Document Rpxd1X7KZOOg0xVDy9owJaV7E

24 1 at close range by people whom they couldn't see. We 2 had aircraft overhead who simply could not see the 3 trails below them, so we had a lot of forces, and 4 yet they were terribly vulnerable to just a few 5 people hidden in the jungle growth. 6 In that situation, the overriding 7 interest was to see whether or not the science and 8 technology that was available could be applied to 9 get rid of some of this cover. Now, that seems to 10 me like a very rational and reasonable action, even 11 in retrospect. 12 The use of herbicides is something that 13 had been used in this country by farmers for decades, 14 something with which we had a lot of experience, and 15 it seemed like a natural approach. 16 I had flown over Vietnam during those 17 years once or twice a year in regions below the DM2, 18 and I remember seeing places where there' was some 19 evidence that the defoliation effort was Working, 20 particularly in the areas of the trails, but it 21 still was a terribly small area, a terribly small 22 fraction of the whole area, so my recollection is 23 that it was very selectively used and that it 24 probably saved a lot of our lives. 25 Now, in spite of the fact that we were w a g a a n d spinelli certified sh orth a n d rftnnrtorc 25 1 overwhelmingly convinced we were doing the right 2 thing to save lives, there were a few people in the 3 U. S. community, scientific community, who were 4 concerned about these long term effects, and under 5 the pressure of the war in Vietnam, I do recall that 6 we did what 1 felt was a very open-handed, even 7 approach to dealing with this matter. Now, it may 8 be that in another decade or two, someone will on 9 further research find out additional things, things 10 in addition to what we knew at that time, but at 11 that time I'm absolutely convinced we. we re doing the 12 right thing. 13 Q. Are you finished, Dr. Foster? 14 A . Yes. 15 MR. DEAN: Move that that portion of the 16 answer that is not responsive be stricken. 17 Q. Doctor, you indicated to us that 18 herbicides were something with which we had a lot of 19 experience 20; MR. DEAN: Off the record. 21 (Discussion off the record.) 22 Q. Could you tell us whether or not your 23 department and those under you and those with whom 24 you conversed had any experience, prior experience 25 with the herbicide Agent Orange? u /n n n n n rl ninelll ro rtifio H c h n rfh n n H ro n n rfo rc We stmo re1anci 31 MS. MIWTZER; Objection. SPECIAL MASTER SC HR EIB ER : Yoa may answer if you recall. A. I can't answer that because I perused this, I have not. read it. MR. O'BRIEN: Thank you sir, I have no further questions. SPECIAL MASTER SCHREIBER; Mr. Matthews, will you begin your cross-examination? Off the record . (Discussion off the record.) (Short recess.) SPECIAL MASTER SCHREIBER: We'll begin the cross-examination now. Mr. Matthews will start the examination. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MATTHEWS: Q. General Westmoreland, did you consider the Defoliation .Program to be a weapon of war? MR. O'BRIEN: Note my objection to the question. SPECIAL MASTER SCHREIBER: All right. You may answer it. General. A. I may answer it? SPECIAL MASTER SCHREIBER: -Yes', please. Wes tmor e 1and 32 A. It certainly was a battlefield weapon, which was compatible with a rather unique battle env 1 ronment. f Q . Did you consider it an effective battlefield weapon? A. Well, yes. MR. O'BRIEN: Note my objection to the question, again. A. You object? SPECIAL MASTER SCHREIBER: You may answer. General, if the objection is made and if I don't -stop you, you just -- you can go right ahead and answer it. They're just posting the record for subsequent -- A. Effective, I thought it was an effective weapon. Q. Was the defoliation generally done in areas remote from population centers? A. Yes. Q . And would this be true during the entire period of time that you were the Commanding General in Vietnam? MR. O'BRIEN: Note my objection. Unless the General can state that he was aware of every single operation, I object to the question. SPECIAL MASTER SCHREIBER: Counsel is ! Westmoreland 35 1 A. There was.-- I did nor get involved in the 2 details. I was aware of -- there was one called 3 Purple and one called Orange ana that is my only 4 recollection. 5 0. Do you know if there were any others used? 6 A. Not that I'm aware of, but this is not a 7 preciseanswer. 8 Q. General, you've indicated that you would 9 not be aware of the details of that type of 10 information. Were there others on your staff who 11 would have been aware of the details, those types of* 12 details? 13 A. Well, I had chemical officers who were 14 commissioned in the Army Chemical Corps on my staff, 15 who were the ones that normally dealt with that, 15 along with the Air Force, who were, basically, the ' 17 delivery seryice. 18 But if I could elaborate, this was a 19 standard munition that was issued to us. It's like 20 a 105 shell or an M-16 rifle bullet and it was in 21 the stockpile and we felt it was appropriate to use 22 it in order to accomplish our military mission. 23 Q. Were you at any time, either prior to 24 your service as the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. 25 forces in Vietnam or during that time involved' in ?t Kissinger 32 1 MR. SABETTA: I just have a couple. 