Document N2gDRRmMK5n2QnkYmGNnzaXmg

ABD00086710 t 686 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER EPA PROPOSED RULE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS FOR ACCIDENTAL CHEMICAL RELEASES [58 FR 54190, Oct. 20, 1993] * ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 40 CFR Part 66 [A-91-73; FRL--4790-1] Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accidental Release Prevention agency: Environmental Protection Agency. ACTION: Proposed rule. noon, and between 1:30 and 3:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, at the address listed below. A reasonable fee may be charged for copying. X. Regulatory Costs and Benefits XI. Required Analyses A. Executive Order 12291 B. Regulatory Flexibility Act C Paperwork Reduction Act ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed or submitted to: Environmental I. Introduction Protection Agency. Air Docket (LE-l31). A. Statutory Authority Attn: Docket No. A-91-73, Waterside Mall, 401 M St. SW., Washington. DC This notice of proposed rulemaking 20460. Comments must be submitted in (NPRM) is being issued under sections duplicate. The public heering will be . 112(r)(7) and 301(a)(1) of the Clean Air held at Temple Micah, 600 M Street, Act (CAA) as amended (42 U.S.C. SW., Washington, DC. 7412(r)(7) and 7601(a)(1)). summary: Under the Clean Air Act. as FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. amended, the U.S. Environmental Lyse Helsing, Chemical Emergency Protection Agency (EPA) is proposing Preparedness and Prevention Office. regulations that would require Environmental Protection Agency. OS- development and implementation of 120. 401 M St. SW.. Washington. DC risk management programs at facilities 20460, (202) 260-6128; or the that manufacture, process, use, store, or Emergency Planning and Community otherwise handle regulated substances Right-to-Know Hotline, (800) 535-0202; in quantities that exceed specified in northern Virginia and Alaska, (703) thresholds. EPA has proposed a list of 920-9877. regulated substances ana thresholds separately. Risk management programs SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION! provide facilities with an integrated Table cf Contents approach to identifying and managing I. Introduction the hazards posed by these regulated A. Statutory Authority substances. The risk management plans B; Background developed under such programs would C. Gean Air Act Amendments of 1990 be registered with EPA, provided to the II. Risk Management Programs Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, state governments, and local planning authorities, and A. Clean Air Act Requirements B. Other CAA Provisions for Regulations C. Relationship to OSHA's Process Safety Management Standard made available to the public. The HI. Discussion of the Proposed Rule proposed rule would assist facilities and A. Introduction communities in efforts to lessen the B. Applicability number and severity of serious chemical C. Definitions accidents. dates: Comments must be submitted on or before February 16, 3994. A public bearing will be held in Washington, DC, D. Risk Management Program Elements E. RMP and Documentation F. Registration G. Prohibitions H. Timing on November 30,1993, from 9 a.m. to IV. Comparison of EPA's Proposed Rule to 5 p.m. Persons interested in appearing OSHA's Standard at a public bearing should register with A. Differences between EPA's Proposed EPA at (703) 218-2570 by November 23. Rule and OSHA's Standard 1993; a copy of the testimony should be B. Section by Section Comparison of the submitted by November 23, 1993, to Dr. Lyse Helsing (see the for further information section). Docket: Supporting documentation EPA Prevention Program and the OSHA Standard V. Relationship to Other Federal and State Requirements VI. Other Approaches Considered used in developing this proposed rule is VII. Guidance contained in Docket No. A-91-73. This VIII. Information Gathering Efforts docket is available for public inspection IX. Section by Section Discussion of the and copying between 8:30 a.m. and 12 Proposed Rule B. Background Public awareness of the potential danger from accidental releases of hazardous chemicals has increased over the years as serious chemical accidents have occurred around the world (e.g., the 1974 explosion in Flixborough, England, and the 1976 release of dioxin in Seveso, Italy). Public concern intensified following the 1984 release of methyl isocyanate in Bhopal, India, that killed more than 2,000 people living near the facility. A subsequent release from a chemical facility in Institute. West Virginia, sent more than 100 people to the hospital and made Americans aware that such incidents can and do happen in the U.S. In response to this public concern and the hazards that exist, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began its Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program (CEPP) in 1985, as part of the Agency's Air Toxics Strategy. CEPP was a voluntary program to encourage state and local authorities to identify hazards in their areas and to plan for chemical emergency response actions. In 1986, Congress enacted many of the elements of CEPP in the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). also known as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). SARA Title III requires states to establish state and local emergency planning groups to develop chemical emergency response plans for each community. SARA Title 111 also requires facilities to provide information on the hazardous chemicals they have -11 "y 4. V 10-27-93 Publishes bv THE 5UREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC., Washington, D.C. 20037 ABD00086711 CURRENT REPORT 689 on site to the states, local planners, and less acilities. for facilities (i.e.. stationary sources) to fire departments, and. through them, the EPA ___________ _ . . rticipant identify hazards that may result from public. This information forms the in international efforts related to releases, to design and maintain a safe foundation of both the community chemical accident prevention, facility, and to minimize the emergency response plans and the particularly through the Organisation consequences of releases when they public*industry dialogue on risks and for Economic Cooperation and occur. Section I12(r)(3) requires EPA to risk reduction. Development, which has held five promulgate a list of at least 100 SARA Title ID did not mandate that international workshops from 1989 substances that are known to cause, or facilities establish accident prevention through 1991 to discuss issues related to may be reasonably anticipated to cause, programs. However. Congress accident prevention, prepareanoss, and death, injury, or serious adverso effects acknowledged the importance of response, and has developed guidelines to human health or the environment accident prevention by requiring EPA, for member countries. when released to air. EPA is required to under SARA section 305(b), to conduct a review of emergency systems to monitor, detect, and prevent chemical accidents. The final report to Congress. Review of Emergency Systems (EPA, 1988). stated that * prevention does not depend on a single piece of equipment or a single technique. Prevention must be part of a comprehensive, integrated system that considers tbehazards of the chemicals involved, the hazards of the process, the hazards to the community, end the capabilities of facility personnel. None of the elements should be considered in isolation nor should any single technical solution be considered a complete solution to a particular problem. Each change in a facility, process, or procedure will have multiple effects that must be assessed in the context of the entire operation. The report concluded that the key to a successful process safety management system is the commitment of management (facility and corporate) to safety. Although SARA Title 111 did not directly address accident prevention except through section 305(b), EPA recognized that prevention, preparedness, and response form a continuum. In 1986, therefore, EPA established a chemical accident prevention program to collect information on chemical accidents and to work with other groups to increase knowledge of prevention practices, encourage industry to improve safety at facilities, and foster increased awareness of prevention, preparedness, and response at the local level. Under this program, EPA developed its In addition to EPA's work in this area, other agencies, states, industries, trade associations, and professional organizations have developed programs related to chemical accident prevention. On February 24.1992, the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) promulgated a standard on chemical process safety management (57 FR 6356). Four states-- New jersey, California, Delaware, and Nevada---have regulations requiring facilities to prepare and implement risk management plans. The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), through its Center for Chemical Process Safety, has published guidance on the management of chemical process safety as well as guidelines on topics related to hazard evaluation, vapor cloud dispersion modeling, handling and storage practices, and vapor cloud mitigation. The Chemical Manufacturers' Association (CMA) has adopted its Responsible CareTM program, with which all CMA members must comply to maintain membership. The American Petroleum Institute has developed a similar program (RP 750) for its members. In 1982, the European Community adopted the Seveso Directive (82/501/EEC, as amended), which requires facilities handling certain chemicals to develop a safety report that is similar to a risk management plan. Congress also recognized the need for a chemical accident prevention program at the Federal level and included prevention provisions in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. set thresholds for each listed substance. The proposed rule for the list and thresholds was published on January 19, 1993 (5S FR 5102). The proposed list includes 100 substances listed based on acute toxicity, 62 flammable gases and highly flammable liquids, and high explosives as a class. CAA section H2(r)(7) requires EPA to promulgate, by November 15,1993, "reasonable regulations and appropriate guidance" to provide for the prevention and detection of accidental releases and for responses to such releases. These regulations shall include, as appropriate, provisions concerning the use. operation, repair, and maintenance of equipment to monitor, detect, inspect, and control releases, including training of personnel in the use and maintenance of equipment or in the conduct of periodic inspections. The regulations shall require facilities to prepare and implement risk management plans that shall provide for compliance with regulations for managing risk (the "risk management program") and shall include a hazard assessment, a prevention program, and an emergency response program. The list and thresholds promulgated under CAA section 112(r)(3) will determine which facilities must comply with the accident prevention regulations. The CAA, as amended, establishes a Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board to investigate or cause to be investigated the causes of chemical accidents and to report its findings to Congress, Federal, state, and local authorities, end the public. Under the CAA, EPA is also required to Accidental Release Information Program C. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 conduct studies related to accidental (AR1P) to collect data on the causes of The Clean Air Act Amendments of releases, including research on hazard chemical accidents and the steps 1990, signed into law on November 15, assessments, hydrogen fluoride, and air facilities take to prevent recurrences. 1990, amend Clean Air Act (CAA) dispersion modeling. EPA also developed a program for section 112 by adding a new subsection In addition, section 304 of tho Clean conducting chemical safety audits at (r), which includes requirements related Air Act Amendments of 1990 requires facilities to learn more about how to chemical accident prevention. The OSHA to promulgate, under tho facilities develop systems to prevent goal of CAA section 112(r) is to prevent Occupational Safety end Health Act (29 accidents. Through the audit program, accidental releases of regulated U.S.C. 655). a chemical process safety EPA has trained its regional staff as well substances and other extremely standard in order to protect employees as state officials on how to conduct hazardous substances to the air and to from hazards associated with accidental audits. EPA has worked with trade minimize the consequences of releases releases of highly hazardous chemicals associations, professional organizations, by focusing preventive measures on in the work place. OSHA promulgated labor, environmental groups, and other those chemicals that pose the greatest its standard for process safety Federal agencies to determine how best risk. management for highly hazardous to reach smaller operations, which the Section 112(r) has a number of chemicals on February 24, 1992 (57 FR SARA section 305(b) study indicated are provisions. It establishes a general duty 6356). Sections IIC and IV of this 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter A ABD00086712 690 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER preamble discuss the relationship documented in the risk management between EPA's proposed risk plan is an emergency response program management program and the OSHA that provides specific actions to be standard cn chemical process safety taken in response to a release to protect management. human health and the environment, Finally. CAA section 112(1) requires including informing the public and EPA to develop guidance for states, local agencies, emergency health care, especially for the registration of sources and employee training. (facilities). This CAA soction also CAA section 112(r)C7)(B){iii) requires contains the statutory authority for EPA that the risk management plans be to approve end delegate Federal registered with EPA. The plans must be authority to the ststes. For further submitted to the implementing agency, information on EPA's proposed rule on the Chemicsl Safety and Hazard CAA section 112(1). see 53 FR 2929S. Investigation Board, the state emergency May 19. 1993. response commission (SERC), and the II. Risk Management Programs local emergency planning committee (LEPC). These plans shall be available to A. Clean Air Act Requirements trie public under CAA section 114(c). Today's proposed requirements to EPA must establish a system for develop and implement a risk auditing the risk management programs. management program are in response to EPA must also ensure that plans are CAA section ll2(r)(7)(B). Specifically. CAA section 112(r)f7)(B)(i) require? EPA to adopt "reasonable regulations and appropriate guidance" to provide for the prevention and detection of accidental releases and for response to such releases. As appropriate, the requirements shall address the use. operation, repair, replacement, and maintenance of equipment to monitor, detect, inspect, and control accidental ' updated periodically. The proposed rule would require facilities to do three things: (1) Register with EPA three years after publication of the final rule in the Federal Register. The registration would consist of a written form to be sent to EPA headquarters indicating that the facility is covered by the rale, identifying the regulated substances triggering the registration and the releases, including the training of persons in the use and maintenance of equipment and in the conduct of periodic inspections. The regulations shall include procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release. The Act requires thet the regulations be promulgated by November 15.1993. CAA section ll2(r)(7)(B)(ii) states: The regulations under this subparagraph shall require the owner or operator of stationary sources at which a regulated substance is present in more than a threshold quantity of those substances (in ranges) in a process. If the information on the registration changes (e.g.. because new chemicals are added, chemicals ere dropped, or the quantity changes), facilities would be required to submit an amended registration form; (2) Develop end implement a risk management program that includes a hazard assessment, prevention program, and emergency response program, and maintain onsite documentation of the implementation. The hazard assessment would include offsite consequence quantity to prepare and implement a risk analyses end a five-year accident management plan to detect and prevent or history. The prevention pregram would minimize accidental releases of such consist of a process hazard analysis, substances from the stationary source, and to process safety information, standard provide a prompt emergency response to any operating procedures (SCPs). training, such releases in order to protect human health and the environment. maintenance, pre-startup reviews, management of change, safety audits, The risk management plans must accident investigations, and a include a hazard assessment that management system. The emergency evaluates potential effects of an response program would require accidental release of any regulated emergency response plans, arills or substance. The hazard assessment must exercises, and coordination with public include an estimate of potential release emergency response plans; and quantities and downwind effects, (3) Develop end submit to the including potential exposure to Chemical Safety and Hazard populations. The assessment also must Investigation Board, the implementing include a five-year release history, agency, SERC, and LEPC, a risk including the size, concentration, and management plan (RMP) that w'ould duration of releases, and must consider document the results of the risk worst-cose releese scenarios. The risk management program including a management plan must also document a summary of the offsite conseouence prevention program including safety analysis, a list of major hazards, steps precautions, maintenance, monitoring, being taken to address those hazards and employee training measures. The (i.e., e summary of the facility's final specified element that must be prevention program), a five-year accident history, a description of the emergency response program, and a description of the management system that ensures the safety of the facility and the implementation of the required elements. This plan will be available to the public. The risk management program addresses the general requirements of CAA section ll2(r)(7)(B)(i) for regulations to provide for accidental release detection and prevention. The risk management plan, referred to as the RMP in this preamble, addresses the specific requirements of CAA section H2(rH7)(B)(ii) fora plan that provides governmental entities and the public with information on the hazards found at facilities and the facilities' plans for addressing the hazards. These hazards would be identified and addressed through implementation of the risk management program elements. Therefore, the RMP would summarize the results of hazard assessments and analyses and the implementation of the risk management program requirements. The submission requirements (registration and the RMP) address the requirements of CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(iii), as does the requirement for a system to audit RMPs. B. Other CAA Provisions for Regulations In addition to CAA section m(r)(7)(B). CAA section H2(r)(7)(A) authorizes EPA to promulgate "release prevention, detection, and correction requirements which may include monitoring, record-keeping, reporting, training, vapor recovery, secondary containment, and other design, equipment, work practice, end operational requirements." EPA is investigating whether regulations, other than today's proposed rule on risk, management programs, are necessary to prevent and detect accidental releases. C. Relationship :c OSHA '$ Process Safety Management Standard The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA) section 304 requires CSHA to promulgate a chemical process safety standard and a list of highly hazardous chemicals. To meet this mandate. OSHA promulgated its process safety management standard. The OSHA standard is intended to protect workers from chemical accidents at facilities using highly toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive substances. EPA's mandate under section 112(r) of the CAA is to protect public health and the environment. EPA and OSHA. have met regularly to coordinate their rules to minimize conflicting requirements. To minimize confusion for facilities covered by both rules, the elements and language of EPA's proposed prevention program are. to the maximum extent possible. 10-27-93 Publishes by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.. Washington, D.C. 20037 ABD00086713 CURRENT REPORT 691 identical to the parallel elements in of technology, facilities, personnel, than a threshold quantity of a regulated OSHA's process safety management hazardous materials, and emergency substance based on the final list and standard. The main differences between responses. thresholds EPA will promulgate. In Its the EPA`$ proposed rule and OSHA's The purpose of today's proposed rule list and threshold rule, EPA is standard are those mandated by the is to require industry to develop such an proposing to exempt ammonia when CAA, such as the hazard assessment integrated, holistic approach to used as an agricultural nutrient and (offsite consequence analysis, the five- managing the risks posod by the held by a farmer. EPA requests year accident history), the emergency presence and use of regulated comments on the proposed exemption response requirements, registration, and substances. EPA's proposed rule builds and requests information on whether the RMP submission to the Board, on procoss safety management elements EPA should develop an ecddent implementing agency. SERC, end LEPC. included in OSHA's standard: process prevention rule directed strictly to In addition, for some elements of the information, process hazard analysis, farmers using ammonia as a fertilizer. two programs, OSHA's focus is on standard operating procedures, training, EPA notes that farm contractors who workplace impacts while EPA's focus is pre-startup reviews, mechanical sell and apply ammonie as e fertilizer on offsite consequences, reflecting the integrity, managemont of change, would bo covered by todey's proposed differing statutory mandates of the two accident investigation, safety audits, rule. programs. The OSHA standard includes elements specific to worker issues that EPA has not included in its proposed rule. EPA anticipates that facilities in compliance with the requirements in the OSHA rule also will be in compliance with EPA's proposed and emergency response. The implementation of these elements and the development of the RMP that will be submitted to governmental authorities wall assist the owners and operators of facilities to identify hazards and construct a management system that EPA estimates that approximately 140,425 facilities would be affected by today's proposed rule. Approximately 87,800 of those facilities would also be covered by OSHA's process safety management standard. The largest prevention program elements. That is. addresses the hazards in a manner that for most prevention program elements, facilities that are in compliance with is most effective for the specific , circumstances and complexity of the OSHA's process safety management facility. standard will not need to do anything EPA's proposed rule, particularly the different or oeate different onsite prevention program, emphasizes the documentation to comply with EPA's importance of management and proposed prevention program management commitment for two requirements. Section IV of this reasons. First, without management preamble describes the differences that commitment and an integrated system sectors covered by the rules would be cold storage facilities (which use ammonia as a refrigerant), public drinking water systems and publicly owned treatment works, manufacturers, and propane retailers. Some wholesalers and service industries would also be covered. See Section X of this preamble for a discussion of the estimated coverage and costs of this proposed rule. exist between the OSHA standard and for managing process safety, it is EPA's proposed rule and outlines the unlikely that safety will be consistently correspondence between EPA's recognized as a priority. Second, proposed rule elements and the OSHA although for some facilities better or standard. Because EPA's proposed list of different technologies may be the most effective methods of addressing hazards, chemicals and thresholds and OSHA's the technologies, by themselves, cannot list and thresholds are not identical ensure safety. Equipment must be (EPA covers more substances with acute maintained and workers trained in its toxic effects, fewer flsmmables and propor uses. Changes in the process or explosives, and no reactives) and procedures may affect the safe operation because OSHA does not cover state and of technologies. Only with an integrated local government employees, the management system that continually universes of facilities covered by the evaluates the safety of a facility can the two rules are not identical, although hazards posed by regulated substances they substantially overlap. See Section be managed to minimize the likelihood X of this preamble for a discussion of of accidental releases. the universe of facilities covered by Besides lessening the likelihood and today's proposed rule. severity of accidents, the HI. Discussion of the^oposed Rule implementation of process safety management can help facilities run A. Introduction more efficiently. Companies that have AIChE, in its