Document RX5DG5nRe0qERdq0Zwb3L2o7

Chapter Twelve The Blue Asbestos Industry at Wittenoom in Western Australia: A Short History Lenore Layman THE INDUSTRY* The crockfoiHc induary at Wittenoom began in 1937 with a rash of prospectors to Wittenoom Gorge on the northern edge of the Hansrsley Ranges in the North Wes! of Western Australia Tbe Wittenoom ctw-idol'rte industry a regarded as the wont industrial duster in Australian teswy, by common concensus. On a global auto ii also ranks among Cm mow harefiM of asbestos industries, is terms of mortality and morbidity among the workforce and those who simply fivrf5n h* environment."By the end of^986, 94'wwa wf mesochetionU) 141 cases of long carver, and 3S6 success ful compenaaUoQ claims for asbesiotis had bees recorded tn a cohort of 6,912 former minora and mitten at Watcnoom (mates 6.502; females - 410). An additional 692 cases of mesothelioma, 183 cases of lung cancer, and 482 iwt of asbestoi* lave been predicted to cscot as this cohen between 198? and 2020 <de Klefk NH, Armstrong BK. Must AW, HoWw MST: Predtcthm oifuture c&ses of asbestos-related disease among former miners aod trailers of crocidolile in Western Australia. Med J Aust 15J :616-- 620,1989). See also Chapter 7. Wittenoom has achieved notoriety >n tfte Australian mass media, and its story has been told separately by Mc Culloch and Hills (McCulloch I: Asbetfos-lts Human Cost. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1986; Htlb B: Btee Minder. South Me&ovrce: Sun Books. Mac* miHaru 1989). Nonetheless, few accouau have appeared outside AusnKa. We b^eve that detailsofthoWittenoom experiencedeserve its wHex dissetniftekjn. Aemoee a die industry was--u* "outback'1 Australtew#* lessor* are oai~ versa!. They include: the wesksess of tbe htdivldual and even govemmen* agencies when faced with bureaucratic inertia and competitive interests within tbe complexities of modem government, We consider dm shea history--based partly oo tbe recollections of "those who were there"--to bew vigrafiem eenmbnMm.te^hefefaa* record,ofIndus- trial mishaps. In ihh chapter, some of tbe protagonists and workers are designated by name. 9* emphasize (bat name* have been used only when they are part of the public record is W-stem Australia, for example these whogaveeviden* ia open borings. In Australia. ssbeuos (chryjodle) was also mined at BaQwlgi/ in tte Xortber& Riven region of New Scsuh Wales. McCulloch's book also contains an account of the Baryulgil industry (pages 131-189). This ventre operated from die eariy 1940s until 1979. V* operation was very tiny, and the workforct'-recnwed from local Aboriginal communities, wtth only a few exceptions'--never exceeded *0. Oral evttkstee from tbe workers and various docw- 306 SOCtAL-HtSTOftlCAU MEDICOLEGAL. AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MCSOTH6UOMA (W.A.). High asbestos prices encouraged the prospectors to knap the mineral from the sides of the gorge, bag u. and carry it out by donkey train to the coastal port of Roeboumc 320 kilo* meters away Prices fell, fortunes did not mate rialize, and the rush faded away. Mining con tinued nevertheless, and milling began is a very small way under the control of Lang Han cock. a young pastorelist, and his partner. Pe ter Wright, In 1943 the tiny venture was taken over by Australian Blue Asbestos Ltd, (ABA), a subsidiaryofthe majorAustralian firm Colo nial Sugar Refining Company (CSR). ABA managed the Wittenoom works until their clo sure In 1966. The town of Wjoeooom was brought Into existence by the mining venture, becoming in die 1950s W. A.'s largest urban center north of the Tfropic ofCapricorn. It temaaed a single industry town. It was also isolated, being lo cated approximately 1,600 kilometers by road or 1,100 kilometers by air from Penh, the Sure capital, and 720 kilometers from the rail head at Mcekathana (Fig. 12-1). Australia had almost no experience in the mining of asbestos when CSK, a companywith almost no mining experience at all, decided to develop the crocidolhe deposits as an adjunct to its Building Materials Division. The federal government encouraged CSR in this wartime decision because of the strategic value of as* bestos and a desire for national self-sufficiency. More than this, asbestos was hailed in the 1940s and 1950s as a mineral with almost un limited potential, "There i$ a strong possibility menu seem *> Indicate that conditions a Baryufgtf were very diary, McCulloch describes the occurrence of asbes tos* among those >*ho worked there. He also mentions 2 mesotheliomas by 19S6. Mesotheliomas among former workers may be related to a disputed allegation that some hessian bags used to pack BaryvIgiJ ctwyswile had prev|, oosty contained asbestos from other isdutfries-'-possiWy brown asbestos from South Africa and crockJoliK from Wtaenoom (see Chapter 7, reference $5). The conse quence* ofthis mine have, however, been dwarfed by Wistenooro, and Bsryutgil has received comparatively linle at tention in 0k media, even in Australia. ofthe value ofcrocidafisc production eventually eclipsing die value of gold production in this Stale, W.A.'s Assssom State Mining Engineer declared in 1942--not an inconsiderable claim, given toe preeminence of gold as a mineral ex port earner since the eastern goldfields rushes of the 1890s.' A 1943 Mines Department memo described tie Hamcrtiey deposit, of which Wiiteaootn was pan, as "one of the finest in the world;4 There were reserves "for at least a ceatuty" and therefore a prospective industry, the y*&e of which would be "incalculable'*'one that would make Australia self-sufficient in asbestos.' On the basis of the Commonwea&h Bureau of Mineral Resources' assessment. Prime Minister CSufiey noted in 1947 that "for all, practical purposes, the life of toe fWktoaoisa] mine is unlimited;* CoBsequemly, CSSt nsjutowl toe Sforearw leases and primitive workings, in the expecta tion ofa major, long-term, and profitable post war industry. This expectation was not real ized. The industry was always small in both output and value. In 1962, the peak year of Australian asbestos production, 18,416 short tons we#warned, 95S oftoil total being CTO-. cidofcte from Wjftenoorth5 However, asbestos contributed only 0,9% of the total value of Australian mineral production for that year. Vforid asbestos production in 1962 was esti mated to total 3,088,000 short tons, of which Australia produced only 0.6%. Even in crocidoliw, mined in Australia only at Winenoom (Figs. 12-2 to 12-4), toe greatest anpual output of 17.491 short tons in 1962 was small in com parison to 116,330 short tons mined in the Re public of South Africa In the same year.4 Tier did Australia achieve self-sufficiency in asbes tos production, even at the time of greatest do mestic output, fo i962, imports vmuaied to 39,105 short tons, mostly chtysotile from Can ada and amosite from South Africa. This ton nage was more than double that of domestic production, a disparity that was even greater for most of the postwar period (Table 12-1). Furthermore, the venture did not prove profitable. By 1955 ABA had accumulated 308 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL, MEDICOLEGAL. AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF M$OTHEUOMA n^re12'2 Aerial view ofthe Wfttenoom mine and lasses of approximately $1.6 million. These wts gradually reduced in the second half ofthe 1950s--primarily because of a S-year (1955-- 1959) export contract with Johns Manvilte, the m^or U.S. mamifacturer--and a dividend of $364,200 was paid m I960. Prom 196i until 1966, however, the company again operated un* profitably, with accumulated losses reaching $2.5 million by its last year of operation,7 A combination of factors produced this out come. Preeminently, the company could not se cure its markets, domestic or overseas, be cause it was not competitive with large scale, low-cost suppliers like the Republic of South Africa and Canada. ABA's costs remained high because of its isolated location, the abrasive ness of the surrounding rock that escalated maintenance and milling costs, and the small scale ofits operadons. Labor shortages, partic ularly of underground workers, were continu ous, and the problem intensified in the 1960s Figure 12<3 The Wirteooom m<r#> workings. Figure 12-4 The interior of tho mine. B!U ASBESTOS INDUSTRY At WiTTENOOM <N W. AUSTRALIA 90S, Table 12-1 AustreSttn Asbestos Production. Imports, and CroddoSte Exports Yto fetaf production* Creckfefite ChrysctSs AOtrpa* Total Import** Croc&ofite . export** 1948 1950 1952 1954 195$ 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 725 1.155 3.293 48 8.160 13.313 14.472 17.491 11,088 12,641 -- 399 655 1,262 1,029 1.549 2.255 1.141 925 1.657 627 696 1,486 1,811 4.548 5.279 9.709 15,568 15,613 18,416 13.545 13,466 696 16,675 33,080 31,053 37,955 29,579 36,888 41,002 39,105 42,896 55,152 66,741 N/A 387 N/A N/A 7,679 10,049 8,177 9,689 7,280 4,644 -- in ahott ton*. Souftt: Au*trS*n Miterai indufiry Anted Rew*w, 1&4S-1968. with the attractions ofthe Pilbara iron ore ven tures. Labor costs rose significantly hi this pe riod, and capital costs also escalated, as the company was pressured to improve fiber qual ity and the control of dust during milling. Fur thermore, the anticipated high-fiber yields wr-- oat realized as mining penetrated further fi` e gorge outcrops, and the inadequacy and inaccuracy of the geological information on which planning had been based were re vealed. In addition, die trend in prices was not what ABA anticipated. Strong overseas de mand for long fiber asbestos did not eventuate and, although prices rose after the war, this trend was not sustained. Instead, in the early 1960s there was increasingly severe competi tion for crocidolite in the market place from theTtepriblic ofSoufc Africa, with overproduc tion and lower prices.1 Thus, the asbestos industry at Wittenoon? was always marginal and ultimately H failed, despite the high expectations that heralded its establishment. In this process