Document RaVM6y9pxZZYBndwnLX1gpd3k
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
349
1 B-126,986
2 RUSSELL ALLEN, ET AL 3 VS.
* IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF *
* JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS *
4 AMERICAN PETROFINA,ET AL *
60TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
5 A-134,614
6 FRENCH HICKS, ET AL 7 VS.
* IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF *
* JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS *
8 BETHLEHEM STEELCORP.,
*
ET AL
* 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
9
B-141,242
10
ROOSEVELT SCOTT
11 VS.
* IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF *
* JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
12 *
AMERICANOPTICAL CORP.,
*
13 ET AL
* 60TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
14 A-138,633
15 MARGARET FAULKNER, ET AL * IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF *
16 VS.
* JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS *
17 AKRON CHEMICAL CO., ET AL * 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
18 A-136,143
19 KEITH GIBLIN, ET AL
20 VS.
21 MOBIL OILCORPORATION, ET AL
22
* IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF *
* JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS *
* * 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
23 VOLUME II
24 VIDEO DEPOSITION OF VERALD K. ROWE
25 TAKEN ON MAY 11, 1993, AND MAY 12, 1993
350
1 E-141,216 Page 1
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
2 JOSEPH E. BARNARD, ET UX * IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF *
3 VS.
* JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS *
4 ALLIED-SIGNAL, INC.,
*
ET AL
* 172ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
5
A-140,498
6
JOYCE A. BORNE, ET AL 7
* IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF *
VS.
8 ALLIED-SIGNAL, INC.,
* JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS *
*
9 ET AL
* 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
10
11 12 VOLUME II
13
14 VIDEO DEPOSITION OF
15 16 VERALD K. ROWE
17
18
19 On May 11, 1993, and May 12, 1993, Volume II
20 of the videotaped deposition of Verald K. Rowe, a 21 Witness in the above-styled causes, was taken, the
22 deposition having begun on October 1, 1992. The
23 deposition was held at the Arizona Biltmore Resort
24 Hotel, 24th Street and Missouri Avenue, Phoenix,
25 Arizona, pursuant to Stipulation of Counsel.
351
1 Those counsel present, representing their 2 respective client or clients in the cause of action or 3 causes of action in which he/she has filed an answer, 4 were as follows:
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
5
6
7 JOSEPH C. BLANKS Reaud, Morgan & Quinn
8 801 Laurel Street Beaumont, Texas 77701
9 AND
10 HERSCHEL L. HOBSON
11 Hobson & Ferguson 2190 Harrison Street
12 Beaumont, Texas 77701
13 Counsel for Plaintiffs
14 STANLEY PIERCE
15 Rivkin, Radler & Kremer EAB Plaza
16 Uniondale, New York 11556-0111
17 Counsel for Witness VERALD K. ROWE
18
19 ARTHUR R. ALMQUIST Mehaffy & Weber
20 500 Dallas Street, Suite 1200 Houston, Texas 77002
21 Counsel for Defendants
22 B.F. GOODRICH COMPANY AND THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
23
24
25
352
1 CHARLES TIMOTHY KELLY Wayne Davidson & Associates, P.C.
2 1900 West Loop South, Suite 905 Houston, Texas 77027
3 Counsel for Defendant
4 COMPLETE ABRASIVE BLASTING SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED (CABS)
5
6 RYAN A. BEASON Funderburk & Funderburk
7 2777 Allen Parkway, Suite 1080 Page 3
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt Houston, Texas 77019
8 Counsel for Defendants
9 WGM SAFETY CORPORATION, d/b/a WILLISON SAFETY PRODUCTS, AND
10 JOHN CRANE, INC.
LISA A. KETAI 12 H irsch, Glover, Robinson & Sheiness
917 Franklin at Main 13 Houston, Texas 77002
14 Counsel for Defendants SURVIVAIR,
15 KELCO SALES AND ENGINEERING, INC., AND RUEMELIN
16
17 DOUGLAS B. DOUGHERTY Woodard, Hall & Primm, P.C.
18 7000 Texas Commerce Tower Houston, Texas 77002
19 Counsel for Defendant
20 MONSANTO COMPANY
21 FRANK A. POFF
22 Gooding & Dodson 300 Texarkana National Bank Building
23 P. O. Box 1877 Texarkana, Texas 75504-1877
24 Counsel for Defendant
25 GREFCO, INC.
353
1 ROBERT S. DAVIS Cowles & Thompson
2 One American Center, Suite 777 909 E.S.E. Loop 323
3 Tyl er, Texas 75701-9684
4 Counsel for Defendant Fuller-Austin Insulation Co.
5
6 KIM C. STANGER Lewis and Roca
7 40 North Central Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4429
8 Counsel for Defendant
9 U.S. SILICA COMPANY, f/k/a PENNSYLVANIA GLASS SAND CORPORATION
10 Page 4
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
11 DEBORAH S. COLDWELL Strasburger & Price, L.L.P.
12 901 Main Street, Suite 4300 Dallas, Texas 75202
13 Counsel for Defendant
14 TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY
15 JAMES R. SCRIVNER
16 Smith, Shew & Scrivner, P.C. 120 East 14th St reet
17 P.O. Box 1373 Ada, Oklahoma 74821-1373
18 Counsel for Defendant
19 HARWICK CHEMICAL CORPORATION
20
21
22
23
24
25
354
1 LOUIS H. KNABESCHUH, JR. Jenkins, Grove & Martin
2 Fifth Floor 2615 Calder Avenue and Tenth Street
3 Beaumont, Texas 77701
4 Counsel for Defendants MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, FINA OIL &
5 CHEMICAL COMPANY, HARWICK CHEMICAL COMPANY, VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY, ALLIED
6 CHEMICAL CORPORATION, AMOCO OIL CORPORATION, E. I. Du PONT DE NEMOURS &
7 COMPANY, INC., MCKESSON CHEMICAL CORPORATION, NECHES BUTANE, INC., OXY
8 U.S.A., INC., PETRO-TEX CHEMICAL CORPORATION, PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY, SHELL
9 OIL COMPANY, SUN OIL COMPANY, TEXACO REFINING & MARKETING, INC., UNION
10 OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, AND PULMOSAN SAFETY EQUIPMENT CORPORATION
11
12 SUSAN SPARKS USERY Alenik & Associates
13 Summit Plaza West Page 5
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 12 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1200
14 Houston, Texas 77046
15 Counsel for Defendants BIG THREE INDUSTRIES, INC.
16
17 KIMBERLY BISHOP Martin & Herring
18 1302 McGowen Avenue Houston, Texas 77004
19 Counsel for Defendant
20 FLEXO PRODUCTS, INC.
21 THOMAS HARRIS
22 Fairchild, Price, Thomas & Haley 413 Shelbyville Street
23 Center, Texas 75935-1336
24 Counsel for Defendants BINKS MANUFACTURING CO. AND
25 J. T. THORPE CO.
355
1 D. ALLAN JONES Orgain, Bell & Tucker
2 470 Orleans Street, Fourth Floor Beaumont, Texas 77701
3 Counsel for Defendants
4 ARCO CHEMICAL COMPANY, ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, CHEVRON U.S.A.,
5 INC., GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY, LUBRIZOL CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY,
6 NECHES BUTANE, INC., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, PURE OIL
7 CORPORATION, SUN OIL COMPANY, TEMPLE-EASTEX, INC., TEMPLE-INLAND,
8 INC., UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, UNOCAL CORPORATION, AND USI CHEMICALS
9 COMPANY, INC., a/k/a QUANTUM CHEMICAL
10 DAVID BURNS
11 Tekell, Book, Matthews & Limmer 3600 Two Houston Center
12 909 Fannin Houston, Texas 77010
13 Counsel for Defendants
14 THE TACKABERRY COMPANY AND TRIPLE B CORPORATION
15
16 GEORGE P. PAPPAS Page 6
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel
17 802 Rosenberg St reet Post Office Box 629
18 Galveston, Texas 77553-0629
19 Counsel for Defendant LONE STAR INDUSTRIES, INC.
20
21 ROSS A. SEARS, II Hays, McConn, Rice & Picker ing
22 400 Citicorp Center 1200 Smith Street
23 Houston, Texas 77002
24 Counsel for Defendant MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES COMPANY
25
356
1 B. STEPHEN RICE Hays, McConn, Rice & Pickering
2 400 Citicorp Center 1200 Smith Street
3 Houston, Texas 77002
4 Counsel for Defendants AMOCO CHEMICAL COMPANY, AMOCO
5 CORPORATION, AMOCO OIL COMPANY, BASF CORPORATION, CHEVRON CHEMICAL COMPANY,
6 CHEVRON U.S.A., CITIES SERVICE OIL AND GAS CORPORATION a/k/a OXY USA, CONOCO,
7 CROWN CENTRAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY, ETHYL
8 CORPORATION, EXXON CORPORATION, GULF OIL CORPORATION, HOECHST CELANESE
9 CHEMICAL GROUP, HUMBLE OIL AND REFINING CORPORATION, LUBRIZOL CORPORATION,
10 MARATHON OIL COMPANY, PHILLIPS 66, PHILLIPS CHEMICAL COMPANY, PHILLIPS
11 PETROLEUM COMPANY, PURE OIL CORPORATION, ROHM AND HAAS BAYPORT,
12 ROHM AND HAAS TEXAS, INC., SHELL OIL COMPANY, STAR ENTERPRISE, SUN OIL
13 COMPANY, TEMPLE-INLAND FOREST PRODUCTS, TENNECO OIL COMPANY, TEXACO CHEMICAL
14 COMPANY, TEXACO CHEMICAL INTERNATIONAL TRADER, TEXACO REFINING & MARKETING,
15 TEXAS CITY REFINING, INC., UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, AND UNOCAL
16 CORPORATION
17 SANDRA S. SULLIVAN, CSR, RPR
18 Charlotte Smith Reporting, Inc. 235 Orleans Street
19 Beaumont, Texas 77701
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 20
VIDEOTAPE OPERATOR/TECHNICIAN: 21
GARY BREWTON 22 Project Video
P.O. Box 5850 23 Beaumont, Texas 77726 24 25
1 IN ATTENDANCE: 2 LINDA M. FIEGENER
Certified Legal Assistant 3 Legal Department
The Dow Chemical Company 4 A.P. Beutel Building
2301 Brazosport Boulevard 5 Freeport, Texas 77541 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 23 24 25
358
1 I NDEX 2 VOLUME II
3 DEPOSITION OF VERALD K. ROWE
4 May 11, 1993, and May 12, 1993
5 MAY 11, 1993
PAGE
6 EXAMINATION BY MR. BLANKS (Cont'd)
363 - 517
7 MAY 12, 1993
8 EXAMINATION BY MR. BLANKS (Cont'd) RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. HOBSON
9
517 - 645 645 - 673
10 E X H I B I T S
11 PLAINTIFFS'
12 EXHIBIT NO.
DESCRIPTION
PAGE
13 * (Exhibit Vol. IV)
14 710105 WCH
15
16
17 ROWE 9
18
19
20
Document Entitled, "Public Health Hazards from Environmental Chemical Carcinogens, Mutagens and Teratogens," by W. C. Hueper
(Bates Nos. 1053 - 1071)
Xerox Copy of Handwritten Speech Notes of V. K. Rowe, Bearing the Penciled Notation "from loose papers at top of
stack" in Upper Left-Hand Corner, Relating to Broad Concept of Toxicology and
609
21 Safety and Kinds of Tests Conducted, Educational
22 Lecture
(Bates Nos. 1072 - 1091)
613
23
* Plaintiffs' Exhibits Bearing Bates Nos. 0001 through
24 1052 will be found in Exhibit Vols. I through III
Attendant to Vol. I of the Deposition of V. K. Rowe
25 Taken on October 1, 1992, and October 2, 1992.
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359
1 ROWE 10 2
Xerox Copy of Handwritten Speech Notes of V. K. Rowe
(Bates Nos. 1092 - 1101)
3 ROWE 11 4
Xerox Copy of Handwritten Speech Notes of V. K. Rowe
(Bates Nos. 1102 - 1111)
5 ROWE 12 6
Xerox Copy of Handwritten Notes of V. K. Rowe (Bates Nos. 1112 - 1113)
7 ROWE 13 8
Xerox Copy of Handwritten Notes of V. K. Rowe (Bates Nos. 1114- 1158)
9 ROWE 14 10
Xerox Copy of Handwritten Draft of Speech of V. K. Rowe
(Bates Nos. 1159 - 1171)
11 ROWE 15 12
Xerox Copy of Handwritten Notes of V. K. Rowe (Bates Nos. 1172 - 1186)
13 ROWE 16 14 15 ROWE 17 16 17
Xerox Copy of Handwritten File Cards of V. K. Rowe (Bates Nos. 1187 - 1236)
Collection of Colored Slides or Charts Regarding Incidence of Various Types of Cancer in Population (Re: Smoking)
(Bates Nos. 1237 - 1258)
18
(Exhibit Vols. V through XVIII)
19 ROWE 18
20
Collection of Documents from Personal File of V. K. Rowe Relating to Various Aspects
21 of the Subject of Carcinogenesis
22 (Bates Nos. 1259 - 6435)
23
24
25
614 614 614 614 614 614 617
620
624
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
1 ST I PULAT I ON 2 3 IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED BY COUNSEL FOR 4 THE PARTIES HERETO: 5 That the deposition of the Witness named 6 herein is taken pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil 7 Procedure; 8 That the Witness may sign the deposition 9 before any duly authorized and acting Notary Public 10 for the appropriate area in which signature is 11 obtained; 12 That this deposition, or any part thereof, 13 when so taken may be used upon the trial of this cause 14 with the same force and effect as if the Witness were 15 present in court and testifying in person; 16 That all objections, other than those that 17 relate to the form of the question and responsiveness 18 of the answer, are hereby preserved and may be made at 19 the time any testimony herein is sought to be offered 20 upon the trial of this cause, despite no objection 21 having been made at the time the testimony was 22 taken; 23 That an objection made by one Defendant 24 shall serve as an objection by all Defendants for 25 purposes of this deposition;
361
1 That the deposition is to be videotaped by 2 Gary Brewton of Project Video;
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 3 That Sandra S. Sullivan, a Certified 4 Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Texas, may 5 act as a Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the 6 State of Arizona for the purposes of swearing the 7 Witness in this deposition; 8 That the original transcript of the 9 deposition, pursuant to Rule 206 of the Texas Rules of 10 Civil Procedure, will be given to Joseph C. Blanks for 11 safekeeping and use at trial. In the event the 12 original deposition is unavailable at the time of 13 trial, an unsigned copy of the transcript may be 14 utilized in lieu thereof. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
362
1 (REPORTER'S NOTE: PRIOR TO THE 2 VIDEOTAPED PORTION OF THE DEPOSITION, 3 THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD:) 4 THE REPORTER: Same stipulations? 5 MR. PIERCE: Yes. And the witness
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 6 will read and sign. 7 MR. PAPPAS: An objection made by 8 one is an objection by all? 9 MR. BLANKS: Oh, yes. 10 (AT THIS TIME THERE WAS A BRIEF 11 OFF-THE-RECORD DISCUSSION AND THE 12 WITNESS WAS RESWORN BY THE REPORTER. 13 AT 9:16 A.M. THE VIDEOTAPED PORTION OF 14 THE PROCEEDINGS THEN BEGAN AS FOLLOWS:) 15 MR. PIERCE: Just a statement for 16 the record and for the room: As you 17 may recall, Dr. Rowe has a severe 18 hearing problem. He wears a hearing 19 aid in each ear. Minor rustling of 20 papers and whispering causes him great 21 discomfort and inability to hear the 22 questions. So, we'd appreciate it if 23 you could be very careful about the 24 amount of background noise here. Thank 25 you.
363
1 VERALD K. ROWE, 2 having been duly resworn, testified as follows, 3 to-wit: 4 RESUMPTION OF EXAMINATION BY MR. BLANKS: 5 Q. Good morning, Dr. Rowe. 6 A. Good morning. 7 Q. How are you today, sir? 8 A. Fine.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 9 Q. Thank you for joining us. Was it the case, 10 Dr. Rowe, that you were not served with a subpoena for 11 this deposition? 12 A. I was not. 13 Q. All right, sir. Well, we appreciate your 14 being here this morning. And could you just tell us 15 who's here representing you today so we know from the 16 start? Is Mr. Almquist here for you? 17 MR. ALMQUIST: I'm here for Dow 18 Chemical. 19 MR. POFF: Could the witness speak 20 up, please? 21 A. Dr . Pierce is representing me. 22 Q. Okay. Dr. Rowe, when we adjourned 23 previously, we were midway into talking about asbestos 24 matters and your knowledge and some history from Dow 25 Chemical and those years that you worked there.
364
1 It was not clear to me in rereading the 2 deposition nor in looking at your resume or your C.V. 3 what years you actually worked in or had any 4 supervision over people doing industrial hygiene at 5 Dow. And I would appreciate it if you could make that 6 clear for me. 7 I note that your C.V. says from '70 to '73 8 you were the Director of Toxicology and Industrial 9 Hygiene in Chemical Biology Research. The period 10 before that, '64 to '70, you show yourself as 11 Assistant Director of Biochemical Research
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 12 Laboratory. 13 Was any of that period, '64 to '70, time 14 where you had any kind of administrative or 15 supervisory responsibility for Dow industrial 16 hygienists anywhere? 17 A. I don't believe I had any administrative 18 responsibility during those years. 19 Q. During those years of '64 to '70, could you 20 tell us who would have had the administrative 21 responsibility or would have been in charge of the Dow 22 industrial hygienists? 23 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 24 form; compound question. 25 A. Would you repeat, please.
365
1 Q. Yes, sir. During the years '64 to '70 who 2 at Dow was in charge of the industrial hygienists? 3 A. Mr. Hoyle was head of the industrial hygiene 4 section. 5 Q. To whom did Mr. Hoyle report during that 6 period, '64 to '70? 7 A. I believe he reported to Dr. Adams. 8 Q. And Dr. Adams would have been in the 9 biochemical research laboratory? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Were you, yourself, reporting to Dr. Adams 12 during any of those years of '64 to '70? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. And would you remind me, then? What was
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 15 Dr. Adams' title during that time, if you recall, or 16 his effective job description? 17 A. He -- As I recall, assistant director of the 18 laboratory. 19 Q. Of the biochemical research laboratory, - 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. -- is it? And you're confusing me. And I'm 22 not meaning to confuse you; but you, yourself, were 23 assistant director of the biochemical research 24 laboratory in '64 to '70. So, does that mean there 25 were two assistant directors or more?
366
1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Okay. And then in the years before '64, 3 going back to the - when Mr. Hoyle was hired, do you 4 recall to whom or to what office he would have been 5 reporting during those prior years? 6 A. He reported to Dr. Adams. 7 Q. So, your recollection would be that on back 8 to into the Forties, whenever Mr. Hoyle joined the 9 company, Dr. Adams would have been the man that was in 10 charge of the industrial hygienists and then - 11 A. That is my recollection. 12 Q. Okay. But there was a time in those years 13 between '37 and '70 when you, yourself, did have some 14 role in the industrial hygiene program at Dow, wasn't 15 there? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Could you just briefly summarize that for
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 18 us? 19 A. In the early years I worked - assisted 20 Dr. Adams in pursuit - occasionally in the industrial 21 hygiene area. But I - my responsibility was not 22 within industrial hygiene. 23 Q. Your work was essentially toxicology in the 24 laboratory? 25 A. That's right.
367
1 Q. And to the extent the toxicology work was 2 helpful to the industrial hygienists, you had some
3 role in the industrial hygiene program, I suppose.
4 A. Oh, yes. All of us are aware of these
5 situations, but you asked me about responsibility.
6 Q. Yes, sir. Okay. And up to the time that
7 you retired from Dow in 1979, did industrial hygiene
8 remain a subdepartment of the biochemical research
9 laboratory?
10 A. The biochemical research laboratory name
11 changed earlier like - but industrial hygiene remained
12 as a section in the -- Industrial hygiene in
13 toxicology was more or less separated and made a unit
14 in about 1970.
15 Q. Okay. If I'm understanding you, then: In
16 the early years industrial hygiene and toxicology were 17 two, like, parallel groups or offices; but both were 18 in the biochemical research lab, or whatever it was
19 called, during the different years. Is that the shape
20 of it?
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 21 A. I will ask you to repeat that one. 22 Q. From an organizational standpoint, the 23 toxicology department was part of the biochemical 24 research lab. 25 A. Yes.
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1 Q. During all the years you were at Dow. 2 A. No. 3 Q. No? Changed around 1970? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Okay. And from the beginning of the 6 industrial hygiene program at Dow, up until around 7 1970, industrial hygiene was also part of the 8 biochemical research lab. 9 A. That's right. 10 Q. And the industrial hygiene staff and the 11 toxicology staff worked together from time to time but 12 not in the same department from an organization 13 standpoint. 14 A. In what time frame? 15 Q. Up until about 1970. 16 A. Yes. They worked -- They were pretty 17 independent groups. 18 Q. And then in 1970 there was some 19 reorganization, and toxicology and industrial hygiene 20 were merged together. And that's when you were 21 director. 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Okay. And so far as you know, toxicology
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 24 and industrial hygiene remained in one group up until 25 the time you retired in 1979.
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1 A. I don't remember. 2 Q. But the medical department during none of 3 the 42 years you were with the company was in charge 4 of industrial hygiene, was it? 5 A. No. 6 Q. And I think you told us that the reason that 7 the toxicology department was created at Dow was 8 because of Dr. Will ard Dow's concern for the health
9 and safety of people working in the Dow plants.
10 A. Yes. 11 Q. And that this concern was triggered or the
12 catalyst for creating the department with some 13 unfortunate incident where some workers were injured
14 by some chemical exposure in a plant. 15 that?
Do you recall
16 A. Yes. 17 Q. And wasn't it the case, then, that the
18 toxicology lab really had a charter to know about the
19 toxicity of the materials that workers in the Dow
20 plants would encounter in doing their work in the 21 plants? 22 A. Our charge really was to learn as much as we 23 could about the toxicological effects of materials,
24 yes. 25 Q.
And one of the ways you did that was to test
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1 all the materials that were used at Dow for which you 2 couldn't find toxicological information already 3 existing in the literature? 4 A. That was our purpose; but, of course, that 5 took over a number of years to accomplish that. 6 Q. All right, sir. But basically where the 7 toxicity of a material used in the Dow plant was 8 unknown, that - that material would have been on your 9 list of materials to investigate? 10 A. As much as was humanly possible with the 11 staff we had at that time. 12 Q. All right, sir. But if a material that was 13 used in Dow plants was already written up in the 14 literature, discussed in the literature, was it the 15 case, then, that you relied on what was in the medical 16 and scientific literature about the material and did 17 not test those materials? 18 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 19 of the question. It's ambiguous and 20 essentially, even though it does not 21 use the word "or," contains the 22 elements of a compound question. 23 A. I guess I'll have to have you rephrase it. 24 Q. If a material used in Dow plants during 25 those years that you worked for the company was
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1 reported in the medical and scientific literature from
2 a toxicological standpoint, would you still go ahead
3 and test that material for toxicity or would you 4 alternatively just rely on what was in the literature? 5 MR. PIERCE: Continue the
6 objection.
7 A. I don't believe there was any set program. 8 We tried to take advantage of any published 9 information and not to repeat any particular work, if
10 we felt that it was all right, in our judgment.
11 Q. All right, sir. So, given the resources
12 that you had, you had to set priorities, I suppose, on
13 what you were going to do tox. testing on. True?
14 A. Always. 15 Q. But one of the resources that you had
16 available would have been the medical and scientific
17 literature that existed in any given year. True?
18 A. 19 Q. 20 of it"?
Well, certainly parts of it. How do you mean -- What do you mean "parts
21 A. Well, I'm sure we didn't have a library that
22 had every journal in the world or article in it. 23 Q. Well, I think you told us that if there was
24 anything that you needed or wanted, your librarian at
25 the Dow - the main plant could always get it for you.
372
1 Wasn't that so? 2 A. They made an effort if it was requested,
3 yes.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 4 Q. Okay. Well, what I was wondering, though, 5 was that if, in fact, a material was reported in the 6 medical literature to where you had toxicological 7 information available to you on it, then that would 8 have been a material that you wouldn't ordinarily test 9 for toxicity. 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. And it was the case, wasn't it, that Dow 12 didn't do any toxicological testing of asbestos? 13 Isn't that so? 14 MR. PIERCE: Do we have a time 15 frame here? Ever? I mean... 16 MR. BLANKS: Well, I think the 17 implied time frame would be during 18 Dr. Rowe's employment there. So, let 19 me - 20 (By Mr. Blanks) 21 Q. Prior to your retiring, sir, did Dow, to 22 your knowledge, do any toxicity testing of asbestos? 23 A. I don't remember that we did. 24 Q. Have you thought about that, given that 25 we've visited over the course of days and knowing you
373
1 were expecting to depose further on the topic? 2 A. The problem, as I understood it, with 3 asbestos was primarily inhalation. And, to my 4 knowledge, we did not do any inhalation work on 5 asbestos. 6 Q. All right. Was it the case, Dr. Rowe, that
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 7 while you were at Dow that Dow did not do any analysis 8 of thermal insulation products for asbestos content? 9 A. I don't know. 10 Q. Wasn't it a fact that the Dow engineering 11 department or its equivalent did, in fact, write 12 specifications for thermal insulation to be used in 13 Dow plants? 14 A. I don't know. 15 Q. Do you recall being - being asked to do any 16 toxicology testing of any kind of materials that Dow 17 purchased over the years? Would this have been part 18 of the normal procedure? 19 A. I don't remember. It certainly wasn't 20 routine. 21 Q. It was not routine? 22 A. No. 23 Q. Could you briefly explain to me what the 24 routine was, then, in those - the first decade or so 25 that you were doing toxicology work? - the routine in
374
1 terms of deciding what would be tested in your labs or
2 sent for testing in outside labs. 3 A. There were a number of factors that would
4 have been considered. One, what the ultimate end of a
5 product was. Was it something that we were going to 6 take to Food and Dr ug? We would -- It may not have
7 been tested in any way outside in that - because this
8 was a new application. Then we would have certainly
9 been involved.
That type of thing. Page 23
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 10 Q. So, during some of these years you were with 11 Dow, the company was in the drug business, the 12 pharmacology business? 13 A. What time frame? 14 Q. I don't know. Perhaps you could tell me. 15 A. I can't remember the dates when Dow engaged 16 first with LePetite and then created Dow 17 Pharmaceutical, but we had little to do with that in 18 the early - early part of it. There was a time when 19 some of the pharmacologists from the Dow 20 Pharmaceutical laboratory in Indianapolis were 21 transferred to Midland as a part of our reorganized 22 laboratory. But otherwise I had nothing to do with 23 the pharmaceutical side. 24 Q. Okay. So, Dow Pharmaceutical was, I'm 25 inferring, a subsidiary of Dow?
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1 A. Yes. 2 Q. And it was based in Indianapolis? 3 A. (Nodding affirmatively) 4 Q. And they had their own laboratory there? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. And it's just that some of those scientists 7 from that laboratory were later transferred to your 8 lab in Midland? 9 A. For a period of short time. I can't 10 remember just the reason why. 11 Q. But as a general rule, then, your toxicology 12 lab in Midland did not specifically do studies of new
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 13 drug formulations. 14 A. That is true. 15 Q. Okay. So, the routine for your lab in 16 Midland would have been to investigate new products 17 being formulated by Dow, for one thing? 18 A. Or synthesized or formulated for some 19 particular purpose. 20 Q. Okay. And would it also have included as 21 part of the routine to investigate materials that Dow 22 was purchaseing to use in the making of its products? 23 A. To some extent, anyway. 24 Q. All right. And to what extent did the 25 routine of the toxicology lab in any of these years
376
1 involve testing, then, materials that were present in 2 the workplace in the Dow plants other than those in 3 the products you were making or the raw materials you 4 were buying? 5 A. The -- From the standpoint of occupational 6 exposure? 7 Q. Yes, sir. 8 A. This was our prime charge at the very 9 beginning. 10 Q. Was to consider any of the potential 11 potentially harmful occupational exposures that could 12 occur in the plant at Dow? 13 A. We tried to identify them, yes. 14 Q. All right, sir. You said that Dow had not 15 done any inhalation tests on asbestos at least by the
Page 25
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 16 time you left the company. 17 A. I do not recollect any. 18 Q. All right, sir. Would you say that asbestos 19 as it might be encountered in Dow's plants was a 20 potential - potentially harmful occupational exposure 21 that the toxicology department did identify? 22 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 23 of the question; assumed facts not in 24 evidence. 25 MR. ALMQUIST: I also obj ect on
377
1 grounds it's ambiguous. It doesn't 2 contain enough information for an 3 answer. 4 A. Insofar as asbestos was concerned, again it 5 is my recollection that we - whatever was done in the 6 industrial hygiene area was done as a result of the 7 whatever was in the literature and the A.C.G.I.H. 8 recommendations. 9 MR. DAVIS: Can you ask the 10 witness to speak up some? 11 MR. ALMQUIST : Doctor - 12 MR. PIERCE: V. K., try to speak a 13 little bit louder, if you can; okay? 14 THE WITNESS: Oh. Sorry. 15 Q. So, you say the industrial hygiene response 16 at Dow to any potential asbestos exposures was based 17 on what was existing in the literature during the 18 particular years that -
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 19 A. That's my understanding. 20 Q. Okay. And, in fact, there was published 21 literature regarding asbestos toxicity and its hazards 22 from inhalation that did exist in the literature 23 during all the years you worked for Dow, wasn't there? 24 MR. PIERCE: Wait. When you say 25 "all the years," you mean starting in
378
1 1937? 2 MR. BLANKS: Yes, sir. 3 A. I'm not familiar with the dates of the 4 publications on asbestos. 5 (By Mr. Blanks) 6 Q. All right, sir. Are you -- You are aware, 7 though, that there are articles in the medical and 8 scientific and industrial hygiene literature going 9 back even to the late Thirties that do address 10 asbestos as an occupational exposure hazard, aren't 11 you? 12 A. That's my understanding. 13 Q. Dr. Rowe, did Dow at any time that you were 14 there rely on manufacturers like Johns-Manville or 15 Owens-Illinois or Owens-Corning Fiberglas for 16 information about the health effects of asbestos 17 inhalation? 18 A. I can't be specific. That was common 19 practice, but that was not my bailiwick. 20 Q. Okay. Well, I don't mean to belabor this 21 point, although Mr. Pierce will probably tell me I
Page 27
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 22 certainly must mean to belabor the point. 23 MR. PIERCE: Of course. 24 Q. Let me start over. But -- I mean, I think 25 you've told us that Dow didn't do tox. testing on
379
1 asbestos and it didn't do inhalation studies for
2 asbestos dust and there was literature available
3 during those different years that you were doing tox.
4 work that Dow would have relied on in setting up its
5 industrial hygiene program and carrying it on. 6 I'm just wondering if any effort was made in
7 the toxicology department to get information from
8 those companies that were manufacturing and selling
9 asbestos insulation and other asbestos products to
10 Dow. 11
MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
12 characterization of his previous
13 testimony.
14 But go ahead.
15 A. I don't know.
16 Q. Is it the case, you think, that you never
17 asked for any information from an asbestos insulation
18 manufacturer about its products and the asbestos 19 hazard that they might pose to workers? 20 MR. PIERCE: By "you," you mean 21 V. K. Rowe?
22 MR. BLANKS: Yeah.
23 A. I do not remember doing any such thing. 24 However, I would add that that would have been normal
Page 28
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 25 practice in the industrial hygiene area for literature
380
1 on materials that were being purchased and used in the 2 plant. But I don't have any personal knowledge of 3 that. 4 (By Mr. Blanks) 5 Q. All right, sir. If such information were 6 requested from a manufacturer of asbestos insulation 7 information about "What do we need to know about the 8 health effects of this product?," is that something 9 that would have been put in a file at Dow in the tox. 10 department or the industrial hygiene department, in 11 your experience? 12 A. I don't know. I would expect so. 13 Q. Were there ever times when you, yourself, 14 requested of a manufacturer information on the 15 toxicity of products that Dow was buying from them? 16 A. I must have, but I don't recollect any 17 specifics. 18 Q. Okay. Do you recollect, sir, that what 19 information you got as a matter of routine you would 20 have put in a file on that material or that irritant 21 or whatever it was? 22 A. Oh, yes. 23 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 24 form. 25 Q. Dr. Rowe, if Owens-Corning Fiberglas or
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381
1 Owens-Illinois had represented to Dow that their Kaylo 2 insulation was nontoxic, is that something that you 3 would have relied on? 4 A. Not with - without parameters of exposure 5 being delineated. 6 Q. Can you tell us, Dr. Rowe, when Dow began to 7 enforce rules to protect workers potentially exposed 8 to asbestos from breathing asbestos dust and fiber? 9 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 10 of the question; assumes facts not in 11 evidence and it's ambiguous. 12 A. I don't know. 13 Q. Do you believe, sir, that during any years 14 Dow had on its premises workers who were potentially 15 exposed to asbestos in their work? 16 A. Would you repeat, please. 17 Q. Yes, sir. I was wondering if you believed 18 that at any time you worked for Dow that there were on 19 Dow premises workers potentially exposed to asbestos 20 on the premises. 21 A. Oh, yes. 22 Q. Do you recall, sir, any steps Dow made 23 between 1970 and 1973 when you were the director of 24 toxicology and industrial hygiene to set out rules to 25 protect workers potentially exposed to asbestos on Dow
1 premises?
Page 30
382
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 2 A. I don't -- I don't remember. 3 Q. Can you recollect any from any prior time? 4 A. No. 5 Q. Was it your belief in the early 1960's, 6 Dr. Rowe, that breathing asbestos dust would not cause 7 disease under any circumstances? 8 MR. PIERCE: I n any quantity, any 9 amount? You're not quantitizing 10 this at all. Are you quanti - 11 MR. BLANKS: Well, no. I meant - 12 MR. PIERCE: Any amount? 13 MR. BLANKS: My que stion was - 14 MR. PIERCE: I think it's very 15 ambiguous as stated. 16 But go ahead. Sorry. 17 (By Mr. Blanks) 18 Q. I was asking - Let's try again - your belief 19 in the early 1960's whether or not breathing asbestos 20 dust in an occupational setting could - could or 21 wouldn't cause disease. 22 MR. PIERCE: Continue the 23 objection. 24 A. That goes back to the fundamental philosophy 25 that there is no such thing as a nontoxic material.
383
1 It's all a matter of how much and under what 2 conditions. If an exposure is too great, you'll have 3 adverse effects. If it's below what is ordinarily 4 thought to be or considered to be a safe level, the
Page 31
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 5 odds are very poor of an adverse effect. All depends 6 on how much and under what conditions. 7 Q. All right, sir. So, with that in mind, was 8 it your belief in the early Sixties, then, that there 9 was some level of asbestos dust exposure that one 10 could have that would cause disease? 11 A. That would cause? 12 Q. Yes, sir. 13 A. My recollection of the literature is that 14 there were documented cases years ago. 15 Q. And "years ago" would take us back at least 16 to the early Sixties? 17 A. I don't know the time frame when these 18 articles were published. 19 Q. We'd just have to look to the articles, 20 themselves, to see the dates for them? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. But it would have been the case, then, that 23 Dow's biomedical research laboratory staff, including 24 its toxicology department and the other professionals 25 working there, at least would have had many, if not
384
1 most or all, of this medical literature available to
2 it. True? 3
MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form
4 of the question. It's unanswerable as 5 asked, requires speculation as to the
6 mind and activities of others.
7 But answer it to the best of your Page 32
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 8 ability. 9 A. Well, certainly there were - there was some 10 literature that was available to people at that time. 11 Q. And it would also, as we mentioned before, 12 have been available in the decade of the Fifties and 13 the Forties, as well, documented cases of asbestosis 14 from occupational exposures. True? 15 A. That's my understanding. 16 Q. All right, sir. Dr. Rowe, had you known 17 from the suppliers or the manufacturers of asbestos 18 insulation that Dow used that these manufacturers' own 19 field installers of insulation had developed 20 asbestosis in, say, the Forties or the Fifties, would 21 you have urged Dow to do more to protect people 22 working in its plants from asbestos exposures? 23 MR. PIERCE: Once again, are you 24 going to leave the question that vague 25 with no numbers and no idea of
385
1 exposure but just that general 2 question? - because I think it's 3 unanswerable as asked. 4 But try. 5 A. Our efforts in a situation like that would 6 have been to recognize the recommended levels of 7 exposure which were considered by the Government 8 agencies and so forth to be without particular 9 hazard. 10 Q. So, are you saying, then, that if a
Page 33
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 11 Government agency said that a particular exposure 12 level was free of hazard that would have been all you 13 needed to know and it would not have been instructive 14 to you to know that people using the products, putting 15 the products in - the insulation in - were, in fact, 16 getting sick? 17 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 18 form; compound question and ambiguous 19 and unintelligible in parts. 20 A. That's impossible to judge without knowing 21 what concentrations of exposure they received. 22 Q. So, had you been told that, let's say, 23 insulators working for Johns-Manville or some other 24 company were developing asbestosis, you would have 25 wanted to know about the actual exposure levels these
386
1 men were encountering in doing their work. 2 A. I don't know that anything other than -- And 3 I don't really know what is in the literature, except 4 the literature and the experience was the basis of my 5 understanding of the acceptable levels as promulgated 6 by the A.C.G.I.H. and U. S. Public Health Service. 7 And we tried and I think, for all practical purposes, 8 we did control our exposures to such a level. That 9 was our -- That was our basic premise. We had 10 guidelines. We tried to follow them to the best of 11 our ability. 12 Q. Do you recall ever doing any testing to see 13 whether these guidelines were, in fact, adequate to
Page 34
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 14 protect the workers exposed at or below the guideline 15 levels? 16 MR. PIERCE: Is that for any 17 compound at all, or are we speaking 18 about asbestos? 19 Objection to the question as 20 completely ambiguous. 21 Go ahead. 22 A. Are you speaking of asbestos? 23 Q. Well, I phrase it generally; and then I 24 follow up with a question on asbestos. 25 A. Well, please restate.