Technical Management of Chemical Process Safety, says: instituted risk management programs report reductions iD injuries, lost-time accidents, mechanical breakdowns, Management systems for chemical process safety are comprehensive sets of policies, procedures, and practices designed to ensure the; barriers to major incidents are in place, in use, and effective. The management maintenance costs, and material losses. Safety improvements will result in lower insurance costs. By preventing accidental releases, companies may systems serve to integrate process safety minimize environmental damage and concepts into the ongoing activities of necessary cleanup costs. See Section X everyone involved in operations--from the of this preamble for a discussion cf the chemical process operators to the chief benefits of this rule. executive officer. Effective process B. Applicability safety management systems can, and do, vary a great deal in bow they are implemented. The CAA states that facilities covered The risk management program rules would affect only those areas at facilities where regulated substances are manufactured, processed, used, stored, or otherwise handled. If a facility uses a regulated substance in quantities above a threshold in only one process (e.g., wastewater treatment or refrigeration), only that process (as well as any unloading, transferring, and storing of the substance) would be covered by the rule. If a single process at a facility includes-more than one regulated substance, a single process hazard analysis may cover all regulated substances for that process. EPA realizes that some facilities, such as batch processors (e.g., specialty chemical manufacturers), may have regulated substances on site for limitad periods during the year; for example, a batch processor may use a regulated substance for only one month dining the year. In some cases, these facilities may Dot be able to predict accurately which substances they will be handling. However, the Agency believes it is important for any facility that handles a regulated substance to have in place a program to manage risks and ensure safe operations. Because regulated substances would not be covered if they represent less than one percent by weight of a solution, EPA does hot expect that the risk management However, they always address the noed for by the risk management program program of publicly owned treatment managing the process safety-releted aspects regulations are those that have more works would need to cover the 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter ABD00086714 692 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER ' substances they receive from facilities range of accidental releases and considered, the worst case should for treatment. determine a worst-case release scenario reflect the accidental release that could C. Definitions A "significant accidental release" means any accidental release of a regulated substance that has caused or has the potential to cause offsite consequences such as death, Injury, or adverse effects to human health or the environment or to cause the public to for each location. The range of releases should include only those events that could lead to significant releases (i.e., accidental releases that have the potential to cause offsite death, injury', or serious adverse effects to human health or the environment). EPA requests comments on this issue. EPA is proposing to define the worst- occur from catastrophic vessel and piping failures. The Agency requests comments on this approach. In addition to the worst-case release scenarios, EPA would require facilities to analyze other more likely significant accidental release scenarios for each process in which the regulated substance is used above the threshold shelter in place or be evacuated to avoid case release as the instantaneous loss of quantity. The proposed rule specifies such consequences. all of the regulated substance in a "Worst-case release" would mean the process, with failure of all mitigation loss of all of the regulated substance systems (active and passive). EPA from the process in an accidental release recognizes that this definition may that leads to the worst offeitc require facilities to consider release consequences. scenarios that are highly unlikely. Such several possible accident causes that facilities should consider when defining these more likely release scenarios. The list, however, should not be viewed as all inclusive. Each facility should examine its processes to determine the D. Risk Management Program Elements a definition will, however, define for the event or sequence of events that may The Clean Air Act mandates that the risk management plan document three elements: a hazard assessment, a prevention program, and an emergency response program. This section discusses the elements EPA is proposing for the risk management program to develop each of the plan requirements. public the extreme worst-case. The roposed definition will also reduce the urden on regulated facilities; a requirement for analysis of a "credible worst-case" would lead to more analyses and documentation to defend the selected scenario. In addition, if each facility defined its own worst-case, local authorities could find it difficult to lead to significant accidental releases. When examining these potential release scenarios, facilities would be allowed to assume that passive mitigation systems, such as containment dikes, functioned properly. Active mitigation systems, such as excess flow valves, fail-safe systems, scrubbers, flares, deluge systems, and water curtains, would be Hazard Assessment compare the results. EPA requests assumed to fail. EPA requests comments As discussed above, the Clean Air Act requires a hazard assessment that includes evaluation of a range of releases including worst-case accidental releases; analyses of potential offsite comments on the worst-case definition. The Agency recognizes that this approach differs from the approach EPA used in its Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis for local planners to on this approach. The Agency plans to issue guidance on the evaluation of a range of accidental releases and determination of the worst-case scenario. consequences; and a five-year accident assess credible worst-case releases for The proposed rule does not specify history. The language in the Conference purposes of screening out situations the number of other more likely Report suggests a more extensive with little or no impact. The credible significant accidental release scenarios assessment that would require a formal worst case in the guidance assumed that facilities would be required to analyze. process hazard analysis (e.g., basic data the entire quantity of a substance was Although this approach provides on the source, identification of potential released from the largest vessel or group flexibility, it may create uncertainty points of release, review of the efficacy of interconnected vessels. Cases were about what EPA will consider an of release and control measures). To assumed to bo released in 10 minutes adequate number of scenarios. EPA allow EPA's prevention program while liquids were assumed to be requests comments on whether it should requirements to parallel OSHA's process spilled on the ground or in a diked area specify a minimum number of scenarios safety management standard, EPA is and allowed to volatilize. Downwind to be analyzed, whether the minimum proposing to separate the offsite impacts were assessed using should vary with the complexity of the consequence analysis and five-year conservative meteorological conditions. facility, and what the minimum(s) accident history from the formal process The Agency still supports this approach should be. hazard analysis requirement. The for screening, however, the Once the worst-case and more likely proposed rule would require a hazard methodology does not fully account for significant accidental release-scenarios assessment that examines a range of site-specific conditions that effect the are identified, the facility would be accidental release scenarios, selects a rate of release. For example, gases may required to analyze the potential offsite worst-case accidental release scenario, be stored in a liquefied state or a liquid consequences associated with these analyzes offsite consequences for may be handled in large quantities at scenarios. The offsite analyses would selected release scenarios including higher than ambient temperatures giving estimate, using models or other worst case, and documents a five-year much different release rates. The approaches specific to each substance, history of significant accidental releases Agency believes that the worst-case the possible rate of release, quantity and accidental releases with the analysis should account for site-specific released, and duration of the release, potential for cffsite consequences. The conditions and physical chemical and the distances in any direction that other elements suggested in the properties. the substance could travel before it Conference Report would be included The Agency considered defining dispersed enough to no longer pose a under the prevention program in the worst case as the instantaneous loss of hazard to the public health or process hazard analysis requirement. the regulated substance from the largest environment. Facilities would be EPA is proposing that facilities containment vessel or pipeline on site. required to analyze the releases under complete a hazard assessment for each This approach is similar to the average weather conditions for the regulated substance present above the Technical Guidance approach. facility and worst-case weather threshold quantity. Facilities that use However, because the threshold conditions, which would be defined as the regulated substance above its quantity applies to the quantity in a a wind speed of 1.5 meters per second threshold in several locations or process and the definition of a process and F stability (moderately stable processes would need to evaluate a defines the vessels and piping to be weather conditions). For flammables 10-27-93 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D.C. 20037 r ABD00086715 A CURRENT REPORT 693 and explosives, the analyses should methodology for assessing the offsite quantity of a regulated substance could consider the distances in all directions impacts would allow a more direct significantly change the distance a that might be affected by pressure comparison among facilities of potential substance could travel before dispersing waves, fire, or debris. The analyses offsite consequences. At the same time, and posing no hazard. Major changes in would also identify all populations that this approach could reduce the resource housing or land-use patterns, such as could be affected by such a release, burden imposed by the rule on many the construction of new, large-scale including sensitive populations (e.g., facilities, particularly smaller housing developments or commercial schools, hospitals), and would detail businesses by reducing the need for arees, could change substantially the potential environmental damage. EPA consultants to perform the offsite population potentially affected. requests comments on the level of detail consequence analysis. A final element of the hazard needed to define the population The Agency recognizes the limitations assessment specified in the Act is a five- potentially exposed. associated with simple, generic tools year history of releases of regulated The fate ana transport of the regulated that will need to cover a potentially substances. EPA interprets the accident substances can be evaluated using air wide variety of scenarios. It would be history requirement to cover significant dispersion models. EPA has published difficult to construct a generic guidance on conducting similar methodology which includes accidental releases and incidents that had the potential for offsite analyses in its Technical Guidance for assumptions about the characteristics of consequences because CAA section Hazards Analysis, much of which could chemicals, the range of chemical 112(r) is directed at preventing such be useful in developing the offsite rocesses (e.g., conditions involving releases. EPA is proposing to require the consequence analyses. Computer igh temperatures and pressures), and history to document releases that caused models to estimate the impacts of vapor other site-specific parameters. As a or had the potential to cause offsite cloud explosions also are available. result, a generic methodology will consequences. As mandated by statute, EPA, the Department of Transportation generally be less sensitive to these the history must include the substance (DOT), and the Federal Emergency conditions (or attributes) and may yield and quantity released, the concentration Management Agency have developed a overly conservative or less realistic of the substance when released, and the model--the Automated Resources for estimates of offsite impacts. The Agency duration of the release. EPA is also Chemical Hazard Incident Evaluation requests comments on this approach proposing that the date of the release, (ARCHIE)--for vapor cloud explosion and requests input on possible evaluation. The World Bank's innovative ways to assist facilities in time of the release, and any offsite consequences (e.g., evacuations, WHAZAN model also evaluates this type of incident, as do other commercially available models. Simple offsite impact analysis that might reduce the burden and provide meaningful, useful results. injuries, environmental effects) included. EPA believes that for of toxic substances, most of the be releases releases equations can be used to calculate the Specific information on the worst- that meet the criteria are already impacts of explosions at various case scenario will help public reported to the Federal or state distances. EPA plans to develop emergency planners and responders governments under CERCLA and SARA additional guidance to assist facilities in recognize the maximum hazard Title III. Therefore, development of the analvzing offsite impacts. potential surrounding the facility. The five-year history of significant Afthough the worst-case scenario is Agency recognizes, however, that the accidental releases would create little specifically defined, facilities are likely worst-case scenario may often be highly additional burden on facilities beyond to use different models and approaches unlikely in comparison to other release maintaining records. to estimate offsite impacts. In addition, scenarios with lesser potential facilities may need to use different consequences. Focusing on the worst- Prevention Program models and analytical techniques to case scenario alone, therefore, could account for site-specific conditions in lead public agencies and the public to The Act requires that the risk assessing offsite impacts associated with overestimate the threat posed by a management plan include a prevention other scenarios. The Agency recognizes facility. For this reason, EPA believes program that covers safety precautions that facilities will need to have inhouse that facilities must examine a range of and maintenance, monitoring, and expertise or hire consultants with such events in addition to the worst-case employee training measures. Although expertise to complete these offsite scenario and communicate information the Act's requirements for the impact analyses. This may pose a on these events to public agencies and prevention program are general, a significant resource burden on some the public to provide additional consensus exists among industry, facilities, and the different approaches information on the hazards posed by tht professional organizations, labor, public and models can make the offsite facility. In addition, EPA does not want interest groups, and government on consequence results more difficult for facilities to focus solely on the worst- what constitutes a good risk local emergency planners to use. The case release because other release management program. In its Review of Agency is working on ways to minimize scenarios are of concern, are generally Emergency Systems, EPA listed this burden and make the results useful far more likely than a worst-case release elements of good management for local emergency planners. For scenario, and must be addressed in the programs. The American Institute of example, the statute requires the prevention program. Therefore, EPA is Chemical Engineers (AIChE) has Administrator to issue RMP guidance requiring facilities to analyze hazards published Guidelines for Technical and model RMPs. The Agency is associated not only with the worst-case Management of Chemical Process considering the development of a set of scenario, but also with more likely Safety, which includes besically the simple, generic tools that would be significant releases. same elements. Delaware, New Jersey, included in the guidance and that could EPA would require that facilities California, and Nevada have each be used for the assessment of offsite update the offsite consequence analyses adopted state risk management program impacts. EPA could develop, for every five years, with the RMP update, regulations that again cover a similar set example, a generic methodology for or sooner if changes at the facility cr its of cl-ments. The OSHA chemical assessing the offsite impacts similar to surroundings might reasonably be process safety management standard the methodology included in the expected to make the results inaccurate covers this same set of elements. Labor Technical Guidance for Hazards to a significant degree. For example, a end environmental groups Analysis cited above. Using a generic substantial increase or decrease in the recommended similar requirements to 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Healtn Reporter ABD00086716 694 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER Congress and the agencies. Therefore, of the program are handled by different two people, with other experts the prevention program EPA is people or divisions, the names or contributing to the process when proposing today consists of elements positions of the people responsible for necessary; a HAZOP may require a core that the Federal government and several each element would also be specified team of five to seven people. For a state cgencies, as well as trade and an organization chart or similar simple process, the process hazard associations, professional organizations, document required to define the lines of analysis may take a day or two; for labor, and public interest groups believe authority. At a small facility, a single complex processes, the evaluation may are necessary in order to have an person may be responsible for all take six weeks to three months. integrated approach to understanding elements. At a large company, separate Although each prevention program and managing risks associated with divisions may handle emergency requirement is Important, EPA regulated substances at a facility. The response, training, and maintenance; considers the process hazard analysis elements of this integrated approach are SOPs may be developed separately for the critical element in developing a risk consistent with and fulfill the each process area; safety audits may be management program. When EPA requirements of the statute. conducted by corporate officials. In analyzed the data collected for the EPA is proposing a prevention such a situation, it is essential that the Review of Emergency Systems, it was program that adopts and builds on involved divisions communicate with clear that a substantial number of OSHA's process safety management each other regularly so that the people respondents did not recognize the standard and covers nine procedural in charge of training know when SOPs hazards associated with either the areas: Process hazard analysis, process have been revised and that the chemicals involved or the processes safety information, standard operating emergency response personnel know used. For the most commonly used, procedures (SOPs), training, when changes to processes may affect high-volume chemicals, such as maintenance, pre-startup review, the hazards in a location. The purpose ammonia and chlorine, a large number management of change, safety audits, of the proposed management of facilities were relatively unaware of and accident investigation. The degree requirement is to have facility the hazards involved. A process hazard of complexity required for compliance management define a system that analysis would help facilities identify for each element will depend on the integrates the implementation of the hazards and ways to address them. For complexity of the facility. For example, elements and assigns responsibility for example, a 1989 explosion and fire at a development of process safety information would take far more time and would require greater expertise at a large petrochemical facility than it would at a smell drinking water system. As they develop plans for implementing the elements, facility owners or operators would have to consider the complexity of their chemical use, the hazards potentially posed by the chemicals, and potential consequences of an accidental release. The prevention program elements must be integrated with each other on an ongoing basis. For example, each time a new substance is introduced to a process or new equipment is installed, the process hazard analysis must be reviewed, SOPs updated, training and maintenance programs revised, with new training if needed. An investigation of a near miss or a safety audit may reveal the need for revised operating and maintenance procedures, which that implementation. Process Hazard Analysis The AJChE's Guidelines for Hazord Evaluation Procedures (AIChE, 1985) defines a hazard evaluation (also known as a process hazard analysis) as a rocedure intended "to identify the azards that exist, the consequences that may occur as a result of the hazards, the likelihood that events may take place that would cause an accident with such a consequence, and the likelihood that safety systems, mitigating systems, and emergency alarms and evacuation plans would function properly and eliminate or reduce the consequences." A process hazard analysis involves the application of a formal technique, such as a "What IF' or a hazards and operability study (HAZOP). (AIChE's Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures provides descriptions of facility in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, led to a partial loss of pressure, power, and fire water because the power, steam, and water lines were co-located with the lines carrying flammable gases. The losses complicated and prolonged the process of responding to the release, thereby increasing the damage caused by the release. Similar problems occurred at a facility in Norco, Louisiana, where an explosion led to the loss of all utilities. A thorough and properly done process hazard analysis should identify these types of potential hazards and allow facilities to determine how to mitigate the problems. Process hazard analyses also identify situations where major accidents due to control failure (e.g., pressure gauges, overfill alarms) could be prevented by redundant or backup controls or by frequent maintenance and inspection practices. will lead to revisions to SOPs, training, these techniques.) Formal techniques Many other elements of a risk and maintenance. The investigation or provide a method for a rigorous, step- management program should flow from, audit may also indicate a need to review by-step examination of processes, or at least be revised based on, the the process hazard analysis. The process equipment and controls, and management system should ensure that procedures to identify each point at results of the process hazard analysis. Existing standard operating procedures, a change in any single element leads to which a mishap may occur (e.g., a valve training and maintenance programs, and a review of other elements to identify failing, a gauge malfunctioning, human pre-startup reviews may need to be any impacts caused by the change. error) and examine the possible revised to reflect changes in either Management System consequences of that mishap, by itself practices or equipment that derive from and in combination with other possible the process hazard analysis. The process Because it is essential that all of the mishaps. The result of a properly hazard analysis may help define critical prevention program elements be conducted process hazard analysis is a equipment that requires preventive integrated into a management system list of possible hazards of the process at maintenance, inspection, and testing that is implemented on an ongoing the facility that could lead to a loss of programs. It may also help a facility basis, EPA is proposing that the owner containment and release of a regulated focus its emergency response programs or operator of the facility designate a substance. Process hazard analyses must on the most likely and most serious single person or position to be be conducted by people trained in the release scenarios. For many facilities, responsible for the development and techniques and knowledgeable about the process hazard analysis may be implementation of the overall program. the process and facility being examined. necessary to help define the worst-case At facilities where individual elements Such evaluations usually require at least release scenario that generates the worst 10-27-93 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., Washington, O.C. 20037 ABD00086717 fit A CURRENT REPORT 695 offsite consequences. A secondary external events could lead to an document material and energy balances benefit of the process hazard analysis is accidental release. The evaluation for new equipment in a process that that it also can be used to identify would also review the