of initial optimis tic planning, continued struggle for viability, and final acknowledgment of failure and conse quent closure, government was deeply in volved in supporting and facilitating the indus try. Both State and federal governments were predisposed to assist the establishment of the industry in the 2940s, because it promised to "populate the north"--a key goal of postwar politics.9 The size and status ofthe parent com pany, CSR, encouraged government support, as h had been recognized by 1946 that success ful development of the crocidolite asbestos in dustry needed substantial capital investment by a single producer. Consequently, throughout the life of the Witteaoom works, the State gov ernment reserved all ground outside ABA's leases from selection for crocidolite mining." This policy was just one of a package of such policies negotiated in 2946/47 between CSR and the W.A. and Australian govern ments, The State undertook to establish the townsite of Wktcnoom <7 kilometers from die minesite in the gorge), providing the necessary surveying and (he "ameoitks which are nor mally a Government function'` (notably water supply and a school, police station, and hospi tal). It agreed also to upgrade the road to the coast and the port storage and handling facili ties at Pori Samson and to provide a conces sional rate for ABA storage at the port, as well as a road transport subsidy for fracture (explo sive) from the Meekathaira railhead. The fed eral government agreed tojoin with the State in tlw provision of workers' housing (a total of 152 homes by 1953), in a shipping subsidy on 310 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL, MEDICOLEGAL, AND ET*HICAL ASPECTS OF MESGTHEUOMA asbestos carried from Pon Samson to Freman tle, and in a road subsidy on asbestos carried from Wirtebooth to Port Samson, as wdj as on most goods carried from tbe port to Wlttenoom. Both governments shared in half tbe cost of construction of a bulk oil terminal at Port Samson.32 Both levels ofgovernment were impressed by CSR's enterprise, and the mar ginally of the industry--perceived at the time as only short-term--determined their united supportive role. Labor supply was another of the com pany's difficulties with which government as sisted. The problem of obtaining underground labor and of retaining all categories of labor existed throughout Wiseooom's operation. Few were prepared to mine in 42-inch scopes and the entire workforce was highly transient, 59% leaving in 6 months or less.1' In a single industry "company town" located in a sparsely populated region. ABA had no local sources of additional labor. The bulk was therefore contract labor, flown in by the com pany. From its commencement of operations, ABA recruited workers in Penh, paid their airfares to Witsenoom, deducted this cost from tbeir wages and refunded it at tbe end of 6 months--an arrangement given legal status in 1947, in the ftm arbitration awards cover ing the industry.1- Hie federal government provided some relief to the company between 2948 and 1952 by allocating 234 displaced persons to work their 2-year contracts at Wittenoom.15 And others were redirected to Wittenoom by the Department of Labour and Na tional Service awhen their initial placements broke down.34 More importantly, the Austra lian government gave CSR permission to cany out private labor recruitment in Europe. Hie men recruited in this way (and their fami lies) were accepted as immigrants after they had signed 2-year contracts with the company. The first of these trips was made in 1950 and had its greatest success in northern Italy and Holland; the last in 1965 recruited in Leba non. Overseas contract labor provided most of the mine's underground workforce and. with out it, the works could not have remained op erational." CSR did not obtain all the government aid it sought. Its requests for tariff protection in 1946/47 and 1954/55 were both rejected,11 Low-cost workers' housing in this period was dependent on asbestos building materials; be tween 1950 and 1953, 25% ofall new Austra lian houses and 50% ofall those in New South Wes (N.S.W.) and W.A. were built with asbestos-cement sheeting. Indeed, in the mid1950$ Australia ranked fourth in total world consumption of asbestos-cement products and first in per capita terms. Nonetheless, asbestos-cement manufacturers continued to prefer imported asbestos because of its lower cost and, in tbe case of Canadian chrysotile, its superiorquality.19 la this situation die Aus tralian government judged that the need to meet postwar housing demand took prece dence over its desire to encourage northern development and a new mineral industry. Consequently, ABA did not receive the pro tection it sought. Nevertheless, government assistance to die ailing industry increased after 2960, chiefly in the form of annual deferments of freight in creases on the State Shipping Service.30 ft was not enough to save die industry. Pessimistic assessments of future fiber quantity and qual ity, together with problems of labor supply and labor costs, caused CSR to close opera tions is December J966.33 The plant wasiate? sold to Lang Hancock, but no further produc tion took place. It had been a failed mining venture, its-legacy tti illness and death among its ex-workers a massive additional negative outcome to set alongside its economic un soundness. WORKERS' EXPERIENCE Approximately 7.000 people worked for ABA in the 23 years that the company mined and milled asbestos. At its peak the workforce reached over 500, but for most of the time it was less than 300. Tbe most striking character- BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WTTTNOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 311 t ist this workforce was its transience. Over At esftwt period from 194W%6, 44% of workers stayed less than 3 months, 59% had left to 6 months, and only 22% stayed longer than one year. A high percentage of these workers were postwar migrants, somewhere between 35-50% being non-British immigrant in origin. Unforoaatfly, it is not possible to separate British from Australian-born to estab lish a reasonably exact percentage of migrants in Ac workforce; but it is certain that the ma but most workers were single men or--more accurately--they anna to Wittenoom as single men. They lived in the single men's quarters that consisted initially of small, shared hut ac commodation and later of dormitories. The men gave (he name "Death Row" to the latter. Conditions were primitive and maintenance lacking, such that the Regional Health Inspec tor commented in 1965: "I seldom see such squalor, even among (he dozens or so Native Reserves that l visit."* Single men had no al jority ofworkers were recent migrants. Twenty ternative to this accommodation, although a percent of workers came from southern Eu rope, predominantly from Italy (12%) and Yu goslavia (5%); 5-6% were eastern European, almost all of them displaced persons, whereas few boarded with married couples and a larger number obtained their meals on a private pay ing basis. The work of mining and milling asbestos German (3.4%) and Dutch (2.5%) migrants were also numerous. Ex-Wfcteaoom people re call that "every nationality'* worked there. In was hard* hot, and dirty. The mine was a lowback raping operation is which face miners and scrapermeo (who cleared the slopes) she parlance of the time it was a town full of worked tbeir lxh hour shifts In a crouched po `New Australians." sition,25 Because Australian miners, accus The workforce was young: 57% were less tomed to full headroom, were not prepared to lhaa 30years ofage and only 15.7% were aged work in these conditions, ABA recruited its 40 or older. The dominant age group was that face miners on 2-year contracts from between 20 and 24 years; it included 27.9% of overseas--mostly from Italy--and trained them dl. kers.a A&nbst iiD were male. \hry few itself. Wbrking conditions were worse is the >f /u-a's jobs were available to women. Min mill because of the very high dust levels, and ing and milling was entirely male work and the :losest women came to industrial employment occurred from 1960-1966, when four female ag-makmg machinists were engaged to sew he jute bags m which the asbestos fiber was msponed. A few women were employed to k) clerical work in the company office and to work as sales assistants in the company's store md in foe town's hotel, which was also owned yy the company. With ABA the town's sole pri vate sector employer, women's employment prospects were very limited and almost no vomen came to the town except as wives of \BA workers. The exceptions were a tiny lumber of State government employees, nosliy nurses and teachers. And so Winenoom vas a man's town with a male r female ratio of (pproximaiely 2: l." Housing for approximately 180 families was irovided by the State Housing Commission, those who wanted, or were forced, to stay in Wittenoom moved to the mine at the first op portunity. Most of the anil workers were re cruited in Perth on 6-n)OB(h contracts. It is not surprising, (ben, that this predomi nancy young, single, migrant, male workforce employed under contract to work in unpleasant conditions iou2d be highly transmit. In the war and immediate postwar years, before mass migration began, ABA was dependent on a class of workers h categorized as "drifters" and "no-hopers"--men who "work a few shifts and then `snatch their time*"--as die employer's advocate si the 1947 arbitration hearings described them.26 Representative of these men was miner Thomas Manindale who gave evidence for his union--the Australian Workers' Union--ax the same hearings. He had worked at Winenoom for 15 months. When asked where his home was he replied, "I have 312 SOCJAL-WiSTORICAL MEWCOlSGAt. AND fTHICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHaiOMA been in tbe North for years ... 