Document QXmzgzXG0Be5xezpEDMMKL6Xv

ABD00306209 HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDIES (HAZOPS) VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY Aberdeen, Mississippi WILLIAM F. EARLY, II JUNE 25, 1990 STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION HOUSTON, TEXAS (713) 492-4000 Copyright 1989 ABD00306210 INTRODUCTION PROGRAM ABD00306211 * CO DC CO cc ABD00306212 A CO MANAGEMENT PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT RISK ASSESSMENT - BACKGROUND Q CO 0 1 CO H LU GC CL O O < _l LU o z LU gGC LU 0- _ Xmi So ooc _1 oc < z Q ,8 2 _ o o< CO GC H* uO<: _i >" < I-- CC 5 LU oLU l- Ll GL ~ < 0 CO o 4 g1 o* < LU O > CL H- GC O Q Ll LU CO GC co Q. < CO 0 1 > CC HCO -J << CC GC CO LU 0 o LL C>O| < QQ O >: QQ at- GC Ql CO CO GC LU LU O 0 CC CO GC >- O CO >] LU LU GC Q z LU q. LU -J CO LU CO Eu 2 Q > GC < LU < C<O LU O CO GC LU < CL GC < LU -1 O D CL < iu 1 o gGC I- z o* \-- CO CO LU O IU GC DC ABD00306213 CURRENT REGULATORY PROGRAMS C a lifo rn ia H ealth and S a fe ty C ode (C h a p te r 6 .9 5 ) <>D1 o cwo O LU UJ 3 o to o CM CO 0>) o o 0) o < CO Oj .2 fP c S 2> 0) CO .2 CO c 3 o E E o O J3 S 0) IO i o 0) > < Ui o I I o CVI w 0) ~ CO c<o0 Or- cvi 3 .b LU Q 0) c1o5 LU *: 0) ^ Kl o o3 13 o .2 x 12 O) CO oa. < x CO o = 03 O^ o O cd o E CD O 2P CO LU H < X < CO. X 1 X oO ABD00306214 CURRENT REGULATORY PROGRAMS o < c 03 E o> CcO (0 CO ^ O) S0) 0^0 O O) CO v 03 O A 3 co -2O o 03 coi 3 O "kO_ a X UJ CO N (0 K 0w) 2) C>>O CO &p 0) 03 Q K Ul O U. 1 0) E 03 o> CcO CO CO wO CO N CO CO CO 03 o o Cc0 co .2 <N oz P: CO "Oc 0) CO c 0) E co 0) E < o zo < K 2> i pa Uj 03 QC cc CO CO p Uj 03 o J Q< Q CwO Uj <0 O X Uj CO CO o. . 0 03 "O 03 LL Q. O oft. ct cc ftj aj ABD00306215 '------ RISK COMMUNICATION LLi < a. DC O (D O LLI > DC 0. LLI G LU < LLI DC CD CD < s| CL ^ zi w cr LU O 9 CO 2Z < LLI otlu DC Ul PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION -----------/ ABD00306216 Clean Air Act Amendment Senate Version 1. Chemical Safety Investigation Board 2. EPA Establish Requirements 3. Mandatory Hazard Assessments 4. Duty to Operate a Safe Facility ABD00306217 Clean Air Act Amendment Senate Version 1.Chemical Safety Investigation Board An independent agency with its own staff Three appointed members -Powers to investigate serious accidents Conduct studies for potential hazards Make recommendations to EPA Administrator ABD00306218 Clean Air Act Amendment Senate Version 2.EPA Establish Prevention Requirements Applicable to Handlers of AHMs Could include all elements of RMPs in practice New Jersey California Delaware Not preempt state requirements Potential elements Procedures Training Maintenance Emergency Planning Prevention systems Record Keeping Board recommendations trigger specific components ABD00306219 Clean Air Act Amendment Senate Version 3.Mandatory Hazard Assessments List of hazardous chemicals requiring an assessment Issue hazard assessment guidelines Completion deadline for hazard assessments Review hazard assessments every two years Hazard assessment results in written report Hazardous chemicals list must total 50 Hazardous chemicals list may be expanded EPA consider hazardous chemicals from SARA Sec 302 New Jersey TCPA European community list Specific reference to AlChE - Guideline for Hazard Evaluation New Jersey - TCPA ABD00306220 Clean Air Act Amendment Senate Version 4.Duty to Operate a Safe Facility Must take reasonable mitigation steps Applies to Extremely Hazardous Substances Broad powers to remove imminent dangers Increase EPA response capability Fixes prime legal responsibility on plant operators ABD00306221 OSHA Process Hazards Management for Highly Hazardous Chemicals 1- Process safety information 2- Process hazard analysis 3- Operating procedures 4- Training 5- Contractors 6- Pre-startup safety review 7- Mechanical integrity 8- Hot work permits 9- Management of change 10- Incident investigations 11- Emergency response ABD00306222 Process Hazards Management for Highly Hazardous Chemicals 1-Process safety information Develop, maintain, and communicate certain process information 2- Process hazard analysis Perform a process hazard analysis. 3-Operating procedures Develop and implement written operating procedures. 4-Training Implement an effective training program. 