Document NeorpqVamVMxRG8pZDYzj0mME

^IOEH 5210 DAX'Ep0tJS 3R0"E?.TIES OF INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS REPORT, I'r.rMSeot./Oct.): 8-17...____ ^ Code 0 The Case for CriminalSanctions in Preventing Occupational Diseases. eo INSTITUTE OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH MONTREAL, CANADA Exhibit A: Asbestos (Rewritten from the STATEMENT BEFORE THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, November 15, 1979 on H.R. 7040, Formerly H.R. 4973) Apc Barry l. Casileman. B'ChE. Masters Degree in Environmental Engineering. Experience tn government, industrial and environmental organisations. Independent, Environmental hazards consultant since /V7.t > the prominent presence of Mt. Sinai and other renowned medical institutions m that state. Another form of compensation is in many places still in good shape, however, and it is increasingly used hv injured working people and the general public. This i* product liability particularly, and damage suits in gene- ral. over the harm caused by reckless or negligent bust ness practices. The mounting litigation over asbestosi.s. Ford Pintos. Firestone tires. Kepone devastation of the James River, pesticide sterility. Love Canal, and PH8 poisoning of the dairy industry in Michigan, involves mortal danger to millions of lives and billions of dollars in liabilities. As a result, business interests in every state are mounting an effort to avert liabilities under the existing laws. This is being done by (he erection of new. legal defenses and statutes of limitations to bar suits for inju ries and disease arising more than ten years or mi alter the egulation of the marketplace has eliminated some sale of a product Since 1977. the product liability laws m R of the worst threats in the workplace and the envi- about twelve states have been rigged with these insidious ronment. But those of us who hoped for more substantilapl ses in the right to redress. Such statutes oflimitations preventive action through the process of regulation have have withstood coun challenges in cases involving been disappointed. Every ,OSHA regulation is contested products with lone-latent eii'ects. by industry, and in Congress it is a continuing struggle to At the national level, asbestos manufacturers col just preserve the protective laws we have and provide laborated in the development of a bill fur asbestos regulatory agencies with some funds to develop stan "compensation." This bill. H.R. 2740. introduced dards and enforce them. originally in 1977 and reintroduced by Congresswoman With the regulatory approach continuously impeded, Milliccni Fenwick in the current session of Congress, those of us concerned with preventing industrially-re would bar all damage suits against asbestos manufac lated diseases have been learning about indirect paths, turers and the government. Compensation for asbestos like compensation. We find that the state laws of worker's diseases would be solely available through a federal bu compensation are full of problems for victims of oc reaucracy using an expert medical board to evaluate cupational disease: short statutes of limitations for tiling causation. The disability compensation would be limned claims, long delays 'in scheduling hearings, arbitrary to something like SI3.000 a year, arid would be paid by limits of medical coverage and poverty levels of disability both the taxpayer and asbestos industry. compensation have made workers' compensation a na Congressman George Miller and others have in tional disgrace. Over the years. 1966-1977. an average of troduced legislation that would, under federal criminal only five people per year received compensation in the law. add the .spectres of humiliation and incarceration to state of New York foroccupational cancer: this despite regulation and compensation. The idea is to personally I PLAINTIFF'S * I EXHIBIT I AL-1484 1 I I DANr.rROl'SMOPFXTIVSIW INIMISTXIAI ma I HIM.' HHViRT confront business ni-nacers who conceal harmful busi ness practices with jail, jnd the resources of the U.S. Attorney's Office in trying the case. In the past three years, research and legal discovery have revealed many details showing what was known, by whom, and what was done about that knowledge in the asbestos industry. The inside story is vital in evaluating the role of "company men" in failing to prevent the sacrifice of one million of their fellow citizens, their chil dren. and their children's children. Society has failed to prevent a great deal of human suffering through con science and civil sanctions in the past The asbestos ex ample illustrates the case for criminal sanctions against business executives who profit by concealing knowledge of mortal dangers from their employees and customers. ASBESTOSIS The founder of the modem U.S. asbestos industry was Henry Ward Johns. He patented asbestos roofing products, bought asbestos mines, started making fireproof textiles and insulation, and then something happened that he didn't expect. He got asbestosis and died in a few years, one bleak day in .February 1898. We have no way of knowing whether Mr. Johns walked through his factories and noticed his longtime employees sutfering the same emaciation, coughing fits, wheezing, and acute shortness of breath that was gripping him. We have no way of knowing what he said and thought when he attended the funerals of foremen of his factories who had died from the dust. We don't even know what his doctors told the sixty-one year old industry magnate he was dying from. We know only that his death certificate lists the cause as "dust phthisis pneumonitis" (dust dis ease of the lungs with pneumonia as the immediate cause of death). In 1906. Or. Montague Murray in England reported (he death of a patient from asbestos fibrosis of the lungs to a parliamentary committee on industrial disease compensation. Murray's repart was cited in a 1918 Bul letin from the U.S. Department of Labor Statistics, which urgently called for the investigation of asbestos dust hazards. The Bulletin expressed concern over the industry's growth, noting that insurance companies were already refusing to sell life insurance to asbestos workers. The first case of asbestosis described pathologically in the literature was reported in the British Medical Journal by W. |{. Cooke in 1924. As this was followed by other reports, the British Factory Inspectorate decided to sur vey the industry. The survey, completed in 1930 and reported both in a government report and the (U.S.) Journal of Industrial Hygiene found asbestosis in one third of all the employees who had been with, the industry for more than live vean. Regulations lor the control of asbestos dust went into eilecl in England in 1933. lnthis country, case reports of fatal asbestosis began to .appear in 1930. Even earlier, in 1927. a foreman-in a Massachusetts asbestos factory received disability com pensation lor asbestosis. In the I930's. compensation was taken up at the top levels in the industry. The Bojrd of Directors of the Johns-Manville Corporation settled eleven asbestosis cases in 1933 for "530.000 provided written assurance were obtained from the attorney for the various plaintiff! that he would not directly or indi rectly participate in the bringing of new actions against the company." That same year. Dr. Merewetherof the British Factory Inspectorate published a report showing that workers dying with asbestosis had an average survival time of only fifteen years past the start of asbestos work, com pared with a figure of forty years for those dying with silicosis. Merewether reiterated more bad news first reported at a conference in Los Angeles by the British radiologist Sparks: the asbestosis often gets worse, even after people showing the disease are removed from dust exposure. Merewether thoroughly described the disease, and its awful prognosis in light of his many cases, who * had died at an average of forty-one. From North Carolina. Dr. Donnelly reported asbes tosis in asbestos textile mills and wanted that, "the pro tective devices now in use in many plants are most in adequate." And in 1934 the Supreme Coun of Nonh Carolina declared that asbestosis was compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act as an injury "by accident" Oddly enough, there were no such problems reported from the region of Canada where asbestos had been mined since the 1870's. Pedley. writing in the Canadian Public Health Journal in 1930 said: "(To) our knowledge, however, no case of pneumoconiosis has ever been reported from asbestos in Canada, and the general impression among the miners is that the dust is not hazardous." He concluded: "From the public health standpoint, however, it seems hardly likely that asbestosis will become of impor tance either from the standpoint of morbidity or mortality." What Pedley did not mention is that (here was plenty of asbestosis in those mines, and he had seen it. A 1444 confidential report of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company contains a table of data referenced merely as unpublished work of Pedley and Lanza. 