Document NGgoMMaZmOjLZaq0m59O0JOb8

1968 National Safety Congress / medical journal (without mentioning their and mines, leaving only 827 inspectors for names, of course). He was told if he did general safety inspection, construction, safety he would have to look for another job. promotion and education, health, and in The doctor had a bad heart and was con dustrial hygiene, according to the Bureau of cerned about looking for other employment Labor Statistics. (There are almost twice Before he could do anything, he died of as many fish and game wardens -- about a second heart attack. . 3,000 -- employed by the states to look out Dr. Lorin E. Kerr of the United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund, an authority on coal workers' pneumoconiosis (or, as the coal dust disease is popularly called, "black lung"), has sharply denounced "the attitude and influence of employeroriented physicians who avoid facing known facts about the ravages of coal dust in hu man lungs because: to. do otherwise would cost money. The impact of physician knowl edge and attitudes is apparent in inaccurate or incomplete death certificates. These doc uments are essential for determining the existence of a dangerous dust requiring gov ernmental action for control or eradication. Too often, no records meajj. no action. Phy sician denial or avoidance of known facts can also determine the publication of infor mation. In 1956, tne concern of some physi cians about management attitudes effectively blocked the publication of a paper of mine on coal workers pneumoconiosis in the most widely circulated medical journal in the United States.' One can only wonder how many times other medical information vital for the protection of the health of workers has not been published for the same reason. Physician attitudes also influence other for wildlife.) Four states have no safety in spection Btaff in any area and 17 other states have 10 or less on their safety inspection staffs. More shocking is the fact that only three states have staffs specialising in the area of occupational health and industrial hygiene. 4. By and large, union leaders have been far too pliable-when confronted b^y manage ment's inaction or decisions regarding worker health and safety. Tbo often, health and safety conditions are treated as trade-offs for more tangible union gains in wages at the collective bargaining table. This has been the case, for example, with the United Mine Workers leadership, which finally is becoming sTightly aroused over the plightiof their workers but little dedicated to over turning coal management's modus operandi that treats coal miners as being less expen sive than coal. Union leaders simply do not give health and safety a first rank pri ority; their lack of aggressive lobbying for the proposed Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1968 in Congress cannot be covered up by resolutions and resonant statements for the records. Labor leaders are wanted on tire ramparts, not just on the record. groups such as company lawyers, state legis lators, and officials who, ajl-told, are remark ably resistant to the elimination or control of coal dust because it would cost money." 5. The Federal government has abdicated its responsibility to devote funds toward effective research programs and training programs for occupational health and safety. Coal workers' black lung or pneumoconi osis affects at least 150,000 active and retired miners in advanced stages of lung destruc tion. Two thousand men die from this dis ease in Pennsylvania every year. What Dr. Kerr was referring to was a critical rupture in the recording and communicating of data by members of the medical profession. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) has had'no sense of the importance of this problem, the need to de velop preventive systems and competent medical^and engineering personnel HEW's ad vocacy has been weak and, if anything, the occupational health activity in the De partment has been downgraded recently. The one area where HEW has received some 3.State safety laws and regulations are consistent funding--$5 million since 1953-- weak, inspection is poor, and penalties rarely for research on the causes and prevention imposed. The states spend an average of of coal workers' pneumoconiosis has had 40 cents per worker per year on industrial little to show for it, apart from a prevalence safety. Some states such as Texas and study completed three years ago. It is dis Oklahoma have taken this down to two maying to note that not only does Western cents per worker per year. Of the 1,524 Europe spend twenty times the level on restate inspectors, 697 inspect boilers, elevators _ search in the coal dust disease area, but