efficacy of pollution prevention opportunities. The prevention and control measures to same changes in procedures, equipment, prevent accidental releases. The team controls, or chemicals that may lessen conducting the process hazard analysis involve a regulated substance above the threshold quantity to ensure that the equipment is appropriately designed for the process. The material balance is the likelihood of an accidental release would include at least one person intended only for ensuring the proper often increase the efficiency of knowledgeable in the technique and one design basis for the equipment and is operations and result in waste knowledgeable in the process. EPA not useful for process inventory minimization. These changes may requests comments on whether the accounting or measurement of chemical reduce costs for facilities by improving requirement for a person knowledgeable loss. For example, it Is necessary to the consistency and quality of products in the technique should be waived for know the flow rate in mass per unit and by decreasing the amount of waste facilities using checklists and what if time to properly design a heat that needs to be treated. The proposed rule would require questions from a model RMP. The team exchanger;however, this flow rate does would be required to submit findings not give the mass of the substance facilities to conduct process hazard and recommendations to the owner or consumed or lost in a reaction system. analyses after determining a priority order for the analyses based on the operator, who then would have to All required process safety information document all actions taken in response would apply only to affected degree of hazard posed by the processes to the findings and recommendations, equipment, not tne facility as a whole. covered by the rule; that is, the facility including schedules for implementing Chemical information is available from would have to conduct its analyses on changes. In response to the CAA's Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) the most hazardous processes first, requirement that the prevention where the degree of hazard is related to program include monitoring, EPA is potential offsite consequences, proposing that the owner or operator mandated under OSHA's hazard communication standard (29 CFR 1910.1200). The level of process operating history of the process, and the investigate and document a plan for (or technology and equipment information age of the process. Facilities would be a rationale for not) installing systems to would vary with the type of facility. For required to use one or more of six techniques: What If, Checklist, What If/ Checklist, HAZOP, failure mode and effects analysis, or fault tree analysis. Facilities could also use an equitialent detect, contain, or mitigate accidental releases if such systems are not already in place. Because accidental releases can be limited or mitigated by the use of detection, secondary containment, warehouses, wholesalers, and service industries, little equipment information would be needed unless special equipment is used with the regulated substances. For manufacturers, more methodology provided the facility could and mitigation systems, facilities should extensive information would be demonstrate tnet the methodology is consider whether the hazards they have required, including flow charts, piping equivalent to the listed methods. identified could be addressed through and instrumentation diagrams of the The complexity of the process hazard such systems. The decision on whether facility as it currently exists, and analysis procedure will depend on the such systems are the best way to address electrical, relief, ventilation, and safety complexity of the processes to which it the hazard must, however, rest, in the system specifications. is applied. Any of the listed techniques first instance, with the facility's can be used for simple and complex management. In some cases, monitors Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) processes although, for simple and detectors do not exist: mitigation The results of the process hazard processes, the simpler procedures, such systems may not be technically feasible analysis, information developed during as the What If, may be more appropriate. for certain types of releases. In other the design of a process, and industry Facilities such as wholesalers who load, cases, steps such as improved and facility experience combine to unload, store, and sometimes repackage procedures.and maintenance may define the proper way to conduct regulated substances would be able to provide a more cost-effective approach operations ana maintain equipment. use a simple technique such as a to controlling the hazards. The purpose SOPs describe the tasks to be performed checklist to ensure that the substances of the requirement is to ensure that by the operator, the operating are stored and handled properly and facilities consider the available options parameters (e.g., temperature, pressure) that fire suppression systems are and find the best method for the facility that must be maintained, and safety appropriate for the substances at the facility. Application of the more to address accidental releases. precautions needed for both operations As required by the CAA, the process and maintenance activities. SOPs must complex procedures, such as the hazard analysis must be reviewed and specify the consequences of deviations HAZOP ox fault tree, requires updated periodically. EPA is proposing from safe operating limits (e.g., if the considerable technical expertise and that the process hazard analysis be safe operating temperatures are between may be more appropriate for complex reviewed and updated at least every five 100 and 150C, the SOPs should processes, such as those at years, which is the same interval indicate what happens if the petrochemical facilities. In some cases, specified in the OSHA process safety tomperature is above or below those facilities will want to use several management standard. limits). Written SOPs provide a guide to techniques: for example, e facility might start with a What If analysis to identify Process Safety Information safe operations in a form that can be used by employees. Lack of SOPs and high hazard areas, then use a HAZOP or The process hazard analysis must be inadequate SOPs have been implicated fault tree method to examine those areas based on up-to-date chemical and in a number of catastrophic accidents. in greater detail. EPA is planning to process information, including For example, improper maintenance develop guidance to help facilities information on physical and chemical procedures have been blamed for a select and use process hazard analysis hazards, process technology (e.g., release and explosion at a facility in techniques. process chemistry, process parameters), New Castle, Delaware, in 1980, which The process hazard analysis would and equipment (e.g., equipment killed six people, injured 27 others, and require facilities to conduct a systematic specifications and design, piping and caused more than $63 million in examination of the process and instrumentation drawings). As per property damage to the facility. procedures to identify ways in which OSHA, after the effective date of the SOPs, which define the proper steps equipment malfiinctioh, human error, or rule, facilities would also have to tc take in these emergency situations, 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Healtn Reporter ABD00086718 696 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER provide a quick source of information that can prevent or mitigate the effects of accidents. SOPs also provide workers and management a standard against which to assess performance; the procedures clarify for both operators and supervisors how operations should be carried out at the facility. Application of SOPs can result in more cost-effective operations by ensuring that operators adhere to procedures that maximize both the safety and efficiency of a process. EFA is proposing that each facility develop written SOPs for each process and operation involving the regulated substance above the threshold. The SOPs would include instructions on steps for each operating phase (e.g., initial startup, normal operation, emergency shutdowns, normal shutdowns, emergency operations), operating limits, safety and health considerations, and safety systems. The facility would also be required to provide for control of hazards during operations involving lockout/tagout, confined space entry, and opening process equipment or lines. The facility would also need SOPs to control entrance to the facility by support personnel. The level of detail included in the SOP should be appropriate for the operation covered. For example, instructions for proper storage of chemicals may be relatively brief, while procedures for routine startup of a complex process may require considerable detail to ensure that each action required is detailed and explained. EPA emphasizes that the SOPs should be usable by the operators in running the process; that is, die SOPs should be written in a language and at a level appropriate for the operators. Training Training provides employees with the information needed to understand what they must do to operate safely and why safe operations are necessary. The required training program is the key to ensuring the effectiveness of other program elements such os SOPs, maintenance programs, pre-startup reviews, and emergency response. Refresher training ensures that employees are reminded of appropriate procedures periodically. Training programs often provide immediate benefits to facilities because trained employees have fewer accidents, damage less equipment through mishandling, and conduct more efficient operations. Inadequately trained maintenance workers have been implicated in the 1969 disaster in Pasadena, Texas, whichJulled 23 people, injured 130 others, and destroyed $750 million of property at the facility. In 1986, at a plating facility in Auburn, Indiana, untrained workers used hydrochloric add to clean a tank that had held zinc cyanide. The resulting hydrogen cyanide killed five workers and sent more than ten others to the hospital. The proposed rule would require each owner or operator to train employees in applicable and appropriate SOPs and provide refresher training at least once every three years. Employers would also be required to ensure that each employee is competent to operate the process safely. EPA is not proposing specific standards for the training requirements because the Agency' believes that each fadlity should have the flexibility to develop a training program that reflects its individual situation. Facilities that handle but do not process regulated substances (e.g., many fadlities in the nonmanufacturing sector) may provide relatively brief training because the procedures to be taught involve a few simple stops. For a complex manufacturing fadlity, training may take much longer for some operations. For some fadlities, formal group training programs may be feasible; for small facilities, one-on-one training may be more appropriate. The form of the training program is loss important than that relevant training is delivered in a manner most likely to be understood. Facilities would be required to document their training programs to indicate when employees were trained. EPA is also not proposing specific means of ensuring that the training is understood, such as testing, but would simply require that the owner or operator develop a system for ensuring competence and document that system. The proposed rule would require facilities to evaluete the effectiveness of the training and develop a schedule for reviewing and revising the training. EPA requests comments on this approach to training requirements. Maintenance (Mechanical Integrity) The Act spedfies that the prevention program must include requirements for equipment maintenance. Preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing of equipment are critical to safe operations at a facility. Waiting for equipment to fail often means waiting until an accidental release occurs before addressing a problem. This approach is not acceptable, espedally considering the extremely hazardous characteristics of the regulated substances. Preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing are needed because many of the potential failures are not obvious from visual inspections. For example, failed alarm systems or detectors rosy need to be tested to determine if they are functioning properly; detectors and monitors, which can provide early warnings of releases, must be calibrated periodically; corrosion of vessels and piping, a hazard with many chemicals, can be detected through testing well before the vessels or pipes fail; scheduled cleaning, oihng, or replacement of parts can prevent equipment failure. A large Dumber of the accidents reported in the Marsh and McLennan review of the 100 largest losses in the petrochemical industry (Large Property Damage Losses in the Hydrocarbon-Chemical Industries. 8 Thirty-Year Review, 1990) were the result of equipment failure that might have been avoided through preventive maintenance. A 1978 fire and explosion at a Texas City, Texas, facility that led to almost $100 million in property damage was attributed to instrument failure and a faulty* relief valve. A 1989 accident in Richmond, California, that injured workers and responders was caused by a failed weld. Besides preventing accidental releases, maintenance programs also provide direct benefits to facilities by decreasing the amount of costly down time that can result from failed equipment. Even in incidents where there is serious property damage, the lost business costs can be significantly greater than the property damage resulting directly from an accident. EPA is proposing that fadlities develop and implement a maintenance program, with written maintenance procedures and training for maintenance workers, for equipment and controls whose failure could lead to a significant accidental release. This equipment may include pressure vessels, storage tanks, piping systems, relief and venting systems, emergency shutdown systems, and controls such as monitors, alarms, sensors, and interlocks. Covered equipment should be inspected, tested, and subject to preventive maintenance. The intervals for such maintenance wouid depend on the equipment and bow it is used. Manufacturers' recommendations may be used to set such schedules and determine testing procedures, but the aDplicability of those recommendations should be reviewed in light of industry and facility experience and the results of the process hazard analysis. In some cases, facilities will need to schedule more frequent inspections based on their specific uses or experience with equipment failure rales, or because the process hazard analysis indicated that A n 10-27-93 Published By THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D.C. 20037 ABD00086719 CURRENT REPORT failure of a particular piece of to improve safety and efficiency, any For example, it is not enough to develop equipment could result in a catastrophic modification can have unintended and train employees on standard loss of containment. Facilities woula be effects and requires a specific review of operating procedures; the facility must required to replace or repair in a timely the safety implications of the change. check to see that procedures are being manner any equipment that is found to Other process modifications are followed. Therefore, a safety audit is be outside acceptable limits. Facilities instituted in response to a specific more than a review of regulatory would also be required to develop problem that arises unexpectedly. It was compliance; it is a check, by procedures to ensure that replacement sueh an unexaminod change in the management, that the facility is being equipment and parts meet design installation of a temporary bypass at operotod safely. Facilities would be specifications. Owners and operators Flixborough, England, that led to the required to document their audits in a would be required to document their 1374 release and explosion that killed report that includes findings and maintenance program, including the 2B employees, injured B9 people, end recommendations. Management's written procedures, the schedules used, damaged almost 2,000 properties off response to the findings would also be and the results of each inspection and site. documented. EPA chose the three-year test performed. The level of complexity Therefore. EPA is proposing to require interval to bo consistent with the OSHA and detail in the maintenance program manegomem of change procedures. requirement for safety audits. EPA notes would be directly related to the These procedures are important for two that for large facilities and those with a complexity of the operations and reasons: (1) They help facilities evaluate number of covered processes, the audit equipment. changes and prevent accidents caused would not need to be performed at one Pre-Startup Review Startup of e new or modified system can be a particularly hazardous time for facilities, especially for complex processes and those that require high temperatures, high pressures, or potentially exothermic reactions. by unintended effects from alterations of equipment, procedures, and chemicals; and (2) they ensure that the process safety information and process hazard analyses are kept up-to-cete. Under the proposed rale, Lbo owner cr operator of a facility would be required to evaluate every change in equipment (except time. The facility may choose to audit different processes on different schedules. The proposed rule would require only that over each three-year period, ell covered processes are audited. Accident Investigation However, even simple facilities need to changes that satisfy the design Accident? can provide valuable conduct such reviews. For example, specifications of the device replaced), information about hazards end the steps before a chemical distributor accepts a processes, chemicals, or procedures to needed to prevent accidental releases. new regulated substance, the distributor ensure that tiro technical basis of tho should check that the fire suppression changa is documented and that the system is appropriate for the substance, change does not create new hazards; if Many times, the immediate cause of an accident is the result c.ra series of other problems that noed to bo addressed to that workers know how to handle and new hazards ara crested or if the change prevent recurrences. For example, an store the substance, and that emergency results in different procedures being operator's mistake rosy be the result of response procedures are in place to needed, those hazards and changes poor training, inappropriate SOPs, cr handle an accidental release. would need to be odriressod prior to To heip ensure safety during startup, implementation. Training, SOPs, and poor design of control systems: equipment failure may result from EPA is proposing that all critical maintenance programs may need to be improper maintenance, misuse of . systems be checked prior to startup of revised as a result of changes; the equipment (operating at too high a a new cr substantially modified process. process hazard analysts anti hazard A new system would require a process assessment may nesd to be revised as temperature), or u:a cf incompatible meteri&is. Without e thorough Lacard analysis prior to startup. A well. investigation, facilities may muss the substantially modified process wculd include any process where the changes Safety Audits cpport-.ir.ity to identify and solve the root problems. to the process are significant enough to An important tool in ensuring that the Therefore. EPA is proposing that require a reevaiuation cf the hazards rocess safety management elements are facilities investigate each significant involved because iiow hazards may have eing implemented is tho periodic accidental release. As discussed above, been created as a result of the changes. safety audit. The safety audit provides a significant accidental release is one This review would include a list cf management with a mechanism for that caused or had the potential to cause items that operators would need to oversight of the implementation of the offsite death, injury, or serious adverse check or test before beginning an safety elements and of the overall safety effects on human health and tire operation. Each pre-startup review cf the facility. Safety audits may take environment. EPA notes that significant should ensure that SOPs ere in place many different forms; some facilities use accidents! release does not include near- and training has been conducted. audits to check on compliance with misses. EPA agrees with AIChE that Management cf Change specific regulations, some do spot- "while it is important to investigate all chocks of safety practices, while others incidents, as the lessons learned in Chemical processes are integrated review all key aspects of safety preventing future incidents ere not ot all systems; changes in cue part of the management. related to the magnitude of the process can have unintended effects in The proposed regulations would occurrence-, it is unquestionable that, at other parts cf the system. For example, require facilities to conduct a complete the very least, `major incidents* should installation of better seals may increase safety eudit once every three years to be investigated" (Guidelines for the prossure in vessols. it is, therefore, ensure that the process safety Technical Management of Chemical important that all changes in processes, management elements are in place, Process Safety). EPA encourages chemicals, and procedures be reviewed updated, and being implemented facilities to investigate all accidental prior to their implementation to identify properly. Although compliance with the releases, but would require only that any potential hazards that may be proposed elements will provide an significant accidental releases be created by the modification. Although indication of safe operations, other investigated. EPA defints significant roost changes at facilities are intended considerations are important as well. accidental release as "any accidental 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Healtn Reporter ABD00086720 A 698 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER release of a regulated substance that has caused or has the potential to cause offsite consequences such as death, injury, or adverse effects to human health or the environment or to cause the public to shelter-ir.-placo or be cvacuatod to avoid such consequences." EPA requests comments on this approach to define the range of incidents requiring accident investigation. In particular, the Agency is interested in whether this definition covers too broad or too narrow a set of incidents, and requests comments on any alternative definition that provides greater regulatory certainty. The accident investigation would determine, to the extent possible, the initiating event that led to the release, and die root ceuse(s); EPA emphasizes that identification of the root causes fe.g., misdesigned piping run) may be more important than identification of the initialing event (e.g., failed flange), ihe investigation would be summarized in n report to management; the report would include recommendations for steps that need 1c be taken to prevent recurrences (e.g.. piping design review) end improve emergency response and mitigation measures. Management would bo required to document its decisions on the recommendations. As with tho management c-f chcnge procedures, the degree of the accident investigation and documentation will vary' with the potential seriousness of tiie ectident. For example, a minor release that was prevented from becoming a major release only by prompt action of operators may require more investigation than a large release that can be quickly attributed to single failure (e.g., a faulty high-level alarm). EPA is also concerned about near misses. Investigation of such incidents may provide facilities with important information on problems that should be addressed bofore a significant accidental release occurs. Information on near misses could help the Agency and facilities understand bow accidents occur and hew they can be prevented. EPA does not consider a release that occurred, but did not offset the public or the environment because of favorable weather conditions at the time of thG release, a near miss. EPA considers this incident a significant occidental release and, therefore, it needs to be investigated. A near miss would refer to mishaps that did not result in a release for some reason other than explicit system design. For example, a release from a pressure relief valve that is vented to a scrubber would not be a near miss because the system is designed to ensure that relief valve releases ere contained and treated. A near miss is a mishap that did not result in a release because of employee ections or luck. For example, a runaway reaction that is brought under control by operators is a near miss and should be investigated to determine why the problem occurred. EPA requests comments on whether facilities should be required to investigate noar misses and on how near rniss should be defined. Emergency Response CAA specifies that the emergency response program include actions to be taken to protect human health and the environment in response to a release, including informing the public and local 8goncies, emergency health care, and employee training. Emergency response procedures are a necessary part of a risk management program because accidents do happen even with the best sefaty systems in place. Emergency response procedures can reduce the severity of a release and protoct employees, emergency responders, and tho public from harmful exposure to the regulated substances. As discussed above, the damage from accidents and risks to responders can be increased if releases have the potential to damage or.destroy utilities end equipment needed to respond to the incident. The emergency response plan helps define these worst cases end develop an approach to prevent potential problems. EPA is proposing that each facility develop an emergency response plan that defines the steps the facility end each employee should take during an accidental release of a regulated substance. The plan would include both evacuation or protective action procedures for employees not directly involved in the response to the release, and the actions taken by employees responsible for responding to and mitigating tire release. All employees would be trained in applicable emergency response procedures. The emergency response plan would include descriptions of all response and mitigation systems. The emergency response plan would also include procedures for notifying the public of releases and of appropriate protective actions and procedures for notifying public agencies. The facility would be required to develop information on proper first-aid and emergency medical care necessary to treat accidental human exposure. EPA is also proposing that the facility emergency response plan be coordinated with the local emergency planning committee (LEPC) plans required under EPCRA for chemical releases. Upon request of the LEPC, the facility would be required to provide the LEPC with information necessary to develop and implement the LEPC plan. This requirement is a restatement of the mandate of EPCRA section 303(d)(3) and would be included in this rule to ensure that the facility and community planning efforts are coordinated, which will improve both plans, thereby facilitating effective response actions when releases occur. Facilities would be required to develop written procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its maintenance, inspection, and testing. Facilities would be required to conduct drills or exercises to test facility plans and revise the plans based on the results; facilities would be responsible for determining the number and type of drills or exercises they need to conduct and the frequency of these tests. 