1930. It shows that 19$ men were examined in Thetford Mines and in Asbestos. Quebec At least two mining companies there were insured by Metropolitan Life. Among the 195 miners examined. 42 had asbestosis; there were only *6 men in this group with more than 10 years in the in. dustry, and so apparently around half of these men had. asbestosis. Squ./Ott. `(Ml APC 003677 PeJlev's publication, read in the light of what he and become compensable in New Jersey until 1945. Lanaa concealed, strongly implies that the examining Asbestosis became compensable in New York in I9J5. phvstcians did not tell any of the Quebec miners they had and an insurance company lawyer wrote that even at top asbestosis. Fony live years later, in 1975. the Thctford rates some turns were unable to obtain insurance and Mines clinic was exposed in the Montreal Star for telling were moving hazardous work out of the state. It was late miners they were in good health, when some had such that year that the trade magazine Asbestos had the severe asbestosis they died within the following two-year temerity to write to Raybestos-Manhattan President period. The clinic has served four U.S. owned asbestos Sumner Simpson for permission to run a first story on companies' mines since 1940. asbestosis and modem methods of dust -control. The In 1929. the U.S. asbestos industry arranged for a subject had been raised earlier, of course: survey of workers with three years or more of em ployment. "selected at random." as it was repored. The "Always you have requested that for certain obvious survey was completed in 1931 by Dr. Anthony Lanza of reasons we publish nothing, and. naturally your the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and his wishes have been respected." coworkers, but it was not submitted for publication until late in 1934. The survey found that fifty-three percent of Simpson sent it right on to Vandiver Brown at J-M. the asbestos factory workers examined had asbestosis by commenting that the magazine had been "very decent a conservative reading of their chest x-rays, and many about not reprinting the British articles." Vandiver others showed clinical symptoms. The galley proofs of Brown replied: the article were sent to the Johns-Manville Corporation and Raybestos Manhattan Corporation by Dr. Lanza. "I quite agree with you that our interests arc best J-M attorney Vandiver Brown sent the galleys on to his served by having asbestosis receive the minimum of legal specialist, George Hobart, in Newark. New Jersey. publicity." Mr. Hobart noted that the company was in danger of having asbestosis recognized as a compensable occupa * The editor of Asbestos magazine wrote again some tional disease in the 1935 session of the New Jersey yean later about publishing the results of industry- Legislative Commission. He reported that the company's sponsored animal inhalation tests. Still acknowledging prindpai defense against negligence suits was the dearth that the information was confidential and "nothing of published medical knowledge on asbestosis. Now that should be published about asbestos in `Asbestos' at the state where J-M had its largest manufacturing plant present.-' This letter is dated March 1939. one week after (in Manville) was thinking of compensating silicosis, as ' Dr. E. W. Baadcr reported in the literature that state bestosis might be joined in. insurance carrien in Nazi Germany were compensating Wrote Hobart: lung cancer with even slight asbestosis as a compensable disease. "1, therefore, dislike to have this report suggest that The industry experiments on animals were conducted asbestosis might be assumed to be 'similar' to silicosis, at the Trudeau Institute's Saranac Labratory in Saranac either as to the period of time within which it might Lake. New York. The lab had started with tuberculosis develop, or as to the dosage received by the lungs, or research and moved on to dust inhalation studies in the as to the quantity of dust, etc" 1920's. In 1936. an invitation was sent out to five other companies by Sumner Simpson. Raybestos' President Attorney Vandiver Brown sent Dr. Lanza Hobart's offering the suggestion of Vandiver Brown and himself three-page letter suggesting detailed changes, and a that the industry support some research: cover note of his own specifically requesting that Lanza insert a sentence he had deleted from the original report "(We) could determine from time to time alter the sent years earlier to the company lawyers. The sentence findings are made whether we wish any publication or appeared, word for word, as the main conclusion of the not. My own idea is that it would be a good thing to medical report published in Public Health Reports in distribute the information among ilie medical frater January 1935: nity. providing it is of the right type and would not injure our companies." "Clinically, from this study, it (asbestosis) appeared to be a type (of disease) milder than silicosis." Saranac chief and pathologist. Dr. Leroy Gardner, promptly accepted the industry's oiler of S5.000. assuring Brown explained to Lanza that "all we ask is that all of Van Brown that "the results of these studies shall become the favorable aspects of the survey be included and that the property of the contributors and that the manuscripts none of the unfavorable be pictured in darker tones than of any reports shall be submitted for approval of the the circumstances justify." Lanza made a number of the contributors before publication." suggested changes, and asbestosis (and silicosis) did not In 1939 and 1940. Brown wrote to Simpson, alarmed to DANGEROUS PROPERTIES OP INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS REPORT APC 003578 that Dr. Gardner was, publicly referring to his findings without obtaining the prior consent of his sponsors. A draft version of a 1949 confidential report to JohnsMunville referred to the "outline of a proposed mono* graph on asbestosis submitted by the late Dr. L. U. Gar dener in February 1943. In it he called attention to the high incidence of lung cancer among mice inhaling long-fiber asbestos." Apparently, this outline was sub mitted to someone who did not wish its publication. (All mention of cancer was deleted Iron the confidential 1949 report sent to Johns-Manville.) Owens-Illinois Glass Company got into the asbestos insulation business in 1943. and came to Saranac to test the dust from "Kaylo" insulation for its potential respi ratory hazards. Five years later the tests had gone on.long enough to produce extensive asbestosis in the test an imals. Wrote Gardner's successor. Dr. Arthur Vorwald, to Owens-Illinois research chief Bowes: "1 realize that our findings regarding Kaylo are less favorable than anticipated, it is better to discover it now in animals rather than later in industrial workers. Thus the company, being forewarned, will be in a better position to institute adequate control measures * I'ofSafc-guardtng exposed employees and protecting its own interests." (November 16. 1948). In 1930. Owens-Illinois safety specialist WQHam Hazard wrote to Dr. Vorwald about his department's plan to issue a brochure on the "health aspects of Kaylo dust." but no such brochure was ever produced. The company hired a team from Saranac to conduct an in dustrial hvgiene survey, completed in the beginning of 1951. In light ot the company's proprietary knowledge, it is interesting to read an April 1932 "exclusive" in The Pe troleum Engineer extolling the virtues of Kaylo. The piece, written by Kaylo Division Director of Research. E. C. Shuman, begins with a photo of a refinery in Port Arthur. Texas, where Ivan Johnson and Clarence Borel worked as insulators. "The story of how this company researched and developed the non-glass insulating material is inter esting. It is also an inspiring example of the American Way. Without the vision, resources, and technical know-how of 'big business.' this material would not be on the market today." The article boasts that applicators appreciate "the fact (hat (Kaylo) is non-toxic." It also has a photo of a smiling workman sawing up a piece of pipe covering using a dust-covered Kaylo box as a makeshift work bench. The box bears the advice. "Handle with Care." obviously intended to protect the product against breakage in transit. Owens-Illinois, continued testing Kaylo at Saranac, where the director in 1954. Dr. G.W. Schepers again told