Document Qkye5kQEZR22472yRmEz9kN75

MINUTES OF MEETING Sail Ramon October 20-21. 1976 Attendance - per attached list. Furpose: To review the design of the El Faso formulation plant and the Mobile triazine plant concerning safe handling of triazine dust and powder, especially with new expiosivity and thermal decomposition data. To recon cile a proposed BIADZX! grinding safety guide and the above designs. The attached Agenda was followed. Results New explosivity data for more finely ground herbicides, i. e., ELAREX and atrazine wettable powders--while not correlating well theoreti cally with earlier data--indicate that the explosivity factors are of the same order as for earlier data. The heat of decomposition of BIADEX (by WKC) appears to be about 25,000 calories/gram mol exothermic, enough to raise the temperature 347 adiabatically, excluding melting. Differential thermal analysis indicates that up to 200C "other ingredients" do not affect BIADEX decomposition. Slow-and mild exothermic decomposition occurs above cr beyond 200C for II.?. and 240 C for technical BIADEX. Atrazine is in same genera 1 range. Little is known about decomposition gases--no HCN has been observed so far--mcre work is needed. Detailed reports will follow; preliminary presentations are attached. Residual acetone concentrations of above 0,027, w can lead to ex plosive mixtures above 100F. The current specification of 0.057= w volatiles, as acetone in BLADEX,' should be revised. In practice, product runs under 0.017, w. El Paso incoming feed--especially in tote bins--should be monitored for acetone content or explosive atmosphere. Mobile will strive to avoid such. "Commercial incidents" - thermal decompositions in BIADEX formula tion are documented in the attached reports from Helena Chemical and a Modesto Trip Report. A recent "hydrolysis decomposition1 at DEGUSSA's technical BIADEX manufacturing facilities occurred in product drying. (See letter from J. J. Haydel, attached.) In all instances there were no reports of poisonings, injury or significant damage to facilities. Causative explanations may be: a. Operating with a blocked hammer mill. b. A piece of metal in a hammer mill - tearing screens overheating extending to product. c. Overheating in a product drying system - (DECUSSA) possibly exacerbated by some impurity. ABS-009783 LAM 027528 2 No explosion incidents have been reported to dace. There are no confirmed incidents regarding atrazine, only rumors of GEIGY decompo sitions. Mechanisms and sources of overheating or electric discharge were discussed, concluding the following: Herbicide powder, falling free down in a bin, is not likely to develop a spark potential exceeding 100 inilli-joules. This value is well below that needed to ignite dust clouds of BLADES par attached data. Ground powder, flowing in grinding loops, will gain heat from hammer-milling and may gain static charge flowing in the loops; again, the static charge is not expected to reach 100 raj. The systems are inerted also. It has been postulated that a piece of metal, coming loose in the system - or escaping detection, etc. - falli free in a large bin or rotating within a ribbon blender will not heat o. ueveiop a spark intensity sufficient to cause trouble. Loose metal in hammer mills may be expected to get very hot and could' start a thermal decomposition without air. Tight seals on rotating shafts as in star valves, feeders, screw conveyors and ribbon blenders are sources of heating. However, the heat is removed considerably by the flowing powder and metal mass. In a ribbon blender the powder charge moves over the hot spot drawing off the heat. (Some ribbon blenders will have water jackets). Blender M-102S at El Paso may hold from 5,500 to 13,750 lbs. of wettable powder feed - has a 75 H? drive - if all the energy input converts to heat (191,000 ETU/hr) and is held adiabatically, the theoretical temperature rise is 115 to 46F/hr. Product melts at 325 F and decomposition starts at 392F. There will be heat loss and melting will absorb heat. A blocked-in ribbon blunder with or without tight shaft seals will heat up slowly. With extended mixing ribbon blenders need watching for possible overheating. The tendency of triazina powders to develop and to bleed off static charges is not known quantitatively or relative to other materials. Some measurements should be attempted by Shell Development to orient on this aspect. Electric grounding in bag houses, bins, lines, ducts, etc. is normally adequately provided by Shell's specifications. Such is being pro vided and will be scrutinized for adequacy of electrical connections. The El Paso design for powdered formulated product manufacture and handling and for building air/vacuum clean-up systems was reviewed in detail and was accepted as satisfactory subject to some items below: By way of quick review, the design calls for: LAM 027529 1. Nitrogen tempering (reduced oxygen) of the gas circulation in each of the three hammar-mill grinding loops (includes oxygen analyzers and alarms.) 2. No nitrogen in receiving or weigh bins, in feed preparation ribbon blenders, product blenders "sack-off bin" or bagged feed slitting. \ ABS-009784 -3 - 3. Electric grounding throughout. 4. Dust proof electrical systems, KEIIA 12. 5. Magnets at strategic points with full metal detection and feed cut-offs at hammer mills. 6. Indoor bag houses with electrically grounded bags. 7. No rupture discs with large vent headers. 