2 CROS S*-EXAM INAT ION BY MR. SABETTA: 3 Q. Dr. Kissinger, at the time the decision 4 was made and announced to terminate the use of 5 herbicides in Vietnam, or in the process by which 6 that determination was made, did the White House, or 7 your office, receive any stated opposition from any 8 of the members of the United States Military to the 9 termination of the use of "herbicides? 10 MR. DEAN: Object to form. SPECIAL MASTER SCHREIBER: You may answer. 12 A. Yes. My recollection is that the Military 13 objected to it. 14 Q. On what grounds? 15 A. They seemed to think that it would make the 16 defense of the perimeters of their camps, more 17 difficult, and they were particularly -- they were 18 particularly concerned that they retain the right to 19 use, to continue to have that right to use 20 herbicides in the area around their camps. 21 Q. Which Military figures expressed such 22 views? 23 A. I can't identify the individuals, but I 24 associate it with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 25 probably the -- and. almost certainly the Saigon wnnfl /wW \) C Kissinger 1Jk Command 33 2 Q. Was that opposition on the part of the 3 Military scrutinized by your office in the 4 determination to recommend to the President the 5 termination of the use of herbicides. Was it 6 weighed and evaluated? 7 A. It was weighed, yes. B Q. Did your office conclude -- did your 9 office conclude in the course of this assessment 10 that there was, indeed, a very substantial military 11 benefit that had been and was being derived from the 12 use of herbicides in Vietnam? 13 MR. O'BRIEN: Objection. 14 MR. DEAN: Object to the -form. 15 A. We -- the Military certainly felt strongly Ifi about the fact that there was a military benefit. 17 We had to weigh it against the overall foreign and 18 domestic policy we were considering, and so we 19 decided to overrule the Military without necessarily 20 questioning their military judgment. 21 Q. You say without necessarily questioning. 22 Do you recall whether your office, in fact, acceded 23 to or agreed with the Military's assessment of the 24 military benefit that was being derived from the use 25 of the product? w nnn nrvi w u i Westmoreland 93 1 A. Yes, it refreshes my memory on some* of the 2 discussions that v,e had at that time concerning 3 restrictions on the use'of herbicides. 4 Q . Specifically, when you say it refreshes 5 your recollection, we're referring to -- are you 5 referring, sir, to Westmoreland Exhibits 10 and 12, 7 sir, and 13? 3 A. Let's see, I've gotten, 12 -- 9 SPECIAL MASTER SCHREIBER; 13 was the one 10 that has just been marked -- it's the last one I 11 gave you, 12 MR. O'BRIEN; 14 May 1970? 13 SPECIAL MASTER SCHREIBER: In the upper 14 right-hand corner there should be a stamp. 15 A. I've got 10 and 12 and 13. All right. Now, 10 16 is Subject: Policy Regarding Use of Herbicides in 17 Vietnam and this is 18 December, 1970, memorandum 18 from the Secretary of Defense signed by the Chairmen 19 of the.Joint Chiefs of Staff and number 12 is dated 20 21 -- 21 MR. O'BRIEN: Looks like December. 22 A. -- I guess that's December, 1970, Subject: 23 Herbicide Use in Vietnam, to the Secretary of 24 Defense signed by T. H. Moorer, Joint Chiefs of 25 Staff, and number 13, also memorandum to the v\ Vvestmo re1and 93 1 Secretary'of Defense, Use of Herbicides in Vietnam 2 dated 14 Nay 197C, again, signed by General Moorcr. 3 So I have noted those. 4 Q. And do those documents, sir, reflect tha 5 views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 5 Defoliation Program? 7 MR. O'BRIEN: I object to the form of the 8 question, unless counsel -- I'll stipulate or have 9 all three go into evidence and-- 10 SPECIAL MASTER SCHREIBER: I'm sure all 11 are going into evidence. I don't think either side 12 is going to object. Am I correct in that? Is 13 anyone on the Defendants' side going to object to 14 these documents going into evidence? Hearing no 15 objection, and I assume Mr. O'Brien, you're not 16 going to object, either. 17 MR. O'BRIEN: No, sir, I'll offer them 18 right now. 19 SPECIAL MASTER SCHREIBER: No, no, you 20 don't have to offer them right now. They're going 21 to go into evidence. You've asked the witness c 22 whether these documents have refreshed his 23 recollection. He's indicated yes, so I think you 24 ought to ask him, if you wish to, what is his 25 recollection, now that it's been refreshed, as to Westmoreland 100 1 what the Joint Chiefs of Staffs* position was. 2 BY MK. MATTHEW'S : 3 Q. General, sir, what was the position of 4 the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the decision to curtail 5 the Defoliation Program? 5 A. , As reflected in those three documents. 7 Q . And did you concur in that position, sir? 8 A . I did. 9 Q . Was that position arrived at solely by 10 the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 11 A. It was, I assume, one of the many many items 12 that we had on the agenda when we met usually twice 13 a week, so I must assume it was an agenda item and 14 if a member of the Joint Chiefs of'Staff had 15 dissented, it would have been so indicated. 16 Q. In arriving at the positions or the 17 position as set forth in these memorandums, did the 18 Joint Chiefs of Staff have input from the members of 19 the irstaffs? 20 A. They did, and they also had the benefit of the 21 Commander, American Commander in Vietnam, General 22 Abrams. 23 Q. General Westmoreland, I would ask you, if 24 you would, sir, I would like to direct your 25 attention to what has been marked as Westmoreland