387
1 Q. Okay. The first question was, was it the 2 case, then, that Dow relied on whatever guidelines 3 were existing at a particular time to decide whether 4 or not to protect workers from exposures. You relied 5 on the guidelines from the A.C.G.I.H.? 6 A. Yes, we did. But we also had one or two 7 occasions where we did not believe that the guidelines 8 were adequate and we revised and made our own. 9 Q. And I take it you made yours stricter than 10 what the A.C.G.I.H. guidelines were. 11 A. That's right. 12 Q. What led Dow to do that? What made you 13 suspicious of the guideline level? 14 MR. PIERCE: Compound question; 15 objection to the form. 16 A. Okay. Please come back with your question
Page 35
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 17 again so I can put it... 18 Q. All right, sir. What was it in those couple 19 of instances that caused Dow to be suspicious of the 20 guideline for whatever the material was? 21 A. People were complaining and reporting to the 22 medical department not feeling well. And this caused 23 us to examine the exposures that were being received 24 in their operation - analyzing the operation. And if 25 those exposures when documented resulted in adverse
388
1 effects, we would conclude and did conclude in several 2 instances that the exposure levels were 3 inappropriate. And, so, we set about to find out what 4 an appropriate level was. 5 Q. So, if I understand you, the medical 6 department alerted you to some problems or complaints 7 among workers who were being exposed to particular 8 materials. Correct? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And then the response to that was for the 11 industrial hygienists to go out and actually measure 12 the exposure levels those workers were encountering. 13 True? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Did you find that the exposure levels were 16 at or below the guideline levels for the material? 17 A. I don't remember specific data. 18 Q. Well, I mean as opposed to finding that the 19 exposures were excessive.
Page 36
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 20 A. The -- Using the guidelines did not explain 21 what was happening. 22 Q. Okay. So, it was apparent from the medical 23 information you had that the guidelines weren't 24 adequate. 25 A. That's right.
389
1 Q. But you surely must have made sure that the 2 exposures were within the guidelines in order to reach 3 the conclusions the guidelines weren't working, right? 4 A. I presume that's - that's an accepted fact. 5 Q. Yeah. It would seem the first thing that 6 you'd do would be to go out there and, let's say, find 7 out what their - what are the exposure levels. And if 8 the exposure levels were above the guideline, you'd 9 say, "Well, that's the problem. Let's get it down to 10 the guidelines," right? 11 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 12 form; asked and answered several 13 times. 14 A. That's true. You had to study in some cases 15 the individual's work habits, why he was getting 16 excessive exposure, and why other people doing the 17 same job didn't. That's part of industrial hygiene. 18 Q. Yes, sir. Because individuals have both 19 different habits and, also, they vary in their 20 susceptibility to occupational disease, don't they, 21 given the same exposure levels? 22 A. Well, no two individuals are the same.
Page 37
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 23 Q. Okay. Do you recall what any of those 24 materials were for which Dow wrote stricter exposure 25 standards for its own plants?
390
1 A. As I recollect, the first one was carbon 2 tetrachloride. 3 Q. Yes, sir. Can you recall any of the others? 4 A. I'm not sure about the - the stimulus for 5 the work we did on most of the aliphatic chlorinated 6 hydrocarbons. I don't recollect that that came 7 through the medical department, but it could have. 8 Q. Well, does that mean that you did at Dow 9 tighten up the guidelines or the standards for the 10 aliphatic chlorinated hydrocarbons for some reason or 11 other? 12 A. Yes. I can remember one other -- One 13 specific one was vinyl chloride. 14 Q. How far back in time or what period can you 15 place these actions in where you tightened up the 16 guidelines below what was generally considered 17 acceptable? 18 A. I can't give you the time frame. If you'll 19 look at our publications, they'll tell you. 20 Q. Oh, okay. Very good, sir. You said a few 21 minutes ago that - when I asked you about whether 22 information concerning asbestos disease in insulators 23 working for the manufacturers like Johns-Manville or 24 Armstrong or others would have been helpful to you 25 that you actually did control exposures to the
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391
1 guideline levels at Dow. Correct? 2 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 3 characterization of previous 4 testimony. 5 A. I -- I can't answer that question 6 positively. I don't know. 7 Q. Well, would you have found useful to you 8 information from asbestos insulation installer 9 companies about the occurrence of disease in their 10 employees? Is that information that would have been 11 useful to you at Dow? 12 A. If it was predicated on with quantitative 13 analyses. 14 Q. Would not the mere fact of reports of 15 asbestosis in insulators have caused you to at least 16 go out and confirm the exposure levels you were facing 17 having in your plants, if any? 18 A. It's my understanding that's what was done. 19 Q. Can you recall when that came to be done and 20 what - approximately when? 21 A. No. 22 Q. Can you recall for us, Dr. Rowe, what it was 23 that was done at Dow in, let s say, the Forties to 24 control exposures to airborne asbestos dust? 25 A. I don't know.
Page 39
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
1 Q. Sir? 2 A. I do not know. 3 Q. Would you have any idea what was done to 4 control exposures to airborne asbestos dust in the 5 Fifties? 6 A. No. I don't know. 7 Q. Or in the Sixties? 8 A. I don't know. 9 Q. How about in the Seventies when you were the 10 director of toxicology and industrial hygiene, '70 to 11 '73? 12 A. I don't know. 13 Q. Can you point us to any evidence that the 14 exposures to airborne asbestos dust that did occur in 15 Dow plants were, in fact, below the guideline levels 16 for any particular year prior to your retirement? 17 A. I don't know. 18 Q. Did Dow ever request that there be 19 monitoring for exposures of workers potentially 20 exposed to asbestos during your years with the 21 company? 22 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 23 form. 24 You're asking not if he requested 25 it but if anybody anyplace at Dow
393
1 requested it; is that correct? 2 A. I don't know.
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3 Q. Let me start over, then. Did you ever 4 request there be monitoring of workers potentially 5 exposed to asbestos in Dow plants?
6 A. Not to my knowledge. 7 Q. Are you aware, sir, of Dr. Adams or 8 Mr. Hoyle or any of the others working in your group 9 or in the I. H. group requesting that workers 10 potentially exposed to asbestos be monitored for their 11 exposures?
12 A. I know there was monitoring done. And 13 Mr. Hoyle would be the person that would be
14 responsible for that knowledge.
15 Q. Okay. In answers to interrogatories I think 16 the company, Dow, has said that in the Texas plants
17 that monitoring began in 1968. 18 knowledge of that?
Do you have any
19 A. No. 20 Q. Do you have any recollection of when
21 monitoring of workers potentially exposed to asbestos 22 would have begun up in the Midland plants?
23 A. I don't recall. 24 Q. Do you recall, sir, if there was ever any
25 effort to try and identify who were the workers
394
1 potentially exposed to asbestos in Dow plants? 2 A. I don't know. 3 Q. Could you tell us when your group at Dow 4 learned of the hazardous properties of airborne 5 asbestos and its potential to cause, say, lung cancer?
Page 41
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 6 A. I don't remember. 7 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 8 form. 9 A. I do not remember. 10 Q. Would you recollect, sir, that that was not 11 until the late 1960's that Dow learned of the 12 hazardous properties of airborne asbestos? 13 A. I don't -- I don't know. 14 Q. So, you have no recollection either for 15 yourself or for what was - what was being done in the 16 toxicology or industrial hygiene group and its 17 awareness of the hazards of airborne abestos? 18 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 19 compound nature of the question. 20 A. Well, I was certainly aware that there was a 21 hazard due to asbestos. The control of that was the 22 responsibility of the industrial hygiene people. And 23 I knew they were -- I knew they made measurements, but 24 I do not know any of the detail. I don't recall, 25 anyway, if I saw them or not.
395
1 Q. Okay. And you can't place that in a time
2 frame for us? 3 A. No.
4 Q. Is it your understanding that the medical 5 and toxicology professionals at Dow learned of the
6 hazardous properties of airborne asbestos prior to
7 articles being published in the medical and scientific
8 literature?
Page 42
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 9 A. I have no such knowledge. 10 Q. Would your awareness of the hazardous 11 properties of airborne asbestos have actually come 12 from the published medical and scientific literature 13 as opposed to some independent work that was being 14 done at Dow? 15 A. Any information that we had came from either 16 published literature or word of mouth from someone. 17 Q. But you have no -18 A. I don't -- I don't recall. 19 Q. All right, sir. Can you tell us when, if 20 ever, the Dow industrial hygiene department banned the 21 purchase of asbestos-containing insulation for use on 22 Dow premises? 23 A. No. 24 Q. How about asbestos-containing gaskets? 25 A. Beg your pardon.
396
1 Q. Asbestos gaskets. 2 A. I don't know. 3 Q. What about asbestos cements? 4 A. I don't know. 5 Q. Was there ever a time that your 6 responsibilities with Dow included any dealings with 7 the Texas Dow plants? 8 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 9 based on vagueness of the terminology. 10 A. Yes. We had relations with the Texas plant. 11 Q. How far back would that go, from its being
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12 constructe d?
13 A. I can't give you dates, but a long time
14 ag. 15 Q.
Yes, sir.
16 A. After -- Shortly after they were in
17 operation, I know that their - our reports were
18 available to them. If they had questions, they came
19 back to us.
20 Q. I'm thinking you told us that in the
21 beginning the Texas plants didn't have their own
22 toxicology lab or staff or even industrial hygienists
23 and they relied on the Midland group for those
24 services. Would that be correct?
25 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
397
1 form; mischaracterization of the 2 testimony he gave last time. 3 But go ahead. 4 A. Well, in the early days they did not, to my 5 knowledge, have - I know they did not have any 6 toxicology facilities. The -- I don't know when the 7 industrial hygiene work began down there but -- They 8 did have industrial hygiene early on, but I don't know 9 when. 10 Q. And wasn't it the case that somewhere along 11 the way that the Freeport plant actually got its own 12 toxicologist? Do you remember that? 13 A. I don't remember the dates. 14 Q. Do you remember that it happened, though?
Page 44
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 15 A. Oh, yes. 16 Q. Okay. So, though we're not clear on the 17 dates - and I appreciate you don't remember them - for 18 some period of time at least the Freeport plant got 19 its industrial hygiene and toxicology services from 20 the Midland Dow employees? 21 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 22 form. Once again, a 23 mischaracterization. Mischaracterizing 24 the exact same testimony 25 mischaracterized earlier and, also,
398
1 compound nature of the question. 2 A. Le t's try again. 3 Q. In the beginning years the Freeport plant 4 was supported by Midland for any industrial hygiene 5 consultation and toxicology consultation. True? 6 MR. PIERCE: Continue the 7 objection. 8 A. That's -- That's my recollection. 9 Q. Okay. And then eventually they had their 10 own folks doing I. H. work and tox. work at Freeport? 11 A. Yes. The tox. lab early in the formative 12 stages was designed for primarily just the first 13 stages of evaluation, not any comprehensive studies. 14 Q. Just a Class I -15 A. Class I. That is correct. 16 Q. Okay. Even after Freeport had its own 17 toxicologists and its own industrial hygienists, did
Page 45
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 18 it still have available the services of the Midland 19 tox. lab and industrial hygiene department? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Do you recollect, Dr. Rowe, that the 22 industrial hygiene and toxicology staff in Freeport, 23 Texas, was reporting up to the Midland group; or were 24 they autonomous from an organizational standpoint? 25 A. They were -- They reported to the medical
399
1 department in the Texas division. 2 Q. Do you have any explanation for why they 3 were organized under the medical department in Texas 4 versus the different organization in Midland? 5 MR. PIERCE: Are you asking that 6 he speculate or does he have knowledge
7 or... 8 MR. BLANKS: Just whatever his
9 understanding was. If you or I were 10 answering, we'd probably be 11 speculating; but Dr. Rowe might be able
12 to tell us. 13 A. The -- This type of work -- The medical
14 director - the first medical director - at the Texas 15 division, as I recollect, had - or had worked in the 16 medical department at Midland and was quite familiar 17 with this type of work. He'd been exposed to it over
18 a period of time. So, when he went down there, he was
19 the only logical person to develop and head up this
20 type of work.
There was no other person down there at Page 46
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 21 that time that was in toxicology or -- And industrial 22 hygiene was in the medical department, which is not 23 dissimilar to many, many corporations. 24 (By Mr. Blanks) 25 Q. Yes, sir. I understand. We found it to be
400
1 common to be organized under the medical department. 2 Do you recall who this doctor was that first 3 went down there to Freeport?
4 A. As I recollect, it was Dr. Kilian. 5 Q. Do you know his first name?
6 A. Jack. 7 Q. And correct me if I'm wrong; but I'm
8 understanding from you that Dr. Kilian, who began with
9 Dow in Midland at the medical department in the plant, 10 acquired from his dealings with your group some
11 appreciation for toxicology and for industrial hygiene 12 to where he was not, let's say, totally ignorant about
13 those matters and had some appreciation for the
14 potential problems to deal with in the plant.
15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Dr. Rowe, do you believe that it was not 17 until the late 1960's that Dow's doctors knew that 18 workers exposed to sufficient levels of airborne 19 asbestos dust over a long enough period could contract 20 an asbestos-related disease?
21 A. 22 Q. 23 other?
I don't know. You have no belief on that one way or the
Page 47
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 24 A. I didn't know they had. 25 Q. That they had known?
401
1 A. I don't -- I have no knowledge that - or at 2 least I don't recollect any - any cases of asbestosis 3 at - at the Dow plant, that - that I know of. 4 Q. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to say that it was 5 by the late 1960's that Dow had cases of asbestosis or 6 at any time. I don't -- That wasn't part of the 7 question. 8 A. Oh. 9 Q. Let me try again, please, sir. I was asking 10 you if you believe that it was not until the late 11 Sixties that Dow's doctors knew or appreciated that 12 workers exposed to sufficient levels of asbestos dust 13 over a long enough time period could get an 14 asbestos-related disease. 15 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 16 to the form of the question. It calls 17 for speculation and knowing the minds 18 and state of knowledge of each 19 physician or other kind of doctor 20 within The Dow Chemical Company. 21 But go ahead and answer. 22 A. I don't know. 23 Q. Do you know of any Dow doctors who gave you 24 any reason to think before the late 1960's that they 25 had an appreciation for that possibility of
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402
1 asbestos-related disease? 2 A. I don't remember. 3 Q. How about Dow industrial hygienists, do you 4 believe that it wasn't until the late 1960's that 5 Dow's industrial hygienists had an awareness that 6 workers exposed to sufficient levels of airborne 7 asbestos dust over a long enough time period could 8 contract an asbestos-related disease? 9 MR. ALMQUIST: Same objection. It 10 calls for speculation as to what 11 someone else knew. 12 A. I don't know. 13 Q. Is there any point in the time when you were 14 with Dow that you can say with any confidence that it 15 was your understanding that the industrial hygiene 16 department appreciated the possibility for 17 asbestos-related disease under certain exposure 18 conditions? 19 A. I know the industrial hygiene people that 20 were involved with monitoring asbestos were aware of 21 the - of the hazards of the material, yes; but I can't 22 put a time frame on it. 23 Q. Okay. And I think you've already told us 24 you can't really put a time frame on when you became 25 aware of this potential for asbestos-related disease
Page 49
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 1 in workers sufficiently exposed. True? 2 A. I don't believe I said that, because early 3 early on there were articles and lectures at the 4 meetings and so forth about asbestos and so forth that 5 I do not have any specific data or time frame that 6 when I first knew of this. These things occurred over 7 a number of years and, really, I really had no 8 particular interest in asbestos as such because we 9 didn't - hadn't done any work on it, didn't know 10 anything about it. 11 Q. All right, sir. 12 MR. ALMQUIST: Okay. Is this - 13 We've been going for about an hour 14 now. Can we take a break? 15 MR. BLANKS: Sure. 16 Are you ready for a break, sir? 17 THE WITNESS: Thanks. 18 (AT THIS TIME A BRIEF RECESS WAS 19 TAKEN, AND THE PROCEEDINGS THEREAFTER 20 RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:) 21 (By Mr. Blanks) 22 Q. Dr. Rowe, had you learned in 1960 that cases 23 of mesothelioma had been reported in petrochemical 24 plant workers, would you have recommended better 25 industrial hygiene controls for workers potentially
404
1 exposed to asbestos in Dow plants, sir? 2 MR. PIERCE: Objection to form; 3 improper hypothetical.
Page 50
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 4 But go ahead. 5 A. I don't know. 6 Q. You don't have an opinion about how you 7 would have responded to such information in 1960? 8 A. Well, it would have depended upon the 9 quantitative aspects of the situation. 10 Q. You mean how many cases of mesothelioma were 11 reported in a particular article or what? 12 A. What kind of exposure had occurred to have 13 caused that effect. And then I would certainly be 14 interested in that in comparison with what our 15 industrial hygienists had found in our own plants. 16 Q. So, at the very least, then, if you had 17 learned of such case reports in 1960, would you have 18 felt the need to inquire further about the exposure 19 levels that the - that the victims had reported? 20 MR. PIERCE: Objection to form; 21 asked and answered, essentially 22 argumentative. 23 A. Well, it was my impression that this 24 particular manifestation was known before that 25 before that time. And, as far as I know, it was
405
1 associated with rather severe exposures. But I don't 2 know what the quantitative aspects are. 3 Q. Had you known, Dr. Rowe, in 1950 that 4 insulators in refineries were potentially exposed to 5 asbestos in hazardous amounts, would that information 6 have been useful to you in your work at Dow?
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 7 A. Not necessarily. 8 Q. Would that be because you were already then 9 aware of the potential for asbestos disease in 10 insulators in 1950 under some levels of exposure? 11 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 12 form; leading. 13 A. The problem I have with your question is the 14 lack of quantitation. I certainly do not deny the 15 fact that heavy exposures can produce mesothelioma and 16 whatever; but, again, unless I have information 17 relative to the intensity of exposure, it doesn't mean 18 too much when I know excessive exposure is likely to 19 do this - heavy exposure. 20 Q. Okay, sir. If I'm understanding you, then, 21 you would have appreciated in 1950 that intensive or 22 heavy exposures could in some cases cause 23 asbestos-related disease. True? 24 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 25 vagueness of the question.
406
1 A. Well, I think it was fairly well understood 2 that heavy exposure was capable of causing this type 3 disease. 4 Q. Okay. And the significant thing to you, 5 then, would not be the reports of asbestos in 6 connection with a particular disease but rather how 7 much exposure did it take to get there: is that what 8 you're telling me? 9 A. That's -- That's right.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 10 Q. Because you keep coming back to 11 quantification as being a significant fact to you. 12 A. To me, it's very important. 13 Q. So, in response to any case report of an 14 asbestos-related disease that might appear in the 15 literature, you would first want to know what were the 16 exposure levels, how long was the man exposed over his 17 work before - before the report would have any 18 significance to you. Is that true? 19 A. That' s true. 20 Q. And what was done at Dow during your years 21 in the toxicology department and with the industrial 22 hygiene department to actually investigate the 23 exposure levels that went with these disease reports? 24 MR. PIERCE: Is that exposure 25 levels to anything or exposure levels
407
1 to asbestos? 2 MR. BLANKS: Well, we're talking 3 about these case reports of 4 asbestos-related disease. And I -- I 5 mean, I'm understanding Dr. Rowe to say 6 quantification is the critical point. 7 (By Mr. Blanks) 8 Q. So, what steps did you take at Dow to try to 9 find out about the exposure levels that went with 10 these reports of mesothelioma or lung cancer or 11 asbestosis in insulators? 12 A. I don't know.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 13 Q. Do you know that any -14 A. No. I did -15 Q. -- any investigation was made, sir? 16 A. I did not make any. 17 Q. Are you aware of any that was made by 18 at Dow? 19 A. I just don't know. 20 Q. So, if I may come back to the earlier 21 question, then, would it have been news to you 22 that insulators working in refineries had a potential 23 for injurious exposure to asbestos? 24 A. Would you please repeat that. 25 Q. Yes, sir. I'm speaking of refineries and
408
1 not chemical plants. 2 A. Speaking of what? 3 Q. First of all, I was speaking about 4 refineries as opposed to chemical plants, - 5 A. Oh, okay. Okay. 6 Q. -- so that's clear. But would it have been 7 news to you in 1950 that insulators working in 8 refineries could potentially have disease-causing 9 exposures to asbestos at work? 10 A. I know nothing about the exposures that 11 occurred in refineries; so, I don't know. I tried to 12 say earlier that there is no such thing as a nontoxic 13 material. If you have an excessive exposure, you're 14 apt to have trouble. If you have a so-called safe 15 exposure, the potential for it is very small; but
Page 54
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 16 there's always potential. 17 Q. And because there's always potential, it's 18 important to measure the levels of exposure? 19 A. Certainly. 20 Q. And to try and validate whether those 21 exposure levels are safe or, alternatively, have the 22 possibility of causing disease, correct? 23 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 24 form; vague and compound, confusing. 25 A. I have to keep coming back to the
409
1 quantitative aspects and the association of those 2 exposure levels - exposure intensities, duration, 3 concentration, and of the effect. And if you don't 4 have that, it's awfully difficult to know how much 5 significance to place upon a -- You have people 6 working with materials for years and years and no 7 problems, you assume that that's a pretty safe level. 8 On the other hand, if you have people working in a 9 high concentration and they become ill or - in one way 10 or another, you do your best to reduce exposures as 11 far as you reasonably can and certainly to the 12 guidelines that are present knowledge or knowledge of 13 the times suggests. 14 Q. Okay. So, you're saying that the data - the 15 facts - are important to the toxicologist, as well as 16 to the industrial hygienist. 17 A. Certainly. 18 Q. The exposure levels; the durations of
Page 55
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 19 exposure; and, as well, the medical effects of 20 exposures. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. And absent that data, it's not really 23 possible to properly formulate an effective industrial 24 hygiene program, is it? 25 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
410
1 form. 2 A. I -- I guess I don't quite understand your 3 question. Can you try it again? 4 Q. Well, I guess what I was getting at is that 5 as a scientist it's important to you to know, if 6 you're concerned about occupational health, just what 7 the levels of exposure to any particular toxic 8 material are that your workers are facing, correct? 9 A. That's right. 10 Q. And the only way to know that is to go out 11 and take samples and monitor it and gather the data; 12 isn't that true? 13 A. That' s one part of it. 14 Q. And another part of occupational health - of 15 an occupational health program is being aware of the 16 duration of the exposures that the men face to the 17 toxic materials. True? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. And the only way to know that, again, is to 20 go out and gather the data, observe, record the time 21 they spend doing these things in conjunction with the
Page 56
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 22 measurements, correct? 23 MR. PIERCE: Objection to form of 24 the question. It's compound and 25 limiting the possible answer.
411
1 A. I think the answer is "yes." 2 Q. And the final -- The final part of the data 3 that provides you some confidence in your program is 4 the medical data, correct? 5 A. Ve ry important. 6 Q. And with a disease that has a long latency 7 period, this involves - would require long-term 8 medical surveillance of the workers potentially 9 exposed to the material. True? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Dr. Rowe, had you known in 1948 that 12 asbestos was thought to be a probable carcinogen, 13 would you have recommended that it be handled 14 differently at Dow than it was in 1948? 15 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 16 for vagueness and, also, improper 17 hypothetical. 18 A. I don't know. 19 Q. Do you think, based on your experience in 20 1948, after 11 years with the company, that 21 information about asbestos as a possible or probable 22 carcinogen would have been useful information to you 23 in the toxicology department? 24 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 25 form; vague and compound.
412
1 A. Scientific information of this nature was 2 always of interest to us. 3 Q. Dr. Rowe, can you help me in any way to 4 understand the relationships between Dow and its 5 subsidiaries like Dowell Company? 6 A. The Dow - Dowell was a wholly owned 7 subsidiary. 8 Q. And it was involved in what, some 9 oil-related business? 10 A. Oil well treatments, as far as I know. 11 Q. Did your group ever provide toxicology 12 industrial hygiene services to Dowell? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Can you recall any sort of specific 15 instances? 16 A. The -- I can't -- I can't recollect the 17 materials but the -- The materials that we worked with 18 for Dowell, as I recollect, were corrosion 19 inhibitors. They were used in the acid for oil 20 treatment. 21 Q. Did Dowell make any drilling muds any time 22 that you know of? 23 A. Beg your pardon. 24 Q. Did Dowell make or sell any drilling muds? 25 A. I don't know anything about Dowell's
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1 business except that they were in the oil business 2 the oil production business. 3 Q. Okay. How far back in time can you recall, 4 approximately, doing any kind of toxicology work for 5 Dowell? Back into the Forties, perhaps? 6 A. I just don't remember. It would have been 7 early. It wasn't late. 8 Q. Were they based inTulsa? 9 A. I believe so. 10 Q. Did they have, to your knowledge, any 11 industrial hygienists or toxicologists at any time 12 that you were with the company? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Would that have been in the later years of 15 your Dow employment? 16 A. Again I can't put that in a time frame. 17 Q. I suppose you had some dealings with their 18 toxicologists or industrial hygienists somewhere along 19 the way. Would that be so? 20 A. At Dowell? 21 Q. Yes, sir. 22 A. To my knowledge, they did not have any 23 toxicologists. They had a -- They had an industrial 24 hygienist. At least one. I don't know. Maybe more. 25 Q. Do you recall that Dowell also had a medical
414
1 professional attached to the company, a doctor? Page 59
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 2 A. I don't remember. 3 Q. Were services that your group did for Dowell 4 charged back to Dowell? 5 A. I don't know. 6 Q. What about Dow Corning, was that also a Dow 7 subsidiary? 8 A. No. 9 Q. What was its relation to Dow, if any? 10 A. Dow Corning is a separate corporation owned 11 50 percent by Corning glass and 50 percent by Dow 12 Chemical. 13 Q. Did your -- Excuse me. Let me start again. 14 Did your group do any kind of tox. work or industrial 15 hygiene work for Dow Corning over the years? 16 A. Yes. 17 MR. PIERCE: Objection; asked and 18 answered at the last session. 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Did they have an industrial hygienist, Dow 21 Corning? 22 MR. PIERCE: Do you have a point 23 in time or just any time? 24 A. It depends. They didn't early in the game, 25 but they did later.
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1 Q. Do you recall who that person was? 2 A. One person who - who was there - Whether or 3 not it was the first one or what, I don't remember 4 was Larry Silverstein.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 5 Q. He had begun his industrial hygiene work at 6 Dow, had he not? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. And then perhaps transferred over to Dow 9 Corning later? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Is Mr. Silverstein a person that worked with 12 you or under you at any time at Dow? 13 A. He was one of our industrial hygienists. 14 Q. Working for Mr . Hoyle? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Can you recall , Dr. Rowe, any other Dow 17 subsidiar ies or related companies, using that term 18 loosely, for which your group ever did any toxicology 19 work or industrial hygiene work? 20 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 21 form. It's compound. The use of the 22 term "related company" is vague and 23 ambiguous. 24 But go ahead. 25 A. There were a few instances in which we did
416
1 some toxicological work for the pharmaceutical 2 division, only when their toxicology labs were
3 overwhelmed by the amount of the work they were doing. 4 And they just didn't have the capacity and we had the
5 capacity at the time and that was it. 6 do it on a routine basis, --
But we did not
7 Q. Yes, sir. Page 61
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 8 A. -- only on special occasions. And, of 9 course, we did work for the various Dow divisions, 10 which is the Texas division and the western division 11 and eastern division, central division, and that sort 12 of thing. 13 Q. All of those being divisions of Dow Chemical 14 Company? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Okay. Can you think of any other companies 17 for whom your group ever did any tox. work or 18 industrial hygiene work, sir? 19 A. I don't recall any. 20 Q. Dr. Rowe, do you recall, sir, if anyone, 21 that you know of, ever requested that medical 22 surveillance be conducted at Dow of workers 23 potentially exposed to asbestos? 24 A. I don't know. 25 Q. Do you recall, Dr. Rowe, that it was ever
417
1 the case at Dow during your years with the company 2 that medical surveillance of workers potentially 3 exposed to asbestos did take place? 4 A. I have no specific information, but I have 5 to say that the workers were continuously under 6 medical surveillance. And what they did in that 7 particular area I don't know. 8 Q. You're saying that all of the Dow workers 9 were under medical surveillance to some extent? 10 A. To some extent, yes.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 11 Q. And was that the case from the beginning of 12 your employment in 1937, that there was a medical 13 surveillance program? 14 A. No. There was not a corporate medical 15 department at that time. 16 Q. Would you remind me again when the corporate 17 medical department came into being, approximately? 18 A. I don't remember. 19 Q. By the Forties, wasn't it? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Were you, yourself, under a medical 22 surveillance program from the Forties on? 23 A. I would think so. We had our annual 24 physicals and that sort of thing. 25 Q. So, you actually had a hands-on physical by
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1 the Dow medical department each year? 2 A. In the early days, yes. I don't know how 3 widespread it was, that program; but it was a general 4 program. And that was under the medical department's 5 operation; so, I do not know how it was set up. 6 Q. Do you know, sir, if there were any special 7 medical monitoring programs for any particular trade 8 or employee group at Dow that went beyond just this 9 general medical surveillance for all employees? 10 A. I don't know. 11 Q. Do you recall that any particular group of 12 Dow employees who might just be working with some 13 particular chemicals actually had biological
Page 63
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 14 monitoring during any years? 15 A. I remember that we have had biological 16 monitoring but on quite a limited basis. The people 17 working in the chlorinated hydrocarbon area were 18 probably as a group observed as much as anyone or more 19 because of the potential, like, for carbon 20 tetrachloride and liver involvement because we knew 21 the consequences of excessive exposure and you 22 couldn't always be sure until medical surveillance 23 was -- Where we had a spot like that, more attention 24 was paid to it. 25 Q. Okay. When you said "because you couldn't
419
1 always be sure," what did you mean? Be sure of what? 2 A. You'd know what exposures always were with
3 individuals.
4 Q. I see. So that even though Dow had an 5 industrial hygiene program to control the exposures of
6 individuals working in the chlorinated hydrocarbon 7 department, it was a concern that some people might
8 have excessive exposures in spite of the controls.
9 A. That' s true.
10 Q. And, therefore, the medical monitoring was a
11 good way to - to detect those excesses, if any
12 occurred. 13
MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
14 form - 15 A. Medical -
16 MR. PIERCE: -- of the question. Page 64
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 17 A. -- monitoring in those days was in its 18 infancy primarily because of the lack of analytical 19 facilities or - I shouldn't say "facilities" 20 capabilities to do analyses that were meaningful. 21 Q. And "in those days," what are we talking 22 about - the Forties, Fifties? When? 23 A. Yes. And beyond. Even today you can't use 24 medical monitoring for - because you don't have the 25 information that's necessary to do it.
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1 Q. I'm sorry. Could you explain? I didn't 2 A. Well, for instance, if you know with the
3 metabolites and how they're excreted and that sort of
4 thing, you can analyze for them. If you don't know,
5 you can't do it. You don't have enough method
6 available.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. So, it's a -- It's a -- Personnel and 9 medical monitoring are very useful techniques if the
10 the capability for doing so is available.
11 Q. And they go together, if I'm understanding
12 you, personnel monitoring as well as medical
13 monitoring. 14
MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form
15 of the question; ambiguous and vague. 16 Q. The two complementary -
17 A. They complement each other.
18 Q. As part of an occupational health program in
19 the prevention of occupational disease. True? Page 65
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 20 A. I guess, yes. 21 Q. Okay. Was it Dow's policy in any year you 22 worked there to not protect workers from breathing 23 toxic chemicals or dust? 24 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 25 to the form of the question --
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1 A. Please repeat that.
2 Q. Yes, sir. Was it Dow's policy -- In any of
3 the years that you worked there, was it a policy to 4 not protect workers from breathing toxic chemicals or 5 dust in the workplace? 6 MR. PIERCE: The question is
7 leading and is essentially
8 argumentative.
9 A. Again we go back to the quantitative aspects
10 of the industrial hygiene/toxicology pro - medical
11 problem.
It's essentially impossible in any operation
12 to prevent all exposure. You try to keep the exposure
13 level to acceptable levels. Certainly if we knew
14 there was an excessive exposure, we would do our best
15 to do something about it. 16 Q. Then was it the policy at Dow in any years
17 you worked there to only provide protection for
18 workers when the exposures were above the guideline 19 levels? 20 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
21 form. Objection to questions relating
22 to the policy of Dow. Page 66
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 23 A. Well, I don't - I don't believe that was a 24 policy but -- Would you restate your question and... 25 Q. Yes, sir. Focusing back on the quantitative
422
1 aspects, as you say, was it the Dow policy in any of 2 your years there to provide protection for workers 3 only where the exposures to toxic dust were in excess 4 of the guideline levels? 5 MR. PIERCE: Continue the 6 objection in respect to Dow policy and 7 some ambiguity within the question. 8 A. If the particular operation was one in which 9 there could be peaks that would not be normally found 10 in industrial hygiene and there was a particular 11 known - particularly acute problem, why, we would wear 12 respiratory protection or whatever, whether it was 13 protective clothing or what was used. 14 Q. So - 15 A. It was just a matter of common sense, I 16 think. 17 Q. Okay. So, protection would be used, then, 18 when exposures were above the guideline levels: is 19 that what you're saying? 20 MR. PIERCE: Asked and answered. 21 A. Either protection would be urged, suggested 22 if changes in procedure or operation could not be 23 effectively instituted. 24 Q. And was it the policy in your years with Dow 25 only to use the industrial hygiene controls in
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1 circumstances where the exposure levels were above the 2 guidelines? 3 A. I don't know. 4 MR. PIERCE: Continue the 5 objection to the use of Dow's policy 6 and the ambiguity within that 7 question. 8 A. I guess I don't know. 9 Q. Well, you continue to emphasize the 10 quantitative aspects. And I think that relates back 11 to the guidelines, if I'm understanding you right. 12 And I'm trying to understand at what point when we're 13 talking about levels of exposure that Dow's rules or 14 regulations required that controls be put in place to 15 limit exposures. That's what I'm asking you about. 16 And was it only after you had exceeded the 17 guidelines that industrial hygiene controls were 18 required? 19 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 20 to the question based on the premise 21 that there weren't industrial hygiene 22 controls at all times. And it's just 23 an assumption of a fact that's part of 24 the question which is not so. 25 But go ahead and answer it to the
Page 68
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1 best of your ability, sir. 2 A. The policy, as I would - as I recollect it, 3 was that we did not have anybody exposed to 4 concentrations of materials that were presumed to be 5 hazardous to health. So, our control -- The last - 6 The last alternative to a situation which hopefully 7 would be temporary or short-term, was to engineer 8 controls and handling procedures into an operation so 9 that you didn't have that situation. 10 Now, in an emergency situation, short-term 11 where you just didn't have time to get this sort of 12 thing done, we used respiratory protection, whatever 13 protection was required. It was not the routine to 14 work - anybody - with respiratory or other 15 protection. The thrust was to maintain the 16 environmental and occupational exposures to acceptable 17 levels or below - as far below as could be reasonably 18 achieved. 19 Q. Okay. And in cases where the exposures 20 could exceed the guidelines, then you'd use 21 respiratory protection as appropriate or as set out on 22 your safety data sheets? 23 A. If this was appropriate. 24 Q. Okay. Dr. Rowe, was it Dow's policy during 25 your years with the company to deny protection to
425
1 workers from particular materials until Dow had 2 evaluated scientifically documented conclusive
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3 findings for relevance to the specific premises or
4 situations at Dow? 5 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 6 of the question for the following 7 reasons: One, objection to use of the 8 term of "Dow policy"; objection to the 9 compound nature of the question; 10 objection to the ambiguity of terms 11 used, including "conclusive" and
12 others. 13 But go ahead and answer, if you
14 can.
15 A. I don't know the answer to that. 16 Q. As a long-time employee of Dow, an executive
17 with Dow - 18
MR. BLANKS: Objection to the use
19 of the word "executive."
20 MR. PIERCE: Thank you.
21 (By Mr. Blanks) 22 Q. As a long-time Dow employee in the 23 biochemical research department and ultimately as the
24 assistant director and then director of different 25 parts of that organization, you have some familiarity
426
1 with Dow's policies regarding occupational health, do 2 you not? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Dow did have some policies about 5 occupational health matters, did it not?
Page 70
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Could you generally restate for us what the 8 scope of that policy was, as you appreciated it? 9 A. I thought I had just explained that. The 10 policy was that we did not - that we tried to control 11 exposures - exposure levels - to acceptable levels by 12 engineering control and not by personnel protection. 13 Personnel protection was an emergency situation or a 14 very short-life situation pending correction of this, 15 that, or the other thing that was causing the problem. 16 Q. Well, was it the approach of your department 17 at Dow to not make recommendations for improved 18 procedures or for monitoring, things of that sort, 19 until Dow had evaluated the scientifically documented 20 conclusive findings for relevance to the particular 21 situations in the Dow plants? 22 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 23 form. It's compound. It's wordy and 24 ambiguous, difficult, and 25 unintelligible.
427
1 MR. RICE: That means you in 2 general terms (di rected to 3 Mr. Blanks). 4 A. I guess I'd like to have you break it up 5 into pieces rather than so much at one time. 6 Q. All right, sir. Once you had scientifically 7 documented conclusive findings about a particular 8 toxic material like, say, asbestos, would you at that
Page 71
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 9 point at Dow make recommendations for medical 10 monitoring or industrial hygiene controls? 11 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 12 form; compound, ambiguous. 13 A. Oh, we would certainly recommend that 14 recommend that the occupational exposure did not 15 exceed the so-called acceptable levels. 16 Q. Did you ever look beyond the so-called 17 acceptable levels to see if they really were 18 acceptable relative to the experience in your own work 19 force? 20 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 21 form; completely ambiguous. 22 A. I think our previous discussion of the 23 carbon tetrachloride situation is an example of this. 24 And, as I said, there were perhaps others. 25 I remember vinyl chloride as another example
428
1 that - where certain people were having a lot of 2 trouble with exposure to vinyl chloride and - but 3 their exposure levels were quite high and ours -- We 4 had lots of it, and we had had no such problem. And 5 we tried to check our analyses and so forth. And we 6 did some work with vinyl chloride to verify the 7 situation because of the severity of the reported 8 responses. 9 And it was never our policy to do as little 10 as possible to meet a particular standard or 11 acceptable-level standard, however you want to call
Page 72
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 12 it. We did the best we could as well as we could. 13 Sometimes it was very difficult and seemingly 14 unnecessary to the extent -- You cannot eliminate 15 exposure. So, somewhere in there there has to be a 16 trade-off. 17 Q. Okay. What is one trading off, Dr. Rowe? 18 A. You have to trade off to some level that's 19 acceptable or better than acceptable and - otherwise, 20 you'll go out out of business. You don't do 21 anything. You can't make materials and handle 22 materials without some escape. So, you're going to 23 have some exposure. That has to be recognized. And, 24 so, if you want to go the ultimate, no exposure, why, 25 you'd probably just say, well, let somebody else do
429
1 it. 2 Q.