'dost facilities are already required to have at least part of the emergency response plan in place, OSHA requires emergency action plans (29 CFR 1910.38{aj). Facilities that are subject to OSHA's and EPA's Hazardous Waste Operations end Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) rules (29 CFR 1910.120 and 40 CFR Pert 311) also must conduct training for their facility response personnel. Facilities covered by EPA's RCRA regulations (40 CFR Parts 264 end 265) or by Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure rules (40 CFR Par. 112) also are required to have many of tha emergency response elements in place. EPA requests comments cn how the proposed requirements can be best integrated with these existing programs to minimize duplication. E. ?<MF and Documentation EPA is proposing that e risk management plan (RMP) be submitted to the implementing agonev, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, the SERC, and to the LEPC. and be made available to the public. EPA is proposing to make a distinction between the RMP that is submitted to these agencies (end through them to the public) and the documentation supporting the implementation of tho risk management program elements that e facility would be required to maintain on site for inspection by EPA and other agencies. The purpose of the RMP is two-fold: First, to provide government agencies and the public with sufficient information to understand the hazards at the facility and the approach the facility is using to manage the risks and. second, to have the facility develop an ongoing system for managing implementation of safety practices and procedures. The information provided r 10-27-93 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D.C. 20037 ABD00086721 v**- CURRENT REPORT ftr 699 in the RMP will assist government agendas in assessing the quality and thoroughness of a fadiity's risk management program. Because of the large number of potentially affected facilities, it is unlikely that EPA or the state implementing agency will audit a substantial percentage of the fsdlities in any one year. Consequently, it is important that government agendas have enough information in the RMP to identify those fadlities that pose the greatest potential hazards, either because of the quantity and kind of substances in use or because cf prevention practices. The RMP information also will assist local emergency planners. UndeSARA Title IH, local planners have received information on substances and quantities at fadlities. The RM? will add to these data by providing information on hazards and practices. For example, a large fadlity with a wellimplemented risk management system may pose less of a hazard than smaller facilities, with smaller quantities of chemicals, that have weak programs. With this information, local planners will be better able to focus on facilities that pose the greatest risk and target their work with facilities to improve prevention practices. The public will be able to identify hazards and risk management procedures from the RMP without having important information obscured by detailed submissions. The second purpose ofthe RMP is to assist facilities in integrating the risk management program elements. Each facility will approach the management of its hazards in a way that is appropriate for Its specific situation. For small facilities, one person may be responsible for implementing and integrating the elements. In large corporations, many ofthe elements may be handled by different operating divisions. Tne RMP would include information on the management system the facility uses to integrate the elements and ensure responsibility for the program. EPA thinks that this is an essential step in successful implementation of the program because unless management is accountable for safety and makes it a priority, other employees may not consider safety important. Equally important, by reporting on how it is addressing each of its major hazards, the facility would have to explain bow it has applied the various risk management program elements to prevent accidental releases. The proposed rule would require facilities to submit an RMP that includes the following information: A copy of the registration form; A summary of the offsite consequence analyses including worst- case and other more likely release scenarios; The five-year history of significant accidental releases for each regulated substance; A list of the major hazards defined through the process hazard analysis, the consequences of failure to control each major hazard, the steps management is taking or planning to take to address the hazards, and an implementation schedule for each step listed; A summary of any risk management program elements not covered under the steps taken to address specific hazards (e.g., if training has not been revised to respond to any listed hazard, a summary of the training program would be neeued); A summary of the facility's emergency response program, including dates and schedules for drills completed and planned, information on coordination with the public, procedures for notifying and alerting the public of a release, and the name of person responsible for coordinating with public agencies; A description of the management system used to implement and integrate the elements of the hazard assossment, prevention program, and emergency response program; and A certification of the accurocy end completeness of the information. EPA envisions the RMP to be comprehensive and succinct. The offsite consequence analysis information should be a summary of the documentation already developed during the hazard assessment. To keep the size of the RMP manageable, EPA requests comments on whether it should specify a maximum number of release scenarios e facility may submit as pert of its offsite consequonce analyses. Complex facilities may conduct a substantial number of such scenarios; submission of every scenario analyzed could overwhelm tie user and make the information less useful. The accident histories can be presented as tables or lists. EPA is not proposing that fadlities include every hazard identified through a process hazard analysis, but rather that the RMP include only those hazards that have the potential to lead to significant ecddental releases with offsite consequences. For each item included in the RMP. the documentation required by the rule w-ould serve as supporting information. The information provided should be brief. For example, if corrosion in piping is a hazard, the facility would list corrosion in piping followed by any steps taken to control corrosion and to ensure that corroded pipes are replaced before a release occurs. These steps might include periodic ultrasonic testing, replacement of pipes, or something similar. For facilities where the steps taken to address hazards apply to several hazards, the hazards can be grouped under the stops. For example, if revised operating procedures and training were used to control and prevent a number of hazards, the facility could list operating procedures ond training followed by the hazards to which they apply. Id this way, duplicative entries can be minimized. The length of the list of hazards would volt with the complexity of the facility and with the current state of prevention practices. EPA is proposing on RMP that summarizes the program because the Agency believes that the information of most use to the public and local agencies wdll be related to the hazard assessment and consequence analysis, as well as general descriptions of hazards at the facility. Other detailed information is likely to be of little interest and, if submitted, could overwhelm the ability of locai sgencies to manage and use the information. EPA also believes that the RMPs should not include information that facilities can legitimately claim as confidential business information under CAA section 114(c). The RMP should provide local and state agencies and the public with sufficient information to determine if additional information is needed. The information will be available, if needed, to EPA or state officials conducting audits or compliance inspections. EPA requests comments on the RMP end particularly on the information communities, local authorities, and public interest groups will find useful in assessing the hazards posed by facilities. EPA also requests comments on the kinds of information facilities consider confidential (and how facilities can report on hazards without revealing confidential data). EPA is proposing that the RMP shall be submitted to the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, to the implementing agency, the state, and to local emergency planning committees. EPA asks for comments on other local agencies that may want a copy of the RMP. EPA is concerned about the burden such submissions may place on the entities receiving the RMPs. If each RMP is submitted, the Board could receive more than 140.000 plans; some states could receive several thousand documents. At the local level, the number could vary from a few to more than 50 plans. 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter ABD00086722 700 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER EPA is considering three options thet might lessen the burden. First, EPA could develop computer software thet would provide facilities with standard formats for completing the information required in the RMP. The RMP could then be submitted on disk in a format that would allow the government agency to locate information quickly. EPA recognizes thet while this approach might ease storage problems and related burdens for the Board and the states, many local entities are not equipped to receive documents on disk. In addition, many of the smaller facilities covered by the rule msv not yet be computerized. Therefore, this approach would work for only pert of the facilities and recipients. The second option would ba to allow local authorities to designate the state as the receiving entity, thereby lessening the burden on the local authorities. The third approech would be to require that the RMP be submitted only on request from the Board, state, or local entity. Facilities would be required to develop the RMP and keep a copy available on site, but would submit it only if requested. EPA solicits comments on these approaches and specifically asks for suggestions on other wavs EPA might be able to facilitate the management and use o: the RMP information by state and local agencies. Section 112(r)(7)(B)(iii) requires EPA to establish, by rule, a system for auditing RMPs and requiring revisions where necessary. EPA is proposing that facilities be selected for audits based on a cumber of criteria. Specific accidents at e facility or the facility's five-year history of accidents would be one criterion used to select d facility for on audit; similarly, if other facilities in the same industry shew a pattern of accidents with regulated substances, a facility might be selected for an audit to ensure that it is addressing the kinds of hazards causing releases at similar facilities. The quantities of reguletGd substances or the presence cl spocific regulated substances would also ba criteria. For example, facilities with high volumes of one or more regulated substance might be selected, or the audits might focus on particular substances. The location of the facility would be a criterion for selection; facilities close to populated areas, or sensitive populations or ecosystems might be audited because of the potential hazard they pose. The hazards identified in the RMP would be a criterion for selection. Finally, facilities might be randomly selected to provide neumai oversight. EPA requests comments on the proposed criteria. EPA a.*fc recuiats comments on whether major facilities should be audited on a regular schedule (e.g., every three to five years). The audit is designed to cover the adequacy of the RMP. If, based on the audit, the implementing agency decides that revisions to the RMP are needed, the agency would issue a preliminary determination explaining the basis for the revision and a timetable. This preliminary determination shall include an explanation for the basis for the revisions, reflecting industry standards and guidelines (such as AIChE/CCPS guidelines and ASME and API standards) to the extent that such standards and guidelines are applicable, and shall include a timetable for ;heix implementation. The owner or operator would have 90 days to respond to the preliminary determination in writing, either agreeing to implement the changes or rejecting the revisions, in whole or in part, with an explanation for any rejection. In its response, the owner or operator may develop substitute revisions addressing the same issues addressed in the preliminary determination. After providing the owner or operator an opportunity to respond, the agency would issue a final determination, which may adopt or modify proposed revisions, or may edopt substitute revisions proposed by the facility. A final determination that rejects a substitute revision would explain the reason for the rejection. Thirty days efte: the final determination, the facility would be considered to be in violation of the rule unless tho RMP is revised. The public would be assured access to preliminary determinations, responses, and final determinations. In addition to the RMP, the facility would be required to maintain onsite documentation of its process hazard analysis, offsite consequence analysis, process information (e.g., PSdDs, MSDSs), training end maintenance programs, SQPs, pre-startup review list, management of change procedures and records, compliance audits, accident investigation procedures and reports, and emergency response plans. This documentation would include schedules for starting end completing actions based on the recommendations of the process hazard analysis, safety audit, and accident investigation. These documentation requirements are similar to those imposed under OSHA's standard. F. Registration Information Required The Act requires that RMPs be registered with EPA prior to the effective date of the regulation. EPa is proposing that, within three years of the date of publication of the final rule, all facilities register with EPA if they have a regulated substance in a quantity that exceeds the threshold quantity. EPA is proposing a simple registration that would require most facilities to complete a one-page form; facilities with large numbers of regulated substances may need an additional page to list the substances. The registration would ask for the name and address of the facility, the facility's Dun and Bradstreet number, the regulated substances on site, quantities of the substances (in ranges), and the facility's Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code(s) that epply to the use of each substance. If, at any time after tho registration is submitted, the information becomes inaccurate, the facility would be required to file an amended registration within 60 days with the Administrator and the implementing agency. The association ofSIC codes with specific substances would allow EPA to identify the types of processes in which a facility may use the substance without requiring the facility to provide detailed inrormation during registration. The Dun and Bradstreet number is a common identifier fer facilities end would allow EPA to cross-reference the date with ether EPA databases. Most of the information requested is alreadyreported under SARA Title III. The reporting ranges proposed are the same ranges used for SARA Title HI reporting. EPA is proposing a registration requirement tor several reasons. First. Lhe statute recuires that RMPs be registered with EPA. Second, EPA is required to establish a system for auditing RMPs. To implement an auditing system. EFA and state agencies that implement the program need to knew which facilities are covered by the ruio es well as the chemicals they havo on site. Facilities may be selected for auditing based on location, quantities of chemicals on site, specific chemicals, or other criteria. A central source of information on which facilities are covered, for which chemicals, and in which industries is essential to apply criteria for selecting facilities for audits in an equitable manner. Finally, although meny of the facilities file similar information with EPA, no current source of data induct's all facilities likely to be effected by the proposed rule. EPCRA section 313, for which a national database exists, covers only manufacturers and does not include many of the chemicals proposed for listing. Some of the fadlities uni! i-n permitted under RCRA, but most unii 10-27-93 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC., Washington, D.C. 20037 ABD00086723 CURRENT REPORT not be. Except for facilities not covered by OSHA's Hazard Communications Standard, most other facilities potentially affected by this proposed rule are also covered by EPCRA section 312. However, EPA does not receive section 312 data. Because these data are primarily used at the local level, only a few states have created section 312 databases. In addition, in many states facilities are not required to file chemical-specific Information under section 312. Even if every state had a section 312 database, it would not be possible to identify facilities potentially covered by this proposed rule with the section 312 data. Consequently, a separate registration is needed. EPA considered requiring an earlier registration to help identify potentially affected facilities and disseminate guidance lo them. An earlier registration (either 12 months or 24 months after the date of promulgation) would also help states determine the scope of their implementation programs. EPA requests comments on whether an earlier registration would be beneficial. Implementation EPA has two main concerns about the implementation of the registration requirement: that multiple or duplicative Slings be avoided to the maximum extent possible and that the burden for processing the information be minimized. EPA requests suggestions on how the registration information might be combined with other forms facilities are required to file to limit the repetitive reporting required of facilities. For example, EPA is considering using the EPCRA section 312 Tier II form as e substitute because th6 Agency believes this would facilitate integration of CAA activities with SARA Title HI activities and would lessen the burden on facilities. EPA's second concern involves the burden on the government to process the information filed. Each registration will include information that would need to be screened for accuracy. For example, the Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) number and chemical name would need to be checked to make sure that they match and are covered by the rule. SIC codes. Dun and Bradstreet numbers, and quantity range codes would need to be reviewed to ensure that the format (number of digits) and codes were acceptable (i.e., that valid codes were used). Such review could place a substantial burden on EPA and slates. EPA is. therefore, considering developing software that would allow electronic filing of the information. The software would perform the quality control function automatically. CAS numbers would be checked to see if they were on the list; the chemical name could then be entered automatically. A list of known synonyms for the listed substances could be included. SIC codes could be checked to ensure that the codes entered actually exist; the format for Dun & Bradstreet cumbers could also be reviewed. Messages alerting the facility that the information entered was not acceptable would be provided. Such a computerized form would lessen the time needed to process the information; it would also provide facilities with a quick check on the accuracy of their information end assure them that th9 data would be accurately represented in EPA's database. If facilities used such a computerized filing, however, they would stiff need to submit a signed certification. EPA recognizes that some facilities may not be computerized or may prefer to file a printed form. Although EPA would prefer a computerized filing, printed forms would be acceptable. EPA requests comments on its plan to encourage computerized filings and specifically solicits suggestions on bow such filings could be coordinated with other information filed on disk. For example, are there other software packages for computerized EPA filings that the RMP registration should be compatible with to facilitate data sharing and limit the amount of rekeying facilities would have to do? G. Prohibitions CAA section H2(r)(7)(E) states that after the effective date of the risk management program regulations it shall be unlawful for any person to operate any stationary sourco subject to the regulations in violation of the requirements of the regulation. Violations of the risk management program and other regulations promulgated under CAA section 112{r)(7) are subject to the same penalties as violations of National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) promulgated under CAA section 112(d). Persons in violation cf the requirements may be subject to civil penalties of not more than S25.000 per day per violation as well as criminal penalties. Civil penalties may be assessed through court actions or through administrative orders under section 113 of CAA. H. Timing The proposed rule must be promulgated by November 15,1993, and will be effective three years after the date of promulgation. EPA is setting a 120-day comment period and will hold a public hearing in Washington, DC. to solidt comments. IV. Comparison of EPA's Proposed Rule to OSHA's Standard A. Differences Between EPA's Proposed Rule and OSHA's Standard The primary differences between today's proposed rule and OSHA's process safety management standard are the result of the different statutory requirements for the two rules. The CAA requires EPA to include several elements in its regulation that are nr' mandated for CSHA. Specifically, EPA's rule must include a hazard assessment, an emergency response program with certain elements, registration, and the submittal and euditing of the RMP. The only other element EPA is proposing that is not included in the OSHA standard is the requirement for the owmer or operator of a facility to define its management system and name the person or position responsible for the program. EPA considers the management requirement critical to ensuring that the risk management program elements are integrated with each other on an ongoing basis. EPA expects that this requirement will create no additional burden for facilities because the proposed section would only require facilities to provide the name or names of people or positions responsible for implementing the program. EPA's proposed hazard assessment includes an offsite consequence analysis and e five-year accident history, as required by the CAA. Under the OSHA standard, facilities are required to develop an onsite consequence analysis. Most of the information needed to define accidental release scenarios will be derived from the process hazard enalvsic, which would be the same under the two rules. The main differences under the EPA nffo would be the need to use eir dispersion models to analyze the distances releases might migrate and the need to document the arees potentially affected by the releases. EPA's hazard assessment also is required to include a five-year release history, which would overlap to some degree with a requirement in the OSHA'6 process hazard analysis. EPA's proposed emergency response provisions respond to the language in the CAA and are somewhat different from the OSHA requirement Under the OSHA