1 have been here off and on, from Darwin downwards, these 40 years."91 He liked life in the North, and his transience was a key dement in ins lifestyle. At kter arbitration hearings in 3949, ASA manager Btoadhurst told of die financial losses the company had to hear when, after paying workers' airfares, they left before die money could be recouped. Only recently three men arrived; one appeared in the mine for Haifa shift aad the other two did sot come in at all. They made it dear to people in the tows that they oriy wanted to go to Witteaooa os their way to Broome nwttworks " This type of scmtacunadic worker persisted through die life ofWraenoom. For instance, in 3953 Vfekh migrant Dennis Morgan had been employed as an underground finer for 5 months before transferring to tire garage as a motor mechanic. After 2 years he left Wine* noom for Roebcurne where he worked as a mechanic for 10 months before reaming to Wiftteooom at 1955. He Jaf been back 9 months when he was asked in the 1957 arbitra tion hearings why he had returned. He ex plained: 1 was passing through. 2 was oa my way south for my holidays, aad there was a vacancy for a motor mechanic, and they came and asked me about it, and I just took it on.29 However, the transience of most workers, par ticularly those categorized as '`unskilled'' or "semiskilled " was more commonly edged with desperation. These were economically vulnerable workers locked at the bottom of the wage structure. Laborer Ccc Recm was a bag ger in die mill is 2957. Although married with four children he lived in tbe single men's quar ters, his family having remained in Perth when he moved temporarily to Wmenoom to find work. Nansrally I did not want to be separated from them but having bees here over four raoothx I fed tbe cost of living generally aad the cost of bringing nay family from South Perth would be too great.91 Tradesmen could also be compelled to move by the exigencies of die labor market. In die sec ond half ofdie 1950$, for instance, unemploy ment in W.A. was the highest in die country. When work was scarce there were always jobs at Wftteaoom. Mill fitter Colin McAyan moved back to tbe town with his wife and two children In mid-1956. He had been "almost forced" back, be explained: At tbe time 1 came baricthere was a great amenta of unemployment in Perth. I had been working with a firm and they were liquidated--and natu rally 1 had my wife and child--also I was paying well above normal rest in Penh, and 1 bad to go and find another job.3* Wlthotg dose personal tics., young men had no reason not to travel. One young finer who spent 6 months on mine maintenance in 1962 could recall no particular reason for going to Wittenooro. 1 don't really know why l wax there. It was round about thc*c years that I'd done my appren ticeship as a finer and turner . . . Wherever the work took me so to speak. 1 wax single, didn't have a girlfriend at that particular point in time, so 1 just went where the work wax ... No ties really.30 Many men came to TOtenoom desperate to find work. The ieatf ffansrertf of ASA's msstasi work ers were the Hope miners, the majority of them Italian migrants. Their 2-year contracts partly explain their longer stays but these same con tracts did not stop the last groups of contract workers recruited in 1964/65 in Lebanon from leaving virtually as soon as they arrived. When recent migrants found that they could save money in Wiaenoom they tended to stay. For instance, one Italian couple remained for $'h BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WITTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 313 . ~dT$. After ibe company's 2*week rising, be became a very successful miner. She took in Italian boarders among the single men and pro vided three meals a day and did some laundry for them. She usually had 7 or 8 such boarders, sometimes 12 and never fewer than 4. "Just to help my husband a bit," she explained. The couple stayed aPWlnenodm to save enough money to buy a small fanning property on the outskirts of Perth. She saw Wittenoom as "the place where you can cam something, better than is Perth, for example, specially for mi grants who just come here with nothing."" For most workers, Wiuenoom was a (dace to make money and then leave. Recent mi grants, is particular, were prepared to make short-terra sacrifices to secure their future m Australia or to return financially better off to their former homes. Many Australian-born workers also west to Wiaenoom with specific saving goals; perhaps to overcome debt and to "get straight again," perhaps to earn the money to buy a suburban home or a car. Some succeeded in improving their financial situa tion; most did not and moved on. One woman 1 lore husband was a displaced person from Latvia explained: He was an ex-army person and when be arrived here without education, without trade, you're re ady giade. Ybu're always chasing that extra vwuaS* They left after a year. "There was nothing there for us", she recalled, with no prospect of advancementfor 1m husband-and no possibil ity of saving any money. They returned to the transient farm work from which they had been attempting to escape when they wem to W?e- owned store. With weekly fooci bills adding to the total, families often had difficulty clearing this debt. A school teaching couple who ob served workers* struggles in the mid-1950s commented critically of ABA that "you had Buckley's chance* of getting out oftheir daws for quite a long time really.''" When the works closed in 1966, hire-purchase debts totaling $5,500 were owed by 60 then-current work ers.* People were deterred from leaving while still in debt, because airline tickets had to be booked at the coezpssy store. Is the absence of a motor vehicle, the only other way out was to ride out to die coast--against company rules-- on the asbestos trucks. It was an avenue to which the desperate resorted. One worker in the imd-1950s with 7 children and no money at all after 3 years of labor in mine and trail loaded Ins children and what household goods he had oafo three asbestos trucks hod managed to reach Roebourne The most frequent metaphor in exWfaenoom workers* oral histones of the tows is that of imprisonment. People make state ments such as: "Not everybody could afford to leave: that was ooeofthetnps. . . ifyew weal st> Wfcteaxanil was as good as in prison ... Td got to find a way of gening out."" *'A lot of people only served out their time in Wiitenoofn."* "Ybu were iwo the trap and then you were caught."*6 "There was no way out. . . We were right in the middle of nowhere."41 Some people, desperate to leave, found themselves trapped in the town. Wbrkere were in debt to the company from the time of their arrival; for theif airfares to Ute town, for their bedding and, if their families accompanied them, for household furniture and equipment (hat was sold secondhand from the company* "You supposed to stay two years. So at first you want to go. Bol after a while you say you have to stay--because there's ao way out. You can't do what you wart."" BucUey's (chaw*), ao chance a> aS). 314 SOCIAL HISTORICAL MEDICOLEGAL, AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHEUOMa `Day by day you are always thinking bow to run away-"41 "Whichever way you turned you came up against &e company. They tailed the tune."4* "No free.'*44 "Everything was belong to company" 'AH those huts in a concentration camp Beady is a row."45 "Nobody could do anything except the compan,."11 "They played a little bit like a tin god "c Even those people, most of whom had been indcpttxteBt of the company, who do not use die metaphor of imprisonment about their own lives is WitteDOcra, use it ofthe mass ofwork ers. "Yba could get in but k was harder to get oat," a former Wioeaoom policeman ob served.46 People who bed bees government employees in the tows stressed their "indepen dence" ofthe company: "W; didnH have to be beholden to them/' a school teacher recalled gratefully* Not everyone was unhappy with life is Wii* tenoom. Some--mostly die self-employed and government employees--enjoyed the life. These people constituted a minority nonethe less. (hie woman remembered "a general air ofdiscontent** pervading the town although she herself lived there happSy for 13 years, and had 6 children in that time.48 "Ybu made your own fun," people recall. The fun included pic nics, barbecues, card evenings, dances, end the weekly cinema. Pub life, two-up, card games, and s.p. betting entertained most of the single men.* These activities provided diver sions from the beat, isolation, shiftwork, long hours of overtime, and unpleasant working condition that rharertfrinvl ibeistduslry The presence of the company was felt in all aspects of Winenoora's life, a presence that many of its workers fouDd oppressive, They recall; Pot). Aftglo-AumJtas dug lens for a public house or hotel, especially as bar, where alcoholic drinks are soM and consumed. Twoup, traditional Australian game of chance. In *hieh beta are laid oo the Ml ef 2 pennies tossed into flu air, S.p. beoiag, Illegal but commoapbce off-course betting, usually on horn races; s.p.. starting price. Wncoooo) was a company mam in the sense that ABA was the sole private employer, and that management dominated residential and so cial life as well as the workplace. The justices of the peace were senior managers and pre sided over the polk* courts. Together with the p&storalistt, they controlled local government. The company owned the single men's resi dences, the only substantial retail More, and the main sock! venue, the hotel. Eves the State Hemsing Commissioa homes were thought by many waters to belong to the company be cause it was the agent for roil collection, water rates, and bouse maintenance, ABA sought to encourage community activities and provided leadership Che Race Qub, the Hospital Board, Country Women's Association, and the like; indeed, its approval was needed for any community venture to be successful,0 like aH mining towns, Wittenoom was a rigidly stratified society. The elite were the CSR staff, the managers, responsible to CSR's Sydney head office. These career men identi fied strongly with the company, worked hard for it, and in turn were well looked after by it. Their workplace authority translated intosocial power in the community and was expressed and reinforced in the maintenance ofsocial dis tance from "the workers.