company officials that the tests showed Kaylo dust was harmful. But after 1953 the largest customer for Kavlo was Owens-Corntng. and in 1958 Owens-Illinois sold the Kaylo business to Owens-Coming. The new owner, which had long manufactured fiberglass insulation, a competitive product, had known about the hazards of asbestos insulation even before the product. Kaylo. came on the market. Back in 1942, Owens-Coming was having trouble breaking into the insulation business with a fiberglass product. Asbestos Workers union members complained of skin irritation and demanded extra pay for their dis comfort in handling fiberglass. Saranac Lab had tested fiberglass dust for Owens-Corning and reported that it caused no significant lung pathology. So as articles by Dr. Gardner and another researcher were going to press, the company decided to "take the offense in telling the health story of fiberglass where it would do the most good." The plan was to buy product liability coverage as a means of assuring the union that the product's safety was guaranteed. If this failed to impress, a "weapon in reserve" on the hazards of asbestos versus fiberglass would be used. This 500-page compendium on asbestosis would be used if the union leadership refused to budee on "fiberglass, and it would be spread among the union locals. In this way, the company hoped to use the health issue to cut in on asbestos in the marketplace, while at the same time promoting dissention in the union, possibly even bringing about "the overthrow of the present union leadership." Though the company unfortunately never unloaded the asbestosis issue on the union. Owens-Coming did print up a brochure for employers. This was full of en dorsements for fiberglass as a raw material that carried lower workers' compensation premiums than competi tive products like asbestos. So when Owens-Coming went into insulation con tracting and then bought the Kaylo business in the 19S0*s, it should have been no surprise that one im mediate result was the filing of workers' compensation claims by insulation workers with asbestosis. Owens was not the only company that both manufactured asbestos insulation and was fighting compensation claims by (contracting division) insulation installers. One insulation worker in southern California filed a claim for permanent total disability, listing os defen dants, thirty-two companies he had worked for over the yean 1920-1957. Mr. James W. Riley and his widow spent the next four yean wresting disability and death benefits from Johns-Manville; Owens-Coming. Arm strong Cork. Philip Carey, and Fibreboard, all of whom were manufacturing products that had caused Mr. Riley to die from asbestosis. The claim file on Mr. Riley at the state's office is nine inches thick and even includes one notice of a 1961 hearing on "penally for willful failure to. pay compensation and death benefits!" Sqa./l Vt. MI II APC 003679 A large number of claims have been found against belief that these men wero riot affiicicd with jnv iic- Armstrong Cork, a company that admits to having been cupational dust diseases." served disability claims for asbestosis before starting to manufacture an asbestos insulation product used by its CANCER APC 003680 contracting units, in 1956. One of the earliest claims was filed by Mr. Richard Rothweil in 1952. Dr. Harriet In 1948. Czechoslovakia followed Germany hv recoc- Hardy, a respected industrial disease expert, asserted at niztng lung cancer as a compensable occupational dis compensation hearings tn Massachusetts that Mr. ease when accompanied by even slight asbestosis. Dr. Rothwell's lung cancer was caused by asbestos insulation Hilton Lewisohn. the present medical director of dust. On the 1953 claim of Floyd Hyatt. Armstrong went Raybestos-Manhattan has written. all the way to Florida Supreme Court to avoid paying compensation for asbestosis on a technicality. "Merewether (1949) first demonstrated a clear-cut Though few compensation records from before I960 association between asbestosis and lung carcinoma." have been preserved, medical reports of insulation in* stallers being compensated for asbestosis date from the Dr. Mereweiher's data was quickly picked up in an edi I930's in the U.S.. Germany, and Finland. torial in the Journal of the American Medical Associa In the 1940's Johns-Manville periodically sent lung tion. And Merewether himself also published a paper in sections and chest X-ray films to Saranac Lab in hopes of the Canadian Medical Association Journal. getting reports to evaluate compensation claims by as This last item was immediately spotted by Dr. Ken bestos workers. Rose Bertogiiat. a widow of Johns-Man- neth Smith of Johns-Manvtlle. who would later become ville plant foreman in Illinois, approached the company corporate medical director. He expressed his concern in a seeking compensation for the occupation-related death note to Dr. Vorwald. who was on his way to an interna of her husband. Sections from Dominic Bertogiiat's tional pneumoconiosis conference in Australia. Vorwald lungs were then sent by the company to Dr. Vorwald. said he'd have a word with Dr. Merewether in Sydney. who concluded that Mr. Bertogiiat must have suffered Mereweiher's Canadian snide included his statistic that, "considerable respiratory difficulty" with his asbestos- of 235 people dying in the U. K. with asbestosis. 31 tom lungs. Johns-Manville headquarters safety engineer (13.2%) aIso'had cancer of the lung and pleura. This was Hugh Jackson, who had worked with Mr. Bertogiiat at contrasted with a 1.32% lung cancer rate with silicosis, the Waukegan plant, wrote back that he was and a 1.0% rate in the general population. In addition "particularly concerned that the type of exposure to Merewether wrote: which Mr. Bertogiiat was subjected should produce the evident results." He continued: "It can be said with certainty, however, that a few months exposure to silica or asbestos dust in gross ... "To our way of thinking, although he had worked in concentrations will inevitably cause death." the general area for a number of yeags. the degree of exposure was relatively slight. That is. he was sub Vorwald wrote to Smith that the anide was a "dillv and. jected not to a concentrated exposure ofany particular as you do. I take strong exception to some of his sta pan of the process but rather only to that of the gen tements." But Vorwuld's real pitch was for further study eral atmosphere. Since there are numerous others who funds. also have this type of exposure. I would appreciate "Paul (Cartier, physician who was in charge at the your opinion as to whether Mr. Bertogiiat might have Thetford Mines clinic) tells of another storm which is had.some individual susceptibility to the asbestos ir brewing, this time concerning a case of xsbestosis with ritation and/or whether we should anticipate others cancer. I am most anxious to get in with the survey of all with similar exposures to be similarly affected." data available on the subject before the storm really breaks. "/Is you know, Jishiny is always best just before Dr. Vorwald replied on August 13. 1948. that "I can see rather than immctliuiely after the .unrm. " (emphasis no other alternative than to anticipate others with similar added) exposures to be similarly affected." Johns-Manville plant worker Venton Hall died later It must have been clear to Dr. Vorwald that the com that month with lung cancer, and Hugh Jackson at cor pany was most pleased with negative findings. In alt of porate headquarters was apprised of the possibility that a Dr. Vorwalds's archives, there is only one letter signed by. compensation claim might be brought against the Vandiver Brown, wjfip was by 1949 ensconced-in Johns- company. Manvillc's Executive Offices. The letter included In 1949. the same year as the famous asbestos mines payment of -590 for. evaluation of two workers' chest strike in Quebec. Dr. Kenneth Smith at Asbestos re X-rays, iA 1949. ported to A. R. Fisher and Vandiver Brown at head quarters the results of his industrial hygiene survey of "08 "I was pleased to note your findings confirm our own mine and mill workers. Dr. Smith reported that seven 12 DANGEROUS PROPERTIES OP INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS REPORT would definitely be entitled to disability compensation and another 52 "should be considered as possihle com pensation claim cases. " but the decent thing is not to tell them they're sick. "It must be remembered that although these men have the X-ray evidence of asbestosis. they are working today and definitely are not disabled from as- bestosis. They have not been told of this diagnosis, for it is felt that as long as the man feels well, is happy at home and at work, and his physical condition remains good, nothing should be said. When he becomes disabled and sick, then the diagnosis should be made and the claim submitted by the Company. The fibrosis of this disease is irreversible and permanent so that eventually compen sation will be paid to each of these men. But as long as the man Ls not disabled it is felt that he should not be told of his condition so he can live and work in peace and the Company can. benefit by his many years of experience. Sou Id the man be told of his condition today there is a very definite possibility that he would become mentally and.physically ill. simply through the knowledge that he has asbestosis.'