Brothers m 1922 to pay Ms. Kershaw workers' compensation, on the basis of a doctor's certificate diagnosing hc-r asr.awr.g "asbestos poisoning ' r` The company replied that 'we repudiate the term 'Asbestos poisoning'" and noted that no such condition was listed among the diseases that v, ere compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act." Tne company meanwhile wrote to its insurer, "we feel that it '.hi] be exceeding]}' dangerous to admit am liability whatever m such a case and before referring the matter to vou, we consid ered that we ought to do all in our power to repudiate the claim. Thus, unable to obtain sickness compensation from either the Nations] Health Insurance system or her employer, Nellie Kershaw wrote to Turner Brothers, saying "I think it is time there was something from you." She said she was in need of nourishment and had not received ?. penny during nine vceeks off work. Her request, and later that ot her husband, unable to par* for her funeral expenses, were rejected, "to avoid creating e precedent. The case was referred to Dr. Cooke in 1924, after a coroner's enquiry was reported in the press, raising the possibility that asbestos had contributed to Ms Kershaw's death at the age of 33. Her treating physician, Walter joss, wrote that he had seen 10-12 cases a year of lung conditions in patients working with asbestos." The case of Nellie Kershaw and Turner & Newall's reaction would much later be cited by Selikoff and Greenberg as an early event in "the long-playing tragedy of asbestos, a story of missed opportunities for avoiding a worldv.'ide disas ter."26 In 1927, Cooke added certain pathologic details about Ms. Kershaw. In this paper, Cooke named the disease "pulmonary A -193 16 Asbestos Medica! and Legal .Aspects also appeared to be least exposed to asbestos dust among the work force studied. The dust sample analysis counted dust particles in the air in toto, and did not distinguish fibers from other airborne dust particles. (For further information, see Chapter 4.) Merewether and Price also made recommendations for the control of dust exposures in asbestos plants 1hese i e-commen dations covered specifically each major manufacturing industry using asbestos, and in addition included general "house keeping" practices to be followed by all In addition, periodic medical examinations of the workers were recommended, to exclude people with lung disease and detect cases of hc.osit and tuberculosis "at the earliest possible moment " The importance of worker education was stressed Respiratory protection was "only recommended as a second ime of defense, and not in substitution for other preventive measures specifi cally directed to the control of dust as near as possible to its point of origin." The hazard of insulation work n shipyards was also noted In a magazine article entitled "Workers Who Breathe Death," Merewether's findings were reported. "The only advantage which the less dusty processes have is that it takes longer fmally to cripple and disable the worker," the article said 4S Govern ment regulation of the industry and compensation for asbestosis were strongly urged. The Merewether and Price survey W2S noted in numerous other publications m England and the Unuec States.4**' The major medical journals in England promptly carried editorials on ltd"'*3 But the "British monopoly" on asbestosis research was now over, and in 1930 new contributions would emerge from a number of countries. For it turned out that virtually everywhere asbestosis was looked for, it was found. Other Events of 1930 This year the British activities on asbestosis received consider able attention in the United States medical literature, as the first case reports of asbestosis in the U.S. were published. There was also a conference on pneumoconisis held by the Interna- A -194 The Development of Knowledge About Asbestosis 17 tional Labor Office in 1930, at which the subject of asbestosis was repeatedly discussed. Medical reviews of the state of knowledge on asbestosis were published in a number of countries. And the British radiologists observed that cessation of exposure to asbestos would not halt the steady progress of the deadly lung disease, once it was established. Statistical highlights of Merewether's findings were reported in the Journal o f the A m erica n M edical Association on June 28, 1930, at the time when a bill had just been introduced in Parliament to extend the silicosis provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to cover asbestosis as well.54 Supporting the bill, Lord Russell for the government said that man)' processes m silica working could not show a mortality approaching that for the asbestos industry, in which 14 fatal cases had now been reported and in addition 3 deaths from asbestosis associated with tuberculosis. Later that year, the Journal o f the A m erican M ed ica l A ssociation noted Mills' report of an asbestosis case." '56 This report, just published in M innesota M edicine, described a severe case of asbestosis in a man who had worked in an asbestos mine in South America long before his death Mills' alert to doctors in the U.S. was amplified. Concerning the relation of physicians of the United States to this industry, Mills pointed out that asbestos is mined and manufactured in many parts of this country, and that pulmonary asbestosis surely will be encountered. The editorial went on to report that the Workmen's Compensa tion Act in England had been extended to include asbestosis. The Journal o f the A m erica n M edical A ssociation was the most widely read medical journal in the United States. By 1920, the J.A M .A . w a s mailed directly to 48 percent of the physicians in the U.S. and was believed to have reached 80 percent of them.57 Total circulation of the journal in 1930 was 98,000, including institutions and individual subscribers.58 T mf Additional medical case reports and reviews of the literature on asbestosis were published in the U.S. by Lynch and Smith Asbestos- Medical and Legal Aspects (in J .A .M .A .), and by Soper, m 1930.a`J,6 Dr. Soper began by expressing disappointment with the medical profession's slowness to appreciate the threat of dust hazards in general and asbestos dust in particular. He concluded, When there has been exposure to asbestos dust the presence of pulmonary asbestosis should always be suspected The International Labor Office held an international confer ence on silicosis and other dust diseases m Johannesburg, South Africa, in 1930.61 This was the first of several major conferences held by the I.L.O. bringing together pneumoconiosis experts and knov.Tedge from all over the world. Here, too, it was noted that there was a bill before the British Parliament to provide compensation for workers disabled by asbestosis Authorities in Great Britain reported that, "Asbestos damaged (the lungs) more rapidly than silica." Incapacitating asbestosis had been observed in South Africa and southern Rhcdesia but not m Australia. Engineering dust controls had been installed at an Italian asbestos plant in 1912. An Italian said it was "well known" that blue asbestos (crocidohte from Africa) was more deadly than white (rhrysotile, mined in itah and elsewhere); but no supporting evidence was given.62 Researchers from the Saranac Laboratory for Research on Tuberculosis (U.S.) contrib uted a preliminar)' report on their experiments on guinea pigs inhaling asbestos. The International Labor Office had stern warnings about asbestos in its encyclopedia, Occupation and Health, m 1930: All processes from extraction onwards unquestionably involve a considerable hazard, and American and Canadian life insurance companies generally refuse asbestos workers on account of the assumed deleterious conditions in the industry. The article went on to deplore the lack of more detailed data on the hazard in various branches of the industry, laying stress on the "rapidly increasing development of industries utilizing asbestos.''63 Other treatises on pneumoconiosis and preventive medicine now included sections about asbestosis.'4'" A -19 6 26 Asbestos Medical and Lega1Aspects some of the features of the disease." The authors dosed with a plea for adoption of preventive measures. Chest physicians in South Carolina reported an additional "pure case" of asbestosis in an asbestos textile worker in 1931 The authors surveyed the literature and counted 172 cr.s.w of asbestosis in medical journals.100 Radiologists Pancoast and Pendergrass reported that the) had seen 58 men employed at various occupations m asbestos mining, of whom 15 "showed definite evidence of pneumoconi osis."101 They did not regard the hazard at the mine as compara ble to that in factories, which were dustier. Gardner and Cummings had exposed guinea pies to air-onrne asbestos and produced asbestosis in the animals, which they examined and described pathologically There was little if any enhancement of the virulence of tuberculous infection bv asbestosis.102 In 1932, medical examinations were conducted for all 1,1-10 employees of Johns-Manville's factory m Manville, New 1ersey. Guidance was obtained from Metropolitan Life doctors Lanza and Fellows m designing the survey. Interpretation of chest Xrays was done by Dr. F. V. Meriwether, chief of the U S Bureau of Mines clinic in Picher, Oklahoma; however, Dr Meriwether was not provided with information on the occupational expo sure histories of the workers after their hire by Johns-Manville The report of this unpublished study shows 327 (29%) of the workers had X-ray evidence of pneumoconiosis, which -was called "asbestosis" if the worker had had no prior history of exposure to occupational dust hazards. The company separately tabulated length of service and length of exposure, while noting asbestosis among a number of workers listed as having no exposure. Some of the employees diagnosed by X-ray as having asbestosis, whose "exposure" at Manville was recorded as "none" were a watchman, a mill-wright, packing and shipping department workers, and machinists.103 Thus, Manville plant workers exposed as "bystanders" were,identified as asbestosis victims before any such cases were repoited in the published medical literature (See Chapter 7). The Children's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor convened an expert committee in 1932 to formulate guidelines A -197 The Development of Knowledge About Asbestosis 27 for the protection of children at work. The committee was unanimous in recommending that minors under 18 be prohib ited from working in a number of hazardous occupations. Among those listed were "occupations involving exposure to free silica dust, asbestos dust, or other dusts in injurious quantities.''504 This reference to health hazards in the asbestos industry was reiterated by a labor representative at a 1933 government hearing on the asbestos industry. The hearing was attended by the Presidents of Johns-Manville Corporation and Philip Carey Manufacturing Company, and a representative of Keasbey & Mattison Company.502 .An 1L O. bibliography, Pncumoccniosis, published m 1932, 1'Stcd 70 references on asbestos. With the exception of one article on geological occurrence, these were all medical reports about asbestosis.502The point of diminishing returns had already been reached, however. The next 70 publications would have little to add to the framework of their predecessors on the subject of asbestosis. The first reports of another scourge, lung cancer with asbestosis, were yet to be written. London chest physician Philip Ellman published thorough articles on the features of asbestosis m both the U.S. and Great 5ritam in 1933-1934.107506 He described some of his patients, who included: a 22-year~old woman with "early" asbestosis; a 26-> ear-old woman whose X-ray showed "definite and progres sive spread of fibrosis in both lungs in less than 9 months"; and a man with an earl}' stage of asbestosis who had worked for 10 years as a pipe-coverer (insulation v/orker). Ellman also mentioned that a terrier dog "kept for ratting purposes in an asbestos factory" was "lethalled in its own interest due to the distressing degree of dyspnea the dog suffered." Ellman warned that "Pulmonary asbestosis, once established, is a progressive disease with a bad prognosis." He also said, Inhalation of asbestos dust must be expected sooner or later to produce pulmonary fibrosis, depending upon (a) length of exposure and (b) nature and concentration of the dust. Ellman's clinical description of the asbestotic was vivid, and was one of the earliest comparisons of asbestosis with its betterknown cousin, silicosis. 