** The managers lived in the gorge on the lease, not in the town. The second tier of staff was the ABA em ployees: shift bosses, plant foremen, and cleri cal workers. They had "a lot of different perks" as one former ABA staffer put it* They received paid annual holiday air navel to Penh for themselves an their families, as well as their initial moving costs and free housing, BIUE ASBESTOS W&USTHY AT W1TTENOOM !N W. AUSTRALIA 315 ater, electricity, and firewood; but ABA bad no superaonoation fund and its staff had no ca reer mobility within CSR beyond WiBencwm and ABA's small Perth office, Theirjobs ended wfeh the closure of the works. ABA's wage and contract employees formed the bulk ofWmenoom's population. Best orga nized were the, &ul tradesmen, menders of the Amalgamated Engineering Union. These men had a reputation among management as tile only group of workers likely to "cause trouble"; they were certainly the most militant section of the workforce. Their tradesmen's "skill," acquired by apprenticeship, en trenched in workplace custom, institutionalized in the differentials of the arbitration awards, and defended by onion organization, protected them from the precariousness of the laborer's situation. Tbe tegular working of overtime (paid at time-and-a-half or double time) gave them their opportunity to prosper. Most of tbe maintenance work, particularly weekend work on the mill, was done on vwtisje.55 'Mages were the equivalent of those in Penh with tbe addition of a diatria allowance that was more tan absorbed by WitteDoom's higher cost of living; and so overtime was essential to boost workers' pay packets. The tradesmen benefited most from the constant labor shortages that made overtime the rule in the industry. For the mU and mine laborers it was more of a lottery. Sometimes freely available and as other times elusive. In Wittenoora's social hierarchy, the mine and mill laborers, in particular the single men, had the lowest status. Isolated to the Compound, the name by which tbe single men's quartets was known, frequently unable to speak English or to stomach the food pro vided for them, and faced with grim working conditions in the mill and mine, the single men were the most transient of Wmenoom's population, They fled on the asbestos trucks, to be replaced by others who repeated the cy cle. No one much noticed; their labor was in terchangeable. These men recall that working and living conditions were generally intoler able. Mill dust was an important component of this situation. Former Wfceaoom residents recall the as bestos dust vividly. In the language of their oral histories "dust" has come to stand for "disease/death." This has happened because of their current circumstances; perhaps their own til health and/or the illness or death of dose family and Mends; certainly their present knowledge of asbestos-related disease, of media-reported deaths of former Wltteaoom people, and of die confirming threat to their own health. Wineooom was an extremely dusty place. Foglike dust hung over both old and new nulls and could be seen 7 miles away in the town. The same dust was brought into the town wish tbe practice ofusing tailings, residue from the asbestos processing, as a road surface and a covering for house yards andpublic ven ues. A former Bane worker who lived for 10 years in Wtttenoom explained ironically: If you wanted t& tows to make a drive way or fortbe backyard tolook nice, you ask the company and they dump a load of tailings in your backyard. Tbe schools aad tbe kindergar ten, churches, everybody had it nice with tailings there, ft's handy.56 Parents recall their children's first years with despair: `Tve got pictures of Robin, eighteen months old, sitting in it!" one mother la mented/3 whereas a father of 3 exclaimed "? suppose all the babies even ate the bloody stuff!"51 When people describe Wmenoom's asbestos dust tbe dominant image U of a duck, suffocat ing covering: "Within five minutes [in the old mill] you were covered with all the dust. . . Ybe were grey,"56 "He (a mill worker] was like a snowman, all covered with dust."60 "As bad as any work fnighl drift maintenance] because everything was just smothered in dust . . . ft would stick to you."61 316 SOCIAL-HlSTORICAt, MEEMCQLEGAl, AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MFSOTMEUOMA "The duy was just engulfing the whole crushing"' plant,'* one year, but have dyspnoea, finger clubbing, basal crep&iioBS and as abnormal chest i ray the following year* "I only knew him with having blue fingernails, blue lips--he was full of Oast."63 'The gorges used to be so thick, hilt of tt; it looked like a big fog at night time.''* 'll was just impenetrable; k was like walking into smog."*5 When people tali of the dust's enveloping as phyxia! form they are doing so in the context of asbestos-related disease (asbestosis, lung can cer, aad ptetrad mesothelioma) among their families or friends or other ex-WUtenoom resi dents, about whom they hear and read. What requires explanation is the Mure of occupa tional health controls in this asbestos industry. An increased incidence of lung cancer among asbestos workers was established by the 1950s, and the association of pleural mesothelioma with exposure to asbestos was recognized in 2969 is South Africa (see Imrodoctieo, page 7). The first case of mesothelioma outside South Africa--in aa ex-Wittenoom mill worker--was reported by McNally in 1962." Thus, medical knowledge of asbestos-related disease increased substantially during the life of the Wmenoom works, particularly from the mid-1950s onward, and this reinforced existing knowledge ofthe other health hazards ofasbes tos. At one level, Western Australia's particular historical experience made it aware of the dan ger of dust in the mining industry. Dust had OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH IN THE INDUSTRY Asbestos was mined and milled at Wjaeooom ouster coo&iofis that were wholly inadequateto protect either die workers themselves or the town's residents from asbestos-related disease. Why was Ms so? Afterall, medteal sciencebad discovered a great deal about asbestos-related disease by the 1940s (see Introduction, pages 2, 4, 7, and 8).afeS7 In Nonh America the health threat to asbestos workers was sufficiently well known by 1918 for U.S. and Canadian insur ance companies to cease seiling*them life insur ance.^ What was not fully understood until the 1950s, however, was the rapidity ofonset of the disease after heavy exposure and the speed of its progression. In 1968, Dr. Jim McNulty of the State Department of Health reported surpris ingly short intervals from first exposure to clini cal onset of disease, on average 5 years among Wittenoom mill workers and 6'/a years among mine workers. At the same brae, he reported the rapid progression of the disease; been identified as the major occupational health hazard from mining in Australia, from the beginning of die century. By the 1940s/ 1950s, there was a long-standing set of proce dures to monitor dust levels in die gold and coal mines and to check miners for pneumoco niosis. These procedures were effective for gold miners in XalgoorUe and coal miners in Cdlte and in other seeled, long-established mining towns. Not surprisingly, they were -much less effective in the smaller, more scat tered and isolated mines, particularly of the North West, where the workforce was transient and the mines mostly marginal and ephemeral. X-ray screening of19orth "West miners was or ganized from Kalgoortie, and in the 1940s a Commonwealth mobile unit made the Marble Bar-Yilgara-Winenoom trip biennially,78 Until 1948 this unit also carried out initial medical checks and issued certificates,71 Given the high turnover of the workforce at Witieoootn. these procedures were clearly inadequate. When the plant grew larger in the early 1950s, annual x* ray examination was instituted, and in 1958-- A man wiih two years exposure in the mill might as a result of the first diagnosis of asbestosis-- have s normal chest x ray and no symptoms w clinical examination was added to the annual - JE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT W1TTENQOM IN W. AUSTRAUA 317 check.73 The x-ray changes in asbestosU had been found to be very subtle (sec Chapter 9) and therefore difficult to delect, and h was hoped that additional clinical examination would enable earlier diagnosis.73 It took some time for public health authori ties to adjust to the particular problems of asbestos--a mineral with which they had no experience. In this situation the Health Depart ment (and die Mines Department for that mat ter) applied traditional procedures that had been found to be appropriate to gold mining. One doctor stationed in Roeboume and serving Wiaenooffi as a flying doctor in the period 1952-1953 explained that: Id e year or two ABA will produce die richest and a&a lethal crop ofeasesofasbcsl&'is is the world's literature . . . Naflirafly 1 tHmfc some of these clasts should be looked loto.