For instance, subcontract out that sort of
3 maintenance work that might involve exposures? 4 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form
5 of the question.
6 I'm sorry. Could you repeat that
7 question?
8 Q. And one way to have somebody else do it, for
9 example, would be perhaps to subcontract out
10 maintenance work that would involve excessive
11 exposures? 12
MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
13 form. I think that's a complete
14 misinterpretation of what his previous Page 73
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 15 answer was in his previous testimony. 16 A. No. 17 Q. Then I guess I didn't understand you, then. 18 And that would be a way of - 19 A. I'm saying if you're going to manufacture a 20 material and you can't control it and you have to 21 control it to such and such a level, your technology 22 may not be adequate to do that. So, you just don't 23 make it. If somebody else wants to make it, then 24 that's their business. 25 Q. Were there any products that Dow considered
430
1 which it decided not to make because of these 2 occupational health concerns? 3 A. Not to my knowledge. 4 Q. But there were some materials you made where 5 you knew that you were going to have some exposures in 6 spite of your control measures; is that true? 7 A. You always have some exposure. 8 Q. And the trade-off was one of either not 9 making it and not having exposures or going ahead and 10 making the product and having exposures in the work 11 force: is that what you meant by "trade-off"? 12 MR. PIERCE: Asked and answered. 13 A. Well, if you can't make a product 14 economically, you better not bother making it. If the 15 sales price is -- There's no point in making it if you 16 can't sell it. And if the expense and cost of - of 17 containment is excessive, it doesn't warrant research,
Page 74
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 18 development, or whatever. 19 Q. It does cost some money to control and limit 20 exposures in the workplace, does it not? 21 A. It costs a lot of money. And that level is 22 very - curve is very, very steep - or with the amount 23 of control, costs lots of money. 24 Q. And I suppose in the handling of asbestos 25 insulation in a chemical plant or a refinery you'd
431
1 agree that it's also inevitable that you're going to 2 have some exposures to airborne dust in its handling; 3 isn't that true?
4 MR. RICE: Obj ection; vague. 5 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
6 form. 7 A. Well, I don't know of anything that we can
8 handle that we don't have some potential for exposure.
9 Q. And that would be true both in the
10 fabricating of it, the installing of it, the removal
11 of it. 12
The potential for exposure exists. True? MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
13 compound nature of the question. And 14 this has been asked and answered
15 several times. 16 A. I don't -- To my knowledge, I don't know how
17 it would be done if it didn't have some.
18 Q. In fact, it's more than just a potential for 19 exposure, isn't it, Dr. Rowe? I mean, it's inevitable
20 that the man actually sawing and handling the asbestos Page 75
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 21 insulation is going to have some exposure to the 22 airborne asbestos dust in the doing of the work, isn't 23 it, sir? 24 MR. PIERCE: Are you asking him to 25 speculate or from his own personal
432
1 knowledge and studies? 2 MR. BLANKS: Well, I'm asking 3 Dr. Rowe as the former director of the 4 toxicology and industrial hygiene 5 section of the chemical biological 6 research lab at Dow Chemical Company. 7 MR. PIERCE: Who has testified he 8 had nothing to do with asbestos. 9 But okay. Answer the question. 10 A. To answer your question: If you were doing 11 this and you were doing it in a glove box, you would 12 be pretty close or you could do it probably pretty 13 close to zero exposure. But once you got it out of 14 there, you'd probably have some exposure. But it's 15 just a matter of proportions one way or another. 16 Q. All right, sir. But, actually, in reality 17 in the field, in the plant - in the handling of 18 asbestos insulation in Dow plants - some exposures to 19 the people working with it were inevitable and did, in 20 fact, occur, didn't they? 21 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 22 form; asked and answered on numerous 23 occasions, redundant, argumentative.
Page 76
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 24 A. You'd have to say there's some - you'd 25 expect to have some exposure.
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1 Q. All right, sir. Dr. Rowe, on those several 2 occasions when your toxicology department decided that 3 the guidelines for specific materials were inadequate 4 to protect the workers, were those decisions made at 5 Dow only after you'd had scientifically documented 6 conclusive evidence to go on or did you respond to 7 something else, something short of that? 8 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 9 form; compound in several ways and use 10 of ambiguous terminology. 11 Go ahead. 12 A. Well, the one example of the carbon 13 tetrachloride situation was one example. Almost the 14 opposite example was the one with vinyl chloride where 15 we had had no problems similar to those which had been 16 reported in the literature. 17 Q. But was your response to these perceived 18 problems delayed until you had conclusive findings? 19 MR. PIERCE: Continue the 20 objection as to the ambiguity. 21 A. I don't -- I don't understand the question 22 now, I guess. 23 Q. I mean, sir, did you decide that you needed 24 further study of the tetra - carbon tetrachloride 25 problem until you'd make a decision to tighten up the
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1 Dow standards? 2 A. As I said before, we had evidence that the 3 controls to the acceptable level were not adequate. 4 Q. And, therefore, a response was required and 5 was, in fact, made, wasn't it? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. To tighten up the standards? 8 A. Yes. 9 MR. PIERCE: Has been asked and 10 answered at least on four different 11 occasions this morning and last time, 12 as well. 13 MR. BLANKS: Do you want to stand 14 up a second, sir? 15 THE WITNESS: I'm okay. For the 16 time being, anyway. 17 MR. BLANKS: Okay. All right. 18 (By Mr. Blanks) 19 Q. Dr. Rowe, with respect to asbestos, what, 20 sir, would you regard as scientifically documented 21 conclusive findings that airborne asbestos could cause 22 disease? What would that be? 23 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to 24 the ambiguity of the term "conclusive" 25 and "scientifically documented."
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 1 But go ahead and answer the 2 question to the best of your ability. 3 A. Well, the occurrence among workers exposed 4 to the material in certain concentrations developed 5 asbestos-type disease. 6 Q. What about suspected carcinogens, how much 7 proof did Dow require about that before it would 8 decide to protect workers in its plants? Can you give 9 us some examples? 10 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 11 form. It is compound. It is 12 ambiguous. It is vague. 13 A. I guess I'll have to ask you to repeat the 14 question, please. 15 Q. Yes, sir. Thank you. With respect to 16 suspected carcinogens, would it be so that - that - 17 In the Dow plants over the years you worked there, 18 there were some suspected carcinogens being used in 19 the plants, weren't there? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Okay. Even some that would be regarded as 22 probable carcinogens. True? 23 A. I'd expect so. 24 Q. Do you think there were any known human 25 carcinogens being used in Dow plants during any of the
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1 you worked there? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Okay. Now, as to those suspected or
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 4 possible or probable carcinogens, I'm wondering, sir, 5 how much proof Dow required before it would decide to 6 protect workers against exposures to them. 7 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to 8 the form of the question. It is 9 compound. It is vague. Using the term 10 "suspected carcinogen" or even "proven 11 carcinogen" is overly broad and 12 general. Are you including sunlight? 13 I mean, what are you including in this 14 group? 15 But go ahead and do the best you 16 can. 17 A. I think when you have a suspected 18 carcinogen, you probably do - or a known carcinogen 19 you do the best you can to keep the exposures at the 20 lowest possible level. 21 Q. I have no quarrel with your answer; but I 22 think you've told me what would be proper, at least at 23 Dow, in dealing with a suspected carcinogen. But my 24 question, sir, was how much proof or scientific 25 evidence did Dow require before it would start to
437
1 protect workers in its plants from suspected 2 carcinogens as opposed to what would be the response. 3 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 4 of the question. It is ambiguous. It 5 presumes Dow didn't protect its workers 6 at a certain period of time. And it's
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 7 compound. 8 A. I don't know how to answer your question. 9 Q. Well, let's try it this way, then. Would 10 you say that during all your years at Dow that the 11 company did, in fact, protect workers from exposures 12 to suspected carcinogens? 13 A. Certainly. 14 Q. Sir? 15 A. Certainly. 16 Q. And at what point, then, in the gathering of 17 knowledge about a new suspected carcinogen would the 18 Dow protection program for the workers kick in? How 19 much proof did it take to get protection implemented? 20 A. I don't know. 21 MR. BLANKS: We're out of tape. 22 MR. PIERCE: Okay. So, I guess 23 this is a good time for a lunch break. 24 And we'll take care of that other 25 matter over lunch. Okay?
438
1 MR. BLANKS: Yes. 2 MR. PIERCE: What time to you want 3 to... 4 MR. BLANKS: I'll leave it up to 5 Dr. Rowe 6 MR. PIERCE: All right. How's 7 1:00 o'c lock? Is 1:00 o'clock okay? 8 (AT 11:32 A. M. THE DEPOSITION WAS 9 RECESSED FOR LUNCH. AT 1:07 P.M.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 10 PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:) 11 MR. BLANKS: So, we're back. Did 12 you finish your sandwich? 13 THE WITNESS: No. 14 MR. HOBSON: Should have brought 15 it to him. 16 MR. BLANKS: He didn't finish his, 17 either. 18 MR. PIERCE: Too big for any one 19 person, huh? 20 MR. BLANKS: Yeah. 21 (By Mr. Blanks) 22 Q. Dr. Rowe, do you remember from around the 23 Forties a gentleman named L. J. Richards at Dow? 24 A. Yes. That name is familiar, but I can't 25 right off the bat place him.
439
1 Q. Can you place him maybe in the engineering 2 department as perhaps - 3 A. Okay. 4 Q. -- the chief - chief engineer? 5 A. That -- Okay. That's right. He was in the 6 engineering department. 7 Q. Was this a man that you would have had any 8 dealings with doing your job over the years? 9 A. I don't recollect any. 10 Q. And at Dow, engineering was responsible for 11 what, plant design and specification of materials to 12 be used in the plants?
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 13 A. I don't know. 14 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 15 of the question; compound and leading. 16 A. I don't know the extent of their charge. 17 Q. Could you tell us any of the things you 18 understood that engineering did in the Forties? 19 A. Well, they supervised buildings and 20 building of roads and buildings and equipment, I 21 guess. I don't know. I didn't have anything to do 22 with them. 23 Q. Okay. I'm not saying that you needed to 24 know but I -- Did they also specify materials to use 25 in the plants?
440
1 A. I don't know. 2 Q. And I don't mean product materials or raw 3 materials but things such as insulation, for example. 4 A. I have no idea. 5 Q. Do you have any idea whether Mr. Richards is 6 still living? 7 A. No. 8 Q. When - 9 A. I don't know. I don't know. 10 Q. When was the last time that you could 11 recollect having known of him? Would that have been 12 around your retirement time? 13 A. Your question was -- Excuse me. 14 Q. Could you just tell us the last time you can 15 recollect knowing of Mr. Richards?
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 16 A. No. 17 Q. We were talking before the lunch break about 18 how Dow dealt with carcinogens or suspected 19 carcinogens in the workplace. And you -- I think you 20 gave us some understanding of what Dow would do about 21 them, but I was exploring with you what level of 22 information was needed before Dow would respond to a 23 suspected or probable carcinogen that they learned of 24 being in the plants. Could you help us with that, 25 sir?
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1 MR. PIERCE: And the question was 2 asked and answered several times; and, 3 so, I object on that basis. 4 A. Well, I don't -- I don't know. 5 Carcinogenicity is just is another manifestation of 6 toxicity. And you deal with it as the end result of 7 that just as though you - just the same as you would 8 with something that caused liver destruction or some 9 other undesirable effect. 10 Q. Is that to say that at Dow during your years 11 that carcinogens were not treated with more care or 12 respect than toxic materials that didn't cause cancer? 13 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 14 of the question; compound and 15 ambiguous. 16 A. I don't know that we can say that - what 17 compounds do cause cancer. Again, it's a matter of 18 quantitation. And if -- If the level that causes
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 19 cancer is low, okay, you'd apply the monitor and 20 control conditions to meet those limits. 21 Q. Well, I was wondering if you treated 22 potential or probable carcinogens differently than, 23 let's say, something that was only a fibrogen. 24 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 25 form, objection to your
442
1 characterization of something as
2
tt i tt
only.
3 But go ahead. 4 And the ambiguity in the
5 question.
6 A. Well, we would certainly treat them
7 different than something that might cause an aesthetic 8 effect; but we looked at carcinogens and tried to
9 control those just like we would any other
10 toxicological effect. It's an undesirable effect to
11 be avoided, if at all possible.
12 Q. All right, sir. And if it couldn't be
13 avoided - it wasn't possible to avoid it, this 14 effect - what was the Dow response to those 15 situations?
16 A. If it's impossible to avoid it, you cease to
17 use it. 18 Q. Did Dow have some sort of a scheme or method 19 for categorizing potential carcinogens?
20 A. Not that I recollect. 21 Q. Did you, yourself, have any method for
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 22 describing or ranking the likelihood that a material 23 could cause cancer in humans? 24 A . I don't think so. 25 Q . S o, it was the case, then, at Dow that the
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1 toxicology department didn't distinguish between 2 materials that were merely suspected of being 3 carcinogens and those that were regarded as probable 4 carcinogens? 5 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 6 form. The witness has already answered 7 from his knowledge, and it's just a 8 completely repetitive question. 9 But go ahead. 10 A. Well, the - whether it - whatever the 11 adverse effects of a material are, you do the best you 12 can under the circumstances to either reduce it to 13 acceptable levels or don't use it. Whether it's a 14 carcinogen -- It's just another manifestation of 15 toxicity. 16 Q. Okay. So, learning that asbestos, for 17 example, was believed to be capable of causing lung 18 cancer would not lead to any change in the industrial 19 hygiene program that was already designed to prevent 20 exposures to asbestos that could cause asbestosis: 21 would that be true? 22 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 23 form. It's leading and ambiguous. 24 A. If you had a material that was a potential
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 25 to cause any sort of effect and you're close to the
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1 margin, you do your best to monitor it more often 2 and - so as to reduce the possibility or the
3 likelihood of excessive exposure. 4 Q. When you say -- Did you say "close to the
. tt Q
5 margin ? 6 A. Well, if your - if your - if your margin 7 is five and you're running four point nine, that's -
8 that's different than if you're running one against a
9 margin of five, as an example.
10 Q. All right, sir. Well, what would be
11 appropriate to do if, in fact, you were running at a
12 margin of four point nine against a five guideline?
13 What... 14 A.
Take whatever measures you could to attempt
15 to reduce exposure. 16 Q. Is four point nine too close for comfort, in
17 your mind, when you have a standard of five or a
18 guideline of five?
19 MR. ALMQUIST: Object to the
20 question as vague.
21 A. Any exposure is too much, as far as I'm 22 concerned; but practicality says that you can't have
23 zero exposure if you're going to handle a material. 24 Q. You've told us earlier, I think, that the
25 threshold limit values and their predecessor, the
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1 maximum allowable concentrations, were merely 2 guidelines for exposure levels. True? 3 A. That' s true. 4 Q. And that as drawn out by the A.C.G.I.H., 5 these guidelines were expected to provide a level of 6 exposure at which most but not every worker would be 7 free from a harmful effect or a bad health effect, 8 correct? 9 A. That was the general philosophy. 10 Q. But that would also entail, wouldn't it, 11 that some workers - if you expose enough of them over 12 a long enough period of time, that some workers would, 13 in fact, develop the disease from exposures. True? 14 A. I certainly couldn't say that they would 15 because I don't know. 16 Q. Well, speak - not speaking about any 17 particular workers but - but as to a group of workers, 18 if you exposed enough of them for a long enough period 19 of time at exposure levels, let's say, close to the 20 guideline, would you not expect that some would 21 develop disease from exposures, Dr. Rowe? 22 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 23 to the form of the question. It really 24 calls for complete speculation. I 25 mean, if you go on forever, someone is
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1 liable to get something. And the Page 88
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2 question just has no parameters, no
3 beginning and no end.
4 But see if you can handle it. 5 A. Well, statistical analyses of those kind of
6 things is very difficult. And that's the reason why
7 you say that there's no absolute guarantee. But lung
8 cancer and other diseases occur from - occur
9 naturally. And they may occur from different
10 materials that are rather unknown. So, it's hard 11 to -- You can't make - cast something like that in
12 bronze. 13 Q.
How about if we speak in terms of asbestosis
14 instead of asbestos-related cancer, would you agree
15 that exposures of enough people over a long enough
16 period of time near but below the guideline level will
17 predictably result in asbestos - in asbestosis in some 18 of those people?
19 MR. PIERCE: Object to the form.
20 It's ambiguous and vague.
21 A. You can't say that anything is impossible.
22 And it's possible.
23 Q. Well, isn't it actually statistically 24 probable, Dr. Rowe? I mean, wasn't that -
25 A. I would -- I would think that it would be -
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1 statistics would be influenced by the dosage and the 2 period of exposure time and such factors. 3 Q. And wouldn't you expect, based on your 4 experience and your knowledge, that exposures at
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 5 levels of, say, 4.7 million particles per cubic foot 6 or 4.9 over a long enough period of time would, in 7 fact, lead to asbestosis in some individuals? 8 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 9 of the question. It's compound; it's 10 argumentative; it's repetitive; and 11 it's, in certain proportion, 12 unanswerable. 13 MR. PAPPAS: And speculative. 14 THE REPORTER: Excuse me. 15 MR. PAPPAS: And speculative. 16 MR. RICE: I also object to it on 17 the basis it's not referenced by time. 18 A. I don't know. 19 Q. When you were applying the guidelines at 20 Dow, was it your understanding that some people 21 exposed below the guideline would, in all probability, 22 develop the occupational disease that the T.L.V. was 23 designed to protect against even though the majority 24 of the workers might be protected at the guideline 25 level?
448
1 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to 2 object to the question as 3 unintelligible as asked. 4 A. I don't like to speculate on - on things 5 like that because anything is possible. 6 Q. Well, I really didn't mean to put you in a 7 posture of speculating; but I'm really asking more
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 8 about your understanding and your application of the 9 T.L.V. guidelines and other guidelines back in the 10 Forties and the Fifties and Sixties when you were 11 doing toxicology work for Dow and then later as the 12 man in charge of the industrial hygiene section. 13 You understood that the guidelines were 14 intended to protect most of the workers if their 15 exposures were limited - kept below those levels. You 16 agree with that, don't you, sir? 17 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to -- I'm 18 going to object to this question. I 19 think Dr. Rowe has explained already 20 what he meant by that, and this is just 21 going over the same area once again. 22 But go ahead. 23 A. That, I think, was the general philosophy. 24 Q. And at the same time you did not expect that 25 keeping exposures at or just below the guideline level
449
1 would, in fact, protect every worker exposed at those 2 levels. True? 3 MR. PIERCE: And I'm going to 4 object to this. Asked and answered 5 more than once. 6 A. The probability of anything happening is 7 always increased with the dosage. 8 Q. So that the higher the dosage was to the 9 guideline, the greater the probability that some 10 person or persons would get the occupational disease.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 11 True? 12 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 13 form. It's vague. 14 And what do you mean 15 "exposure to the guideline"? 16 But go ahead, if you can. 17 Q. As exposures approach the guideline levels, 18 the probability of the occupational disease in some of 19 the workers would increase, wouldn't it? 20 MR. RICE: Object to the 21 speculation. 22 MR. PIERCE: Object to the form. 23 You're asking for speculation. And 24 Dr. Rowe has already given you an 25 answer as to his entire thinking in
450
1 respect to exposure levels. 2 But go ahead. 3 A. I don't think that anyone can say that if 4 you increase exposure levels that you are - you have 5 to -- Excuse me. Let me back up. As you increase the 6 intensity of exposure, you're going to increase the 7 probability however small or however it may be before. 8 Q. And would the opposite also be true, 9 Dr. Rowe, that as you decrease the intensity of 10 exposure you would decrease the probability of 11 occupational disease? 12 A. I would think that would naturally follow. 13 Q. And that was, in fact, your experience as a
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 14 scientist at Dow, wasn't it, that the lower you kept 15 the exposures the less probability you had of 16 occupational disease? The less occupational disease 17 you had, as well. True? 18 MR. PAPPAS: Obj ect - 19 MR. PIERCE: Object to the 20 compound nature of the question. 21 A. I would agree. 22 Q. Which is precisely the reason that you - or 23 that the Dow people, for instance, lowered their 24 standards on the vinyl chlorides and the aliphatic 25 chlorinated hydrocarbons and carbon tetrachloride,
451
1 among other things, right? 2 A. Right. 3 Q. Dr. Rowe, do you recall that Dow passed on 4 to the A.C.G.I.H. its experience with these different 5 materials we just mentioned, the ones where Dow 6 actually lowered the guideline below the T.L.V. that 7 the A.C.G.I.H. had proposed? 8 A. Yes, sir. 9 Q. Do you recall, sir, what the response of the 10 American Conference of Governmental Industrial 11 Hyg ienists was to this important information from Dow? 12 A. Well, the A.C.G.I.H., I think, respected 13 very highly the results that were given them and moved 14 their threshold limit values accordingly. 15 Q. They did, in fact, lower their - 16 A. Oh, yes.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 17 Q. -- T.L.V. down to the ones that Dow had set 18 internal ly? 19 A. Well, I'm not going to say specifically 20 because I don't remember; but I know they were reduced 21 in most of those situations. 22 Q. I see. Is it your view, Dr. Rowe, that the 23 state of knowledge about, let's say, the 24 carcinogenicity of a material like asbestos is one 25 that increased with time and with more studies, say,
452
1 from 1935 up to 1965? 2 A. I think that's true of every person - every 3 material I know. 4 Q. Well, I didn't ask you about every material 5 because somebody would have objected it wasn't 6 specific. 7 A. As more knowledge becomes available, it's 8 put into use. 9 Q. All right, sir. Would you say that with 10 more knowledge you - as a scientist, you have an 11 increasing level of confidence or certainty about the 12 suspected carcinogenicity of the particular material? 13 Is that the way it works? 14 A. Well, the more knowledge you have, certainly 15 the better perspective you have for drawing 16 conclusions. 17 Q. Could you give us some feel for that point 18 on the spectrum of increasing knowledge or increasing 19 certainty where at Dow it was felt proper to begin to
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 20 take steps to protect the workers from exposures to 21 the material? 22 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 23 of the question. It's compound, and 24 it's very vague and very difficult to 25 understand.
453
1 A. I guess I would ask you if you would repeat, 2 please. 3 Q. Yes, sir. I was just wondering if you could 4 describe to us at what point on that spectrum of 5 increasing knowledge and certainty about the 6 carcinogenicity of asbestos that Dow thought it proper 7 to take steps to protect the workers from exposures to 8 asbestos. 9 MR. PIERCE: I' m going to continue 10 the objection based on the assumption 11 that there was a point in time where 12 they did not protect the workers at Dow 13 and other ambiguities within the 14 question. 15 But go ahead. 16 MR. ALMQUIST: I'm going to object 17 to the question. 18 A. I don't know. 19 Q. Would you know, sir, or could you explain to 20 us relative to this level of increasing knowledge and 21 certainty about carcinogenicity if - where Dow would 22 respond on carcinogens generally? Not asbestos, but
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 23 anything 24 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to ask you 25 to clarify that question as to -- What
454
1 does that mean, "respond to"? So, I'm 2 going to object to the form of the 3 question as being vague.
4 A. I guess I don't understand it, either.
5 Q. Okay. Well, I'm trying to get a feel for 6 what point you felt like you knew enough to justify
7 telling the people working with this material that was 8 suspected of being a cancer-causing material that you
9 did have those suspicions.
10 A. I don't know. That would be just simply a
11 matter of judgment. 12 Q. Well, what factors went into exercising that 13 judgment during your years at Dow?
14 A. Experience, I guess. 15 Q. Experience with cases of cancer in the work
16 force? 17 A.
No. But maybe in some work forces in the
18 literature, whatever was available. You have to
19 evaluate the situation in light of the current state
20 of the art, so to speak. 21 Q. So, at any given time you'd be looking to 22 and relying on the current state of the art; that is,
23 what's been published in the pertinent medical and
24 scientific literature on the subject, correct?
25 A. Yes. Page 96
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455
1 Q. Well, would you wait, Dr. Rowe, until there 2 was a unanimous agreement among physicians and 3 toxicologists that a material caused cancer before you 4 would begin to tell your workers that there was 5 concern about it? 6 MR. PIERCE: Objection to form of 7 the question; requires complete 8 speculation, no specifics within. 9 A. I don't believe we would do that for - we'd 10 do that for anything that we felt that the situation 11 was hazardous. 12 Q. That you'd tell the workers? 13 A. That was their policy. 14 Q. Would you do this as soon as you had some 15 information from your own experience or the literature 16 that the material in issue could be a harmful 17 material, one that could cause health effects? 18 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 19 form; compound. 20 A. Well, we tried to keep our people informed 21 of the present state of knowledge. 22 Q. Did Dow have any special rules for the 23 workers who were handling cancer-causing materials? 24 A. I don't believe so. 25 Q. Did those workers get any kind of special
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1 training, those men that were handling cancer-causing 2 materials? 3 A. They may have. 4 Q. Can you recall any instances where that 5 would have been the case? 6 A. Not offhand. 7 Q. Do you recall, Dr. Rowe, that workers 8 handling cancer-causing materials were given any kind 9 of special protection or industrial hygiene controls? 10 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 11 again in terms of the vagueness of the 12 question. Once again not dealing with 13 any exposure levels or - and implying 14 within that they did reach a level at 15 which there was some danger. 16 But go ahead and answer it to the 17 best of your ability. 18 A. We gave all the handling precautions that we 19 knew how to give with respect to any material being 20 handled that we thought might pose a significant 21 toxicological problem under the circumstances. 22 Certainly if a material was going to be absorbed 23 through the skin, why, we would caution people about 24 getting it on the skin and getting it off quickly and 25 all the rest of these things. It's just normal
457
1 industrial hygiene - and medical, I guess, too 2 treatment or instructions that - commonly in use.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 3 Q. Do you reca ll sir, what Dow did in the 4 1930's, for example, to safeguard workers handling 5 asbestos as a carcinogen? 6 A. I don't know. 7 MR. ALMQUIST: I'm going to object 8 to that question, as well, because, 9 Mr. Blanks, we've been over that, I 10 think, on many, many occasions through 11 the day and on the dates preceding 12 this. 13 Q. In the 1940's do you recall that Dow caused 14 the people working with or around asbestos to do 15 anything special to handle it as a carcinogen? 16 A. I don't know. 17 Q. How about in the Fifties, sir? 18 A. I don't know. 19 Q. Would you have any knowledge of what Dow was 20 doing in the Sixties to handle asbestos as a 21 carcinogen and protect the workers? 22 A. I don't know. 23 Q. What about the warnings about its 24 carcinogenecity in those periods, do you have any 25 knowledge of that?
458
1 A. No. 2 Q. Was it the policy at Dow to wait until there 3 had been a statistically significant number of workers 4 perish from toxic exposure to a material before the 5 men at Dow would be protected from that material?
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6 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form
7 of the question. It's argumentative, 8 it's speechmaking, and it's completely
9 inappropriate. 10 A. No. 11 MR. PIERCE: And has been
12 asked.
13 Q. So, the Dow response would come earlier than 14 the point at which you had a statistically significant
15 number of deaths reported. True? 16 MR. PIERCE: I'm sorry.
Could we
17 have that question read back? 18 THE REPORTER: "QUESTION: So, the
19 Dow - the Dow response would come 20 earlier than the point at which you had 21 a statistically significant number of
22 deaths reported. --"
23 MR. PIERCE: I'd like just to -
24 THE REPORTER: Wait. 25 MR. PIERCE: I'm sorry.
459
1 THE REPORTER: Go ahead. 2 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to continue 3 the objection to that question in that 4 it's been asked and answered and is 5 vague in portions. 6 Q. Did you have an answer, Dr. Rowe? 7 A. No. 8 Q. Is "no" the answer?
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 9 A. What? Yes. 10 Q. Okay. 11 A. "No" is my answer. 12 Q. Thank you. Okay. I thought I'd heard that, 13 but I lost the trail there during the lawyer's 14 comments - objection. 15 MR. PIERCE: Wait. Wa it one 16 second, please. The delay in the 17 answer, for the record, had nothing to 18 do with this lawyer's comments but your 19 conversation with Mr. Hobson. And 20 just let's make that clear on the 21 record. 22 MR. BLANKS: Are you speculating 23 about my state of mind and my reason 24 for forgetting, Mr. Pierce? 25 MR. PIERCE: I like that.
460
1 MR. PAPPAS: There's a lot of 2 speculation about that, Joe. 3 (By Mr. Blanks) 4 Q. As a practicing toxicologist and then later 5 as the chief of industrial hygiene, Dr. Rowe, did you 6 feel like individual case reports of cancer deaths 7 deserved attention? 8 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object. 9 This has been asked and answered. I 10 think it's -- Exactly that question was 11 asked and answered this morning and
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12 maybe last time.
13 Go ahead.
14 A. Would you restate it, please.
15 Q. Yes, sir. I was wondering whether you would 16 regard case reports - individual case reports - as 17 being information that would - that you would rely on 18 in deciding whether or not to protect workers from 19 exposures to the material that was suspected of
20 causing the death. 21
MR. PIERCE: Continue the
22 objection. 23 MR. PAPPAS: I'm going to object. 24 This question has been asked and
25 answered. Mr. Blanks, I was here this
461
1 morning; and I remember this same 2 gentleman saying that it was 3 dose-related and it had to do with 4 exposure and concentrations of 5 exposure. And on that basis I would 6 object. 7 A. Well, certainly case reports are important. 8 It's also important to know the basis for those 9 reports and to learn what the circumstances were 10 that - that may be extraneous to that particular... 11 To state that just a little differently: One needs to 12 know what else was along with a case report because 13 case reports are very brief usually and they do not 14 have data behind them except they report a particular
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 15 occurrence. And the background for that occurrence 16 needs to be evaluated before they're given 17 credibility. 18 Q. All right, sir. Did you find that case 19 reports would pique your interest when you would read 20 them? 21 A. I guess so. 22 Q. Now, how about articles in peer review 23 journals that reported multiple cases, would those 24 arouse a somewhat higher level of interest when you 25 read them?
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1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Did you think during your work at Dow that 3 an international symposia of recognized experts 4 deserved even further attention? 5 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to 6 the ambiguity. 7 But go ahead. 8 A. Depends on those so-called experts. 9 Q. You mean who they were? 10 A. And their reputation. 11 Q. Was it your view while you were at Dow that 12 national presentations by Government scientists 13 discussing, say, environmental cancers deserved your 14 attention as a toxicologist? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. How about reports from individual doctors or 17 toxicologists whom you knew to be competent and
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 18 regarded well, would that deserve your attention in 19 your work at Dow? 20 A. Any reports deserve attention. 21 Q. Just how much attention depending on who was 22 the author? Was that the way it was? 23 A. And the data behind them. 24 Q. Okay. Would you regard reports from trade 25 association, medical, and industrial hygiene
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1 committees made up of your peers or contemporaries 2 worthy of attention when they were reporting on 3 occupational health problems? 4 A. Yes. 5 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 6 form; compound. 7 Q. Can you give us any understanding of the 8 reports or series of reports from which Dow finally 9 did learn that asbestos was a carcinogen, Dr. Rowe? 10 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 11 There's an assumption within there. 12 It's facts not in evidence. 13 But go ahead. 14 A. No. 15 Q. Do you think that Dow never did learn that 16 asbestos was a human carcinogen, Dr. Rowe? 17 A. Would you please repeat that. 18 Q. Well, yes, sir. Mr. Pierce, one of Dow's 19 lawyers, objected that there was an assumption - 20 MR. PIERCE: No. Excuse me,
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 21 Mr. Blanks. I am V. K. Rowe's 22 attorney. 23 MR. BLANKS: Oh, I'm sorry. I 24 thought you had enrolled in this case 25 as co-counsel for Dow Chemical Company.
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1 MR. ALMQUIST: He's here as 2 counsel for V. K. Rowe. 3 MR. BLANKS: Whatever you say. 4 MR. RICE: Kind of like you and 5 Herschel. 6 MR. HOBSON: We don't represent 7 Mr. Rowe. 8 (By Mr. Blanks) 9 Q. There was an objection to some assumed fact, 10 and I suppose it was that Dow finally did learn that 11 asbestos was a carcinogen. 12 Do you think that Dow did finally become 13 aware of that before you left the company? 14 A. Well, I don't know that I can speak for the 15 company. 16 Q. Well, how about your group within the 17 company? 18 A. Well, personally my opinion is that - that 19 asbestos in sufficient dosage is a carcinogen. 20 Q. Can you give us any notion for what reports 21 it was or articles or experiences that led you to that 22 conviction, sir? 23 A. I don't recollect.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 24 Q. Could you help us to understand, Dr. Rowe, 25 what would be the best information available about the
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1 known and suspected health hazards of asbestos dust, 2 say, in the late Thirties? 3 A. No. 4 Q. Could you just describe it - 5 A. I don't know. 6 Q. -- generally for us? 7 A. I don't know. 8 Q. What would they be during the Forties? Now, 9 I'm not asking you to cite specific articles but just 10 the sources for the best information available. 11 MR. PIERCE: With the 12 understanding that Dr. Rowe has already 13 testified that asbestos is not his 14 field of interest or expertise? 15 MR. BLANKS: Well, yeah. 16 (By Mr. Blanks) 17 Q. I'm really not attempting to quiz you on 18 every article that was ever published. That wouldn't 19 be fair under the circumstances. But my question was: 20 Generally speaking, what would you say would be the 21 best information available - the best sources for it 22 about the known and suspected health hazards of 23 asbestos during those different decades when you 24 worked for Dow? 25 A. Well, I never followed the literature on
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1 asbestos; and I really can't tell you. 2 Q. All right, sir. 3 A. I have heard, -4 Q. Excuse me. 5 A. -- but I don't know. 6 Q. What have you heard? 7 A. Well, you see reports with certain names on 8 them; and, so, "Okay. Well, that's that." 9 Q. As to the materials you did follow, what 10 were the sources for the best information available on 11 those materials, generally speaking? 12 A. Well, this depends on the type of material 13 because some laboratories seemed to concentrate on 14 certain categories of chemicals, substances that they 15 were concerned with and whereas others had little 16 information or a little experience with others. So, 17 you had to select and choose the information on the 18 basis of the particular group that was doing the 19 work. 20 Q. So, for example, Dr. Smyth at the Mellon 21 Institute might have had a specialized area of 22 interest. And if you were dealing with that kind of 23 material, you might consider him to be a good source 24 of information, I suppose. 25 A. Yes.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 1 Q. Or on the other hand, for dust inhalation 2 topics and lung fibrosis, Saranac Laboratories in New 3 York would have been a highly regarded source of 4 information in the Thirties and Forties and Fifties? 5 A. I think so. 6 Q. Well, during all the years that you worked 7 at Dow, would sources for the best information 8 available about known and suspected health hazards of 9 a material like asbestos include the industrial 10 hygiene and medical literature in the journals? 11 A. I'm not sure I understood your question. 12 Whether there was a double negative in that or not, I 13 don't know. 14 Q. Okay. Let me try again. 15 A. Okay. 16 Q. We're speaking again generally about the 17 sources for the best information available about known 18 and suspected health hazards of a material like 19 asbestos. 20 Would you say for that period of the 21 Thirties, Forties, Fifties, even on into the Sixties, 22 that those sources would include the industrial 23 hygiene and medical literature published in the 24 journals? 25 A. Yes.
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1 Q. Would it include things like the proceedings 2 of the National Safety Council dealing with - with 3 such materials?
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 4 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 5 because I don't think it's clear that 6 the National Safety Council had 7 literature going back into the 8 Thirties. It's not anything I was 9 aware of, so -- It may be; but I think 10 without going through the time periods 11 there may be a problem in answering 12 that question. And I'm just trying to 13 avoid that problem. 14 A. It really doesn't matter too much what 15 organization you speak to. It depends on the people 16 who are doing the speaking. And the National Safety 17 Council was very strong in terms of mechanical 18 safety. And I don't think -- I did not ever consider 19 them to be strong in the area of organic toxicology. 20 Q. All right, sir. How about in the area of 21 mineral dust hazards such as silicosis or asbestosis 22 and such as that? 23 A. I don't know. 24 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 25 to the form of the question, if there
469
1 is a proper question before us. 2 A. I don't know. 3 Q. Okay. You would regard people like Philip 4 Drinker and Ted Hatch and Leroy Gardner as persons 5 with knowledge to impart even back in the Thirties and 6 Forties about asbestosis and silicosis, wouldn't you,
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 7 sir? 8 MR. PIERCE: All three or any one 9 of them? 10 I object to the form of the 11 question as compound. 12 A. I think I would respect all - the opinions 13 of all of those particular individuals. 14 Q. Okay. And if they'd been speaking and 15 presenting papers at the National Safety Council 16 Congresses even back in the Thirties, that would at 17 least be a source of good information about known and 18 suspected health hazards. Would you agree? 19 A. It would certainly be information that one 20 would have to - to respect unless there were some 21 mitigating circumstances that would tend to depreciate 22 it. 23 Q. Would you also agree that during this time 24 period of the late Thirties and the Forties, Fifties 25 that the industrial hygiene foundation would have been
470
1 a source for some of the best information available 2 about the known and suspected health hazards of 3 asbestos dust and fiber? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Including through their publication the 6 industrial hygiene foundation digest. True? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Would you include the United States Public 9 Health Service and its publications on occupational
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 10 diseases to be one of the sources for some of the best 11 information available during those decades, as well? 12 A. The U. S. Public Health Service did good 13 work, generally. They had a few bad ones, but I can't 14 tell you what they were. 15 Q. Okay. Would you regard textbooks by 16 physicians and toxicologists and industrial hygienists 17 to also be a source for the best information available 18 about the known and suspected health hazards of 19 asbestos during your decades of work with Dow? 20 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 21 form; overly broad and general. 22 A. Yes. I'd consider them sources of 23 information. 24 Q. Would you consider the American Public 25 Health Association proceedings to be yet another good
471
1 source for some of the best information available on 2 these health hazards we're discussing? 3 A. I think U. S. Public Health Service was
4 generally quite reputable.