28 Asbestos. Medical and Legal Aspect [A] case o simple silicosis often looks well, declares that he is well, and is even offended when any reflection :s casi upon the soundness of his lungs, in contrast to this, a case of asbestosis is cyanotic, emaciated, arxious, and often obviously going downhill. Such, then, is the clinical picture of sufferers from asbestosis. Only by an extension of meaning could the woid sniierer' be applied to anyone vcith simple silicosis (original empha sis) The publication of Ellman's article m the British Jem mu cf Radiolcg-j followed another on asbestosis by radiologist W Burton Wood.10'' Dr. Wood reported that he had had patients with asbestosis that did not worsen after cessation of exposure as well as others that did, The British journal Tubercle ran separate, comprehensive, three-part articles on asbestosis byMerewerher and Gloyne u 'r Gloyne described minutely the pathological aspects of asbesto sis, and Merewether described almost everj.th.ng else then known. Merewether began with a description of the esbectoc mdustry's phenomenal growth. Just between 1922 and 1921 Britain's consumption of asbestos had tripled. Merewether reviewed earlier work, and described the disease as he had in his 1930 Factory Department report By 1933, ht recommended that chest X-rays were "invaluable" in diagnos ing asbestosis, "and should never be neglected." Again and more clearly, the fundamental concepts o: the requisite lung burden and the period of maturation o f fibrosis were explained: [TJhis is important from the practical point of view of prevention, that a certain minimum fibrosis-producing amount, as it were, of asbestos dust must be trapped m the lungs in order to produce a potentially disabling or serious amount of fibrosis, and also that a certain "maturation" period must elapse before that amount of fibrosis is devel oped. A- 199 The Development of Knowledge About Asbestosis 29 Pausing to describe two illustrative fatal cases with under 5 years' duration of exposure, he went on to explain the interplay between exposure and the maturation of disease: Particulars of cases seem to show that with high concentra tions of dust the minimum period of time which must elapse between the commencement of exposure and the production of a serious degree of asbestosis is approximately seven years--which include not only the trapping period of the fibrosis-producing dose of dust, but also the maturation period of the fibrosis, which periods, of course, overlap. The existence of this, which may be referred to as the fibrosis-producing period, i.e , the period which must elapse from the date of commencing work before a serious degree of asbestosis can be produced, accounts for the fact that it is not until the second five years of employment is reached that appreciable numbers of cases of asbestosis are discov ered. This period of seven years is, of course, the minimum, and few cases mature in this minimum period; in successive years, however, depending on the dustiness of the process in which employed, more cases mature. In the more dusty processes the fibrosis-producing period, as defined above, is commonly eleven years The workers themselves were commonly oblivious of the inexorable progress of the disease until it became well ad vanced, he said. Dr. Merev/ether then posed the question "Does Asbestosis Shorten Life?" The answer to this question is "emphatically Yes," he wrote. He presented figures showing that of 42 fatal cases of asbestosis m Great Britain, the average age at death was 41. All but two of these cases were examined post-mortem. The extent of the devastation caused by asbestosis was indicated by a comparison with silicosis: The average duration of employment sufficient to cause a fatal degree of asbestosis was only 15.2 years, as compared with 40.1 years for all cases of silicosis. Merewether concluded that asbestosis was "comparable with the more serious silicosis risks" based on these findings. In light of the irreversible and progressive nature of asbePosis, he held out little hope for the victims of asbestosis The ultimate prognosis in those with developed asbestosi1or in those who have incarcerated m their lungs a fibres.sprodiicing amount of asbestos dust, even though no appre ciable fibrosis or only a slight amount can be cietc-ctcd, w bad Death from the disease is inevitable sooner or latei, n life is not cut short by accident or bv some inccnrec'vc disease. He went on to explain that asbestosis needn't es en be ad\ ar.cei. to cause death. It proved sufficient m some cases simply by destroying the body's reserve capacity to deal with othei It is remarkable to what extent the lungs can be affected ard yet life in a fair degree of comfort rc- ram. The reserve is however, so slender that the addition of any burden to the system, in the form of a disturbance of health which v. ou'.d only slightly inconvenience a normal person, ma\ c\crccmt the remaining resistance and precipitate the fatal outcome It is apparent, therefore, that while the onset of an acute respiratory infection is most ominous, the development c: any disease which directly or indirectly throws an added strain on the heart or lungs is of serious import. For these reasons and from consideration of the features present in recorded fatal cases, the view is forced upon or.c th a t the existence o f even a moderate degree o f asbestosis is n serious and ever-present potential risk to life, (emphas s added) Donnelly, a physician in North Carolina, reported on 15 cases of asbestosis he had seen from the asbestos plants in his area He emphasized that exposure "for even a comparatively short time is a definite and serious industrial hazard."11' A -201 The Development of Knowledge About Asbestosis 33 No further clarification was given on the meaning of "selected more or less at random." Only if there was a consensus of the X-ray readers was a worker classified as having radiologic evidence of asbestosis: The (X-ray) film s were read conservatively, taking into account the physical examination and the age of the individ ual, and were classed as positive only w hen there was no major disagreement (among the examiners of the X-rays),, empha sis added) The films classified as negatne for asbestosis were further subdivided into doubtful and negathe. The definite cases of asbestosis were broken down into first siage and second stags, the latter being a more extensive development of the disease. Of the total of 126 X-ray examinations, 4 were diagnosed as second degree asbestosis, 63 as first degree, 39 as doubtful, and 20 as negative. In other words, 53 percent of the workers had asbestosis by a conservative reading of the X-rays, and another 31 percent had some X-ray signs of disease ("doubtful"). Only 16 percent had no signs of asbestosis on X-ray. it should be recalled that these were active workers; those who had left due to illness were not examined. The majority of persons classified by X-ray as "doubtful" and "negative" complained of cough and/or shortness of breath. Referring to those that were classified as "negative" by X-ray v,ho complained of symptoms, the authors said, "too much emphasis should not be placed on statements of subjective symptoms." The authors minimized their finding of widespread asbestosis, commenting that, in the cases selected for examination, none had "marked disability." The threat of progressive maturation of fibrosis previously noted by many authorities was not discussed; one of those authorities, Dr. Pancoast at the Univer sity of Pennsylvania, had even been consulted by the Metropoli tan Life investigators in the interpretation of the X-ray films. p --^ ". :.T}* tii,, \ \ . tti^ 3 t t e u 0 ig g ? jCTj ^J The Development cf Kncvdedce About A<AestOS1S 14. Merev.-c-ther, E.R.A. A Memorandum on Asbestosis. Tubercle 15: 6 9 - SI, 109-118. 152-159 (1933-1954). 15. Effects of Asbestos Dust on Workers' Health m Asbestos khr.es and Factories. Labour Gazette 12: 761 (1912). Printed in Ottawa, Canada. 16. Fabr, T. Demonsiralfcneri: Praparate und Micropho- togrcmrr.es vor, einen Falle von Fneumekomose. Mucnchcr.er M e d . Woe':. 11: 625 (1914). 17. Pancoast, H.K., T.G. M:Eer, and H.M. Landis. A Roentgen ologic Study of the Effects of Dust Inhalation upon the Lungs. T'.ar.s. Assoc. A v.cr. Fhys. 32: 97-1TS (1917). IS PanccasL H K,, T.G. Miller, and H M. Landis. A Roentgen oRleopguicblSisthueddy. oAf nthen*. E].ffReccnts'iof5D: 1u2st--i1n7hSal(a1t9io1nS)u. pon the Lungs. Ir-yft 19 Cooke, V.'.E. Fibrosis of the Lungs Due to the 1:vlva1at:c--; cr Afbcrfio? Di*5t. I'i'cd }. 3' t-A t j t-,24) 20. ranccE'L H.K. and E.P. Pence: mass. A F:v.cw cf Ovr Present Kncv,ledge cf Pneumoccndcs-.s, Eased Loon Roentgeno logic Studies, with Nctc-s on the Pathology o; the Conoit.on. Av.,cr. }. R o a d 14. 381-423 (1925). 21. Blomley, 1. (Nev.-bold Approved Sobcty) Letter to Turner Pros. Asbestos Co. (Sept. 1, 1922). 22. Turner Eros. Asbestos Co. 1-tt`er to N'cv.bole Approved Societv (Sept. 15, 1922). 23. Turner Bros Asbestos Co. Letter to London A Lancashire m Insurance Co. (Sept. 21, 1922). 24. Kershaw, N. Letter to Turner Bros. Asbestos Co. (Sept 1922). And Turner A Nev.-all document G06S-1766 (July 25, 1924). 25. joss, W.S. Note explaining basis for his previous diagnosis of "Asbestos poisoning." Turner A Nev.-all files, No. 006S-17e2. 26. Selikoff, Lj,, and M. Greenberg, "A Landmark Case m Asbestosis," J.A M.A. 265: 898-901 (1991). 27. Cooke, IV.E. Pulmonary Asbestosis. Bn'/. M ed. }. 2: 1024- 1025 (1927). 28. McDonald, S. Histology of Pulmonary Asbestosis. Brit. M ed . J. 2: 1025-1026 (1927). 29. Oliver, T. Clinical Aspects of Pulmonary Asbestosis. Brit. Micd. ]. 2 : 1026-1027 (1927). A -203 ;>>^Vii^''>i'< 76 Asbestos. Medical and Legal Aspects The editorial cited epidemiological and experimental e\idence suggesting that asbestos workers were at an increased risk of lung cancer. It characterized this cancer risk as ''probable," and stated that workers in asbestos-consuming industries should be considered at risk along with manufacturing plant workers.1" This unsigned J.A AT.A. editorial v.-as also written bv Wilhelm Ilueper at the request of the e d ito rM em b ers of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation, a group of more'than 300 industrial and insurance companies, received a summary oi this editorial m the In d u stria l Hygiene D igestT:'5 Dr. LTV Smith echoed Tiese concerns, writing later that year, end funher pubhe/mg the British data.13. The Scientific American Article The same month the Chief Inspector of Factories published his annual report for the \ ear 1947, an article called ' Cancer and Environment" was published m Scicnhj'c American ,,s This leport by Groff Conklin listed asbestos in a table o; "carcino gens known to be present in human environment," and in another graphic display showed that the target organ for asbestos cancer was the lung. Excerpts from Conklin's article were read at the April 7, 1949 general meeting of the Asbestos Textile institute (ATI). One of those present, George Marshall, wrote for "clarification" to Dr. A.J. Lanza at the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Lanza's associate, Dr W.J McConnell, replied that, "During the last few years, quite a number of articles claim that carcinoma of the lungs was found due to asbestos." McConnell said he had seen no evidence in his own work to support the asbestos-cancer relationship and Cosed. "However, time will prove whether the)' are right or wrong "1-"` Dr. W yers' Report fro m Cape Asbestos Wyers' report on 115 fatal cases involving asbestosis in England offered statistics on the incidence of accompanying lung and pleura] cancer.li0 There were 17 such cancers in all, and they were referred to as one entity: "The proportion of pulmonary cancers in the senes v/as therefore 14.8%." Seven others died 84 Asbestos Medical and Legal Aspects yet been obtained. In the case of some such studies which were initiated by the American industry support was withdrawn at the interim stage because of the wav the results seemed to be going. More Reports and Reviews Linking Asbestos and Cancer Merewethei's statistics associating asbestosis with cancer of the lung and pleura were cited by Dotg (also with the Factory Department), who wrote' "evidence is accumulating that cancer of the lung is unduly frequent m asbestos vomers."1-' S.milar comments and reviews were published by others, including Fischer, Frost, Fickhoff, Middleton, G.C. Smith, Silscn, and Gloyne in the yeais 1949-1951. Hueper, who had become Chief of the Enwronmental Cancer Section of the U.S National Cancer Institute, no ed m 1c 51 that most of those who had written on the subject had concluded that there was a causal relationship between asbestos's and lung cancer.1"' Owen m England reported another case of asbestos:? with lung cancer in 1951. The victim died at age 39, and hn only exposure to asbestos had been a 13-month job in a London asbestos factory 20 vears before.1"5 r~ Another fatal case of asbestosis with lung cancer was reported in New York that year in a 40-year-old man. He had worked as I a pipecoverer starting m 1940 and had been a plumber before that. The authors (one of whom had reported 2 earliei deaths from these causes in insulators) introduced their report with a preview of earlier literature. The}- concluded:169 (The association of carcinoma in cases of asbestosis) emphasizes the hazards of industrial exposure, the compen sability of the cancerous process as well as asbestosis and the need of careful preventive measures. A tabular presentation of the literature on cases of lung cancer with asbestosis w7as published in 1952 by Behrens. He reviewed the cumulative world literature and his own experience for the Cancer 85 frequency of lung cancer with asbestosis and compared that with the reported rate of lung cancer with silicosis. He counted a total of 509 autopsied cases of asbestosis in which 44 (14.2%) had lung cancer. For silicosis, there were only 35 cases with lung cancer out of 2,475 autopsy reports (1.4%).170 Hardy of the Massachusetts Institute of Technolog)' referred to prior case reports of asbestosis with lung cancer in an insulation worker and in a man who "worked for seven years sorting and carding asbestos fibers intended for insulation manufacturing." She concluded, These cases have particular significance since there are nearly 10,000 v.