Document MJm4gdrMGw6p7NbXN3ZDn4Xyk
( June 16, 1993
To: Gerald Wagener and Joe Schell
xc: Rick Wittmann Bruce Miles Julie Clebert
Doyle Haney Terry Vavasseur
re: Mini-reactive chemical review for new CMP R-22 refrigeration system
Gerald and Joe,
The following is the list questions that came up during our review and responses.
1. Are there any aluminum or copper parts in K-1100 compressor?
No, according to Rick Wittmann, all the wetted parts on the compressor were specified not to be aluminum. Also, there are no pure copper parts. The majority of the compressor is made from low temperature carbon steel.
2. How will you detect if there is a leak from the process into the R-22 refrigeration system?
If there was an HCI or Methyl Chloride leak, it would show up as non-condensables. The other chlorinated organics would cause efficiency losses and any small amounts of water would probably form hydrates in various control loops. To check for leaks, our lab specialist, Terry Vavassuer, will test the R-22 every 6 months. He will perform a titration to check for acidity and shoot a sample in the G.C. to check for chlorinated organics.
3. What is the maximum temperature the R-22 can get up to? The high discharge temperature trip on K-1100 is set at 1 50 degrees C.
Sincerely:
John Sacks
DO 006564 00NFIDFNTTAI
/ HYDROCHLORINATION REACTIONS
II
VAPOR PHASE REACTION OVER ACTIVATED ALUMINA
* 98 % MeOH Conversion * 20% XS HC1
CH3OH + HQ --> CH3CI + H20 220 C
(Hr = -11.0 kcal/mol)
STDE REACTION
( * Dimethyl ether production
CH3OH + CH3OH --> CH3OCH3 + h2o
220C (Hr = -5.9 kcal/mol)
DME CONSUMPTION * Cellulose mixture (70% DME, 30% Ml)
CH3OCH3 + HC1 --> CH3CI + CH3OH
220C (Hr = -2.2 kcal/mol)
DO 006565 OONF'TDfTNTTAI
HYDROCHLORINATION SCENARIOS
(
1. BIS-CHLOROMETHYL ETHER FORMATION FROM DME CARRY OVER:
* THERMAL CHLORINATION OF DME -> BIS * RUN XS HCL TO MINIMIZE DME FORMATION * 0210 INSTALLATION HAS UNLOADED 0202 * ALARMS
0202 MIDSECTION TEMP EXCEEDS 35 C HI TEMP ALARMS ON PACKED SECTION LOW DENSITY ON SULFURIC ACID SULFURIC MAKE UP LOW FLOW ALARM
2. ALUMINA CATALYST REACTION:
* REACTION WITH WET AIR DURING VACUUM REMOVAL OF CATALYST
* RECHARGE PROCEDURES CATALYST IS DUMPED, AND NOT VACUUMED OUT CATALYST IS WATER SOAKED DURING DISPOSAL PROCEDURE PROPER LABELING AND ATTENTION TO WASTE TYPE
3. LOSS OF HOT OIL FLOW THROUGH REACTORS:
* SPARE PUMP OFF-LINE * ALARMS:
LOW HOT OIL FLOW HIGH REACTOR TEMPERATURES * MODICON REACTOR TRIP: HYDROCHLORINATORS N2 FLOODED AND @ 320 C IN ADIABATIC SECTION
DO 006566
CONFIDENTIAL
HYDROCHLORINATION SCENARIOS
(
4. LACK OF QUENCH WATER CAUSING CORROSION AND H2 EVOLUTION:
* START UP PROCEDURES ENSURE QUENCH RECIRCULATION * ALARMS:
LOW WATER FLOW HIGH QUENCH COLUMN TEMPERATURES
5. EXOTHERM FROM RUNAWAY DURING COOLDOWN
* COOLDOWN PROCEDURES PROVIDE FOR PROPER COOL DOWN MIXTURES AND FLOW RATES * TEMPERATURE ALARMS IN CASE OF HOT SPOT
6. TUBE LEAK ON ISOTHERMAL SECTION
* QUENCH SAMPLES TWICE PER SHIFT - CHECK APPEARANCE * NOT REACTIVE WITH CATALYST AND PROCESS CHEMICALS
7. EXCESS CORROSION FROM REACTION
* ELECTRICAL HEAT TRACING (THERMON) ON REACTOR HEADS AND INLET LINES * TANTALUM LINE REACTOR OUTLET LINES * ALARMS:
HEAT TRACING SYSTEM IDENTIFIES ELECTRICAL AND TEMPERATURE PROBLEMS
DO 006567 CONFIDENTIAL
00
METHYL CHLORIDE FINISHING
PROCESS SUMMARY:
* METHYL CHLORIDE FROM HYDROCHLORINATION IS DISTILLED AND ASLO USED FOR CROSS EXCHANGE IN HYDROCHLORINATION
METHYL CHLORIDE SYSTEM SCENARIOS
1. TUBE LEAKS
* CROSS EXCHANGED WITH SIMILAR PROCESS, NO REACTIVITY PROBLEMS
* POTENTIAL FOR LEAKING METHYL CHLORIDE INTO FREON 22 AT E-211.