5 Q. I'm sorry. I meant to ask you about the 6 American Public Health Association and their
7 proceedings.
8 A. I'm not too many familiar with the
9 proceedings.
10 Q. Okay. Or their publications? 11 A. There was a journal of the U.S. Public
12 Health Service.
I don't remember the exact title. Page 111
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 13 Q. Okay. How about your insurance companies 14 that had industrial hygiene departments and medical 15 departments, such as Metropolitan or Travelers or 16 Liberty Mutual or Aetna or any others, would that have 17 been a source of information for the known and 18 suspected health hazards of asbestos dust and fiber in 19 the Thirties or the Forties or the Fifties, Dr. Rowe? 20 MR. PIERCE: Unfortunately I must 21 object because it assumes facts not in 22 evidence. 23 But go ahead. 24 MR. RICE: Also assumes that he 25 had such knowledge. Calls for
472
1 speculation. 2 A. I was not familiar with the insurance 3 company work in this area. I knew some good insurance 4 people, but I don't know just exactly what their best 5 work was. 6 Q. Would you regard Government bulletins and 7 reports on occupational disease to be good sources, 8 ones that would include some of the best information 9 available about the known and suspected health hazards 10 of asbestos during your years working for Dow? 11 A. That was -- What journal was that? 12 Q. I'm just speaking of Government bulletins 13 and reports generally that would deal with 14 occupational disease hazards such as asbestos. 15 A. I don't know whether I would or not. All
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16 depends on who was involved in that particular
17 article. 18 Q. If -- If the author were a person like 19 Anthony Lanza from Metropolitan, would you give 20 credence to his work?
21 A. I didn't know Lanza very well.
22 Q. Did you know of his reputation?
23 A. My personal contacts, as I said, were very
24 limited.
I know he had a good reputation, but I have
25 no way o f judging it.
473
1 Q. Okay. Well, did you, like, withhold 2 judgment until you could actually become acquainted 3 personally with the authors of the different 4 scientific articles and medical articles that you 5 would encounter in your profession and before you'd 6 give credence to their work? 7 A. I don't know. It seemed that that was the 8 case and very frequently. 9 Q. Dr. Rowe, do you recall ever finding in Dow 10 files any kind of information or publications from 11 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company concerning 12 occupational disease and occupational health hazards? 13 A. I don't recollect. 14 Q. You recollect that Metropolitan, at least 15 for some period of time, provided insurance coverage 16 in the form of disability coverage for Dow employees? 17 A. I don't know. 18 Q. Would you regard persons like Alice Hamilton
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 19 as a credible source of information on occupational 20 diseases? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. How about Dr. Harriet Hardy, would you 23 regard Dr. Hardy well, also? 24 A. She had a good reputation. 25 Q. Is that a "yes"?
474
1 A. Qualified. 2 Q. All right, sir. Was it the practice at Dow 3 during any of the years you worked there to monitor 4 for any of the materials that showed up on the 5 A.C.G.I.H. T.L.V. list that were used or present in 6 the plants? 7 MR. PIERCE: Asked and answered. 8 But go ahead. 9 A. Again I'd ask -- Please repeat. 10 Q. Would your industrial hygienists at Dow 11 automatically monitor for any of the materials or for 12 all of the materials on the A.C.G.I.H. threshold limit 13 value list that were known to be present in the Dow 14 plants? 15 A. I don't know. 16 Q. You don't know? 17 A. I don't know. "All" is a very inclusive 18 word. 19 Q. Well , most? 20 A. So, I don't know. 21 Q. Was it the rule that if the material was
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 22 listed on the A.C.G.I.H. table that the hygienists 23 were expected to monitor for it if it was present in 24 the Dow plant? 25 A. That was the usual case, yes.
475
1 Q. And that was the case going back to the - to 2 the beginning of the A.C.G.I.H. standards in the late 3 Forties, as you recall? 4 A. Probably not. 5 Q. Do you think the extent of the monitoring 6 increased after that time? 7 A. Well, we simply did not have the capacity t 8 do that. We di d not even have an industrial 9 hygienist. 10 Q. Until -11 A. Until '48. 12 Q. '48? About the same time that the T.L.V.'s 13 were published by the A.C.G.I.H., isn't it? 14 A. I don't remember when they were first 15 published. 16 Q. Dr. Rowe, can you tell us who, if anybody, 17 from Dow attended the New York Academy of Science 18 presentations on asbestos disease hazards in 1964? 19 A. I don't remember. 20 Q. Do you recall that anyone went to this - 21 A. I don't recall. 22 Q. Do you recall learning of this symposium, 23 yourself, at some point, the one at Mount Sinai in 24 connection with Dr. Selikoff and his doctors?
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1 Q. Did you ever meet Dr. I rving Selikoff? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. When was that, sir? 4 A. I don't remember. 5 Q. Was it after the mid-Sixties? 6 A. I don't know. I don't remember the -7 Q. Can you recall any of the circumstances 8 surrounding this meeting? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Could you recount those for us, sir? 11 A. We -- I met with Dr. Selikoff with respect 12 to a major problem with dioxins and Agent Orange, 13 2,4,5-T. 14 Q. Would this not likely, then, have been in 15 maybe the late Seventies, early Eighties? 16 A. No. 17 Q. Earlier than that? 18 A. Oh, yes. It was at the time when this was 19 I don't even remember what the dates were - that had 20 to do with the Agent Orange problem. And Selikoff was 21 very interested in it. And we, as a laboratory, 22 visited Dr. Selikoff and made - presented him with all 23 the toxicological data we had on these compounds in 24 his conference room, I guess, at his laboratory. 25 Q. Did any work by Selikoff or his doctors
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1 follow from that meeting? 2 A. I don't recollect. 3 Q. What was the purpose of Dow going to meet 4 with - Dow scientists meeting with Dr. Selikoff in 5 connection with Agent Orange? 6 A. As I recollect, Dr. Selikoff asked us if we 7 would share the information we had with him. Seems as 8 though they were doing some work, themselves, and 9 didn't wish to - wished to have the benefit of what we 10 already had learned. 11 Q. I see. Can you recall any other occasions 12 when Dr. Selikoff called on Dow for information or 13 provided any -14 A. I don't recall. 15 Q. -- any information to Dow? 16 A. I don't recall. 17 Q. Do you think that you or your colleagues in 18 your department at Dow learned anything about asbestos 19 health hazards from the studies of Dr. Selikoff's 20 doctors that were reported in 1964? 21 A. I don't know. 22 Q. Or later? 23 A. I don't know. 24 Q. Wasn't it largely due to the - the report in 25 1964 at Mount Sinai and the subsequent studies that
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1 Dow finally began to monitor routinely for asbestos in Page 117
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 2 its Texas plants in 1968, Dr. Rowe? 3 A. I - 4 MR. PIERCE: Object to the form; 5 leading. And it's asked and answered. 6 A. I don't know. 7 Q. Can you give us any understanding why in 8 1968 Dow did begin monitoring for asbestos exposures 9 in the Texas plants? 10 A. I don't know. 11 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 12 form. It assumes matters not in 13 evidence. 14 A. I don't know. 15 Q. Was Dow a maker of Agent Orange or any of 16 its components? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Was it your belief at the time that Agent 19 Orange was a safe material? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Still your belief? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. In... 24 MR. ALMQUIST: We' ve been going 25 for another hour here. Are you getting
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1 ready to switch gears? 2 MR. BLANKS: Oh, okay. Sure. 3 MR. PIERCE: Let's take a 4 short...
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 5 THE WITNESS: It's time to 6 stretch. 7 MR. PIERCE: How's your pain 8 (d irected to the witness)? 9 (AT THIS TIME A BRIEF RECESS WAS 10 TAKEN, AND THE PROCEEDINGS THEREAFTER 11 RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:) 12 (By Mr. Blanks) 13 Q. Dr. Rowe, you said a few minutes ago that 14 you regarded Agent Orange as a safety material. I 15 wonder if you believe that asbestos insulation, as it 16 was used at Dow plants in the Forties through the 17 Sixties, was a safe material. 18 A. As far as I know. 19 Q. You said - 20 A. Depends on how it's used and the dosage. 21 Q. I sort of spoke over you there. You said it 22 depends on how it's used and the dosage? 23 A. That's right. 24 Q. Okay. So, in some uses and in some dosages 25 it wouldn't be a safe material?
480
1 A. If you have excessive doses, there's nothing 2 that's safe. 3 Q. Well, do you believe, sir, that, as it was 4 used at Dow in the Forties through the Sixties, that 5 asbestos insulation was, in fact, a safe material as 6 used? 7 A. As far as I know.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 8 Q. Now, you said back in one of your talks in 9 1974 that "safe" implies absolute safety or no risk. 10 Do you still use the word "safe" that way? 11 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 12 form. 13 If you're reading from something, 14 please let us know what it is. 15 A. Well, the only safe exposure is no exposure. 16 Q. In some of your speech notes, Dr. Rowe, you 17 refer to Dr. Selikoff of Mount Sinai as "one of our 18 adversaries." Could you explain what you would have 19 meant by that? 20 A. Well, Dr. Selikoff was one of those persons 21 who believed that any exposure was likely to produce 22 with respect to asbestos, as far as I know, that any 23 exposure was something really serious. And I don't 24 believe that that is true. 25 Q. Would you say that an exposure sufficient to
481
1 cause mesothelioma in a worker would be something 2 really serious? 3 A. Would be what? 4 Q. Something really serious. 5 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 6 form; argumentative. 7 A. Certainly that's a serious response. 8 Q. And do you think that at any time you were 9 at Dow that Dow knew - knew what, really, were 10 asbestos exposures that were not serious?
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 11 MR. PIERCE: I object to the 12 form. It's confusing. 13 MR. BLANKS: You're right. It was 14 a bad question. Thank you. 15 (By Mr. Blanks) 16 Q. Would you say, Dr. Rowe, that there was a 17 time when you were with Dow that Dow did know to a 18 certainty what amount of asbestos exposure would not 19 be something really serious? 20 A. To the best of my knowledge, exposures 21 controlled to recommended levels were considered to be 22 acceptable. 23 Q. Yes, sir. But the question was did Dow know 24 what levels of exposure would not, in fact, cause any 25 kind of occupational disease.
482
1 MR. PIERCE: Asked and answered. 2 A. I don't know. 3 Q. Do you think that you knew before you left 4 Dow what level of asbestos exposure was certain not to 5 cause disease in any person exposed to it at work? 6 A. I don't know except to say that I - that I 7 don't believe that I have ever seen information which 8 indicated or proved that exposures which were below 9 the accepted level had caused asbestos-type disease. 10 Q. Dr. Rowe, would you expect that one would 11 have cases of asbestosis in workers who had been using 12 asbestos in a safe way, as you've used the term? 13 A. I would -- I guess I'll have you ask that
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14 again.
15 Q. Would you expect that you would have cases
16 of asbestosis in workers who had used the material in 17 a way - in a safe way, as you've used the term?
18 A. I have no reason to believe that they would. 19 Q. And, therefore, if you did find cases of
20 asbestosis in workers who had been exposed in a safe 21 way, as you say, that really wouldn't have been a safe
22 use. 23
It would have been unsafe, wouldn't it? MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form
24 of the question. It implies that the
25 only place anyone could have an
483
1 asbestos exposure was from an 2 occupational setting and that the 3 individual involved could not have had 4 exposure at other places. 5 But given that objection and the 6 ambiguous nature of the question, go 7 ahead. 8 MR. PAPPAS: Obj ection; 9 argumentative. 10 A. My -- My own opinion is that - that, again, 11 it's exposure intensity that is a controlling factor. 12 And I know of nothing, as I said before, where 13 documented exposures could show that the exposure had 14 never exceeded those levels. 15 Q. So, if you found cases of asbestosis in Dow 16 workers, would that lead you to the conclusion that,
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 17 in fact, their exposures had been excessive? 18 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 19 for the same - 20 A. No. Well... 21 MR. PIERCE: -- reasons as given 22 earlier. 23 MR. PAPPAS: Also, speculation. 24 Q. Sir? 25 A. If we knew for sure all the rest of the
484
1 exposures that could possibly have occurred. I don't 2 know the history of the people. I'd have to know 3 that. 4 Q. Like if they'd had some hobby that would 5 cause them to have high asbestos exposures? Is that 6 what you're thinking of? 7 A. I don't know where it might be. 8 Q. In your experience, would the occupational 9 exposures of a worker to asbestos almost always be the 10 most intense and those of the longest duration that 11 you'd find in a person? 12 A. I had no way of knowing. 13 Q. Did you suspect during any of the years that 14 you were with Dow that there were significant 15 nonoccupational exposures to asbestos that people 16 working in your plants could have had? 17 A. I don't know. 18 Q. Did you all give preplacement examinations 19 at Dow to look for indications of occupational disease
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 20 before you'd put somebody on the payroll? 21 A. Again, that's in a time frame. And I can't 22 identify that. I don't believe that was the case in 23 the early days. It was, I think, quite universal with 24 the latter days. I don't know what that means, 25 either. But the last few years that I was around it
485
1 was... 2 Q.
Do you recollect that it was part of the
3 routine in the periodic medical exams during any of
4 the years that the doctor would ask - would ask the
5 employee about his exposures at work or what the
6 employee thought his exposures were to toxic
7 materials?
8 A. I don't know. 9 Q. Did the medical department ever consult with
10 you in toxicology or with your industrial hygienists,
11 that you know of, about what kind of toxic exposures
12 workers could be facing so the doctors would know what
13 kind of disease signs or symptoms to be on the lookout
14 for? 15 A.
Did I interpret -- Did the doctors talk to
16 us?
17 Q. Yes, sir.
18 A. Yes. 19 Q. And did they talk to you about "What kind of
20 occupational diseases should we be aware of or on the 21 lookout for?" 22 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 23 form; leading. 24 A. Well, I'm sure that was the case; but we 25 developed information that we shared first with the
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1 medical department on materials that were unknown to 2 anybody else or they were compositions which were new 3 where there was no evidence, that we knew of - I mean 4 no toxicological evidence - anywhere. 5 Q. Yes, sir. 6 A. So, the medical department relied on us to 7 tell them what to expect from, more or less, 8 short-term exposures. And that's as far as we could 9 possibly go. 10 Q. Okay. And for those more mundane materials 11 that had been around for a while such as asbestos or 12 silica, you expected the medical department was just 13 relying on their medical training and the medical 14 literature for - 15 A. That was my under - 16 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 17 form; compound, ambiguous. 18 A. That was my understanding. 19 Q. Okay. I think in the same talk where you 20 used Dr. Selikoff as an example of one of your 21 adversaries, you referred to him as "an artist of 22 innuendo." 23 A. I beg your pardon. 24 Q. "An artist of innuendo." It sounds like a 25 Spi ro Agnew-ism, I know, but...
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1 MR. PIERCE: I like it. However,
2 I'm going to object since we have no 3 way of checking the accuracy of that
4 quotation.
5 But in the context of the question
6 go ahead and answer.
7 Q. Could you elaborate on that, sir? 8 A. I don't know what I was referring to at the
9 moment when I said that. 10 Q. This -- This comes from what was marked as 11 Exhibit 6 to your deposition, sir, around page 63
12 through 65. 13
Let me hand you those. MR. BLANKS: Is there more? Did
14 this fall out of it? 15 (By Mr. Blanks) 16 Q. Let me hand you these three (tendering 17 documents). Do you recognize that as your 18 handwriting, Dr. Rowe?
19 A. (Reviewing document) It sure looks like it.
20 Q. It may be missing a page there. This one
21 got stamped sideways. 66, I think, follows 65. And
22 67 -- Is 65 the first page there? 23 MR. PIERCE: No. Sixty -- It runs
24 63 to 66 now.
25 MR. BLANKS: Okay.
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1 MR. PIERCE: Where are you - 2 MR. BLANKS: We're at the point 3 where Dr. Rowe -- I think he said he 4 recognized that as his handwriting. 5 MR. PIERCE: All right. 6 (By Mr. Blanks) 7 Q. And these would appear to be your notes for 8 a talk you gave somewhere in your career? Yes, sir? 9 A. (Reviewing document) 10 MR. BLANKS: Take that off 11 (referring to yellow tab on document). 12 MR. PIERCE: Well, I think now my 13 objection to the quotation is all the 14 more pertinent since on page 65 15 Selikoff is certainly indicated as an 16 artist of innuendo but rather as an 17 example of people who go public and not 18 worry about the correct - correctness 19 or the probability of their 20 statements. 21 So, yeah, I think that was 22 appropriate, indeed, as an objection. 23 MR. BLANKS: You think that was an 24 appropriate objection? What was the 25 objection? Bet you can't even remember
489
1 it now. 2 MR. PIERCE: That we did not see
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 3 the quote. 4 MR. BLANKS: Ah. Well, now we've 5 remedied that. 6 MR. PIERCE: And now your quote 7 was incorrect. 8 (By Mr. Blanks) 9 Q. My God, did you not say "artist of 10 innuendo," Dr. Rowe? You didn't say "may bob of 11 negative-ism," did you? 12 MR. PIERCE: I said that - 13 A. Well, I explained it -- Exactly what I meant 14 is explained right there. 15 Q. Well, our colloquy aside, would you - now 16 that you have the paper in front of you, would you 17 tell us -- This is a copy of notes you made for a talk 18 you gave somewhere. Would that be correct? 19 A. It's my handwriting. 20 Q. All right, sir. And could you explain to us 21 what you meant when you used Dr. Selikoff as an 22 example of an artist of innuendo? 23 MR. ALMQUIST: I'm going to object 24 to the characterization since I'm not 25 sure that's what the document says.
490
1 A. Statements such as "may" and -- Pretty soon 2 these sort of things get repeated and they get into 3 the press. And by the time they've got there, they're 4 quoted as fact. And often they're not really 5 supported by factual data (tendering document).
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6 Q. And when you said "may," you mean like a
7 statement that as bestos may cause cancer was the type
8 of -9 A. 10 Q.
Does it say asbestos? No, it doesn't. But --
11 A. Okay.
12 Q. -- it wasn't clear when you said a statement
13 such as " may" was an example of innuendo.
14 A. This is -- I'm speaking generally. 15 Q. Your -- Your quote here says "They are 16 articles" -- I'm sorry. Let me start over. You say, 17 "They are artists of innuendo -- Such and such may
18 cause cancer."
19 A. Uh-huh. 20 Q. That's what you meant as an innuendo that 21 could be misleading?
22 A. It was an example of using "may." "This may
23 cause cancer." May cause almost anything that's -
24 that's disagreeable to sway public opinion. 25 Q. Do you think, Dr. Rowe, that it's - that
491
1 it's misleading to - for a researcher to say that a 2 material being investigated may cause cancer while 3 he's still gathering data? 4 A. I guess I don't understand your question. 5 Q. Well, I guess -- At what point is it not 6 misleading to say that asbestos may cause cancer? 7 That's what I'm trying to - 8 A. I didn't say that asbestos may cause
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 9 cancer. I was speaking in -- Dr. Selikoff has spoken 10 on many things other than sil - than asbestos. 11 MR. PIERCE: And, also, are your 12 questions related to the scientific 13 literature, to the use of newspaper and 14 public access as, I believe, is implied 15 in the exhibit? I believe it's 16 Exhibit 6. I mean, I think you have to 17 really limit it to what the talk is 18 about for us to understand where you're 19 going, Mr. Blanks. 20 Q. I think you said here, quoting you, 21 "Contrarywise our adversaries use every opportunity to 22 go public and they worry not about the" 23 "correctness," perhaps - "or the probability of their 24 statements as we do. Example, Selikoff." And then 25 you go on to say they're artists of innuendo.
492
1 This general statement with Dr. Selikoff as 2 an example, is that one that you say doesn't relate to 3 his work on asbestos and asbestos as a cause of 4 cancer? 5 A. I didn't say that. 6 Q. Do you think it does relate to his work on 7 cancer as first came to light in the early Sixties? 8 A. I don't have any question about that 9 that - the asbestos situation. When he said "may," 10 well, I wouldn't argue with that; but there are other 11 things that he has spoken to -- And other people have,
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 12 too. Not only Dr. Selikoff but others have frequently 13 used something that is in prepublication stage and 14 quote it in the press for some purpose to their 15 benefit. And we have seen many examples of this, not 16 only with Dr. Selikoff but with others, some of whom I 17 don't know who they were. They just came out as 18 edicts that this is bad, but there's not the data 19 behind it. Anybody -- I could -- I could postulate 20 that - most anything you want to mention that it may 21 be carcinogenic. And give me five years and I might 22 be able to prove it. 23 MR. PIERCE: And, Mr. Blanks, if I 24 could just bring to your attention - 25 When you read the sentence "Such and
493
1 such may cause cancer," you did not 2 read the entire sentence which is 3 completed when it says "when in fact 4 the data weigh heavily in the other 5 direction." 6 Q. What's - 7 MR. PIERCE: That's page 65. 8 Q. Could you tell us, Dr. Rowe, what is the 9 example you give there in that next-to-the-last 10 paragraph? I can't read it. 11 A. Are you referring to the paragraph starting 12 with "They are" or what? 13 Q. No, sir. The one right below it where it 14 says "Example."
Page 131
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 15 A. It says "Elsea." And I'm trying to remember 16 what that was. I don't remember. I don't remember 17 what that refers to. 18 Q. I couldn't - couldn't connect it with 19 anything. Would you look at the next page of that, 20 that first full paragraph where you start out "As you 21 can probably tell from the thrust of my remarks," and 22 then go on "I am concerned about our ability to 23 communicate our science effectively to others than 24 the friendly scientific community." Do you see that, 25 sir?
494
1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Who did you regard as "the friendly 3 scientific community"? 4 A. Those scientists who are primarily concerned 5 with dealing with facts and not fancy. 6 Q. All right, sir. You include yourself and 7 your colleagues at Dow in that group who deals with 8 facts and not -9 A. I do. 10 Q. -- fancy? In connection with the 11 Mount Sinai studies on asbestos as a cause of disease 12 and cancer, would you view the Mount Sinai physicians 13 and their epidemiologists as scientists who deal in 14 facts and not fancy? 15 A. When the data is there to support it. 16 Q. Is it your view that the data was there to 17 support their conclusions in 1964 and in their
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 18 subsequent reports? 19 MR. PIERCE: In respect to what, 20 Mr. Blanks? 21 MR. BLANKS: The conclusions that 22 they set out about asbestos as a cause 23 of lung cancer and other matters. 24 A. I think I have mentioned several times I do 25 not have a problem with the asbestos situation.
495
1 (By Mr. Blanks) 2 Q. All right, sir. So, as far as - 3 A. Insofar as I am aware - And I'm certainly no 4 expert in asbestos - my impression is that asbestos in 5 appropriate dosages and types of exposure can cause 6 cancer. I don't argue this one bit. 7 Q. Okay. So, you don't view the Selikoff and 8 Mount Sinai work from the Sixties as being bad 9 science, then? 10 MR. PIERCE: Meaning -- The "work 11 from the Sixties" meaning the asbestos 12 and mesothelioma work, not any 13 Selikoff work; is that correct, 14 Mr. Blanks? 15 MR. BLANKS: Yeah. 16 A. I'm referring to that. Yes 17 (By M r. Blanks) 18 Q. Yes. 19 A. I agree with that. 20 Q. You wouldn't say that's bad science would
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 21 you? 22 A. No. No. I didn't say that. 23 Q. Okay. Well, I just want to make that 24 clear. 25 MR. PIERCE: And we've certainly
496
1 made it clear often enough. 2 MR. BLANKS: Anything worth doing 3 is worth overdoing, Mr. Pierce. 4 (By Mr. Blanks) 5 Q. Would you agree, then, Dr. Rowe, that if the 6 best information available by 1965 said that asbestos 7 was a cause of lung cancer that - 8 A. I wouldn't argue that point. 9 Q. Okay. Would you agree, then, that cancer 10 should have been reported by Dow as an asbestos health 11 hazard - 12 A. I don't know. 13 Q. -- by 1965? 14 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 15 to the ambiguity. 16 A. Again I have to relate it to the intensity 17 of exposure. 18 Q. Yes, sir? 19 A. Well, that's my answer. 20 Q. Well, I mean, how in providing information 21 to your colleagues or your employees would you relate 22 that fact of asbestos-causing cancer to exposure? How 23 would you tell that to a worker?
Page 134
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 24 A. Well, you would specify the levels of 25 exposure that the supposed authorities or experts
497
1 would indicate would be safe. If you have a -- If you 2 have -- If you don't take care of yourself and so 3 forth and you get into a cloud of this stuff all the
4 time -- If that's the case, that's bad news. 5 Q. Well, in terms of relaying this information 6 to people working in your plants, though, I mean was 7 it the approach to just say "Keep your exposures below 8 this level, and you will be okay"? 9 A. I don't know exactly what was said in the
10 plants. I wasn't there. 11 Q. Well, if, as you said, the view was by 1965 12 that asbestos could cause lung cancer, how then would 13 you relay that to a worker? I mean, would you say,
14 "Asbestos can cause cancer. That's one of the health
15 hazards"? 16
MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to
17 the form. It calls for speculation. 18 He's told you he has no firsthand
19 knowledge of what was said.
20 But go ahead.
21 A. I don't know that it wasn't said. I'm
22 surprised if it wasn't. 23 Q. Can you tell me a little bit about the 24 history of the documents that Dow used to describe
25 material health hazards? Are those things that
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1 preceded the Material Safety Data Sheets? Do you know 2 what I'm talking about? 3 A. (No response) 4 Q. Didn't you have a form to report health 5 hazard information on about specific materials? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. And what did you call that form? Was it 8 something called "Data Sheet of Properties, Health 9 Hazards, and Precautions for Safe Handling of 10 Materials"? Does that ring a bell? 11 A. That rings a bell. 12 Q. Do you recognize the form (tendering 13 document to Mr. Pierce)? 14 MR. PIERCE: Thanks (reviews and 15 tenders document to the witness) 16 A. (Reviewing document) Yes. 17 Q. How far back in time, approximately, do 18 these forms or something equivalent to it at Dow, 19 Dr. Rowe? 20 A. I don't know. It would have been after 21 Mr. Hoyle begun operations. And I can't tell you 22 the -- I just don't know. 23 Q. So, probably after '48? 24 A. I'm sure it was after '48. 25 Q. Were these prepared just as a matter of
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 1 routine as the toxicology department and the 2 industrial hygiene department began to explore 3 materials and a bank of them created - a library of 4 them built up? 5 A. I really don't know what you're -- Rephrase 6 it, would you, please? 7 Q. I'm wondering, Dr. Rowe, whether these kind 8 of forms were done on an ad hoc basis when a question 9 would arise, when a problem might be reported or 10 suspected. 11 A. No. 12 Q. Or were they done as part of a routine of 13 trying to set up a safety data sheet for every 14 potential toxic material in the plant that took place 15 over time? 16 A. Well, they were routine after a certain 17 point; but I can't tell you just when that point was. 18 Q. Okay. But they weren't one-shot deals - 19 A. Oh, no. 20 Q. -- in response to a - some fellow reporting 21 a problem with a skin ailment or what have you? Okay. 22 MR. BLANKS: Could I have that 23 back now (indicating document)? 24 MR. PIERCE: Sure. 25 MR. BLANKS: I'll have to hand it
500
1 back to you in a second. 2 (By Mr. Blanks) 3 Q. Would it be surprising to you that in 1965
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4 in a biochemical research laboratory report regarding
5 exposures to fine dust encountered by workers cutting 6 various types of pipe material that in discussing 7 asbestos and its health hazards that no mention 8 whatever would be made of asbestos as a carcinogen or 9 even a suspected carcinogen, Dr. Rowe? 10 A. I don't know whether the particular person
11 that prepared that was aware of it or not. I don't
12 know. 13 Q.
Would you expect that Mr. Hoyle, had he
14 checked that report, would have been aware of
15 asbestos' propensity to cause cancer in 1965? 16 MR. PIERCE: Are you looking at a 17 particular document? And, if so, bring
18 it to our attention. 19 MR. BLANKS: We're looking at 20 Hoyle Exhibit 7. 21 MR. ALMQUIST: I don't have the
22 quote. If you've got it -- I don't
23 have a copy of that. 24 And I'm also going to object to
25 the question because it asks him to
501
1 speculate as to what Mr. Hoyle 2 would have known in 1965. 3 MR. BLANKS: Well, certainly, I 4 wouldn't expect somebody in the 5 toxicology department to have any 6 notion of what Mr. Hoyle would know
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 7 about asbestos and cancer in 1965. 8 MR. ALMQUIST: Object to the 9 side-bar comment. 10 (By Mr. Blanks) 11 Q. The question, sir, was: Would you have 12 expected Mr. Hoyle, given his experience and training, 13 by 1965 to have know that cancer was one of the health 14 hazards associated with asbestos dust exposure? 15 MR. ALMQUIST: Same objection. 16 A. I would have expected it, but I don't know. 17 Q. If he had known about it, wouldn't you have 18 expected that he would mention asbestos caused cancer 19 as one of the health hazards of asbestos exposure and 20 to have put it in a report - due to asbestos exposure? 21 MR. PIERCE: A report relating to 22 what? 23 MR. BLANKS: A report relating to 24 exposures to workers cutting various 25 types of pipe covering material,
502
1 including asbestos. 2 A. Well, I'd like to read the whole report, if 3 I could, because I don't remember it at all. 4 (By Mr. Blanks) 5 Q. All right, sir. I'm happy to make that 6 available to you. I just wonder if in discussing 7 asbestos health hazards you would have expected 8 Mr. Hoyle, at least by 1965, to mention cancer as one 9 of the potential health hazards.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 10 A. I don't know what he was discussing. 11 MR. PIERCE: That -- What's the 12 date of that report? 13 MR. BLANKS: This is a July 21st, 14 1965, report by Mr. E. J. Schneider, 15 checked by H. R. Hoyle. 16 (By Mr. Blanks) 17 Q. Do you recall Mr. Schneider? 18 A. He was an industrial hygienist. 19 Q. I take it that Mr. Hoyle would have been 20 reporting to Dr. Adams in 1965. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. And not to you. 23 A. I don't -- I don't recollect that that -- I 24 think that's the case. He didn't report to me, I 25 don't believe, until it was in the - '70 or
503
1 thereabouts. 2 Q. All right, sir. I'm happy to pass this over 3 to you (tendering document). 4 A. (Reviewing document) 5 Q. Okay. Do you have anything you want to add 6 to what you covered a few minutes ago about that 7 report, Dr. Rowe? 8 A. Well, it would seem to me that it was a 9 pretty decent report. The word "cancer" is not 10 mentioned but "asbestosis." And that was -- I didn't 11 know when the definitive nature of the carcinogenesis 12 appeared; but asbestosis was the same bag of worms as
Page 140
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 13 far as that's concerned. But I think that's a very 14 good report. 15 Q. All right, sir. 16 A. It analyzes the situation and tells them 17 what they should be doing differently. 18 Q. When you say "asbestosis is the same bag of 19 worms as cancer," - 20 A. It's a serious -- It's a serious 21 incapacitating disease in the end. We certainly don't 22 want asbestosis. 23 Q. So, the goal would have been to prevent 24 asbestosis. And if you'd done that, perhaps you would 25 have prevented any cancers that may have gone with
504
1 it. True? 2 A. That would be my offhand opinion without 3 being an expert in the area. 4 Q. Okay. And if you had, in fact, been using 5 industrial hygiene controls and medical controls to 6 sufficient to prevent any cases of asbestosis, you 7 would certainly have increased the probability of 8 preventing cases of asbestos-related cancer in that 9 same work force, correct? 10 A. I think that's a fair statement. 11 Q. But you don't have any explanation for us 12 why in 1965 the authors of this Dow report done for 13 Dow Corning failed to mention that asbestos was a 14 suspected or probable carcinogen -15 A. I don't know.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 16 Q. -- in discussing the health hazards of 17 asbestos? 18 A. I don't know. 19 Q. As to this type of form that we looked at a 20 little earlier, the one that reported on the health 21 hazards of different materials, were those health 22 hazard forms, if I can use that term, kept on file at 23 Dow for the different departments to have access to? 24 A. To my knowledge, yes. 25 Q. Would you have had a collection of those
505
1 available in your department? 2 A. I'm sure we would. 3 Q. And updates, if any were made, would come to 4 you to replace the obsolete edition or version of - 5 A. They wouldn't come to me but they would - 6 Routinely, unless something got screwed up, they would 7 be in the - in the file. 8 Q. Okay. Do you -- I got the impression that 9 some of these - And you have one in front of you; so, 10 that may as well do as an example - were prepared 11 around the time of the inquiry that is mentioned on 12 the form. Can you help me to understand that? 13 A. I don't know. These things... 14 MR. PIERCE: I'm sorry. I'd like 15 to pose an objection. Both documents 16 speak for themselves. They're both 17 dated. And whether they're close in 18 time or not is something that certainly
Page 142
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 19 you're quite as capable of finding as 20 Dr. Rowe is. 21 MR. BLANKS: Well, if the 22 documents spoke for themselves, I guess 23 we wouldn't have to speak with one 24 another. But I just - 25 MR. PIERCE: Well, if a document
506
1 is labeled 1958, another one 1965, I
2 think that's pretty clear. Now, what 3 you mean by "close in time," I don't
4 know.
5 MR. BLANKS: Let me borrow the
6 exhibits back. 7 MR. PIERCE: 8 (By Mr. Blanks)
(Tendering documents)
9 Q. Dr. Rowe, what I'm wondering is this, sir. 10 And this Exhibit No. 2 is a sufficient example for the
11 question. 12 13 14
MR. PIERCE: Is this Exhibit 2 from the Hoyle deposition or from Dr. Rowe's deposition?
15 MR. BLANKS: From Mr. Hoyle's
16 deposition. 17 (By Mr. Blanks)
18 Q. There is a report with the same format as
19 the one you looked at on the asbestos matter regarding 20 pipe covers that - in this case the result of a
21 range-finding tox. test on a floor tile formulation Page 143
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 22 that is done by Ken Olson in Apr il 21st of 1958. And 23 attached to it was the Data Sheet of Properties, 24 Health Hazards, and Precautions for Safe Handling of 25 Materials, discussing the components of the floor tile
507
1 formulation. And it's dated various dates beginning
2 in mid-March, going through April 7th of '58, just the
3 weeks preceding Mr. Olson's report. And, so, I was - 4 That's why I was asking you, sir, whether or not these
5 safe handling of material sheets that mention health 6 hazards were from time to time prepared to go along
7 with an investigation that was done by industrial
8 hygiene as opposed to being part of a library of such
9 data sheets.
10 A. The -- I can't give you the dates. I don't
11 know. But there were -- There was a time when the
12 value of those was appreciated and we prepared -- The
13 industrial hygienist would take the toxicology reports
14 and prepare that particular form, which was their
15 form, and that would become a part of that report that
16 was distributed.
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. And those sheets then -- There may have been
19 separate ones that would be sent to the particular
20 areas or plant superintendents that - that were
21 involved.
22 Q. Okay. And from time to time such sheets 23 might be sent to customers, as well?
24
A. I don't remember whether those were
I
Page 144
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 25 don't remember -- I don't remember.
508
1 Q. Dr. Rowe, in one of your rough drafts for a 2 speech of - perhaps given in the late Seventies, you 3 mention - you mentioned some things I'd like to ask
4 you about.
5 MR. BLANKS: It's Rowe 6 Exhibit 7 that we're referring to,
7 Mr. Almquist. 8 (By Mr. Blanks)
9 Q. And it has a title on it, sir, of 10 "Environmental Health," to put it in a little bit of
11 context. But one thing you mention there was -- You
12 said by 1946 that bimonthly conferences were being
13 held between medical, toxicology, industrial hygiene,
14 and safety. 15 16
Do you recall that that was so? MR. PIERCE: Could you give us a
page on that, please?
17 Four? Okay. 18 A. Again, I can't testify to the dates; but
19 that was - that was common practice. We did that
20 quite often. Maybe we might have missed a meeting or
21 two, but it was - generally that was the routine.
22 Q. Okay. Forgive me if we've touched on this
23 in prior visits. I don't recall that we did. But
24 this - this talk says that these conferences between
25 the departments - medical, toxicology, industrial
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509
1 hygiene, and safety - have continued to the present 2 date. And we surmise that present date in this paper 3 to be somewhere around '76 or after. 4 But would that be your recollection that for 5 that 30-year period - that these kind of bimonthly 6 meetings were taking place? 7 A. As far as I know, they were; but I probably 8 was not involved in those in the later years. 9 Q. Why would that be, sir? 10 A. Because I had a different position. 11 Q. "The later years" meaning just the last few 12 years you were at Dow, from '79 - 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. -- back into '73, that l ast six years or so? 15 A. Yeah. In that time frame. 16 Q. That would have been the period when you 17 became a director of toxicological affairs and related 18 jobs? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Okay. Were notes made, Dr. Rowe, of these 21 bimonthly conferences between the medical, the 22 toxicological, the industrial hygiene, and the safety 23 staffs at Dow? 24 A. I don't remember. I don't think so. 25 Q. Was this called a committee or just didn't
1 have any
Did it have any title? Page 146
510
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 2 A. We called it the biochem/safety/medical 3 meetings. 4 Q. Okay. Sounds like a descriptive title. 5 Could you share with us sort of the format 6 of these? Were they informal just get-togethers and 7 round-table discussions or were there agendas for 8 these meetings or both? 9 A. They were definitely informal. We -- We met 10 and had lunch at the expense of the medical 11 department. 12 Q. Even better. 13 A. And the agenda was -- Sometimes there were 14 specific items that somebody wanted to discuss, but 15 generally what they amounted to was a place where the 16 medical department might have seen someone and 17 wondered if what was wrong with them could possibly be 18 related to this or that or so on. 19 The industrial hygiene or safety department 20 might come in with a - something that they didn't like 21 the looks of out in the plant and ask medical if they 22 had had any particular problems. Action could be 23 instituted by any of the people there. 24 In other words, if the medical department 25 had seen someone who had a rash, industrial hygienists
511
1 would probably be detailed to investigate and see what 2 it was, if it was occupationally caused, or maybe talk
3 to the man and find out what he had been doing at
4 home.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 5 Might work the other way. Might be that the 6 safety department had seen something. The safety 7 department was primarily concerned with fire and the 8 mechanical hazards, but they were in the plant and 9 often observed things that they didn't think were 10 right. And they might have wanted industrial 11 hygienists to check on it. 12 Toxicology was there to pass on any new 13 information on materials that perhaps had been 14 they'd been requested to look at in previous meetings 15 or otherwise. Particularly anything remarkable, would 16 be called. 17 Secondly, if there were materials that 18 suddenly appeared that we didn't have any information 19 on - the medical department didn't have - they would 20 ask us if we would get a sample and run it through the 21 screen to see if there was anything unusual about it. 22 So, it was a communication - informal communication, 23 gathering of people. 24 Now, the physicians, whoever was there, 25 except who was duty - was on duty on the floor during
512
1 the noon hour would probably be attending. Sometimes 2 even the nurses, safety department representative 3 not necessarily the same person each time - and the 4 same for toxicology and industrial hygiene. 5 MR. PIERCE: Joe, if you're not 6 going to finish very shortly, perhaps 7 this is an appropriate time. We can 8 pick it up tomorrow. I think we've had
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9 a couple hours now, unless you think
10 you're going to finish early. 11 MR. BLANKS: Well, I'm finished 12 with this little talk here but -
13 MR. BREWTON: You have seven
14 minutes.