-orkers exposed to varying amounts of asbestos in American industry, many of them in some operations not properl)- safeguarded against a potential carcinogen. Hardy used the term "potential carcinogen" though she seemed convinced by Merewether's 1947 statistics171 The use of such an expression does raise the point that, whether one was inclined to accept the carcinogenicity of asbestos as proven or await further data before drawing a conclusion, one had to acknowl edge the immediate responsibility for taking preventive measures. Werber added another report of asbestosis and lung cancer, which the author believed was the first case in the literature to be operated upon with success. The cancer was presumed to be occupationally caused.1' 7 Others to comment positively on the relation between asbestosis and lung cancer were Mayers, Sroka, and Grosse.1'3'170 Dr. W.E. Smith, at New York University, still felt that there had been inconclusively few reports of lung cancer with asbestosis in Germany, the United States, and Canada. How ever, he seemed persuaded that a cancer hazard with asbestosis had been demonstrated in England, where dust control regula tions had been in force since 1933. Smith had recently been informed by Dr. Merewether that although lung cancer had been found predominantly among people who started work in the asbestos industry before the industrial hygiene rules took effect, some cases had also been diagnosed in individuals first A-207 86 Asbestos- Medical and Legal Aspects I i`_slS3l>, exposed afterwards. While the latter could have been unrelated to occupation in the regulated era, Smith acknowledged that people starting their employment in the 1930s "are only now reaching the mean age at which tumors might be expected to appear."177,174 - v" In the published discussion of one of Smith's papers, Dr. A.]. Lanza offered this incredible critique of Merev. ether's data'1" m Cancer vim lungs was given as ' whom these data w> that more study wc '17X>' "vanetv" of malign Smith, however, j D~i3r polycyclic hydrccs multiple target or;. .3: rermnded Smith of I think it is important to distinguish between cases of clinically recognizable and fatal lung cancer, on one hand, and cases in which the diagnosis of lung cancer has been made as more or less of an incidental finding at autopsy, on the other. The English claim for an association between lung cancer and asbestosis has been based, it seems to me, on data obtained from lungs that a pathologist has searched in England " c Or I ?S-' 1 am interestec mesothelioma j - pathological rr ; '' v, e found amo; j-.vo alveolar c with a microscope. I wonder how many cases of lung cancer would be found if lungs from am sort of populaLon were subjected to the same minute scrutiny? Smith's mam Smith responded that the British Pneumoconiosis Board handled silicosis cases the same war as asbestosis cases, and so the silicohcs could serve as a control group. In (zcl, the silicotics had an almost identical incidence of lung cancer as the genera! population, one tenth the incidence of lung cancer m asbestotics. In addition, man)- of the pathologists reporting excess lung cancer in asbestotics had done thousands of autopsies of the general population, and cited them as a industrial materia' on asbestos' carer to conduct such positive carcinoiVoiv,ald at ihe di After oarr-mmg Smith said, "it v. people studying comparison or "control" group. Further, no autopsy series of asbestotics was reported as having a "normal" rate of lung M uzzling Dr. Hut cancer. Hazardous Jndusi Another person who commented after Dr. William Smith's Huepcr scon fo' report on European research on occupational cancer was Dr. expert on occu; Paul Cartier, of the Thetford Industrial Clinic in Quebec.179 industrial opposi i Cartier reported that his clinic had detected "eight cases of Smith, perhaps t primary cancer of the lung" among an asbestos mine and mill Dr Anthony La working population of 4000. Other cases were suspected, but only those cases confirmed by an autopsy (or biopsy) were included. Of the eight cases described, two were called "pleural mesothelioma." The degree of concomitant asbestosis of the 'Them minors C of tr.s era A -208 m 172 Asbesto?. Medical and Legal Aspects Workers' compensation was becoming mere than just an insurance problem for asbestos manufacturers by the 1950s L>, then, a medical consensus had formed that asbestos caused iurg cancer, which had risen to become the most common form of cancer m U.S. males Moreover, major asbestos manufacturers learned first-hand about the afflictions of asbestosis and lime cancer in users of their insulation products, whom thc\ had employed in their contracting divisions. The compensation claims filed by these workers in the 1950s presaged the deluge of product liability suits that would come in the 1970?, IW'W and 1990s. In the absence of direct prer entne measures, ?ocut\ s provisions for the compensation of occupational disease bmcthe brunt of the burden of prevention, in the United State?, fo.s situation prevailed at least until the passage of the Cccupct.ur.D Safety and Health Act of 1970. Compensation is thus a myotheme of the history of the asbestos problem of todai Asbestos Compensation m the Early Years' Damage Sint? The \ear W.E. Cooke named the disease asbestosis, ls-57, a foreman in the weaving department of a U.S. asbestos tacion filed a claim fo r workers' compensation The Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board awarded the man compensation icr disability from occupational lung diseased'' Three years !ater, another claimant with asbestosis in Connecticut was awarded compensation."a In many states, the workers' compensation laves either did net cover occupational diseases or applied only to designated industrial diseases, and workers seeking compensation for "unlisted" ailments had to sue their employers m civil court Dr Anthony]. Lanza, Assistant Medical Director of the Metropoli tan Life Insurance Company, remarked that "the damage suit situation" prortipted employers to deal with asbestosis.-'" Silicosis arid asbestosis burst upon the amazed conscious ness of American industry during the period 1929-1930 Arising out of the period of economic depression, the situation with respect to silicosis and asbestosis became A -209 Compensation. The Final Check-Up 173 manifest as a medico-legal phenomenon of a scope and intensity that was at once preposterous and almost unbe lievable. Damage suits, under the common law, were instituted against employers by employees, alleging pulmo nar)- dust diseases, in industrial centers all over the United States, to an amount in excess of 100 million dollars. Beginning in 1929, attorney Samuel Greenstone brought suits against the Johns-Manville Corporation on behalf of 11 employ ees and former employees alleging disability from lung damage.30The negligence suits typically demanded $50,000 for total disability and specifically charged that the Manville, N.j. plant management had failed to provide. i. a safe place to work 2 masks and other safety appliances, and 3. a proper ventilating system at the plant. At least 3 of these complaints were served on A.R Fisher, who rose to be the President of Johns-Manville m the early 1950s. Perhaps due to questionable practices Mr. Greenstone used in soliciting these cases, Johns-Manville lawyers were able to negotiate a settlement of $30,000 for all the cases and obtain Greenstone's written assurance that he "would not directly or indirectly participate in the bringing of new actions against the Corporation." Settlement by the company President was thus authorized at a meeting of the J-M Board of Directors on April 24, 1933.31 Later that year, A.R. Fisher, manager of the Manville plant, received a confidential note from corporate Vice President S.A. Williams, referring to advice received by a plant doctor at another location (Waukegan, Illinois). Dr. A.J. Lanza's "verba tim'' responses to questions were enclosed. Asked whether employees should "definitely be made aware that asbestos is hazardous to their health" by means of posters, Lanza had reportedly said he doubted the hazard justified that: "This is especially true in view of the extraordinary legal situation."33 . In 1935, Johns-Manville was hit with another volley of lawsuits (about 2C) from former employees at its Waukegan, A -210 180 Asbestos' Medical and Legal Aspects part of Saranac's budget with annual contributions of S500C The 1933 annual report of Saranac referred to Met as the "mainstay of the experimental v/ork during the past five ) ears.1,34 As Lanza himself put it, "Both Dr. Sayers and I >, ere instrumental in establishing Saranac Laboratory m the indus trial consultation field."" Correspondence remaining from 1934 suggests that the compensation issue may have been crucial in the decision to finally publish Dr. Lanza's research on asbestos facterr v orkers. By 1935, compensation had become a pressing ccocc r: of industry executives. Lanza sent a galle}' proot of his article to johns-Manville lawyer Vandiver Brov.n, v,ho passed it alone to Newark attorney George Hobart iv.ho had earlier negotiated the settlement of asbestosis lawsuits brought by Samuel Greenstone). Hobart explained that the New Jersey Legislate e Commission was considering the addition of silicosis to ir e list of occupational diseases under the New Jersey cemponsahon lav. Hobart worried that asbestosis might also be recognized as a compensable diseases" (tVje have consistently urged that there is a substantia; difference bet'/, een silicosis and asbestosis and vc have urged that asbestosis should not at the present t.me be included in the list of compensation diseases, for the reason that it is onl\ within a comparatively recent time that asbestosis has been recognized by the medical scientific professions as a disease--in fact one of our principal defenses in actions against the company on the common law theory of negligence has been that the scier tific and medical knowledge have been insufficient until a very recent period to place upon the owners of plants or factories the burden or duty of taking special precautions against the possible onset of the disease to their employees. Brown and Hobart were well aware of the fact that if asbestosis became a compensable disease under the woikers1compensa tion code, workers would not have to prove that the employer was at fault as required in negligence suits. Before even receiving Hobart's reply, Vandiver Brown focused on a sentence Dr. Lanza had deleted from his initial report, to A -211 Compensation- The Final Check-Up 181 the effect that, "Clinically, it (asbestosis) is of a type (of disease) milder than silicosis."37,58 Brown had suggested to Lanza, and Hobart agreed, that the sentence must be re-inserted but could be reworded to "Clinical!)', fr o m this stu d y it appeared to be of a tvpe milder than silicosis" (emphasis added).'6 The exact wording didn't matter, Hobart said, but that sentence must be included in some form: Here again I have in mind the probability that the New Jersey Commission will introduce a bill in the Legislature which opens in January of 1935; and if it is the policy of Johns-Manville to oppose any bill that attempted to include asbestosis, as compensable, it would be vers' helpful to have an official report to show that there is a substantial differ ence between asbestosis and silicosis; and by the same token it would be troublesome if an official report should appear from which the conclusion might be drawn that theie is very little if any difference between the two diseased3 Vandner Brown sent a cop}- of Hobart's 3-page letter to Dr. Lanza, asking that the contents be given "your most serious consideration."'7Two weeks later, on January 4, 1935, Lanza's paper appeared in Public Health Reports with the sentence from Hobart's letter in conclusion number one, word for w o rd /6 Other changes requested by the lawyers were also made by Lanza. It certainly appears plausible, from this record, that Lanza was asked to get his work into print so that the asbestos companies would have a tool to lobby against compensating asbestosis in New jersey (and perhaps elsewhere). However, in the years since Lanza had originally written his findings, Merewether in England had published statistics (1933) showing that asbestotics were djing far younger than silicotics and after careers less than half as lo n g /0 Lanza was almost certainly aware of Merev/ether's work at this time, as he was a leading authority on asbestosis and referred to this article of Merewether's in his lengthy text, published in 1938.39 These statistics were also published in the Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories for the Years 1931-1933, and reprinted in the U.S. in II ! 