Document NGp8Db3pRvgG5J8n0EzrMBz3w

LERT EQUIPMENT ISOLATION The investigation of the December 14, 1981, hexane fire incident in the polyethylene unit revealed a potential plant-wide safety concern. This was the second recent incident in which equipment was thought to be isolated (in preparation for maintenance) but was later found tied into analyzer or instrument systems. The result of the polyethylene unit incident was a serious spill and fire. The procedure bulletin P-0117, "Fire, Entry, and Special Permit Procedure," Section E-3 is specific--"ALL PIPING WHICH HAS CONTAINED FLAMMABLES OR WHICH MIGHT BECOME HAZARDOUS THROUGH CONTAMINATION WITH FLAMMABLES OR PRODUCT OXYGEN, MUST BE ISOLATED AND DECONTAMINATED BEFORE A PERMIT IS ISSUED. DECONTAMINATION MEANS REMOVING THE FLAMMABLES OR OTHER HAZARDOUS MATERIALS UNTIL THERE IS NO REASONABLE POSSIBILITY OF FIRL, EXPLOSION, OR OTHER HEALTH HAZARD. SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ATTACHMENTS SUCH AS GAUGE GLASSES, INSTRUMENT CONNECTIONS, ETC." Supervisors are requested to review this P-Bulletin and ensure that their personnel understand and use it. Even if fire permit work is not planned when equipment is removed from service, special attention should be paid to securing the system so that no material can in advertently enter or spill from the system. Remember, isolation is not complete until a field examination proves all connections are isolated. 1982 SHAC Safety and Housekeeping Action Committee D. D. Kos, Chairman sc 002252 LAM003457 Monsanto SAFETY ALERT On March 15, we'd had a month and a half of smooth plant operations and hadn't had a recordable Injury since January 28! We had really made a turnaround since January when we'd had many serious injuries, operating problems, and near misses. Then came March 16! One of the AN reactors tripped out and during the shutdown process, the other reactor mistakenly shut down. This caused a plantwide steam crisis resulting in curtailing styrene production. Then a flex hose on an expander lube system broke, shutting down the methanol-syn gas cold box and subsequently acetic acid and oxo alcohol. During the cold box shutdown, the CO com pressor went into a serious overspeed condition because the trip system didn't function properly. Later that night, we had a recordable injury when the hinge on a hatch fastener on an HC1 truck broke and sprayed one of our pumper gaugers with HC1. His hard hat and safety goggles were blown off by the pressure release and his right eye was burned. However, no permanent damage resulted. This rash of incidents all in one day are, tome, a signal. Have we let up on our safety awareness? Have we lost our momemtum? I don't think so, but I'm concerned. Let's pull together to continue the fine performance we had from January 28 to March 15. That's the kind of Texas City performance we're capable of and proud of. 3-18-82 Texas City Gene Tromblee sc 0022S3 fr jVlonsanto STATEMENT OF SAFETY POLICY ABOUT WEARING OF HARD HATS IN VEHICLES IN THE PLANT THE FOLLOWING POLICY WAS ADOPTED BY THE PLANT MANAGER'S SAFETY BOARD ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1981: "It is NOT MANDATORY that hard hats be WORN in vehicles which have solid steel roofs. Hard hats must be carried in the vehicle when driving about the plant to be used in the event of an emergency when cars are stopped and the personnel need to evacuate the area." ALL EMPLOYEES ARE EXPECTED TO COMPLY WITH THIS NEW POLICY. G.L. Tromblee Post: 12/08/81 (Remove: 12/22/81) SC 002255 LAM003460