15 MR. BLANKS: Oh. Seven minutes?
16 Let's run out the tape.
17 18 (By Mr. Blanks)
MR. PIERCE: Okay.
19 Q. All right, sir. And I guess you found these 20 biochemical/safety/medical meetings to be a good
21 opportunity to exchange ideas and to share new 22 information that you may have read about in the
23 literature or encountered at meetings and so on.
24 A. That's right. 25 Q. Could you tell us just briefly about the
513
1 retrieval system that was created in 1954 to document 2 chemical exposures' causes and consequences? 3 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 4 form; leading. It assumes facts not in 5 evidence. And you're reading from a 6 document that we don't have access to. 7 MR. BLANKS: Page 5. 8 MR. HOBSON: Page 5. 9 MR. BLANKS: Page 5. 10 MR. PIERCE: Of what? 11 MR. HOBSON: The same thing.
Page 149
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 12 MR. PIERCE: Oh. 13 MR. BLANKS: I try to lead 14 you from page to page, and still you 15 complain. 16 MR. PIERCE: Well, thank you for 17 bringing this to our attention. 18 MR. HOBSON: First full 19 paragraph. 20 A. Is this supposed to have to do with the 21 question? 22 (By Mr. Blanks) 23 Q. Yes, sir. Well, I don't know. Mr. Pierce 24 always likes to read these things. I figured you'd 25 know from your recollection.
514
1 A. Well, I -- The name didn't ring a bell 2 quickly; so, I'm trying to figure out what it was we 3 were talking about. 4 Q. I was just wondering what you remember about 5 the beginnings which, according to this paper, were 6 1954 of a retrieval system to document exposures' 7 causes and consequences. 8 A. Well, I'm blank. 9 Q. This refers to acute chemical exposures. 10 So, perhaps it was just limited to that. 11 A. I don't remember. 12 Q. Okay. Do you remember anything like this 13 that may have evolved into the computer-based system 14 that was being used in the late Seventies, or could
Page 150
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 15 you tell us anything about the computer data base of 16 your last decade there that had health hazard 17 information in it? 18 A. The computer laboratory had set up a - the 19 program. And I do not remember... I don't remember 20 what the source of information was that they had. And 21 it just -- I don't remember. That's all there is to 22 it. 23 Q. Okay. 24 A. We had a computer system that was gathering 25 data, but that's as far as I can say.
515
1 Q. Do you recall around 1967 that biostatistics
2 and epidemiology were included and made a part of the 3 Dow environmental health program?
4 A. We incorporated that, yes. I don't know the
5 dates. 6 Q.
Hired an epidemiologist, did you?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Were there epidemiology studies, then, done 9 of Dow employees, looking for occupational disease?
10 A. Yes. 11 Q. These were done, like, in-house by the Dow 12 epidemiologist, as you remember?
13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Can you recall, sir, if there before then
15 had been any studies done by outside folks that would 16 have included Dow workers in the epidemiology study?
17 A. I don't remember... I just don't remember Page 151
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 18 any. Any time the epidemiological work -- If there 19 was any done before the time we got the 20 epidemiologist, it would have been through the medical 21 department. 22 Q. Could you tell us anything, sir, about the 23 corporate ecology council that this paper says was 24 created by the board of directors in '67? 25 A. That was a group of people whose charge it
516
1 was to - basically to study the possible ecological 2 effects of disposal of materials, containers, and that 3 type of problem that you find in normal distribution 4 systems and to look at new - new materials to see what 5 effect they might have on probably some of the simple 6 systems in the environment. 7 Q. How about the Dow environmental testing 8 advisory board, what role did that have? 9 A. That was another similar group that - with 10 various disciplines in it to plan and - studies that 11 people thought would be appropriate to conduct. 12 Q. Did you have anything to do with either the 13 environmental testing advisory board or the corporate 14 ecology council? 15 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 16 form; compound. And "having anything 17 to do with" is rather vague and 18 ambiguous. 19 But go ahead. 20 A. Was it -- The question was did I have a part
Page 152
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 21 to do? 22 Q. Yes, sir. 23 A. I was -- I was a member of the - of the 24 board. 25 Q. Of the advisory board?
517
1 A. Both of them, I think.
2 Q. I'm sorry. Both?
3 A. Both, yes.
4 Q. I see. Okay.
5 MR. BLANKS: We're out of time.
6 Okay. Thanks for the extra - 7 MR. PIERCE: Nine o'clock?
8 MR. BLANKS: -- couple of minutes.
9 9:00 a.m. 10 MR. PIERCE: S ee you tomorrow.
11 MR. BLANKS: Thank you, Dr. Rowe.
12 Have a good evening, sir.
13 (AT 3:19 P.M., ON MAY 11, 1993,
14 THE DEPOSITION WAS RECESSED. AT
15 9:50 A.M., ON MAY 12, 1993, THE 16 DEPOSITION RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:)
17 18 RESUMPTION OF EXAMINATION BY MR. BLANKS:
19 Q. Good morning again, Dr. Rowe.
20 A. Good morning.
21 Q. I understand you went through your records
22 and found some more papers for us which came this
23 morning.
I appreciate your taking the time to make Page 153
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 24 that effort and apologize for the substantial 25 inconvenience it must have caused you.
518
1 A. Okay. 2 Q. We'll get to those documents later on and 3 see if we can deal with them then; but I appreciate 4 your trouble, sir. 5 I think when we quit yesterday we were 6 talking about epidemiology studies that the medical 7 department may have done and then the fact that Dow 8 had hired a biostatistician and epidemiologist 9 somewhere around '67 or so, as your notes seem to 10 show. 11 Do you recollect, sir, any particular 12 epidemiology studies that were done before you left 13 Dow that would have touched on cancer cases in the Dow 14 work force? 15 A. I'm not familiar with them. 16 Q. Okay. Would those studies have been kept in 17 the medical department or the tox - the biomedical 18 research department? 19 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 20 form. He indicated he had no knowledge 21 of such studies. 22 A. It might be in either. 23 Q. Do you recall that these type studies would 24 have come to you as a person in a position of 25 responsibility after '67?
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519
1 A. No. I didn't - didn't have anything to do 2 with the epidemiology people. 3 Q. Okay. Dr. Rowe, during that time when you 4 were administratively in charge of industrial 5 hygiene - or earlier, if it's the case - if a Dow 6 industrial hygienist or a Dow safety man had seen 7 visible dust in the workplace in connection with 8 insulation work, for example, what would you have 9 expected your industrial hygienist to do? 10 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 11 form. It's compound. It mentions two 12 kinds and then asks only about one. 13 Confusing. Ambiguous. 14 Go ahead. 15 A. I would have expected them to investigate 16 the situation and determine whether or not there was a 17 reasonable expectation of a hazardous situation. 18 Q. If the people responsible for health and 19 safety in the Dow plant had seen a turnaround or a 20 shutdown being done where there was dust being 21 generated from asbestos around trades just besides the 22 insulator's, what would you have expected them to do? 23 A. I don't know. 24 Q. Would you not have expected them to 25 investigate the exposure levels for the people working
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 1 in or near that dust cloud that we've postulated? 2 A. I think my answer to your other question 3 covered your -- I don't know any more. I just said I 4 would have expected them to investigate and that... 5 Q. All right, sir. What if your people at Dow 6 responsible for health and safety on the job had seen 7 men handling asbestos insulation and working without 8 respiratory protection, what would the response be 9 that you'd expect to that situation? 10 MR. ALMQUIST: I object to the 11 vagueness of the question. It doesn't 12 have a time period associated with it. 13 A. I would expect them to suggest remedial 14 action. 15 Q. What would you have expected had your health 16 and safety people at Dow seen men working with 17 asbestos insulation and not using wet methods? 18 MR. PIERCE: Do we have a time 19 frame? 20 MR. BLANKS: In any time frame. 21 A. I would expect them to correct the situation 22 as they saw it - as they determined it - whatever it 23 to be. 24 (By Mr. Blanks) 25 Q. Have you, yourself, ever observed a
521
1 turnaround or shutdown in a Dow plant? 2 A. Observed? 3 Q. Well, been there to see any part of that
Page 156
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 4 sort of maintenance operation, - 5 A. No. 6 Q. -- a major shutdown. Am I using a term that 7 was familiar to you about a shutdown or a turnaround? 8 A. I'm interpreting it to mean closing the 9 plant. 10 Q. Closing the... You mean like closing the 11 plant for good or... 12 A. Whatever. 13 MR. PIERCE: Why don't you define 14 your term, and then you won't have to 15 go through this. 16 Q. Well, what term was used at Dow to describe 17 the periodic major maintenance work on a unit in a 18 plant where you'd shut down the unit and come in and 19 do extensive preventive maintenance and routine 20 maintenance -21 A. I don't know what they called it. 22 Q. -- on a periodic basis? 23 A. I don't know what they called it. I don't 24 know that there was a specific name for it. If 25 someone were going to do that, they would have
522
1 described what they were going to do. 2 Q. Do you know that such things were done from 3 time to time on Dow units? 4 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 5 form; vague, confusing. 6 A. Yes.
Page 157
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 7 Q. Okay. Well, that was the type of 8 maintenance operation I was describing when I used the 9 word "turnaround" or "shutdown." 10 A. Oh, I see. 11 Q. So, with that understanding, did you ever 12 observe that kind of maintenance operation going on at 13 a Dow plant? 14 A. I never did. 15 Q. All right, sir. Did you ever personally 16 observe asbestos insulation being handled in any Dow 17 facility whether in a shop or in the field or in a 18 warehouse? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Would it also be true, Dr. Rowe, that 21 personally you've never seen a measured 22 5-million-particle-per-cubic-foot asbestos dust 23 concentration in air? 24 A. I don't recall ever. 25 Q. Okay. Sir, did you use asbestos in your
523
1 laboratories for any purposes? 2 A. I believe we have. 3 Q. Would that have been in things like Gooch 4 filters and - 5 A. As a -- As a filter bed in different types 6 of filters where you're filtering corrosive 7 materials. And asbestos was a common bed that you 8 prepared, yourself. 9 Q. Okay. Would you start with a dry asbestos
Page 158
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 10 material and then prepare some sort of a slurry to 11 make the filter? Is that how it was done? 12 A. I don't remember how we did it. 13 Q. Okay. Could you describe for us the kind of 14 precautions that you recall using in the Dow 15 toxicology labs when dealing with materials of 16 suspected or unknown toxicity? 17 MR. PIERCE: Could we have a time 18 frame? 19 MR. BLANKS: Well, I think that we 20 could cover this over the many years 21 that Dr. Rowe did it. 22 A. You mean generally handle - how we handled 23 materials or what? I don't quite understand your... 24 (By Mr. Blanks) 25 Q. All right, sir. Let me make a little
524
1 preface to make it clear. I gather from what you've 2 told us that some of the important work done in your 3 toxicology lab was directed at determining the 4 toxicity of materials that were going to be used at 5 Dow - materials that you at least thought might pose 6 some health hazard to either your own workers or your 7 customers. So, I'm wondering, then, in handling 8 these, let's say, suspect materials what kind of 9 protective measures over the years you and your 10 scientists and technicians would have used in the 11 handling of the suspect materials in the lab. 12 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
Page 159
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 13 form. Objection to characterization of 14 his earlier testimony and to vague 15 terminology, ambiguities within. 16 A. Well, we handled many, many compounds about 17 which there was no knowledge of toxicology type or 18 physiological effects. That was our job to determine 19 what those properties would be. So, when an unknown 20 material was submitted to the laboratory for 21 evaluation, regardless of what we thought, we handled 22 the material so that we did not have exposure or if 23 there was it was trivial. That was our job, to find 24 out what was the significance of various types of 25 exposure. And, to my knowledge, we've handled some
525
1 extremely toxic materials. Extremely toxic. We have 2 never in our laboratory had a lost-time injury due to 3 any of our laboratory people working with totally 4 unknown materials. 5 Q. Do you know, sir, whether any of your 6 laboratory people developed any occupational disease 7 as a result of exposures to the materials you examined 8 in the lab? 9 A. Not to my knowledge. 10 Q. Could you give us some specifics by way of 11 example, Dr. Rowe, over the different decades that you 12 were in toxicology of the sort of precautionary 13 measures or protective equipment or means that you 14 used to prevent these possible exposures to the 15 materials you were examining in the lab?
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 16 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 17 form; compound question. 18 And this -- Just for 19 clarification: Is this for his entire 20 time at Dow? 21 MR. BLANKS: Well, I think I said 22 over the years. 23 MR. PIERCE: Okay. 24 MR. BLANKS: You know, I ask these 25 compound questions so that we can kill
526
1 two or three birds with one stone. 2 Dr. Rowe hadn't let one slip by yet
3 but... 4 (By Mr. Blanks) 5 Q. I'd just like for the jury to understand the 6 precautionary measures that you used during the
7 different decades to protect your lab workers from any 8 exposure to the materials that you were testing for
9 toxicity.
10 MR. BLANKS: You're just making me 11 better (directed to Mr. Pierce).
12 A. With respect to possible eye contact, our
13 people all were required to wear eye protection. With
14 respect to skin contact, we trained our people not to
15 have skin contact.
16 Now, you can, again, expect that accidents
17 will happen and you'll have a spill or something of
18 this nature.
If you do, the first instruction is "Get Page 161
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 19 to the sink and wash now. Don't wait." If it was a 20 material that was volatile and there was a potential 21 for inhalation, we conducted the work in a hood so as 22 to minimize or prevent - at least minimize the 23 possibility of inhalation. 24 Q. And a hood would be like an exhaust hood? 25 A. Just like a laboratory - any laboratory
527
1 hood. 2 Q.
Not having been in a lab in many years and,
3 perhaps, jurors not knowing what you mean by the term, 4 could you just elaborate a little bit on what the hood 5 does and accomplishes? 6 A. Well, a hood is a ventilation system in 7 which - with an open door - enclosed all the way
8 around except for the door. And sometimes you'd use 9 leave - even leave the door down and look what you're
10 doing and - through the glass. But there's airflow
11 passing through all the time so that the flow is away
12 from the person.
13 Q. Okay. And then any of the vapors that come
14 off of the volatile material are exhausted up through
15 the system -
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- safely? Okay. All right, sir. Could
18 you continue with your -
19 A. That was the essence of our procedures. You
20 have to look at the possible types of exposure when
21 you're handling a material and take precautions to Page 162
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 22 avoid or minimize it. 23 Q. And if you were working with something where 24 dust could be an inhalation hazard, I suppose you'd 25 also be using the exhaust ventilation system with the
528
1 hood. 2 A.
That was -- Anything like that would be
3 handled in a hood. 4 Q. Would you allow people to eat in the 5 laboratory?
6 A. No. We did not. 7 Q. And why would that be? Why would you not 8 want that, sir? 9 A. You never know what contamination might have
10 occurred. 11 Q. Something could get on the food and -
12 A. It was just a precautionary measure.
13 Q. Okay. Intended to keep people from 14 ingesting any of the possible toxic materials that 15 might have been in the lab, right?
16 A. Yes. 17 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
18 form.
19 A. Or if you would happen to have your hands 20 contaminated and you didn't know it, it could
21 contaminate your food.
22 Q. All right, sir. What about protection
23 from - other protection from ingesting any toxic 24 material? That would be another way to get it into
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 25 the body, I suppose. What would you do for that?
529
1 A. Well, with respect to industrial chemicals, 2 ingestion is a very rare type of exposure. 3 Q. Okay. Did the people working in the lab 4 wear any kind of special protective clothing or gloves 5 or that sort of thing? 6 A. We did not unless there was something very 7 special because as you -- If you handle an unknown 8 material, you do not know necessarily or you don't 9 know, period, whether it might deteriorate a 10 protective piece of equipment and thereby cause an 11 exposure that people didn't realize that they had. 12 Protective equipment is only for emergency purposes or 13 for very special applications. 14 Q. But your laboratory technicians would at 15 least be wearing some sort of lab coat, wouldn't they? 16 A. We'd wear a lab coat, yes. 17 Q. Okay. And I guess those lab clothes were 18 laundered at the plant and not taken home - 19 A. That's right. 20 Q. -- to clean. Okay. Did you have any kind 21 of respiratory protective equipment that you'd use in 22 the lab when working with these toxic materials or 23 suspected toxic materials? 24 A. I don't recollect using respiratory 25 protection in our lab.
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530
1 Q. You mentioned having had no lost-time 2 injuries in your lab force or staff over the years. 3 What did you mean by "lost-time injury"? 4 A. An injury that prevents someone from coming 5 to work. 6 Q. Okay. I suppose over the years you would 7 have had some injuries and exposures that occurred 8 that didn't require people to take off time from work, 9 though. 10 A. I think we had one or two. 11 Q. So, over all those years you were able to 12 limit the exposures - the unintended exposures - to 13 just one or two? 14 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 15 form. He did not speak about 16 unintended exposures. 17 Q. Well, would you say the exposures were 18 intended, Dr. Rowe, the one or two? Is that what you 19 meant? 20 A. I'm sorry. I can't hear you. 21 Q. Well, you said you had one or two - 22 MR. PIERCE: It did not deal with 23 exposures. 24 Q. You said you had one or two exposures over 25 the years where people didn't have to take off time
1 from work.
Page 165
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 2 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 3 form, to the mischaracterization of the 4 earlier testimony. 5 (By Mr. Blanks) 6 Q. Did I misstate what you told us? 7 A. No. I don't think -- I was just trying 8 to -- The only one that was ever serious was a - was a 9 person who was handling a bottle and there was -- It 10 was contaminated around the neck, and he got his 11 fingers in it. And before he got burnt, he had sore 12 fingers. 13 Q. Yes, sir. Okay. And my - 14 A. We had that happen a couple - two or three 15 times but very rarely. 16 Q. So, over a, roughly, 30-year period when you 17 were working with or supervising the laboratory, the 18 toxicology lab at Dow, handling a large number of 19 materials of even extreme toxicity, you were able to 20 control the exposures to these materials to just a few 21 incidents? Is that the case? 22 A. I -- That -- Fair representation. 23 Q. Okay. And what do you attribute that very 24 good rate of exposure or controlling exposures to, 25 Dr. Rowe? How do you account for that outstanding
532
1 record of protecting the people working in the lab? 2 A. I'd have to think it was the training that 3 we gave our people and our surveillance of it. 4 Q. And their use of the proper procedures as
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5 they were taught to do, correct? 6 A. I guess that would be the answer. 7 Q. Okay. Do you know, sir, approximately how
8 many cases of occupational diseases at Dow that you
9 ever learned of? 10 A. I don't know. 11 Q. Do you recall, Dr. Rowe, that you ever 12 became aware of any cases of occupational disease 13 diseases among Dow workers? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Would that have been in the Sixties or
16 later? 17 A. 18 Q.
I don't know the time frame. What kind of occupational diseases did you
19 learn of? 20 A. The only ones I recall were dermatological
21 problems. 22 Q. Would reports of these come to you from the 23 medical department, sir? 24 A. Well, I don't know whether they came
25 initially from the medical department or whether
533
1 somebody was in trouble called up to see what - what 2 was going on, if we knew anything about it. 3 Q. Okay. 4 A. It could have come from any place. 5 Q. Was it the routine or the policy at Dow to 6 inform the industrial hygiene department about 7 instances of occupational disease in the workers or
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8 former employees?
9 MR. PIERCE: At any time during 10 Dr. Rowe's career? 11 MR. BLANKS: Any time. 12 A. I'm not aware of any fixed policy, but I
13 would expect it to have been general practice.
14 (By Mr. Blanks) 15 Q. Would you agree that that is an important 16 thing for industrial hygienists to know of, whether or
17 not there have been occupational diseases develop in
18 the work force?
19 A. Well, certainly. 20 Q. Hasn't Dow recognized since the - since the 21 Forties at least that people working in heavy dust
22 concentrations should wear respiratory protection, 23 Dr. Rowe?
24 A. Would you restate that.
25
Q.
Yes, sir.
I asked you, has not Dow
534
1 recognized since the early Forties at least that 2 workers working in heavy dust concentrations should 3 wear respiratory protection? 4 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to 5 the form of the question based on the 6 ambiguity of the term "heavy" and not 7 knowing what you consider heavy. 8 A. Well, the use of respiratory protection, as 9 a general practice, was for purposes of emergency 10 situations or those which were temporarily awaiting
Page 168
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 11 engineering change or if something was going to be 12 done once or something of this nature where it would 13 not be practical to spend weeks designing something if 14 it were going to be a one short time potential 15 exposure. Otherwise, basically it was as an emergency 16 situation when we used protection. 17 Q. Okay. And a situation that was a long-term 18 or repeat condition that generated heavy dust such 19 that respirators would be mandatory would be a 20 situation that called out for engineering controls or 21 at least the consideration of them to reduce that dust 22 level down, wouldn't it? 23 A. Well, I just tried to say that if this was a 24 long-term effect or problem, our policy generally, as 25 far as I know, was not to use protective devices.
535
1 Q. But to solve the problem - 2 A. Solve the problem. 3 Q. Okay. But my original question, Dr. Rowe, 4 was: Don't you agree that even back in the early 5 1940's that Dow recognized that people working where 6 there are heavy fumes or dust should be required to 7 wear respirators to protect them? 8 MR. PIERCE: Asked and answered. 9 A. I don't know. 10 Q. Do you know if there ever came to be a time 11 when Dow recognized that need? 12 A. I don't know. 13 Q. Certainly you would agree that that would be
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14 appropriate if one were working where there was heavy
15 fumes or dust that you should wear respiratory
16 protection. 17
MR. PIERCE: I think Dr. Rowe has
18 explained his position on this in great
19 detail.
20 But go ahead.
21 A. I would say it would determine - it would be 22 more likely to be influenced by the nature of the
23 dust.
24 Q. What does -- As a toxicologist, sir, what 25 does "heavy dust" mean to you?
1 A. I don
2 Q. All r 3 "heavy fumes or
4 A. I don 5 Q. Makes
6 A. I don
7 Q. Well,
8 A. I don
9 Q. Okay.
10 anything as a t
11 described : is tl 12 A. I've
13 people, i f they
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. -- un
16 detail.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 17 Q. All right, sir. During the 1940's could you 18 tell us who at Dow where you worked had authority to 19 decide whether or not there should be testing for 20 toxic dust in the work environment? 21 A. I don't know. 22 Q. How about in the Fifties, do you know who 23 would have had authority to make that decision? 24 A. Well, if an industrial hygienist observed 25 this, he would - he could, well, make that suggestion.
537
1 Q. All right, sir. And that would certainly 2 have been true for the industrial hygienist even in 3 the 1960's, that he would have had the authority to go 4 out and do monitoring, if he cared to, for asbestos 5 dust or silica dust or any other kind of dust? 6 A. He would be expected to initiate appropriate 7 action, I think. 8 Q. Does that mean that the industrial hygienist 9 also, say, in the Fifties would have had the authority 10 to require that workers potentially exposed to a 11 pneumoconiosis-causing dust should be 12 protected - should be given respirators, for example? 13 MR. PIERCE: Are we going to have 14 a level here of exposure or just the 15 vague term "exposure"? 16 I object to the form for 17 vagueness. 18 A. I guess I'd like to have you repeat the 19 question, please.
Page 171
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 20 Q. Yes, sir. I was wondering if your 21 industrial hygienist, beginning in 1948 when you first 22 had one, would have had the authority to require that 23 workers potentially exposed to 24 pneumoconiosis-producing dust be given respiratory 25 protection.
538
1 MR. PIERCE: Continue the
2 objection.
3 A. No. 4 Q. Who would have had that authority?
5 A. The plant manager.
6 Q. Okay. Would the industrial hygienist have 7 had the authority to require that workers potentially
8 exposed to pneumoconiosis-producing dust be given 9 training about the hazards posed by such dust in the
10 1950's?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Would that have been the plant manager's
13 authority -
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. -- again? And who would have had the 16 authority, Dr. Rowe, to require that workers
17 potentially exposed to pneumoconiosis-producing dust
18 like asbestos or silica be put under a medical
19 surveillance or medical monitoring program in the
20 1950's? 21
MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
22 form; compound question. Page 172
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 23 A. Medical department. 24 Q. Okay. Now, would that be the corporate 25 medical department or the medical department at the
539
1 plant level who would have had that authority? 2 A. Either one, I believe. 3 Q. Dr. Rowe, when you were working as a 4 toxicologist, could you do testing on any material 5 that you wanted to investigate; or did someone above 6 you in management have to approve the testing program? 7 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 8 form; compound question. 9 A. That would depend upon the magnitude of the 10 program. 11 Q. You mean how much it might likely cost to 12 do? 13 A. And whether or not the facilities could be 14 should be used for that rather than something else. 15 Q. Who would make those kind of decisions? I 16 mean, where did the responsibility lie? 17 A. It was more or less a joint responsibility. 18 Q. Between the toxicologist and the management? 19 A. Or the person responsible for that 20 particular product or manufacturing process or what... 21 Q. Does that mean, sir, that the group in Dow 22 that had the process in which the material was being 23 used or produced would have to approve the cost of 24 doing the toxicology testing on the material before 25 you could undertake it?
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540
1 A. The answer is really "yes and no." 2 Q. Okay. Cou ld you explain? 3 A. If it were -- If we felt that it was some 4 particular situation that we wished to explore, we had 5 a budget at our discretion that we could use and do 6 that. If it were a major project such as a potential 7 foods additive or major product, the product 8 department was responsible for budgeting that work. 9 And those things would be worked out in joint 10 conversation and put into effect, and that would be 11 undertaken at the time. And at times if there were - 12 It would be dependent upon the capacity of the 13 laboratory to handle it. If it was tied up and it 14 couldn't do it, there'd be another way to do it. 15 Q. Okay. And another way to do it might be to 16 contract it out to an outside lab - 17 A. That' s true. 18 Q. Can you recall, sir, being refused authority 19 or a budget to investigate some materials that you 20 toxicologists felt ought to be checked out? 21 A. The very first one that I had anything to do 22 with was a study of methyl bromide. 23 Q. Was that one where you were denied authority 24 or funding to proceed? 25 A. No. It was in the early days when - before
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1 we had as big a laboratory as we had and we had - were 2 developing the capacity to do inhalation work. And 3 that was a material that we chose to study. 4 Q. Can you think of any that you proposed to 5 study where you were told, "No, you can't do that," 6 or, "No, we're not" - "we don't want to pay for that"? 7 A. That was a very rare occasion, if ever. If 8 we felt that there was a serious need where we had no 9 individual authority, we could take our case to higher 10 authority and get authorization to proceed. But I 11 don't know of anything -- I can't think of anything 12 where we were told that we couldn't do it. 13 Q. But you did have access to higher levels of 14 management if you scientists thought that there was a 15 potential problem that ought to be investigated: is 16 that the case? 17 A. That's right. 18 Q. Was that always the case at Dow during your 19 years - 20 A. Always the case. 21 Q. So, there's no question, then, Dr. Rowe, 22 that, as far as the toxicology department was 23 concerned, if there was a serious matter to be 24 investigated you always had or could get the resources 25 to do the investigation or have it done?
542
1 A. I do not recall any that that - other 2 than -- I do not recall any situations where that was
Page 175
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 3 not possible to do. 4 Q. Okay. Do you believe, Dr. Rowe, that a man 5 has to have a massive severe long-term exposure to 6 asbestos in order to get an asbestos-related disease? 7 A. I don't know. 8 Q. Did you ever have an opinion or an 9 understanding about that? 10 A. I -- I have opinions, but I don't know. 11 Q. What would be your opinion about that? 12 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to just 13 interject at this time, so that we all 14 recall, that the witness is here as 15 fact witness. He is not he re in an 16 expert capacity. He is not here to 17 give opinion testimony. 18 I'm not going to prevent that from 19 happening, but I'd like you just to 20 take note of that so - and to try to 21 move away from areas outside of his 22 purpose here. 23 Q. Well, let me - 24 MR. PIERCE: Go ahead. 25 Q. Let me make that easier. Could you tell us,
543
1 sir, what your opinion was about the severity and 2 duration of exposure to asbestos required to cause 3 asbestosis during any of the years you worked for Dow? 4 A. Are you asking again for my opinion? 5 Q. Yes, sir.
Page 176
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 6 A. I do not know whether it always takes a long 7 duration exposure or whether a few massive or a single 8 massive exposure to do this. It depends upon the 9 ability of the lungs to clear material. It depends 10 upon a lot of environmental situation -- I do not 11 know. I'm not an expert in toxicology of asbestos. 12 Q. All right, sir. I understand you say you do 13 not know. I was wondering, though, what was your 14 opinion on that during any of the years that you were 15 working for Dow either as a toxicologist or as the man 16 in charge of industrial hygiene. 17 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to once 18 again interpose an objection and remind 19 you that you went over this at quite 20 some length and Dr. Rowe mentioned 21 several times yesterday that that is 22 not a field in which he feels 23 comfortable or has an expertise in. 24 But go ahead. 25 MR. ALMQUIST: And I want to
544
1 impose another objection that that 2 question was just asked and answered by 3 the doctor when he said he didn't know. 4 Q. If you have an opinion, sir, or had an 5 opinion back during that time frame, that's what I'd 6 like you to express. 7 A. My opinion with respect to things of that 8 nature was that if they were maintained within
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 9 Government regulations or Government recommendations 10 that that was an adequate precautionary measure. 11 Q. Okay. Have you changed your view about that 12 over the last 15 years since you've left Dow? 13 A. I have changed my opinion perhaps sometimes 14 on things that I know something about; otherwise, I do 15 not argue the issue. 16 Q. Was that -- Was that a "yes" or a "no"? 17 MR. PIERCE: It was an answer to 18 your question. 19 A. I don't know. I don't know that I can 20 answer your question "yes" or "no." 21 Q. Do you know, Dr. Rowe, that Dow employees 22 have in fact - some of them have developed asbestosis? 23 A. I don't know that. 24 Q. Had you ever been -- Have you ever heard 25 that from anyone at Dow?
545
1 A. No. I don't believe I have. 2 Q. Was there someone at Dow, sir, that was more 3 knowledgeable than you on mineral dusts such as 4 asbestos or silica during the years you worked there? 5 A. I don't know. 6 Q. Do you think there was anyone at Dow during 7 the years you worked there who was knowledgeable about 8 the health hazards of mineral dust like silica or 9 asbestos? 10 A. Well, I think we're all somewhat familiar 11 with it from the stand -- But we did not do any
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 12 research ourselves on this with respect to 13 occupational disease. We -- Through the medical 14 department, my understanding was that they were 15 surveying the people by - with medical procedures. 16 And outside of that, I do not know. 17 Q. Okay. You can't direct us to any person 18 from your - that you worked with at Dow who you 19 believe is still living whom you regarded as having 20 more knowledge about asbestos or silica health hazards 21 than you? 22 A. Well, I - I have said before Harold Hoyle 23 was the person most knowledgeable, that I know of. 24 Q. All right, sir. Can you tell us, Dr. Rowe, 25 about what kind of warnings Dow gave its own workers
546
1 potentially exposed to asbestos about the health 2 hazards of asbestos during the Forties? 3 A. I don't know. 4 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 5 to the form of the question. It 6 assumes facts not in evidence. 7 A. I don't -- I don't -- I don't recall. I 8 don't -- I don't know. 9 Q. Would that -- Would you recall for what was 10 done to warn these workers during the Fifties? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Or the Sixties? 13 A. No. 14 Q. How about the Seventies?
Page 179
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 15 A. No. 16 Q. How about workers potentially exposed to 17 free silica in the air? 18 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 19 of the question, if that is a question. 20 MR. BLANKS: Well, there was a 21 comma there; and I was in mid clause. 22 MR. PIERCE: I'm sorry to 23 interrupt you at a comma. 24 (By Mr. Blanks) 25 Q. Do you know, sir, if Dow gave any warnings
547
1 to workers potentially exposed to free silica - 2 MR. PIERCE: Obj ection. 3 Q. -- at their plants? 4 A. I do not know, personally. 5 Q. Okay. 6 A. I would assume that that was the case, but I 7 do not know. 8 Q. You would expect that that would have been 9 done in the Forties? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Would you expect that warnings would have 12 been given to workers potentially exposed to asbestos 13 about its health hazards in the Forties? 14 MR. PIERCE: Obj ection. 15 A. I would expect so. 16 Just a minute. In the Forties? 17 Q. Yes, sir.
Page 180
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 18 A. I'm not sure. 19 Q. How about in the Fifties? 20 A. I don't know. 21 Q. Did the folks working in your laboratories 22 who handled asbestos get any kind of warnings about 23 its health hazards? 24 A. Not to my knowledge. 25 Q. As you don't know about any warnings given
548
1 to Dow employees potentially exposed to asbestos or 2 silica, I wonder - you probably wouldn't know about 3 any warnings that might have been given to 4 contractors. 5 A. I do -- I have no knowledge. 6 Q. Okay. Did you, yourself, ever recommend, 7 Dr. Rowe, that warnings and training be given to 8 workers potentially exposed to asbestos at Dow? 9 A. I don't recall any. 10 Q. How about exposures - possible exposures 11 to free silica, did you ever recommend that warnings 12 be given about that possibility? 13 A. Not that I recall. 14 Q. Did Dow tell workers at its plants during 15 any years, Dr. Rowe, that exposures below the 16 guidelines were safe? 17 A. I don't -- I can't answer that. I don't 18 know. 19 Q. Do you know who, if anyone, ever recommended 20 that all of the asbestos insulation in the Dow plant
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 21 should be removed? 22 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 23 form; assumes facts not in evidence. 24 A. I don't know. 25 Q. Do you know whether any effort was begun
549
1 while you were at Dow to, in fact, remove all the 2 asbestos-containing insulation? 3 A. I didn't -- I do not know. 4 Q. Dr. Rowe, do you think that it would be 5 appropriate to tell workers being exposed below the 6 guideline levels that it was safe for them to work in 7 airborne dust at those concentrations? 8 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 9 on ambiguity. 10 But go ahead. 11 A. I -- I don't know how much was told in that 12 respect. My feeling was that if the exposure levels 13 were within so-called acceptable levels, the issue was 14 not pursued. 15 Q. But do you think that it would have been 16 appropriate or proper to tell people working at below 17 or near and below the guideline levels that they were, 18 in fact, safe from any risk of disease? 19 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 20 of the question. It's compound and 21 also asked and answered. 22 A. I think it's always desirable to... 23 MR. BLANKS: I see Mr. Pierce has
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 24 yanked the microphone out and... 25 THE WITNESS: Something came
550
1 loose. I don't know how it's supposed 2 to go on there. 3 MR. PIERCE: If there is a record, 4 for the record, certainly Mr. Pierce 5 didn't do it. 6 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 7 MR. BLANKS: Supposing counsel 8 must have done it from over here. 9 (By Mr. Blanks) 10 Q. Sorry, Dr. Rowe. You were saying that 11 you... 12 A. Excuse me. 13 Q. You were in the middle of an answer when you 14 discovered the microphone dangling. 15 MR. PIERCE: Perhaps for 16 everyone's -- Could we reread the 17 question? 18 THE WITNESS: Maybe so. 19 THE REPORTER: "QUESTION: But do 20 you think that it would have been 21 appropriate or proper to tell people 22 working at below or near and below the 23 guideline levels that they were, in 24 fact, safe from any risk of disease?" 25 And then there was an objection.
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1 "MR. PIERCE: "Objection to the 2 form of the question. It's compound 3 and also asked and answered. 4 "ANSWER: I think it's always 5 desirable to..." 6 And then... 7 MR. PIERCE: And then the 8 microphone. 9 THE REPORTER: Right. 10 A. I think it's always desirable to inform 11 people of potential hazards. In the earlier years I 12 did not think that was necessarily done as thoroughly 13 as it has in the last maybe 20 years. 14 (By Mr. Blanks) 15 Q. Okay. Do you recall, Dr. Rowe, whether or 16 not contractors from time to time would do work in 17 your laboratory areas? 18 A. I had nothing to do with contractors. I 19 don't know what they were doing. 20 Q. Well, did you ever see non-Dow employees 21 doing maintenance work or remodeling work or any kind 22 of building work in your laboratories? 23 A. Not that I recall. 24 Q. So, if any of that work was done, it would 25 have been done by Dow employees?
Page 184
552
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 1 A. I don't know. I say I don't know. There 2 may have contractors that I didn't know they were 3 contractors. 4 Q. Well, let me ask you this: If people from 5 outside the lab came in to do some work, whether it 6 was to modify some plumbing or paint the ceilings or 7 what have you, did they get any kind of warning or 8 instructions from folks in the lab about potential 9 hazards in the lab - in the lab environment? 10 A. I can't think of any particular situation 11 where anything like that would have been required. 12 Q. You mean if somebody were coming in to do 13 some repair work or some construction work, all of the 14 laboratory materials and the toxic materials would be 15 put away and out of the way safe where there wouldn't 16 be any possibility of exposure? 17 A. We certainly wouldn't leave them out where 18 they were likely to be encountered. 19 Q. Okay. Do you recall, sir, from any of your 20 biochemical medical safety meetings whether there were 21 discussions about the health hazards of asbestos or 22 silica or benzene that might be encountered in Dow 23 premises? 24 MR. PIERCE: At any time? 25 MR. BLANKS: Any time.