182 Asbestos Medical and Legai Aspects M onthly la b o r R eview .61-63 Ellman also described asbestosis as a cause of more pronounced suffering than s.hcosis in papers published in the U.S. in 1933 and in the U.K in 1934 Attorney Brown immediately noticed that the crucial sentence was deleted and quite possibly perceived that the publication of Lanza's report could backfire and hasten legislative recognition of asbestosis. By this time, the report had already been submit ted for publication and was in the galley proof stage, and could hardly be withdrawn. So, as Brown realized and Hobart stressed, the report would have to be edited--and it was. In the state of New Jersey, where Johns-Manville had its largest manufacturing plant, asbestosis and silicosis were net listed as compensable diseases until-1945 65 By this t.me, Vandiver Brown had changed his mind on the comparable costs of civil suits and workers' compensation for asbestos^ (see opening quote of this chapter). The Asbestos Magazine Letters The English radiologist VV. Burton Wood published an arbole on the chest X-rays of asbestos workers m the May, 1929 issue of Tubercle.67 An abstract of this paper appeared in Bulletin of Hygiene, also printed in England.63This in turn was summarized and discussed in M onthly Labor Review, a publication of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.60Finall)-, this last item was picked up by the trade magazine of the asbestos industry in the United States, A s b e s t o s / 0 The magazine not only informed its readers that much had been written in England about asbestosis, but went on to say, "The Bureau urges the establishment of efficient exhaust systems and the introduction of other safety methods." This article appeared among advertisements of asbestos companies from all over the world, including Ehret Magnesia Manufacturing Company, Philip Carey Manufacturing Com pany, Johns-Manville, Keasbey & Mattison Compan)', Asbestos Corporation Limited, Ruberoid Company, and Cape Asbestos ,0 That very month, the Merewether and Price report was laid before Parliament by the Chief Inspector of Factories. Merewether's monumental contribution to the literature on asbesto sis was not, however, cited in Asbestos. In fact, the subject of A -213 184 Asbestos- Medical and Legal Aspects A.S. Rossiter, editor of Asbestos, about publishing a reviev. of a book on pneumoconiosis.'6 (I) told her m substance that...! felt there v,-3s considerable likelihood that a number of her subscribers would dislike an article on this subject in the trade magazine of the Asbestos Industry, I had in mind the ostrich-like attr.ude which has been evidenced from time to time by some members of the Industry. While I did not ovei-emphasize this point with Miss Rossiter, but merely suggested she gire it consider ation, I am inclined to believe she will omi: anv review of the book in question. Nothing more about the health hazards of asbestos appeared m the trade magazine until 1969. [The 1935 A sbestos magazine letters are reproduced m full m Appendix 1.] RISING TIDE OF COMPENSATION IN THE liJOs Insurance carriers' concern about asbestos was evident by 1932." Asbestos manufacturing was listed along with industries with silicosis, lead, and serious chemical hazards as receiving special attention "for some time" in insurance underwriting But the closing paragraph of a 1932 occupational disease report in T he N ational U n d erw riter was reserved for asbes'os: Any processes involving asbestos are considered especially hazardous, for the asbestos fibers appear to be difficult to expel from the lungs. Britain's industry leader, Turner & Newall, found it "impossi ble" to insure the risk of asbestosis by the earl}' 1930s. Commercial Union was hired only to carry out the administrative aspects of claims processing, according to T&N instructions.'8 The Supreme Court of North Carolina (M cN eely v. Carolina A s b e s to s Co., May 23, 1934) determined that the occupational disease, asbestosis, contracted unexpectedly and gradually over a long time, if due to the employer's failure to provide means of prevention, was an injury "by accident" and was compensable Compensation: The Final Check-Up 185 under the state Workmen's Compensation Act.79There had been many civil suits filed against employers by workers with asbestcsis in North Carolina, according to Dr. ]. Donnelly.80 Insurance executive F.R. jones wrote that the M cN eely case and others like it injected elements of uncertainty that rendered the hazards of asbestosis and silicosis "often uninsurable at practicable rates." Jones went on to discuss the workers' compensation insurance rates in New York, following that state's recognition of asbestosis and other diseases under the Workers' Compensation lav; in 1935. He wrote that even though the rates were high, "their adequacy...is generally doubted." Jones said the State Fund charged even higher rates to compa nies rejected by the private insurance earners. This, in turn, v;as driving operations with dust hazards out of New York, and at the same time fueling (successful) efforts to weaken the New York compensation law.'9 Jones was the General Manager of the Association of Casualty and Surety Executives, and in 1935-1936 he issued urgent warnings to the effect that dust diseases were a mortal menace to industry. He called for the development of minimum engi neering standards, "to impress backward industrialists, to guide and support insurers in granting or refusing coverage, and to furnish a scientific basis for regulations kept open to continual revision .. In this way, Jones hoped occupational diseases could be reduced to exceptional misfortunes instead of routine ones.53 He was much alarmed about the perils to business posed by occupational disease compensation, which had risen from insignificance to a major expense, along with taxes and unem ployment insurance, in three years' time. All-inclusive occupa tional disease laves, Jones said, "should be avoided like sin" because they would leave open the possibility that courts and industrial commissions would then hold industries and their insurance carriers liable for all forms of ill health in any way contributed to by work.83,81 To confront the dust disease threat, a meeting of about 250 people representing over 50 industries with industrial disease problems was held on January 15, 1935. According to Vandiver Brown's memorandum of the meeting, speakers included Vice A -215 186 Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects President F.W. Sherwood and attorney A.C. Hirth of OwensIllinois, Dr. A.J. Lanza of Metropolitan Life, Dr R.R. Savers from the U.S. Public Health Service, Dr Philip Drinker of Harvard, and insurance lobbyist F.R. Jones.S:> Reviewing the discussions, Brown wrote, Only two forms of dust, namely, free silica and asbestos, are definitely known to produce disabling fibrosis of the lung. Turning to problems common to all, the meeting then focused on what Brown called "the menace of ambulance chasing lawyers m combination with unsctupulous doctors." This menace to employers was seen to be greatest where juries decided the facts in each case. Brown then quoted a speaker who urged that "the strongest bulwark against future disaster for industry is the enactment of properly drawn (workers' compensation laws)." Such legislation would. 1. "eliminate the jury" and replace it by an appointed med-eal board within the workers' compensation svstcm; 2. "eliminate the shyster lawyer and the quaes doctor" bv strictly limiting their fees under the law; and 3. "permit the correcting of initial mistakes m the making of awards" by establishing hearing procedures where new evidence could be offered to contest av/ards of compensation By March 21, 1935, Willis Hazard of Owens-Illinois reported that 14 companies had pledged funds to establish an oigamzation on industrial dust issues, "representing industries." The Suggested Program of Initial Activities outlined a number of offensive strategies for bringing down the costs tc> business.50 One objective was to set up "authoritative and approved standards for the control of industrial dusts, which, if complied with by industries or by industrial companies, will act as a defense against personal injury suits." The profession of industrial hygiene appears to have enjoyed industry's blessing after that, and within a short time professional organizations were formed (American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists in 1938, American Industrial Hygiene Association in A- 216 c-o to ^ dm "O 226 Asbestos Medical and Legal Aspects knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care wculd have known that, "asbestos fumes and particles were likely to be breathed into (Dugan's) lungs and to injure him ... yet failed to warn plaintiff of the dangers ... carelessly and negligently failed to furnish an)-instrument, or device for the mixing of said ingredi ents with safety to plaintiff and other employees, or an}- mask, or device or other protection to be used over his nostrils and mouth ...1,152 It appears that Mr. Dugan died m 1934, and the lawsuit was dismissed.153 There were also two damage suits filed by insulation workers in 1957 and 1961 against Johns-Manville. The first of these cases was brought by Fiederick LcGranJe, who had been an insulation worker for about 30 years!54::5: A complaint was filed in U.S. District Court m New Jersey, statin that LeGrande had not been warned of the c anger of breathm dust from the asbestos products he handled. Mr LeGrand asked for a jury trial and $500,000 m damages. P t this time, M: LeGrande asserted that he was disabled by asbestos'? cod ha ceased work involving the handling of insu'ation. He ha worked for J-M distributor H.W. Porter k Company, agamst whom a workers' compensation claim was filed. When Johns-Manville failed to respond to LeGrande's lawyer's interrogatories, a Court Order was obtained directing the company to do so. The Answers to interregatonc-s m li is earl)- damage suit, made under oath, set the tone for future proceedings (and contained factual errors) This deponent has no knowledge of any case of asbestosis ever being contracted by an applicator. Asbestosis was first contracted by an employee of this defendant at one of its plants in 1946 ... Since this defendant never received notice o f any dawn of asbestosis resulting to any persons other than our employees w ho were engaged in the manufacture o f the products, we had no reason to issue any warnings, instructions, or preven tions to any other persons, (emphasis added) A -217 Coir,pensahon. The Final Check-Up 227 As the jury was about to be selected for trial, Johns-Manville offered $35,000 to settle the case out of court, and this was accepted in March of 1959. Fred C. Wenham was an insulation v/orker who developed asbestosis and lung cancer. A workers' compensation claim