8. Fire hoses and extinguishers at strategic points. Items to be added and/or pursued are: A. Make certain ducts are electrically bonded. B. Put v/ater-f looding hose connections and manual shut-off valves on all major "dust" and solids handling equipment or where a sig nificant amount of dust can occur. Provide hose reels conveniently. C. Add gas purge on seals where erosion by powder is probable. D. Check unit heater motors for adequacy in dusty atmosphere. Correct auy problem - use fresh air blanketing if need be so. E. Check sandmili "drip-proof motors11 for compliance with dustproof criteria. Correct if problem exists. F. Set up inspection incoming totes and grinding loops for presence of acetone. Determine if flammable vapor alarms can be' useful on feed hoppers. If so, provide them. G. Provide temperature alarms in gas leaving heat exchangers in grinding loops to warn of poor or no cooling. H. Review self-contained air masks to permit coping with fumes from a decomposition or overheating. I. Provide thermometers on hammer mills to catch any local heat buildup for whatever reason. J. Provide for grinding loop automatic shutdown when the secon dary filter has a high pressure drop. K. Make sure the grinding loop.will not be over-pressured by blockage, excessive nitrogen, etc. L. Avoid skin temperature in building air (unit) heaters which melt or would decompose the triazines. t LAM 027530 ABS-009785 :vv i.i'.. ; 4- - Mobile and Vicksburg were also reviewed with limited information on the latter. Ko difficulties arose re Mobile. Vicksburg should be ad vised of our safety concepts. The proposed safety guide and an amended version, more appli cable to BLADEa^ and to atrazine, were reviewed. It was concluded that the proposed guide should be called a "general purpose pesticide grind ing guide" as it was intended and was used originally for materials more sensitive than the triazines and by foraiulators considered much less skilled and diligent than the Shell plants. Copies of the relevant passages under consideration are attached. The differences are highlighted ill that the general guide calls for: - 1. Nitrogen tempering of air whenever BLADES or atrazine is pro cessed instead of only in grinding loops. 2. Outdoor location of bag houses - (suitable in warn southern climates). 3. Water addition by spray headers with remote activation versus plain hose connections. 4. Large blow-out rupture discs with vent-off headers. It was agreed the draft general guide for grinding Shell pesticides would be rewritten as an all purpose instruction to contract formulators with its full safety features. It will be submitted to Safety and Health before Operations & Distribution uses it in obtaining custom, formulation work. Appropriate measures for BIADD1, atrazine are as discussed above. - Toxicology reported that acute inhalation studies with ground BLADEXs showed no untoward effects so far - all test animals had not been examined. Measures should be enforced to keep air clean down to 10 mg. and better yet 5 mg./cubic meter if dust particles run up to 5-8 microns. Noise control is not overlooked but difficult to tackle till the specific arrangements have been constructed. LAM 027531 ABS-009786 ATTENDANCE El Paso Plant Houston - A. C-. McKee Mobile Modesto - San Ramon - R. J. Gasperi R. A. Page R. G. Powell V. C. Politz J. J. llaydel H. L. Ott R. B. Howard D. E. Dodd P. 0. Dotson H. S. Row L. P. Reiss G. W. Gaertner B. I. Sparr J. W. Cotton E. S. Loeffler H. G. Staaterman C. K. Hahn W. H. Owen, Jr. M. S. Honig 11. Moss, Jr. C. M. Parker lam 027532 ABS-009787 wv-- V j'C 3 _THE FOLLOWING. IS A. PRELIMINARY. VERSION.OF TllE AGENDA. TOR. TUE.yO.ITlICTOIXG. .SArETY_->E2TIKG* - Il? YOUJIAVE. OTHER ITEMS,.. PLEASE ADVISE. SOONEST,.. PLEASE. NOTE VX LOOT, FOR A DETAILED. COVERAGE. ON ..IMPLEHE.NTATIOK,_..; BIAHK-ffi/ATEAZIKK 1*A .'UFACTUP.T.KG SAFETY REVIEW FETING AGENDA ... SAN RAMON OCTOBER 20-21. 1976 _ ' ' OPENING STATEMENT_*H.. G. STAATERKAN ____ REVIEW .OF INCTDEjNTS IN BLADES.ATRAZINE ______ ___________ W. H. OWEN ' 'KANUrACjOIPE/FCGlMFlATiOMS - DISCCSSIOlV .......... " .......... EXPL05IVIIY DATA "- OLDER"' ' ---------- ----------- - KBs' , DECOMPOSITION DATA . .._____ ............ ~ MODESTO ANT) * ' HOUSTON ........ ....................... ............. ______ _____ ______________ IIOUSTON/MODESTO . OKIEKTAttq;-: q:; INTENSITY ASPECTS of kt-Lcyr'k: uischabrk. iuo: '.eiae ;. ............... . .* _ R. B. HOWARD i\ politz PRACTICALITIES F.E SPARK CONTROL, GROUNDING___ _____ _ __________ ______ ____. ENGINE.?*. INC T.NPLOfEKTATION SAFETY liEASURES-DUST/PCWDIM HANDLING _________ ____ _______________ ______ A..... EL. PAS 0. FORM! IATIMG PlAlsTEKG1KF.ERINC B. BLADES/ATRAZINE KANUFACTURE Ij,_______________ MOBILEENGINEERING .... . "Z.. .VICKSBURG -L_______________________________________________________ (OPERATIONS). .. C..... TOTE. ,E IN TRANSPORT. _1L...................................................................................... B.....DUS.T_CIX?vl5JP_SYSTEMS:-AIR/SlXvrACE3________________ ____________ENGINEERING. TOXICOLOGY SAFETY GUIDE FOR BTAUEN/ATRAZINE _____ A.....REVIEW . OF FEATURES........ - ... RECONCILIATION OF GUIDE AND SHELL PLANTS _______ _____________ ___ _______ ... LAM 027533 FORWARD PROGRAMS '........ ..........CHANGES TO.GUIDE OR TO .PLANTS,,______________________________ _______ _______ ABS-009788 /.rmmnvf.T nrwn nr>\n.'VT wrnrT tf ANV