553
1 A. Well, you mentioned a number of compounds. 2 And I'm sure that many compounds were discussed, but I 3 don't remember which ones.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 4 (By Mr. Blanks) 5 Q. Would you remember asbestos being a topic? 6 A. I do not remember discussing asbestos. 7 Q. How about free silica dust? 8 A. I don't remember silica dust. 9 Q. What about benzene? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. What time frame would that have been in? 12 A. I don't remember. 13 Q. Would you agree, Dr. Rowe, that when a 14 when you have a pneumoconiosis-producing dust in the 15 air in a worker's breathing zone that he will, in 16 fact, inhale some of that dust so long as he 17 breathes? 18 MS. KETAI: Objection. 19 THE REPORTER: Excuse me. 20 MS. KETAI: Objection; calls for 21 speculation, misstating facts not in 22 evidence. 23 A. I guess one would have to assume that if 24 it's in the air that he's breathing he would have 25 some.
554
1 Q. And wouldn't you agree that the longer the 2 man works in an asbestos or silica dust environment 3 then the more dust or fibers he would breathe in? 4 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 5 form. Some of the terminology used is 6 vague and ambiguous.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 7 MR. BLANKS: Like "environment"? 8 MR. PIERCE: You want me to phrase 9 the question for you? That's not my 10 purpose here. But you should -- Well, 11 I'm sure you're quite adequate and 12 capable of phrasing a question 13 properly. 14 MR. BLANKS: Object to the 15 compliments. 16 (By Mr. Blanks) 17 Q. L et's try again. Yes, sir. Dr. Rowe, 18 wouldn't you agree that the longer a man works in a 19 in an environment where there is airborne asbestos or 20 silica in his breathing zone, then the more of that 21 particulate he is actually going to breathe into his 22 lungs? 23 MR. PIERCE: I am going to 24 continue the objection. I think that 25 question is unintelligible as asked.
555
1 It makes assumptions such as that there 2 is any place in which there are no such 3 fibers and suggests by implication that 4 we're dealing with certain level when 5 no levels are mentioned within the 6 question, making the question almost 7 impossible to answer. 8 But go ahead. 9 A. Well, certainly the - a more prolonged
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10 exposure to a given condition is - would be expected
11 to produce a greater accumulation, providing that the 12 level is higher than the clearance potential of the
13 respiratory tract, if you're talking about dust. 14 I don't know just where that comes, but the
And
15 respiratory tract does have a capability - capacity to
16 clear itself of foreign bodies.
17 (By Mr. Blanks)
18 Q. To some extent.
19 A. That's the best answer I could give you.
20 Q. And, likewise, the higher the concentration
21 in the air of the respirable asbestos or silica, then
22 the more fiber or dust the man would be breathing in, 23 correct? 24 A. Well, I'd suspect that that would depend 25 somewhat on particle size; but generally that's a
556
1 safe - we'd have to - we'd have to assume that that 2 was correct. 3 Q. And wouldn't you agree that even today it's 4 not known exactly how much asbestos fiber a man can 5 inhale and still be a hundred percent free of risk for 6 an asbestos-related disease? 7 A. I don't know. 8 Q. Certainly when you were with Dow, you didn't 9 know just how much asbestos fiber one could breathe 10 and be a hundred percent free of the risk of an 11 asbestos -12 A. I don't know.
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13 Q. -- related disease, did you, sir?
14 A. I don't know. 15 Q. You don't know whether you knew when you
16 were at Dow? 17 18
MR. PIERCE: I think we've spent enough time -
19 A. I don't -- I don't -
20 MR. PIERCE: Excuse me. Let me
21 just interpose this objection. This
22 has been asked and answered, plus you 23 have investigated both today and 24 yesterday the state of knowledge in 25 respect to asbestos of this particular
557
1 witness. 2 But go ahead. 3 A. I guess I'd have to ask you to repeat. 4 Q. I think I as ked you isn't it true that when 5 you were with Dow you did not know then nor did Dow 6 know exactly how much asbestos fiber a man could 7 breathe and inhale and still remain a hundred percent 8 free of the risk of getting an occupational disease 9 from it. 10 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to now add 11 to the objection to what Dow did or 12 did not know. 13 But go ahead and answer the 14 question. 15 A. I don't know.
Page 189
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 16 Q. Isn't it true, Dr. Rowe, that during the 17 late Thirties, the Forties, the Fifties, the Sixties, 18 even into the Seventies while you were at Dow that Dow 19 had no scientifically documented conclusive findings 20 that exposures at any guideline level to asbestos dust 21 would be a hundred percent safe and free of risk of 22 disease? Did it? 23 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 24 to the form. You're asking this 25 witness as to what Dow knew rather than
558
1 what he, V. K. Rowe, knew. 2 A. I don't know. 3 Q. That is to say you know of no such 4 scientifically documented conclusive evidence that 5 exposures at any guideline level would be a hundred 6 percent safe? 7 A. I don't know. 8 Q. Would that also be true as regards silica 9 exposures at any threshold limit value or guideline 10 level? 11 A. I don't know. 12 MR. PIERCE: Might what also be 13 true? 14 Q. That you don't know of any scientifically 15 documented conclusive evidence that exposures at the 16 guideline levels to silica are a hundred percent free 17 of the risk of occupational disease. 18 A. I don't.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 19 MR. ALMQUIST: We've been going 20 about an hour. 21 MR. BLANKS: Okay. 22 MR. ALMQUIST: Let's take a 23 short... 24 (AT THIS TIME A BRIEF RECESS WAS 25 TAKEN, AND THE PROCEEDINGS THEREAFTER
559
1 RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:) 2 (By Mr. Blanks) 3 Q. Dr. Rowe, in your work at Dow can you tell 4 us how many cases there were that you did have 5 scientifically documented conclusive findings that 6 exposures at a T.L.V. or guideline level were 7 100 percent safe? 8 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 9 to the ambiguity in that question 10 and to the premise that you could 11 somehow cull a negative into the 12 terms of nondisease. 13 But go ahead and answer it to the 14 best of your ability. 15 A. I don't think you ever have a situation that 16 is a hundred percent safe. 17 Q. So, is that to say, then, that for the 18 chemicals and materials that people worked with at Dow 19 that could cause disease that, as far as you were 20 concerned, you could never know that you were a 21 hundred percent free of risk in handling those
Page 191
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 22 materials? 23 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 24 to the question as being ambiguous. 25 You mean only materials at Dow or
560
1 materials - all chemical materials or 2 what? 3 I find the question ambiguous, but 4 go ahead and answer it. 5 MR. ALMQUIST: It's also overly 6 broad. 7 A. I'll answer the question this way: In no 8 circumstance - no circumstance - are you a hundred 9 percent safe. You're not a hundred percent safe 10 sitting here. 11 Q. So, in no circumstance of handling an 12 industrial material is the worker a hundred percent 13 safe, in your experience? 14 MR. PIERCE: Asked and answered. 15 A. Philosophically there is no such thing as 16 absolute safety. 17 Q. Okay. Were there any materials that were 18 used at Dow premises over the years for which you had 19 scientifically documented conclusive findings that a 20 particular exposure level would cause disease? 21 A. Would you please restate that. 22 Q. Yes, sir. We've gone to the opposite 23 extreme here. Can you recall any materials that were 24 used at Dow during the years you were there for which
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 25 you had scientifically documented conclusive findings
561
1 that a particular exposure level to that material 2 would cause occupational disease? 3 A. Yes. I think so. 4 Q. What would some of those be? 5 A. I don't recall, but certainly dermatitis was 6 one of the situations that is an occupational 7 disease. Some people are more susceptible to 8 irritation than others. We've had situations where 9 we've had dermatitis. We've had people ill from 10 exposures. As I mentioned earlier, carbon 11 tetrachloride. We had people that were ill. 12 Q. So, those would be situations where you 13 actually had the scientifically documented conclusive 14 findings that a particular exposure level would result 15 in disease? 16 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to 17 the form. The question has been asked 18 and answered. 19 MR. ALMQUIST: And I also object 20 to the form because it doesn't specify 21 whether you're talking about it caused 22 disease in a specific individual or 23 every individual exposed at that 24 level. 25 A. I have trouble with your word "disease." I
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562
1 would say "ill effects," "adverse effects." 2 Q. Would you call, let's say, asbestos-related 3 lung cancer just an adverse effect of exposure to
4 asbestos?
5 A. 6 Q. 7 they? 8 A.
I would call it "an adverse effect." Some adverse effects can be fatal, can't
You'll have to describe an adverse - what's
9 the character of the adverse effect. But any adverse
10 effect is an effect. It may be severe. It may be
11 mild. It may be transitory.
12 Q. Or terminal. 13 MR. PIERCE: You want to let 14 Dr. Rowe answer his question, please? 15 A. I guess it's the connotation of words that
16 bothers me.
17 Q. All right, sir. Isn't it a little bit 18 euphemistic to speak of a terminal disease as being
19 merely an adverse effect? 20 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
21 form; argumentative. 22 A. Not if it's char acterized. 23 Q. Characterized how?
24 A. Well, you define it as an adverse effect.
25 Well, then how adverse is it?
563
1 Q. I see. Okay. Part of your job as a Page 194
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 2 toxicologist was to recommend to management what to do 3 about materials' health hazards. Isn't that true? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Did you believe, Dr. Rowe, as a toxicologist 6 that you had to wait for scientifically documented 7 conclusive findings before you should make a 8 recommendation to management? 9 A. I don't know that we ever did that. 10 Q. What would be a sufficient level of 11 information or confidence to cause you to make 12 recommendations to management about health effects or 13 precautions to be used with materials at Dow? 14 A. We made recommendations to management all 15 the time on the basis of our toxicological 16 investigations. 17 Q. Sometimes you'd do it on the basis of 18 preliminary Class I-type investigation. 19 A. Certainly. 20 Q. Sometimes those studies would be followed by 21 more intensive investigations? 22 A. That's right. 23 Q. But it wasn't the practice to wait until you 24 had absolutely conclusive evidence about the harmful 25 effects of a material before you would pass that on to
564
1 the management or people in the plants, was it? 2 A. Of course not. 3 Q. Do you think that would be improper from a 4 scientific standpoint to delay conveying information
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 5 about hazards until you had conclusive proof? 6 MR. PIERCE: Object to the form; 7 ambiguous and vague. 8 A. I didn't say that we waited till we had 9 conclusive proof. I said if we had information that 10 suggested an adverse effect might develop with new 11 materials and our toxicological studies indicated that 12 we should control exposures to such level or if we 13 didn't have quantitative data to the best of our - our 14 best guess. 15 Q. I didn't mean to imply that you did await 16 conclusive proof. I was meaning -- I'm sorry. I 17 apologize. I was meaning to ask you whether you think 18 it's reasonable from a scientific standpoint to wait 19 for conclusive proof about health hazards before 20 conveying the information you do have that could help 21 to protect your company, your employees, people 22 working in your plants. That was the question. Would 23 it be proper to delay - 24 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to continue 25 the objection. Especially terminology
565
1 used like "proper," scientifically," 2 and "conclusive proof" are ambiguous 3 in terms and very difficult or 4 impossible to answer, making the 5 question unintelligible to answer. 6 But go ahead, please, sir. 7 A. Our whole purpose in our - in our work was
Page 196
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 8 to prevent occupational disease from occurring. 9 Q. Yes, sir? 10 MR. PIERCE: Is there a question? 11 Is "Yes, sir" a question? 12 A. Isn't that the answer to your question? We 13 did not wait until somebody was laying flat out on the 14 slab before we did anything. 15 Q. Okay. And you don't do the best job of 16 preventing the occupational diseases by waiting until 17 you have scientifically documented conclusive findings 18 before you react, do you, sir? 19 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object 20 again to the continuing use of 21 "scientifically "conclusive" or 22 whatever findings they are since 23 they're not amenable to 24 interpretation. 25 A. Well, that would -- I would have to
566
1 interpret your statement there as indicating that 2 that we did not practice preventive measures and alert 3 medical people and others as to the hazards as best we 4 could judge them. We certainly didn't expose people 5 and then go back to the animal lab to find out except 6 in rare systems or situations where something 7 unexpected happened. And then we would go back to the 8 laboratory and try to find out why and how come. But 9 our charge was to prevent occupational health hazards. 10 Q. And you would best accomplish that charge by
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 11 responding to perceived hazards as soon as you had 12 some information to work with as opposed to waiting 13 until you had conclusive findings? That's the 14 question, Dr. Rowe. 15 MR. PIERCE: Object to the form. 16 Completely vague and ambiguous unless 17 you spell out what you mean by "some 18 findings." 19 A. I guess -- May I ask, what do you mean by 20 "conclusive findings"? 21 Q. Well, I suppose something that would be 22 scientifically documented as to which you, as a 23 scientist, would find it to be conclusive. 24 A. Well, that's looking at things after the 25 fact. We're talking about preempting these things in
567
1 a preventive mode. 2 Q. That was your approach? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. That was, you still believe, the proper 5 approach? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Prevent the problems before you get to the 8 point where you have many documented conclusive cases 9 of occupational disease that prove there was a 10 problem. Would you agree with that? 11 A. With our best judgment, we tried to achieve 12 that end. 13 Q. All right, sir. You said in our discussions
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 14 yesterday that people you refer to as "friendly 15 scientists" work with facts, not fantasy. Do you 16 remember that? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. How many facts did Dow need before it felt 19 compelled to warn people working in its plants about 20 their risk to occupational health hazards like 21 asbestos or silica? 22 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 23 form; ambiguous and vague and asks for 24 Dr. Rowe to present the thinking of 25 The Dow Chemical Company.
568
1 A. Well, certainly you have to have some facts 2 before you can predict. 3 Q. All right, sir. Would you agree that 4 somebody seeking to prevent occupational disease in a 5 workplace ought to do some investigation to obtain 6 facts about suspect materials used in the plant the 7 way that you did in the tox. lab and in your other 8 work? 9 A. I don't know any other way to approach it. 10 Q. Okay. And obtaining those facts that will 11 allow you to predict hazards would include, as we 12 discussed yesterday, going to the published literature 13 for the - to obtain the experience of others as 14 reported in professional journals, correct? 15 A. To look at the literature, if there's any 16 if it's available.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 17 Q. And that if you failed to go and investigate 18 the literature, knowing that you had a suspected 19 material in your plant where people could be or were 20 being exposed to it would not be a responsible 21 approach, would it, sir? 22 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 23 form. That's too vague. 24 In any instance under any 25 circumstance?
569
1 A. I don't -- I don't think anyone can be
2 totally informed about the literature. Particularly
3 in the days past, literature was hard to find and was
4 not accessible like it is today. 5 Q. There weren't computer data bases to go to
6 and such as that? 7 A. We didn't have data bases to go to --
8 Q. Okay.
9 A. -- and computerized information centers and
10 so forth. 11 Q. You would have gone to the - probably to the
12 trade journals, your professional journals, for your
13 own professional associations and the medical
14 associations, -
15 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the
16 form; leading.
17 Q. -- would you not? 18 A. Those were our usual sources of literature
19 information.
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 20 Q. Industrial hygiene association journals. 21 The different sources we discussed yesterday. Would 22 you agree? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. And such things as the Chemical Abstracts, 25 which I suppose you used from time to time.
570
1 A. From time to time. 2 Q. Okay. So, do you think, Dr. Rowe, that even 3 in the 1940's it would have been reasonable for a 4 company that had a toxic material or suspected toxic 5 material in its plants and that - one that workers 6 were being exposed to, to ignore the published 7 literature and to not make any effort to investigate 8 the health hazards that might have been reported in 9 the literature? 10 MR. PIERCE: I'm forced to object 11 to that question as being highly 12 ambiguous, nonspecific as to facts and 13 circumstances, making it very, very 14 difficult, if impossible, to answer. 15 Do your best. 16 A. I did not know that literature was ignored. 17 Q. Well, now, Dr. Rowe, just because I asked 18 you something doesn't mean I'm implying that you did 19 it or Dow did it. I'm just asking you what your view 20 was from that time period as to whether it would be 21 reasonable to ignore the literature. I'm not saying 22 that you did it. I'm not meaning to suggest you did
Page 201
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 23 it. 24 A. No. It's -- It's -- It's reasonable to use 25 the literature that you can find and limited, perhaps,
571
1 on your capacity and your ability to do so. But 2 certainly don't ignore facts. 3 Q. Dr. Rowe, do you recall making any kind of 4 presentations at any time to the board of directors of 5 Dow on a health- or safety-related matter? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. What would be -- What would be the 8 occasion? What was it? 9 A. I don't know. Don't remember. 10 Q. Were there several? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Does this mean you were, like, periodically 13 invited to talk to them and bring them up to date on 14 current topics or -15 MR. PIERCE: Obj ect -- Obj ection 16 to the form; leading. 17 MR. BLANKS: Leading? I get to 18 lead. You're the one that doesn't get 19 to lead. 20 A. It was not -- It was not on a periodic or 21 scheduled basis except on - at various times certain 22 of the board were interested in what we were doing as 23 part of their job, I suppose, to know what's going on. 24 Q. All right, sir. So, you had access to the 25 board and were from time to times invited there to
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572
1 speak to them about things of interest to them and to 2 you? 3 A. Yes. 4 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to 5 mischaracterization of certain parts of 6 his answer. 7 Go ahead. He already answered it; 8 so, let's go forward. 9 Q. Do you know, sir, of any destruction at Dow 10 of industrial hygiene records? 11 A. I'm sorry. I didn't hear it, I guess. 12 Q. Yes, sir. I wonder if you were aware of any 13 destruction of industrial hygiene records that was 14 done at Dow before you left the company. 15 A. Not to my knowledge. I don't know anything 16 about anything like that. I've never heard of it. 17 Q. Have you heard of any -- Okay. You've never 18 heard of any destructions even since you left Dow - 19 A. No. 20 Q. -- of such records? Okay. How about 21 toxicological records, reports, and such? 22 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 23 of the question, - 24 A. Not to my knowledge. 25 MR. PIERCE: -- if that is a
Page 203
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
1 question. 2 A. Not to my knowledge. 3 Q. Do you know, Dr. Rowe, whether Dow had a 4 document retention or document destruction program 5 that called for getting rid of documents of a certain 6 age? 7 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 8 of the question. It's compound. I 9 think it's editorializing. And it's 10 leading. 11 And if there is a program you 12 wish to ask him about, why don't you 13 just identify it. Go ahead. 14 Q. Do you know, Dr. Rowe, whether Dow adopted a 15 policy to purge its files of old records of any sort 16 to destroy documents from the past while you were 17 there with the company? 18 A. As I recollect, there was a - a program - I 19 can't tell you what time or what - but to clear 20 records of old - or clear the records section, 21 whatever that was, of, I presume, irrelevant 22 material. 23 Q. Did this program affect the departments for 24 which you were responsible or in which you worked? 25 A. I don't -- I'm not aware of it. I don't
574
1 know. 2 Q.
Did you understand that medical or health Page 204
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 3 and safety records were not included in this program 4 of destroying old records? 5 A. I'm not aware -- I'm not aware. As far as I 6 know, they were not. 7 Q. I see. 8 A. Not destroyed, I mean. Nothing -- Health 9 records, I always thought, were - were there at least 10 for the life of the person. 11 Q. And what about the - all the data gathered 12 by the toxicology lab at Dow, did you understand that 13 that was protected from the document destruction 14 program? 15 A. I - 16 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 17 form. Objection to the use of the term 18 "document destruction program." 19 MR. ALMQUIST: And I want to join 20 in that objection. There is a 21 characteriza -- Argumentative 22 characterization of the program. 23 Q. You did understand that the - 24 A. Not that I know of. 25 Q. -- program called for the destruction of old
575
1 documents, didn't you, Dr. Rowe? 2 MR. PIERCE: I think he has 3 already given you his answer. 4 A. I -- This was out of my area of 5 responsibility. And I don't know what the -- They
Page 205
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 6 certainly were not in my files or any lab files, that 7 I know of. 8 Q. Okay. So, the "document police" never came 9 to your lab or offices and said, "Hey, Dr. Rowe, get 10 with the program. You haven't been purging your 11 files," anything like that? 12 MR. PIERCE: Come on, now, 13 Mr. Blanks. Even for you "document 14 police" is a bit much. And, also, he 15 has indicated to you that his documents 16 are retained. So, what else do you 17 need? You're asking for his personal 18 knowledge of his documents. He's 19 telling you about them. 20 Q. How about your department's documents? 21 A. Not to my knowledge. 22 Q. Did you have an opinion while you were still 23 with Dow about the propriety of discarding and 24 destroying old records from the scientists, tox. lab, 25 that sort of thing?
576
1 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 2 form. I think he's indicated to you 3 that his records were not removed or 4 destroyed. 5 A. I had no part of destroying any records. 6 Q. If the program had called for the 7 destruction of the toxicological lab records, is that 8 something that you would have been philosophically
Page 206
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 9 opposed to, then, Dr. Rowe? 10 A. I would have objected. 11 Q. All right, sir. Do you know, sir, whether 12 copies of any of the toxicological records at Dow were 13 sent from time to time to the Dow legal department? 14 A. I'm sure reports went to the legal 15 department. I don't know whether all did or not 16 but -- They probably did not, but certainly some did. 17 Q. Okay. Can you recollect any of the sort of 18 situations that would have called for tox. lab records 19 to go to the legal department? What would have been 20 the condition that would have made that happen? 21 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 22 to the form of the question because, as 23 worded, it requires speculation. 24 A. There was -- I certainly can't remember all 25 possible situations, but certainly the -- There was a
577
1 unit involved in registration of materials with the 2 Government which was in the legal department. And 3 they certainly had all of our reports. If there was a 4 particular issue that the legal department wanted or 5 was interested, they had access to it. 6 Q. Would that also have been true of industrial 7 hygiene documents during the years that you were 8 respons ible for industrial hygiene? 9 A. As far as I know, 10 Q. Do you know, sir, whether records from 11 industrial hygiene section were destroyed under the
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12 document program at Dow that we've talked about?
13 A. Not to my knowledge. 14 Q. Is that -- Is that something that you would 15 have been philosophically opposed to, as well, the 16 destruction of the old industrial hygiene records and
17 files? 18 A. 19 Q.
Yes. Why is that, Dr. Rowe? Why would you be
20 opposed to that?
21 A. I think they would probably contain a lot of
22 history.
23 Q. And what conceivable importance would that 24 be to a scientist, Dr. Rowe? 25 A. It would be the only way, that I know of,
578
1 that you could document what the situation was. 2 Q. In the past? 3 A. In the particular plant, certainly. I don't 4 know that -- If they were destroyed, I don't know 5 that. 6 Q. Yes, sir. 7 A. If they were, I don't know it. I don't know 8 that they were. 9 Q. And if they were - 10 A. I doubt if they were but that's... 11 Q. Okay. Have you, yourself, been working on a 12 history of your work or the Dow toxicology program? 13 A. Not for years. 14 Q. You plan to get back to the project?
Page 208
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 15 A. I don't -- I don't know whether I will or 16 not. 17 Q. When the OSHA regulations came into effect 18 around 1970, what did Dow do then, that you recall, to 19 change its rules for working with asbestos insulation 20 in its plants? 21 A. I don't know. 22 Q. Do you recall that there were any changes 23 during that time, '70 to '73, in the asbestos handling 24 program? 25 A. I don't recall.
579
1 Q. Do you recall that your department or the 2 people that were reporting to you made any proposals 3 that would have come before you to improve the methods 4 for handling asbestos materials in Dow plants? 5 A. I don't remember. 6 Q. Do you recall, Dr. Rowe, whether there were 7 any changes that took place in the toxicology lab in 8 conjunction with the OSHA regulations of the early 9 Seventies as to handling asbestos in the lab? 10 A. No. I don't remember. 11 Q. Were you still working in the lab at all in 12 1970 through '73? 13 A. Very little. 14 Q. Do you know whether Dow ever ceased the use 15 of asbestos in the Gooch crucible filters? 16 A. No, I don't know. 17 Q. They were still using it the last time you
Page 209
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 18 wore in the lab, I suppose. 19 A. Don't know. 20 Q. Don't remember? 21 A. No. 22 Q. Did not the -- Didn't the health and safety 23 professionals that worked at Dowell Company share with 24 you the occupational health information that they 25 developed and had at hand?
580
1 A. I don't recall. I just don't -- I don't 2 remember. 3 Q. You told us how you had done over the years 4 your toxicology work or industrial hygiene work for 5 subsidiaries like Dowell and including Dowell, I 6 think, yesterday, correct? 7 A. We did a certain amount of - of 8 toxicological work, as we discussed yesterday, I 9 believe; but as far as industrial hygiene, I don't - 10 I just don't recall what the situation was there. 11 Q. Was the case, though, that you did have open 12 communications with the health and safety people 13 working for Dowell between your tox. lab in Midland 14 and their folks in Tulsa or wherever they were? I 15 mean there was a... 16 A. Well, there must be must have. There would 17 be no reason why there wasn't. But I don't recall 18 the - any particular arrangements. 19 Q. But the practice was that there was a free 20 exchange of information between the health and safety
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 21 professionals in Midland and Tulsa? 22 A. It would depend upon your description of 23 "information exchange," because our reports would not 24 go to Dowell unless they were concerned with materials 25 that Dowell was interested in or asked about.
581
1 Q. Okay. But they had access to you - to your 2 department for consultations, I suppose. 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. And they didn't withhold information that 5 they had from the Midland toxicologists or medical 6 departments, to your knowledge, did they? 7 A. I don't know. 8 Q. You wouldn't have expected them to, would 9 you? 10 A. I wouldn't expect them to, but I don't know. 11 Q. I mean, surely the Dowell company operated 12 under the same general philosophy about providing safe 13 workplaces as Dow Chemical did, didn't it? 14 MR. PIERCE: He's given you his 15 answer that he doesn't know. Of 16 course, he can not know what's in the 17 mind of anyone at Dowell. 18 A. I'm not -- I really don't remember what 19 the - even how that operation was conducted down 20 there. 21 Q. Okay. When was it, Dr. Rowe, approximately, 22 that Dow adopted the policy to inform each and every 23 person who would be in a block area of all the known
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 24 hazards? 25 A. I don't know.
582
1 Q. Do you know, sir, whether that ever became 2 the Dow policy? 3 A. No, I don't know. 4 Q. Well, certainly it was the policy in your 5 lab, wasn't it, to inform everybody that would be in 6 there of all the known hazards that they might 7 encounter there? 8 A. I'm confused, I guess, by where the -- I 9 don't understand what your - what you're talking 10 about, I guess. We passed our information to people 11 that asked for it or that we thought it was important 12 that they know about it. And there was no problem on 13 that, as far as I know; but I guess I don't understand 14 your question. 15 Q. Okay. Let me try again, and maybe we can 16 get together because I know you're trying to be 17 helpful. 18 Do you know, Dr. Rowe, whether it was ever 19 the practice at Dow to inform each and every worker 20 who would be in a block area in the plant of all the 21 known hazards that they could encounter there? 22 A. Now, what do you mean by "block area"? 23 Q. I use that term the same way Dow may have 24 used it. It's a Dow term. 25 A. I don't know what it means. That's why
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1 I'm -2 Q. Okay. 3 A. -- I' m -- I can't answer you. 4 Q. In a particular unit area. Would that make 5 easier ? 6 A. Well, in a particular plant, yes. 7 Q. When we speak of a plant, are we talking 8 about a subpart of the big Midland facility; or do you 9 just - do you speak of the Midland plant as 10 encompassing everything? 11 A. Well, various operations were scattered 12 different places in the - in the Midland area. Now, 13 we're talking about Midland. 14 Q. Yes, sir. 15 A. That's a big area. And there were plants 16 that were dealing with, for instance, the chlorinated 17 hydrocarbons. And there might be one over here and 18 there might be one over there making a different 19 material, but they would probably be under the same 20 supervision. 21 Q. But would we speak of each grouping of 22 machinery as a plant? That's what I was trying to get 23 a handle on. 24 A. Yes. A manufacturing unit, for instance, 25 that was making carbon tetrachloride.
Page 213
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 1 Q. Okay. 2 A. Or a separate unit that was making vinyl 3 chloride or something similar. Now, those two 4 probably didn't go together. But there were groupings 5 of operations, and they were under - usually under a 6 single manager. 7 Q. Well, then, let's speak in terms of a 8 manufacturing unit, if that makes it more precise. Do 9 you know, sir, when, approximately - what decade, 10 even - it became the practice at Dow to inform each 11 and every person who would be in a unit area of the 12 all the known hazards there? 13 A. I can't -- I don't know when that was. That 14 was pretty much under Mr. Hoyle's operation. And I 15 know he was one who was very interested in perfecting 16 that distribution of information. 17 Q. So that if Mr. Hoyle were the one who began 18 that practice, it would have obviously begun after his 19 employment began around '48 or so. 20 A. I would expect it would be his - him or his 21 people. 22 Q. Okay. And would it also have been the 23 procedure or the policy to inform the people who would 24 be in a particular manufacturing unit of the 25 appropriate protective equipment required for that
1 area? 2 3
585
MR. PIERCE: Are you asking Dr. Rowe if he knows, his specific
Page 214
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 4 knowledge on this; or are you asking 5 him to speculate as to what might have 6 been? 7 MR. BLANKS: Well, - 8 MR. PIERCE: I don't think the 9 question is clear as to really what you 10 want on that. 11 (By Mr. Blanks) 12 Q. Are you confused, Dr. Rowe? I find that 13 Dr. Pie rce's objections always confuse me. 14 MR. PIERCE: Not as much as your 15 questions confuse us. 16 A. Well, would you try again? 17 Q. Yes, sir. I wonder if, as part of the 18 policy of informing each and every person who would be 19 in a manufacturing unit area of all the known hazards 20 there, whether Dow also would have informed these 21 folks of the appropriate protective equipment required 22 for that area that they'd be going into. 23 A. I would think they would if there was 24 protective equipment required. And that was not our 25 general policy to operate with protective equipment.
586
1 That was not supposed to be except on emergencies or 2 very short-term efforts. 3 Q. All right, sir. Do you know, Dr. Rowe, of 4 any times when Dow began to monitor for asbestos dust 5 in connection with brake shoe repair work? 6 A. I don't recollect.
Page 215
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 7 Q. Do you recall, sir, ever receiving at the 8 toxicology lab or the industrial hygiene department 9 any information from the automobile manufacturers that 10 asbestos was - in brake shoes was a hazardous 11 material? 12 A. I do not recall receiving any information 13 from manufacturers. 14 Q. Would the same be true for the manufacturers 15 of brake shoe parts, brake - disk pads in brake shoes, 16 as well as the auto manufacturers? 17 A. I don't recall. 18 Q. Don't recall getting any information from 19 them, either? 20 A. I beg your pardon. 21 Q. Recall receiving no information from the 22 brake parts manufacturers, either? 23 A. I don't recall that. It seems to me that 24 there was a publication somewhere along the line 25 discussing that, but I don't - I don't know where it
587
1 is. 2 Q. You're recollecting a publication you had at 3 Dow that discussed the asbestos brake shoe -4 A. No. 5 Q. -- hazard? Is that what - 6 A. Something in the literature. 7 Q. Oh, okay. All right, sir. Was it always 8 during your years with the company Dow's policy to 9 tell its customers of all the known and suspected
Page 216
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 10 health hazards of Dow products? 11 A. As far as I know, at the - very early in the 12 game - early years - I do not believe that was the way 13 they practiced. 14 Q. Shortly after you arrived - 15 A. But later on, after the Material Safety Data 16 Sheets and everything started to come out, I believe 17 it was - the information was supposed to have passed 18 on, but that would have been through salespeople. 19 Q. Would that have been as early as the 1940's? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Fifties? 22 A. I don't know. 23 Q. Weren't you, in your tox. lab, developing 24 information about the products that Dow made as early 25 as the - even the late 1930's?
588
1 A. Yes. 2 Q. You just don't know whether or not Dow was 3 providing that information to the customers for those 4 products that early? 5 A. That I don't know. 6 Q. Surely you'd agree that that's a reasonable 7 thing to do, is to tell your customers about the known 8 and suspected hazards that could be encountered in the 9 use of a material, wouldn't you? 10 MR. PIERCE: Are you asking this 11 of the witness as an expert on required 12 warnings, as a citizen in his
Page 217
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 13 community, as a toxicologist? I don't 14 understand the basis of asking that 15 kind of general question to this 16 witness. 17 Q. Do you understand that the reasonableness of 18 telling the users of products about the health hazards 19 that they entail would be different for a toxicologist 20 as opposed to a manufacturer as opposed to some 21 ignorant customer, Dr. Rowe? 22 A. Well, the literature that would be - that 23 would go along with it, including labels, were 24 supposedly to inform people that - of hazards. And 25 there were certain - certain governmental regulation
589
1 that prescribed - stated this sort of information that
2 had to be presented in the label which was, I presume,
3 on every package that - of a material. 4 The biggest problem was sometimes the labels
5 were pretty small if the package was small. And an
6 effort then was made to - I don't know how
7 consistently - to pass on information that was
8 available.
9 Q. And certainly if Dow had information that 10 went beyond what the minimum Government standard was
11 for a label - I mean that dealt with the toxicity of a
12 material to the user - it would convey that, wouldn't
13 it? 14
MR. PIERCE: Once again, I would
15 like to object. Dr. Rowe has not Page 218
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 16 indicated he is an expert on labeling. 17 Portions of this question require legal 18 conclusions from this witness which he 19 is not in a position to make. But he 20 certainly can answer it, to the best of 21 his ability, as a general person in the 22 community. 23 A. There was a section that I mentioned earlier 24 that was in - in the legal department that was 25 responsible for meeting Government regulations with
590
1 respect to labeling. 2 Q. As a scientist concerned with facts working 3 in the area of toxicology, an area that deals with the 4 ability of materials to cause disease and death and 5 adverse effects, as you say, certainly you never 6 condoned, did you, withholding information about 7 poisonous materials or potentially poison material 8 just because there was a label required that the 9 Government wanted, would you? 10 MR. PIERCE: Object to the form of 11 the question. It's ambiguous. 12 Withholding what materials, 13 molecular weights? I mean, it's so 14 ambiguous that it's impossible to 15 answer accurately. 16 MR. ALMQUIST: And I'm going to 17 further object to it because it is 18 nonspecific with respect to whom the
Page 219
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 19 material was being sold, whether we're 20 talking about sale to a sophisticated 21 merchant user or we're talking about 22 consumers. That type of question 23 without more information is incapable 24 of being answered. 25 A. Well, I certainly didn't object to passing
591
1 information along and - if it was useful for the 2 prevention of adverse effects at the other end of the
3 pipeline, so to speak. That was not my job to pass 4 that information along, and I don't know how well it
5 was done. 6 Q. Certainly you believed that it should be
7 passed along during the years that you worked at Dow, 8 didn't you, sir? 9 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form
10 of the question and the ambiguity of
11 the term "it." 12 Q. That information -- Didn't you believe when
13 you worked for Dow that that information that you 14 developed should be passed along to the customers? 15 MR. PIERCE: I continue the
16 objection for ambuguity and vagueness. 17 A. Oh, I had every reason to believe that it
18 did. 19 Q.
Don't you think, Dr. Rowe, that a
20 manufacturer of a product that's known or suspected of
21 being able to cause cancer or crippling, disabling Page 220
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 22 diseases has an obligation to investigate what can 23 reasonably be known about the health effects of the 24 material - 25 MR. PIERCE: Obj ection.
592
1 Q. -- before it puts it on the market? 2 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 3 of the question. It's asking about 4 obligations, requiring legal 5 conclusions on the part of this 6 witness. 7 Go ahead. 8 A. Well, I would categorize it in a more 9 general way and just say that if there was a 10 particular hazard, irrespective of what the material 11 is, that that information should be passed along. 12 Q. Indeed, then, you'd agree that - as a 13 scientist, that a company would have a moral 14 obligation to investigate those hazards and pass it 15 on, wouldn't you, sir? 16 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 17 to the form of the question. He's not 18 here to answer about moral obligations, 19 which, also, requires essentially legal 20 conclusions. He's here as a fact 21 witness. Why don't you ask him the 22 fact questions that he's here to 23 answer. 24 Q. Sir?
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 25 A. I don't think anyone can say that
593
1 information shouldn't be passed on. 2 Q. And even back in the Thirties, didn't you 3 believe, Dr. Rowe, that it was the right thing to do 4 for Dow to try to learn what it could reasonably know 5 about the potential health hazards of the materials it 6 was using and selling? 7 A. Well, that was the reason why our laboratory 8 was developed, to generate that sort of information. 9 Q. And didn't you believe then, sir, that this 10 was the right thing for any company to do that made 11 materials that could have harmful health effects in 12 their ordinary use? 13 MR. PIERCE: When you say, "this 14 the right thing to do," does that 15 mean -- I'm sorry. Do you mean share 16 information? Do you mean test it, 17 themselves? Do you mean send it out? 18 It's a completely ambiguous question. 19 A. I can only speak for my own feelings, which 20 I've already expressed. 21 Q. So, was it the case, then, that during the 22 Thirties and the Forties, the Fifties and the Sixties 23 you really didn't expect the suppliers of toxic 24 materials to Dow to have made any kind of 25 investigation about the health hazards that it could -
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594
1 that they could pass on to Dow? 2 MR. ALMQUIST: Object as being an 3 argumentative question. 4 A. There were -- There were some companies that 5 had facilities and used them to develop information. 6 And our purchasing people were - in the later years, 7 anyway -- I don't like to say "required," but it was 8 part of the program to inquire of the seller what 9 information they had with respect to a particular 10 substance. Many -- Many very small companies did not 11 have that -- They had no information; so, they 12 couldn't pass it on. 13 Q. And they would have had no information 14 because they hadn't developed any, I suppose. 15 A. Or there wasn't any in the literature or 16 anything of that nature. 17 Q. Yet when Dow faced a situation like that 18 where it didn't have the information or found none in 19 the literature, Dow would actually make an 20 investigation through its toxicology lab, wouldn't it? 21 A. Well, we tried to do that. 22 MR. STANGER: Could we ask the 23 witness to speak up, please? 24 Q. Dr. Rowe, could you share with us how in 25 your job at Dow you would go about attempting to
1 influence decision makers in Government? Page 223
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
2 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to
3 the form of the question. 4 Could you be more specific?