* the Commissioner of Health responded posi tively, acknowledging that "these workers could easily incur a greater hazard than do workers in our gold mines.'' He explained that x rays m Perth would be required of all work ers before the coramcaceroem of employment, and that the Department was endeavoring to arrange for the Commonwealth Mobile Labo ratory to mat*. annual (rather than biennial) visits to Wseooom" Saint tackled the company at the same time: At this stage they were aot concerned about long disease caused by asbestos. They wen son talking about dua on the lung which a miner usu ally gas. They wen concerned about the miner that worked directly in the none.74 Experience suggested to officials that it was the men with a history of mining behind them who i jre the group irv danger and therefore to be watebed closely. The greater danger facing the mill workers who were almost all newcomers to, and transient in, die mining industry was not fully recognized until the mid- to late 1950s. First to realize the extern of the threat posed at Wittenoom was Eric Saint. One among a group of doctors recruited in Britain by the Health Department in the postwar period to ease die mechcai shortage in remote areas, he was appointed to Fort Hediand and serviced Wtaenoom as a flying doctor from 1948-1951. What made him unusual in W.A. at the time was his extensive knowledge of industrial health. He had recently gained his doctorate in the Department ofIndustrial Health at Newcas tle University in England. Furthermore, asbes tos manufacture near Newcastle had given him an understanding of die dangers of asbestos.7' Consequently, he was horrified by what he saw on his first visit to Winenoom and wrote imme diately to Perth, stating that: I said "Lock, you've got problems." .. . They poob>poohd me and in feet they labeled me as a troublemaker... They didn't listen. I wasjust a young man, a flying doctor ... I'd only just come out from England and they thonght "Who's this jumped-up fellow?"* Thai was the asimde.7' And so he made no impact on ABA, and the Department seemed to him uncomprehending of the scope of rive potential disaster: It was the local experience. They'd never en countered asbestos: they'd sever had occasion to lock It up in the Uteraoire. It wasn't in the froru of then consciousness. All thty were thinking was via! they knew, that there's a certain amount ofsilicosis among the misers La Xalgoor* \k . .. The rftfalag people were looking at the nurtritiity -gpqngarafters; -efcaimerowtd them was silicosis.79 At this stage the Health Department did not have an Occupational Health Division. The State's small population and lack of secondary iadustty, together with the abolition of the Commonwealth Department of Industrial Hy giene in 1932, resulted in ignorance and ne glect of the area. It was not until 1958 that Jumped-up. self-iroponam. 318 SOClAUHiSTORICAt, MEDICOLEGAL, AW>THfCAl ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA Dr. D. IffNm (tuberculosis physician at the*7 Penh Qiest Clinic) was offered the opportunity whole is ignorant ofthe Health Deparaaef&'s at titude in this naner.** to establish either as occupational health or ge riatric division in the Department. Be chose This evidence suggests (hat, although the De the former because of an interest in preventive partment took an increasingly strong line In the medicine, developed during his years as a phy 1960s, it was not always politically astute or sician at Viborooloo Sanatorium, where be effective, lb assume that information detri treated former gold miners for sifieotuberculo* mental to the company and supplied to man sis. The division was set up in 195$ with.a staff agement would be disseminated on even a lim of oae; there mas so seecod physician until ited scale can be considered naive. 1963, although a nurse and health surveyor were appointed in the interim.11 Increased interest and expertise in occupa tional health and growing W.A. knowledge A further ares where die Department's doc tors attempted to intervene to protecs workers was in their advice to leave Wittenoom, which they offered to individual workers during the about asbestos-related disease were expressed yearly clinical examinations. There were prob throughout the 1960s in stronger pressure on lems with this, however, as the doctor most ABA to reduce the dust menace. In 1961 Le- involved, Jim McNulty, describes: iham informed the compary that dust counts were too high and a meeting of company, Health Department, and Mines Department representatives agreed that improvements to the ventilation of the mine and mill would be made and a system of dust counting begun.0 In this period die Department also con demned the. use of tffinj is the township. Perhaps die only medical advice one could have ever given, ia view of the dusty conditions and history was ``If you are thinking of going-- don't!" and "If you are there--leave!" but this is not fee advice they wasted ... If there were no signs ofclinical disease, one could not advise them te leave.*3 When the Commissioner of Public Health, Dr. W. S. Davidson, visited Wittcnoom in 1965 he Few workers appear to have followed the ad "rebated1' the state school headmaster "in vice to leave when it was given. Many workers vigorous terms" for covering the school yard '`didn't want to be told" and some even tried with tailings, and he informed the Shire Clerk to dodge the examination.*4 There were prob that: ably a number of reasons for this response, but a major one was workers* perception of their Over the past years our attitude has bees made perfectly clear to the Mines Department and the ..ounagerom of ibe mine on the use of tailings . , , Tig management of the mine has bees given the opportunity to examine all the literature we have available on the subject.0 lack of choice. They faced unemployment and loss of housing if they left Wittenoom; some were in debt to the company; others did not have the fares out for themselves and -tlier families. In material terms, many did not have a choice. The Health Department also struggled In answer to the Secretary's complaint that the Shire had not been informed officially of die Department's views, Davidson replied: through the period to achieve more accurate dust counting in mine and mill. In 1959 the Commissioner complained that the konimetcr used by Mines Department inspectors (who took the readings) "is not regarded as art effec As your Council has always contained members tive instrument for dust counting in the asbesassoeisttd with the management of the mine, I los industry in Canada."1' Nevertheless, it was cannot accept a suggestion that the Council as a not until 1966 that an industrial hygienist, cx- BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY At WITTCNOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 319 in the use of more sophisticated equip ment, was brought across frosty Hew South Wiles to take more reliable readings. His re port showed imutisfactorUy high dust concen tration* in both mice mi mitt, bat by the time k was completed the plant had closed The isolation of Wffieaoom made adequate occupational health supervision and servfciag a difficult task fox the Health Department until closure ofthe plant. A Ur greater impediment to iu effectiveness was the legislative inade quacy and bureaucratic division of authority within which it worked. W.A. had no occupa tional health legislation that could have pro vided the Department with the necessary power to effect change. Wtocaoom was deemed a mine. Therefore, it came artier die provisions of the Mining Act19 (wfckfc did not touch on health at ail) and the Mines Regula tion Act" which vested in fee Mines Depart ment the powers of Inspection and supervision and of framing regulations relating to sanita tion, safety, and health. The latter Act defined "miae*' widely to include not only theplace of 'xteactioe ofa rumend/metal but also "a place I .. where the products of any such place are bebg toasted or desk with.'** Thus fee mill as Wittenoom was a mine for the purposes of the Act. The Health Department had no right of inspection or power co intervene and insist aa change. It could only liaise with the Mines De partment; it could advise but not direct. Knowledge and expertise were thus separated from authority over occupational health mat- ten. There is asefejwalevidence.thatJorShe entire postwar period the Health Department was conscious ofthe inadequacy of this administra tive arrangement. Although Dr. Sunt was not aware of ft, Ws letter in 1948 warning of the astwsJOsis danger spurred the Department to propose in 1949 that an area within 5 miles of ABA's works be excised from the jurisdiction of tits Mining Act and brought within that of the Factories and Shops Act. so that the Fac tory Inspector could 'inspect the works and enforce improvements"" The attempt was blocked when the Solicitor General, on the ad* vice of the Mines Department, fttied that Wittenoom was a "mine" and therefore not a "factory."" The Department tried again in 1953, in response to Kwinana's industrial growth, with a report that called for coordina tion to replace the piecemeal approach of the past. Industrial health, it argued: ... has largely tea neglected la W. A. Hsherio this neglect has been of comparatively small impomace but the ttcon aad potential rapid ex pansion of local industry requires us to take im mediate steps to dose this gap in public health defence measures to protect die health of cur growing iafestrial population.** Whai was seeded was legislation end orga nization that would p&& cosed of industrial hygiene in the bands ofthe Health Department, with representation provided for other departswots. The response was again negative; the Assistant Parliamentary Draftsman and Chief Conveyancer advised that such legislation would cut across at least 10 Acts, as well as industrial awards. And H was unnecessary aa' "ample legislative power already exists to bring about what Is desired without farther ex pense to the State."* The Commissioner of Public Health protested that it was not possible under existing legislation for bis Department to maintain "adequate medical supervision" of other authorities who are `'without the medi cal knowledge required to appreciate the prob lems involved."