2. FLAMMABILITY POTENTIAL
* SPRINKLER SYSTEM PROTECTS D-1250 AREA AND FINISHING EQUIPMENT IN CASE OF FIRE
3. REACTIVITY WITH ALUMINUM
* ALUMINUM IS NOT USED IN ANY PROCESS EQUIPMENT, VALVES, FITTINGS, ETC
* EMPLOYEES ARE TRAINED ON REACTIVE POTENTIAL
4. METHYL CHLORIDE CAUSTIC FILTERS
* WATER/CAUSTIC REACTION INCIDENT (MAY 1992)
* HCL/CAUSTIC REACTION OCCURING AT LOW PPM
(
rONFTDFNTrA,
DO 006569
HOT OIL (SHELL THERMIA C) SYSTEM
CONFTDFNTf Al
DO 0 0 6 5 7 0
HOT OIL SYSTEM
PROCESS SUMMARY: CLOSED LOOP SYSTEM FOR TEMPERATURE CONTROL * ISOTHERMAL SECTION OF HYDROCHLORINATORS
SUPER HEATS MEOH AND HCL TO HYDRO. * TEMPERATURE CONTROL TO HCL PURIFICATION
REACTORS * E-470/E-480 USED TO COOL OR HEAT HOT OIL
cNFTDFNTrAl
DO 006571
HOT OIL SYSTEM SCENARIOS (
1. TUBE LEAKS IN HYDRO OR IN PURIFICATION
REACTION OF SHELL THERMIA OIL WITH HCL, MEOH, OR CATALYSTS * REACTIVE CHEMICAL TESTS INDICATED NO REACTION * OIL SYSTEM DRUM (D-470) PROTECTED BY PSV'S
2. FLAMMABILITY POTENTIAL
AUTO IGNITION TEMPERATURE OF 340 C - LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH REACTOR MAY OVERHEAT OIL
4 SPARE PUMP AVAILABLE * TDC ALARMS FOR HI/LO FLOW * FOAM AND SPRINKLER SYSTEMS PROTECT AREA
IN CASE OF FIRE
DO 006570 OONFTDFNTT At
HCL PURIFICATION REACTIONS
PURIFICATION SUMMARY:
* PURIFY 24,000 LB/HR AHCL FROM VINYL II * ACETYLENE TO VINYL CHLORIDE, ALPHA-DI (R-50) * ETHYLENE TO ETHYL CHLORIDE (R-60) * COMPRESS AND DISTILL OUT HEAVIES
R-50 REACTIONS (ACETYLENE ~> VINYL -> ALPHA-DI) * 2000 PPM ACETYLENE (100% CONVERSION) * 10% MERCURIC CHLORIDE ON ACTIVATED CARBON
C2H2+ HC1 --> CH2=CHCI + HC1
HgC12/C 120 C
(Hr = -27.3 kcal/mol)
* CONTINUED REACTION (15% OF VINYL)
CH2=CHCI + HC1 --> CH3CHCI2
HgC12/C 120 C
(Hr = -41.4 kcal/mol)
D 006573
C0^rnFNTrAt
HCL PURIFICATION REACTIONS
(
R-60 REACTIONS (ETHYLENE ~> ETHYL CHLORIDE AND VINYL ~> ALPHA-DI) * 50-60 PPM ETHYLENE (95% CONVERSION) * 30% ZINC CHLORIDE ON ACTIVATED CARBON
C2H4 + HC1 --> CH3CH2CI
ZnC12/C 120 c
* CONTINUED REACTION (97% OF VINYL)
(
CH2=CHC1 + HC1 --> CH3CHC12
HgC12/C @ 120 c
CONFIDENT! At
00 00>S74
HCL PURIFICATION SCENARIOS
1. TUBE LEAK ON E-52 (REACTOR PRE-HEATER)
REACTION OF SHELL THERMIA OIL WITH HCL OR CATALYSTS * REACTIVE CHEMICAL TESTS INDICATED NO REACTION
2. TUBE LEAK ON E-73 OR E-74 (FREON EXCHANGERS)
POTENTIAL CONTAMINATIN OF FREON-12 SYSTEM WITH HCL * NO REACTIVITY PROBLEMS BETWEEN THESE TWO
3. EXTENSIVE CORROSION DUE TO WATER IN THE SYSTEM
* HCL SYSTEM PIPING AND VALVES ALWAYS DRIED PROPERLY * OIL SAMPLED IN COMPRESSOR TO MONITOR FOR IMPURITIES
4. REACTION BETWEEN HYDROCARBON OIL AND HCL
* HCL IN COMPRESSOR (K-55) CAN REACT WITH IMPROPER OILS * TRAINING ON DANGERS OF WRONG OIL ADDITION * OIL PROGRAM ON PDP-11 SPECIFIES CP-1000 SYNTHETIC OIL
CONFIDENTIAL 00 006575
CONFTDFNTTAl
THROX
THROX PROCESS SUMMARY:
* COMBUSTION REACTION AT 1300 C * FUEL GAS AND AIR INCINERATE VENTS FROM PROCESS,
LOADING, AND AIR STRIPPER. VENTS ARE CONVERTED TO HCL AND C02. * GENERATES 235# STEAM BY VAPORIZING CONDENSATE * HCL IS SCRUBBED IN C-750 (PROCESS WATER) * CL2 IS SCRUBBED IN C-751 (CELL EFFLUENT/STS)
D 006577
co^oeNriAi
THROX SCENARIOS
(
1. PROPYLENE OXIDE REACTION WITH HCL
P.O. IN CELLULOSE LIQUID * POTENTIAL VALVING ERROR COULD PUT CELLULOSE LIQUID INTO DRY VENT KNOCK OUT DRUM * DOUBLE BLOCK AND BLEED SYSTEM IN PLACE/TRAINING * ONLY ONE LIQUID STREAM CAN BE BURNED AT A TIME
2. OXYGEN IN VENT HEADER
* EXPLOSIVE MIXTURES CAN BE FORMED PREVENTIVE MEASURE: CLOSED LOOP VENT SYSTEM
3. CHLORINE IN VENT HEADER
CHLORINE MAY REACT WITH ORGANICS * SEPARATE NOZZLE IN SIDE OF THROX BURNER TO VENT SOAK TANK AND DEPRESSURE CHLORINE HEADER. * STRICT OPERATING PROCEDURES STATING CHLORINE STREAMS ARE NOT TO BE VENTED TO EITHER VENT HEADER PURE CHLORINE IS VENTED TO THE CAUSTIC SCRUBBER, C-751 THROUGH A DEDICATED LINE
00 006578 C0NFJr>ENTlAl
THROX SCENARIOS
4. METHANOL TN DRY VENT HEADER
POTENTIAL METHANOL REACTION WITH ANHYDROUS HCL * PROCEDURES STATE NO METHANOL TO DRY VENT HEADER * HYDROCHLORINATOR MEOH LOOPS HARD PIPED TO WET VENTHEADER
5. EXPLOSION IN THROX
POTENTIAL EXPLOSION DURING START-UP OR SHUTDOWN * MODICON TRIP SYSTEM GOVERNED BY BURNER MANAGEMENT
6. CHLORINE RELEASE FROM LOSS OF SODIUM THIOSULFATE FLOW
CHLORINE MAY BE RELEASED IN FRONT DITCH * EXCESS OF STS * CASCADE CONTROL LOOP MAINTAINS A 9.4 pH IN C-751 BOTTOMS * CHLORINE MONITORS THROUGHOUT PLANT
Do 6S? cNFrc>ENrTAi
(
WASTE DISPOSAL REACTIVE CHEMICAL CONCERNS
1. WASTE DISPOSAL PROCEDURES DEVELOPED
* D-750 WASTE/FLY ASH REACTION INCIDENT (JAN 1992)
* NOW ABSORB WASTE WITH OIL SORB * MATERIALS ARE IDENTIFIED BY WASTE CHAR- # * MATERIALS ARE STORED IN HAZARDOUS WASTE AREA
* DURING MIXING PROCESS SAFETY EQUIPMENT FILL DRUMS 1/2 WITH LIQUID, THEN OIL SORB ENV. OPERATIONS PICKS-UP
DO 006580
C0N8TD8NITTAI.