* In November. 1950 the Quebec Asbestos Mining As sociation approved a request from Saranac for funds to do both epidemiological and animai inhalation inves tigations to see if asbestos caused cancer of the lungs. The aninial tests cost S36.000 for two yean of work. Approval was granted in a meeting attended by QAMA lawyer Ivan Sabounn and longtime Johns-Manville consultant. Dr. Anthony Lanza. The only trace of the animal study is ap.interim.confidential report in 1952. in which Vorwald reported an excess of pulmonary cancer in mice exposed to.asbestos dust for 14 months. No final report has ever been ;found...There was similar concealment of the epidemiological findings. DrTCartier in Thetfnrd Mines; Quebec had autopsied 53 asbestos miners, among-whom 10 had had lung cancer: He-presented this table of results at the Seventh Sarao?C. Symposium in. 1.952^ proceedings of which were ne*er.published. : * Comparative Incidence of' Pulmonary Cancer in 2 -groups of52 A utopsied asbestos workers r.ar sr-r Croup2 'fouj `Employees Employees: wut: j!tt.-.;c: sxrc..tfith ^"without Asbestosis Asbestosis iNumber... Autopsied . : -34 -- ,-:ru 19 -:r --JJ- -Numberof Pulmonary :.:r - I -v~ ,,.l. Cancers ..........4 . . . i? .10. IPerceniin .... . .- I____ - . * Each Group JI.7% _ ...3|4* -From these results, one might think there was a high risk.of cancer in the asbestos industry. a risk that ex tended to the employees with moderate as well as heavy exposure. But rather than consider this obvious point. Canter concluded. "(T)his table does not reveal a statistical evidence of a causal relationship between asbestosis and cancer." (emphasis added) In a paper presented in 1953 and published in 1955. Cartier reported that, of 40 miners with asbestosis that he had autopsied. 6 had had cancer of the lung. Without publishing a figure for the number of non-asbestotic workers autopsied. he said there were 7 other lung cancers among non-a.sbestotics. He alluded to a general industry survey, never published, which did not seem to indicate "a causal relationship." Playing a semantic game he described the role of the "asbestottc fibrosis" as "questionable" in the causation of cancer. Again, he walked wide around the frightening implications of his data, which showed that Canadian asbestos was quite a carcinogenic substance. This would have been clear if Cartier had revealed the proportion of lung cancer among non-asbestotics. which we now know was on the order of 30 percent No one in the industry was fooled by Cartier's pub lished conclusions, least of all the lawyer of the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association. Minutes of his September. 1955. presentation to members of the Asbestos Textile Institute, were recorded by Johns-Manville's Hugh Jackson: * -- "Mr. Sabounn stated that the present major health problems of the industry pertained to the relationship Of heart difficulties and cancer to asbestos exposure." Sabounn was accompanied by Dr. Cartier, himself, at the meeting. Cartier's 1953 presentation on asbestos miners was hosted by Professor Anthony Lanza at "New York University. One of Lanza's young as- sociates. Dr. William E. Smith; approached Lanza -ibout that time to test inhaled asbestos on rats for its -cancer properties. Shortly before he was fired. Dr. Smith was told by Lanza that scientists looking for ~ industrial causes of cancer were "trouble makers." having supported studies on men and mice that both yielded evidence of the carcinogenic effects of asbestos, industry enthusiasm for further research dissipated. Dr. Vorwald was fired hv the Saranac Laboratory. He was replaced by Dr. Gerrit Schepers. who did not know of Vorwald's cancer study on asbestos. Dr. Schepers proposed that the Asbestos Textile Institute support car cinogenicity tests on asbestos and was' turned down. In I9J7 the laboratory folded; r -There was still one place left for conducting confidential studies: The Industrial Hygiene Founda tion. originally the Air Hygiene Foundation. It was set up by a cross-section of, represenatives of American in dustry. (iti the words of Vandiver Brown of Johns-Man- Srpf./OtT. M ARC 003681 13 ville "(1)1 is . . the creature of industry and is the one institution upon which employers can rclv completely for j sympathetic appreciation of their viewpoint.") In 1947, IHF did a medical and industrial hveiene survey for the members of the Asbestos Textile Institute (ATI) in 1947. The study found a continuing incidence ol'asbestosis and dust levels exceeding the lax guidelines recommended by the Public Health Service in 1938. (The textile mill owners had fired 150 workers, most with asbestostx. just before the Service showed up.) The author recommend* cd that the industry assemble the best possible medical brains in a major effort to bnng the asbestosis problem under control. Though the author called this industry wide. confidential survey a "preliminary dust investiga tion". IHF was never invited back to those plants. After Saranac's cancer study proposal was rejected by the industry ("ill-advised ... due to its implication (hat a relationship existed between asbestos and carcinogenic development, a condition which has not been established although it has been given rather widespread publicity in the press"). IHF decided to approach two asbestos com pany associations. AT! and Quebec Asbestos Mining Association, on a cancer epidemiology study. IHF Di rector Daniel Braun sent excellent summaries of the cancer literature to Johns-Manville safety chief Hugh Jackson, as well as more lengthy reviews to the trade associations. The ATI members, thus informed that a recent study in England showed a very high lung cancer rate in asbestos textile workers, rejected the study proposal by a 6-2 vote. From ATI's minutes in 1957: "There is a feeling among certain members that such an investigation would stir up a hornet's nest and put the whole industry under suspicion." However, the National Cancer Institute of Canada was by now planning to conduct an epidemiological study, and only an offer by the Quebec Asbestos Mining As sociation to do its own research instead, averted a government investigation of the industry. After assuring a study design and method of analysis most likely to produce negative results, the Asbestos Mining group bought the idea of a cancer study to be done by IH F. As usual, the survey report was sent back to its sponsors for final review. Johns-Manville's Medical Director Kenneth Smith reviewed the draff with Hugh Jackson, and sent on recommended changes via Quebec attorney Sahourin. The study was published in 1958. and in the introduction it noted. "Perhaps no one has written so extensively on the subject as Hucper." Dr. Wilhelm Hueper at the U.S. National Cancer Institute, who had written about the carcinogenicity of asbestos since 1943. denounced the IHF report as "statistical acrobatics which tend to obscure incriminating evidence." We can only wonder what Mr. A. R. Fisher, the Pres ident of Johns-Manvtlle had in mind when he addressed his fellow industrialists at a 1955 meeting of the Indus trial Hygiene Foundation with those words: "Years ago industrial research was unconcerned about problems of health and safety that mieht be involved in a product. When the product was developed, it was put on the market. Todav our in dustrial research organizations probe into cvcrv health hazard. And every safeguard is insisted upon before the product is marketed to the consumer. A number of companies have established research or ganizations and laboratories for the solo purpose of eliminating health hazards that .might injure the con sumer. Some companies have granted fellowships for this specific purpose. And industry has inspired, to ,i very great extent, the movement to label properly certain types of products that might harm the con sumer if he were not forewarned." Johns-Manville did not put caution labels on sacks of asbestos until 1968. No asbestos products are alleged by manufacturers to have carried warning labels until 1964 and later. By the late I950'i there were regular meetings of the compensation committee at Johns-Manville's hugh New Jersey plant. At these meetings were Medical Director Ken Smith, plant engineer Cliir Sheckler. Nurse Hahn, and a couple of others. Some exerpts of their notes: Sigmund Skirzcnski. age 52. advanced pneumoconiosis Sheckler: Should we change him. Smith: Won't make any difference. Do not transfer, retire if necessary. Alphonso Desantis, age 50 Hahn: Should these men be advised? Sheckler: We can put transite pipe out of business from this list alone. John Hudak. 