standard, facilities must comply with one of two existing OSHA standards. Facilities that are currently in compliance with OSHA's Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response standard (29 CFR 1910.120) 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Healtn Reporter ABD00086724 702 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER are likely to be in substantial additional requirements and are deviations include those affecting compliance with EPA's proposed rule. intended to clarify the purpose of the public health and the environment OSHA's emergency action plan section's requirements ana the level of rather than workers. regulation (29 CFR 1910.36(e)) basically detail expected of different types of EPA's standard operating requires an evacuation plan. The CAA facilities. In addition, EPA bas made procedures requirement ( 68.28) is requires EPA's emergoncy response editorial chances in the OSHA language identical to OSHA'a operating program to include "specific actions to to make the rule consistent with the procedures (29 CFR 1910.119(f)) except be taken in response to an accidental CAA's statutory language. Specifically, for the introductory paragraph and reloase of a regulated substance so as to where OSHA uses the word editorial changes. protect human health and the "employer,'' EPA would use "owner or EPA's training section ( 68.30) is environment" (CAA section operator." which is defined in the CAA. identical to OSHA's training section (29 112(r)(7)(B)(ii)). Therefore, facilities that Where CSHA uses "highly hazardous CFR 1910.119(g)), except for the currently have only an emergency chemicals," EPA would use "regulated introductory paragraph, editorial action plan required under 29 CFR substance." Where OSHA uses changes, and a requirement that 1910.138(a) would, under EPA's "facility." EPA would use "stationary facilities evaluate the effectiveness of proposed rule, need to develop a more source." Where OSHA uses "standard," their training programs and revise the extensive emergency response plan that EPA would use "rule." Finally, where programs, if necessary, based on the details how the facility would respond OSHA references workplace impacts, evaluation. to a release to limit offsite EPA would reference offsite EPA's maintenance requirements consequences. EPA is also proposing consequences, reflecting the different ( 68.32) uses the sam6 language as that facilities conduct drills and exercises to test their plans. Without statutory mandates of the two agencies. OSHA's mechanical integrity paragraph The specific parallel elements cf the (29 CFR 1910.119(j)) with certain such exercises, a facility will not be two rules are as follows: exceptions. EPA would use the term certain that a plan can be implemented EPA's process hazard analysis properly during an emergency. All requirement ( 68.24) is the same as facilities covered by the EPA rule would OSHA's process hazard analysis "maintenance" rather than "mechanical integrity" to parallel its statutory' language. EPA would add an need to coordinate their plans with the requirements (29 CFR 1910.119(e)), with introductory' paragraph and mak9 LEPC. which is not required by the the following changes: (1) An editorial changes. In paragraph 68.32(b). OSHA standard. EPA considers this introductory paragraph; (2) the priority EPA would require the facility to coordination essential to protect the order for conducting the analysis would develop a list of equipment that requires public. Many facilities are already coordinating their plans with the LEPC plans and with local emergency responders. Therefore, EPA does not anticipate that this requirement will add substantially to the burden for most facilities. The final differences between the two consider offsite consequences rather than the number of potentially affected employees; (3) OSHA's schedule for implementaticn would not be included because the CAA requires that facilities comply with EP"s rule within three years of the date of promulgation and, therefore, OSHA's five-year schedule maintenance; the OSHA standard provides a list of equipment. EPA's paragraph (b) includes the OSHA list, but EPA is concerned th3t for some facilities the list may bo too extensive and for others it may no; be comprehensive. For example, for warehouses, the only equipment that rules are the proposed requirements for could not be used; (4) the identification may need maintenance may be the registration, submission, and auditing of of previous incidents would be limited sprinkler system and the forklifts, the RMP. CAA section ll2{r)(7)(B)(iii) to those with offsite consequences neither of which are on the list. EFA manda!es these requirements. The rather than those with catastrophic believes the responsibility should be on information in the RMP would be consequences in the workplace; and (5) the facility to develop a list, based on derived from the documentation the qualitative evaluation of safety and specific facility concerns. EPA would required elsewhere under the EPA health impacts would focus on impacts also add an opening paragraph to the proposed rule or OSHA's standard. on public health and the environment OSHA paragraph on inspections and Consequently, EPA expects that the rather than on amployees, EPA expects testing and include the word RMP will not add substantially to the that, in most cases, fewer incidents will "maintenance" before inspection and burden cf complying with the'ruies. need to be considered under EPA's testing throughout the paragraph. Tbe See Section a of Inis Preamble for a proposed rule because releases are inclusion of the word "maintenance" discussion of the incremental burden generally more likely to affect workers would that equipment should be imposed by the EFA rule over the OSKA rather than the public. However, some maintained on e regular basis; for some rule. types of releases, such as the release at equipment simple routine maintenance, B. Section by Section Comparison of the EPA Prevention Program and the OSHA Standard Bhopal, have their primary impact off site. EPA's rule would ensure that these potential releases are evaluated. Finally, in response to the statutory requirement such as cleaning and oiling, may be all that is necessary; other equipment, such as seals, may be replaced on a regular schedule. EPA's revision would clarify Except for the management svstem that the prevention program include that such maintenance is included in requirement discussed above, the monitoring. EPA would add a paragraph the inspection and testing requirement. proposed EPA prevention program (j) requiring facilities to evaluate EPA would also-add language to clarify covers the same elements es OSHA's monitors, detectors, containment or that training of maintenance workers process safety management standard control devices, and mitigation systems. would be documented in the same and generally uses identical language EPA's proposed process safety manner as other training.. except where the statutory mandates of information ( 66.26) is identical to EPA's pre-startup review the two agencies dictate differences. OSHA's process safety information requirement ( 68.34) is identical to EPA has added introductory paragraphs system (29 CFR 1910.119(d)) except for OSHA's pre-startup review paragraph to most sections to provide further editorial changes and the requirement, (29 CFR 1910.19S(i)) except for editorial information to the regulated in paragraph (c)(5), that the evaluation changes, the introductory paragraph, community; these paragraphs impose no of the consequences of process and the requirement in paragraph 10-27-93 PuSlisnec Dy THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC., Washington. D.C. 20037 ABD00086725 CURRENT REPORT 703 A 68.34(c)(4) that maintenance as well as operating employees are trained prior to startup and that ell employees are trained on any new emergency response procedures. EPA believes these additions are necessary to ensure the safety of the facility. EPA's management of change requirements ( 68.36) are identical to OSHA's paragraph (29 CFR 1910.119(1)), except for the introductory paragraph, editorial changes, and a new paragraph (b) in which EPA defines alterations that do not constitute a change. Paragraph 68.36(b) is intended to clarify what constitutes a replacement in kind. EPA would also change paragraph (d)(2) to replace OSHA's "impact of change on health and safety" to "impact of change on likelihood of a significant accidental release." EPA's safety audit requirement ( 68.38) is identical to OSHA's compliance audit paragraph (29 CFR 1910,119(o)), except for the introductory paragraph and editorial changes. EPA's accident investigation requirements ( 68.40) are identical to OSHA's incident investigation paragraph (29 CFR 1910.119(m)), except for: (l) The introductory paragraph and editorial changes to substitute the phrase "significant accidental release" for the word "incident": (2) the addition, in paragraph (b), of a requirement that the procedures be written; (3) the requirement in paragraph (c) that incidents that require investigation are those that caused or could have caused offsite consequences rather than catastrophic releases in the work place; and (4) the addition, in paragraph (0(4), that the facility identify* root causes as well as initiating events. The OSHA standard includes several requirements that are not covered by EPA's proposed rule--worker consultation, hot work permits, contractor rules, and trade secrets. EPA believes that worker consultation and hot work permits are worker protection issues and are, therefore, properly in OSHA's area of concern. EPA's trade secret rule's for the CAA already are covered in 40 CFR part 2. Finally, although EPA recognizes the importance of contractor competence on safety. EPA believes this issue is primarily one that OSHA should address, as it has in its section on contractors. In addition, EPA believes that contractors are mainly an issue at larger companies, most of which are covered by the OSHA standard. EPA requests comments on whether EPA should adept OSHA's contractor paragraph as part of the risk management program requirements. As specified in CAA section U2(r)(7)(B)(i), EPA's rule would become effective three years after the date of promulgation. OSHA's rule will allow facilities up to five years to conduct process hazard analyses. Because the OSHA standard was promulgated prior to EPA's rule, however, EPA does not anticipate that the actual compliance dates for the two rules will differ significantly. V. Relationship to Other Federal and State Requirements Federal Regulations A number of the facilities potentially affected by today's proposed rule are also covered by other Federal requirements that may relate to practices that will be included in the risk management program. As discussed in the section on emergency response, several EPA programs require facilities to develop emergency response plans. These programs include the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requirements and the Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure requirements under the Clean Water Act. In addition, loading and unloading of hazardous materials for transportation are covered by DOT regulations, as are storage incident to transportation and repackaging for resale and transportation. The DOT regulations are particularly likely to affect distributors and warehouses EPA requests comments on how these requirements can be harmonized to eliminate conflicts and minimize duplication. Specifically, EPA requests comments on whether compliance with other Federal regulations will meet some or all of the requirements of the proposed rule and. if so, how the rule should acknowledge this fact to ensure that facilities understand what, if any. additional steps they must take to come into compliance with the risk management program requirements. State Laws Four states--California. New Jersey. Delaware, and Nevada--have implemented state laws that require certain facilities to develop risk management programs. Although the existing state programs differ in some respects, they address the same besic elements that EPA is proposing in this rulemaking, except that the California program does not specify a management of change procedure. The New Jersey Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA) program is the most detailed program, specifying to a considerable degree the information required to be developed and submitted; New Jersey also requires that workers pass competency tests after training. The Delaware program provides facilities with more flexibility by specifying less detailed requirements. The California program is the most general of the programs: the California risk management plan program developed by each affected facility is driven by the results of the process hazard analysis, rather than responding to a set of specific mandated requirements. The primary differences in the state programs relate to their implementation and the chemicals covered. New Jersey. Delaware, and Nevada have implemented their programs at the state level. California has delegated implementation authority to more than 100 administering agencies, which are usually the fire or health departments. New Jersey, California, and Nevada require facilities to submit their plans to the administering agencies for review and approval. Delaware requires facilities to'maintain the plan and documentation on site for state inspectors. California also allows the administering agencies to exempt facilities that meet the thresholds if the agency determines that the facility does not pose a significant risk to the community. Each of (he states has a different list of chemicals and thresholds. New Jersey's list covers 109 acutely toxic substances: Delaware covers 90 toxic substances, as well as flammables and explosives; California covers all 360 of the EPCRA section 302 list of extremely hazardous substances; Nevada adopted OSHA's list of highly hazardous chemicals. California uses EPA's threshold planning quantities (TPQs) as thresholds for notification and allows local agencies to decide whether a facility must comply; New Jersey and Delaware developed separate and different methodologies for calculating thresholds; Nevada adopted OSHA's thresholds. None of the state lists is entirely consistent with EPA's proposed list. EPA anticipates that facilities currently in compliance with the New Jersey, Delaware, and Nevada regulations will be in compliance with most elements of today's proposed rule. Because the California rules are more general and because different administering agencies have interpreted the requirements differently. It is not possible to determine, except on a caseby-case basis, to what extent a California facility will be in compliance with EPA's rule. The Clear. Air Act section 112(1) allows EPA to delegate the implementation of the risk management 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Healtn Reporter ABD00086726 704 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER program to states that have an approved program. The criteria for state programs are listed in CAA section 112(1)(5). The Act allows states to adopt the Federal program or implement a program that is more stringent. Consequently, the existing side programs will require some revisions to meet EPA's requirements or set more stringent requirements than those established by the EPA rule. EPA expects that most of the needed changes will involve the listing of chemicals and adjusting of thresholds. Other states that are developing state programs to implement these regulations should determine whether they have sufficient statutory authority under their eir or emergency planning/community right*to-know SARA Title III programs to edopt the recul-emerts of these regulations. EPA will provide additional guidance for states before the final rule is promulgated. VI. Other Approaches Considered The CAA requires facilities that have a regulated substance in quantities greater than the tbroshold to develop and subrr,.. RMPs. EPA recognizes that, for small facilities, oven the less complex risk management program that would be needed for simnlo processes could create a substantial burden. EPA considered three approaches, therefore, that might reduce this burden. Each of these approaches would create two tiers of risk management programs, a minimal program and an expanded risk management program. The approaches differ on how facilities would be divided between* Lhe two tiers. The first approach considered would be to develop criteria for determining when facilities needed an expanded risk management program. The criteria could be as simple as c multiple of threshold quantity (e.g.. en expanded risk management program would be required at 10 times the threshold quantity), or would combine the quantity c- rite with other factors such as distance to the fer.celir.e, proximity cf sensitive populations (e.g., hospitals, schools, residences), similar to the approach used in Delaware. EPA decided not to propose this approach for several reasons. Facility operators in Delaware and state officials report that this approach is difficult to implement because considerable technical expertise is needed end many smaller facilities and non-manufacturers do not have Lhe expertise in house. In addition, developing a set of criteria that would be appropriate in all situations may not be possible because too many factors influence uhe hazard posed by a particular process and substance. Using the simple multiple of the threshold quantity would ignore the dangers posed by relatively small quantities of regulated substances in specific circumstances. The second approach considered would be to have facilities determine whether they needed an expanded risk management program based on the offsite consequence analysis: If the worst-case release could not expose the public or the environment to significant risks, the facility would not need an expanded risk management progrem. Although this approach is a better way to determine whether tho potential risks of a facility merit an expanded risk management program, it is fraught with problems. This approach would create considirable potential for debate and legal disputes over the assumptions facilities use to determine offsite consequences. Assumptions appropriate for one facility or area may not be appropriate for others. EPA believes that this approach would leave facilities uncertain of the legal status of their decisions and create difficulties for enforcement by governments and citizens. In addition, given the experience of Delaware facilities, it is likely that many smaller facilities and those outside the manufacturing sector would have substantia! difficulty understanding and implementing this approach. EFA notes that most of the facilities potentially affected by the proposed rule are ncri-msnuiucturers; lets than five percent cf the potentially effected facilities are chemical manufacturers or petroleum refineries. The final approach considered would be to fellow the California model and let local or state agencies decide which facilities pose the greatest threat and, therefore, require an expanded risk management program. EPA believes that local agencies are in the best position to identify and evaluate local hazards. However, the viability of this approach rests on the ability and willingness, of stale or local groups to make these decisions. This approach would impose a considerable burden on state and local authorities. It could elso lead to ihe uneven imposition cf requirements on facilitios if states or localities chose to cover facilities differently. Some facilities already covered by risk management program rules believe that they have been placed at a substantial competitive disadvantage because they are-complying with the state law, while similar facilities in other states are not. An uneven implementation also leaves Lhe protection of the public uneven. EFA requests comments on these approaches and methods that could be used tp create tiers in risk management program requirements. EPA also requests comments on what a "minimalprogram" would be, given the Congressional mandate that requires the risk management program to include a hazard assessment, a prevention program that includes safety procedures, maintenance, monitoring, and training, and an emergency response plan. VII. Guidance The CAA requires EPA to publish, when the final rule is promulgated, guidelines to essist facilities in the preparation of risk management programs. The guidelines shall, to the extent possible, include model RMPs. EPA is aware that for many facilities, especially those outside Lhe chemical and petroleum refining industry and many smaller facilities, the risk management program approach and some cf the elements will be unfamiliar. EFA intends, therefore, to provide as much guidance as possible and to encourage trace associations, professional organizations, labor, and others to develop and disseminate appropriate guidance as well. EPA requests comments on areas where guidance is needed (e.g., process hazard analyses, maintenance programs), the levels at which guidance should be directed, and appropriate formats for the guidance. EFA has identified industry sectors that may be candidates for model risk management programs. Generally, most of the covered facilities in these sectors esc using the same chemical in the same woy, with similar types of equipment. Tho similarity will allow EPA to develop guidance on the chemical and process hazards, identify typical hazards that need to be considered in the process hazard analysis, suggest areas that should be covered in SOPs and L-air.ing. identify critical equipment for maintenance programs, and describe model emergency response procedures. The purpose cf the guidance will not be to provide facilities with an "off-theshelf" plan, but rather to provide a framework that the facility can use to analyze Us own operations and develop a program to manage risks. Industry sectors that msy be appropriate for model risk management programs include chlorine and ammonia users such as public drinking water systems and wastewater treatment works, cold storage facilities, wholesalers, and propane retailers. EPA requests suggestions for other indust^ groups for which model risk management programs may be possible. 