Report To : R. J. Bordelon
ANALYTICAL REPORT REACTIVE CHEMICALS LABORATORY DOW CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Department: Methanes
Building: 4601
R&D Analytical Labs Dow Chemical USA
Charge Number: 93
Request Number: 92033
Requisition Date: 02/05/92
Preliminary Report: 06/05/92
Final Report: 06/09/92
TITLE: Compatibility of Calcined Oil Absorbent with Waste Containing Sulfuric Acid.
Author(s) : Gerald Barrilleaux and Joe Schell Phone(s) : 6052 Location : 2511
Archival : DB-5723-20B File 92033.03
Reviewer:
Procedure:
A 2-Drop Mixing Cell Calorimeter was used to determine the heat of mixing of 1 part calcined oil adsorbent and 2 parts C-202 bottoms waste containing 60-80% sulfuric acid at ambient temperature. A 2 ml septum-sealed vial was loaded with 50 mg of calcined oil adsorbent, equilibrated, and then 50 microliters sulfuric acid waste from the Methanes plant was added.
Another heat of mixing test was conducted in which a small, nearadiabatic dewar was used and the temperature change was monitored with a Tegam digital thermometer. The temperature changes were measured for a 1:2 mixture of calcined oil adsorbent and C-202 bottoms containing 60-80% sulfuric acid and also a 1:2 mixture of calcined oil adsorbent and C-202 bottoms diluted 1:1 with water (30-40% sulfuric acid).
To determine compatibility above ambient temperature, 1.1 mg calcined oil adsorbent and 2.1 mg sulfuric acid waste were loaded into a glass capillary chilled in liquid nitrogen, sealed, and analyzed on the DuPont 9900 Thermal Analysis Differential Scanning Calorimeter from 25 degrees C to 200 degrees C at 10 degrees/minute.
Heat of Mixing Results:
The heat of mixing measured by the 2-Drop calorimeter at ambient temperature was -4.9 calories/gram of mixture.
DO 006581 CONFTDFNTTAL
Heat of Mixing by Dewar: C-202 bottoms sample (60-80% sulfuric acid) Initial temperature = 22.5 degrees C Maximum temperature after addition of adsorbent = 26 degree C C-202 bottoms diluted 1:1 with water (30-40% sulfuric acid) Initial temperature =25 degrees C Maximum temperature after addition of adsorbent = 26 degrees C Differential Scanning Calorimetry Results: File 92033.03 is a DSC scan of 1.1 mg calcined oil adsorbent + 2.1 mg sulfuric acid waste. There was no thermal activity detected to 200 C. Conclusions: The C-202 bottoms waste containing 60-80% sulfuric acid and the bottoms waste diluted 1:1 with water (30-40% sulfuric acid) are compatible with calcined oil adsorbent within test limits.
CONFIDENTIAL 00658;?
CONFTOFNTTAl
i
sample: 92033/R.R. BORDELON/8674/B-4601
DSCSize: 3,2000 mg
File: 92033.03 Operator: GERALD BARRILLEAUX
Method: GLASS CAPILLARY/AG HOLDER
Run Date: 02/13/92 13: 40
Comment: 1.1 mg Calcined Oil adsorbent + 2.1 mg Sufluric acid (60% -80%)
f;
NO THERMAL ACTIVITY DETECTED
'A
.04
!l.
1i "1(' . 1 .i:
20
40
--r 60
--i------- 1--------- 1-------- 1-------- 1-------- 1-------- 1-------- 1------- 1-- 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Ter -`nature (C)
DSC V2.2A DuP(
9900
D-470
r- - - - - - - n
HOT OIL (SHELL THERMIA
SYSTEM
E-24S a/b MEOH
HYDROCHLOR1NATORS R-250A/B
v- ,
J
P470 A/B/C
/--------- ^ T-252
o o
J
oo eOn'
475# STEAM E-480
TO D-470
E-52
HCL PURIFICATION
CONFTDFNTTAl
C O N F ID E N T IA L
rO NFTDFNTTAl.
sample: 92033/R.R, B0RDELGN/8674/B-460
Size: 3.2000 mg Method: GLASS CAPILLARY/AG HOLDER Comment: 1.1 mg Calcined Oil adsorbent
DSC
File: 92033.03 Operator: GERALD BARRILLEAUX
Run Date: 02/13/92 13: 40
+ 2.1 mg Sufluric acid (60% -80%)
NO THERMAL ACTIVITY DETECTED
! 1.