5-Contractors Inform contractors of known potential hazards. 6- Pre-startup safety review Perform a pre-startup review. 7-Mechanical integrity Establish a program to assure mechanical integrity. 8-Hot work permits Issue a permit for hot work operations. 9-Management of change Establish and implement a written procedure to manage change 10- Incident investigations Implement an incident investigation program. 11-Emergency response Develop and implement an emergency response plan. ABD00306223 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION PRESCREENING I HAZARD > IDENTIFICATION ! HAZARD ANALYSIS RISK REDUCTION ABD00306224 CRITICALITY RANKINGS (C O N TD ) X </> w o ABD00306225 O) UJ 0) 2 Ul * O IU cc < cn H i= < 2 =1 oc o 3O u. UJ < Q2S UJ w o' > U . CUCj oT u. T_ u. co uiu. < <0 uUJ. < (0 CO tu 7. NO. OF RANKINGS W ILL EXPAND/CONTRACT WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL SITUATION (i.e. 4-5 AS SHOWN IN EX. IS NOT A STANDARD) * r u ii ia) ABD00306226 O| z <J < oc nn^ o< o o oc </> o o * LU < LL DC < </> cc LU < X CC < 3< z cn o si2O GC O UJ W < Ul UJ </) _ sM UUU.l umj So hOwcc uu.i m u] z EE 5T Zk uj sum O O X f <3 22 oOin wUJ | oul OIL ^o J w C o LU Al 55 Vh z *ni ABD00306227 Q LU CC cm eo < o CC o SUMMARY REPORT TO MANAGEMENT REQUIRED NO REPORT REQUIRED (5 LU Q IICC < CC o Z UJ UJ oc i- O 2O 3W 2!oCC H Z OE Ui 3 flC0 O uj CL LU CC CC o OQ. zUI OS X LU UJ O CC < z z ABD00306228 A WHAT IF" ANALYSIS P R IO R IT IZ A T IO N LLLLI Q HI oc a q. LU oLU |-- LU ' 2 </) O3Z UJ < m N LU -J Z X CO < O W LLI O S (3 UJ UJ > < Q. O j (/> 2 CC O<< z o u. < o E 3 Ul UJ Ul o z UJ E ui 0. XUJ 2O U<J C/) o s CO U<J <o N w O < UJ oc ifLU O < < uj o> UJ (UfJt OE uj o z< Wuj --5 > d, o m=;i Soc uj o Q < UJ UJ z 3 oc oc < cn O O ABD00306229 Q Z < cn LU Q o LU DC < LL DC O 36-48, 255 & ABD00306230 FORMAT FOR FMECA TABLE 86-48, 256-1 FORMAT FOR FMECA TABLE ABD00306231 HAZARDS EVALUATION ABD00306232 PROCEED WITH SYSTEM DESIGN OR OPERATION MODIFY SYSTEM A HAZARD ABD00306233 LU Q CHECKLISTS DOW/MOND INDICES ABD00306234 in < Qo 2< u= . LU in U. o. oLU < LL. LU N << <n X ABD00306235 A Ubt ry 3 ABD00306236 CO LU o< I- < OC Z LU a O oo H Sb CO OC 0. CO o = < CO 2 |LU X LL O < QZ LU = o co Q OC < o CO N oCO LU < o CO LU 5 cc < OC CO <z LU < X < o LU s OC Q < 2 < CO 0. O < 2 5 2 Q. OF LU O A 951 CHECKLISTS NO PRIORITIZATION OF RESULTS ABD00306237 C/5 * o UJ X o UJ .z 2 2m O V) CC Q Ul UJ s o5 zo = UJ < cc o UJ HS 2 So CE J" < Oo LL UJ < UJ s < 52Ul ~ 3G ,, O u 52 g g UJ | o> CL UJ 0. CC (0 o 2w m </> IU o < as H UJ H"^O (0 UJ o o UJ (0 il s? ? to <o Z <UJ 0) UJ (3 < UJ <0 3 o o iu O 3 Z~ "o I< >cc o< UJ > Q < 5Q CO < A ABD00306238 ABD00306239 A THE AUDITOR cIT ce c<cc ABD00306240 CO LU Q CO 3 h CO O *H O3 LU CD o <2 wz LU os a co o 3 5 < SS uj < O > JO </) - H LU LL Z Z CO UJ O UJ 3 s3< (/> o-- <0 UJ 1 = g o (0 LU O co 5 o uj g < <<3 co > Uj 3 0 g O CC 2 o< 2 u. X CO Q NO PRIORITIZATION OF RESULTS REQUIRES TEAM OF PEOPLE s ws ABD00306241 ABD00306242 A VSl `9t~98 WHAT IF" ANALYSIS - TCPA REGULATIONS Q UESTIO N LIST M AY BE PREPARED IN CO NFERENCE OR INDEPENDENTLY ABD00306243 LU O a < < LU a LU CC CC < <a. oLL </) (Zft o p (/) a LU o o <u. LU CL CC Q. QC o LL O rCaOr <0 (ft I- z (0 UJ Jf Q O a a o <0 Ul O o o. <r o p ogS-pou o I- LOZ < < oSg cc UJ S 3 O a(ftO UJ o z LU o o LU 5a 2 o2 LU H < I-- < QC z UaJ. o s -SS cc h (0 > Q 0. 3 Ul 0. O ~ < S <ft z UJ b u. OL 98 a. aX) uj xo LL CC LU (0 I I I I I I I I 0. A ABD00306244 A Q LU i o RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO MITIGATE HAZARD CO UJ o LU HO H < X oZ LU GC o< UJ D CC < < UJ < cc o LU LU N < X UJ X oQ. o Qt CC LU UJ < o z H_ u. O LU CC C/5 CO LU CC CL Q_____L_U_ Zo 03 2 W 3 JJ < 2 O o I- UJ LJj 3ooI- LU Q. (A -- oo oQ UJ 3 (5 z 2 UJ (A < ffi QH <$ S 3 B sLU CC -I 3 oz ot a. <A < I- UJ o < CC ^ c3o Jm CC t O cc lu < oo I- u. cc i- I I I I WHAT IF" ANALYSIS DATA ABD00306245 CRITICALITY RANKINGS ABD00306246 Q LU 2 CC o LL CC LU o LU 0. (3 L(/U) LU OCC UJ ll < CoO 3CO 0. CO czo o CO < UJ - CC u. I- UJ UJ > ~u. </> 51LU W ft P >< tW u. > < CO O >t UJ -1 < OO CO Z o CO 2 o CO z O b oUJ "IE uj iu 5 o 3 o 3 X *3 Q O LU " 5 -go (D sis OO CC CC cl a fi oo UJ 2 O0) X** o> CO CO h- UJ CO cao> 5UJ O uU_J LL 3 o< CC UJ UJ 3X <5 < zUl UJ (0 CO 2> UJ UJ 0. p CO CO t<3s 3 < o oUJ 3 0 5< 3 UJ Od UJ CO < UJ c^* LU UJ < DC oc** oLU <%I- CC CC CC o CO gO oc UJ o DC o< CO a < oz o3 |S o" 01 Ph- CO ixj o< .