5 MR. BLANKS: Well, about what,
6 "Government"?
7 MR. PIERCE: Yes. 8 MR. BLANKS: "Decision"?
9 MR. PIERCE: What Government?
10 What influence? 11 Well, go ahead --
12 MR. BLANKS: "Influence"?
13 Go ahead and answer, to the 14 best of your ability, with the
15 vagueness. 16 (By Mr. Blanks)
Go ahead.
17 Q. Now, wait a minute. I'm not
18 suggesting -
19 A. I didn't get your question.
20 Q. All right. We'll try again. And not 21 meaning to imply any illegal influence of the sorts
22 we - 23
MR. PIERCE: Oh, we never would
24 have seen that in your --
25 Q. -- see in Government from time to time.
596
1 How did you in your job at Dow go about 2 influencing decision makers in Government? 3 A. We would do our best to gather the facts and 4 present them to them on a scientific basis, along with
Page 224
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 5 our interpretation of those results, and discuss it 6 with the appropriate people. 7 Q. And these efforts were from time to time 8 directed at influencing proposed changes in 9 regulations about the chemicals you were using at Dow? 10 MR. PIERCE: Why not -- Instead of 11 leading that way, why don't you ask him 12 what he did; and then he could tell 13 you. 14 MR. BLANKS: Well, then I wouldn't 15 get your objections. 16 MR. PIERCE: Okay. So, now you 17 have it. 18 Objection to the form. 19 A. I would think that that would have been 20 within the scope of Government relations. 21 (By Mr. Blanks) 22 Q. Could you explain to us, Dr. Rowe, what sort 23 of topics or areas that you did attempt to influence 24 Government decision makers as part of your Government 25 relations activities?
597
1 MR. PIERCE: When you say 2 "influence," you mean educate, bring 3 information to them? I mean, what is 4 what are you really asking this 5 witness? 6 Okay. Try to answer it, Dr. Rowe. 7 A. Well, when we developed information that was
Page 225
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 8 pertinent to the A.C.G.I.H. threshold limit committee, 9 we presented it to them and made our suggestions. 10 When we went to the Food and Drug Administration, we 11 presented our data and our proposals to acquaint them 12 and give them the best information and opinions that 13 we had or that were available with respect to 14 regulations that were to come out on a particular 15 material or whatever. This was very broad in scope. 16 Q. All right. Did any of your work in 17 Government relations deal with any proposed OSHA 18 regulations or changes in the standards - in OSHA 19 standards? 20 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to 21 the form of the question. The way you 22 phrased it, "his work in Government 23 relations," suggests he was in the 24 Government relations department, which 25 I don't believe was part of Dr. Rowe's
598
1 background. 2 But given that objection, go ahead
3 and answer.
4 MR. BLANKS: Well, it was the term
5 he used earlier, you know. 6 A. Relations with OSHA?
7 Q. Yes, sir.
8 A. Yes. I had - I had relations with OSHA. I 9 can't remember all the materials that we discussed
10 with them.
Page 226
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 11 (By Mr. Blanks) 12 Q. Were your relations with OSHA directed 13 toward influencing changes in the regulations that 14 OSHA wrote or proposed to write? 15 A. I -- I don't know about the "change," 16 but "help develop appropriate regulations" might be a 17 better description. 18 Q. Were there any particular materials you 19 recall, Dr. Rowe, in which you attempted to influence 20 the development of proposed regulations with OSHA? 21 A. I don't -- I can't remember specifics. 22 Q. Okay. 23 A. Are you talking about developing regulations 24 or criticizing them or what? 25 Q. Well, I suppose all of the above because I
599
1 really don't know what your activities were and was
2 just hoping you'd explain those to us. 3 You never went to OSHA and suggested that
4 regulations be written about any particular material 5 or workplace condition, did you?
6 A. I'm not -- I'm not certain that we didn't
7 make suggestions to OSHA as to things that might or
8 that should occur or did occur. I served on the OSHA
9 carcinogen advisory committee. And we presented data
10 on a number of materials that we were handling and
11 using.
12 Q. Did you find that to be a productive effort,
13 Dr. Rowe?
Page 227
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 14 A. In some respects. 15 Q. And what were those? 16 A. Well, that was a very - very interesting 17 committee. There were many factors. "Many factions" 18 I should say. And there was considerable disagreement 19 between the various groups, as one might expect. 20 Q. What did you learn from that experience 21 about the purpose of some of Dow's adversaries that 22 you encountered on that committee? 23 A. Of what? 24 Q. About the goals and purposes of Dow's 25 adversaries that you encountered on that advisory
600
1 commission or advisory committee. 2 A. Well, the principal - the principal 3 difference in philosophy, I think, between different 4 groups was the belief that reflected the Delaney 5 clause in the Food and Drug Act which indicates that 6 if a material produces a cancer in any animal at any 7 dose, it therefore deserves a zero tolerance. And I 8 don't believe that that's scientifically sound at all. 9 THE REPORTER: Excuse me. I need 10 to change my paper. 11 MR. BREWTON: You've got another 12 minute and a half (directed to 13 Mr. Blanks). 14 MR. BLANKS: He's out of tape, 15 you're out of paper. 16 MR. PIERCE: Okay. Let's take a
Page 228
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 17 lunch break. 18 1:15? Is that all right? 19 MR. BLANKS: Sure, guys. 20 (AT 12:07 P.M. THE DEPOSITION WAS 21 RECESSED FOR LUNCH. AT 1:33 P.M. THE 22 PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:) 23 (By Mr. Blanks) 24 Q. Dr. Rowe, from our first couple of days 25 visiting together, you'll recall that you brought with
601
1 you a number of documents from your personal files in 2 response to the subpoena duces tecum that was part of 3 the deposition notice. And I just wanted to establish 4 for our record that those documents were, in fact, 5 things that you brought from your personal file. 6 With that in mind, Dr. Rowe, have you had a 7 chance to check through the three volumes of the 8 exhibits to the deposition of yourself taken on 9 October 1st and October 2nd of 1992? 10 A. I have not. 11 Q. Can you tell us, sir, whether or not the 12 documents that are in each of the three exhibits to 13 your October 1st and 2nd, 1992, deposition did come 14 from your personal files at home? 15 MR. PIERCE: I think with that 16 question you have to give him at least 17 a few seconds to scan them or 18 something. 19 Why don't you just take a quick -
Page 229
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 20 Scan through them very quickly. 21 MR. ALMQUIST: And for the benefit 22 of Dr. Rowe, as well, let me simply 23 tell him that these are the 24 documents that we had copied and 25 produced; that I have looked at
602
1 them, as well, to make sure that they 2 are the documents that you brought. 3 MR. PIERCE: From the first 4 deposition. 5 MR. ALMQUIST: From the first 6 deposition. 7 Q. But take a moment, if need be, to - 8 A. Well, there's quite a volume. All I can say 9 is that the originals that I provided the attorneys I 10 have to assume are - these are copies of those. That 11 was -- That was the understanding when I gave them to 12 them for copying. And if they can attest to the fact 13 that -- They came -- All they had to copy came from my 14 personal files, yes. 15 MR. ALMQUIST: And I can tell you 16 that I had - took those documents that 17 Dr. Rowe gave me and had them copied 18 and provided them to you. And they are 19 attached as the three volumes of 20 exhibits to his first deposition. 21 Q. Okay. Mr. Pierce, is that - 22 MR. PIERCE: I have no problem.
Page 230
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 23 I'm not making any objection. I just 24 think the way you worded the question 25 would put him in a -- But I think he's
603
1 explained; and that's fine for all of 2 us, I believe. 3 Q. All right, sir. Now, Dr. Rowe, bear with me 4 on a few questions about a couple other things from 5 the older times. 6 Do you recall, sir, having with you at Dow 7 the industrial toxicology textbook from 1934 when you 8 were working there? 9 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 10 of the question. It's vague. No 11 author -12 Q. A text titled Industrial Toxicology, 13 published in '34. 14 A. I -- Was this the -- Who was the editor? 15 Was it Patty? 16 Q. I think it's too early for Patty. 17 A. I think so, too. I don't believe so. The 18 earliest one that I have is the Industrial Hygiene and 19 Toxicology edited by Patty, and I can't remember what 20 the publication date on that was. 21 Q. All right, sir. I think you told us before 22 that you thought that was the first edition. Do you 23 know - 24 A. Yes. It is. 25 Q. Okay. Do you recall having a text called
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
604
1 Industrial Hygiene, edited by Lanza - 2 A. No. No. 3 Q. -- and Goldberg from '39? 4 A. I do not. I do not. 5 Q. How about Cyril Blacktin's text titled Dust 6 from 1934? 7 A. I do not. 8 Q. Did you have a book called Industrial 9 Hyg iene for Engineers and Managers by Carey McCord and 10 Floyd Allen? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Do you recall having Drinker and Hatch's 13 text titled Industrial Dust from '36? 14 A. No, I do not. 15 Q. How about Lanza's 1938 book titled Silicosis 16 and Asbestosis? 17 A. No. 18 Q. All right, sir. Dr. Rowe, sometime in the 19 morning a couple of boxes of papers were wheeled in. 20 And could you explain to us where those copies came 21 from, just generally? 22 A. The big bulk of that material was a file 23 that I accumulated over - of reprints that I 24 accumulated over the years on various - various 25 aspects of the subject of carcinogenesis. And I had
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1 at one time a thought that I might try to write a 2 treatise of some description on the subject. It 3 always did intrigue me, but I never knew enough about 4 it; and nothing has ever happened. Those things -- I 5 don't know why I shipped them down here when I came 6 down here 13 years ago, but I did. And I haven't 7 looked at them since until Counsel suggested that they 8 might be part of the things that I should provide. 9 And there's nothing -- I have nothing to hide. I 10 simply didn't believe that they pertained to the 11 particular subject that we had at issue. 12 Q. Okay. 13 A. So, I made them available for whatever use 14 you may have. 15 Q. Okay. So, back in October it just didn't 16 strike you that they came within the scope of the 17 document request; but since then you've considered 18 they might be? 19 A. That' s true. 20 Q. And you were kind enough, then, to go 21 through your papers of the ones you've just described 22 and pull out those that you thought could possibly be 23 responsive to the document request? 24 A. That was what I did at the first 25 deposition. I have not even -- I did not even go
606
1 through that box of stuff. It just was in my closet. 2 Q. I see. Okay. Does that pretty much exhaust
Page 233
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 3 your collection of old articles and papers, then? 4 A. It does. 5 Q. All right, sir. 6 A. I may have something on 2,4,5-T and loose 7 paper clippings on Agent Orange and things like that 8 and the dioxins that -- I think I have those yet. 9 Q. Generally speaking, Dr. Rowe, the two boxes 10 of documents you brought consist of articles from 11 years past concerning carcinogenicity and related - or 12 just generally toxicology and industrial hygiene, I 13 suppose. 14 A. Well, the one batch was -- I tried to 15 categorize them years ago into what was related to 16 carcinogenesis, occupational and otherwise. And then 17 there are other documents that I didn't think had any 18 bearing on - on the hearing that are now available to 19 you - a lot of personal cards and notes that I've used 20 and will probably continue to use in lectures on this, 21 that, and other things. Every once in a while someone 22 asks me to give a talk on the subject, and I go back 23 and I look at some of my old notes so that I don't 24 have to reconstruct everything. 25 Q. Okay.
607
1 A. So -- But they're there for whatever value 2 they may be to the purpose of your inquisition. 3 MR. PIERCE: Appropriate 4 terminology. 5 A. I don't know what's going on but -
Page 234
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 6 Q. Oh, well, Mr. Pierce was laughing at your 7 use of the word "inquisition," which is one of my 8 favorites, too, but... 9 All right, sir. The articles that are in 10 the boxes, would those be reprints that you acquired 11 around the time that the articles were published? 12 A. I don't know. 13 Q. Does the box also include typed notes of 14 some lectures that you, yourself, gave over the years? 15 A. It could be. 16 Q. If among the documents in the two boxes are 17 papers that on their title show that it's a paper 18 authored by you or a speech to be given by you, would 19 that be accurate? 20 A. I think so. 21 Q. All right, sir. And if the box contains 22 text of speeches given by others and yourself and the 23 title shows that to be so, would those, to your 24 knowledge, be accurate, as well? 25 A. They all came from my file.
608
1 Q. So, for example, - 2 A. I don't know what all -- I don't even know 3 what all is in there. 4 Q. Well, for example, if we were to find in 5 there a couple of talks that appeared to have been 6 authored by John Zapp, a Cummings Lecture, or a 7 Stokinger Lecture, would it be your recollection that 8 those would be copies of speeches that you obtained
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9 around the time they were given?
10 A. Yes. 11 Q. And there are also, as you mentioned, some
12 handwritten documents in there. And I don't mean to 13 address them globally, but some of those would be 14 things that you, yourself, wrote that have been 15 copied - photocopied? 16 A. I think they're probably all - all my
17 writing. I looked over those, those - those
18 handwritten statements. And there may be one or two
19 in there that I can't even remember where they - where
20 they were given. So, I don't know.
21 Q. Okay. Well, that's understandable. 22 A. But they're there, and that's why I brought
23 them. 24 25
MR. PIERCE: Mr. Blanks, perhaps this would be an appropriate time to
609
1 put on the record what we were 2 discussing informally before 3 Mr. Almquist, yourself, and myself 4 that if there are any questions as to 5 any specific document's handwriting, 6 that if you'll bring it to our 7 attention, we'll certainly have 8 Dr. Rowe look at it and identify it for 9 you at any time. 10 MR. BLANKS: Well, we appreciate 11 that kind offer, sir.
Page 236
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 12 (By Mr. Blanks) 13 Q. I had a few specific ones that I did want to 14 visit with you about, if we could just take a few 15 minutes. 16 Dr. Rowe, I've got - I have a reprint of an 17 article titled, "Public Health Hazards from 18 Environmental Chemical Carcinogens, Mutagens and 19 Teratogens," that I'd like to show you here as soon as 20 I can put a label on it. 21 MR. BLANKS: And I'm going to 22 label this Plaintiffs' Exhibit 710105 23 WCH. 24 (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT 710105 WCH 25 WAS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION
610
1 PURPOSES BY MR. BLANKS. SAME WILL BE 2 FOUND IN THE EXHIBIT VOLUMES ATTENDANT
3 TO THIS DEPOSITION.)
4 (By Mr. Blanks)
5 Q. (Tendering document) And this one does have
6 some handwritten notes on it. 7 MR. PIERCE: (Reviewing document)
8 (By Mr. Blanks)
9 Q. But Mr. Pie rce doesn't want you to see it
10 yet. 11
MR. BLANKS: I'm sorry. I should
12 have gotten out your copy, too. I
13 think there were two of them in there.
14 MR. PIERCE: I mean, I hope you Page 237
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 15 don't object to me looking at a 16 document that you're about to hand the 17 witness. 18 MR. BLANKS: Well, I think it's 19 I think it's quite unreasonable, 20 actually, but... 21 MR. PIERCE: (Tendering document 22 to the witness) 23 (By Mr. Blanks) 24 Q. Do you recognize the handwriting that's on 25 the front page of that article or reprint, sir?
611
1 A. (Reviewing document) I don't recognize the 2 handwriting. 3 Q. So, that's not your handwriting on the cover 4 of that? 5 A. No, sir. 6 Q. Okay. Is this an article that you did have 7 in your files, however? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Okay. And you recognize the name of the 10 author? 11 A. Dr. Hueper? 12 Q. Yes, sir. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Okay. Did you ever have any dealings or 15 communications, correspondence, that sort of thing 16 with Dr. Hueper? 17 A. I -- I don't remember.
Page 238
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 18 Q. Okay. 19 A. He was pretty early on in the game, when I 20 was a neophyte. 21 Q. Yes, sir. Okay. Do you think you ever met 22 the gentleman? 23 A. I may have met him at a meeting or something 24 of that nature, but I've never had any meetings with 25 him.
612
1 Q. All right, sir. Dr. Rowe, the note on the 2 cover page of Dr. Hue per's article looks to be signed 3 by -- -- Cv_,hneeLt?f 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Do you know who "Chet" is? 6 A. His name was Chet Otis. 7 Q. How do you spell that last name, sir? 8 A. O-t-i-s. 9 Q. Oh, Otis. Okay. 10 A. He signed it up above. 11 Q. Oh, I see. And who was he with, Dr. Rowe? 12 A. He was in our agricultural - I don't know 13 what the name of it - agricultural division. In 14 sales, I believe. 15 Q. I see. 16 A. Sales or development. I don't know which. 17 Q. Do you recognize the name above the Chet 18 Otis name at the top right? 19 A. I beg your pardon. 20 Q. Can you tell what word that is above Chet
Page 239
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
21 Otis' name?
22 A. I don't know who that is. I don't know who
23 that is. 24 Q. 25
Oh, okay. Probably of no - no matter. Dr. Rowe, I've got some papers that are
613
1 handwritten notes that came out of one of the files in 2 the boxes that you provided today that was titled,
3 "loose papers at top of stack." And I rubber-banded 4 them together so that we'd know where they came from, 5 but could we just run through these quickly and let 6 you at least identify them as being in your hand or 7 not and perhaps just a brief clue as to what each one 8 might represent (tendering document)?
9 (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT ROWE 9 10 WAS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION
11
PURPOSES BY MR. BLANKS.
SAME WILL BE
12 FOUND IN THE EXHIBIT VOLUMES ATTENDANT
13 TO THIS DEPOSITION.) 14 MS. COLDWELL: What exhibit is
15 that? 16 MR. BLANKS: This is marked as 17 Rowe Exhibit No. 9. And I've penciled
18 in at the top there "from loose papers"
19 so we'd keep track of it. 20 A. (Reviewing document) 21 THE WITNESS: See if there's 22 something missing (directed to
23 Mr. Pierce). Page 240
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 24 MR. BLANKS: I don't know, 25 Mr. Pierce. I thought this was an
614
1 appropriate time for you to object that 2 the document speaks for itself and... 3 MR. PIERCE: I haven't heard a 4 question yet. Maybe I will. 5 MR. BLANKS: No. I was asking 6 Dr. Rowe to just try and tell us what 7 that collection of notes was or 8 pertained to. 9 (AT THIS TIME PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS 10 ROWE 10, ROWE 11, ROWE 12, ROWE 13, 11 ROWE 14, AND ROWE 15 WERE MARKED FOR 12 IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES BY MR. BLANKS. 13 SAME WILL BE FOUND IN THE EXHIBIT 14 VOLUMES ATTENDANT TO THIS DEPOSITION.) 15 MR. HOBSON: He's waiting for a 16 question. 17 (By Mr. Blanks) 18 Q. Oh, I'm sorry. Could you give us a clue as 19 to what that generally pertains to or what it is? 20 A. Well, it's obviously the card notes that I 21 used in a speech somewhere. 22 Q. Topic - 23 A. But I can't tell you where. 24 Q. Could you tell what the topic of the talk 25 was, Dr. Rowe?
Page 241
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
615
1 A. I don't know. It has to do with - with the 2 broad concept of toxicology and safety and 3 responsibility and the kinds of tests that are 4 conducted and... It looks like an educational lecture 5 for somebody that I don't -- I don't know where 6 (tendering document). 7 Q. All right, sir. Can you place it in a 8 decade, even? 9 A. No. 10 Q. Let me hand you Rowe Exhibit 10, sir, and 11 ask you if that's your handwritten notes (tendering 12 document). 13 A. (Reviewing document) 14 MR. PIERCE: Mr. Blanks, no 15 underlinings or tabs or anything like 16 that on these documents? 17 MR. BLANKS: No. Just the "from 18 the loose papers at the top of the 19 stack" right here. 20 MR. PIERCE: Okay. 21 MR. HOBSON: We haven't had time 22 to accomplish that yet. Lunch was only 23 an hour. Hour and a half, I guess. 24 MR. BLANKS: There is a note 25 written in here on one, "We knew all
Page 242
616
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 1 along..."
2 A. (Reviewing document) Again, obviously, my 3 notes from a speech. I have no idea where it was
4 given. 5 Q.
Or even --
6 A. When. 7 Q. -- or even approximately when? All right, 8 sir. Let me hand you Rowe 11 and ask you if you can
9 answer the same questions about that, sir (te ndering
10 document). 11 A. This, again, is another one of the same
12 category. 13 Q. All right, sir.
Your handwritten notes?
14 A. Yes. 15 Q. (Tendering document) Rowe 12, please, sir.
16 A. That's my handwriting. 17 Q. All right, sir. (Tendering documen t) 18 Please look at Exhibit Rowe --
19 What is that one? Hold it. What's the
20 number on that, please?
21 A. Twelve. 22 Q. Oh, dear. I've misnumbered here. We've got
23 two 12's. You just gave me back 12. Let me change
24 the number on that. I've equivocated on us here.
25 MR. BLANKS: All right. We've got
617
1 12. I'm going to change that one to 16 2 because I've already marked up through 3 15.
Page 243
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
4 (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT ROWE 16
5 WAS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION
6 PURPOSES BY MR. BLANKS. SAME WILL BE
7 FOUND IN THE EXHIBIT VOLUMES ATTENDANT
8 TO THIS DEPOSITION.)
9 (By Mr. Blanks) 10 Q. Let's proceed on orderly fashion to Rowe
11 Exhibit No. 13, sir (tendering document).
12 A. (Reviewing document) That's my handwriting.
13 Q. Thank you. Would you please look at Rowe
14 Exhibit 14 (tendering document).
15 A. (Reviewing document) That's mine. There's 16 a blank piece in here that I don't identify as mine,
17 though. I don't know where that belongs or where it 18 came from (tendering document). 19 Q. "Do you want to cover the presentation and 20 provisions?" Well...
21 A. I don't know where it came from.
22 Q. Okay. I'd leave out -
23 A. As I said, I didn't...
24 Q. All right, sir. 25 writing?
Anyway, that's not your
618
1 A. That' s not mine, no.
2 Q. Apparently it was in there, but nothing to
3 do but set it aside now.
4 All right, sir. And Rowe Exhibit 15. would
5 this be your handwriting, as well, sir (tendering
6 document)?
Page 244
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 7 A. (Reviewing document) Yes, it is. 8 Q. Dr. Rowe, the next bunch of these appears to 9 be from - copies of file cards. And they were not 10 stapled together; so, I assume they were all loose in 11 your file, as well. But we've marked these as Rowe 12 Exhibit 16. And these came out of a file in the boxes 13 that was labeled "from V. K. R.'s talks and papers," 14 within which were found, also, typed notes that 15 appeared to be from your talks. 16 Could you identify that stack or 17 characterize it generally for us (tendering document)? 18 A. (Reviewing document) This is my 19 handwriting. 20 Q. All right, sir. Dr. Rowe, I have some 21 handsome laser color copies of what look to be charts 22 here. And we've just paper-clipped them all together 23 at this point. I've not marked them yet. But could 24 you tell me, first, if they all go together, as best 25 you remember (tendering charts)?
619
1 A. (Reviewing charts) Yes. These are copies 2 of color slides that I have used in - in talks to 3 discuss various aspects of carcinogenicity and other 4 diseases and so forth and particularly to demonstrate 5 the -- I think most all these data probably came from 6 U. S. Public Health Service publications relative to 7 the incidence of various types of cancer in the 8 population. My use of it was primarily in lectures in 9 which I was trying to get people to understand the
Page 245
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 10 hazards of smoking. 11 Q. All right, sir. Would these have been 12 slides that you had had prepared while you were still 13 at Dow? 14 A. Yes. I had those prepared. And there were 15 several copies of them. I had one sheet - one set of 16 slides that I used in lectures. And I've used them 17 here - I mean at my present location - for other 18 groups, not recently but sometime -- The data is 19 pretty much outdated, I think, now; but nevertheless 20 it does explain the - or shows graphically the 21 incidence of various types of cancer that the 22 population in this country experiences. 23 Q. Would the data be generally from the Sixties 24 and Seventies? 25 A. I -- It would be in the Sixty or Seventy,
620
1 somewhere in that range. I don't know. I can't tell
2 you. 3 Q.
All right, sir. I'm going to label this
4 collection as Rowe Exhibit 17, and we'll leave them
5 grouped together. And I'm going to put that label on
6 the clean side of the mystery paper. And we'll put
7 that together.
8 (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT ROWE 17 9 WAS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION
10 PURPOSES BY MR. BLANKS. SAME WILL BE
11 FOUND IN THE EXHIBIT VOLUMES ATTENDANT
12 TO THIS DEPOSITION.) Page 246
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 13 (By Mr. Blanks) 14 Q. All right, sir. Was it -- The kind of notes 15 that you have on your file cards, would those be, 16 like, notes for little talks you might have given to 17 Dow employees? 18 A. Very likely. It could have been any place, 19 but I did give a lot of talks like that to various 20 groups within the company. 21 Q. And generally when you made a presentation 22 before a professional body of your colleagues or your 23 peers, you would normally have that talk typed up in 24 advance to where you would have a more complete and 25 formal draft, would you not?
621
1 A. That generally would be true, but I did not
2 always in verbal presen - in verbal presentations read
3 a talk. And sometimes I used cue cards, so to speak,
4 in - to keep me on track.
5 Q. Okay. Dr. Rowe, if we looked to one of 6 these cards, specifically the -- Let's just look at...
7 MR. HOBSON: Garth Brooks. Never
8 mind. Wrong award. I'm sorry. 9 MR. BLANKS: That was even 10 supposed to be a joke?
11 MR. HOBSON: S ome people got it.
12 (By Mr. Blanks) 13 Q. Dr. Rowe, let's just look at one of these 14 cards out of your Exhibit Rowe 9, or any of the other
15 cards on there that you want. Page 247
But I'm wondering from
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 16 looking at the sixth page and using these notes what 17 kind of a presentation you would give from that 18 (tendering document). 19 A. (Reviewing document) This would have been 20 to some area of management or sales department 21 people. I think there's a lot more in this than just 22 the - some of the legal and moral responsibilities; 23 but that type of talk would have been internal and to, 24 as I say, sales management or company management or 25 whatever. I don't know.
622
1 Q. Could you share with us the message that you 2 would have been - would give off of these notes on 3 this particular card and the context of the rest of 4 that talk? 5 A. Well, I was attempting to emphasize to 6 whoever was present that the - that subject, breach of 7 warranty of safety. What I said was (reading) 8 warranty expressed in or implied from communication 9 such as letters, labels, advertising, or verbal 10 statements made by a representative. And deceit or 11 fraudulent misrepresentation allegations usually are 12 that defendant made false or misleading statements to 13 conceal true facts. Generally if moral or legal 14 responsibilities are discharged there will be few - 15 "Suits," I guess it is (tendering document). 16 Q. I'm sorry. The last part was "Generally if 17 moral and legal responsibilities are discharged," - 18 A. Yes.
Page 248
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 19 Q. -- "then there will be few suits"? And this 20 was a message you were giving to - 21 A. Management. 22 Q. Dow management? 23 A. Someplace. Yes. 24 Q. All right. 25 A. Or sales - salespeople. I say some area of
623
1 management. I don't know where. 2 Q. For these different exhibits you've been 3 kind enough to go through with us up through 16, 17, 4 do these notes reflect your thoughts accurately at the 5 time that you - that you made them? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. And they - what facts or views that you set 8 out on the notes would have been truthful at the time 9 that you made them, whenever that was? 10 A. That was -- I would have no reason to 11 believe otherwise. 12 Q. All right, sir. Very good. I would like to 13 mark as Rowe Exhibit 18 the remainder of the 14 documents, the contents of the box - the box, itself. 15 And we will arrange to have those and all these other 16 exhibits appropriately stamped and numbered so that we 17 have a record of what you've been good enough to 18 bring, Dr. Rowe, and attorneys. 19 A. Well, I brought them -- I don't know whether 20 they're useful, whether they're of any interest; but 21 they were in my files.
Page 249
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 22 Q. Very good. Well, we appreciate that, sir. 23 MR. BLANKS: So, that will be 24 Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. Rowe 18. And 25 there are many hundreds of pages.
624
1 (REPORTER'S NOTE: PLAINTIFFS' 2 EXHIBIT ROWE 18 WAS LATER MARKED FOR 3 IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES BY THE 4 REPORTER. SAME WILL BE FOUND IN THE 5 EXHIBIT VOLUMES ATTENDANT TO THIS 6 DEPOSITION.) 7 (By Mr. Blanks) 8 Q. Dr. Rowe, finally, I want to ask you about a 9 couple of things that we've talked about before. 10 Has Dow, since we last met, hired you to 11 serve as a consultant to them in connection with these 12 cases or any other cases? 13 A. When I retired I had a contract with Dow to 14 consult and to do a lot of writing, which I did after 15 I retired. They wished me to be a part of the 16 information source. I did not require or ask -- As a 17 matter of fact, I told them I did not want a contract 18 but I would try to be available if I could be helpful 19 or useful in things that I knew about. And that is 20 the arrangement that we've had since then. We have no 21 formal arrangement. I do bill them for my time, and 22 they pay me. 23 Q. In connection with the lawsuits that we're 24 here testifying about today, are you actually serving
Page 250
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 25 as a consultant to Dow?
625
1 A. I presume so, but I don't know the 2 connotation of that word all the way but... 3 MR. ALMQUIST: He's a fact witness 4 in this case, obviously, Mr. Blanks. 5 And we have reimbursed him for his time 6 since there's been a significant drain 7 on his time, obviously, to be here for 8 these depositions; but we are not 9 retaining him as an expert witness 10 in this litigation either as a 11 consulting expert or at trial. 12 (By Mr. Blanks) 13 Q. Okay. Before we resumed our deposition 14 yesterday, had you taken time to visit again with 15 lawyers about the continuation or resumption of your 16 deposition? 17 A. This particular one? 18 Q. Yes, sir. 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. When did that occur? 21 A. Monday - Monday afternoon, about 3:30 to 22 5:00 o'clock, I believe, something like that. 23 Q. And that was the first time since we'd left 24 you in October that you'd met with any lawyers about 25 your testimony in these cases?
Page 251
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
626
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. Who was present at your Monday afternoon
3 meeting?
4 A. Dr. Pie rce and Linda.
5 MR. ALMQUIST: Linda Fiegener.
6 Q. And who do you understand Ms. Pickner to be?
7 A. Pardon?
8 Q. Who do you understand Ms. Pickner to be
9 associated with?
10
MR. ALMQUIST
Fiegener.
11 MR. BLANKS: I'm sorry.
12 MR. PIERCE: Fiegener.
13 MR. BLANKS: Sounds like what I
14 said. 15 How do you spell it?
16 MR. PIERCE: F-i-e-g-e-n-e-r.
17 18 (By Mr. Blanks)
MR. BLANKS: Thank you.
19 Q. Yes, sir. Who is the lady connected with?
20 A. She's representing Dow someplace or other.
21 Texas d ivision, I think.
22 Q. Do you understand her to be an attorney who
23 works for Dow?
24 A. I understand her to be an attorney.
25 MR. ALMQUIST: Let's correct the
627
1 record for Linda's benefit. She's a Page 252
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 2 legal assistant in the Dow legal 3 department. 4 Q. And during this visit with Ms. Fiegener 5 present, what things were discussed, Dr. Rowe? 6 MR. PIERCE: I direct you not to 7 answer any questions as to any 8 specifics of our conversations. 9 MR. ALMQUIST: And I will join - 10 MR. PIERCE: And, listen, you know 11 that this is attorney-client 12 privilege. You know this is 13 inappropriate. So, please, let's not 14 go through this again. 15 MR. ALMQUIST: And on behalf of 16 Dow, we would assert the 17 attorney-client privilege, as well, 18 with any communications with Mr. Rowe. 19 Q. Did the lady, Ms. Fiegener, have anything to 20 say at this meeting, Dr. Rowe? 21 MR. ALMQUIST: Again the same 22 instruction, the same objection. 23 MR. PIERCE: I direct you not to 24 answer anything about our 25 communications.
628
1 Q. Dr. Rowe, are you going to continue to 2 follow the instructions of your counsel? 3 A. I believe that's what I should do. 4 Q. All right, sir. Are you going to follow the
Page 253
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 5 instructions from Mr. Almquist who is here as Dow's 6 lawyer today? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. There were, in fact, conversations that took 9 place while Ms. Fiegener was present with you and 10 Mr. Pierce, were there not? 11 MR. PIERCE: You can answer that. 12 A. Certainly. 13 Q. Okay. And did you look at any documents or 14 papers before or during that meeting or at any time to 15 get ready for resuming your deposition, sir? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. What did those consist of, Dr. Rowe? 18 A. That 50, 60 pounds of paper that you 19 received. 20 Q. All right, sir. Anything other than the 21 documents you were kind enough to bring today that you 22 looked at before the deposition or for purposes of 23 preparing 24 A. I beg your pardon. 25 Q. I was wondering, sir, if there were any
629
1 other papers besides those that are in Exhibit 18 and 2 Exhibits 9 through 17 - 3 A. I don't believe so. 4 Q. Have you had any conversations with 5 Mr. Almquist about your testimony either in the past 6 or during this week? 7 A. Not at all.
Page 254
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8 Q. Have you had any letters or written
9 communications from him? 10 A. No. 11 Q. Or from any other lawyers associated with 12 Dow, that you know of? 13 A. No. 14 Q. Do you understand, Dr. Rowe, that Dow is 15 paying for Mr. Pierce to appear here with you today
16 and yesterday?
17 A. Yes. 18 Q. And who was it, Dr. Rowe, that suggested 19 that or told you that Mr. Pierce would be designated 20 to represent you at these deposition days?
21 A. Nobody told me that he would. They asked me 22 if I would like to have him represent me, and I said
23 yes. 24 Q. 25 A.
So, this came in the form of a - Pardon?
630
1 Q. This came in the form of an implied 2 suggestion that you might want to have him represent 3 you, then? 4 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 5 form. 6 He said it came in the form of a 7 question which he answered. 8 Q. Who asked you that question, Dr. Rowe? 9 A. Mr. Stuart. 10 Q. Duncan Stuart, the lawyer that's an employee
Page 255
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 11 of Dow Chemical Company? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Same - 14 MR. PIERCE: I think we're getting 15 back to the same area of specifics 16 and conversation between attorney and 17 clients. And although I'm not going to 18 interpose objections on behalf of The 19 Dow Chemical Company, I feel that we're 20 skirting an area of privilege which you 21 should not raise at this deposition. 22 And you should be on notice about that, 23 please. 24 Q. Did you have any conversations with Duncan 25 Stuart about your deposition either in October or this
631
1 upcoming one or - the one that we're in here today on? 2 A. No. 3 MR. BLANKS: Okay. I'm going to 4 pass the witness at this time, 5 provisionally given that we still have 6 Exhibit 18 and several thousand pages 7 of documents to peruse and with the 8 reservation that we may need to return 9 and spend a little more time with 10 Dr. Rowe, but not to a certainty. We 11 don't know that until we get a 12 chance to look through all those 13 documents. But I want to give anybody
Page 256
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 14 else who wanted to cross-examine 15 Dr. Rowe on asbestos-related matters an 16 opportunity to do that at this time. 17 MR. PIERCE: Okay. Let me 18 also state for the record that if there 19 are a few questions that do come to 20 mind, we'd be very happy to give you 21 written responses - notarized, if you 22 wish - to any of those questions so as 23 to make no unnecessary trips or 24 problems for any of the attorneys 25 involved here. We'd be very happy to
632
1 cooperate with you. 2 MR. BLANKS: Well, depending on 3 the nature of the questions, 4 we'll - 5 MR. PIERCE: Well, of course. 6 Yeah. 7 MR. BLANKS: -- try to work with 8 you on what's appropriate. Very good. 9 Does anyone have any examination 10 for Dr. Rowe? 11 MR. HOBSON: Asbe stos. 12 MR. BLANKS: On asbestos? 13 And the room was silent. Well, 14 then, let us move on to the wonderful 15 world of silica. 16 Just another dust, Mr. Pierce.
Page 257
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 17 (By Mr. Blanks) 18 Q. Dr. Rowe, we visited at great length, as you 19 know, about your toxicology work and the industrial 20 hygiene program at Dow and the general philosophy that 21 you had and that you observed at Dow concerning 22 occupational health and safety. 23 Would the same general principles that 24 you've described to us about the industrial hygiene 25 program at Dow apply to dealing with any potential
633
1 silica dust hazards that might arise in the Dow 2 premises? 3 A. I think anything that I could say with 4 respect to silica would probably also - or what I 5 would say about asbestos I would probably take about 6 the same position with respect to silica, at least as 7 I understand it. Again, I would - I wish to qualify 8 I'm not an expert at all in the field of silicosis or 9 other such diseases. 10 Q. Certainly you recognized before 1940 in your 11 first few years at Dow that silicosis was a recognized 12 occupational disease among people exposed to 13 sufficient quantities of free silica, didn't you, sir? 14 A. I don't know when I became aware of it. 15 Q. It certainly would have been during the 16 first decade of your work in toxicology? 17 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 18 terminology "certainly" within those 19 questions.
Page 258
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 20 A. I would expect that to be true. 21 Q. All right, sir. And at Dow from time to 22 time abrasive blasting was done using sand as the 23 abrasive, was it not? 24 A. I don't know. 25 Q. Do you know, sir, whether or not Dow
634
1 required even back to 1940 the use of air-supplied 2 hoods to protect workers doing sandblasting on their 3 premises? 4 A. I don't know. 5 Q. Would it be your view, sir, that that would 6 be the appropriate protective device to give a man 7 doing sandblasting? 8 A. I do not know from firsthand experience what 9 kind of equipment was used. 10 Q. Was air-supplied respiratory equipment 11 available in the Dow plants back when you began 12 working there? 13 A. I don't know. 14 Q. You don't recall encountering air-line 15 respirators or - 16 A. I had no personal experience with it. 17 Q. Okay. Do you recall encountering any cases 18 of silicosis among Dow employees during any of the 19 years you were with the company or being advised of 20 any cases? 21 A. I don't recall. 22 Q. Did you ever do any toxicological work in
Page 259
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 23 connection with free silica or silica dust while you 24 were at Dow? 25 A. At one time I believe we used free silica as
635
1 a control in an animal experiment - a very cursory
2 experiment - to check on the fibrotic nature of
3 something or other. 4 Q. And were you using silica in that 5 experiment, Dr. Rowe, as a positive control?