was hied against Mr. Wenham's employer, and a wrongful death case was filed against Johns-Manville in U.S. District Court in New Jersey.l3t''1:'7 This case was also settled out of court, for about $10,000, and most of that was remitted back to the workers' compensation carrier that had insured Mr. Wenham's employer. Eagle-Piche: Company was sued in 1960 by Gladys Faciane, widow of insulator Clarence A. Faciane. Mr. Faciane had died from lung cancer. An amended petition filed with the court in Louisiana on March 15, 1961 named as additional defendants Armstrong Contracting and Supply, Johns-Manville, OwensCorning Fiberglas, Ruteroid, U.S. Rubber, Philip Carey, Mundet Cork, Nicolet Industries, Keasbey & Mattison, Baldwin-EhretHill, Pittsburgh-Coming, and tobacco manufacturers R.J. Reynolds and P.F.Lorillard.1"5 The product liability case was dismissed because the widow could not prove whose products her husband had used. Corporate Compensation Meetings at Manville The compensation claim files and court documents are valuable, but offer little direct insight into the company's internal reaction to the compensation toll among both its employees and its customers. By the late 1950s, there were regular meetings of the compen sation committee at Johns-Manville's main (Manville, New Jersey) plant. At these meetings were Medical Director Ken Smith, plant engineer Cliff Sheckler, nurse Hahn, and a couple of others. Some excerpts of their notes:155 Sigm und Skirzenski, age 52, advanced pneumoconiosis Sneckler: Should we change him? Smith: Won't make any difference. Do not transfer, retire if necessary'. A- 218 ' fn the other case reported by Stewart, et al. the asbestosis was severe. This individual had worked in an asbestos factory for ' ' only 9 months in 1921, and had taken no precautions against the inhalation of dust. Commenting on the second case, the authors illustrated the connection between short-term, heavy ,' ' exposure and longterm, brief exposure. They concluded that respirator}7protection should be very widely used in work with asbestos: This demonstrates that the symptoms of a pneumoconiosis may come on years after a short exposure and em phasizes again the absolute necessity fo r wearing masks in even the less dusty atmospheres, (emphasis added) At the other extreme, Aetna Life Insurance Company physi cian Roscoe Gray, in his A tto rn eys' Textbook o f M edicine, threw - caution to the wind in interpreting the literature; Since asbestosis practically does not occur with spinning, ; unless there has been previous exposure to more dusty processes, it is considered that the dust concentration of the spinning room is safe Merewether found the dust count in this department to be as low as 506 to the cubic centimeter, equal to about 13,500,000 to the cubic foot, (emphasis added)*32 Such reasoning may have been useful in contesting asbestosis compensation claims; but it is doubtful that it was used by Aetna to justify the sale of life insurance to asbestos' workers. in 1935, the state of Pennsylvania published the results of a medical and engineering survey of four asbestos plants.53 Table 1shows the distribution of 14 cases of asbestosis among the 56 people examined. The data show an increasing prevalence and severity of the disease at 4.64, 16.9, and 44.3 million particles per cubic foot.** *The correct equivalent of 506 particles per cubic centimeter is 14 3 MPPCF, as previously noted. **Here again, all types of particles captured by the sampling instrument v.-ere counted, not just asbestos fibers. A-218 a r*'TK* wc. u - a s - Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects Table l 53 Incidence and Degree of Asbestosis with Relation to Occupation, Average Concentration Millions of particles per Occupation cubic foot Preparers and Carders 44.26 Weavers and Spinners 10.87 Winders, Twisters, Warpers, 4.64 etc. Totals Years of Exposure 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 over 20 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 over 20 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 over 20 Total Total Numbei Examined 3 3 5 2 1 14 3 4 4 5 2 18 4 7 8 1 4 24 56 Negative 2 -- 1 1 1 5 2 3 3 3 2 14 4 7 8 1 4 21 40 Asbestosis Slight -- -- 1 1 -- 2 -- i -- -- 3 -- 1 1 -- -- Moderate -- 3 3 -- -- 6 -- -- 1 -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- 2 -- 7 Advanced -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Doubtful 1 -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- 1 2 > litt V*r* -Aftr _ V;t-w 289 ,The data indicate that the "safe" level is less than any in the i f f l range reported. An abstract of this study in Journal o f Industrial '..Hygiene and Toxicology concluded that, "The study was too limited to permit the formulation of permissible standards of n dustiness, but a reduction in the asbestos dust concentration in l"' the operations studied is shown to be necessary."54 -Lanza and coworkers at the Metropolitan Life insurance / Company conducted the first industry-sponsored study of asbestosis published in the United States.55 X-ray evidence of asbestosis was found in over half the workers examined (and in 87 percent of those with over 15 years in the plants). A total of 121 dust counts for various processes in five plants were tabulated. Most of the values were below 5 MPPCF, and only a few were as high as 40-82 MPPCF. The authors declined to recommend any level of asbestos exposure as a guideline, saying, "It is not practicable as yet to establish standards for the asbestos dust content of air." Meanwhile, other events were setting the stage for a dust limit for asbestos. At a National Silicosis Conference, in April, 1936, Alfred Hirth, Chairman of the Air Hygiene Foundation's Legal Committee, urged the establishment of "safe" levels of dust high in free silica content. The Foundation's Medical Committee, chaired by A.J, Lanza, then suggested a limit of 5 MPPCF, though they separately doubted the adequacy of scientific knowledge for setting a threshold to prevent silicosis. Vandiver Brown, whose desire that asbestosis be presented by Lanza as a "milder" disease than silicosis, would later remark that the 5 MPPCF limit for asbestos-containing dust was selected with it well in the mind that this limit "had already been prescribed for silicosis."56,57 Dr. Leroy Gardner, m a plant survey at an asbestos plant owned by U.S. Gypsum in 1936, advised keeping dust counts less than 5 MPPCF, noting that this limithad been "tentatively suggested" by various authorities for free silica. He also said, "It is quite possible that the safe limit might be even lower for asbestos than for silica."38 Plant Surveys by the U.S. Public Health Service The Public Health Service employed engineers, doctors, and chemists who performed studies on hazardous industries. While 290 Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects the P.H.S. had no enforcement authority, its Public H ealth Bulletins and reports in scientific periodicals advanced the state of knowledge in many industries. These studies were widely cited and commented upon; they also were directed toward determining what degree of exposure was acceptable and what was not. In the years 1935-1937 two separate investigations were conducted. The smaller one was published first, and consisted of an industrial hygiene engineering survey of an asbestos textile plant. This facility was not described as having the best available control technology; but it was believed to be "repre sentative of the best practice m this country at this time."59 A table of dust counts taken with and without the exhaust ventilation in operation showed that exposures were reduced 90 percent and more by the controls m most operations. Most impressive was the rise from 1.7 MPPCF to 62.4 MPPCF in the carding process after one hour's operation without exhaust. An abstract of this paper by Dr. Philip Drinker at Harvard con cluded, "A final table shows clearly that the industry can keep dustiness well below 10 MPPCF."60 Dreessen and others from the U.S. Public Health Service were meanwhile conducting a medical and engineering survey of three North Carolina asbestos textile plants. However, prior to the arrival of the Service, the mills discharged more than one fourth of their employees.61 Public Health Service researchers later noted, The incidence of frank disease was so great that prior to the beginning of the study out of a total of less than 600 employees the plants discharged 150 workers suspected of having asbestosis.62 The reports of the Public Health Service and local chest physicians leave no doubt that most of the people discharged had asbestosis.61-65 Shull, for example, wrote: During the latter part of 1934 it was my privilege to examine the chests of 71 of 100 workers who had been dismissed from local asbestos plants. All had undergone physical Thresholds and Sta examination t stud)- and wer Most of the peopl worked for the Soi and Raybestos-JM Service was able t was made to asse in the plants.6' Some dismissa government, foliosupreme court hel compensation. Hr hygiene division, that all workersir Service study be Easom, who perfc he did not issue' had asbestosis. T less than 5 perce an)' of those year The average/a studied was only in any of the, 14 Public Health Sei - v operation for-,,i6|l employed in the ] more) m the lowexposed to appre> 27 seeking empJ ers--were exaicu asbestosis it was i reported in Ion asbestos plants^' By finng emplo less dusty process base the Public,h good dose-res Company Knowledge 617 District Court for Western District of Pennsylvania, taken in Baltimore, Dec. 1-2, 1983). The equipment in the Tyler plant was dismantled and buried following the plant closing. A book was written by N e w Yorker journalist Paul Brodeur about the hazardous conditions in this plant (Expendable A m ericans, Viking Press, 1974). The class action brought by 445 Tyler plant employees was settled out of court for $20 million in 1977. Pittsburgh-Coming paid $8.1 million, Union Asbestos and Rubber Co. paid $1.0 million, Cape Industries paid $5.2 million, and the U.S. government paid $5.7 million. Pittsburgh-Coming had previously made non-asbestos insulations, and was a member of the National insulation Manufacturers Association during the years 1960-1964. EAGLc-PICHEK INDUSTRIES Eagle-Picher began producing "Super 66" asbestos-contammg insulating cement in 1938. Another product line, "One-Cote Cement," was added m 1950. The company also manufactured asbestos-free, mineral wool insulation products. As early as 1932, the hazards of asbestos were pointedly noted in a report to the company by the U.S. Bureau of Mines. In a report of lung fibrosis among employees at the company's plant in jophn, Missouri, v.'here rock wool and asbestos were used, the mixing room was described as "a particularly dust)- place." The report continued, "It is now known that asbestos dust is one of the most dangerous dusts to which man is exposed." Dust control was recommended throughout the plant by the author of the report, Dr. F.V. Meriwether (F.V. Meriwether report and letter of transmittal to Dr, R. R. Sayers, March 11, 1932; Bureau Director Scott Turner letter to Erbon Mahon, Safety Engineer, Eagle-Picher Co., Picher, OK, March 21, 1932. U.S. National Archives documents). Glen Christner, who began work for Eagle Picher in 1931 and retired as Vice President of the insulation division in 1963, recalls having heard about the early Bureau of Mines report at the plant when it arrived (testimony in Kitsap Co. Cases o f Shroeter, Goldmark, and Bender, No. 81-2-00669-0, Port Orchard, WA, Nov. 1, 1984). In 1942, a salesman reported from Texas that health officials A- 219 618 Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects had made unfavorable comments about "Supertemp'' to a customer, Humble Oil and Refining Company. The salesman, H.M. Aber, also reported that a 1938 article, "Asbestos" (written by Gloyne and Merewether and published m the 1938 Supple ment to the encyclopedia, Occupation and Health, by the Interna tional Labor Office) shoveed asbestos to be more dangerous than mineral wool. (See also Table 8 in Chapter 5) Aber communicated a state health official's offer to "make any reasonable test on Supertemp relative to its being injurious to workmen." (H.M. Aber. "Texas State Board of Health." EaglePicher Sales Co. Industrial Contact Report, April 8, 1942) Eagle-Picher advertised its "Super 66" in the same issue of Southern Power and In d u stry that carried the article "Industrial Hygiene Importance of Dust" (Nov. 1946). The article, by N V. Hendricks of the Georgia Dept, of Public Health, repeatedly referred to asbestos as a threat to health warranting engineering controls and exposuie monitoring. The Research Library of the Eagle-Picher firm accumulated the following documents relating to asbestosis; Document Year Received Comme Tits Drinker, P andT Hatch. I n d u s t r i a l D u s t Neve YorkMcGraw-Hill Book Co , (1936). i 93S section on asbestesm pp 32-34 Johnstone, R.T. O c c u p a t i o n a l M ed icin e and In dustrial H y g i e n e St. Louis: C.V. Mosby Co, (1948) 1953 Chapter 30 on asbestosis notes that occupational exposure occurs in the insulation trade Sax, N.I. H a n d b o o k o f D a n g e r o u s M a t e r i a l s New York: Reinhold Pub!. Co., (1951). 