(aA rQ-1 <5 ll o JaQ UJ 00 o a*"IU -- UJ X > i- iiUJ < 2 CO UJ <2 S o J! 5gp *hCC X< Oh z< o - z< I-- U0J 01 A ABD00306247 CO H UJ Z lo *" CL is co UJ co O uX sg CO oc LLj UJ <s o ^ w CC Li. UJ CO CC 2< UJ CO < CC o UJ O Z Ul <> UJ CC UJ CC CO < o CL H (/) 0. o < UJ u. OQ UJZ UJ CO CC <3 < UJ Z Ul < CC CC UJ Ul UJ (0 < o CC * in V UJ UJ <0 < <n (3 UJ UJ -J UJ CC < 2 < UJ H CO oH 4jC0 hi o CC o UL UJ UJ CC o " i*n VI C^C Ooc * ^ Scce<n Ow 2 UJ Al VI VI co 2 X UJ co NO RELEASE A ABD00306248 A oc /ip o-n ABD00306249 A PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT TABLE 2 (Ref. 19) FAILURE MOOE ANO EFFECT TABULATION SHEET >*; j ! 3 i eomcci *< TtON 0T* :o**&**n *cu sn* MX* cuss *c*t CAN TMfAWM j *A*&-HA* *C*C } l(AK CANTUt*fc.t ACC kM0M*X a SI&XT nucac COHttUatAtlJ 1 bMKutCtl I M#6W44 iwMS oy<*tena iu*i <nc*t 5*i **0*lturv yt<u*s 1 CC*( i*' -i 3in:fw j c-s.Mst MflNfCS | ' . to OOSi*'A* > " syf s.. 0*f***0* k * S .. 1 . <9 00*w*r ^*t*! shut Oft OMfMfOM r ' > tto* "** ! S-w* 0* Si#i 0**10 | 4CH0v|tx.uC '0 v*EAVCI v*ue cn* NO* NO* NON! 1 o*wn | nuciic M(iiu<ns NO* MMBMtk t>6~ fWMl| ylNtt'jMII T*OuO uO *IN4 MOM NOM V* l ' | j ! ; wixcro i 03*0 CONTAMXtATf Oft NOltMk OCtrOM MOCAt i MMtUMi mtt NOM CAMTM4tUi too A *>u *Kn WiOOXLrOxM nut'M 0**41 MAMMA t j 0Mi r*ion nOM CM r tu *M Wl % ma+ *UC* Wul ^4M* 0**41 WMfttff A H4*Mt 'tuotll > wMlAUCMT GU4SMMA teoiMt* MOufAMlO i oo**o *VgGO uKt<n 9ll<OiC **4<T l < 10 * UMtS 4< 14M j St 0f Uj--if k<0 j 4 CU** Ctrr ' t 0 ________________ l__________________ IT 0|St*M*f*0W fM0SC0N4<* SMic4*ff i 0* 1 .10 OtSCOVAfiON imjf C* SuMct fCMMfO* 4CU4**v*(.n 1' oostf*<>ON at SMUT oorjytoiT oosMtea 4 w*v*a yoMT cttuir I.*- C*IUTMC* MLlCMUMI Mfl t to- i*eOKATOI UTOt* SLM*1.T owu*uMfr 4 MMMVhVI 1. tp+ V QOSIWATCM tmdm oiscomacr tWKCM 4 VMI fUM4*U<M i. >0 VOOSJMTION stmfo*$uopwt 4*UM4$*T T4M 4MuNtl V<0 MMTfeiM 4 9T\A fclWO CONCfMfftAltS rout* Mft: 1 * gin 1 rcniirunm STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS ABD00306250 O -M O . EFFECTS ON SVSTEM/PATH l-B E D U C E O PLANT CAPACITY MTTR - MEAN TIME TO REPAIR MTBF - MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURE 2 -P L A N T SHUTOOWN 3-REPORTABLE EVENT EQUIPMENT HISTORY DATA ABD0<0306251 zUOl <z UJ < 2 CzO 0o 1 CE < 0. UJ ce UJ UJ 2s it <2 UJ m SQ UJ QC UJ 5w D ohzCO = t UJ UJ O CO 3 s*o UJ rr S , Ujg ce <* CO 0 CO < oCu. U1-J UccJ z oUJ UJ cc JOr c<c (c0c CcOc oU. 38 S3UJ UJ ffi o UJ iu r* UJ cc < PP2 = d UJ d)UJ 5u. <u. UJ 0) < = 0) UJ < 5 ^h<2 UJ CO -- UJ o 2ce 3 uj z i 0- D 3 CO n uj z Hao ^ d UJ 221 zo>; = CO Ul CL 111 S Sdtu uj S a hih H<X < CO UJ CE UJ < CO < o UHJ <, Sg g <d ZO u.^ u:z CD < hSfl-f>Sa t< SPuj CO CE 3O ft ABD00306252 0) CO DOESN'T ANALYZE SYSTEM DEPENDENCIES DOESN'T LOCATE COMBINATIONS OF FAILURES DOESN'T INCLUDE OPERATOR-INDUCED FAILURES (/> h o LU LL Li. _ W< Q LU a UJ O o x (/) o S < UJ O- 0 CO UJ UJ > <7) </> 2 iug g O Ul d UJ < < 0. H Z w se 5 o Is O o CO UJ < (0 UJ O < h- Q < (0 5 z(0 o o < cc UJ s UJ </) <o UJ N < Li. ABD00306253 o</> Q. X LU </> 111 < Ui o (/) Q Li. fiC CO 3 w2 < > SN Q o< Z ox o < z <zA <s K- o Og </> UJ " ts s X < 0. "2 o O I- 0)LJJ ZO Q 111 3 2 UJ I- 3ooc u. o o 38cc m m UJ 0. Ui UJ oUJ UaJ XO LU z i g< UJ = o to ^ j ^ < ? Ul Ul > 7 UJ UJ <0 o >> < ooc ooc a. a. H i- < Oz Oz is 5TQ OZ <> iI'gfiSs Q (oau < Q (A (A UJ UJ c2n a a Q S U B J E C T IV E A ABD00306254 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT FIGURE 6 (Ref. 2) FIRE AND EXPLOSION INOEX TTT r'7 t'ttitki MATjfllAuS ANQ aOCt T*. 1 CtNCAAL MOCSSS MA2AMOS (SC T A6lE "i i o'-i** *c*'** 4C'o je ioo'i *e*'0* eto ?o*f c *<!>. *e. -oc ** i *eo* ?>* c < scoOsie eeibi <* *c*e* jo* *o ( 4CIII B*t<4CI <*C*Oa BO' 2 SOCIAL PROCESS MA2AAOS * *0(IU T|W1 IWtl Ml' 0*1' I AOQvt lO^'lC *Oi* 3 *0O*l *vTO*C>f<e* bOf"OtB3w*' ilwfOwOt*"M>Ci c *kCt > t*4 * *aw jt 0**CI * 7 oeiiiw$r ov6i 3 Ak**t kAMAOkl **6I i'Ow'Ot 0 0W*T la#hOOM ifACTO* nvIUHtll mi * kOnM*i*4TWi utro* mw.mi 6 OwAMt'f Of * tAMMAOal MAtVAlAfc k'OuiOB 0 ft*MI ! BB Itll 3> 7 k<Ow<OB OA CAMS B'OOACI (B< c f 6 i eo*wft<wl bo*. >o* i*oo*6i iiii *u, $ COffOtiO MQ Ifonoii if METOf io* *n * kiOOACC - JOlMtS AAOAatClf AeTOA l| 1 Ml wBI 0 frft |i w mor 0o t*ctoi j*f w>T*t*e#*cte* if, * *0 < IHMIO* MM <f j. f ||m 1 at, * * ' 00 uii e < 00 3* 00 | BO ft 30 30 30 00 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 f lM ABD00306255 O z <> D CD D OC < < CC h N LU CD o< 0. X 86-48. 