58. moderately advanced pneumoconiosis Smith: Has he been counseled? No. Smith: I see no reason to bring in a man like this it is dangerous. Anna Blanik. 49. moderately advanced asbestosis Du Bow: She is very nervous. If she is called in. she will get hysterical and I am sure you will have a claim on your hands. Hahn: If she is transferred to another job. wouldn't that also precipitate something? DuBow: Mrs. Blanik is working with no complaints. It is one year since she was (health counselled). Smith: As a doctor, you can't leave her where she is today. DuBow: Taking her blf the job will not change things. The damage has been. done. Stella Krzesewski. 41. moderate to advanced asbestosis 14 DANGEROUS PROPERTIES OF INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS REPORT APC 003582 Schcckler: No hetilth counseling Palsy Infante 53. 33 years in asbestos Getter: Records indicate asbestosis in 2/51. Man was advised about dust in his lung tn 1/55 Workers at Manville describe the conditions in the I950's as extremely dusty. Ted Kowalski, who is a leader of this community's victims of asbestos, used to saw the butt ends olf of molded pipe insulation. The dust was so thick he couldn't see across the room. The air pollution from the factory blanketed the town with asbestos dust and solid wastes were dumped in a wanton manner. The Manville asbestos workers' group is still struggling to bring New Jersey's compensation laws up to a minimum level of decency. These plant workers may have no al ternative to workers' compensation, and their employer's failure to tell them when thetr examinations showed oc cupational disease may not even be able to be litigated, let alone used to demand punitive damages. At the January. I960 meeting of the National Insula tion Manufacturers Association somebody raised the idea of a health program. By this time, the industry leaders were busily fighting compensation claims from insulation workers in their contracting divisions. The idea was dropped at the Manufacturers' meeting that May. at a Florida beach resort. Of ail the asbestos products ever marketed, the one that accounts for the greatest toll in exposure and disease is undoubtedly in sulation. dust from which was daily breathed by millions ofshipyard and construction workers. A major producer of asbestos insulation was Philip Carey Manufacturing Company. In 1962. at the recom mendation of consulting actuaries. Carey hired Or. Thomas' Marfcuso for a medical survey of their man ufacturing plant. It was initially hoped that: "From the claims standpoint Dr! Mancuso. as a nationally accredited expert, cap help us ditrerentiate ' an expensive asbestosis or silicoisis case from non-oc' cupational illnesses such as cancer and bronchitis, and make the defense stand up." for not providing .1 sale place to work. Reporting the results of j conference wuh Mr Reeh- stein and others. Dr. Mancuso Mibmiltcd a eonlidcuti.il report to management on September 23. I*>M. 1 he report was full of specific recommendations to clean up the plant, control air pollution, and provide jdvisorv services to product users. By this time. Mancuso appears to have realized that his advice would be rejected. "Internally, within the company, the question has been raised js to why medical problems, particularly relating to cancer and asbestos, were not recognized before. Actually, they were recognized, but the asbes tos industry chose to ignore and deny their existence.'' This company continued manufacturing asbestos in sulation products without even attaching warning labels, until 1971. Dr. Kenneth Smith testified in 1976. shortly before his death, that he'd recommended the use of warning labels on Johns-Manville asbestos way back in 1952: "The reason why the caution labels were not im plemented immediately, it was a business decision as far as 1 could understand. Here was a recommenda tion. the corporation is in business to make, to provide jobs for people and make money for stockholders and they had to take into consideration the effects of everything they did and if the application of a caution label identifying a product as hazardous would cut into sales, there would be serious financial implica tions. And the powers of be had to make some elfort to judge the necessity of the label versus the con sequences of placing the label on the product." It would appear that the company's decision had been made some years before. Starting in 1947. and contin uously until the insurance carriers hailed out bn JohnsManville in 1976. (he corporation purchased a total of S364.000.000.00 in product liability insurance coverage. What can we conclude from all this? The author of this prediction was Louis A. Pechstein, 1. The entire xsbestos problem of today is man made. Assistant Secretary of the company. Mr. Pechstein is now 2. The concealment of medical facts and reckless an official with the company that bought Carey in the indiircrcncc to the growing threat represented hv the early I970's. Cclotex Corporation. rising use of asbestos involved every major firm in the Or. Mancuso did a thorough survey of conditions at industry.. the plant and recommended extensive changes, not only inside the plant hut involving consumer warnings and air SPECIFICALLY pollution control. These recommendations were couched in terms of promoting public and consumer relations a) The concealment by several asbestos companies *fiile avoiding lawsuits and compensation claims. By mining asbestos in Canada and Metropolitan Life mid-1%3. Dr. Mancuso presented the company with the Insurance Company of a 1930 survey by Lanza and first repon of Dr. Selikotr. showing the very high death Pedley showing 42 cases of asbestosis in a rate from cancer and asbestosis among insulation population of workers only 76 of which had had workers'. He advisedthat the officers and managers of an more than 10 years of exposure. Pedley reported enterprise might even be sued by their own employees' publicly only that the miners felt the dust was not Vp*./<Vi. no APC 003683 15 APC 003584 harmful, and that no cases of pneumoconiosis from report to QAMA. The ume year that industry asbestos mining had been reported in Canada. doctor Paul Cartier published figures purporting to b) The delayed publication of Lanza's 1935 industry- show nd cancer hazard in asbestos mines. QA-Ma's sponsored medical survey, critically weakened by lawyer informed the (9/55) meeting o! the Asbestos editorial changes requested by Johns-Manvtlle at Textile Institute that cancer was a major problem in torney Vandiver Brown representing his turn and the industry. Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation President j) ATI's members rejected proposed cancer studies Sumner Simpson. from Saranac Lab and Industrial Hygiene Foun c) The suppression of any mention of asbestosis in the dation in 1956-57. QAMA supported a short-term U. S. trade journal. Asbestos, throughout the I920's follow-up. mortality study of asbestos miners, and 1930's, at the direction of Brown and Simpson. published by IHF researchers and roundly den d) Five asbestos companies, including Johns-Man- ounced for design biases by Dr. Wilhelm Hueper ville and Raybestos-Manhattan. contributed to in and Dr. Thomas Mancuso. halation experiments on animals with asbestos k) Armstrong Cork had a large number of compen dust, but the scientists at Saranac were not allowed sation claims (for asbestosis and cancer, starting to publish any of their findings unless approved by 1952) from insulation workers hired by us con Vandiver Brown. Studies implicating asbestos as a tracting division. Yet Armstrong had long been carcinogen were suppressed. repackaging asbestos insulation and then man e) Even after receiving a report (194$) that Kaylo dust ufactured its own starting in 1956. with no warning caused asbestosis. and having Saranac personnel labels and no attempts to advise workers of safest conduct industrial hygiene surveys of the Ohio work practices. plant where Kaylo was produced (1951). Owens- l) Compensation claims by insulators were also being Illinois continued to push the product as "non- paid by Johns-Manville and Philip Carey Man toxic'* in trade magazines (1952). At the same time. ufacturing Company in