1951 notes that occupational exposure occurs in insulation work, p. 34 Eagle-Picher was the primary defendant in the product liability case filed by the widow of insulator C. Faciane in 1960. (See "Lawsuits by Product Users Against Asbestos Manufactur ers," in Chapter 3). A- 22 0 Correspo; subject of 1 ly 8, 1960 I960 re> Insurantused in an ins contain Apnl 6,196: Dry doc! Notes t were us` ents cot tration, dermati relative we do r May 22, 19 River, I The r ceme. antid1 Subsequ in 1963, at met with memorano Dr. E who susta a fev The use of dum was i privilege t Plant, Jop James Rah si Aspects ap" to a slesman, (written 5 Suppleinternaangerous 5) Aber eke any -nous to " Eagle'4 2) issue of tdustnal by N V oc atcdly .neermg nulated & ' ns t -esure -x-v1 'ation 4' i f ctional ,n v&l p. 34 product .n 1960. ufactur- Company Knowledge Correspondence of officials of the company also dealt with the subject of health hazards of Eagie-Picher insulations. July 8,1960. R. Beaudry letter to Eagle Picher Sales Co., and July 21, 1960 reply from Glen Christner (V.P, Insulation Div.). insurance claims adjuster writes that E-P mineral woo! products used in 1946-1948 are suspected of contributing to asbestosis in an insulator. Christner reply says products sold in those years contained no asbestos. April 6, 1965 P.L. Losse letter to R. Alexander (Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. Chester, PA). Motes that "minor amounts" of asbestos and other materials were used in the products. "(Wjhile each of these added ingredi ents could be a health hazard if exposure were to a high concen tration, such is not the case." After mentioning occasional dermatitis problems, Losse concluded' "In view of the above relative minor hazard potential for the materials we manufacture, we do not have an)' medical reports relative to this matter." May 22, 1968. P.K. Maitre letter to F.J Hess (Shell Oil Co. Wood River, Illinois.) The above Eagie-Picher products (Super 66 and One-Cote cements) do not contain any toxic ingredients. Therefore, no antidotes are needed. Subsequent to the filing of a civil claim against Eagie-Picher in 1963, attorneys employed by and representing the company met with Johns-Manville Medical Director K.W. Smith. A memorandum of these discussions observed that: Dr, Smith gave us an example of samples taken of a mart who was exposed approximately 5 minutes an hour who sustained a serious asbestosis in a working period of only a few months. The use of warning labeling was also discussed. This memoran dum was withheld for years under the claim of attorney-client privilege ("Conference Feb. 19, 1964, Eagie-Picher Insulation Plant, Joplin, Missouri"; and Affidavit of E-P Vice President James Ralston in H eathm an, Case No. 87-C-1934, Brazoria Co., A -221 i T;!ii! y Uhl - ] l `>i l b TX, March 25, 1988; and videotaped deposition of E-P corporate '`Z representative, R. Bochstaller, by former insulation worker, attorney Lawrence Madeksho, of Houston, TX, in H eathm an case, Mar. 2, 1989). The document's existence was revealed after it was inadvertently produced by E-P in discovery, m a lawsuit E-P had filed against the U.S. government. An internal memorandum about the size of printing to use m labeling product hazards reflects the dominance of commercial considerations over concern for the consumer's awareness of health risks Placement and design of health warnings predict ably prevented their notice by man)' vcorkers handling labeled insulation products W -/ This is large and dear enough type face to be completely legible, yet does not 'shout CAUTION from the roof tops 1 (IV F. McCarthy, E-P Advertising Dept, memorandum to Alton L. Jones, Joplin Insulation Plant, "Type Face for 'Caution' Notice, June 19, 1964.") =< J In a letter July 20, 1970, Dr. Irving Sehkoff urged Eagle-Picher President W. Atteberry to market asbestos cement products in plastic bags to facilitate lov/er worker exposures by enclosed mixing (as opposed to mixing in open troughs). Retired Eagle-Picher engineer Herman Lee Huelster has testified that, although asbestos was used in the company's insulating cements from 1942 to 1971, it was never needed. He attributed the use of asbestos to pressures from the company sales department, and characterized this as a "sales gimmick." Huelster had always objected to spending "big money for an ingredient that we did not manufacture ourselves and (which) did nothing to improve the insulating qualities of the product." He attributed the requirement for asbestos in some Naval specifications for insulating cements not to technical purposes, but rather to "clout" of firms with major interests in asbestos (deposition taken Aug. 28, 1980 in Z sa m b a v. State Insulation Corp. et a!. Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, No. L-32392-770). Eagle-Pic; tion during trial Hygie hygiene. T Insulation considered U.S. Gyps products i applied ar block insul The con' from the ei examined chasing tb U5G bad f packing as with expor workers a were trans Dust Surv Gypsum t Laborator City," 3-pi Manager, asbestos c USG w expenmeManhatta: reports or at Johns-L referenceasbestos r "Early St Chapter I A- 222 Company Knowledge 621 Lagle-Picher was a member of the Industrial Hygiene Founda tion during the years 1936-1961, and thus received the In d u s trial Hygiene Digest abstracts on industrial medicine and hygiene. The company was also a member of the National Insulation Manufacturers Association in I960, v/hen NIMA considered the possibility of a health program and rejected it. UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY U.S. Gypsum has manufactured a wide range of building products in which asbestos is used. These include trow-elapplied and sprayed acoustical plasters, sprayed insulation, block insulation, ceiling tiles, and paints. The company was associated with the Saranac Laboratory' from the early 1930s, when tissue samples from employees were examined for pathological effects of gypsum dust. After pur chasing the National Asbestos Co. plant fin jersey City, NJ), USG had the Saranac Laboratory conduct a survey. Loading and packing asbestos cement were among the most hazardous jobs, with exposures of 261 MPPCF. Asbestosis was diagnosed in 5 workers and suspected in the cases of 5 others. The findings were transmitted to USG Vice President W.L. Keady ("Report of Dust Surxey at National Asbestos Co. Plant of United States Gypsum Co. at Jersey City, NJ," by L.U, Gardner, Saranac Laboratory, Max' 25-June 2, 1936; and "Dust Survey--Jersey City," 3-pp. memorandum to W.L. Keady from General Service Manager, Aug. 13, 1936). The memorandum characterized the asbestos dust hazard as "serious." USG was one of the contributors to the series of asbestos experiments started at Saranac in 1937 (See "RaybestosManhattan, Inc./' this chapter.) The company received progress reports on Saranac asbestos experiments from Vandiver Brown at johns-Manville. USG was also a party to the censorship of all references to cancer in the report of industry-sponsored asbestos research at Saranac, published by Vorwald in 1951 (See "Early Saranac Laboratory' Cancer Tests with Asbestos" in Chapter 2). A-223 Co ' Kn e,\\lecce c c CO.'trY. \ : h? v . v ; \ G ASHIS7CS IN Ct- m z . Ch.W.OA T h e r e is ;5 b o d y o f k n o w ! e e p e t h a t m , a v b e a s or: b e d t o C a n a Ti . a n ? Sis e s t o ? r a p i r :p c a n o a : -.i cs, c e n a e i l v . T h e ! c T Z Q 5 ? s r Cc.i . r . i n g o p e r a t i o n i n Q u e t o c w a s t h a t o f l e hr.s-1 w a n M ' l c ( s c !>: 1 i, J *:i n v i ] e C o r p o r a t i o n t o f o r m e r e m p i z v ? c < : n I ? S " } , : n t h e i :>V. J L- .C A s b c s t o s . 0 t r e r s a r e l o c a t e d n c M (l erir Z V ' c ' v, n e s t r e a r i r z t o ' . o n o f T h e t ' o r d . M i n e s . T h e s e e t h . e r s n `iCi J c e, o r i r t h p v e a r s h a ' \ C i l Ci u d c d : r - - ' -. . ; .. , \ / - ^ ^ 1 c _; = d -- : ' ;' : ; fw . e W- -e o.'-: -w- Oc'; v- - - ' --- ^ ' L`.ee ) 1 ` r c , Ltc C'-cbcc Asbestos Cere.; Carev C crccici Ptir.es S.-bb c crv c r Ae: v :, -r.c ^ ? 1, - cp crE G n'iw n'w a u t m o r ;V Subsidiaries c; rh:t:r Carev Marut'acw: "a Company (l .S ), which ir. turr has fct cero succeeded fcv Glen A'ce-r,, Reo d-.`. m o c c i CcrrorcOc.i, Pc-ecrn, ar.d C c le m , ; ari c: Jim Waiter Ccrp. fJ.S ) The rsi ci Mese operatic;-? closed e re he scccrd bey.an i" tre late SSCs. A- 2 24 Asbestos. Medical and Legal Aspects Coer-c-rziicn amer ~ -r^^e.rstes m-ring companies in Quebec cat; irom ivoO or fore, on the subject of asbestos:. In that year, an article on asbestosis app m Asbestos magazine amidst ac'vert.sements h Philip Carey Manufacturing Company, Johns- Mcr,ville, Keasbey b Mattison, Asbestos Corporation Ltd., and ethers. Other material cn asbestos hazards kncv.'r, to mining arms in Quebec induces the following items: , I^rlih ?vrvcvs v.^rc under*'*.eri ire cf thr Metrepebtzn Life Insurance Company n 1550 cy D:s Trank rrd A.]. Lanza Their i:-.dir,g? -.vere contained in c. reo ori by Dr Gcroce Whcstiev, meric.-: c rector of Metreyrbteo Lite I n . 5 cb'-cure 1544 report. 7;..ri-c...'ce,i ,vri .`.siwii.'is, .: rl'.dcJ cV: '-cm a 5550 survey cf 555 : ri -stm n e e -'- in -'.sbw' ; cno, 7r chord bt-ncs Of iris numb 42 h-d .vlvricsis 77.. V. 'evie. :-:re:t dso noted that csbcsicsis v.:? : cf'"pcns?blc c w ; :n M;~ rg Association lav,o'er ) Sab our,n ''attici od t- ice i.:.ck r : the report), tire report rad bcim sent to compensation vriciris ar.i puimora'v experts in Quebec at the Unte it t.as prepared {See also "Asbestosis m Canee?" :n C~arter 1). An unrubbshed lepori to MctrcrcQv n Life insumrcc O. pery iccntii.es the comrr-nics cc n : y : ; m 7rctf~:d t 7ms is Asbestos Corporation, ricssbc-y u t vnson s ,,.ir.: (Frank Feciey. F.cye;'. c f i;:c ,r Q os cod X-f 01,' Z.'u.o"i:;:rriicus of Asbestos I'.V.rifis < C "-'ber,15 pages, Xov 1950). o Horten LeDoux report, "Ashes; :s s ' and the asbestos sti.kc of 1919 Pierre Elliott Trudeau's bo:!., 72r Asl :;!:< S:r.: c (Toronto- j Lorimer z Co, 1954, originally published m 1956) says that LeDoux had previously written exposes of silicosis in Quebec, creating a scandal in 194S (pp 241-242, 274) His in\estimation of the asbestos mines was written entire!)' about Quebec Asbestos Corp., Ltd. a subsidiary of Philip Carey LeDoux' account was printed in the newspaper Le Devoir, an indictment that filled several full pages of the newspaper. It was entitled, "Asbestosis at East Broughton--A Village of 3,000 Suffocated by Dust," and appeared in print on January' 12, 1949. LeDoux' account was also printed in English It describes case histories of workers disabled by asbestosis, local doctors who were afraid to tell them so, estimates of how much profit Carey Company Knowledge mined out of the town, descriptions of r.sbestos air pebutio- m town, commentary on the 'em,pie end ruthmnt?*.;'. c mod cr.l literature., that the disease is incurable and fatal"; and cul r.i- r.atc-s wnth what LcDcu' called "proof cf compare, and go'.ern- nent responsibility" starting in 1944. Inis was a- thorough, piercing, iw.est gative report. Le Dezc:r let hardlv ? day pass for the not month without adding reports and editorials on asbestosis. One of tire r a r e cm o: this scene, Gc.raid Peli<_t cr of L e P t r c i r , is the r r e e - t eu r w Me chcp ter cf 1 nodeairis book about press cc\ e: <\ a t ! t 21 S `!: Le L. ,, describe,:! the w`erbe rs of Carey's Last l: ought: r r.; : c p ,tc - lien rs ~r:cTiir i1.y th o wtw's of a si. "2 s r r ri \ c*. ;r - r - a unie rusts \ ,Fo ri 'ri n :t jc.n the fi\ e-m r. ,A, S*!ri` :s a t; ,, r mines tr. c t two;;n i''i Fcbrucw, 194 9 F La rire Ac csrcir A: C c n m d C e on . ^r"c.* A ( - r^ " " - ; w C " 0 .J ' 7: lech:2V '/ Asbestos L o r . i 2~v) C; ned ;r. ge\ `err."nent cffici.