* Nevertheless, nothing more was heard of the move. The Department had failed again. Thus liaison and cooperation remained the only tools the Department had at its disposal to achieve its occupational health goals, and it used them on the Mines Department and Fac tories Department, the two authorities that con trolled the bulk of the State's workplaces, Re lations with tfre Factories Dcpamrtcnt were close and cordial as evidenced by the 1949 at tempt to bring Wittcrtoom under Us jurisdic tion. The Mines Department was more difficult l 320 SOCfAt-HISTORJCAL. MEDICOLEGAL. ANOfTHICAJ. ASPECTS OP MESOTHELIOMA to influxace and relations were often more dis tant, though apparently not embittered. Bu reaucratic divisions of authority produced by legislative inadequacy were most marked in the mining industry. Here, die Mines Department had statutory responsibility for health and safety ia the mines whereas the Health Depart ment was responsible for the medical examina tions of mine workers. The situation was for* tber complicated by federal involvement; in the period before 1953 it was the Commonwealth Department ofHealth that carried out the x-ray program, a task that tire State Department as sumed only after that date. Such divided au thority, and particularly that between the Mines and Health Departments, impeded effective action on occupational health. Furthermore, the Mines Department was a large and traditionally oriented organization with a powerful ideology ofdevelopment hid ing its actions. In this it reflected the views of successive W.A. governments, both Labor and noo-Labor.* One health official labeled Mines Department officers "engineers who knew ev erything,** a description that points to two ma jor characteristics of the Department: its developmentalism and its optimism. These determined the department's fundamental and continuing response to Wioenooa's asbestos production--that it was a valuable industry to be fostered and preserved. The Mines Department did not lack concern about the health hazards of mining, in particu lar those ofdust ami inadequate ventilation, but this concern was tempered by a pragmatic view about what was reasonable is a marginal indus try and by a sarong desire 10 encourage new mining ventures. And. without callousness, its officers knew that a certain measure of dust disease was always associated with the mining industry, Dr. McNulty, who worked first as Mines Medical Officer in KaJgoorlic and then as Occupational Health Physician in (he Health Department in Perth, explains that: When Cassandra . . . advised that dust was a problem and predicted die development of dis ease fat Wiaeaoom) it dkla'l nog any alarm bells in the people concerned ia the mining in dustry because they were used to it; they ex pected it.* Nonetheless, k would be wrong to portray the Mines Department and its inspectors simply as lax and ineffective. In the area the Department knew best, underground milting, standards were enforced firmly. It insisted initially that ABA find "a competent mining man" to take charge of underground operations.* After the introduction of low-back sloping as the most efficient working procedure, the mine functioned smoothly, with a low accident rate100 and no major engineering setbacks, apart from an underground collapse in 1962.w The Department ensured that the mine was worked in accordance with regulations, al though it made two concessions that illustrate its pragmatism: first, ft allowed ABA to install diesel locomotives in the mine is 1945 because they were cheapest'*; and second, it studiously ignored the employment underground of nonEnglish speaking migrants, although this con travened the Mines Regulation Act. The De partment's awareness of the company's constant labor shortage explains the over sight,as The Department was confident that ft under stood and could handle the problems of the industry--a view reflected in the District In spector's report in 1945: ^, The problem to be faced is the future develop tneo of the-asbestos `mtiasByin this `State is purely a mining one. The metallurgical require ments of the undertaking are comparatively sim ple, since the separation ofthe fibre a an entirely mechanical process, and since the deposits are so large and regular the geological aspect is also relatively simple.w Such optimism proved to be misplaced, for sat isfactory quality and dust control in milling was never achieved and unexpected variations in the length and quality of fiber revealed the deficiency of geological knowledge.I<rt With 9WS ASBESTOS INDVSTXY AT W^TTfWOOM IN W AUS7SAUA 321 . ~ Department's assistsnee, the mining prob lems were the ones most easily and immedi acy resolved. Satisfactory dust control (especially in the dry milling process ofcrushing, grinding, aspirating, and bagging) was never achieved, al though the Department knew of the problem and tackled h evei? year. Its basic premise was sound: The MdattOQ of the dust problem resolves fiself uao the willingness of die Management to accept die responsibility of to st that the various machines rdease as little dust as possible intothe atmosphere.. . Anyone constructing a dry aci'~ tocal plant of any description mast realise that dust control is the major principle around winch the rest of the plant is designed.106 provement in conditions all round."160 Mill ex tensions brought renewed concern in 1952, but the inspccsor reported that "at ray request the mill building is being totally codosed and a great improvement can already be seen in dost control." By the close ofthe year he noted that "the dust is now controlled by extractor fans and cyclones placed in the roof.""1 Nonethe less, a tour ofinspection the following year by the Assistant State Mining Engineer found con ditions much less pleasing: Mill operation, at the tirae ofour visit, was very dusty being brought about by the installation of new plant od (he removal of dnst curtains. The mill staffadmesthe the dust win only be a t#nporaiy nuia&Dce and should be well undercontrol within a week or two.1'* Respirators were not an answer. Tire Depart ment knew from experience that the men could not (and would not) wear them in hot and hard mining conditions. Faced with this problem, the Department's respoose was to take the optimistic view. Year /" *ter year ns inspectors -ruled thBt dua control 1 as unsatisfactory, and year after year they re ported that conditions were about to ioiprose because of some planned change. Thus in 1945 it was noted that: 7be pfeof is eqc/pped with a esrefufiy designed dust collection system. Dust escapes at certain points, hit these are noxtur matters and can be corrected. The conectioo ofdust at (he final dis charge is no) satisfactory. Hus is to receive fur ther attention,405 The 1946 inspection recommended "a slow current of air distributed over a large area" to solve the continuing problem but concluded that ''when this is carried out. and it can be done easily and cheaply, the dust nuisance will disappear."** In 1949 the erection of a new milling plant was noted whh the addendum that "dust nuisance and similar defects will now be overcome."** Dust extractors were installed in 1950 in the inili resulting in "a general im Dust control did not eventuate, however, and the 1954 inspection reported a "disgraceful" situation in the null with "severe dust (or fi ber) concentration polluting the entire plant." Nevertheless, the inspector bad yet another so lution, sating that "the most effective remedy would be to exhaust targe volumes of air through the roof of the null building.""* Thus, after more titan 10 years of milling, dust levels had not been brought under control. What had seemed to the inspector in 194S a "minor matter" was proving an intractable problem, ft was to persist until tite closure of the plant in 1966, despite some improvement after the new mill in Colonial Gorge began op eration in 1957. What significant, however, e the coounoe traads ia the attitudes of Mines Department officials: (1) that the prob lem was capable of a simple solution that they could identify; and (2) that conditions, though bad at the time, were about to improve. The N S W. industrial hygienist who look dust tradings in the plant in 1966 jusi before its clo sure concluded that the task of dust control in such an installation was one on which a deter mined and skilled industrial hygienist would need to spend a good deal of time to accom plish, ft should not, he concluded "have been 322 SOOAi-HJSTOfl/CAt, MKJiCOtfGAL, AND ETWICAi. ASPECTS OP MESOTHELIOMA the responsibility of busy mines inspectors."m-r began commenting critically on its inexperi Even so, the fact remains that tbc Mines De ence and labeling its management "ama partment believed it had the time, experience, teurs."11* One man who went to Wittenoom in and expertise to handle the problem, ft clearly 1946 to work as a fitter in the mill recalled did not. that: Given that government controls did not op* erate effectively to police the conditions for oc cupational health at Wfteeoom, why were such controls so necessary? Why were die com pany's own standards so inadequate? CSR has been found legally "negligent" ia Us manage CSR didn't know very aacb about crushing ore. They knew a lot about sugar cane and were try ing to y the tune principles and it didn't work ... 1 think they tried to do their best but they we forever experimental,m ment ofasbestos dust in ASA's works, making asbestos-related disease among ABA's former workforce its responsibility. This "negli gence" had several causes, like any private sector enterprise, CSR was concerned with profitability and therefore with cost contain ment. Hea&h costs were not, however, part of die company's calculations, bung externalized in the public health system. Two additional fac tors further determined the company's behav ior. The first was CSK's inexperience and ap parent incompetence in managing the mining works, and the second was the continual weak ness of its market position. Although the W.A. government was delighted is 1943 that such a large and prestigious Australian company as CSS. should be interested in developing Ws&enoom's asbestos, ABA did not live up to ex pectations. The parent company had virtually no mining experience; h was a sugar company, and Its only other mining venture was ax Zcehan *m Tasmania, where small quantities of white asbestos were produced. CSK had be come interested in asbestos fiber because it had entered the buUdiqg materials field in 1938, with die manufacture of cane fiber insulation board, a by-product of its sugar milling.ns lb this mining inexperience was added the ab sence of any Australian precedent for blue as Be worked for ABA until 1950, becoming a mill shift boss sad finally draughtsman. In this last capacity he Joined is the experimentation, writing to the National Safety Council for "guidance as to the rules and regulations" on the designing of safeguards for call *acker*cry."