6 A. Yes. 7 Q. One where you knew that the control group 8 would develop a fibrosis or disease?
9 A. Yes. 10 Q. That's what we mean by "positive control"? 11 A. Well, we -- I don't know that - about the 12 disease part; but it elicited a particular type of
13 response when injected intraperitoneally in rats. And 14 it was rather - a rather unique observation so that 15 you could have something to compare with.
16 Q. Okay. If I could restate it, perhaps, 17 simply, then, you selected silica as your positive
18 control substance because you knew that it would 19 produce an adverse effect in the way you were using
20 it. 21 A.
Well, we presumed it would.
22 Q. Okay. And did, indeed, find that it
23 worked.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Okay. You were aware at some point from Page 260
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
636
1 your dealings or communiques with the Saranac 2 Laboratory that they had done some work on the 3 inhalation hazards associated with silica, weren't 4 you, Dr. Rowe? 5 A. With whom? 6 Q. That the Saranac Laboratory scientists, 7 Dr. Gardner and his associates, had done some 8 experimental work with silica inhalation. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Could you recall approximately when you did 11 the study that used silica as a positive control, 12 Dr. Rowe? 13 A. I don't remember when that was. 14 Q. What was the nature of the rest of the 15 study; do you recall? 16 A. I don't remember the details. As I 17 remember -- What I do remember of it is that there 18 was - that one of the research laboratories had 19 developed something that they thought could be used as 20 a substitute somewhere along the line. And we had no 21 knowledge of what it might do; and, so, we thought we 22 would check it out. And that's what -- I don't even 23 know when it was. 24 Q. Or what they were trying - 25 A. I don't remember what the material was that
Page 261
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
1 we were checking. Whether it ever came to production 2 or anything or not, I don't know. 3 Q. All right, sir. Do you recollect what you 4 were seeking a substitute for? 5 A. No. That's a blank, also. 6 Q. Okay. Did that lead to any kind of a 7 publication, that experiment that used the silica as a 8 positive control? 9 A. I beg your pardon. 10 Q. Did your work on the - that involved using 11 silica in the experiment, did that lead to any 12 publication? 13 A. No. 14 Q. What was it that gave you the idea to use 15 silica in your experiment, Dr. Rowe? 16 A. The purpose -- This was a totally new 17 technique for us. And if the results were to be any 18 be meaningful, we had to know that - what the lesion 19 that would be produced by silica would look like under 20 those conditions. And if a material that we were 21 testing also produced a similar lesion, we would 22 assume it would behave similar to silica. 23 Q. I see. Was the new technique that of doing 24 the intraperitoneal injection of the irritant? 25 A. Yes.
638
1 Q. So, that would probably place that back in 2 the first few years of your -
Page 262
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 3 A. Not necessarily. I just don't know. 4 Q. Okay. I was just thinking there had been 5 some similar experiments done, perhaps at Saranac, 6 using that technique and by Bradley and Patty in 7 Detroit around the late Thirties, if that helps in 8 your recollection. 9 Did you ever consider in the tox. lab or 10 analyze any proposed substitute abrasives to use 11 instead of silica so that you could prevent any 12 possibility of silicosis in your sandblasters? 13 A. As I say, I don't remember what the material 14 we were working with was even designed for at this 15 time. I just -- I've forgotten, I guess. 16 Q. Oh, I'm sorry. I had moved on to wondering 17 if you considered any substitute materials for 18 abrasive blasting use. 19 A. I don't know. It might have been that the 20 material we were working on was a substitute for that 21 for all I know. I just don't know. 22 Q. Okay. Do you know if your industrial 23 hygienists at Dow were doing air monitoring in 24 connection with sandblasting work during that time 25 when you were in charge of the industrial hygienists?
639
1 A. I don't remember. 2 Q. Would you agree with me that in the presence 3 of a visible dust cloud from sandblasting that 4 monitoring of the individuals in that work area would 5 be an appropriate thing for the industrial hygienists
Page 263
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 6 to do? 7 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 8 to the form. And I'd like to indicate 9 to you that Dr. Rowe answered 10 previously that this was not an area in 11 which he is familiar or expert in. 12 But go ahead. 13 MR. BLANKS: I was simply asking 14 Dr. Rowe as the chief of the toxicology 15 and industrial hygiene department. 16 MR. PIERCE: Well, he's told you 17 that he was administratively head of 18 that, of the industrial hygiene 19 department. 20 A. Well, I would think that that would be 21 appropriate. 22 (By Mr. Blanks) 23 Q. All right, sir. Do you know, Dr. Rowe, if 24 Dow ever banned the use of silica as an abrasive for 25 blasting in its plants, sir?
640
1 A. I don't know. 2 Q. Given the propensity for silica to cause 3 silicosis in workers sufficiently exposed, would it be 4 your view as a toxicologist that it would be desirable 5 to find a substitute abrasive for silica? 6 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to 7 the form; argumentative term, 8 "propensity."
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9 Go ahead.
10 A. I think it -- It think it would be
11 appropriate.
12 Q. Thank you, sir. Dr. Rowe, do you think it's 13 really fair to - in giving health information to 14 workers to describe the toxic qualities of silica in 15 terms of being merely an irritant to the lung?
16 A. I beg your pardon. Would you please
17 repeat.
18 Q. Yes, sir. If you were -- In the context of 19 a worker's safety manual, is it fair to simply 20 describe the toxic character of silica from 21 sandblasting as being merely an irritant to the lung?
22 A. I don't think that -- I wouldn't think that
23 that would be quite appropriate. It wouldn't be
24 right. 25 Q.
And why would information like that be
641
1 deficient? I mean, how would it be deficient? 2 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the form 3 and mischaracterization of his 4 testimony. He never indicated it was 5 deficient. 6 Go ahead. 7 MR. BLANKS: Don't worry, Stan. 8 Dow didn't do this sort of thing. 9 MR. PIERCE: I'm just dealing with 10 the questions you are setting up for 11 this witness. And I'd like him to have
Page 265
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 12 an opportunity to answer the questions 13 fairly. That's my only interest here 14 today. 15 (By Mr. Blanks) 16 Q. I'm sorry, sir. Tell the jury why a warning 17 or an instruction that simply describes the toxicity 18 of silica in sandblasting as an irritant is not fair 19 or adequate, if you don't think it's adequate. 20 A. Well, I don't -- I don't think that would be 21 correct. It would not be correct. 22 Q. Would you say, Dr. Rowe, that it would be 23 also incorrect and inadequate to describe the toxicity 24 of asbestos as being merely an irritant to the lung? 25 A. I don't...
642
1 MR. PIERCE: You mean as we sit 2 here today? 3 A. If that's a hypothetical, that's one thing;
4 but I don't believe we ever did that.
5 Q. I don't suggest that you ever did that,
6 sir. 7
It was a hypothetical. Would it be fair to describe the toxic
8 properties of asbestos simply as an irritant to the 9 lung? 10 A. No. 11 MR. ALMQUIST: I think we can just
12 take a couple of minutes before you go
13 on for him to move around a little.
14 MR. BLANKS: Oh. Well, okay. Page 266
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 15 MR. PIERCE: Thank you. 16 MR. BLANKS: You want to get 17 up and stretch just a second, 18 Dr. Rowe? 19 THE WITNESS: Yes. I will. 20 MR. BLANKS: We're about to 21 finish on this. 22 (Brief pause) 23 MR. PIERCE: Are you okay? 24 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 25 MR. PIERCE: Okay.
643
1 THE WITNESS: Got it loosened up 2 again. 3 MR. PIERCE: Good. 4 (By Mr. Blanks) 5 Q. Would you agree, Dr. Rowe, that when 6 sandblasting in an inadequately ventilated area that 7 an air hood or equivalent equipment supplied with 8 filtered air should be worn by the workers? 9 A. If that's what's required to prevent 10 excessive exposure. As I say, I don't know what all 11 is available, what all is required; but my general 12 understanding is that some sort of ventilation to 13 provide reasonably clean air at least would be 14 appropriate. 15 Q. So that the air that the worker is breathing 16 has a very low amount of the pneumoconiosis-causing 17 dust in the air, right?
Page 267
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 18 A. Well , as best as possible. 19 MR. BLANKS: All right. I'll pass 20 the witness at this time on this topic 21 for anybody that has cross-examination 22 on silica-related matters. 23 No takers, Dr. Rowe. You want to 24 take a short break at this point or... 25 MR. PIERCE: Unless you're ready
644
1 to finish up. 2 MR. BLANKS: Well, I'm through 3 with that part; and we move on to 4 Chapter III now. 5 MS. KETAI: Let's take a break. 6 MR. POFF: Are we done with 7 silicosis now? 8 MR. BLANKS: I reckon. 9 MS. KETAI: Well, they'll think 10 of something to ask at the break. 11 If you want to leave, well, -12 MR. BLANKS: All right. Be gone. 13 A pox on you. Get out. You've stayed 14 too long here. 15 MR. POFF: Don't want to stay too 16 long. 17 MS. KETAI: Yeah. Really. Get 18 out of here. 19 MR. BLANKS: Well, let's take a 20 quick break, Dr. Rowe, to stretch your
Page 268
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 21 legs, get something to drink, and head 22 on toward the finish line. 23 THE WITNESS: I didn't need to 24 take that stretch, did I? 25 MR. BLANKS: Well, maybe you need
645
1 another one.
2 (AT THIS TIME A BRIEF RECESS WAS 3 TAKEN, AND THE PROCEEDINGS THEREAFTER 4 RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:)
5 6 RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. HOBSON: 7 Q. Dr. Rowe, beginning here on a different 8 topic with you, sir, if we may, in the documents that 9 you produced was a copy of an article that you are
10 shown as a coauthor on with Mr. Wolf and others. 11 starts on the Bates-numbered page 384 and has
It
12 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 561000, all caps "DOW," D-O-W, and
13 then in parentheses "AMA-AIH."
14 That is a paper that you were one of the 15 coauthors on; is that right, sir?
16 A. Yes. 17 Q. And this was published in the American 18 Medical Association Archives of Industrial Health,
19 October, 1956, as indicated in the reprint; is that 20 right, sir?
21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Can you tell me if Dow did any other 23 toxicological studies on benzene other than this
Page 269
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 24 particular one, sir? 25 A. Not that I recollect.
646
1 Q. There are a number of references in the 2 bibliography to this paper. And the bibliography 3 begins on page 395 and continues to 396. 4 Would it be accurate, sir, to say that you 5 had copies of all of these items that are listed in 6 the bibliography and had an opportunity to read them 7 and review them when you wrote this paper? 8 A. (Reviewing document) I don't remember 9 that - a number of those. 10 Q. Is it the usual practice sir, when, you cite 11 a paper in a bibliography that you've authored that, 12 indeed, you have read that particular paper that 13 you've referenced and would be familiar with it or you 14 wouldn't have put it in the bibliography? 15 A. That's right. 16 Q. There's a series of referenced items that 17 are shown to - or attributed to the American Petroleum 18 Institute that are called Toxicological Reviews for 19 various materials. 20 Do you happen to have a specific 21 recollection of those, Dr. Rowe? 22 A. I don't have a recollection of them. The 23 name rings a bell, so to speak, but I can't even - 24 I've forgotten, I guess. I don't know what they look 25 like.
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647
1 Q. Can you give me your best recollection, 2 Dr. Rowe, of when you appreciated that there was some 3 association between benzene exposure and leukemia? 4 A. I don't know when it was. 5 Q. Do you recall any conversations that you had 6 while you were an employee of Dow about benzene and 7 its ability to cause leukemia? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Can you tell me, in general, what you 10 recall, sir? 11 A. I just recall that it was rather unique in 12 that category of aromatic hydrocarbons. 13 Q. Is there any way that you could tell me how 14 far back in time, even to the nearest decade, that you 15 would have had these conversations about benzene and 16 leukemia while you were a Dow employee, sir? 17 A. I -- I don't remember the situation, even. 18 Q. If you'll notice, Reference 5 to your 19 bibliography there happens to be one of the A.P.I. 20 Toxicological Reviews, this one for benzene. And it's 21 dated 1948. 22 A. Uh-huh. 23 Q. If -- The fact that it's referenced here as 24 No. 5 - I think you told me earlier you would have 25 had that document and would have read it. Would a
Page 271
648
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 1 reference to leukemia in a document like that be 2 something that you would have likely noticed, or can 3 you tell me? 4 A. I think that it would have been very -- If 5 it was in there. I don't know that. If it had been, 6 I'm sure we would have been - it would have struck us, 7 a note of concern. 8 Q. As of the time you left Dow as their 9 employee, would you give me, if you might recall, sir, 10 your understanding of benzene's ability to cause 11 leukemia at that point in time? 12 A. I guess I really don't know how to answer 13 your question. Try it again on me. 14 Q. All right, sir. I'm trying to find out if 15 you can relate to me -- And I know it's been some time 16 ago but -- Trying to learn what your appreciation was 17 at the time you left Dow Chemical as its employee 18 about benzene and the ability of benzene to cause 19 leukemia in humans. 20 A. Okay. I think that was very well known and 21 long before I left the company, but I can't tell you 22 exactly when I learned it. 23 Q. Is it your understanding, sir, that benzene 24 can cause different kinds of leukemia or one kind of 25 leukemia? Can you help me with that, please?
649
1 A. Well, it -- As I recollect, it does produce 2 leukopenia at some stages. And it's somewhat 3 different in different species, as I remember; but I
Page 272
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 4 don't remember the details now. 5 Q. Would you recall, Dr. Rowe, that if you look 6 in the medical and scientific literature as of the 7 time you left Dow that there were reports that benzene 8 could cause various kinds of leukemia in humans? 9 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 10 to the form of the question. 11 Would you identify which specific 12 types of leukemia you claim are 13 indicated by the time Dr. Rowe left Dow 14 as in any way related to benzene 15 exposure. 16 MR. HOBSON: Yes, sir. I have in 17 mind the myelogenous leukemias and the 18 lymphatic leukemias. 19 A. I just don't -- I'm not sure of myself. I 20 don't know. 21 (By Mr. Hobson) 22 Q. Do you recall a text called Industrial 23 Toxicology by Hamilton and Hardy? 24 A. Yes. That is quite ancient. 25 Q. I think there were several editions of it;
650
1 and it does go back to the first edition being a very, 2 very long time ago. Would you recall - 3 A. I remember the name, yes. 4 Q. Is that a textbook that you would look at 5 with any kind of authority? 6 A. I would certainly look at it with - because
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7 both of those people were very highly respected, I
8 guess, by the community. 9 Q. But as we sit here today, you can't recall
10 ever coming to an appreciation for whether or not 11 benzene can cause any one kind of leukemia or other 12 kinds of leukemia: would that be a fair statement?
13 MR. PIERCE: Asked and answered.
14 A. I've forgotten, I guess. I just don't know
15 now. 16 Q.
I noticed in your paper that was published
17 in 1956 that we referred to earlier that you reported
18 on effect levels. And I wondered if you could help me 19 with part of that, Dr. Rowe, and make sure I'm reading
20 it accurately. 21 There's a Table 6 which is on the Bates
22 number 390, page 6 of your article. 23 there, sir?
You see Table 6
24 A. Yes. 25 Q. And as I read Table 6, the levels of
651
1 exposure that you tested for the different species,
2 the lowest levels that you used all showed an effect
3 in the species that received the exposure. Is that 4 the correct interpretation of that table, sir?
5 A. Yes. 6 Q. And over -- If you'll look, sir, on Table
7 11, it seemed to be a little bit confusing to me. And
8 I wanted you to explain to me precisely what you meant
9 as one of the authors of this paper. Page 274
Table 9 which -
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 10 A. Table 9? 11 Q. I'm sorry. On page 9, Table 11. 12 A. Oh, okay. 13 Q. It says "Comparison of Results of Repeated 14 Vapor Inhalation Studies on Animals Exposed to Benzene 15 and Some Alkylated Benzenes." And under "Material" 16 the first one listed is benzene. And it lists the 17 species tested next. And then there's a column that 18 says "No Effect Level, Parts Per Million"; and you 19 have an entry there for benzene. 20 Could you read that entry and then explain 21 to me how you meant that? 22 A. (Reviewing document) Would you please 23 repeat your question. I -24 Q. Yes, sir. 25 A. I'm on the right spot here now.
652
1 Q. Okay, sir. Under "No Effect Level, Parts
2 Per Mill ion" in Table 11 --
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. -- on page 9 of the article, in the row for
5 benzene, --
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. -- under that entry, it says "Not found:
8 well bel
O
00 0
Were you intending to communicate
9 there that you did not determine a no-effect level for 10 benzene in this experiment?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. And that you believed that the no-effect Page 275
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 13 level for benzene in this experiment was well below 80 14 parts per million? 15 A. That was our interpretation. 16 Q. Did you ever determine, that you can recall, 17 what a no-effect level for benzene exposure was at Dow 18 Chemical? 19 A. I don't remember. 20 Q. Can you recall, Dr. Rowe, what it was at Dow 21 that led you to do this work on benzene and alkylated 22 benzenes? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Would you tell us, please. 25 A. Because of the effect of benzene, which was
653
1 known, the questions came up primarily because we were 2 manufacturing ethyl benzene, styrene, a-methyl 3 styrene, and vinyl toluene and - which are closely 4 related to benzene. And the question logically came 5 up will these materials elicit a response similar to 6 that of benzene. So, in this study we used benzene as 7 a positive control. It was not a study on benzene for 8 the sake of benzene. It was a -- It was simply a 9 control - positive control - for evaluating the 10 potential of the other materials to produce a - a 11 hemolytic - hemological ex - effect and other 12 pathology, as well. 13 Q. Was benzene a product that or material that 14 Dow was using or manufacturing in its facilities in 15 the 1950's about the time this article was written?
Page 276
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. And I was curious, sir. Would you know if 18 benzene was either used or manufactured by Dow when 19 you joined the company in the late Thirties? 20 A. I'm sorry. I didn't get... 21 Q. Would you recall, sir, if -- When you joined 22 Dow in the late Thirties, was benzene either being 23 used or manufactured at Dow? 24 A. I'm quite certain it was not being 25 manufactured, but I can't answer your question. I
654
1 don't know. 2 Q. Is there a time that - or an approximation 3 of a time that you can give me that you learned that 4 Dow did use benzene in a process at manufacturing 5 activities? 6 A. I can't -- I don't know. 7 Q. So, sometime at least around 1956, though, 8 you know that Dow did use benzene in some of its 9 processes? 10 A. I'm sure Dow used benzene because they used 11 it as an intermediate in the chemical synthesis. I 12 don't know when this started. 13 Q. Was Dow already making some of these 14 alkylated benzenes at the time you did this work in 15 1956? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. And had they been making some of these 18 alkylated benzenes for a number of years; or would you
Page 277
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 19 know, sir? 20 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 21 form; asked and answered. 22 A. I don't know exactly when these particular 23 benzene derivatives were first produced, but I would 24 I would say that the article was published in '56. 25 So, the work was actually done before that. And I
655
1 don't know just how long or the period of time it took 2 to get all the pathology done and the publication 3 the reports written. I don't remember. 4 Q. I noted, sir, on page 388 of the -- That's 5 the Bates number. It's page 4 of the article, 6 itself. On the right-hand column - It's numbered 7 paragraph 2 - it talks about odor and irritation 8 experiments. Do you see that entry, sir? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. It talks about human subjects. Was there an 11 activity in your laboratories that called from time to 12 time for you to use human subjects in your 13 experimentation on toxicology? 14 A. We did some, yes. 15 Q. May I ask, sir, how you - how you did that 16 as far as getting the volunteers? I take it they were 17 volunteers to do the work. 18 A. Yes. I was one of them. We used our 19 professional staff in toxicology, everyone thoroughly 20 understanding the situation. And as far as odor and 21 irritation is concerned, that's a very brief
Page 278
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 22 exposure. But this is important to identify. If you 23 have a good warning property for a material, it's much 24 less hazardous than one that has no odor or irritating 25 properties.
656
1 Q. Was there a standard protocol that you used 2 in working with human subjects in the early 1950's, or 3 was this fairly informal in that time period? 4 A. It was quite informal. 5 Q. Would the human subjects always have been 6 those workers there in the toxicological laboratories? 7 A. I -- I think so. 8 Q. I don't see that benzene was used in this 9 particular phase of the experiment. Would that be 10 your understanding of reading this, as well, sir? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Was that because you understood that benzene 13 did have the potential to cause serious injury to the 14 bone marrow at this time? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Are you aware of any epidemiological studies 17 that Dow did with regard to benzene? 18 A. I don't recall any. 19 Q. Were you involved at all, Dr. Rowe, in any 20 of Dr. Kil ian's work with benzene in Texas? 21 A. No. 22 Q. Were you aware of it at the time it was 23 being planned? 24 A. I don't recollect.
Page 279
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 25 Q. Are you now aware that Dr. Kilian did do
657
1 some work with benzene and workers at the Texas 2 facilities with regard to chromosomal aberrations? 3 A. I know he was doing that kind of work, but I 4 don't know what materials he was working with. I 5 don't remember, if I did know. 6 Q. Now, the last six to eight years that you 7 were with Dow, would you have been getting reports of 8 what Dr. Kilian was doing in Texas? 9 A. I don't know. 10 Q. Now, Dr. Kil ian was a physician, correct? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. So, he was in a different organization than 13 you were; and, also, he was in Texas? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. And the last five or six years you were with 16 Dow, what was your position again, sir? 17 A. I was in a section called 18 Health/Environmental Research. 19 Q. And did your job duties in that position 20 have anything to do with what Dr. Kilian would have 21 been planning on doing in Texas? 22 A. I doubt it. 23 Q. Was it your experience, Dr. Rowe, that if a 24 physician were going to carry out the kinds of tests 25 that Dr. Kil ian did with regard to chromosomal
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658
1 aberrations in benzene exposures that they would need 2 approval for that; or would you know one way or the 3 other? 4 A. I don't know -- I can't recall if I ever did 5 know what he did; so, I don't know. 6 Q. Would you know of a Dr. Ott, O-t-t, at Dow? 7 A. Doc -- Mr. Ott? 8 Q. Is it Mr. Ott? 9 A. Yeah. Yes. 10 Q. How is it that you knew of Mr. Ott? 11 A. He was a biostatistician. He was a 12 statistician, I guess. 13 Q. And an employee of Dow, I take it. 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. We had some testimony earlier about the 16 establishment of an epidemiological program at Dow. 17 Was Mr. Ott part of that program that was 18 established, the epidemiology - 19 A. I believe so. 20 Q. Could you tell me, if you have any opinion, 21 of Mr. Ott's ability to do his work at Dow? 22 A. We considered him to be competent in that 23 in his area. 24 Q. Would Mr. Ott be doing the kind of work that 25 you as a scientist would rely upon?
659
1 A. Well, I don't - I believe Mr. Ott would have Page 281
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 2 been a - the prime investigator. On any of this type 3 of work I believe it would have been in an association 4 with an epidemiologist in the medical department. 5 Q. Would you know of a Mr. Bond or Dr. Bond? 6 A. Who? 7 Q. Bond, B-o-n-d. 8 A. That name is not familiar. 9 MR. BLANKS: James Bond. 10 (By Mr. Hobson) 11 Q. Did you ever have any involvement, Dr. Rowe, 12 with doing any work with benzene in trying to 13 determine the amount of benzene that would be expired 14 by Dow employees after exposure to benzene in their 15 expired air? 16 A. Some work of that nature was done, but I 17 don't recall that benzene was included. It may have 18 been. I don't know. 19 Q. But you never did anything any of that work, 20 yourself? 21 A. No. 22 Q. Or your laboratory? 23 A. Well, I may have participated in some 24 experiments to - in what we would call "metabolic 25 experiments." And I think many of us participated in
660
1 that. But certainly not benzene. 2 Q. But not for benzene? 3 A. No. 4 Q. Are you aware of any human experiments at
Page 282
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 5 Dow during your tenure that involved benzene? 6 A. No. 7 Q. And, I mean, you say that rather with some 8 assurances. Why would that be? 9 A. I know of none but - at least in - that I 10 had anything to do with. 11 Q. Would you have been opposed to any kind of 12 human experimentation with benzene while you were a 13 Dow employee? 14 A. I guess it would be -- Generally, yes. But 15 there may have been... Well, possibly some things can 16 happen when you have an accidental exposure, for 17 instance, and you know that it happened. Then it's 18 sometimes advantageous to collect biological samples 19 for purposes of possible use in monitoring when 20 questions are asked and things like this. I don't 21 know that anything purposefully was ever done. 22 Q. Yes, sir. And that was my question, really, 23 would be purpose - purposeful or intentional 24 experimenting - 25 A. I'm not aware of any.
661
1 Q. And you would caution against doing any
2 intentional or purposeful exposures in human
3 experimentation? 4
MR. PIERCE: You mean at any level
5 or -
6 MR. HOBSON: Yes.
7 MR. PIERCE: And what time Page 283
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 8 frame are we - 9 MR. HOBSON: Any time he was a Dow 10 employee, even from the early 11 Thirties. I'm sorry. Late Thirties. 12 A. I don't necessar -- I wouldn't say that I 13 would categorically. It would depend upon the 14 particular circumstances. Certainly it would be done 15 with extreme caution. 16 (By Mr. Hobson) 17 Q. Now, you mentioned some biological 18 monitoring in connection with accidental exposures in 19 talking about benzene. 20 Are you aware of any of that work actually 21 being done at Dow, Dr. Rowe? 22 A. Any of what work? 23 Q. B iological monitoring following an 24 accidental exposure to benzene. 25 A. No, I'm not.
662
1 Q. Let me tell you, sir, that I have heard 2 and I wonder if you can confirm - that there were a 3 number of employees - less than a dozen - who did have 4 an accidental exposure to benzene in the early 1950's 5 that was on the order of a hundred parts per million 6 for some 90 days. Does that have any familiarity to 7 you at all, Dr. Rowe? 8 A. I don't remember that. It may have 9 happened. I don't know. 10 Q. Is that the kind of information that, if it
Page 284
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 11 did happen, you would want to have known about and 12 likely would have recalled? 13 A. Well, - 14 MR. PIERCE: Object to the 15 speculative nature of that 16 question. 17 But go ahead and answer it. 18 A. I would have expected so. 19 Q. Can you tell me, Dr. Rowe, if in the 20 instance of a carcinogen whether or not you can 21 accurately and reliably determine a no threshold in 22 humans? 23 MR. PIERCE: I'm sorry. A what 24 kind of threshold? 25 MR. HOBSON: Accurately and
663
1 reliably establish a no effect 2 threshold. 3 A. I don't know that you can. It comes down to 4 a matter of diminishing effects. And where that curve 5 tails off to zero nobody knows. There are statistical 6 ways of looking at it which I think are fallacious in 7 many instances. 8 (By Mr. Hobson) 9 Q. Would you agree then, sir, that the prudent 10 thing to do is to aim at the complete elimination of 11 exposure as much as you can do? 12 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 13 to that question as asked and answered
Page 285
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 14 numerous times. The witness has 15 testified that zero exposure is the way 16 to go. I think he has been asked that 17 question at least six or seven times. 18 But once again... 19 A. Well, you certainly do as much as you can to 20 diminish the probability of exposure. It doesn't mean 21 that you can reach zero. There is no such thing if 22 you're going to work with a material and maybe not 23 even if you're not because there are other things 24 around that may elaborate benzene. Who knows? 25 Q. Dr. Rowe, we've previously marked Exhibit 17
664
1 to your deposition. And there's one of these charts 2 that you identified for us. And I see at the top it 3 says "Occupational Exposure." And you've listed a 4 number of materials. And in the center of the middle 5 column is listed benzene (indicating). 6 Can you put in context for me how you would 7 have used this slide in any of your speeches? 8 A. No. I don't -- I would expect it would be 9 in the text - one of those texts that I gave you. 10 Q. It struck me that most, if not all, of these 11 materials that are listed on this chart have been 12 reported as having the potential to cause cancer. I 13 see coal soot, coal tar, petroleum - although that's a 14 very broad term - 15 A. Yeah. That's too broad. 16 Q. -- pet roleum coke, wax - again a very broad
Page 286
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 17 subject - 18 A. Uh-huh. 19 Q. -- creosote, antharacene. And it 20 continues. 21 MR. PIERCE: And includes 22 and wood dust and -23 MR. HOBSON: Yes. 24 MR. PIERCE: -- lea ther. 25 MR. HOBSON: Well, I think
665
1 it's leather dust.
2 MR. PIERCE: Leather dust. 3 MR. HOBSON: As well as asbestos
4 and chromium and nickel. 5 A. I think it was used as an example of
6 materials that were suspected of being carcinogens.
7 (By Mr. Hobson) 8 Q. Can you give me any kind of a time period 9 when you would have first prepared this particular 10 list, Dr. Rowe?
11 A. I'm -- I'm not certain that I prepared that
12 list. I think maybe that was a copy from a
13 publication. And I don't know just when it was that I
14 used it. It was some years ago.
15 Q. All right, sir. 16 decade for me? 17 A. No.
You can't even put it in a
18 Q. I notice the next one that we happen to turn
19 to in this particular exhibit at the top it's titled, Page 287
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 20 "Cancer Triggering Diseases." And on here is 21 pernicious anemia. Would you have had reference to 22 benzene with that, Dr. Rowe? 23 MR. PIERCE: I'm going to object 24 to that question. 25 And I'd like to bring to your
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1 attention I believe you are completely 2 misinterpreting the term "pernicious 3 anemia." And if you're trying to imply 4 that that's a benzene-related anemia, I 5 just -- That's not my place. I'm 6 sorry. 7 I withdraw that objection. 8 MR. HOBSON: That's what I thought 9 I was asking him. But anyway... 10 A. I don't remember. 11 MR. BLANKS: I t was a pernicious 12 objection, as well. 13 MR. PIERCE: I get offended by 14 such obvious scientific inaccuracies. 15 I'm sorry. I should not have reacted 16 that way. 17 (By Mr. Hobson) 18 Q. Can you tell me, Dr. Rowe, if you recall, 19 how you intended to use the term "cancer triggering 20 diseases" that heads up this chart? 21 A. If memory serves me correctly, those were 22 associated with existing conditions in which perhaps
Page 288
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 23 they were activators or at least would make a person 24 more susceptible to development of cancer from other 25 stresses or exposures.
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1 Q. And can you recall, sir, in the instance of 2 listing pernicious anemia -
3 A. I don't recall details on those.
4 Q. All right, sir. There's another chart that 5 makes up Exhibit 17 that appears to show a flow of
6 information. And on the left it says "inheritance,"
7 on the right it says "mutagens." And those two arrows
8 seem to come together on "defective chromosomes." 9 Can you tell me how you would have used this 10 chart and, in particular, that part of it, Dr. Rowe?
11 A. I don't remember enough of the detail now to
12 elaborate on it.
13 Q. And would that also be so for the rest of 14 this particular chart?
15 A. I think so, yes. 16 Q. Did you use benzene for purposes other than 17 positive control at your laboratory there at Dow; in
18 other words, did you use it as a solvent or as an 19 analytical agent?
20 A. Possibly. I don't know. I don't remember
21 that we did, but we could have because there are -
22 sometimes you have to use benzene. It's a very
23 excellent solvent. If you want to dissolve
24 something that won't dissolve something else, you use
25 benzene.
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1 Q. Would you recall if you had any kind of a 2 medical surveillance program or a biological 3 monitoring program for your workers there at the 4 laboratory who would have done work such as the 5 benzene experiment that was reported in 1956? 6 MR. PIERCE: You mean -- Excuse 7 me. That question is ambiguous. 8 Do you mean only for the workers 9 who did - who might have done the 10 benzene work or for anybody who worked 11 in that laboratory? 12 MR. HOBSON: I was asking about 13 the ones who did the benzene work. 14 A. No, we did not. 15 (By Mr. Hobson) 16 Q. And, Dr. Rowe, if I could, I want to move to 17 another subject with you. 18 Did you ever do any work in your 19 laboratories at Dow, that you might recall, that dealt 20 with nitrosamines? 21 A. I don't remember working with nitrosamines. 22 Q. Is the area of nitrosamines and 23 carcinogenicity something that you feel that you have 24 knowledge about? 25 A. Those are in the category of aromatic amines
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1 and the derivatives which as a class are suspect, I 2 guess. We would have recognized that. 3 Q. And the aromatic amines were known to be 4 human carcinogens at least from the late Thirties; is 5 that correct, sir? 6 A. I don't know the dates. Not all aromatic 7 amines are carcinogenic, as I understand; but there 8 are - that is a class of compounds that's associated 9 usually with the dyes that are of concern. 10 Q. And when you say that nitrosamines would be 11 suspect, how did you mean that, sir? 12 A. Well, they belong to an amine group or 13 amine-type compound that - that one would be cautious 14 about. 15 Q. Are you saying that because you know that 16 some of the materials in this family of chemicals have 17 known carcinogenic properties you would be suspicious 18 of the other families until you had evidence that they 19 were not carcinogenic? 20 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 21 form; leading, leading. 22 Why don't you ask him what he 23 thinks. 24 A. I would -- I would say that it would be 25 analogous to the situation that we discussed earlier
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1 with respect to benzene and benzene derivatives.
2 Until you know about the others, you don't know. Page 291
And
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt
3 you have concerns because they belong to a class.
4 Q. And I think you've put in your writings in 5 the past that one of the jobs of a toxicologist is to 6 look at materials that have known properties and 7 extrapolate to other members of that same family of 8 chemicals for a suspicion and then do testing as
9 appropriate. 10 11
Would that be accurate, sir? MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to
the form of the question as being
12 multipart.
13 A. Well, that, I think, is a reasonable
14 approach to the thing. Until you've tried it, you
15 don't know.
16 Q. And that's what you were doing in 1956 in 17 your publication on benzene and the alkylated
18 benzenes. Yet you knew about benzene. You had
19 suspicions about the other materials. And, so, you 20 tested them to show that they did not affect the bone
21 marrow and the blood as benzene did. Is that right,
22 sir?
23 A. That's correct. 24 MR. PIERCE: I'd like to object to
25 the form as a mischaracterization of
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1 the nature of that scien - paper which 2 you brought to his attention as an 3 exhibit earlier. 4 But go ahead. 5 A. That was our approach.
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6 Q. Would you agree with me, Dr. Rowe, that
7 certain polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons have been 8 known to be human carcinogens for at least 50 years, 9 if not much longer?
10 A. What -- Would you repeat, please.
11 Q. Yes, sir. Would you agree with me that
12 certain polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons have been 13 known to cause cancer in humans for at least 50 years, 14 if not longer? 15 A. I don't know the time frame, but I'm aware 16 that - that certain polycyclic's aromatic compounds
17 have been associated with that. 18 Q. One of the materials on your chart that we
19 looked at a moment ago was antharacene. That's a 20 polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbon, is it not?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And it has known carcinogenicity, does it
23 not? 24 A.
I -- I don't remember offhand that - the
25 information on antharacene.
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1 Q. Would you recall if Dow either purchased or 2 sold any materials that were rich in polynuclear 3 aromatic hydrocarbons, sir? 4 MR. PIERCE: Objection to the 5 form in the utilization of the vague 6 and ambiguous term "rich." 7 MR. BLANKS: Everybody knows 8 what's rich, who's rich and who's not.
Page 293
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 9 MR. PIERCE: Go ahead. 10 A. I don't recollect that they did. 11 Q. Did Dow manufacture any products, to your 12 knowledge or recollection, that were used in the 13 rubber industry? 14 A. We made materials that were used in the - in 15 the synthetic rubber industry. 16 Q. And what kinds of materials would those have 17 been, Dr. Rowe, that you might recall? 18 A. It would be styrene and butadiene. 19 Q. Would you have made any of the other lesser 20 components of synthetic rubber such as antioxidants, 21 the retardants, the short stops, any of the other 22 materials that you might recall that are used in the 23 manufacture of synthetic rubber? 24 MR. PIERCE: Could we ask them 25 individually or -- Change the question
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1 so it really isn't a compound question 2 with these multi parts. 3 MR. HOBSON: Well, we might be 4 done with the whole topic, depending on 5 the answer. 6 A. I don't know. 7 MR. BLANKS: So, there. 8 MR. PIERCE: You were correct. 9 MR. HOBSON: I think that's all 10 I've got on this subject area. 11 I'll pass the witness for any
Page 294
Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 12 cross-examination. 13 There being none, I thank you for 14 your patience, Dr. Rowe. And I think 15 that for today's activities we are 16 concluded. Thank you, sir. 17 THE WITNESS: Okay. 18 (AT THIS TIME, 3:36 P.M., THE 19 PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 12, 1993, WERE 20 CONCLUDED.) 21 22 23 24 25
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1 THE STATE OF ARIZONA:
2 COUNTY OF
:
3
4 I, VERALD K. ROWE, hereby certify that I 5 have read the foregoing Vol. II transcript of my 6 testimony, given in the foregoing numbered and styled
7 case, and that same is true and correct to the best of
8 my knowledge and belief.
9 I further certify that any and all 10 corrections have been made on a separate page and
11 initialed by me.
12
This
day of
, 19
.
13
14 Page 295
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15 VERALD K. ROWE
16 SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME this
17 day of
, 19
.
18 19 NOTARY PUBLIC
20 My C ommission Expires:
21
22
23
24
25
675
1 THE STATE OF TEXAS : 2 COUNTY OF JEFFERSON: 3 4 I, SANDRA S. SULLIVAN, a Certified Shorthand 5 Reporter for the State of Texas, hereby certify 6 pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and/or 7 agreement of the parties present to the following: 8 9 That this Vol. II deposition transcript is a 10 true record of the testimony given by Verald K. Rowe, 11 the Witness named herein, on May 11, 1993, and May 12, 12 1993, after said Witness was duly resworn by me. 13 14 SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED by me on the 15 1st day of June, 1993. 16 17
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Rowe-Verald-K-051193.txt 18 SANDRA S. SULLIVAN, CSR, RPR
19 Certification No.: Expiration Date:
20 Business Address:
21
22 Telephone:
23
2411 12-31-93
Charlotte Smith Reporting, 235 Orleans
Beaumont, Texas 77701
Inc
(409) 839- 4407
24
25
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