1
.tr _ J
--r~
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 100 200
Terrr-^atu re (C)
DSC V2.2A DuPc 9900
Louisiana Division Ctiloromethanes Plant - Hvdrochlorlnation System
An 1IC1 MeOH
R-2SO A/B Hyd roc hlorina lion
Reactor
DAH 10/9J
0200/201 Quench Column
C-210 Chilling Column
C-202 Drying Column
DOW CONFIDENTIAL
C-204 Demister
E-1250 Ml
Condensor
IffiW
C-1260 Ml Finishing
Column NFW
688900 00
DOW CONFIDENTIAL
roz->n
r--(
aT1 z
3>
CHLORINATED METHANES PLANT RX. CHEM INCIDENTS
SINCE 1992 CONSOLIDATED AUDIT REVIEW
1. METHYL CHLORIDE CAUSTIC FILTERS (5/92)
- OPERATOR EXPOSURE TO NAOH/WATER PLUME - WELL COMMUNICATED - A MAIN DRIVING FORCE FOR PROCEDURE SYSTEM
2. ALUMINUM BAFFLED TANK TRUCK/MI (9/94)
- NEW TRANSPORTATION SERVICE - POOR KNOWLEDGE OF RXN POTENTIAL & MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION - DETAILED PROCEDURES FOR DISPOSAL DEVELOPED
Reactive Chemicals
November 9,1994
r.ONFTDFNTTAL New Superintendent Review
LguJ^^n^ Division,Qhlorom^h^n^ Plant * Thermal Chlorination / .Quench / Condensing Svn.m
R-1100
(T vE-1410 1 t--Ml
| E-M30 -- ! 1 E-l-
Distillation Train
E-V430D-i K*l J00 HS
(Y1 E,. )
R-!l -J
-K'l 100 Li
yff)
Ml
( D-M50 ]
i t s ?oo oa
R-1300 Thermal Chlorination
Reactor
U*W 10/93
r> ozm*--i o z
T>
0:1320 Quench System
E-1410 thru M4S0 Condensing Train
DOW CONFIDENTIAL
THERMAL CHLORINATION REACTIONS
(
REACTION IN THERMAL CHLORINATOR (R-1300)
* 25% Per Pass Conversion, Recycle M2 --> M3 production * 25% Molar Chlorine Concentration * Reaction Temperature averages 455 C
METHYLENE CHLORIDE FORMATION (M2) Cl2 + CH3CI --> CH2CI2 + HQ
(Hr - -25.3 kcal/mol)
CHLOROFORM FORMATION (M3) Cl2 + CH2CI2 --> CHCI3 + HC1
(Hr = -23.9 kcal/mol)
CARBON TETRACHLORIDE FORMATION (M4) * Byproduct, Sent to Solvents
Cl2 + CHCI3 --> CC14 + HC1
(Hr = *20.4 kcal/mol)
ASSORTED SATURATED AND UNSATURATED C2'S ARE ALSO CREATED - TOTAL < 1000 PPM
CONFTDFIMTTAI. DO 00659?
THERMAL CHLORINATION SCENARIOS
1. LIQUID CHLORINE CARRY OVER:
CHLORINE / ORGANIC RATIO EXPLOSIVE POTENTIAL
* HIGH LEVEL ALARM/TRIP ON CL2 KNOCK OUT DRUM (S-1301) * SELF-LIMITING ELECTRIC HEAT TRACING ON S-1301 4 HIGH REACTOR INLET TEMPERATURE ALARM/TRIP * DEW POINT CALCULATION ALARM (25 C ABOVE DEW POINT)
2. HIGH CHLORINE MOLAR % FLAMMABILITY:
CHLORINE / ORGANIC RATIO EXPLOSIVE POTENTIAL
* HIGH OUTLET TEMP ALARM/TRIP * HIGH MOLAR CHLORINE % FLAMMABILITY ALARM/TRIP
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE CHLORINE MOLAR CONCENTRATION CALCULATION
[Cl2] pl = 33-01 ' 0.0672T - 0.03804P + 0.1997[M2] - 0.001194 [M2]2
WHERE*
[d2] fl = MAX ALLOWED CHLORINE MOLAR CONC
T = R-300 INLET TEMP, DEG C P = R-300 INLET PRESSURE, PSIG [M2] = M2 MOLAR CONC IN ORGANIC VAPOR FEED
% FLAM = [Cl2]/[a2]FL
WHERE*
% FLAM = MOLAR CHLORINE % FLAMMABILITY [d2] * MOLAR CONC OF CHLORINE IN VAPOR FEED
CONFTDFNTTAl DO 006593
THERMAL CHLORINATION SCENARIOS
(
3. INLET LINE EXOTHERM
OTHER POTENTIAL CAUSES OF INLET IGNITION * HIGH REACTOR INLET LINE TEMP ALARM/TRIP * Ml IS PURGED THROUGH THE REACTOR BEFORE START UP TO SWEEP ANY FERRIC CHLORIDE THROUGH THE SYSTEM * RUST CAN CAUSE THE REACTION TO BEGIN IN THE INLET LINE * CHLORINE SIDE OF THE MIX NOZZLE IS PURGED WITH HQ PRIOR TO STARTUP TO ENSURE NO ORGANICS ARE PRESENT
4. OTHER SHUT DOWN CONDITIONS:
* MAJOR INSTRUMENT FAILURES * DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ON CHLORINE HEADER * HIGH/HIGH K.O. POT LEVELS
CONFTOFNTTAl DO 006,594
CHLORINE SYSTEM
* ONLY TESTED LEAK SEALANTS ARE USED * TITANIUM NOT USED AT CMP * FLUOROLUBE IS USED IN DP CELL DIAPHRAGMS * GRAPHOIL GASKETS USED * CHLORINE HEADER PRESSURE HIGHER TO PREVENT BACK
FLOW * PIPE SPEC "T" FOR CHLORINE SERVICE IS STRICTLY ADHERED
TO * VALVES FOR CHLORINE SERVICE ARE PROPERLY PREPARED * CHLORINE/IRON FIRE PREVENTED BY SELF LIMITING
ELECTRIC HEAT TRACING * 8 CHLORINE PROBES ARE LOCATED AROUND CMP
tONFTDFNTTAt
THERMAL CHLORINATION AND CHLORINE SYSTEM RELATED REACTIVE CHEMICAL REPORTS
TITLE