257 COMPARISONS CO h 22 o H oo ui o z o ABD00306256 <0 I- 5 3 < > hUJ U. < <0 o (9 WHAT IF -- INNOVATIVE IMAGINATION -- ENGINEERING ANALYSES OF PLANT DESIGN -- GROUP EFFORT IN CONFERENCE COMPARISONS o Q < K 111 < Li! o z II C LU ABD00306257 < X u. HAZOP -- ANALYSES OF MULTI-COMPONENT FAILURES -- MORE STRUCTURES IN IDENTIFICATION -- GROUP EFFORT IN CONFERENCE OPERATOR TO IMPROVISE IN HIS A C T IO N S ABD00306258 Q < LU LU <A LU OC (A O CC oc LU OC ooc o Q OC < N LL < LU X Q < OC LU oQ. ABD00306259 O o LU o< Q o LL QO zO 0. h LU -- O iu LU O HI s dS N = O I- < 0. <o C5 LL LU < OC O <2</> <(/) h Og Ul N Q LU 0. LU H ! </> P Q. < o is< 2< 11 EN $ I- < LU < UJ Ui <0 zX > 5= LU O LU D < O UJ OK iiI " yg ^2 > O Q UJ (f> < aa io o g a Z < a. < (Oh (L o o BAS IC SAFETY REQUIREMENTS ARE IGNORED. A ABD00306260 IT IS DONE TO FIND THE WEAK LINK" A PLANT. Q. O N < X < (/> oa u_ < N cc < LU 0. >UJ I- ABD00306261 AFTER CK; n k </) 0. >< uj GUCJ oz 1 UJ (z0 o oo O (H</)- - 1<o ll ZD Q O 0) c/) 2 UJ . Om LU - O s 1z< a. o ABD00306262 LU <0 <\ <h ; DC uj l iE< tu! < W0 L jy ii s 2 UJ I < C USES OF A STUDY: ABD00306263 03 h CO >< HI LU Z -J H< < 3cc Q UJ o o cc cc 1-0 LU CC z o- I- o LU Q <H 2S111e<e -1 z ON 22 LL Q. LU CC < 2 LU OC d UjU Z CO J. ^ UUJJ z h- > > o LU U. <Pco go CO <z > UJ UQO o o 9 zp CC Q > w< Q. LU 02o f 5[Z QO9 Z uj O Z2 o CO < < o 2HE o z z o2 LU LU z 22 UJ si3 0- O 05 o LU u. O u. LU LU O 53 2 o gSUJ Ul cc E >E LU Z uj 5 CD < u- 3 _l O < CO UJ z do co 13 -r LU 2 cc >w o = Ul 2S < Q. LU 2 CO CO UJ CO C<O CO CO > < z< CO E DC o LL CO C<O CD < CO UJ v! Sc >o o> z0. > A WHAT IT IS NOT: PLANT WILL BE OPERATING UNDER SOME LOWER RISK. ABD00306264 5 LU p o EO z z oO O co LU oz LU 3 Q. N< Z LU (z3 LU LU z O5 oCC LU rr -J LU CzO LU O z LU LU < o go LU ^ " CO si2 z CQ t o55IoS2 i CO o- <8> = o < CO Z LU <o zo < LU o LU za LU Z cc LU CO S-i o< Po LU Si o <oZee E!2 2 * CO tr OS c--o lu i- O cc o. LU z zj h -I CC i |2g (52<h 5t Id I . -- LU ohHz<hzh ^ < Z UJ UJ LU LU t1 | BH <5 5 CC Z "i <2 =)5 <H oo < <2 oe u. Ocr lu -- Z UJ z g CZOi >m LU o O s A ABDOO306265 t\ ABD00306266 UJ 2 i3 occ a O C/5 ^ E 1 u_ HI z < cc UJ Oq: * <o 0 cUJ 3 Q 1 1 UJ 111 o so ooffi *4 UJ O CC X UJ 0. X A HAZOP GUIDE WORD APPROACH ABD00306267 A X u o GE Ui ouc. uj CO z 5o < cc < Q. UocJ I<- 3 CC UJ UJ H- CC < 3 CC H Q o oo 2 2 UJ K z iSlc<c UJ Qo. co|o O uj S < _j CC UJ UJ U. O. H CC <gajo o UJ 5 < _J CC UJ UJ = tz o<c < UJ q! o O O Q Q U. Q. H OC O uj O z cc z UJ UJ UJ UJ <0 </) <0 <0 <<<< UJ UJ UJ UJ cc cc oc cc oooo zzzz QOQO UJ UJ UJ UJ OOOO QQOQ UJ UJ UJ UJ oc s cc oc O Q z< UJ 5 si jLIL oz Q UJ oc CO o CO UJ oc UJ o OTHER: Different Plant Conditions From Normal Operation o 2 o O 2 2|sr LU CO 111 0) ABD00306268 o CO o S' o t "O CO CO CO o d) O) c!= c co T3 ao .o^o < UL Maintenance Grounding/static Sabotage Safety ABD00306269 ooc a. LU OC 8 D 9H CO Ui QC z> > H a Li. CQ < QC LU a. O Q Q<C N < LU Q LaU 2 QC LU LU 3 CD CO i 2ui CQ Q o o Ui > ?> CO a. CD o H cc CL Ui CD acEo Ui a h UI Ui Ui 22 CL CL 53 aa | Ui Ui Ul Ui CO -I -I O co z 2 u. z < oc a o Ui CO Ui CD H C3D 3 CO CO Uai U3zI a Ui CO z oa Ui -i Ui CD CO CO 2 oCO o CL a QC OZ $2 Ui t is CD Q CRITICALITY RATING F - FREQUENCY RATING R HAZARD RANKING A a ABD00306270 EETING PARTICIPANTS ELECTRICAL SAFETY/FIRE PROTECTION UJ O UJ CL UJ o. UJ UJ X UJ O z0. o UJ <N (/> CL UJ Q< UJ W S CL </)j o ft! !< gP O2 O UJ 0- - ABD00306271 EAGER BEAVER ABD00306272 GETTING STARTED LOGISTICS PLA DOCUMENTATI aC*u UJ (/) Iin UJ CC <UJ < 0) CC O li z< O >- UJ S <o 2 S oO gfflsa 1" O CC at o >- b o ui o Q III z (J ABD00306273 CO LU GC z o co LU H CO << CD LU 111 CO D CO O Q LU O_ O u. O CC CL CO CO < ^ CC CL < LU CC z < O<S CO UJ o Qo O Q LU (0 ___ (0 CO 0) CO UJ < LU <A O oc o So 08 O Q. Q Q LL CL O CC Q. LU O& O CL EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS SPECS A ABD00306274 HAZOP PREPLANNING ISSUES Preplanning issues addressed in a recent refinery unit HAZOP performed by Stone and Webster include: Verification of as-built conditions of P&IDs Line segment boundaries set - markup of P&IDs List of support documents compiled: P&IDs - this is the base study