the 1950's. They continued Owen-Ulinois patented asbestos-free calcium to manufacture asbestos insulation with no at silicate pipe covering materials. tempts to wam of the danger, or conduct studies on Owens-Coming, which had used the health issue the exposure and fate of insulation workers. against asbestos in the 1940's went into asbestos m) The National Insulation Manufacturers Associa insulation contracting in the 1950's and bought the tion rejected the idea ofsetting up a health program Kaylo burmess in 1958. Despite the longstanding in I960. Member firms included major producers lutwledge of asbestos insulation dangers both in of asbestos insulation. The corresponding British Owens-Coming and its new subsidiary, and despite manufacturers group (Thermal Insulation Con mounting compensation claims by insulation in tractors Association) had requested 70 copies of stallers in the 1950's, the company made no effort government warning on the health hazard of as to inform insulators of the dangers and the mea bestos in shipyards in 1945. sures to lake to reduce exposure to the deadly dust. n) Dr. Thomas Mancuso. whose study of xshestos 8) Johns-Manville top management rejected the proposal by Dr. Kenneth Smith to affix warning workers published in 1963 showed an excess of cancer, was hired by the Philip Carey Manufac labels to asbestos in 1952. This despite the turing Company to conduct an industrial hygiene company's discovery in 194ft that one employee and medical survey of the Carey plant making as died of asbestosis from just breathing the general bestos insulation. He recommended continuous atmosphere inside their Waukegan. Illinois plant. industrial hygiene oversight for the plant workers, h) Johns-Manville's management held regular meet the compilation of health and autopsy data for ings at the large Manville. New Jersey plant, to studies, and the development of a multi-faceted consider health problems and avert customer advisory cllon on the health hazards. The workers'compcnsation claims (1957-1958). Their responsible company officials, including l.oms notes show that the workers were routinely kept in Pechstein, who had hired Dr. Mancuso. apparently the dark about the company doctors' diagnoses of disregarded much of this advice. Carey asbestos asbestosis. A John-Manville plant manager in insulation was Mild lor the next 7 years without California. Wilber RutT. has testified that the com warning labels. pany had a "hush-hush" policy until 1971 of not o) Thetford Mines clinic, which served Carey Can telling workers if their biennial company physical adian. Lake Asbestos. Bell Asbestos, and Asbestos showed signs of dust disease. Corporation in- Quebec run from 1940 - 19*4 The Quebec. Asbtstos Mining Association spon . .under the direction of Dr. Paul Cartier, admittedly sored an inhalation test of asbestos on mice, at had a. policy of telling workers they were healthy Saranac in 1951-52. The preliminary findings of even when medical examinations revealed disa these tests, never published, were positive, in a 1952 bling asbestosis. in nearby Asbestos. Quebec Dr. t DANGEROUS PROPERTIES OF INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS REPORT k Kenneth Smith examined '08 Johns-Manville as bestos mining employees in 1949, and did not tell one that he had symptoms of asbestosis. STATUS OF REMEDIAL CRIMINAL SANCTIONS LEGISLATION There are several attempts afoot in Congress to amend the U.S. Criminal Code by providing jail penalties for certain practices by business managers. The least exten sive proposals would deal with concealment only: other bills would contain complementary lesser penalties for reckless endangermenL Using the example of asbestos, the payment of workmen's compensation to sick insula tors by officials of a company who did nothing about the firm's continued manufacture of asbestos insulation without warning labels--this might be handled as reckless endangerment. if not concealment. In the House. Congressman George Miller (California) has offered H.R. 7040. and a print of the hearings on this bill should be available soon from the House Judiciary Committee. Subcommittee on Crime. No Senate version of this bill has appeared, althoueh similar provisions may be incorporated into the overall revised Criminal Code wending ns wav throuch both Houses of Coneress. The Administration has no official position on the Miller bill: which is to sav that various Departments have very strong positions that point in opposite directions. Business interests have generally re frained from taking public positions on the Miller bill, but are lobbying fiercely against its passage. The fact that this is an election year not only for the President but also many Members of Congress, who must all raise campaign funds largely from business contributors, militates against favorable consideration of this legislation in 1980. However, if it does not come up this year, renewed efforts will be made in 1981. based on the hearing record and whatever else comes up in (he next few months, to provide criminal sanctions in the U.S. Code where they are most needed. This legislation is definitely an area where individuals and professional organizations can help by making their views known to Congress and the Administration. frat "jar** Vk : , Svpr./Ocr. 'to APcodssas 17 ' cpm? n P l n^pjry EUtJBuaiWi.dk.JiLk IB \ MEDICAL MALPRACTICE By Ronald L. Motley The Lid Comes Off are also aware of our responsibilities to the consuming public. Today, the The asbestos industry's reaction products of industry are designed to historically to mounting evidence that promote the health and comfort of the magic mineral was grossly de the public. Industry is constantly structive to human life exemplifies striving to bring about more pleasant the "keep the lid on" philosophy living through improved products at practiced by some industries. better values to the consumer. Through evolution the industry's tac Moreover, every effort is made tics progressed by degrees from denial nowadays to protect the consumer of a health problem to active solicita with safer products and better tion of favorable evidence. methods of handling them. As Dr. Wilhelm Hueper so pro "Years ago industrial research was phetically stated in 1943: unconcerned about problems of "Industrial concerns are in general health and safety that might be in not particularly anxious to have the volved in a product. When the prod occurrence of occupational cancers uct was developed, it was put on the among their employees or of en market. Today our" industrial re vironmental cancers among the con search organizations probe into every sumers of their products made a mat health hazard. And every safeguard is ter of public records. Such publicity insisted upon before the product is might reflect unfavorably upon their marketed to the consumer."1 business activities, and oblige them to In fulfillment of Hueper's predic undertake extensive and expensive tion and in stark contrast to Fisher's technical and sanitary changes in pontifications are historical corporate their production methods and in the documents evincing a pattern of sup types of products manufactured. pression of information, denial of a "There is, moreover, the distinct problem, and solicitation of un possibility of becoming involved in founded scientific support for their compensation suits with extravagant position and manipulation of data. financial claims by the injured par By 1932, the British had fully ties. It is, therefore, not an uncom documented, through the classic mon practice that some pressure is ex Mereweather and Price study, the oc erted by the parties financially in cupational hazard of asbestos dust in terested in such matters to keep infor halation. On September 25, 1935, the mation on the occurrence of in editor of Asbestos, a trade journal, dustrial cancer well under cover. It is wrote Sumner Simpson, president of for these reasons that the statistical Raybestos-Manhattan, requesting data to be presented here concerning permission to publish an article about the incidence of occupational cancers the hazards of asbestos. The editor as caused by the different industrial referred to the magazine's past ac agents represent only those made quiescence to the American industry's public.'" desires that this dirty linen not be A.R. Fisher, President of Johns- publicly aired: "Always you have re Manvilie in 1935, spoke in glowing quested that for certain obvious terms of his company's dedication to reasons we publish nothing and research and its responsibility to the naturally your wishes have been re consuming public: - spected." Dangling the tempting car "As with the rest of industry, we rot of a favorable forum, the editor suggested that a "discussion of it (the alleged asbestos hazard) in Asbestos along the right lines'would serve to Ronald L, Motley is associated combat the rather undesirable with the Barnwell, South Carolina publicity given to it in current firm of Blatt and Fates. newspapers."