-c- w ; , . _ 1 "i2 Q-cb: c 1. c ccs t s s i'r ed.'Cois ', ss ccic ` i : ] >1 A k M55s mt C J . G . i ~ _C _ ' . ' i_V e cf ( s estesis by t'me :. ri i. A" A- me m' - - ; ' (r e ' c m c,ri Q a : bQ c Asemt os M.r.mg b h t caww .Al s 4: O C Sm; th (Bed! AM c ? tos Fbncs, snVs. C - a i~r c ' j A : ; s " r N'c v ; , u : i , ' Fcr c A ; C- c b e c - AMs ' ; A -, T V m c " - - C : _ c;r z d SuppM'" c - r --' m - c - i ; " r ,, _ " J2' A2 .5 ca;cr. iDcc i 9 , 1950,1 Vf , _ vrrdti r, c c!esmg ree.cw hv Dr Ie r r Kr 2' \ c ` ' 2: the U K i c ctc :e ins nccte : c.tc 's stct ,= s ' n'-un c cAmst: p L^mcna A> C r - . . cr. .. ddressed to rerre s : ra ; a\ -a rri aa: 1; 'lew. 2 s ' c g tIS'tOS Cc'pcraticr. Ltd., Tii rricotc V ' C Johns-M c.m, die / N 12islet Asbestos M. A r - c. vri 21CACe . 'm e w t e s Corp. A) Yewcalc, i n s i h : i n n : R e v e r t A s : as:i o s : < r"> ri F M ' w w a n . C m cor Saranac Lab era tory, report to Q.A M A (Man 7, 1 9 5 2 ) The Saranac Lab was commissioned by the Quebec Asbestos Mining .Association to test Canadian chrysotile asbestos in mice by inhalation By May 1952, this preliminary report cf 14 months' testing appeared, showing a trend toward positive findings, and shortly thereafter funding of the stud}' was apparently hr Hod (See "The Saranac Lab's Cancer Studies for the Quebec Asbc stos Mining Association,' in Chapter 2) A- 2 2 6 As'_esto? VeC:c?.l and Lee?] As:;-: C; rt rr Rcrort? of Cancer ?rr'-"S Asbc:Acs Mir ers t *netferd , 5, It-52-1955. i 'tho'r.;vreview? of tissue vc-w done ?.V`Pc S-rn ^ 7aberato; ici`tb.e mining companies <starting m 19-42, at'. i?. number cf F-.irr*cr.2ncancer cases were _T.11rcac .*rccorded bv TV19 (S.ee "Dr S: hept Msit to America, in Crmeter 2) Dr Ca rtic-r, cf the 1 /.,- Jrr;rd )nc^slrisl Clime, prri cdicr!lv rct `0l'Hr on these car :cr wr-<^r-s V?C-e "More Resorts C.j'. PZWCVi c ~c T1 c S c Svrposium," in Ch:.r tir - ) nL- C Err.'j ; 7' S' i 'j j r L:,' g_- `.ce;f l". `; l ' s f e.s r ;o^r.;ed ty Ind'jstr i i 1V^ir';- ! 0k t.!cn *V1 Tul ' - \ cbest OS '.`."-i-o ai:-\*" (S .r ; 1 rr'' / D C r*1Ir.,. '"1 cud T ~ -~c n, .r. l ptCeTM: c3z r 2\ c1 . . of r,7^.Cm;:cr .r -r . r': s Miners hic,:r' : 11--QQ<-:-cr_ ' i / Cu1 QAV.A r- o . <r-st:- A -- H'Wicr,.. 5: undat.cr, Cancir Stud',," in C: rpter 2' G e c je 's Ch.b, 0} tito Ncwbcrk ` V h w : s c: the So0 ;a1McCng c the Quebec Asbestos \ , - p Association Held en V ; rch 2S and 19, 1A6S, a! He G n=.hE.na lo tel and Ccuntrx Cub, G.5.' And ' SpoCjaI Grsrc. Eahama Hete! rod Country Club, G 5." The first of these rr cr.fens 2 proposed health warning label for bags ci asbestos "to release the producers from possible legal resr onsibilit}'." The text was to be checked by "member company coTunhseelsse"cofonrdrerveifeewrs attothteheneT>LtYQACoMmmAittmeeeetoifngt.he American iI Conicicr.ee of Governmental Industrial Hygienists. The Committee has petent legal standing m theory, but not in practice. It was emphasized that adequate information is not always available to this Committee; for instance, stan dards for the asbestos industry are not. up-to-date. A-227 I Company Knowledge i 37 10. M c':`.rcal Shir (March 20, 1975). Contains two front-page- stories about the Thetford ch lie's failure to inform asbestos miners that the}' load asbestosis, ever a i er;od of decades. The minutes of the Quebec Asbestos Mining Associauon (founded m 1931) have never been made available to; ins; ac tion in discovery proceedings. 7 A l t ? C/.FFY M.'.XMTACTLFdNC COM3.'NY ( n:; Gi~ .\'z IP, Tir.accr, Ccmu>, ] n 'i ' 7'T i The 7rw p Carer Cc-mp? ny of Cuncirm,:. ti, O ru'o,Pbo cc*10 lead be C. ,iV/^ V V 'mg ashec `oS and asbrs is? pr od i W_, _ :t;; for c. c r o o years in an ad appeering in AC J i Pk C, iti iC . wh, 1v30 (;hm urn: also c_rvee on c:r*i c.c about asbeste sis). Ca rev Vf-5 jl uwuls: .cm, coni:;setmg buslne ss as well i'>1. ', icT.y ovc:r asues tosis among CaroAs Q-; cbcc r. no cmplc'ores lee to g his;c;:ic as bc-stos Cm:ike In kMr i- rev.n ;e 0C Q "Com; ; r ration at the A.sbcstos Mines m C? r c C C.j ' in Ch c " i ^ r 2, and S- - 44` > v " ;c? Mir/ mbestos m Qu: be1z, Ct, .C.C^. Js.<-f , un.s chr-pie r) Cr-ey's e v u rr Ship of the Quebec ,As:rest C S Cor P ' 1Tc ~ tion v, ?. s rccotc eu ;n 3 M a y - T C o m ; o f J i - ; 5 *' ., : m s (1 FTC, Q.A M A .r.v.ycr Ivam Sa bcuri n commu: )C Z. tc C l inc ) . i . - I c ' crt and find r-cs cf i U - . - sponsors1C C Y- *'i cc r c' Y d " ofn w Studs' to Ed Bro ?dwav cA Qu:rbec AM-::stcs C o rp on MeV i J, 19o7 (See 'The 1nc us! rir l H ) i C Pi G F 0 Undati on Cmoc:; ot , ' m Chapter 2). The following documentation relates ohrcc'.ly to Carey 1 National Industrial Reamere Administm.ticn Hearing c-, OcT of Fair Practices and Competition, Presented by Ash. nos Industry, Oct. 19, 1933. Carcv President George Crabbs and Johns-Mrnville President Lewis Brown, accompanied by representati\ es of 3 other asbestos companies, testified at hearings on a proposed code that would have excluded minors underage 18 fiom emplo\mcnt in occupa tions with CAposure to "asbestos dust .. in injurious quantities." Brown presented a list of companies that had signed the pro posed code (including A.merican Braheblok, Carey, Eire-1, Garlock, J-M, Keasbey L Mattison, Rubcroid, Southern Asbestos, A- 22 8 Ccv.r? STCS COr.PC:.A7,C\- L'VtTEO (AC.-) This company was set up in 1925 end nationaliucc in the 195"? (incorporated into the Quebec government co:r.pany, Soctetc- Katicnale co EArmante). A Gust surrey of the firm's iCjr.e mine and null was cr relucted m 1944 by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and the 1r_; report ci the findings was on file pocvment Ido. 217S) at A: Instil:ute of Occur;itiena! ana Envircnmental Kcah.h, m Montreal (1.0 Cl), wa s a part cf tinc Quebec Arc.Acs M - As so ::?t;o n ur.t.l ;lb \ >C.' Ashe- C*QC **-( r-v--~1;icn Centre m 19(2, r.o.. .2 h =; Inst:; ***^ * vr or! notes ti at a . - e be.' conducted :n 4950 . Dust center.-.: " c '' r.yCv; W ' . _,, . 29 6 I /Pi"\^A in the r\ e eperafiens c *r. ior ' cc i r , .c ~ .r.' i ^ r. r ; ....1..' ^. C1UCi 7H, c w w't? v..nr. v . c _ .. ' - . ?TCf.? . .1- 0 `; q c'::r.v\ ;*s v. c;c `A- cr.. t . r : , cr p .. v " - C.\ lC Lb; co'.wing cf cc;r. e\ ers, :n c v-C.llC., i. u.c i*.?v \ e .< . c - v. c:e CA'v0.7 as rase $ for Ac " n u ; 1 lower' dust r e n 1at - ' in casv-: co. 1C:^ j -. t c - ' ; c' L fbw'p.u . j.t .^^ ..t:^ v.nance... \ ,o c r n:;s iwvx been made m 'he :u... new , ; . ; ; Inst survim Too cnt\ crcrt at c..;i se'.'press c ' c CC Y l 7j C bOif iC COIV. CYCVb Tr.c Metropolitan Life report recommended tret cifcr.s be made tc lcee/er exposures to e ; : ? ' e : r e r cor;:"Ira.,or cf ; MPPCP. in this connection, the rcpotl cf the C S. Pub':' Kcahh Scr.icc Drcrsscn c: a 1, 195?) v es otc-d. Keu'.ns c f ! o repent by Dr. Lane.?, and his co-workers at Met Life (3'-Mo, t : attached to the King Mine survey report. Starting m 1943, numerous cases in which asbestosis was suspected among ACL employees were referred to the Saranac / Laboratory. Liam' of these people had been seen hs Dr. I Cartier's Thetford Industrial Clinic, and compensation claims l had been filed m at least 17 of the cases reviewed by Dr. Gardner and Dr. \ 'orv,-ld between 1943 and 1957. In r. 1946 case where a death claim had been filed, the asbestosis was extensive and was accompanied by lung cancc; (Yorwah; Patient A- 229 Asbestos. Medical and Legal Aspects File P-46-372T The Treasurer cf A.CL, whose exposure consisted only of crime- work starting tn 1920, died from pleura! mesothe lioma in 1919 (Yorwald Pal'.ent File 1M-573.'. Details cf these cases beyond those in the Yorwald fries are unavailable from the Quebec government and the mining companies ;r. Quebec, due to the Quebec Records Concerns Act, which b?rs the transfer of certain types of records out of the Province, even as photccop- A C L w ? c 3 7-q o QQ r o f t h e } U: C'J stria.] D w y e r w F o r m e a t . c n f r o m Dec. 1, i. 9 5 3 until Dec. A f1 , i r 60. ACL veas r ' 1 'a sc.. :.? 'C -"oW e: : A s b e s t o s T c . At . . C U' iStL A c r r c A 3 j w a s c -SSOi r e d i n - wr '( " 7 0 s J u n e , U- 3 _ u r. 1 1 1 w u j c i v j a r c 5 , l o 7 0 , . A L L '( <- -n Ur O c e n t b C C : n . . ' ' 1 3 rc-urz-s ' n l Q n. e s c f c t h : . ^ L- e s t e s eg c c . cs t_- 7 *- * l c i r c l s \. c o l d b : r b " r 'i c n fi r ' - _n ^c- "Tr. 'j s c l a b e n V.'CIC l w . >CDr rT-T i r C3 ci o n s h i r m ; C r n a d . a n ? " C ' 1 T- r a n c u 5 1c rr. e r s c; fc r . g m a i c m ; ' b a s i s ' : T h i s b p > r p r . . 3 11 > c h n s ? 1 A ^ s b r s * o s V n : e Urns a n s L-D l ..:: r". r. [ rQ.... u-1 cS , i u' p 3. - j u usc ,r 3. CC l1 31C u r 7 13 3 A . 3 C <1; v . c c s as .. - D. - 1- t i c n cf this v \? <o r .31 C'a c r )c *-> * * c? t-> - r ' r * a b s ' : v 1 3 .73. U U - 7bs corrnanv v.as the asbestos industry leader m the United States, v.ith mines m Canada. Its founder was Henry Ward lohns, who patented inventions for roofing and insulation products. Johns started his own company at the age of 21, and died 40 rears later of a chronic lung condition, in 1S9S. (His death certificate lists the cause of death as "phthisis pulmonalis.") The company's continuous concern about the problem of asbestosis apparently dates from the late 1920s. Lanza, in his 1935 publication, acknowledged that "officials representing the asbes-os industry in the United States" had approached him to conduct a health survey m 1929. A-230 Cc mp an; Kr, d,. ledge J'M also presumably knew that Company doctors ar.d !\ C<;. examinee workers at their nunc m Asbestos, Quebec, r-ridenhfied IS cases of asbestesis there in 1950 (See V.s.cstcs.s in Canada," m Chapter 1). A 1950 report L-yJ-ld Sales Pi emotion Dopar meri f! m Analysis Section) contained factu:-] summer :s cf dr.tn ; medical reports published m 1929. This .s c m c : ibi ( d o c u m e n t s c f i n t e r e s t p r o d u c e d i n d i s c e \ '(IS- b v l e h r i s - , ' b a r , . t o p l a i n t i i i i i n c i v i l h t ' g a t i o n (rrcmv ; b r>` ` |C;.: W a v ; w : w , h i . n o ; ? n '-C-- . *it i. D : s : c , e r v c c r . d u c t c d h i C. C \ \ S Dm. : 1. j u s t i c e i n t h c m i d - 1 9 8 0 ? , i n i c o n n e c t . : - 1:r c. s , . . t c : x ; ` 1 - Y r eua - ,-t I *- Ci . l . 1- ' **/ c. r, c c ' [s c ^ * 'I* c.- - * e n e i c t r ;; r *\:l b a d b e e n p;r c s wr ! ^ : r . i z : V 1', Id . L a v . s u 2S w e r y i d e e Egad n s t j _' ' ' ** c i' y C v.!Pi ! 0 Q c s a r C n i v f r o m l u n Q c . s e r i e s , t L As' ; s c : : A ? s 1 ^ A Tj ; ILr.' L^ ,, . c . i S j ^ c i u j b r t c U i s ; 7 T \ c a 0*' c s : f d . v - r o f a s h e s i c s . *s, . - , - -C . 1C7i- ^v 1*i J. s. C t ( 5 . : - - C a m p e r . s e t : c n i n t h e E a r l y Y e a r s , ' w, C !U P t e r D1 . Y C - 0 h r Idr . , l. 1, L ? Ci r a c f Y e t : o ; "i h : . a n L A c 1p.. c '. ,, `.. \ . c r t p c.v A , j - M f o u n d t h a t i19 p e r c e n t 0 f i t s x 1~ 0. \ \ l.. c, \ \ y ' ` c m p i c \ e' Vc te b n e n an ^ Cjp *''' o i C ' ' c, ' r i. u " . , c c r r ' : s - s W o " A E ~ d . . j C. ` *r \ . c c :\ ' l : : . W b w C v. ' 1 C m ptc-r : ) L a n ? a a c v . s c c . a Cr. ' \ \ ^ \ r : . : r : :., a IP,C C' r *i s i n J C d ' s Y b a u .-.Lg^.!, ... 7 . c >'lt i n i V; ?, 1 - - ^ - * C c c n c c r r , o v e ; : l a w s u i t s (?c-e " A cb o s [c c A - ; '7Sr*CCOi 1*1 1 7C : ' Years' Damarne Suits,' m Chapter 5). JchnsCCanville's carl; invohcinc-iV. in natte:? re1:-' up to ` ; health hazards of asbestos seems to ha\c- been harmler. pr m i - j)\- by corporate attorney Yancixc: Prcv.r, m tire years WCW 1950. Shortly after 1950, Brown was summarily re ned, uni.'! his death in 1983 he resided alternatively in Scotland ana Wgco, Texas. Plaintiffs' attorneys vrerc surprised to discover in:; he was still living, having been told in lohns-Y.smmk s Answers to Interrogatories that Vancivci Brown -..as dear Brown's doctor and banker (financial guardian) then testifico that he was completely senile and in such poor heahh that he could not safely undergo a deposition. Brown never vrs prevailed upon to add to the documentai;' record oil is \ears at johns-Manville. A ?m Asbestos; Medica! and Lega! Aspects Brown's activities in : h 1 5 3 0 s are known largely through the Sumner Simpscn Pacers (See "Raybestos-Man.hattan," this chapter; and Chapter 3). These activities included mak.ng editorial suggestions to Dr. Lanza on galley proofs cf hm paper published in 1935; discouraging the trade magazine A sbestos from running stories on asbestosts and dust control; and representing asbestos companies sponsoring research at the Saranac Laboratory. In this last capacity, Proven vigilantly watched (or any vtclaircn of the laboratory director's contract forbidding publication v.