10-27-93 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D.C. 20037 ABD00086727 CURRENT REPORT 705 vm. Information Gathering Efforts Before EPA began writing its proposed rule on risk management programs, the Agency decided to seek information from those already implementing risk management program regulations. EPA staff met extensively with officials in the three states and held interviews with seven facilities that have developed risk management programs under state laws. To gather more information, EPA held eight focus groups, five with facilities (two each in New Jersey and California, one in Delaware), and three with administering agency officials in California, to elicit their opinions of the risk management program regulations in their respective states and their ideas about what EPA should consider as it develops its program. After analyzing the results of these meetings, EPA and the National Governors' Association sponsored a two-day seminar on issues that have arisen at the state level. Officials from California, Delaware, and New Jersey, as well as New York, Minnesota, and Wisconsin attended the meetings. On the second day, other groups including trade associations, professional organizations, labor, and environmentalists joined the discussion. Several industry participants believed that the risk management program process is improving safety, although the initial costs are high. Many considered the most costly element, the process hazard analysis, the most important because it identifies hazards and allows facilities to set priorities. Larger facilities, especially those in the chemical and petroleum industries, currently have more risk management program elements in place than do smaller facilities. Larger facilities are also more able to implement the program with their own staff; smaller facilities often lack the in-house expertise to develop and implement all risk management program elements. Various industry participants recommended that the risk management program regulations give facilities the flexibility to tailor a program to their own situations. According to these participants, the regulations should tell e facility what to do, not how to do it. Many participants with various perspectives recommended that regulations bo specific enough to limit inconsistent interpretation either across states or among inspectors. Inconsistently applied regulations create competitive disadvantages and undermine the willingness of facilities to comply. Many participants from various sectors expressed th9 view that guidance and technical assistance will be needed et the state, local, and facility levels, and that education and outreach efforts will be necessary. Several industrial and governmental participants said that to the extent possible, the OSHA, EPA, and state regulations and chemical lists should be consistent. The same participants believed that facilities would like to ensure that if they are in compliance with one rule, they would automatically be in compliance with all rules, at least for a specific chemical. There was a general concern that the expertise to implement the program may not be uniformly available in the short-term. This lack of expertise will affect both facilities and government egencies. A report cn "this information gathering effort entitled CJeon Air Act of 1990, Chemical Accident Release Provisions, Report on Focus Groups and Hound Table Discussions is available in the docket as are transcripts of the eight focus groups. DC. Section by Section Discussion of the Proposed Rule EPA is proposing to add a new part 68 to 40 CFR, which would include the risk management program requirements, as well as the list of regulated substances and related regulations, and any additional chemical accident prevention regulations that EPA may promulgate in the future. This section reviews the regulations that would be added in this rulemekine. Proposed 68.1 would define the scope of the part. Proposed 68.3 would provide definitions applicable to the Part. Proposed $ 68.10 would define the applicability of the risk management plan requirements to all stationary sources where a regulated substance is present in a process at any one time in more than the threshold quantity. The section also includes the effective dates for the risk management program elements. Facilities would be required to develop and implement all risk management program elements within three years of the date of promulgation of the rule or within three years cf becoming subject to the rule (i.e., three years after the facility introduces a new regulated substance to its operations or a new' substance is listed). Proposed 68.12 would define the requirements for registration. Facilities would be required to register three years after the date of promulgation of the rule or within three years of date on which the facility becomes subject to the rule (either because the facility introduces a new regulated substance to its operations or a new' substance is listed). If the information submitted on a registration form is no longer accurate, facilities would be required to update the information within 60 days of the change. Proposed 68.15 would provide the requirements for the hazard assessment. Facilities would be required to complete a hazard assessment for each regulated substance present in greater than a threshold quantity. For each such substance, a worst-case release scenario would have to be defined. The offsite consequences of a range of release scenarios, including the worst-case and other more likely significant accidental release scenarios, would have to be analyzed. The proposed section specifies a number of scenarios that should be considered and the information that must be included in the offsite consequence analyses. The section also would require the facility to develop and maintain a five-year history of significant accidental releases and releases w'ith the potential for offsite consequences for each regulated substance. The hazard assessment would have to be reviewed and updated every five years, unless changes necessitated an update sooner. The section would detail the documentation that would be required to be maintained on site. Proposed 68.20 would explain the purpose of the prevention program and specify that the ten elements of the program must be tailored to suit the degree of hazard present at a facility and the degree of complexity of the operations. Proposed 68.22 w'ould require facilities to designate a person cr position responsible for overseeing the development and implementation of the prevention program elements. Where other individuals are responsible for separate elements, an organization chart showing lines of authority would be required. Proposed 66.24 would detail the requirements for the process hazard analysis. A process hazard analysis would be required for each location where regulated substances are present above the threshold quantity. Formal process hazard analysis techniques w'ould have to be applied, with the complexity of the process and potential consequences of a release to be considered in selecting an appropriate technique. The section would require facilities to conduct evaluations on the most hazardous locations first. The process hazard analysis team would be required to report findings and recommendations to management. The facility management would be required to document its response to each finding and recommendation, and 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter ABD00086728 706 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER maintain a schedule for implementing actions to address findings. If the facility management decides not to implement certain recommendations, a rationale for the decision would have to be documented. Based on the process hazard analysis results, the facility would be required to evaluate and develop 8 plan for (or a rationale for not) installing detection and alarm systems, secondary containment and control systems, and mitigation systems. The process hazard analysis would have to.be reviewed and updated every five years unless changes of chemical use, process technology, or equipment require an earlier review and revision. Proposed 68.26 would require the facility to develop and maintain up-todate chemical, technology, and equipment information. Technology information would include process flow diagrams t;.i process chemistry information, maximum intended inventories for vessels, process parameters, and consequences of deviations from parameters. Equipment information would include materials of construction, electrical classifications, material and energy balances, design bases and codes, safety equipment designs, and diagrams of piping, equipment, and controls. The owner or operator would have to document that equipment complies with good engineering practices. Proposed 68.28 would require facilities to develop and maintain written procedures for operations. Proposed 68.30 would require facilities to develop and implement training programs to ensure that all employees are trained in SOPs that apply to them. Refresher training would be required "it least even* three years. The facility would have to develop a method of ensuring that each employee is competent. In addition, facilities would be required to evaluate the effectiveness of their training. Based on this evaluation, the facility vvould be required to develop and maintain a schedule for revising the training program. All training conducted at the facility would be documented. In lieu of initial training, the facility could certify that current employees have the knowledge and skills to earn* out the SOPs. Proposed 68.32 would require facilities to develop a list of equipment and controls whose failure could lead to a significant accidental release of a regulated substance. For items on the list, a maintenance program that Included a schedule for inspections, testing, and maintenance would be required. L.ipection and testing rocedures and schedules would be ased on manufacturers' recommendations unless industry or facility experience indicated that more frequent inspections and tests, or different procedures were needed. Written maintenance procedures and training of maintenance workers would also be required. Equipment found to be outside acceptable limits would have to be replaced or repaired prior to being used again or in a timely manner that ensures safety. Procedures to ensure that replacement equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications would be required. Records of each inspection, test, repair, and replacement would be required. Proposed 68.34 would require facilities to develop procedures to ensure that a pre-startup review is conducted before a new or modified process is brought online. This section would not apply to routine startups after shutdowns for maintenance provided standard procedures are developed for such startups. The pre-startup review would confirm that all installations and changes meet design specifications, that SOPs and maintenance programs are in place for the new processes, end that employees heve been trained. Records of each startup, including actions taken to address any problems uncovered during the review, would be maintained at the facility under 68.55. Proposed 68.36 would require facilities to develop management of chango procedures to ensure that any alteration of chemicals, processes, and procedures are reviewed prior to implementation. Replacement of equipment or controls with e device that meets the design specifications of the replaced device would net be considered a change. The procedures would ensure that the technical basis of the change is documented and that the consequences of the change are evaluated. Process safety information and the process hazard analysis would be updated as needed, as would SOPs, training, and maintenance programs. The results of each such review would be maintained at the facility under 68.55. Proposed 68.38 would require facilities to conduct safety audits every three years. Each audit would be documented in a report with findings and recommendations. Management's response to each finding and recommendation would be documented, with a schedule for implementation or a rationale for not implementing. Proposed 68.40 would require facilities to develop and implement procedures to investigate each significant accidental release. Investigations would have to start within 48 hours of the accident The investigation would document, in a report to management, the initiating event, root causes, and recommendations for preventing recurrences. Management would be required to document its response to eaci recommendation, with either a schedule for implementation or a rationale for not implementing the recommendation. Tne results of the investigation would have to be reviewed with ail potentially affected employees. Proposed 68.45 would require facilities to develop a written emergency response plan that would specify procedures for employees not involved in a response action, procedures for responders, a list of all response and mitigation technologies. The plan would also include procedures for notifying and alerting the public and public response agencies. The facility would be required to have procedures for the use, inspection, testing, and maintenance of response equipment. The facility would also develop information on first aid and emergency health care related to potential exposures. Employees would be trained in applicable response procedures. Facilities would be required to conduct drills or exercises to tesi the plan. Ar.y drill or exercise would be documented, with findings relevant to plan revisions; management wmuld be required to document responses to the findings, with schedules for implementation. The emergency response pier. would be coordinated with the local emergency' planning committee's community plan prepared under SARA Title III. Proposed 68.50 would require submission cf the RMP containing a copy of the facility's registration form, hazard assessments for each regulated substance (i.e., worst-case scenario, offsite consequences for e range of more likely significant accidental release scenarios, and five-year history of significant accidental releases), c list of major hazards identified through the process hazard analysis, the consequences of failure to control each major hazard, steps being taken to address the hazards, implementation schedules, a summary of other prevention elements, a description of the emergency response plan, a description of the management system for implementing and integrating the risk management program, and a certification of accuracy and completeness. The RM? w*ould be revised and resubmitted every five ve?.rs unless changes dictate a more frequent revision. 10-27-93 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., Washington, D.C. 20037 ABD00086729 CURRENT REPORT A 707 Proposed 60.55 would specify which records would need to be maintained and that records would be maintained for five years, Facilities would also be required to maintain implementation schedules for recommendations from the process hazard analysis, safety audit, and accident investigation. Proposed 63.60 would specify the audit system for reviewing RMPs. X. Regulator}' Costs and Benefits Agencies preposing and promulgating regulations must consider both the costs and benefits of those rules on the affected community. This section summarizes the analyses conducted in support of this proposed rule end the list and threshold rule. The full regulatory impact analysis (RIA), entitled "Regulatory Impact Analysis in Support cf Listing Regulated Substances and Thresholds and Mandating Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accident Release Prevention, as Required by Section 112{r) of the Cieen Air Act," is available in the docket. As mentioned above, the cost information in this section is based on an analysis of this proposed ruio and the list and threshold rule. Since the RIA was completed, the Agency has collected new cost information from comments to the proposed list and threshold rule and has conducted additional analyses. Tka revised cost information is contained in an addendum to the RIA, which is available in the docket. The Agency recognizes that the costs/benefits and the universe of affected facilities are difficult to estimate accurately and requests comments and input on the RIA and the addendum. Specifically, EPA requests comments on the unit-cost estimates for the prevention program elements and rate of current compliance with these elements. Options Considered To evaluate alternatives, EPA analyzed five list and threshold options and two risk management program options. The five list options were: List 1--101 acute toxics at the proposed thresholds: List 2--EPA's proposed list (100 toxics. 62 fiammables, and high explosives) at the proposed thresholds; List 3--EPA's proposed list at the EPCRA section 302 threshold planning quantities (TPQs) where applicable; List 4--the full EPCRA section 302 list at the TPQs; and List 5--the full EPCRA section 302 list of extremely hazardous substances at the threshold planning quantities, plus 62 fiammables and high explosives. The options were selected to bound the different combinations of chemicals and threshold quantities that New Jersey data to adjust for these were under consideration by EPA limitations. For example, because during development of the proposed list facilities in New Jersey are not required regulation. The OSKA list was not to report on fiammables, data from included as e listing option because it Louisiana's EPCRA section 312 database includes some substances that EPA is were used tc develop estimates of the statutorily prohibited from listing, it number of additional facilities that does not include many acutely toxic would be covered because of the listed chemicals that meet EPA's criteria for fiammables. Similarly, certain industrial listing, nor does it include all statutorily sectors were clearly underrepresented in mandated regulated substances. Ln the New Jersey data; adjustments were addition, many of the substances listed made wherever possible to correct for by OSKA are reactives, which EPA has not determined pose a significant hazard to the puolic in the event of an accidental reSoase. The RIA also considered two options these limitations. The New Jersey database was searched by four-digit SIC code to identify for each such code the number cf facilities that reported a listed toxic for risk management program chemical above the threshold. The requirements: EPA's proposed rule; and number of reports of regulated e more stringent version of the proposed substances per four-digit SIC code was rule, modeled on the New jersey state also obtained from the New Jersey data. regulations, which are more detailed The information obtained from these and impose more specific requirements searches was compared with the for many cf the risk management number of facilities in each four-digit program elements. The OSHA standard SIC code in New Jersey (based on 1983 wss not considered because it does r.ot County Business Pattern data). The ratio fuilv mest the statutory mandate for EPA's risk management regulation. of the number of facilities reporting the presence of the chemicals above the Methodology proposed thresholds to the number of facilities in the SIC code in the state was To estimate th9 universe of extrapolated tc the nation to estimate uotentialiy affected facilities under each the number of facilities in each SIC code list and threshold option, EPA used potentially affected by the proposed l?38 data from the New Jersey Kight-te* rule. The ratio cf the number of Know database. Under the New Jersey regulated substances reported per Riiht-to-Know statute (New Jersey Pub. facility in New Jersey in each four-digit L. 1983, Chapter 315), facilities are SIC code was used to estimate the required to complete surveys of number of hazard assessments that chemical inventories if they have any would hkely be required under each amount cf the listed substances on site. listing option. The Louisiana data were Facilities are required to report the used to identify those four-digit SIC maximum quantity or. site for each codes where the addition of fiammables covered substance and the CAS number would result in additional facilities and for the substance; all of the toxic additional chemicals per facility substances EPA considered for listing covered by EPA's regulatory options. are or. the New Jersey list. Facilities also Three industry sectors were are required to report applicable four- substantially underrepresented in the digit SIC codes end the number of state databases: public facilities, cold facility employees- Although there are storage facilities, and prepane retailers. limitations and cautions that must be To adjust for this underrepresentation cf exercised when extrapolating state data public facilities, die analysis used EPA to estimate national impacts. EPA data on public drinking water systems believes that the New Jersey data and publicly owned treatment works to provide comprehensive coverage of SIC estimate the number cf public facilities codes, including the majority cf four- potentially affected by the proposed digit SIC codes across both the rule. Industry information was used to manufacturing and non-manufacturing estimate the number of cold storage sectors, and are reasonably facilities (i.e., food processors, fcod representative of chemical use patterns distributors, and refrigerated throughout the nation. In addition. New warehouses) and the number of propane Jersey facilities are required to report on retailers. inventories of all acutely toxic In Delaware and New Jersey. 30 chemicals covered by EPA's listing percent and 52 percent of the facilities options. Further, the information in the (respectively) that initially registered New Jersey database or. number of under the state laws lowered inventories employees allows disaggregation of the or switched chemicals to avoid having data by facility size. There are, however, to comply with the risk management limitations to the New Jersey data; to the program requirements. Based on this extent possible, EPA augmented the experience, EPA assumed that 30 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter ABD00086730 708 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER percent of the facilities in most manufacturing, utility, and service industries would take similar steps to avoid being affected by EPA's proposed rule. The final estimates of the number of affected facilities in these sectors were adjusted to account for this expected change in chemical use. The number of chemical manufacturers, wholesalers, and propane distributors was not adjusted downward; facilities in these sectors were assumed to be unable to reduce inventories sufficiently to avoid coverage because of the nature of their businesses. To develop cost estimates, affected manufacturing facilities (SIC codes 2039) were classified as small, medium, and large, based on the number of employees. For each SIC code, manufacturing facilities were also categorized as likely to have simple, moderately complex, and complex processes, based on categories developed by OSHA for its process safety management standard. Facilities outside the manufacturing sector were divided into six categories: public drinking water and treatment works; private utilities (SIC code 49--electric and gas utilities); cold storage facilities that use ammonia as a refrigerant (SIC codes 20. 4222, 514); wholesalers (SIC codes 50-51); retailers, which are primarily propane distributors; and others (primarily service industries (SIC codes 70--89)). Non-manufacturers wore assumed to handle the regulated substances in simple ways and to have available EPA model risk management programs or guidance, described in Section VII of this preamble, that would lessen the burden of compliance. Wholesalers and cold storage facilities were divided into small and large facilities based on the quantity of chemicals on site because the complexity of implementing the rule is assumed more likely to be related to the quantity of the chemicals on site rother than the number of employees at a facility. For example, some chemical distributors have more than 100 million pounds of a substance on site, but employ fewer than 20 people, only some of whom handle the substance. Public and private utilities were assumed to be small because a limited number of employees are assumed to handle regulated substances. Using industry' experience and engineering expertise, cost estimates were developed for each risk management program element for each class and category of facility. Costs were developed on a per chemical, per process, per release, or per facility basis for each element cf the program, as appropriate. Because many facilities already implement sr.me of the risk management program requirements (e g., training, emergency response plans), costs were adjusted to account for current compliance, based on compliance estimates for each risk management program element developed by EPA, OSHA, an American Paper Institute study of the actual level of ament compliance among its members, and experts in the cold storege industry. For final cost calculations, facilities were divided into two further groups: those covered only by the EPA rule, w'ho would be subject to the full cost of complying with all elements of the proposed rule, and those covered by EPA and OSHA, who would incur costs only to implement the additional elements covered in EPA's proposed regulation (i.e., registration, hazard assessments, and the RMP). Different cost estimates were developed for publicly owned drinking water systems and wastewater treatment systems, depending on the states where the systems are located. For systems in states with delegated OSHA health and safety programs (i.e., st3le-plan states), only incremental costs associated w'ith performing the hazard assessment and developing the RMP were attributed to the EPA proposed rule; these systems must already comply with state standards at least as stringent as the Federal OSHA standards. For systems not in state-plan states, the full cost of tho proposed rule was assumed to be incurred. Table 1 presents th.6 estimated number of facilities covered by each list option. Table i.--Estimated Number of Facilities Affected by EPA's List and Threshold Options Options Manufacturers not otherwise regulated Manufacturers Non-mar.ulac- previously regu turers not other lated ' wise regulated Non-manufac turers pre viously regu lated Total Ust 1 ............................................................................. List 2 ............................................................................. Ust 3............................................................................. List 4 ............................................................................. List 5 ............................................................................. 