Document Nej8KZgENMa7wpEnzXzxqaVN8

ABD00228202 To: OSHA File A Interoffice Communication From: Date: Subject: V. E. Messick May 30, 1986 VCM Release on 5/28/86 VIS1A On May 28, 1986 at about 2:30 P.M., Charles Kinsey was charging 2-ME to reactor 745. Rendell Newton and Jeff Popp were observing the addition procedure. Charles had pre-loaded the CTA pot. The pot was pressured to 100-125 psig and rising as per the procedure and Kinsey opened the reactor RAM valve. The air bleed valve on the pot was open and should have been closed. There must have been pluggage in the bleed valve discharge line to allow the pot to pressurize. When the reactor RAM valve opened, material from the reactor backed down the line through the open bleed valve discharge pipe to the nearby sewer hub. Slurry spashed out of the hub for several yards. After 15-20 seconds, the open valve was discovered and closed. Several fixed point monitors in the new module area indicated high VCM readings. The deluge system did not go off. Bud Stone came over immediately and began washing down resin that had splashed out of the sewer hub. The incident was reported to the National Response Center with an estimated 5-10 pounds of VCM being released. This estimate was not based on any calculation. Plant personnel discussed the matter with Bill McClain and Tom Grumbles. The question was raised about OSHA reporting since four people were potentially exposed to VCM. Bill reviewed the requirements that would trigger OSHA reporting. He indicated that two conditions must be met. First, it must be a massive release. Second, there must be exposure. The guidelines for a massive release are not well defined. It was decided that an exposure condition may have occurred, but the release was far from massive, so the event was not an OSHA reportable incident. Veldon E. Messick CHIEF PROCESS ENGINEER /beb cc: JF, JWW, AHS, DWH, WLM, TGG File C 10.4.0