CRI: TPO-T-68-5 CRI: LAD-512 CRI: LAD-1635 CRI: LAD-LR-75.10 CRI: LAD-LR-76.06 CRI: LAD-LR-75.18 CRI: TCL-710 CRI: TCL-818 INC# 79-0012 INC# 83-0063 INC# 88-0005 INC# 89-0019 INC# 89-0061 RCL-82-9132 RCL-86-9357 RCT-87-0390 RCT-88-0486 RCT-88-0794
DETAIL
KINETICS OF THERMAL CHLORINATION KINETICS KINETICS BYPRODUCTS OF THERMAL CHLORINATION BYPRODUCTS BYPRODUCTS FLAMMABILITY FLAMMABILITY CL2 AND TITANIUM CL2/IRON FIRE DUE TO 400# STEAM TRACING AMMONIA FLASH FIRES DURING LEAK TEST OIL IN N2 HOSE THAT PURGED CL2 LINE CHLORINE/NEVERSEEZ REACTION IN FLANGE METHYL CHLORIDE/ CHLORINE METHYLENE CHLORIDE SATURATE WITH CL2 Ml, M2, AND CHLORINE GRAPHOIL GTR AND CHLORINE GAS ALUMINUM RING AND CHLORINE
CONFTDFNTTAl
00 006&^fo
CONDENSING TRAIN
PROCESS SUMMARY: * CONDENSE VIA CROSS EXCHANGE WITH R-22, Ml, AIR * R-22 SYSTEM COMPRESSOR (K-1100) * FINAL DESTINATION D-1450, DIST. FEED TANK
CONDENSING TRAIN SCENARIOS
TUBE LEAKS
* NO REACTION WITH CROSS EXCHANGE MEDIUMS * ORGANICS IN FREON SYSTEM WOULD SHOW UP AS INERTS (Ml)
OR WOULD CAUSE EFFICIENCY LOSSES/EXCHANGER LEVEL RISE (M2/M3) 4 ALUMINUM FINS ON AIR COOLERS... SHUTDOWN ON HIGH INLET AIR TEMPERATURE
rNFTDFNTTAI. DO 006597
Louisiana.Division Chloromethanes Plant Distillation Train
C-1500 An HCtSpliuer
Column
DAH 10/93
C-1'510 Recycle Column
C-1S20 M2 Splitter
Column OLD
C-1530 M2 Finishing
Column OLD
D-1525 Cis Soak Tank
Reactor
C-1540 M3 Splitter
Column
C-155Q M3 Finishing
Column
DOW CONFIDENTIAL
DISTILLATION
PROCESS SUMMARY:
* SPLIT AND RECYCLE HCL (C-1500) * RECYCLE M1/M2 MIX (C-1510) * SPLIT M2/M3 (C-1520) * FINISH M2 (LIGHTS STRIPPER) (C-1530) * REACT 1,2-DICHLOROETHYLENE (CIS) VIA
CHLORINATION IN SOAK TANK (D-1525) * SEPARATE M3 & CL2 FROM M4 (C-1540) * FINISH M3 (CHLORINE STRIPPER) (C-1550)
* STEAM ON ALL REBOILERS
* FREON 22, FIN FANS, COOLING TOWER WATER FOR CONDENSING
M3EXPDIST.TXT
KELLEY 6/93
CONFTDFNTT At DO 006599
DOW CONFIDENTIAL
DISTILLATION SCENARIOS
1. TUBE LEAKS
* NO REACTION WITH CROSS EXCHANGE MEDIUMS
2. CHLORINE/M2 REACTION IN SOAK TANK
* CONTROL CL2 CONCENTRATION AT 200 PPM * SAMPLE ONCE PER SHIFT * CL2 PROBE ON SOAK TANK
3. CHLORINE INTECTION PROBLEMS
* CHLORINE AT 115 PSIG/ DP INDICATION AND ALARM, AUTOMATIC DOUBLE-BLOCK-AND-BLEED TO PREVENT BACKFLOW
* INJECTION FLOW CONTROLLED AND ALARMED BY MOD5 * LIQUID CHLORINE PREVENTION VIA ELECTRIC HEAT TRACING
CONFTDFNTTAL DO 006600
DISTILLATION SCENARIOS
4. REBOILER POLYMER FORMATION
* CMP COMPOUNDS DO NOT POLYMERIZE IN REBOILERS
5. MOLE SIEVE BED EXOTHERMS
* MOLE SIEVE TYPE AW-300 NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO DAMAGE FROM HCL
* BED TEMPERATURES MONITORED AND ALARMED ON MOD V * LIQUID FILLED BED WITH CONSTANT SIDE STREAM FEED FLOW 4 REGENERATION BY NITROGEN HEATED BY 475# STEAM * MIGRATION PREVENTED BY JOHNSON SCREEN AND STRATIFIED
LAYER OF INERT BALLS (DENSTONE 57)
6. FLAMMABLE LEAK TO ATMOSPHERE
* FIN FAN EXCHANGERS WITH FLAMMABLES HAVE AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE MONITORED FOR AUTO SHUTDOWN IN EVENT OF AFIRE
* FIN FAN MATERIALS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH PROCESS
M3EXP-DIST.TXT
KELLEY 6/93
CONFIDFNTIAI D0 006601
DOW CONFIDENTIAL
N2 PAD
CYCLOHEXANE
D-100 A
M2 INHIBITOR
N2 PAD
TO PSA-1760
FROM C-1530
T-804 A/B
N2 PAD
AMYLENE
D-100
FROM C-1550
M3 INHIBITOR
TO STORAGE ^ & LOADING
T0
PSA-1750
N2 PAD
T-1555 A/B
*
CONF TDFNT t
TO STORAGE & LOADING
PRODUCT FINISHING ( REACTIVE CHEMICAL CONCERNS
1. METHYLENE CHLORIDE/ CHLOROFORM INHIBITORS
* CYCLOHEXANE IN METHYLENE CHLORIDE (300 PPM) RATIO CONTROLLED BYTDC
* AMYLENE IN CHLOROFORM (15 PPM) CONCENTRATION CONTROLLED BY MODS
* FLOW ALARMS * TANKS ARE SAMPLED TO VERIFY ANTICIPATED
CONCENTRATIONS * RECENT R&D WORK INDICATES PRODUCT BREAKDOWN
IS FREE A RADICAL RXN IN PRESENCE OF UV LIGHT AND OXYGEN
2. CHLQROFORM/CAUSTIC REACTION
* LIGHTS STRIPPER USED FOR HCL REMOVAL IN M2, NO M2 CAUSTIC FILTERS ANYMORE
CONFir>FNTTAl no 006603
PSA SYSTEM
FROM M2 TANKS
T-804 A/B T-100
+~ ATMOS.