* Analysis and Testimony by physicians in ALL specialties of medicine by a professional organization dedicated to objec tive assistance at a reasonable cost FREE COST ESTIMATE AT YOUR REQUEST Technical Assistance Bureau* P.O. Box 2908 Reston, Virginia 22090 (Suburban Wash. O.C.) CALL COLLECT 703/471-5026 JNATIONWIDE A tm or Gmm Sysom Group Reader Service No. 193 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE EXPERTS AVAILABLE EVALUATION - EXPERT TESTIMONY 73% #1 cuti mtfie by tl*4 ptit : * SERVING THE ENTIRE U.S. MEDI-LEGAL SERVICES h 2550 5th Avenue, Suite 712 San Diefo, California 92103 (714) 239-1472 TRIAL April 19X0 ARC 003586 CERTIFIED DEPOSITION NOTARIES POLK COURT REPORTERS Free deposition space: telephone for reservations See our listing in Martindale Hubbell 606 South Olive Street Suite 307-309 Los Angeles. California 90014 (Area code 213) 625-7615 Reader Service No. 117 woeeoooooooooooow CXLINNIiCrAAIL. PSYCHOLOGIST IN THE COURTROOM On Tape: Dr. Thomas Sannito, professional in Forensic Psychology, frequent C.LE. lecturer, expert witness, consultant to trial attorneys, gives four 75-minute lectures on:! "Psychological Techniques in Voir Dire" "Reading Nonverbal Communication Messages in the Courtroom" > "Strategies to Boost Impact on Jury Psychology" PURCHASE ALL FOUR TAPES FOR ONLY S29.9S Matt thrck to: Uncol* Cmitr foe T4 Lc(il Suidki. Inc., IIOO N. Kent St.. Suite M0. Arlington, VA 22200 i Name. Reader Service No. 52 `...the less said...' inevitable conclusions be changed, he nevertheless asked that ``all the While Simpson was unpersuaded by the editor's entreaties, in a letter to Vandiver Brown, secretary of Johns- favorable aspects of the survey be in cluded and that none of the un favorable be unintentionally pictured Manville. he praised the magazine for in darker tones than the comments "not reprinting the English articles" justify."* and pointedly observed that "the less Lanza acceded to many of the in said about asbestos the better off we dustry lawyers' requests including the are...."4 conclusion that asbestosis was milder Brown hastened to agroe and sug than silicosis. Lanza's study entailed gested that if an article on asbestosis taking x-rays of 126 workers with had to be published, it should reflect three years' or more asbestos ex "American data rather than En posure who were selected "more or glish."* less at random" with physical ex The American data referred to was aminations being performed on 121 obtained from a study conducted by of the workers. The results were start Dr. Anthony Lanza, et al,, on behalf ling: 67 of 126 (53 percent) were of Raybestos-Manhattan and Johns- classified as positive asbestotics and Manville and the Metropolitan Life only 20 (17 percent) were asymp Insurance Company, the insurance tomatic,* but these statistical cgndu- carrier for both manufacturers. The sions were not presented in Lanza's Lanza study was begun in 1929 and report. completed in late 1931, but the results The quest for helpful scientific remained unpublished until 1935. "facts" did not end with the publica Brown's confidence in the Amer tion of Lanza's study. Seeking am ican (Lanza) data was well-founded munition for courtroom use ajair.:- as he and other industry officials and "ambulance chasing attorneys and lawyers were to serve in ah editorial unscrupulous doctors,"'* certain capacity prior to its publication. Lan asbestos manufacturers banded to za dutifully submitted his galley gether to fund asbestos dust research proof to Brown on December 7,1934. at the prestigious Saranac Labora Brown returned the galley on tories (Trudeau Foundation). December 10, 1934, with, among Simpson wrote F.H. Schulter, other suggestions, the comment that President of Thermoid Rubber Co., Lanza had omitted from this final on November 10, 1936, suggesting draft a sentence which appeared in an that several of the manufacturers earlier draft that: "Clinically from jointly fund asbestos experiments at this study, it (asbestosis) appeared to Saranac. Simpson allowed that the be of a type milder than silicosis."' benefactors "could determine from Further suggestions were rendered time to time after the findings arc by Mr. Hobart, Johns-Manville's made whether we wish any publica New Jersey attorney who forcefully tion or not" - the decision to publish, explained why Johns-Manville wished of course, being a function of the to portray asbestosis as a disease nature of the results of the study. "It milder than silicosis. Referring to the would be a good idea to distribute the pendency of legislation in New Jersey information to the medical fraternity to schedule asbestosis under the providing it is of the right type and Workmen's Compensation Act, would not injure our companies.'"' Hobart stated that Johns-Manville Conferences between industry and opposed the inclusion of asbestosis as Saranac representatives culminated in a compensable disease and observed a deal being struck whereby certain that "it would be very helpful to have laudable experiments would be con an official report to show that there is ducted with the decision whether ot a substantial difference between not to publish the scientific results be asbestosis and silicosis: and by the ing reposed entirely with the spon same token, would be troublesome if sors. an official report should appear from "It is our further understanding' which the conclusion might be drawn that the results obtained will be con that there is' very little, if any dif sidered the property of those who arc ference, between the two diseases."' advancing the required funds, whe On December 21, 1934, Brown for- will determine whether, to what ex warded Hobart's suggestions to Lan tent and in what manner they shall be za and wrote that while he did not in made public. In the event it is deemed tend to suggest that scientific facts or desirable that the results be madt APC 003587 A mil IQSflTVIAl public, the manuscript of your study had, of course, been published prior will be submitted to us for approval to the rejection of Saranac's pro prior to publication."'1 posal. Shortly thereafter, Gardner agreed to annoint the industry sponsors as `...derogatory literature...' the sole arbiters of publication of the results of the experiments: The mid-1950s found the asbestos "The Saranac Laboratories agrees industry embroiled in Workmen's that the results of these studies shall Compensation litigation with asbes become the property of the con tos workers who were lung cancer vic tributors and that the manuscripts of tims. The escalating cancer claims any reports shall be submitted for ap moved Dr. Kenneth W. Smith, proval of the contributors before medical director of Johns-Manville in publication.'"* March 1956, to implore the ATI to re Even this marriage was not without tain its friend, the Industrial Health strife. Carped Simpson in 1939 upon Foundation (IHF), to conduct a learning that Gardner was presenting cancer study which could enable the papers which incorporated reference ATI to "procure information which to his preliminary asbestos findings: would combat current derogatory "The reports may be so favorable to literature." us that they would cause us no trou Smith suggested an alliance with ble but they might be just the op the Quebec Asbestos Mining Associa posite which could be very embarras tion (QAMA) which was conducting sing.'"4 a similar study. He alarmingly related that one company had recently suf Predictable Reaction ` fered an award in favor of a cancer victim. The mid-1940s brought increasing Smith carefully reviewed a 1955 concern about the relationship be publication of Dr. Wilhelm Hueper tween asbestos and cancer. The as and reported to the ATI that Hueper bestos industry was not ignorant of had opined that all asbestos workers the early reports suggesting a causal as well as those environmentally ex relationship. Its reaction was predic posed were at risk to contract asbes table. An article which appeared in tos-induced cancer. 