document PFDs Process description Operating manuals/procedures Processing materials information Equipment and material specifications Tentative schedules of time per P&ID are set PCHAZOP computer program set up List of standard abbreviations and acronyms compiled Criticality rankings devised HAZOP training given to all team members (1 day) Arrange for system/process briefings for team before work begins ABD00306275 HAZOP STUDY LOGISTICS Logistical development of a recent refinary unit HAZOP performed by Stone & Webster included: Preplanning issues were addressed the prior week The team included 3 core team members and 4 part-time members The study included 16 moderately busy P&IDs The study took 3 1/2 weeks The team met 4 hours/day in morning review sessions and spent 2 hours/day in individual effort for reviews, followups, and field checks Dedicated space was required due to the large amount of documents The study resulted in 170 data sheets The team recorder used a PC to record, sort and retrieve data on PCHAZOP The plant operator was the key contributing member of the team Key operating procedures were reviewed relative to the P&ID's and safe engineering practices ........ HAZOP SUMMARY TOGETHER INSTEAD OF ALL GUIDEWORDS (e.g. NONE, MORE) TOGETHER. OPTION: DO EQUIPMENT FIRST. ABD00306276 C>* C/5 UJ C/5 3 < O oO E .UzJ K UCCJ < < Z z* UJ P" GQC <N < C/5 h CGOC il QZ < QOC o UJ Q 5 O. LL U) O QGC 5op Nz< <z UGCJ s< 5 </) os o jy -I LU oZ <Q. zUJ UzJ o z o 0z 05 3O Ou. 1 zUJ 6 Oco o 3CL OGC (3 CozO o CO oz UJ UzJ oz UJ o o oz 2 JsUJ OCQCCD. < GUOJ Zo< CUOJ <o3z offi oz ChUOJ ohUzoJ* o5 UccJ UJ > UJ C/5 da>> UoJuccJ.0k iZ oCzO Q Z UJ Z 6) O -i C<OD0k o ZH tc WQ- JzU>UJJ UJ 5< uj oUJ zGh<UXUCJJ zG<C X o CO < UJ UccJ 3 CO CO UJ QOC. d0)) t </> ii UJ t E" Qz o o > _J o< z .. Xz o2 oUzJ oho-. A ABD00306277 Li. (0 (0 LU o o 3 CO o co < z LU a</) uz cc < N < < UJ CC O o UJ o UJ < cc UJ LU O Q. ooSO X o UJ CD CD OQ << A ABD00306278 CO h- o*z h UJ UJ < hX X CO UJ X 1- ou. H < x X hUJ o < X < X o UJ 2 < UJ o2 X Zo > O CO CO CO Li. UJ > < vms > Q. o HX N UJ < X J fti CO XQ OC uj CO ffi < Q U1J XH 1t - u. E 0 1 Q UJ UJ S zQ 2-1 < UJ 05 >< <H UJ uy=_ ^o UhJ- CO < XH A ABD00306279 EXAMPLE PROBLEMS ABD00306280 HAZOP NO. I ABD00306281 HAZOP AGENDA WITH EXAMPLES A typical HAZOP agenda is presented below, with expanded explanations and examples following: 1. Introduce team members 2. HAZOP Methodology 3. AHM (EHS) Properties 4. Identify Hazards 5. Purpose or goal of HAZOP 6. Scope the HAZOP 7. Establish Criticality and Frequency Codes 8. Define Dispersion Models 9. Process Description 10. PCHAZOP Online 11. Plant Walk Through 12. HAZOP Team Meetings 13. Interim Report 14. HAZOP Report* * PCHAZOP is a proprietary program ABD00306282 0 1 CO i- --o CO -Q .2 E CO <D 4T i 0) 15 E CO |2 iO- (o0 CSO < ao> a o A ABD00306283 0) a. u. O aN e i^>* --C Q < (0 2 i.S |o .S2 ja 3 S S aoc -o1- T 5 * c *- <0 co cao q. o -oo $ CO 0) -C =jCaO o 3 "coO ^ < 0) as "5 o a Oo) i^s -2 <o Iso o CO <_0 CO 0<D5 !E o 3 H si 0. co 3 05 N E W "O < t a?j Sfti CVJ k ABD00306284 o co o -Q CO o ao o> a "a 0) a E co o$ o CO M <g CO aa o CO a 2 co 3 -2 O *5 a "S CO o N CO "O aj c a co co < 0a) a> ABD00306285 2 o <0 O cc o > '5o5 ax LU Ethylene Oxide is: ABD00306286 <0 CO <D O 2k O a 5a B C if* - S "O c>D a ^^ -4- <0 (Q <D N S &< . 1 oo a3- <s o a o u (0 O CO Jr ""* i s?! c E co (U (0 r O O t ABD00306287 co <D c a 3E COO O) CO Oc Qx. LL 5 * 0) oo <wv. QX. Sx Li. LU h- Hazards are.- ABD00306288 CO a co g 4) "O co E Q co MV I<s5 c a. O aN > O) S 1 < a o5 CL CL N oN < CO < o1 o O coa O 4) O 0 co a o SS ao coao 09 4) > 3 CL 4) 09 lO A ABD00306289 o c5 a) to a co -0a0 aoa ca N a o 00 < 00 a) a o c d) ao a co CL O 0. N O< N < 0) .1 a) "O <D o a oc o <D <0 "a CO F IG U R E I E T H Y LE N E G LY C D L P R O D U C T IO N Ld -I CrL <c X Ld Q- aM <C X w ABD00306290 CL u f-- CL (X u> X u oo m uw < Cd CL U Ld LJ Z O LD C/0 LJ eo uo k to A ..... A 8a wx 4. a oX > *0 tr> . u - a il >3* OX o--0 ee g u-- xe ao --em--xot x* * i awn ABD00306291 CL 8 < o oc> C 0) o o (0 c o O3' .-O2 3 CO *" . -a 0 1<a>0 -ocS N. Establish Criticality and Frequency Codes: Hazard classification matrix parameters are set by the ABDOO306292 * CRITICALITY E 0) C<DO AM* 3 C I^>3m^^ C .oa a Oc) CCOD "O 0) coCO c (0 c MV a '5co5 <D a E c M o ICocVO 0) Oc) COmv CG c 13 Qoo. CcG -3Q CaO o> c cO) mv ac> 3^^^ M ^v C C3O o o "a "0a*50>caa> Co3O -caa "coca <au ac ac co o z (5 Ca>G. CO oo CO CC>DG o oM > o zHi => oLU LCLC <Q5. 