* lids level of managerial expertise fed more in common with the traditional od hoc practices ofoutback mining than it did with the effective operation of a large corporate enter prise. Tbc inefficiency and ineptitude of these early years wererepeated throughout the lifeof die mine, and stories illustrating the company's low standards are a common element in work ers' recall oftheir time in Wrtenoom--whether they worked there in the 1940s or the 1960s. The description of the work process in 1966 given by the industrial hygienist, Major, m acconvptoy h destreadings confirmsthe pjeture of continuing inefficiency; unskilled Modifieslions to machinery, spillages, leakages, and c*rt*away due* work. One metal tradesman, who worked from 1964-1966 as a leading hand underground, drew sharp contrasts between ABA and his later employer. Mount ha Mines*; bestos mining or milling. The process would be one of trial tod error and hs success would depend on the expertise and innovativeness of management. ABA did not prove equal to the Mouat Isa was different. When you wcai there you went to school for a week ... it was &3) safety, you know; learning all about safety At task. Almost immediately on the company's es tablishment, in 1944, the Mines Department Locked ia the northwestern region of QueeuUaad, the Mows Isa Mi is * may* pretax' o( ka4, coppcf. and zinc. BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WfTTENOOM W. AUSTRALIA '323 Mourn U* they were very stria, you know. You had glasses and goggles and safeQ' belts and they had blokes going around a2 tbe time there. If you didat abide by tbe rules they'd suspend yw. It wasn't as strict there fat Wioeztoasl as what it was Meant Isa."9 Hie question of silks would be involved here ... But H is the discomfort caused by working in the dust that k why we are claiming it. Very often when men are working in tbe dust they have to wear respirators to keep tbe dust from dogging their month and nose, aod ifthey have to wear something it is very uncomfortable.123 Casual inefficiency multiplied the dust hazard both iflside the mill and in the surrounding en vironment, which was grossly polluted as tbe exhaust systemcoatiwred to disch&Tje to rant degree into the atmosphere. Inadequate mainte nance, the use of poorly adapted worn-out ma chinery, and constant improvisation and costsaviag were characteristic management practices, which became more noticeable in the 1960s as comparisons began to be drawn with tbe uew Ptibara iron ore ventures. Because Wkteooom was an isolated com pany town, where management had prior knowledge of official visits, ABA was able to disguise the extent ofthese health hazards, es pecially in the mill, by cleaning up especially for inspections.1*3 This action undoubtedly saved the company from greater tiepaitmttftal ( mure. Also important was ABA's weak auarket position. The industry was always mar ginal and ABA recorded a loss in all years 1943-1966 except those from 1956-1961.**1 By 1955 it had accumulated losses of $1.6 million, which had grown to $2.5 million by 5966. Although These losses were absorbed hi CSR's larger bookkeeping, the effect in W.A. was to remove some olthe pressure from the company on the issue of dust control im provements. Few wanted IQ see the industry dose altogether; more than 200 jobs were at stake and another mining ghost town would be created. Thus a weak market position helped to limit health improvements. Organized labor complained of the "dust nuisance" at various times across the whole period of Wktertoom's operation. In 1946, when the first award for the asbestos mining industry was being negotiated, die Australian Workers' Union (AWU) argued for the inclu sion ofa dust allowance on two grounds: So, initially, although there was some suspicion of the threat of silicosis, (he AWU perceived the dust essentially as discomfort that extra remuneration for workers. Hus claim was not granted, and die initial AWU award gazetted in 1947 went only so for as to declare that "ao dry crushing plants shall be operated unless under such conditions as obviate dust as far as is reasonably practicable."1* Theuaiotis displayed % much greatest **r ness of the dangers of dm dust by 2949. Like the health authorities, however, they stressed the silica content in the rock containing (be as bestos fiber and tbe danger ofsilicosis in mine workers. Asbestos was sees as dangerous pri marily io its capacity to accelerate sIIkqsU.13 The wspaay fe 2949, though clasraseg that it was is the process ofeliminating the "duet nui sance." was still not prepared to concede its danger. Tbe employer's advocate insisted that: The Company does not admit that that IWlaeaocm'sj dust '& dangerous. Merely because there are ticods ol das, it does not mean dm that dun k dangerous.m The Award in 1949 was amended to include provision for a dust allowance, should a Board of Reference recommend a.m A Board of Reference held in 1957 con firmed the poor working conditions in (he null: Coodhkjos within tbe mill were extremely dusty aod . . . null workers were begrimed with dust ... A thick paU of dust was present in the near vicinity of the mill, 123 The Board ruled that "the asbestos mining i' dustry is necessarily associated with some d 324 SOCfAL-HtSTOftfCAt, MEDICOLEGAL, AND KTHJCAi. ASPECTS OF MESOTHEUOMA gree of dust suisaoce," but that at Wittenooro the nuisance was "excessive.'' Mill workers therefore received a fid per hour dust allow ance (to add to tilt 1/6 already being paid by the Company).*** Seven months later, because dust-reducing equipment had been installed, the allowance was reduced to 3d or 4d and re stricted to workers in the bagging and crushing areas, and is the dust rooms. In 1959 a union attempt to have the allowance increased was rejected.** The trade unions representing TOttenoom's workers had very limited success in reducing the levels of asbestos dust in the workplace. Above all, they lacked knowledge, and they remained unaware of the degree of danger. Though they certainly struggled to have the dust recognized as a problem, they did so in the context ofarbitration in an endeavor to gain monetary compensation foe their members ex posed to dust Union influence was weak in Wittcnoom itself. Many workers were only nominal members of their unions, and the high labor turnover meant that the unions bad diffi culties keeping local branches staffed with of fice bearers. Few workers supported industrial confrontation; either they could not afford it, or they wanted to save money quickly to get out Thus, Wiaenoom sustained no strong rank and file union presence to challenge the power of management and to effect improvements in working conditions at the plant level. A mesh of conditions determined the enor mity of occupational ill health and death that resulted from Winenoom's asbestos industry, A company with insignificant mining experience and deficient safeguards was locked into an un economic venture in a Slate with an inadequate regulatory framework for occupational health, combined with a fiercely dcvelopmeotalist ide ology. Especially powerless workers, hungry Pmiecimal coinage, toed ost the 4d British imperial syseeet. At about the tune of convention to dolUis and cents, 6 peuen (6d) was roughly equivalent to !0 ceats, and wse shilling and 6 pence <J/6> was worth abow 30cents. Id teruu of eunency exchange, one Australiae dollar was (ben worth slightly more than its U S. counterpart. to survive in an isolated and harsh environ ment, compounded foe situation. Within this complex of determinants, individual late was cast. REFERENCES AND NOTES The interviews cited in these endnotes are some of the 90 interviews containing the oral histories of 115 former Wittenoom residents that have been collected by the author 1 J.S. Foxall, February 1942. Wstem Australia Mines Dept, file 1404/42, AN 350, Ace. 964 (WA State Archives, Basyc Lftrtjy). 2 WA Mines Dept, file 413/43. 3 WA Mima Dept press handout, April 1945, file 321/43. Memo, Sute Mining Engineer to Uadep'Secretazy for Mines, 5 September 1946, file 789/45. Report of the Dept of Mines 1943, V/K \tes and Proceedings of Parlia ment,^ 1944, p, 31. 4 Letter, Chifky to WA Premier McLany, 4 July 1947. WA Mines Dept, file 789M5. 5 Production data draw from Australian Mis tral Industry Annual Review, 1949-1968. Cotuaomvealch of Australia, Bureau of Min eral Resources, Geology and Geophysics: Dept ofNational Development. 6 Minerals Yearbook, 1, 1964, p. 231, United States Bureau of Mines, Deps. of foe Interior. 7 WA Dept, of die North West, unnumbered file emitlcd Wittesoom General. Stack 15, AN 40/ * 5Aec. 1302. , 8 For postwar price changes see Ausudfj&n Min eral Industry Annual Review, 1949-1968. 9 Commonwealth Northern Australia Develop ment Committee correspondence, Novembef- December 1946. WA Mines Dept, files 789/45 and 413/43. 16 WA Mines Dept, file 789/4$. 11 WA Mines Dept, file 374/46. 12 WA Mines Dept, files 789/45, 320/48. 13 Statistic from Dept, ofMedicine. University of Western Australia. 14 Nos. 20/45 and 26/46 Western Australian Io* dustrial Gazette. 27. 1947, pp. 47, 52. 15 Appfeyard RT: Displaced persons in Ufesiem Australia, University Studies b History and Economics, 2 0) September 1955, p. 94. BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WtTTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA *325 16 The evidence here is anecdotal. See the au thor's 9fcric end Writers* Responses at Wttenoom, 1943-1966, Community Health Susfies, 7(1) 1983, p. 6, 17 My Informarioe oo ABA's overseas recruitment is fragmentary; much of il is.drawn from oral sources. 