oo o
ro> z~n
oCcrT>' o
om z--t
D-1760
V______ ___J
----------------------- TOTHROX
K1760
<3
VENTS
T-251
T-101
T-809
T-808
LOADING VENT HEADER (M2/M3)
N2 _i N2 --4 N2 --i
M1SC. PSA SYSTEM
V-1770A
ATMOS.
D-1770
TOTHROX
K1770
RCI-84-0022 RCI-88-0141 RCR-89-0074 RCT-87-0007
C O N F ID E N T IA L
PSA SYSTEMS
( PROCESS SUMMARY: * ABSORB VAPORS FROM ATMOSPHERIC TANKS/LOADING * VACUUM OPERATION TO DESORB VAPORS * CONDENSE WITH R-22 * BURN OR REPROCESS PRODUCT * PSA-1750 FOR CHLOROFORM TANKS * PSA-1760 FOR METHYLENE CHLORIDE TANKS * PSA-1770 FOR M4 / MEOH / URETHANE / AEROTHANE
( TANKS * REACTIVE CHEMICAL REVIEW DURING STARTUP IN NOVEMBER 1991
( OONFIDFNTIAI DO 0 0 & 6> 0
PSA SCENARIOS
Is___ POTENTIAL FIRE IN CARBON BEDS
* PROCEDURES FOR BED DUMPING * BED TEMPERATURES USED TO MONITOR, ALARM AND
SHUTDOWN - ON CRITICAL INSTRUMENTS * VACUUM BREAK DONE WITH NITROGEN TO PREVENT
AIR/CARBON OR AIR/MEOH/CARBON INCIDENT * ENTHALPY OF ABSORBTION RESEARCHED AND IS OK
(PSA START-UP REVIEW)
2. TUBE LEAK
* FREON 22 ON SHELL, DOESN'T REACT WITH PRODUCTS
CONFTDFNTT
DO 006607
PSA RELATED REACTIVE ( CHEMICAL REPORTS
TITLEDETAIL
RCI-84-0022 RCI-88-0141 RCR-89-0074 RCT-87-0007
M2 AND MEOH FLASH POINT WORK M3 AND MEOH MIXTURE OF RCL'S AND MEOH METHANOL/CHARCOAL (CARBON)
CONFIDENTIAL DO 006608
From: To: CC: Sub J :
LACSDC::MILES
19-JUN-1992 12:00:42.88
LARNDC: :WAGENER,HANEY, KKELLEY
MILES
REACTIVE CHEMICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE
Gerald Wagner urman of Reactive Chemical Committed LAD
Gerald,
The following are the Plant responses and dates for follow-up on findings from the reactive chemical review. Please let me know if you have any questions or comments on the proposed follow-up actions
the
SubJ: Reactive Chemicals Incident at Methanes Plant
Reactive Chemicals Incident Investigation Conducted on 5-29-92
Incident: Methyl Chloride Caustic Filter Exotherm during Recharging------5-29-92
Description: A routine operation of recharging the methyl chloride caustic pots was being performed. The operator was dumping a 400 lb hopper of crude flake caustic into the V--800 west filter. Apparently water was still in the vessel and when the caustic was dumped a violent reaction occurred. A 50 ft plume of steam and caustic erupted from the vessel. The hopper was thrown upward, striking and damaging the hydraulic hoist and funnel. The employee received first and second degree burns to the face, lips and neck.
Action Items/Recommendations:
1. Develop a procedure to verify dryness of the adding flake caustic. The current procedures do that is mentioned is to inspect for caustic and cross.
filter pots before not address this--all condition of inlet
RESPONSE: The followup was assigned to James Cook and the procedures were ammended on 5/29/92 to look for water and to verify with bleeds on the bottom of the vessels.
2. The reactive chemical hazard potential of adding flake caustic to a filter pot containing water should be clearly described in the written procedures.
RESPONSE: This follow-up was included in item 1 above.
3. The modifications to the common drain header for the 4 filter pots should be expedited. This includes addition of new drain valves. A comment was made that the configuration that currently exists contributes to the problem of water backing-up into the pots.
RESPONSE: The common drain header was eliminated and individual drains were all in service by 6/12/92.
C0NFTDFNTTA1
4. Reactive Chemicals training on th hazards of caustic/wat r
reactivity needs to be re-emphasized. The superint ndent surveyed
several operators after the incident and reported that a lack of
knowledge existed in some cases.
DO 006609
RESPONSE: Tailgates were held with all five shifts by 6/3/92 to
block mill be reemphasized at the June safety meetings.
*
5. Sizing of the caustic filter safety relief devices should be re-evaluated. There is a concern that these devices wer not siz d for caustic/wat r reactive venting.