00 CCQ) oOac cCG -22 o 0) CG o "cCOG T" <cav oo "CDcG OT* aca> * o E a> a aQ ooo o cCaG OO a0c>) 5 .aa aa> a> coo (0 c o o CO (0 o CO a3o 0oo3k0* CO Oa3 CO oO3 CO 3 o o OOOOo < CD O Q LU ABD00306293 to A z 1X zz 1 zzz 2 zv 4 Risk Matrix raQUBVCT BC 11 23 34 44 0 2 3 4 4 8 4 4 4 4 ABD00306294 O) 0 ak. Eo 0 0 O) OcT C .X o> c X c0 '0 0 O) b 0 0 0 0 o> cMB >. BcBM a c J? c c 0 o .i 0 IB0B c^B CO CO 1s-Q '.3 CO o o 0wbm "O c0 CO . o ^s. B0^B "O * 0 4-* E "O 0 0 0 a 0 <D o> o 13 CO CO "2 ELU Q O O * CO QC "O 0 0 > 0 O N CO 0 0 b0^b C 3 "O 0 O 0 0 0 I 0 -a CO 0 O) MB 5 0o o CO c0 o o O 3 <d 0 0o N 3 0 2 -a 0 .0mnm 0c-- o 0 0 0 k. 0 "o jO o 0 <0 o CO BO^B) ^r^B B^B B^B c o 0 S5 o2 "E 0 0O N0 jS a 0 .E 0 >2 *2 c 0o >o CO CO N CO o c O) -o 0) 3 cr c0 0 "O CO 0 00 .a n -Q 0 00 0 0 aa o 0 00 "O a o B^B %mm o c oo < c a 0) E E <0 a a. 00 Define Dispersion Models: The team identifies AHM release scenarios which will be different cases ABD00306296 > (0 8E J2 o j "l o 2| 8 ago 2 * k. o Oc) Hi CO CO CO CO a CO CO c o CO o 4^ a g "OMB o o a c o CL o mmam CD Z CO 3 o E "a >* jO co -22 CO N "a a CL co c 0) O N CO CO < o aI a CD T3 CO CO *- a CO CO 0) a o a. o `co co -Q o1-- a 5. (0 c a) o A ABD00306297 u 3 aa id d o. a. 2: (\J <c X uu cx o ZD CL a ID M < Id X z Id d > X Ld A V 0- w>at ,tT!i GpC \ CD Xw t-H 0a P Ld < LJ y <610 z 2a 10- s^ oX' L0 ^ Ld O9 kaa 00c S ?u w fj u&s kv n *0 > - u0 4s V 4t o 04 ii 1*8 fW>*3s 61 DATC ABD00306298 kN o CO O) 3c a mmm TO o oa oo g a. Oa NE < CO X 0) a CL Q. 90) N *-> < TO X CO o -1 o> c MM ' g oo co a c o oa. o N < CO X O) oo CL Q. o ABD00306299 SCREEN l OF 8 | HAAZHAHRD AMO OPERABILITY STUDY ACTION REPORT CGHPANY: HOJAVE ANTIFREEZE CORPORATION STUDY TITLE: ETHYLENE GLYCOL PRODUCTION JOB NO.: 13426 PUD NO.: 18428-A REV.: 884 DATE: 84/81/81 EQUIPHENT / PROCEDURE 10:-LINE SEGMENT 1 DESCRIPTION: PUNP SUCTION LINE PREPARED GY: HCl PREP. QATE : 86/82/81 OPERATING DEVIATION : NO FUW CRITICALITY: 4 ASSIGNED: CAUSE : PUNP TRIP OR NOV SHUT OR LOU LEVEL IN TANK TK-1 C8NSE9. : LOSS OF PRODUCTION, OPERATING PROBLEM ACTION : RESPONSE: IV-A | OPERATING DEVIATION: REVERSE FLOH CRITICALITY: 1 ASSIGNED: CAUSE : PUNP TRIP 1 PIC FAILS fc HS NOT CLOSED CONSEfl. : HATER IN TANK, AUTO-OECONP RXN, CATASTROPHIC TANK FAILURE ACTION : RESPONSE: l-B QPERATIN6 DEVIATION: INCREASED FIOH CAUSE : NOT A PROBLEM (NAP) CONSEfl. : ACTION : RESPONSE: CRITICALITY: ASSIGNED: OPERATING DEVIATION: REDUCED FUN) CRITICALITY: 4 ASSIGNED: CAUSE : PARTIAL VALVE CLOSURE CONSEfl. : REDUCED PROOUCTI. NOT A HAZARD ACTION : RESPONSE: IV-8 OPERATING DEVIATION: AS HELL AS CRITICALITY: CAUSE i HATER IACXFLQH. CONSEfl. : ACTION : RESPONSE: SANE AS REVERSE FIOH. ASSIGNED; APPEND |<0:>|PCXAZQP |Rk: 1/2 | JNuiCaps A Figure 8 ABD00306300 O o> 3o mo- (0 $ E CO .O c? I5 iis oc CD O o ^ CO (0 0) E~ fl) = T3 ?O >45 0) 0) 3 O s <D CO O co O) ^ -- .E 5 a II8 i |-t 33 TD s 1 5 CM (_) QD L_d) oc a. a. rc X u a Ld CL u D LD >_i CaL 0 rsi <c UI ~z. u _>J I1-- Ld ABD00306302 <4 ff n 1 0-CK SI CL Ld I-- oo CL (V U aw>e VT* CD s. Ld 13 Z W a od CL -- Ld 2 . u 5 J co Q .g in c/a fid > 2 oM 1M-3 fe s s fid ao* a 3 O O<S N jSI hi 3 s u 5 bl abeaJs cii aS* I fvv>s as O -s a6 bi Cal >o H Hos <N 2 03 Cal 3 Cd O H 2s 03 Qm 9 > OB M < * >M a Cal HZ 32 5 5* OS M 1 z 0 i h* S sOS z 1 8 Qm Ca. O OOSS a 'a h* > Hz 9Q 9 QX 9 o * 3 J a* s < HXM9 os bl 9 X SX a a 9 H03 Cal h 06 3 01 Zm & o P zo o z u bl 03 si So bl ao za* CO 9 06 < H03 0 z z" HQS1 ss! H zO sa sCA 83 bl 03 M N OHS O9S U U 82 5 H 5 8os bl 3o S& Cal g OS 3 oa I i 3 s oo H i =*p gg S w* s s e z oa VS 03 < osbl a -J Cal J 9 Cal 3 Cal 2 OS fib 3 os < a M s oz C R IT IC A LIT Y RATING P FREQUENCY RATING- R HAZARD RANKING- A I o ABD00306304 31 fa 3tel* 5 tel aa* 5OS tel tO tei 3 n 09 foi I06 tel fi tei H CN 4 tel -- 3 Oo tel Z Z 2 5 *fl4u 2 uas zo M e < a <e 03 H> a &- Do Ma WM fa fi cu oflu G Z < o % N S *s OS 8 Q U N Wtt t 09 O *Z* ,fa -- uo -- M t-t tel fi O fa 32 > 09 o a tHel Z >38 Ifi 3--09 09 ss Zo N4 0f9i CU * H 5 as Z tel OH -- tel t) h 9 h 09 O tel SB 3< 09 3 =*gi >h< as 55htel fi tel -- H Z fa b." 32tel H ssss*o oi a cj Z * __ te* H SSS 2 H SkS o z o tel -- tel