3.975 3,975 13,640 19,530 19.530 18.56C 18,960 19.540 20,470 20,470 28.650 48.650 54.560 37,630 57,830 64,060 68,840 68,640 64,060 68.840 115,545 140,425 156,980 141,690 166.670 1 "Previously regulated" refers to facilities subject to the OSHA standard or to a state standard at least as stringent as th9 Federal OSHA standard. EPA estimates that approximately 140,425 facilities would be affected by EPA's proposed rule. Of this universe, 87,800 would aiso be covered by the OSHA rule or an equivalent state standard; the costs estimated fer these facilities reflect only the costs for registering and developing the hazard assessment and RMP. The remaining 52,625 facilities will only be covered by EPA's proposed rule; the estimated costs reflect the costs of implementing all risk management program requirements. The total universe of covered facilities includes 22,935 manufacturers (covering all manufacturing sectors except tobacco); 3,360 private utilities (electric and gas utilities, drinking water systems, and treatment works); 33,250 public drinking water and treatment works; 50,000 cold storage facilities; 9,460 wholesalers; 20,000 propane retailers, and 1,240 service industry facilities. EPA estimates that the costs per facility will vary, for facilities covered solely by the EPA rule, from approximately S1.700 for a facility in the service industry sector, to approximately $153,000 for a large complex manufacturing facility. EPA did not estimate the ccst cf compliance for a highly complex facility such as a petroleum refinery because ail of these facilities are covered by the OSHA standard. The most costly items in the prevention program for manufacturers include the process hazard analysis, which varies from S5.600 per process for a simple facility to $35,000 per evaluation for a complex facility; training costs, which vary from $2,400 for a small simple facility to $61,000 for a large (150-employee) complex facility; process and equipment information, which may cost a large facility S36.G00 10-27-93 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., Washington, D.C. 20037 ABD00086731 CURRENT REPORT 709 A per process; and SOPs, which vary from 32,500 fora simple process to 534.000 for a complex process. Costs for non* manufacturers are estimated to be considerably low*er both because their operations frequently do not involve special equipment and because model RMPs ana guidance are assumed to bo available to them, thus lessening the burden. The cost of conducting the hazard assessment is estimated to vary from $70 per assessment for non manufacturers to $280 per assessment for large complex manufacturers; the number of assessments likely to be required is estimated to vary from one (for a cold storage facility with only ammonia on site) to 10 for a petrochemical facility. The cost of developing the RMP is estimated to range from 5356 to more than 51.000 for a highly complex facility. Registration costs are estimated to vary between $43 and $105, depending on the number of substances on site. Table 2 presents the avemgo cost per facility for manufacturers and non-manufacturers. EPA estimates that the initial cost of the proposed rule would be S503 million. EPA estimated subsequent year total costs for a period often years. Costs vary from year to year because certain risk management program elements ere not required to be updated yearly. For example, safety audits would be conducted every three years; hezard assessments and process hazard analyses would be updated every five yearn. Table 3 presents the estimated costs for years one through five for the five listing options. Benefits The proposed risk management rule is expected to generate benefits to the regulated community and to society at large. EPA has estimated a dollar value for many of these benefits; the methodology used to generate these estimates is presented in chapter 7 of the RIA. The benefits of the proposed risk management rule were estimated using several quantitative techniques to investigate each of the different types of benefits expected to occur. First, the proposed risk management rule is expected to reduce the number of significant hazardous chemical releases occurring each year at facilities affected by the fivo list options. This reduction in the number of releases was estimated using Accidental Release Information Program (ART?) data for the four-year period 1987-1990. The trend ir. the cumber of hazardous chemical releases in New Jersey, where many of the riskmansgement program elements are required to be in place already, was comoared with the trend in the number of releases in the rest of the natioa. The difference between the two trends, approximately 27 percent at the end of the four-year period, provided an estimate of the magnitude of the reduction in the number of hazardous chemical releases that could be expected to occur as a result of EPA's proposed risk management rule. The proposed rule is also expected to reduce the number of incidents of environmental damage (e.g., soil contamination, vegetation damage, and property damage), human impacts (e.g.. injuries, hospitalizations, and deaths), and response actions (e.g.. evacuations and sheltering in place) occurring each year as a result of releases of hazardous chemicals. These reductions were estimated by using a regression analysis with ARIP data to predict the probability that each type of environmental domage, human impact, or response action would occur as a result of a hazardous chemical release, both with and without the proposed risk management program in effect. The estimated probability thet each type of incident would occur was then multiplied by the estimated number of releases under each scenario (i.e., with and without the risk management program in effect) to derive an estimate of the number of incidents causing environmental damage, human impact, or response actions that would be avoided each year at facilities affected by the proposed risk management rule. The analysis indicated that the number of incidents would decline by 35 percent or more, depending on the type of incident and the List Option selected, following implementation of the proposed risk management program. For human impacts and response actions, the estimated number of incidents was multiplied by the average number of people injured, hospitalized, evacuated, or sheltered in place to derive an estimate of the number of people affected per year by incidents of each type. Table 2.--Estimated Average Cost per Facility Manufacturers SmaJl-sizeo facilities Medium-sized facilities Simple Moderate Simple Moderate Simple Largo-sized facilities Moderate Complex Highly complex Not Otherwise Regulated ............................... Previously Regulated....................................... $15,430 760 $27,760 1.C70 $33,430 910 $81,920 3.680 $53,750 1.500 93,750 $153,470 1.960 3.280 $5,720 Non-Manufacturers Public fa Private cilities utilities Co<d storage facilities Small Large Not Otnerwise Regulated...................................................... Previously Regulated ............................................................ $8,200 530 $8,250 580 $9,400 $510 Whole* salers Service industries Retailers $2,220 650 SI ,860 560 SI .670 Table 3.--Subsequent-Year Costs by List Option for Program Option 1 ($ millions] Year 2................................................................................................................................ List option 1 $453 79 84 List option 2 List option 3 $503 92 981 $858 144 152 List option 4 SI,004 159 167 List option 5 St,046 171 181 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter ABD00086732 710 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER Table 3.--Subsequent-Year Costs by List Option for Program Option 1--Continued {$ millions] Ust option 1 109 84 195 Ust option 2 126 98 217 Ust option 3 213 152 338 Ust option 4 241 167 383 Ust option 5 258 161 404 Finally, the dollar value of the Air Act," has been prepared and is benefits of the proposed risk available in the docket. management program were estimated by developing an estimate of the cost of each type of incident, and then by multiplying the estimated cost of each type of incident by the number of incidents avoided that may be attributed to the presence of a risk management program. The benefits of the proposed rule are estimated to be approximately B. Regulatory Flexibility Act In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Federal agencies must evaluate the effects of the rule on small entities and examine alternatives that may reduce these effects. EPA has prepared an analysis of the effects on small entities. The analysis employed $890 million per year. Table 4 presents three measures for assessing the effects the estimated costs and benefits for each of the proposed rule, and the of the list options considered by EPA alternatives, on small business: the during the rule development. before-tax cost of compliance as a percentage of firm sales; the after-tax Table 4.--Estimated First Year cost of compliance as a percentage of Costs and benefits 1$ Millions] net income; and the percent change in the debt-to-asset ratio. The results indicated that for 90 percent of the List option 1 ..... Ust option 2..... Ust option 3..... Ust option 4..... List option 5..... Estimated costs $460 503 058 1,004 1,046 Estimated benefits S636 890 1,539 1,615 1,670 small businesses affected, the economic burden for initial costs would be mild. For the remaining 10 percent, the program would impose a significant adverse effect in the first year, as measured by the ratio of after-tax compliance costs to net income. This burden is an upper-bound estimate XI. Required Analyses A. Executive Order 12291 because, in actuality, many firms are likely to finance compliance in a variety of ways, such as debt, current earnings, Under Executive Order 12291, the and increased prices, rather than Agency must judge whether a regulation finance compliance in one way. is "major*' and thus subject to the Consequently, the impact of compliance requirement for a Regulatory Impact costs is likely to be less severe than Analysis. Under E.O. 12291, a major estimated in the analysis. For rule is one that is likely to result in: (1) subsequent years, the economic impact An adverse (cost) impact in the as moasured by the after-tax ratio is economy of S100 million or more, {2} a major increase in cost or prices to consumers, individual industries, Federal, state, or local government, or geographic region, or (3) significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or the ability of U.S. based enterprises in domestic or export estimated to be small for businesses. The impact on small governments also is estimated to be small based on the ratio of compliance costs to revenues. The full regulatory flexibility analysis is included, es Chapter 8. in the RIA. available in the docket. C. Paperwork Reduction Act markets. EPA has determined that The information collection today's proposed rule is a major rule for requirements in this proposed rule have the purposes of E.O. 12291 because the been submitted for approval to the first year cost of the rule is estimated to Office of Management and Budget be $503 million. An RiA entitled, (OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction "Regulatory Impact Analysis in Support Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. An of Listing Regulated Substances and Information Collection Request Thresholds and Mandating Risk document has been prepared by EPA Management Programs for Chemical (ICR No. 1656.1) and a copy may be Accident Release Prevention, as obtained from Sandy Fanner, Required by Section 112(r) of the Clean Information Policy Branch, EPA, 401M St. SW.. (PM-223Y), Washington, DC 20460, or by calling (202) 260-2740. Public reporting burden for this collection of information, which will take place three years after the rule is final, will vary depending on the size and complexity of the facility and the number of substances affected: between 1.25 and 3 hours for the registration form, another .2 to 341.2 hours for the burden to maintain onsite documentation, and a range of between 4.25 and 31.5 hours to prepare and submit a risk management plan. These hours reflect time for renewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining date needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding the burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Chief, Information Policy Branch, PM223. U.S. EPA, 401 M St. SW., Washington, DC 20460; and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503, Attn: Desk Officer for EPA. The final rule will respond to any OMB or public comments on the information collection requirements contained in this proposal. Li9l of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 68 Environmental protection. Accidental release prevention. Chemicals, Chemical accident prevention, Emergency response. Extremely hazardous substances. Hazardous substances. Intergovernmental relations, Process safety management, Risk management. Dated: October 7,1993. Carol M, Browner, Administrator. For the reasons set out in the preamble, title 40, chapter I, subchapter C, part 68 of the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be added to read as follows: PART 68--ACCIDENTAL RELEASE PREVENTION PROVISIONS Subpart A--General Provision* Sec. 68.1 Scope. 10-27-93 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC., Washington, D.C. 20037 ABD00086733 current report A 711 Sc. 68.3 Definitions. 68.5 Threshold Determination (Reserved]. Subpart B--Risk Management Plan Requirements 68.10 Applicability. 66.12 Registration. 68.15 Hazard assessment. 68.20 Prevention program purpose68.22 Prevention program--management system. 68.24 Prevention program--process hazard analysis. 68.26 Prevention program-process safety information. 68.28 Prevention program--standard operating procedures. 68.30 Prevention program--training. 68.32 Prevention program--maintenance (mechanical integrity). 68.34 Prevention program--pre-startup review. 68.36 Prevention program--management of change. 68.38 Prevention program--safety audits. 68.40 Prevention program--accident investigation. 68.45 Emergency response program. 68.50 Risk management plan. 68.55 Recordkeeping requirements. 68.60 Audits. Subpart C--List of Regulated Substance* and Thresholds for Accidental Release Prevention [Reserved] Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7412(r) and 7601(a)(1). Subpart A--Genera! Previsions 68.1 Scope. This part sets forth requirements fer chemical accident prevention steps that must be taken by the owner or operator of stationary sources. S8.3 Definitions. As used in this part, all terms not defined shall have the meaning given to them by the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.). Act means the Clean Air Act as amended {42 U.S.C. 7*101 et seq.). Adnumstrotor means the administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Analysis of offsite consequences means a qualitative or quantitative analysis of a range of accidental releases, including worst-case releases, to determine offsite effects including potential exposures of affected populations. Mitigation system means specific equipment, substances or personnel designed or deployed to mitigate an accidental release; examples of mitigation systems include water curtain sprays, foam suppression systems, end emergency response teams. Offsite means areas beyond the property boundary' of the stationary source or areas within the property boundary to which the public has routine and unrestricted access. Owner or operator means any person who owns, leases, operates, or controls a stationary source. AMP means the risk management plan required under 68.50. SIC means Standard Industrial Classification. Significant accidental release means any accidental release of a regulated substance that has caused or has the potential to cause offsite consequences such as death, injury, or adverse effects to human health or the environment or to cause the public to shelter-in-place or be evacuated to avoid such consequences. Worst-case release means the loss of all of the regulated substance from the process in an accidental release that leads to the worst offsite consequences. 68.5 Threshold determination. Subpart B--Risk Management Program Requirements 68.10 Applicability. (a) The requirements in this subpart apply to ail stationary sources that, efter (three years from the date of final rule publication] have a regulated substance present in a process in more than a threshold quantity as determined under 68.5. fb) Stationary sources covered by this subpart shall comply with 68.12 through 68.60 no later than (three years after the date of final rule publication) or within three years after the date on which a regulated substance first becomes present in a process in more than a threshold quantity. 66.12 Registration. (a) By (three years after the publication date of the final rule), or within three years cf the date on which a stationary' source becomes subject to this subpart, the owner or operator of each stationary source covered by this part shall register with the Administrator. (b) The registration shall include the following: (1) The name of the stationary source, its street address, its mailing address, and telephone number; (2) The names and CAS numbers of all regulated substances that are present at the stationary source in greater than the threshold quantities, and the maximum amount present in a process at any one time (in ranges); (3) For each regulated substance, the four-digit SIC code(s) that apply to the use of the substance at the stationary source; (4) The Dun and Bradstreet number of the stationary source; (5) The name of a contact person; and (6) The following certification signed by the owner or operator: "The undersigned certifies that, to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the information submitted is true, accurate, and complete. I certify that I prepared or caused to be prepared a risk management plan that complies with 40 CFR 68.50 (and. when applicable: "and the provisions of 40 CFR 68.60") and that I submitted or caused to be submitted copies of the risk management plan to each of the entities listed in 40 CFR 68.50(a). [Signature]." (c) If at any time after the submission of the registration, information in the registration is no longer accurate, the owner or operator shall submit an amended notice within 60 days to the Administrator and implementing agency. After a final determination of necessary revisions under 68.60(f). the owner or operator shall register the revised risk management plan by the date required in 68.60(g). 68.15 Hazard assessment (a) The purpose of the hazard assessment is to evaluate the impact of significant accidental releases on the public health and environment and to develop e history of such releases. fb) Hazard assessments shall be conducted for each regulated substance present at the stationary source above the threshold quantity. For each regulated substance, the hazard assessment shell include the following steps: (1) Determine a worst-case release scenario for the regulated substance et the stationery source; (2) Identify ether more likely significant accidental releases for each process where the regulated substance is present above the threshold quantity, including processes where the substance is manufactured, processed, or used, and where the regulated substance is stored, loaded, or unloaded; (3) Analyze the offsite consequences of the worst-case release scenario and the other more likely significant accidental release scenarios identified in 68.15(b)(2); and (4) Develop a history of accidental releases of the regulated substance. (c) To determine a worst-case release scenario, the owner or operator shall examine each process handling each regulated substance and assume that all of the regulated substance in the process 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Healtn Reporter ABD00086734 712 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER is instantaneously released and all mitigation systems fail to minimize the consequences of the release. (d) The owner or operator shall determine other more likely significant accidental releases such as but not Limited to: (1) Transfer hose failure, excess flow valve or emergency shutoff failure and subsequent loss of piping end shipping container contents (truck or rail); (2) Process piping failure and loss of contents from both directions from the break; and (3) Reactor or other process vessel failure where the contents are at temperatures and pressures above ambient conditions. In these situations, passive mitigation systems are assumed to work to minimize the consequences of the release. (e) For each regulated substance, the offsite consequences of the worst case or more likely significant accidental release scenarios shall be analyzed as follows: (1) The rate and quantity of substance lost to the air and the duration of the event; (2) The distance, in all directions, 6t which exposure to the substance or damage to offsite property or the environment from the release could occur using both worst-case meteorological conditions (i.e.. F stability and 1.5 m/sec wind speed) end meteorological conditions most often occurring at the stationary source; (3) Populations within these distances that could be exposed to the vapor cloud, pressure wsve, or debris, depending on wind direction and meteorological conditions; and (4) Environmental damage that could be expected within these distances, including consideration of sensitive ecosystems, migration routes, vulnerable natural areas, and critical habitats for threatened or endangered species. (f) The owner or operator shall prepare a five-year history of significant accidental releases and releases with potential fcr offsite consequences for each regulated substance handled at the stationary source. The history shall list the release date, time, substance and quantity released, the duration of the release, the concentration of the substance released, and any offsite consequences such as deaths, injuries, hospitalizations, medical treatments, evacuations, sheltering in-place, and major off-site environmental impacts such as soil, groundwater, or drinking water contamination, fish kills, and vegetation damage. (g) The hazard assessment shall be reviewed and updated at least once every five years. If changes in process, management, or any other relevant aspect of the stationary source or its surroundings (e.g. new housing developments or improved emergency response services) might reasonably be expected to make the results of the hazard assessment inaccurate (i.e., if either the worst-case release scenario or the estimate of offsite effects might reasonably be expected to change), the owner or operator shall complete a new or revised hazard assessment within 60 days of such change. (b) The owner or operator shall maintain the following records documenting the hazard assessment and analysis of offsite consequences: (1) A description of the worst-CAS9 scenario: (2) A description of the other more likely significant accidental release scenarios identified in 68.15(b)(2), assumptions used, analyses or worksheets used to derive the accident scenarios, and the rationale for selection of specific scenarios; and (3) Documentation for how the offsite consequences for each scenario wore determined including: (i) Estimated quantity of substance released, rate of release, and duration of the release; (ii) Meteorological data used for typical conditions at the stationary source: (iiil For toxic substances, the concentration used to determine the level cf exposure and the data used for that concentration; (iv) Calculations for determination of the distances downwind to the acute toxicity concentration; and (v) Data used for estimation of the populations exposed or are3 damaged. (i) A summan* of the information required under paragraph (h) of this section and a table showing the data for the five-year accident history under paragraph (f) of this section shall be included in the RM? required under 68.50. 6S.2Q Prevention program purpose. The owner or operator of a stationary source haring one or more regulated substance above the threshold quantity shall develop and implement an integrated management system to evaluate the hazards present at the stationary source and to find the best ways to control these hazards. The prevention program includes ten required elements that must be tailored to suit the degree of hazards present et the stationary source and th6 degree of complexity of the stationary source's operations and that should work together under management control to ensure safe operations. $68.22 Prevention proyreny- rn*n*p*mfit system. (a) The owner or operator of the stationary source shall develop a management system to oversee the implementation of the risk management program elements. The purpose cf the management system is to ensure thet the elements of the risk management program are integrated and implemented on an ongoing basis and that the responsibility for the overall program and for each element is clear. (b) As part of the management system, the owner ot operator shall identify a single person or position that has the overall responsibility for the development, implementation, and integration of the risk management program requirements. (c) When responsibility for implementing individual requirements of the risk management program is assigned to persons other than the person designated under paragraph fb) of this section, the names or positions of these people shall be documented and the lines of authority denned through an organization chart or similar document. 68.2-i Prevention program--process hazard analyst*. (a) The purpose cf the process hazard analysis (hazard evaluation) is tc examine, in a systematic, st8p-by-step way, the equipment, systems, and procedures for handling regulated substances and to identify the mishaps that could occur, analyze Lie likelihood that mishaps will occur, evaluate the consequences of these mishaps, and analyze the likelihood that safety systems, mitigation systems, and emergency alarms will function properly to eliminate or reduce the consequences of a mishap. A thorough process hazard analysis is the foundation for the remaining elements cf the prevention program. fb) The owner or operator shall perform an initial process hazard analysis on processes covered by this part. The process hazard analysis shall be appropriate to the complexity of the process and shall identify, evaluate, ar.d control the hazards involved in the process. The owner or operator shell determine and document the priority order fcr conducting process hazard analyses based on a rationale which includes such considerations as Lhe extent ox process hazards, offsite consequences, age of the process, and operating history of the process. The process hazard analysis shell be 10-27-93 Published by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.. Washington, D.C. 20037 ABD00086735 CURRENT REPORT :A 713 completed no later than (three years after the date of final rule publication). (c) Process hazard analyses completed after (Insert date 5 years before the effective dale of the final rule) which meet the requirements of this section are acceptable as initial process hazard analyses. These process hazard analyses shall be updated and revalidated, based on their completion date, in accordance with paragraph (h) of this section. (d) The owner or operator shall use one or more of the following methodologies that are appropriate to determine and evaluate the hazards of the process being analyzed: (1) What-lf; (2) Checklist; (3) What-If/Checklist: (4) Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP); (5) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA); (6) Fault Tree Analysis; or (7) An appropriate equivalent methodology. (e) The process hazard analysis shall address: (1) The hazards of the process; (2) The identification of any previous incident which had a likely potential for significant offsite consequences: (3) Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases. Acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors; (4) Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls; (5) Stationary* source siting; (6) Human factors; and (7) A qualitative evaluation of a range of possible safety and health effects of failure of the controls on public health and the environment. (f) The process hazard analysis shall be performed by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations, end the team shall include at least one employee who has experience and knowledge specific to the process being evaluated. Also, one member of the team must be knowledgeable in the specific process hazard analysis methodology being used. (g) The owmer or operator shall establish a system to promptly address the team's findings and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed; end communicate the action to operating, maintenance, and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who are affected by the recommendations or actions. (h) At least every five (5) years after the completion of the initial process hazard analysis, the process hazard analysis shall be updated and revalidated by a team meeting the requirements in paragraph (f) of this section, to assure that the process hazard analysis i6 consistent with the current process. (i) The owner or operator shall retain process hazard analyses and updates or revalidations for each process covered by this section, as well as the documented resolution of recommendations described in paragraph (g) of this section for the life of the process. (j) Based on the findings and recommendations of the process hazard analysis, the owner or operator shall elso investigate, evaluate, and document a plan for, or rationale for not, installing (if not already in place): (1) Monitors, detectors, sensors, or alarms for early detection of accidental releases; (2) Secondary containment or control devices such as, but not limited to, flares, scrubbers, quench, surge, or dump tanks, to capture releases; and (3) Mitigation systems to reduce the downwind consequences of the release. 