1949 in the Scientific American in Smith's revelations prompted the dicting asbestos as a carcinogen ATI General Meeting on March 18, prompted swift reaction from the 1956, to appropriate S1000 to initiate membership of the Asbestos Textile . a "preliminary survey to investigate Institute (ATI), a trade association of the possibility of more concerted ac asbestos textile manufacturers. Cry tion designed to refute the work of ing foul the industry sought solace Dr. Hueper." After agonizing over from Dr. Lanza. Correspondence was an IHF cancer study proposal for exchanged between industry officials almost a year, the ATI Air Hygiene and Lanza,'1 but to date the writings Committee rejected the plan on have not surfaced. March 7, 1957, assigning the follow Asbestos-cancer reared its ugly ing reasons: head again in 1954. Saranac officials QAMA has a similar program. appeared before the ATI and, citing There is a feeling among certain German and English data on the members that such an investigation association supporting a causal rela would stir up a hornets nest and put tion, urged that animal studies be the whole industry under suspicion. undertaken to explore the associa We do not believe there is tion. enough evidence of cancer or asbesto- The ATI pondered the proposal for sis or cancer and asbestosis in this in eight months before rejecting it in dustry to warrant this survey.'* June 1955, on the grounds that such a With the toll in human life from study was "ill-advised due to its im asbestos-induced cancer increasing, plication that a relationship existed the issue would not die. In June 1963, between asbestos and carcinogenic . ATI members obtained copies of Dr. development, a condition which to I.J. Selikoffs epic cancer study of in date has not been established al sulation workers and braced itself for though it has been given widespread the 1964 New York Academy of publicity in the press.'"* Sciences Symposia on Asbestos by Sir Richard Doll's study,'* which discussing the retention of a "public clearly linked asbestos to lung cancer. relations man to get accurate publici ty to the public.'" As late as 1971, an industry medical consultant labelled Selikoff a "dangerous man;'' and to the question as to whether the Amer ican Medical Association might be able to control Selikoff, the consul tant replied that "pressure" on SclikofPs hospital, Mt. Sinai, might be "effective. One asbestos insulation manufac turer, when advised in 1963 by its well-respected medical consultant that the asbestos-cancer relationship was beyond cavil and that the com pany should take steps to warn con sumers, responded by declining to renew the consultant's contract and failing ever to disseminate warnings to its customers. Perhaps the corporation was miffed because its consultant had the* temerity to observe: "Internally within the company the question has been raised as to why medical prob lems, particularly relating to cancer and asbestos, were not recognized before. Actually, they were recog nized, but the asbestos industry chose to ignore and deny their existence."*' Johns-Manville "led" the industry in its efforts to keep workers and con sumers in the dark. Asbestosis by EVERY YEAR MILLIONS OF UNITEDWAY VOLUNTEERS WORK TIMEANDAHALF SOYOU'RE NOT BOTHERED TIMEANDAGAIN. Once a year--and only once-- United Way raises money to support vital human services for people in communities all across America. United Way's continued success year after year proves a Very basic point. When you ask the American people for help, they respond. Twhoarknsk,srotor you* all of us. .. . ... . United W3M APC 003588 Expert Medical Testimony And Case Analysis For Medical Malpractice And Personal Injury . 'Northeast Orthopedics, Inc. Box 707 Miilburn, New Jersey 07041 (201) 533 - 0066 grader Service No. 150 1949 was acknowledged io be a pro as far as I could understand. Here gressively debilitating disease. Yet I was a recommendation, the corpora- Dr. Kenneth Smith, in a 1949 survey ' lion is in business to make |money|, of dust conditions in a Canadian provide jobs for people and make Johns-Manvillc mining and milling money for stockholders and they had facility, deemed it inadvisable to ap to take into consideration the effects prise seven asbcstotics of their peril: of everything they did and if the ap "It must be remembered that plication of a caution label identify although these men have the x-ray ing a product as hazardous would cut evidence of asbestosis, they are work out sales, there would be serious ing today and definitely are not financial implications. And the disabled from asbestosis. They have powers [that] be had to make some not been told of this diagnosis for it is effort to judge the necessity of the felt that as long as the man feels well, label vs. the consequences of placing is happy at home and at work, and his the label on the product."*4 physical condition remains good, Stung by mounting public criticism nothing should be said. When he of industry's research activities. becomes disabled and sick, then the Johns-Manville, through its executive diagnosis should be made and the vice president, Francis H. May, of claim submitted by the Company. fered the following riposte: The fibrosis of this disease is irre "1 do know that the entire record versible and permanent so that even makes it abundantly dear that Johns- tually compensation will be paid to Manville and Raybestos-Manhatian each of these men. But as long as the went forward with the first medical man is not disabled it is felt that he research done in this country; I do should not be told of his condition so know that such research was pub that he can live and work in peace and lished for all the world to see in the the Company can benefit by his many public health reports of the United years of experience. Should the man States Health Service; 1 do know that be told of his condition today there is industry continued to finance re a very definite possibility that he search; I do know that the findings of would become mentally and physical such research were consistent with ly ill, simply through the knowledge other developing medical informa that he has asbestosis."" tional do know that these actions The Johns-Manville policy of "were voluntary; T~do know that in refusing to advise workers of early dustry's efforts antedated by several evidence of asbestosis was years any action by the Federal characterized in court testimony by a government; I do know that Johns- former plant manager as a "hush- Manville was promoting and has con hush policy" and one which, horrify tinued to promote basic medical ingly, persisted until the late 1960s." research; and I do know that but for industry's efforts, which I suspect Time Bomb "were unparalleled in the 1930s, the 'state of medical knowledge in this The most graphic illustration of country would have lagged for years. Johns-Manville's disinclination to I don't understand the contention alert the unwary of the asbestos time that manipulation and suppression bomb is the following colloquy taken and total lack of concern for in from the court testimony of Dr. dividuals were basic motives of in Smith before he died in 1977. When dustry. If that were so, why did in asked whether he had ever advised dustry bother to do anything at all? Johns-Manville officials to place And yet, the record is clear this was warning labels on asbestos-containing not the path chosen."" insulation products. Smith's response To the extent that its research ac is both illuminating and shocking: tivities contrast with the distinct Q: "What was the reason, when "ostrich-like attitude"" of many of the responses which you were getting, the asbestos manufacturers. May's asf to why the asbestos containing long-arm pat on the Johns-Manville products were not labelled with a cau back is partially justified. The condu- tion label back in I9S2 when you first sion is inescapable, however, that recommended that while compared to Johns-Manville was moved to engage the diatamaceous earth product in partisan research by goals less lofty known as Celite?" than humanitarianism and corporate A: "The reasons why the caution rectitude.T labels were not implemented im mediately, it was a business decision (see References, p.60) APC 003589 < APC 003600 Location Addy Works Arkansas Operations Alcoa Technical Center Badin Works Cleveland Works Corona Operations Davenport Works Lafayette Works Lancaster Works Lebanon Works Massena Operations Pittsburgh Office Point Comfort Operations Richmond Works Rockdale Works Tennessee Operations Vancouver Operations Vernon Works Warrick Operations Wenatchee Works No. of Employees Being Medically Screened Periodically for Past and/or Present Asbestos Exposure 0 0 0 81 0 0 20 23 0 40 20 0 40 3 521 16 80 0 144 12 85-06-04/bal APC 003591 Notes: Lebanon Pittsburgh Pt. Comfort Richmond Tennessee This number will decrease with the elimination of certain asbestos-based material. 26 employees of the William Penn Hotel were screened to see if they could use a respirator last year, but there has been no follow-up. Total of 40 = 35 Active and 5 Inactive This number is for x-rays of 3 people in 1983. 6 of the total number given are now retired. 5 85-06-04/bal APC 003592