as H h as a9s n06 5 3 52asss" 09 tel tel fi tel 3 tel > g n^ 09 H . as * 52 f4 St (4 h fi Satesl tel as 09 *S< tel O HUk jzk i "hi au i09 Sou tel M H Xfi Hm X0 fi 09 O g |3 ESS tel 33 <3 tel fa Z1-4 ZO X5* 8 sc|l h < hg 3 as bfi s hu -- P4 09 X 5 tel fi * tel O PS I- P fa X x 06 a. 3 553 Zhb tel X M X 09 09 u 3 fi os u >a fi 3 s g H M 3M S Pr- Z I W < 9 fi M & u 35 Z*Z* Zz* Go tel & 01 53 ii --H C R ITIC A LITY RATING F FREQUENCY RATING- R HAZARD RANKING- I u ABD00306305 j1 oi s. <N oi s 02 G ft.H < 0026 oi 9 CO CO aO3 nz0fc0ro12* v<ON9 02 59 3 >6 a02 *co* 3O 0Q32 HmGm 3< CO zo sCO 0a2 zo S Ja oaCO. go3j Sa<' o 0a2 tt 06 n 02 O < 02 Z oz G ft.2 g CO ><0 u 06 z oH 8 < 25 ssss< 3 HftlHttl >2aa simm 02 >s HH >z CzO >Q r* cq w> 0DU6 tHJ* HM h. 03 S U0* O O 5 N s OGB SgSofCtO] 3cs KMU4* Zft. o 06 ft* ft. CO g "io 2HOM* MMCohO MfOzlt. 5|S a02 9a0g1 06 1a >% 8g5g 00C2O2 02 E oz a CO 0o6 S NOoJi 5S iOJ fc M g ja 0>1 uz sa 9co z a S siB ile CO a ff a S' a02 < m 0z2 0Z2 -J a OJ ! 06 0. a02 0oa62 O CO 0aa2 c00o26 06 ft* CO a g a _a 01 02 n- 8OS G 02 Si- 3Z HS01 gZ-- 2s a s: S So3i Sa__ oi . as a. <N S X g ft.m2 CO SO iXge01g02 ssi O01 HCOM mi aaMC0Z<O2 zZ302 CG<O Co030zzftO61* C R IT IC A LIT Y RATING F FREQUENCY RATING- R HAZARD RANKING- A I u ABD00306306 SCREEN t 2F 3 J HAZARD ANO OPERABILITY SFIJOY ACTION REPORT COMPANY: NOJAVE ANTIFREEZE CORPORATION STUDY TITLE: ETHYLENE 6LYC0L PRODUCTION JOB NO.: 13426 PttO NO.: 18426-A REV.: 394 DATE: 04/01/80 EDUIPNENT / PROCEDURE ID: PUHP 1 4/0 ' DESCRIPTION: ETHYLENE OIIDE FEED PUMPS PREPARED 3Y: NCL PREP. OATE : 36/92/8? OPERATING DEVIATION : NO ROW CRITICAUTY: 1 ASSIGNED: II CAUSE : DISCHARGE NOV CLOSED CQNSEQ. : PUHP DEADHEAD,HEAT TO AUTO-DECQHP,CATASTROPHIC PUWP FAILURE ACTION : RESPONSE: I-C OPERATING DEVIATION: REVERSE FUN CRITICAUTY: l ASSIGNED: CAUSE : PUNP TRIP & CKVLV FAILS I PIC FAILS 4 HS NOT aOSED CONSEQ. : HATER IN TANK, AUTO-OECOHP RIN, CATASTROPHIC TANK FAILURE ACTION : RESPONSE: I-C OPERATING DEVIATION: INCREASED TEHPERATURE CRITICALITY: 1 ASSIGNED: CAUSE : EXTERNAL HEAT SOURCE, SUNSHINE ON OFFLINE PUHP? CONSEQ. : HEAT TO AUTO-DECOHP TEHP, CATASTROPHIC PUJHP FAILURE I-C ACTION : VERIFY DSTAN08Y ISOLATION PROCEDURE, 2)0EC0NP INITIATION TEHP RESPONSE: OPERATING DEVIATION: REDUCED FU CRITICAUTY: ASSIGNED: DIZ CAUSE : SUCTION NOV PINO CONSEQ. : CAVITATION, POSSIBLE AUTO-DECONP RIN, CATASTROPHIC PUNP FAILURE ACTION : VERIFY AUTO-DECOHP PHASE ENVELOPE RESPONSE: OPERATING DEVIATION: REDUCES PRESSURE CRITICAUTY: CAUSE : LON LEVEL TANK 1 OR SUCTION NOV PINCHED CONSEQ. : SEE REDUCES FIW ACTION : RESPONSE: ASSIGNED: DIZ OPERATING DEVIATION: NA1NTEIANCE CRITICAUTY: 2 ASSIGNED: CAUSE : INPROPER MAINTENANCE PREPARATION I 1HPR0PER PROTECTIVE SEAR CQNSEQ. : RESIDUAL EO IN PUNP CASE, CATASTROPHIC TOXIC EXPOSURE ACTION : RESPONSE: I-D figure 9 A h. O. frl I W 2 S1 w H < O ui 1 5 s *4 a. H 6< Q .2 H (0 w> OS 6* O *J* MH fc 03 NCoU o s os N ABD00306307 A ta> HM X o M j| G < (Q uca i IMX 8 R HAZARD RANKING- F FREQUENCY RATING- C R IT IC A L IT Y RATING S ss aH xo* a hu PPE 'X* I- (O 9 pJ H *M J Sx s SC as 1 ABD00306308 Interim Report: A mini report providing immediate oCL _ (0 .2 N* a to ~ o o awa S E>* o> E E mb t- U O -O c^ a~ 0oa) ->a a2 ^ o 05 c "O Q) 2 2 o) <S E .a a 2 m- c 2: 3 o CO .3* 00 o aE o _a .coo> 9Eo- $ co o2 CO o N CO c <U O) :i OO CO ABD00306309 A INTERIM REPORT o mm -2 c <D E 2o Co O On a tS| o ^o 5 oc ~ 0 a -a *" <5 C0 N ca o e .2 o *- ou -c5 ^ 0? ">O --"O E o) co .2 <D o wco a a o CO -I .2 o CM -a c co "aCO co N CO *a a mm C 0) a ivi o> o ^^m a a "a co E uo. < ABD00306310 !rl FIGURE 8. BO SAMPLE PROBLEM MOJAVE ANTIFREEZE CORPORATION ETHYLENE GLYCOL PLANT APRIL 1, 1989 HAZOF SUMMARY 07 CRITICAL IDENTIFIED HAZARDS CRITICAL RANK: 1, Critical must ba improved I-B, Isdeath B=occurs batvaan i and 10 yrs DEVIATION: Ravarsa Flow EQUIPMENT NUMBER: Lina Segment 1 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: Pump (PI A/B) Suction Lina CAUSE: Pump trips and PIC valve fails to shut (provide tight shutoff) and board mounted HS fails to shut (provide tight shutoff) CONSEQUENCE: Mora than 5 gallons of water backflows into storage tank/ initiating autodecoaposition reaction, causing catastrophic tank failure. SUGGESTED MITIGATION: 1. Add primary sensor to close board mounted HS valve on low pressure. 