68.26 Prevention program--process safety Information. () The owner or operator shall complete a compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required in 68.24. The compilation of written process safety information is to enable tne owner or operator and the employees involved in operating the process to identify and understand the hazards posed by those processes involving regulated substances. This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substances used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technolog)' of the process, and information pertaining to the equipment in the process. fb) Information pertaining to hazards of the regulated substance in the process. This information shall consist of at least the following: (1) Toxicity information; (2) Permissible exposure limits; (3) Physical data; (4) Reactivity data; (5) Corrosivity data; () Thermal and chemical stability data; and (7) Hazardous effects of inadvertent mixing of different materials that could foreseeably occur. Note: MSDSs meeting the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.1200(g) may be used to comply with this requirement to the extent they contain the information required by this paragraph. (c) Information pertaining to the technolog)' of the process. Information concerning the technology of the process shall include at least the following: (1) A block flow diagram or simplified process flow diagram; (2) Process chemistry; (3) Maximum intended inventory; (4) Safe unoer and lower limits for such items as temperatures, pressures, flows, or compositions; and, (5) An evaluation of the consequences of deviations, including those affecting public health and the environment. (d) Where the original technological information required by paragraph (c) of this section no longer exists, such information may be developed in conjunction with the process hazard analysis in sufficient detail to support the analysis. (e) Information pertaining to the equipment in the process. Information pertaining to the equipment in the process shall include: (1) Materials of construction; (2) Piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's); (3) Electrical classification; (4) Relief system design and design basis; (5) Ventilation system design: (5) Design codes and standards employed; (7) Materiel and energy balances for processes built after the effective date of role: and (8) Safety systems (e.g., interlocks, detection, or suppression systems). (0 The owner or operator shall document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. (g) For existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards, or practices that are no longer in general use, the owmer or operetor shall determine and document thet the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe maimer. 68.28 Prevention program--standard operating procedures. (a) The purpose of wTitten standard operating procedures is to document the safe and proper way to operate and maintain processes and equipment, and to handle and store regulated substances at a stationary source. Procedures may 10-27-S3 Occuoaronai Safety & Health Reporter ABD00086736 714 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER be based on the process hazard analysis (hazard evaluation) information, successful past operating experience, manufacturers' recommendations, and applicable and appropriate codes and standards. The owner or operator shall consider the complexity of the process or stationary source to develop standard procedures. (b)The owner or operator shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least tlv: following elements: (1) Slaps for each operating phase: (1) Initial startup; (ii) Norma! operations; (iii) Temporary operations; (iv) Emergency shutdown including the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required, and the assignment cf shutdown responsibility to qualified operators to assure that emergency shutdown is executed in a safe and timely manner. (v) Emergency operations; (vi) Normal shutdown; end tvii) Startup jolicnvtne a turnaround, or after an emergency shutdown. (2) Operating iir.it>: (i) Consequences of deviation; and (:;} Steps required to correct or avoid deviation. (3) Safety end health considerations: (i) Properties of. and hazards presented by, the substances used Ln the process: (:i) Precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including enointvrirg controls, administrative controls, end personal protective equipment; (iiij Control measures to he talien if physical contact or airborne exposure occurs; (iv) Quality contra] for raw materials and centre! of regulatc-d substance inventory levels; and, (') Ar-y rr-fc:?l or unique hazards. {4) Safety systems end their functions, (c* Operating procedures shall be readily acctvtefbio to employees who work in or maintain n process. (d) The cper.'ting procedures shall be reviewed as often as rtv.e.'.r.arv to assure that they reflect current cper.vjng practice, including. changes that result from changes in process chemicals, technology, and equipment, and changes to stationary sour ces. The owner cr operator shall certify annually that these operating procedures are current ana accurate. (el The owner or operator shall develop and isplemsnt safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations involving lockout/tagout; confined space entry; opening process equipment or piping; and control over entrance into a stationary source by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel. These safe work practices shall apply to employees and contractor employees working on a facility. 68.30 Prevention program--training. (a) The purpose of the training program is to ensure that each employee involved with regulated substances has learned and understands the procedures developed under 68.2-9. The owner or operator shall consider the complexity of the procedures, and th* complexity of the process or stationary sources when developing training programs. (b) Initio! framing. (1) Each employee presently operating e process, end eecb employee before operating a newly assigned process shall be trained in an overview of the process and in the operating procedures as specified in 6o.28. Tr.9 training shall include emphasis on the specific safety and health standards, emergency operations including shutdown, and safe work practices applicable to the employee s job tasks. (2) in Leu of initial training so; those employees already involved in operating a process on the effective date of this rrie, an owner or operator may certify in writing the* the employee has the required kncwlvbps. skills, end abilities to safely carry cut the duties and responsibilities as specified in the operating procedures. (cl Refresher training. Refresher training shall be provided at less! every three years ar.d mere often if nectssary to each employer? involved in operating a covered process to assure `mat. the employee understands and adheres to the current operating procedures in the process. The owner cr operator, in consultation with the employees involved in operating the process, shall determine the appropriate frequency of refresher training. (dj Training dc^camentaiion. The owner cr operator shall ascertain that cadi employee involved Li operating a process has received and understood the training required by this section. The owner or operator shall prepare a record which contains the identity of the employee, the date of training, and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training. . (e) The owner or operator shall evaluate the effectiveness of the training program. A schedule for reviewing and revising the program shall be maintained at the stationary source- 68.32 Prevention program--maintenance (mechanical Integrity). (a) The purpose of the maintenance program is to determine and target the specific equipment that is identified through the process hazard analysis (hazard evaluation) or through operatize experience as needing regular maintenance because failure of the equipment would lead to a significant accidental release. The owner or operator shall consider the complexity of the process or stationary source in developing the maintenance program. (b) The owner or operator shall develop a list of equipment and consols the failure of which could result in a significant accidental release. As applicable, the equipment list shall include: (1) Pressure vessel* and storage tanks: (2) Piping systems {including piping components such as valves); (3) Relief and vent systems and devices; (4) Emergency shutdown.systems: (5) Controls (including mcni-tcring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks}; and, (6) Pumps. (c) Written procedures. The owner cr operator shall establish end implement written procedures to maintain the on going integrity of process equipment. (dj Training for process maintenance activities. The owner or operator shall train each employee involved in maintaining tho on-gcir.g integrity cf process equipment in an overview c-f that process and its hazards anc in the procedures applicable to the employee's job tasks to assure that the employee can perform; the job tasks in a safe menr.e: and sr.el: document the'.reining as required Ln j 58.20'dJ. (ej Maintenance, inspections, end testing. For every item of equipment required tc be listed under paregreph fol of this cc-cticn, tine owner or operator shall develop a maintenance program to inspect, test, and maintain tha equipment on an appropriate schedule to ensure that the equipment and controls continue to rejection according to specifications. (:} Maintenance, inspections. and tests shall be performed or. process equipment. (2) Maintenance, inspection, ar.d testing procedures shall fellow recognized and generally accepted gned engineering practices. (3) The frequency cf maintenance, inspections, and test* of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers' recommendations and good engineer'.'.^ practices, and more frequently if 10-27-93 PuDlishea by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. D.C. 20037 ABD00086737 CURRENT REPORT 715 A determined to be necessaty by prior operating experience. (4) The owner or operator shall document each maintenance procedure, inspection, and test that has been performed on process equipment. The documentation shall identify the date of the maintenance/inspection/test; the name of the person who performed the maintenence/inspection/test; the serial number or other identifier of the equipment on which the maintenance, inspection, or test was performed; a description of the maintenance, inspection, aod test that is performed; and the results of the inspection or test. (f) Equipment deficiencies. The owner or operator shall correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits (defined in the process safety information in 68.26(c)(4) and (e)) before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operations. (g) Quality assurance. (1) In the construction of new plants and equipment, the owner or operator shall assure that equipment as it is fabricated is suitable for the process application for which they will be used. (2) Appropriate checks and inspections shall be performed to assure that equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications and manufacturer's instructions. (3) The owner or operator shall assure that maintenance materials, spare parts, and equipment are suitable for the process application for which they will be used. $ 68.34 Prevention program--pr*-startup review. (a) The purpose of the pre-startup review is to ensure that new or modified equipment is ready to properly and safely contain any new or previously handled regulated substance before that substance is introduced into the system. Tbs owner or operator shall consider the complexity of the process or stationary source in developing the pre- startup review. (b; l he owner or operator shall perform a pre-startup safety review for new stationary sources and for modified stationary sources when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the process safety information. (c) The pre-startup safety review shall confirm that prior to the introduction of regulated substances to a process: (1) Construction and equipment is in accordance with design specifications; (2) Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate; (3) For new stationary sources, a process hazard analysis has been performed and recommendations have oeen resolved or implemented before startup; and modified stationary sources meet the requirements contained in management of change, 68.36; and (4) Training of each employee involved in operating or maintaining a process has been completed and that employees are trained in any new emergency response procedures. 66.36 Prevention program--management of change. (a) The purpose of a management of change program is to ensure that any . alteration of equipment, procedures, substances, or processes are thoroughly analyzed to identify hazards, the consequences of failures, and impacts of the change on existing equipment, procedures, substances, and processes prior to implementation of the change. (bj For process equipment, devices, or controls, replacement is not a change if the design, materials of construction, and parameters for flow, pressure, and temperature satisfy the design specifications of the device replaced. (c) The owner or operator shall establish and implement written procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures; and changes to stationary sources that affect a covered process. (d) The procedures shall assure that the following considerations are addressed prior to any change: (1) The technical basis for the proposed change; (2) Impact ofchange on likelihood of a significant accidental release; (3J Modifications to operating procedures; (4) Necessary time period for the change; and, (5) Authorization requirements for the proposed change. (e; Employees involved in operating a process end maintenance and contract employees whose job tasks will be directly affected by a change in the process shall be informed of and trained in the change prior to the startup of the process or affected pan of the process. (f) If a change covered by this section results in a change in the process safety information required by 68.26, such information shall be updated accordingly. (g) If a change covered by this section results in a change in the operating procedures or practices required by 68.28, such procedures or practices shall be updated accordingly. 68.38 Prevention program--safety audita. (a) The safety audit consists of a periodic examination of the management systems and programs at the stationary source. The examination shall include a review of the documentation and implementation of the requirements of this subpart The owner or operator shall consider the complexity of the process and of the process safety management program to develop the safety audit procedures, plans, and timing. (b) The owners or operators shall certify that they have evaluated compliance with the provisions of this section at least every three years, to verify that the procedures and practices developed under this part are adequate and are being followed. (c) The safety audit shall be conducted by at least one person knowledgeable in the process. (d) A report of the findings of the audit shall be developed. (e) The owner or operator shall promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the audit, and document the! deficiencies have been corrected. (f) The owner or operator shall retain the two most recent safety audit reports, as well as the documented actions in paragraph (e) of this section. $68.40 Prevention program--accident investigation. (a) The purpose of the accident investigation is to learn the underlying causes of accidents to take steps to prevent them or similar accidental releases from recurring. (b) The owner or operator shall establish and implement written procedures to investigate each significant accidental release. (c) The owner or operator shall investigate each significant accidental release. (d) An accident investigation shall be initiated as promptly as possible, but not later than 48 hours following the significant accidental release. (e) An accident investigation team shall be established and consist of at least one person knowledgeable in the process involved, including a contract employee if the incident involved work of the contractor, and other persons with appropriate knowledge and experience to thoroughly investigate and analyze the significant accidental release. (f) A report shall be prepared at the conclusion of the investigation which includes at a minimum: (1J Date of significant accidental release; (2) Date investigation began; (3) A description of the significant accidental release; (4) The factors that contributed to the significant accidental release, including 10-27-93 Occupational Safety & Health Reporter ABD00086738 716 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER its initiating event and root cause or causes that may have increased the likelihood of the initiating event; and. (5) Any recommendations resulting from the investigation. (g) The owner or operator shall establish a system to promptly address and resolve the accident report findings and recommendations. Resolutions and corrective actions shall be documented. (h) The report shall be reviewed with all affected personnel whose job tasks are relevant to the significant accidental release findings including contract employees where applicable. (i) Significant accidental release investigation reports shall he retained for five years. $66.45 Emergency response program. (a) The purpose of the emergency response program is to prepare for response to and mitigation of accidental releases to limit the severity of such releases and their impact on the public health and environment. (b) The owner or operator of a stationary source shall establish and implement an emergency response plan for responding to and mitigating accidental releases of regulated substances. The plan shall detail the steps all employees shall take in response to accidental releases and shall include: (1) Evacuation routes or protective actions for employees not directly involved in responding to the release; (2) Procedures for employees responding to the release, including protective equipment use; (3) Descriptions of all response and mitigation technologies available at the stationary source; and (4) Procedures for informing the public and emergency response agencies about releases. (c) The owner or operator shall develop written procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing, and maintenance. The maintenance program for emergency response equipment shall be documented as required in 68.32(e)(4). (d) For each regulated substance, the owner or operator shall document the proper first-aid and emergency medicel treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposure. (e) The owner or operator shall train ell employees in relevant emergency response procedures and document the training as required under 68.30(d). (f) The owner or operator shall conduct drills or exercises to test the plan and evaluate its effectiveness. Each drill or exercise shall be documented in writing and shall include findings of the drill or exercise that indicate aspects of the plan and procedures which need to be revised. Plans shall be revised based on the findings of the drills or exercises. The owner or operator shall document the response to each finding from a drill or exercise. For each finding requiring a change that is implemented, the schedule for implementing the change shell be documented. (g) Each emergency response plan shall be coordinated with local emergency response plans developed under part 355 of this chapter by the local emergency planning committees and local emergency response agencies. Upon request of the local emergency planning committee, the owner or operator shall promptly provide information to the local emergency planning committee necessary for developing and implementing the community emergency response plan. (h) The owner and operator shall maintain a copy of the emergency response plan, including descriptions of all mitigation systems in place, at the stationary source. 68.50 Risk management plan. (a) The owner or operator of a stationary source covered by this part shall submit a risk management plan (report) summarizing the key elements of its risk management program to the implementing agency and shall submit copies to the State Emergency Response Commission, the Local Emergency Planning Committee with jurisdiction for the area where the source is located, and the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. Each report submitted by the stationary source shall address all regulated substances present at the stationary source in quantities above the threshold quantity. (b) The report shall include a copy of the registration form, with updated information to ensure that the registration information is accurate. Xc) The report shall include, for each regulated substance, a summary of the hazard assessment and analysis of offsite consequences and accident historv data required by 68.15(i). (d) llie report shall include, for the stationary source, a description of the major hazards (e.g., equipment failure, human error, natural phenomena, or other factors or a combination of such factors which could lead to a significant accidental release) identified through the process hazard analyses, a description of the consequences of a failure to control for each identified major hazard, a summary of all actions taken or planned to address these hazards, and how significant accidental releases are prevented or mitigated, or the consequences reduced by these actions. The purpose of the summary is to identify major hazards and provide an overview of the prevention program being implemented by the stationary " source to prevent significant accidental releases. For each action taken to address a hazard, the report shall include the date on which the action was started (or is scheduled to start) and the actual or scheduled completion date. Where the same actions (e.g., training, certain controls, preventive maintenance programs, improved emergency response plan) address a number of hazards, the description may be organized by actions rather than hazards. If any requirement for the risk management program specified in this subpart is not covered in the summary of actions taken to address hazards, the report shall include a brief description of the stationary' source's implementation of the requirement. (e) The report shall include a summary of the stationary source.'s emergency response plan. The summary shall include: (1) The procedures adopted to inform emergency response authorities and the public; (2) The name or position of the point of contact between the stationary source and the public authorities; (3) The dates of drills and exercises completed and planned and the results of completed drills; and (4) A description of coordination with the local emergency planning committee. (f) The report shall include a description of the management system developed to implement and coordinate the elements of the hazard assessment, prevention program, and emergency' response program at the stationary source. The description shall define the person or position at the stationary' source that is responsible for the overall implementation and coordination of the risk management program requirements. Where regulated substances are present above thoir threshold quantities at several locations at the stationary' source or where responsibility for implementing individual requirements is delegated to separate groups at the stationary source, an organization chart shall be included to describe the lines of responsibility. (g) The report shall include a certification by the owner or operator that, to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the information submitted is true, accurate, and complete. (h) The report shall be reviewed and updated at least every five years and 10-27-93 PuOiisnefl by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL. AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington, D.C. 20037