-.t'nout approval of the industry spon sors. He also received in T943 an annotated c u /w e r r ?. nonegraph that Dr. Gardner intended to write. This contained evaluations c: human arm unpublished Saranac animal tcH data, to the effect tbs tin both cases the evidence -..as suceest.vc PL. *v ^ DL -I* c i f-at asbestos was a carclnc ccrii. 3rov;n a i. - c c rr eempanh;s pwssM Sar cenac to onut HI cnt.cn of cancer in tre r urh'shec report cf Ga;idnc-r's ic sea::ch (3 "Earlv S u r ; ; Li-rrA-trrv Cr ncc: Tests wi : cnnL*es, in Cbarter 2). \ sr civcr 'ro w n 'vs; ? asbesto t industry rwu .*M-N^.T1C*.il<-re who J^.n:v \.:th rep:csep;;stives cf cth: : mdustr ;? to launch ![P? .Mr I_T}gicne Fcundaticn , seen after renamed Ind us trial Hvo cme Foundation. Brown and the ]ch ns-'Danville president (Le v.is Brew V r' n L 7.'ith Cn arles Reamer and officials from the Union .hsbest CS md TA~>jbbe-r Ccmpanv in 1942 c: IN13. According to Mr. Rcerner, L>:rown explained that li. VAp- C0Id",Viany policy to ;net tcii c;rph ees their medical examinations shewed the\ hud asbestesw Brown went cn to explain the financial reasoning behind this police, (See "A Lcbster Lunch with Van or, cr Brown," in Chapter 3, and opening quote to this chapter). In 1547, Brown criticized the lacking of scientific basis of the tentative threshold limit first proposed for dust m asbestos plants bv the U.5. Public Health Service (See "Unsteady Movement Toward Numerical Exposure Limits/' m Chapter 4). In 1950, Brown demanded that Dr. Gerrit Schepers suppress a report Schepers had prepared for the South African govern ment about the asbestos problem in the U.S. and Canada. Brown objected particularly to Schepers1reference to cancer at A- 2 3 2 Ccrr.psny Knowledge the Canadian nines end the extreme destines ci two Jehn.s- Manvil]e asbestos plants (See "Dr. Scncpe-rs' Visit to Amener,' in Chapter 2). In late 1952, Pape Woodard, another 1 w ccetmc, r.ct v it -, Dr. Vorwald, Dr. A.]. Lanas, and Quebec Asbestos Min.ne, Association attorney Ivan Sabcurin to negotiate tc-rim for an animal inhalation test on the ccicinogcnicilv cf asbesTs. Vue bonding for the- test was apparently interrupted before ccmrlc- tior., and none of the bni.ngs mere published (S r. c 'Tim Saranac Lab's Cancer Studies for the Quebec Asbestos Mir.Mo Ct.sscc.aiG'n, ' 1>' C.hapter 2). Another 'c-V -. CTere in th: JobQ\C x/ .*\ 1' 1,, ,,LL v..L p ealth thre-a;! CI cSG'GStOS V. c.s Dr. Kcru\ GKh V.' M-- -*j.1 .G 1 Cf:.mran\ 's cc ."*3 cnc iv,::, CO' 1 ,\ _r.,.t 4\ es, Qu <-r _c, c.r *"z z cl v?d c c- rvey of 70S civ>0.0- CLb 1.0 tHe ir . 1e - V.1b: r \_on side-red 5C/ '"rr era el a ccmpcr,s:-Tuen Gr *'p .\ C!' g : * c r.plcyecs v cre in formed to?1<r ilh,1.` \->r ~ ' ^Gr - b ;mr - 'G' C7,CC*' C`"'i c t th`3 1Mb as: es Mmes in Ca l'r. c? ' m C'., -"ter Mvc-n before 1949, Smit'n rc ;callim ir gb ' : r -.-->r,,v, , l'c' 1 cd.cal oftic::al at A, c'hnc|n Qu n^cc \ :? ce oc ;-ncd V. 1(.i. *'WO Vc r n , - ^' nd cf 1-M's T!")PtC r Gtu, *" c: /C,o.o 1 \ C' "C ' 1'' , '' .* ^ in tr : C: mmur, ;tV, !n Ch b'. . ~ GCl , ,t 5-c.vcpcrs met Dr. Suuti' L-' i>*<d.s: j; - 3. *. h:m the path oh w1cG rcccros cf Ci ccr Cn I!. c at the 5 L?ire; atew fto:'ll eleven Ca:3.c C* r,!i r 5!-r c 1Cc rmd u V. crh.ers (Sec "Dr. Schepers Visit to Ai.terdea," in Cr *-r 1*- t ut even be iorc 1950, Dr. Ha; riet Harc y rc Dr 5 y.Hh . discrec-l) tn :r>1<~r to interestt do etCTb C- ii. the Mass. -VJ5, G en era l Hospital m the issue of asbestos carcinogens?.? Umo though this suggestion was v.c-11 received, Smith later toM Hardy he was not allowed to follow up because of J-M c ucm tivc-s' objections. Smith recommended warning labels for asbestos a; early as 1952, the year he became corporate medical director. He testified as follows shortly before his death about the fate of that recommendation: The reason why the cr.utmn labels v.erc not implemc.ved immediately, it was a business decision as far as 1 could A -233 t 5 Asbestos Medics! and Lege! Aspects understand. Here was a recommendation, the corporation is in business to make, to provide jobs for people and make money for stockholders and trey had to take into ccnstcer- at.on the effects of everything they did and if the applica tion of a caution label identifv.'ng a product as hazardous would cut into sales, there would be serious financial implications. And the power s of be (sic) hrd to rr.sk e some effort to judge the necessity cf the label versus the consc- cu enees Olpi acing the label on the product. (m. A Sir, th deposit:or> in L c . r s o t P o T r u s t C c . v } ~ J- >' s - ' (- 1r Uli, Ccoy Jefferson r m ~ t Court, Com me w P 1 0 Z S B:. 7th D..v cf Kent , C o m ' ~ ^ _c ~ * ^ 7 S . j - i-h-n n u rm xtm , not cn sacks of j-M asbestos f.ber from Canada u hi !9c? Wee also ' Too Charges: Fm'.ure to Test, 1allure to 'Ms V m C-anter o). Apparently, most if not all others in the .rod I n d d no; h_ cin * o to label their products as hazsrdo..s until lehr -Manv.Pe ct:d so; and some lacoed veers behind. w< o The company policy of not informing j-M employees v hen tneir medical examinations rc-reded asbostcsis has also been desorbed by Wilbur RuR, lormer manager of tire ccmprtyCs Pittsburgh, California manufacturing plant. Ruff test.ncd that this "hush-hush condition" persisted as company policy at the olar.t he managed until 1971 or 1972 Ruff himself had been toh hos caused lung disease m the late 1910s from C 3. burnety vrho went on to become the company's president :n I960 (Sworn Statement of Wilbur l . Ruff, Jan. 11, 157S, at law offices of Marrs A. Craddick, Walnut Creek, California) At the corporate level, safety engineer Hugh Jackson worked cIcscTv with medical director Dr. Kenneth Smith. Even before Smith arrhed at the corporate offices in Mew York, Jackson dealt v,it'n health problems at the plants, even arranging for lung tissue slides to be sent to Saranac Laboratory. In 194S, he verified that a plant foreman had died of asbestosis from breath.ng the general atmosphere m the plant, and expressed concern to Dr. Vorwald at Saranac that such exposure could A -2 34 L. . r i. V.-1H procuce such severe lung disease (See "Sarrnrc Ccwper. ration Reviews tor Manufacturers," and "Cancer," Chspicr 5). In 1954, Jackson wrote to an official at the Vdaukeg-n riant that compliance with threshold limit values for employee exposure to asbestos did not assure protection for all tire workers: "... no guarantee of full protection can he assumed at any level of exposure." (See "The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists TLVs," Chapter 4) A ma ,v^ient "compensation committee" held regni;?: mee ting;?at the larye Manylile, New Jersey` r'pjA Jfacturjiic pia: it in 1957--195?. Kenneth Smith, Clifford Shec' cr, and : `.hc 'S ce-ci deci V\.1PvlC.rDhiv:: to inform workers c.'rose medica1o a m rano- ' <v bad tor is.0 V.p unt dis case, v. J:c:hcr to tra : a. rem c cdi_ ^ tc less nr.stv arcas of the pi:.c.iii-, r~nd hcv; io h r - . : tt cWc ctc-o men idua!s so 1:h?t tre)1 |` Vc !d i " ` Me w^rkw com satin :i cip.;rviS. Sir1'.a: prac tices \/ere* 1' v.cc bv i-:11 maripCC1-e rte ! : : v - ; re, in the 19-0 s (See ` Cero:: : a:c Cerne: SStv:n 1.>r -i *.> U\ .\.c.Ji\ iile," in Chapter 3). con on contract jnr*.V.-r-. owned tv J- M v. as sued 1933 bv a workman, Bernard Dugan, who said he was totally disabled with lung disease freni w `:ug r?besic-s-con`;nr.r'c materials _sed in c o 'scruction. In 1957 ecu 4565, lohr.s- ' toni die v. i s r ?-"cd :n crm?gc scuts in Nc-v, lcrse\ by nsU r - teis Frcde :ick ! cC-rar.do and Fr cc We nhr.m 3e;h plruikffs rccwve d cut-ef-ccurt settlcmcn ts. loh'ns-Muuu.ic \. s r-lso n ?nicc in tbc pioduct liabiht)- so.:t f.ic-d by G Fac.r.ne in, 19l (Sec- '!..c'-'Sn.ts b\ Product Users .'. n ~unsi .AsbcS'os Ma nt ir Mor c-rs" in Chaipter 3). Vier!::er` ccnrcnsation claims wer c al so filed against Job,ns- .ManviDe by insulation wcikcrs empio) ed in j-.M construction contracting divisions in the 195Os. Based maini) on ? list o' claims involving Armstrong Cork, it was possible to ascertain that J-M was joined as a co-defendant in the following cases- Harn- Kish (1953) Edward Campbell (1954) James Riley (1957) Harry Haake (1957) John Swartont (1S5S) A- 2 35 66S - I t C C o O ' 4- Ervey McCarrel! (1959) Lewis Monger (1955) Harvey Curtis (1961) Anthony Oncirio (1962) Robert Goans (196?) (Se e "Workers' Compensationi Claims b\ Insulators again -g1 Contracting Dir isicns of Ash estos Prodi :ct M_ fM Cb apier 3.) J-M was also a c.icvi3cnLin (1TmQ ,C.c. V of iJor:71 npleton in Michigan in I960 (Fee 'O'. .'cr.5 Co::- - Fib C. C*i-, Villi V.XlCvr). Johrs-Mar.vilh: also referred a. r. ait*aar c .r'.C? =' - .lb_" ;^ Saranac Lab orator;, for re, lev. In the cam Of OPe ; r \ cr . u o hr.d asbestos: s and died :r: u h p.c cap :;r, 5afet;. bt.g'PLcr Hu gin Jackson at corporate he adc uerters ar v i c ca ta T j `:' w IT-5nt cccumenrs C.i . C.1! k/\ "Lil\ $ CMQ_* (Q Smans - r ',rc .c to j r Verveaid cm juh 28, 1950, 'LOs you kp.cvv job " ^-Fban . ih e V ccnsiderablv int crested m the relationsh; p of c.sa.v.ci::a a;-d t .... g carcinoma" Odorvai d Pat lent File P- 19-4:H'1 T-.vo oth cr Cr? es c: lung cancer and ashes tosis were :Q\ JC . w'' .. \ C- - -QQ for Johns-Manviil;e in 19M3 an d 1951; en. X.^c .' 1' -: J VOrked at the I-Vaukegan, hk r.ois plant, c.:. the c`.her h;:d ve rs ed at the companv's Quebec ssbestes rune iVcrv. aid Lent Files P-50-495, P-51-542). 3 y 1 9 5 - 4, J c h n s - V a n ' v i l l e e p e r a t e d a c l : - c . n A s b 0 c 4c Q u e b e c , v. i t h t h e c a i t y t o p e ; : f o r i n i n n : rC h wmIT1c r. '- , . ' 5Qs n C c. S a i r b o r n e d u s t s a m nl I n a d d s t i o n , a n a '1n 2 ! si : r v o \ t" " - conducted with dust s a i t . r JV; -c <" T*v i ' r i t e d to the Tr a c 1e r s I n s u : ? Pi C o m p a n y f o r a n a h SIS ( PI. R o z o v s k v . " A i r H a n d ! ! m g a n d D u s t Control at the Jeffrey .Mine of Canadian Johns-Mana lie Company." Car.ad. h v:h :g ]. 75.59-65, 1554). johns-Manviile was a member of the Asbestos Textile Insti tue, the National Insulation Manufacturers Association, Industrial Hygiene Foundation, Quebec Asbestos Mining Association, and the Asbestosis Research Council, among others Through special studies, meetings, and publications of these organizations Johns-Manville was continually dealing v.ith the problem of asbestos disease (See ''Industry Research and Trade Associations,'' in Chapter 10). A- 2 3 6 C r cn v K n o v .'l e c ' In 196S-1F70, J-M was among the n e n l e r s cf the Awbwstiw Cement Products Association willing to warn the poetic that sawing asbestos-cement products 'would create a health (See "National Gypsum Company," next in this chapter)-- others in the ircustrv would also co so. N A ! iC \ n L g w s e x : C O N ! ? .A \ 'V X ?;-ew ? 1 G v A . $ b C 5 1 0 1v - o s e ::o % / >. i e ow in n e d int Q u o to crests i n c) a n d a . s b : C * - 7 .. i . , r a m d i r e . i c. r j v~ r L O U S 1- ? ! r. E r . r . J N ' c w J e r s e y ) . . T i n ? c : m p a : y e r e Z ; v V - A c : \ G, G . . . `. n e ti j o i n t c . m r , p o u n d s a " t C r.SZ Z ' t 5 " C a m r r : d u c t u n d e r c C Y c 1C A 1` m C ! i t a t e . T * - -1 ti P ' A: /N . * -- 1 . . ,, ~ \\ . l 1 y. ~ Z A br l S o s in L' d C C r, C o u s t , : ; : ! t ' - * t >. , i e r c Ti L C U 1 A 0 c s t t i o n s v . e r e ` t C i t c C 1 5 A ' . \ a : v. U b- C *' w C ! r . s i e s t e s ( ' o r e C \ Cl . N. 1-T * c : * : Sc. ' * t ^ ' ' 1 G* a t i n a . i s v. c -re a p p l i e d t e t! c e n i n g c t S C 1' 0 ~ . f J 5 ' U r. : 0 A c\ 5 w te d T h e ; 1" 5 . ' C C " t . c :'i n ; t w `l - r C ^ r* * J l l ^ j __ I i ? ; `S * *^ I r. c s i . o n t i r . c r c - i c > a 5 . A 5 , ... _ i u - . 1v- w 1 C * - C ' C ' - r * it W eb c ^c ^ c ' " i **' ' r ^ r ** A ~ - * 1 * i a m c s W , i - . C-' w 1 > t ^ s c r u s e d ; o e f f s e t t h e e f f e c t o i r e m o -c i u p i n ; c s h : c r *L icI\ u t 'p - p (i: M S. c . ^ . c p r a \ m ,g W o o and 1 fo r B 0 . St:c v . a i t , A c o u s tic a l Ire 1 C . o t h e J o b A;r p h e a t i e n c * i- " at m e n 1 v r,; Pc. Q-63P4, i > eut On Pc l l a r M c. N:l a r d v. j 91, l u n ch 11, 1 r o te to e 28 953, Dr. , 1 9 4 ') N ati cn a l G y p s L . W . . Spoly a r , u m , Dme c i >or D r e c t o r of f/ K_ tULJ t C ; p x >* .Q - n a Division of Industrial Hygiene. He listed arnosite asbestos as constituent of "Thermacoustic" spray-applied insulation, and recommended that operators mixing it for use wear ? respwaio: approved for pneumoconiosis-producing dusts "because of the asbestos used in the product." Pollard suggested that lespirutors might be necessary for applicators, too, "if there is dust pres ent " The same day, Pollard also sent an internal memorandum to others in the company, saving that asbestosis was a respira- A- 237