RESPONSE: A project has been initiated with enginnerring and meetings have been held with John Monroe and Belinda Furby to define credible scenerios and to start sizing relief valves. Follo-up assigned to Kevin Kelley. Sizing complete by 6/30 and implementation in a reasonable timeframe depending on the extent of the modifications. When uie have \
Ja definitive estimate we eill communicate it to the reactive chemical
Chairman.
6. Verify that the flake caustic which was added to the filter during the incident is indeed sodium hydroxide and also verify that the liquid remaining from the incident is only water/caustic solution.
RESPONSE: Both the caustic flake and residual liquor in the vessel was analyzed by research and found to contain only sodium hydroxide. Completed 6/3/92.
7. A caustic dust problem exists during the caustic dump step of the the recharging operation. Steps should be taken to minimize dust exposure to personnel. Industrial Hygiene personnel should be consulted for their input. One suggestion was to consider installing a remote dumping switch.
RESPONSE: The same engineering project for the safety valve sizing will address this problem also. The engineering should be complete by 6/30/92.
8. Amend procedures to include reading pressure gauge to insure that the pressure is relieved to 1 atm before pulling heads.
RESPONSE: This item was also taken care of in item one above.
9. Communicate this incident to the Chlorinated Hydrocarbons Technology Center and ask Maurice Oubre to pass this information on to other plants that use caustic filters.
RESPONSE: Kevin Kelley communicated the incident to Maurice Oubre. Maurice suggested that we communicate the incident to the other plants when we request information in item 10 below.
10. Check with the Technology Center concerning the best method of adding water to the spent caustic during the washing step to minimize the potential for a reactive chemicals incident.
RESPONSE: The other Plants with caustic filters were communicated with by VAX mail on 6/12/92 to request information on the wash steps that they are using. Follow-up will depend on the types of response Again we will communicate the findings form the survey to the Reactive Chemicals Chairman and to the Tech Center.
Bruce Miles ' Production Plant
00 006610 CONFIDENTIAL
CHLORINATED METHANES PLANT ( LEAK REPAIR METHODS
1. ENGINEERING DEFINED PROCEDURES ARE FOLLOWED
2. LIST OF ACCEPTED SEALANTS CURRENTLY ON PDP-11 * * * PROPOSE USING LACSDC ''SAFETY" MENU ***
TO AVOID DOUBLE WORK FOR ENGINEERS & CATS
(
(
Reactive Chemicals
November 9,1994
CONFIDENTIAL New Superintendent Review
DO 006611
PLANT
LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 LHC 3 METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES ME1 \NES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES
46
TABLE III. REACTIVITY OF SEALANT WITH PROCESS CHEMICAL (SORTED BY PLANT)
PROCESS CHEMICAL
SEALANT
REF. NO. TEST
WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM CARBON TETRACHLORIDE CARBON TETRACHLORIDE CARBON TETRACHLORIDE CARBON TETRACHLORIDE CARBON TETRACHLORIDE CARBON TETRACHLORIDE CHLORINE (LIQUID) CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM CHLOROFORM CP-1000 OIL SATURATED WITH HCL DIMETHYL ETHER DOWTHERM Q FREON 12 HCI (15%) + METHYL CHLORIDE (85%) HO (15%) + METHYL CHLORIDE (85%) HQ, Ml, M2, M3, M4 (T-851) HO, Ml, M2, M3, M4 (T-851) Ha,M1,M2,M3,M4 (K-350 SUCTION) HYDROGEN CHLORIDE HYDROGEN CHLORIDE HYDROGEN CHLORIDE HYDROGEN CHLORIDE HYDROGEN CHLORIDE
'
SERVICE GROUP INC SG-110 SOLID
89272
SERVICE GROUP INC SG-113
89272
SERVICE GROUP INC SG-201
89272
SERVICE GROUP INC SG-201HT
89272
SERVICE GROUP INC SG-250
89272
SERVICE GROUP INC SG-302
89272
SERVICE GROUP INC SG-303
89272
SERVICE GROUP INC SG-304
89272
SERVICE GROUP INC SG-306
89272
SERVICE GROUP INC SG-312
89272
SERVICE GROUP INC SGC FIBER
89272
SERVICE GROUP INC SGK FIBER
89272
WHITE BAKERSEAL SEALANT
4792-25A
SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON
94060
SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON
94060
SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR CARBON CO GRAFOIL) 94060
SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR CARBON CO GRAFOIL) 94060
SAFE SEAL MULTIPAK (JOHN CRANE 6KB)
94060
SAFE SEAL MULTIPAK (JOHN CRANE 6KB)
94060
SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON
94060
SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON
94060
SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON
94060
SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR CARBON CO GRAFOIL) 94060
SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR CARBON CO GRAFOIL) 94060
SAFE SEAL MULTIPAK (JOHN CRANE 6KB)
94060
SAFE SEAL MULTIPAK (JOHN CRANE 6KB)
94060
STEAM 8 PROCESS SP-CM
85133D
TEAM LEAK REPAIRS SEALANT DB-2
RCL 82-039
TEAM LEAK REPAIRS SEALANT #6
92288
TEAM LEAK REPAIRS SEALANT DB-2
RCL 82-043
STEAM & PROCESS SP-109
RCL 1458
STEAM 8 PROCESS SP-2007
RCL 82-037
STEAM 8 PROCESS SP-1011
RCL 1145
STEAM 8 PROCESS SP-103
RCL 1147
STEAM 8 PROCESS SP-2600
RCL 82-014
STEAM 8 PROCESS SP-CM
RCL 1400
STEAM 8 PROCESS SP-2000
RCL 82-119
SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON
94060
SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON
94060
SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR CARBON CO GRAFOIL) 94060
SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR CARBON CO GRAFOIL) 94060
SAFE SEAL MULTIPAK (JOHN CRANE 6KB)
94060
DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC ARC HOM DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC DTA DTA OSC DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA HOM DSC HOM DSC HOM
Dow Confidential
REACTIVITY