18 WA Mines Dept, file 789/45, Commosweahh Tariff Board Report or Asbestos Fibre, 24 March 1955, WA Mines Dept, file 760/49. 19 Coxnmoaweafth ThriftBoard Report oa Asbes tos Fibre, pp. 6-IS. 28 WA Dept of the North West files A2I, 21/62, sad "Winenocra Geoeral." 21 CSR Feasibility Study, 29 September 1966, WA Dept of the North V*s file "Wiaeaoom Geoera!.*' 22 AS demographic statistic* from the Department of Medicine, University of Wsstero Australia. 23 Commonwealth of Australia. Census, 1954, 1961, end 1966. 24 m Dept of Health AN 120/4. Acc. 1003, file 14/58. 25 Australian Slue Asbestos l-d. Report of Oper ations at WiBaoooiQ Gorge WA, undated c. 1953. Bartye 12bwy PR 7591, 26 WbstiUn Australia Court of Arbitration Nos. 20/45 and 26/46 transcript, 10 June 1947. p. 106. 27 IHd., 7 May 1947, pp. 24-26. 28 WA Arbitration Court transcript 41/48. 12/49 and 22/49, 15 July 1949. pp. 131-132. 29 WA Arbitration Court transact 17,50,68,80, 118. and 207/1957,27 September 1957, p. 83. 30 Interview with former mint fitter, Australian* bam male, resident 1962. 31 WA Arbitration Court transcript 17.50,68,80, til, fiftd'2$7/i957,27 September 4957, p. 68. 32 Ibid., p. 79, 33 Interview with Italian-born female, housewife. 34 Interview with former mill worker/mine woricer/hoiel worker and bis wife (office worker/bousewife), Latvian- and Australian boro, residents 1953-54. ' 35 Interview with husband and wife, both school teachers, residents 1954-1956. 36 State Housing Commission report. 3 December 1966. WA Dept, of North West file 59/66. 37 Interview with former mill and mine worker; English-born male, resident 1953-1955. 38 Ibid. 39 Interview with forme? mine worker/miH worker/botci worker, Latvian-boro rale, resi dent 1953-1954. 46 Interview whh former mine worker, Austnliao-bora sale, resides! 19. 42 Interview with former mb* worker/storenaan, Afigio-Cdtk male, resident 1962. 42 Interview with former mill worksr, haUas-bcro male, resides! 1951-1953. 43 Interview with former mill worker/tramee miner. Yugoslav-born male, resided briefly 1962 and 1963. 44 interview with former mine worker. Yugoslav* boro male, resident 1960-2963. 45 Interview with former aurse/houaewife, Dutch- Indonesian bon female, resident 1950-1954. 46 interview with former policeman, Angb-Cettc male, resident 1956-1962. 47 interview with former school teacher, Anglo* Celtic female, resident 1955-1957. 48 Interview with wife of fodependee! cartage contractor, resident 1949-1962. 49 Interview with former independent cartagecon tractor, Australia-born mate, resident 1949- 1962. 59 Iserriew viittenwf4ww wpflefi Y**wte*- boro male, resident l960-t963. 51 Interview with former hospital matron. AngloCdtk female, resident 1954-1957. 52 Interview with former mine worker, Dutchborn male, resident 1965-1967. S3 The Wioesoom column ofthe Northern Times, the regional newspaper, reported on the various social organrzakms. 54 Interview with former first aid officer, resided 1962-1963, 55 Interview with former mill superintendent and manager, Aearabafr-bota mate, resident 19491966. 56 Interview with former nunc worker, Austrianborn male, resident 1957-1967. 57 Interview with former office worker/ housewife, Anglo-Cchic female, residem 1954-1959. 58 Interview with former ABA staff member, English-bora male, resides 2962-1963. 59 Interview with former electrician, Dutch-born male, resident 1950-1954, 60 Interview with Polish-boro housewife, resident 1950-1953. 61 Interview with former mill workeriralnc 326 SOCIAt-HISTOmCAk. MCDtCOUGAt, AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA worker, English-bom male, resident 19531955. 62 interview with former Hying doctor, displaced person, male, reridem at Port Hcdlsnd and vis ited Wkteooora fo early 1950s, 63 Interview with German-bom housewife, resi dent 1965-1966. 64 Iaervjew with former shop worker/hotel, woiicr/housewife, Australiao-borii female, resident 1954-1967. 65 Interview with Australiao-tam housewife, resr idei* 1949-1962. 66 Eider JL: Aabettom ra Western Australia, Med S Am 2:579-583. 1967. 67 Epstein S5: The Politics ofCancer, pp. 83-84. Sac Francisco: Siam Club Books, 1978. 68 McNulty JC: Asbestos mining--Wfceoowu, Western Australia. In: Proceedings offoe First 'Australian Pneumoconiosis Coatetoce, 12-14 February 1968, p. 451, Sydney, 1968, 69 McNulty-JC: Malignant pleural GKSO&eltana ta an esbesms woriat Med 1 Aon 2:953-954, 1962, 70 WA Dept. of Labour file 479/49, AN 25/1, Acc, 749. 71 Wk Mara Dept, files 523/45 and 352/45. 72 McNulty JC: Asbestos Mining--MarxKxmi, ^festers Australia, p. 449 {see ref. 68). 73 Elder JL: Asbestosis us Vfeaera Australis, p. 583 (see ref. 66). 74 Interview with Dr. Koval, 30 August 1983. 75 Interview with Dr, Saint, 27 April 1984. 76 Letter, EG Saint to CE Coot, 6 Jane 1948; Dept, of Labour file 479/49. 77 loner. Commissioner ofPublic Health Cook to Sab*, 16 liute 1948; Dept, of Labour fife 479/ 49. 78 Interview with Dr. Saks. 79 tb&. 60 Gtndevia B: Occupation and disease in Austra lia nce 1788. Postgraduate oration. Univer sity of Sydney, 26 May 1971, pp. 217-222. Sydney, 1971. 81 Interview with Dr. DD Utham, 15 May 1984, Dr. J McNulty joined him in 1963, Interview with Dr. S McNulty, 10 May 1984. 82 Curepston AG: The Health Hazard at Wmcnootn. Division of Occupational Health, Ctean Air and Noise Abatement, WA Public Health Dept., 8 December 1978, p. 2, 83 Letter, CommissionerofPublic Health to Shire _ O*, 20 October 1965, Dept, of Health He 14/58. 84 Ibid. 85 McNulty JC: Asbestos mining--W5tonnes, Ffestera Australia, pp. 453-454 (see ref. 68). 86 Interviews wifo Dr. Lefoam and Dr. McNulty 87 Cumpstoq AG: The Health Hazard at Wine- ooota, p. ! (see ref. 82). 88 Major G: Asbestos dug exposure. la: Proceed ings of foe First Australian pBeumoeoatosis Oaafertaet, 12-14 February 1%8, pp. 467518. Sydney, 1968. 89 Mining Act, 1904-1957; The Reprinted Ads ofthePariiameffl ofWestern Austria, vol. 12. 90 Mates Kegulatka Act, 1946-1957; The Re printed Acts offoe Parliament of fcfestem Aus tralia, vd. 10. 91 Dad., p. 3. 92 Minute, Acting CommissioaerofPublic Health to Minister for Rubik Health, 14 November 1949; Dept, of Labour file 479/49. 93 Minute, Sectary of Labour to CSdeCInspector of Factories, 15 December 1949; Dept. ofLabosr file 479/49. 94 Report, 1953; Dept, of Health fife 473/64. 95 Response of Assistant Parliamentary Drafts man bd Chief Gwwyaawr, 5 May 2953; Dept, of Health file 473/64. 96 Minute, Commissioner of Public Health, 28 May 1953; Dept, ofHealth fife 473/M, 97 For a dsauaoc of development ideology and policy in foe period see the author's Changing Resource Development Policy in Western Aus tralia, I930s-I%0s. la: Stare. Capital and Re sources in foe North and Vfest of Australia, edited by 1 Harman and BW Head, cp. 8, NedUftds: University of W. A. Press; 1982. Also Development Ideology in Western Austro -tia.2933-.196S, J&ttuksl Studios, 30lf?9) pp 234-260, October 1982. 98 Interview with Dr. McNulty. 99 Lester to CSR. 4 April 1944; Mines Dept, file 321/43. 100 There were only seven fatal accidsaw in the life of foe mine, two of them the result ofmin ers boring imo hurts containing unexploded fracture; Department of Mines Annual Re ports, 1943 -1967; Western Australia Minutes and \bt8 and Proceedings of Parliament (WAVP). 101 Telegram, ABA to Mines Department. 24 Oc- BIVK ASBESTOS JNDUSTRY AT WJTTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 327 ( tofeer 1962; Wfcstere Australian Depc. of North Was file 35/59. I Mines Dept, files 413/43 aad 789/45. IS3 Report ofthe Dept, of Mines, i960; WAV?. 2, 1953, 104 Report, Inspector of Mines Cue (CF Adams). 25 October IMS; Mice* Dept. file 352/45. 165 CSR's FeasfcSify Study, 29 September 1966; Dept. of North Wsm, unnumbered file. Stack \S, waited "Vfitteooorn Genera." 306 Report, Inspector of Mines Cue, 1945; Mines Dept, file 352/45. 10? Report, Assistant &ate Mining Engineer (HE Brisbane), 6 August 1945; Mines Dept, fik 523/45. 103 Report. Inspector of Mines Cue (CF Adams), 17 September 1946; Mines Dept, file 789/45. 209 Report. Inspector of Mines Cue (1 BoyUnd), 1949; Mines Dipt fik 37/49. 120 Report, Inspector of Mines Cue Q BoyLand), 1950; Mines Dept, file 37/50. 211 Report, Inspector of Mines Coe (J BoyUad), 3) December 1952; Mines Dept, file 31/52. Ill Report, Assistant State Mining Engineer (K lioyd), 8 December 1953; Mines Dept, file 1238/53. 113 Report, Inspector of Mines Cse (AW R*ot sen), 31 December 1954; Mines Dept, file 31/ * 54. 224 M^or G: Asbestos dust exposure, p. 474 (see ref. 88). 115 Commonwealth Thrift Board's Report on As bestos Fibre, 24 March 1955; Mines I>ept. file 760/49. 116 Mines Dept, files 413/43 and 352/45. 117 Interview with fanner fitter/mill shift boss/ draughtsman. Australian-born male, reside 1946-1950. 128 Letter, National Safety Council to Chief in spector of Factories, 20 March 1950; Dept, ef Labour file 479/49. 229 Interview with former metal trarfftsman/kadiag hand underground, resident 1964-1966. 12t> Two m2) workers, one who worked in Wjtttaoom from 1935-1955 sad the other from 1957-1959, and one underground worker re called the clean-ups in interview* with the au thor. 121 Premier** Dept, file 258/56. 222 CSR's Feasibility Study, 29 September 1966; Dept, of the North Wan file "Wi&enoora Geaeral." 123 WA Arbitration Court transcript 20/45, 25 March 1946, p. 6. 124 kttvA ASA! (fclae Asbestos Works) No. 20/ 1945; Wjstere Australian Industrial Gazette (WJG), 27, J947, p. 49. 125 WA Court of ArtwafioB transcript 41/48. 12/ 49.22/49, 3 June 1949, pp. 19-26. 126 Ibid.. 15 July 1949. p. 98. U7 No, 41 f 1948; 9ft3G. 29, 1949, p. 2i. 228 Decisions ofBoards of Reference, AWU (Blue Asbestos) No. 41 of 1948 and Engineering (Bine Asbestos) No. 2 of 1953 (re: Claims for Dust Allowance); WAIG, 37. 1957. p. 16 L 129 Ibid., pp, 261-162. 130 WAIG. 37, 1957, p. 803.