2. Verify all backflow prevention devices are tight shutoff type. 3. Add primary sensor to shut FRC valve on low flow. 4. Consider complete review of backflow instrumentation to determine best method for backflow prevention. 5. Perform hazard analysis to determine if final mitigation steps reduce frequency to an acceptable level. RESOLUTION: (To be added in follow up) All suggested mitigation actions were done including interconnecting the primary sensors to provide redundant backflow protection. 9 ABD00306311 HAZOP Report: A formal report is prepared by "a a c o o "a mm a o 3 c o CD to & 0a Ca CO o> 1 I! c MM >? %2 ac E 0 09 *- E (0 o o o .. o1 i o E a o E a o v. B_ O 2>o^ a a Oo b: c J= o co ABD00306312 HAZOP EVALUATION The 'HAZOP Report Evaluation Criteria' has been developed to assure there is documented evidence that the key elements have been followed in conductiong a HAZOP study. The criteria ia as follows: 1. Key members present 2. Documentation available 3. Proper form used 4. Thorough questioning * 5. Open participation 6. Preliminary hazard identification 7. Criticality evaluation * 8. Documentation used 9. Procedures addressed 10. Ahm MSDS addressed 11. Spill size quantified/evaluated 12. Instrumentation addressed 13. Documentation up-to-date 14. Thorough cause investigation 15. Define purpose/scope* * Can be evaluated only from actual observation ABD00306313 FINAL HAZOP REPORT Define Purpose and Scope: The HAZOP Report should include a statement as to the purpose and the scope of the HAZOP study. Key Members Present: The HAZOP Report should include a list of participants in the team meetings, their qualifications, and the attendance roster. Documentation available: The HAZOP report should list the documentation which was the basis for the team review. The list should also include reference documentation available outside of the team meeting required to support the study. ABD00306314 FINAL HAZOP REPORT (CONTINUED) Proper Form Used: THe HAZOP tam data should be recorded on standardized forms containing the key question and answer elements of the HAZOP one form for each line segment investigated, one form for each equipment item investigated. Thorough Questioning: All segments of the HAZOP forms should be filled out to indicate the HAZOP team executed a thorough study of the system under investigation. Open Participation: Although open participation is desirable, this can only be evaluated by actual observation of the HAZOP team in action. ABD00306315 FINAL HAZOP REPORT (CONTINUED) Preliminary Hazard Identification: The HAZOP report should include the preliminary list of hazards identified at the onset of the HAZOP study. Criticality Evaluation: The HAZOP report should include the basis for the screening matrix that was used during the HAZOP study. Documentation Used: Although thiscan only be evaluated by actual observation of the HAZOP team in action, the assimilated documentation should be used in this study. Procedures Addressed: The HAZOP report should include a list of the procedures reviewed including their revision number and date. ABD00306316 FINAL HAZOP REPORT (CONTINUED) AHM MSDS Addressed: The HAZOP Report shoul include a list of the acutely hazardous materials (AHMs) and their hazardous properties and a statement that these were included within the scope of the HAZOP study. Spill Size Quantified/Evaluated: The HAZOP report should include a list of any spill size quantification and consequence evaluation that was prepared for use as a basis for criticality ranking during the study. Instrumentation Addressed: The HAZOP report should Include ample references to the examination of the effects of instrumentation to establish criticality rankings and probability rankings of identified hazards. ABD00306317 FINAL HAZOP REPORT (CONTINUED) Documentation Up-to-Date: The HAZOP Report should include a list of revision numbers and issue dates of the actual documents used as the HAZOP study basis. Thorough Cause Investigation: For critically identified hazards, the HAZOP study, and hence the report, should include a multiple cause investigation for use in mitigation efforts. Additional Items: The HAZOP Report should have a list of abbreviations and acronyms added for clarification. ABD00306318 HAZOP NO. 2 SIMPLE SYSTEM - HAZOP EXAMPLE