NO EXO TO 275 C EXOAT 185 C EXO AT 75 C EXOAT 125 C NO EXO TO 325 C NO EXO TO 350 C EXO AT 260 C NO EXO TO 325 C NO EXO TO 290 C NO EXO TO 350 C NO EXO TO 325 C NO EXO TO 325 C EXO AT 360 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 297 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 325 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXOAT 185 C EXO AT 8 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 310 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 200 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 224 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 290 C NO EXO TO 100 C NO EXO TO 350 C EXO AT 145 C NO EXO TO 500 C NO EXO TO 300 C NO EXO TO 200 C SL. EXO AT 22 C NO EXO TO 450 C SL. EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 360 C EXO AT 22 C
CO NFTDFNTT At
PLANT
METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES METHANES
Oo o o
O'
w
17
TABLE III. REACTIVITY OF SEALANT WITH PROCESS CHEMICAL (SORTED BY PLANT)
PROCESS CHEMICAL
HYDROGEN CHLORIDE HYDROGEN CHLORIDE (ANHYDROUS) HYDROGEN CHLORIDE (ANHYDROUS) Ml, M2, M3, M4, + HCI Ml, M2, M3, M4, + HCI METHANES E-259 VENT (HCI,Ml,M2,M3) METHANES R-300OUTLET (Ml,M2,M3,M4,HCI) METHANOL METHANOL METHYL CHLORIDE METHYL CHLORIDE METHYL CHLORIDE METHYL CHLORIDE METHYL CHLORIDE METHYL CHLORIDE METHYL CHLORIDE METHYL CHLORIDE METHYL CHLORIDE METHYL CHLORIDE METHYL CHLORIDE METHYL CHLORIDE METHYLENE CHLORIDE METHYLENE CHLORIDE METHYLENE CHLORIOE METHYLENE CHLORIDE METHYLENE CHLORIDE METHYLENE CHLORIDE METHYLENE CHLORIDE METHYLENE CHLORIDE METHYLENE CHLORIDE METHYLENE CHLORIDE METHYLENE CHLORIDE METHYLENE CHLORIDE SHELL THERMIA C OIL WITH DISSOLVED HCL SHELL THERMIA OIL C SHELL THERMIA OIL C SODIUM HYDROXIOE (50%) SULFURIC ACID VINYL CHLORIDE WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM WATER/STEAM
CONFTDFNTTAl
SEALANT
REF. NO. TEST
SAFE SEAL MULTIPAK (JOHN CRANE 6KB)
94060
STEAM & PROCESS SP-CM
B5133F
TEAM LEAK REPAIRS SEALANT DB-2
RCL 82-042
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-325
93093
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-325
93093
SILASTIC 732-RTV SILICONE RUBBER
RCL 83-092
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-2600
RCL 82-045
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-t015
85173A
TEAM LEAK REPAIRS SEALANT DB-2
RCL 82-041
755 STICK SEALANT
91126
SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON
94060
SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON
94060
SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR CARBON CO GRAFOIL) 94060
SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR CARBON CO GRAFOIL) 94060
SAFE SEAL MULTIPAK (JOHN CRANE 6KB)
94060
SAFE SEAL MULTIPAK (JOHN CRANE 6KB)
94060
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-1360
RCL 1578
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-2007
84E156
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-2026
85132A
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-CM
851338
TEAM LEAK REPAIRS SEALANT DB-2
RCL 82-040
SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON
94060
SAFE SEAL - CHEMOLA TEFLON
94060
SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR CARBON CO GRAFOIL) 94060
SAFE SEAL GRAFPAK (UCAR CARBON CO GRAFOIL) 94060
SAFE SEAL MULTIPM (JOHN CRANE 6KB)
94060
SAFE SEAL MULTIPAK (JOHN CRANE 6KB)
94060
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-103
RCL 1584
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-1300
RCL 15B2
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-1360
RCL 1577
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-2026
85132B
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-CM
85133C
TEAM LEAK REPAIRS SEALANT DB-2
RCL 82-038
ULTRAMETAL LIQUID METAL (CURED)
93028
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-1011
90400
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-109
90400
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-1011
RCL 1146
TEAM LEAK REPAIRS SEALANT DB-2
RCL 82-044
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-429
93179
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-1011
90037
STEAM 4 PROCESS SP-2511 TEAM LEM REPAIRS SEALANT #1
86060A RCL 83-017
DSC DTA DTA DSC HOM DTA DTA DTA DTA DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA HOM DSC HOM DSC HOM DSC DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DSC DSC DSC DTA DTA DSC DSC DTA DTA
Dow Confidential
REACTIVITY
NO EXO TO 325 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 300 C NO EXO AT 22 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 310 C NO EXO TO 225 C NO EXO TO 175 C NO EXO TO 175 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 375 C SL. EXO AT 22 C NO EXO TO 250 C SL. EXO AT 22 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO T0140 C NO EXO TO 150 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 190 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 228 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 335 C NO EXO AT 22 C EXO AT 120 C NO EXO TO 150 C NO EXO TO 150 C NO EXO TO 150 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 200 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 250 C NO EXO TO 295 C EXO AT 45 C EXO AT114 C NO EXO TO 300 C NO EXO TO 275 C NO EXO TO 150 C
CHLORINATED METHANES PLANT RAW MATERIAL I.D.
MATERIAL
MEOH AMYLENE INHIBITOR CYCLOHEXANE SODIUM THIOSULFATE OILS/GREASES FLAKE CAUSTIC LIQUID NITROGEN H2S04 LAB GASES CATALYST MOLE SIEVE
I.D. PROCESS
G.C G.C G.C IODINE COLOR TEST LABEL LABEL CO.A ON INVOICE DENSITY CYLINDER LABELS COA LABEL
Reactive Chemicals
November 9,1994
CONFTDFNTTAL DO 006614
New Superintendent Review
CHLORINATED METHANES PLANT CRITICAL INSTRUMENT PROGRAM
1. THERMALCHLORINATTON: REACTION RUNAWAY PREVENTION:
MOD V - TRIPLE REDUNDANCY ELIMINATING MANY CRITICAL INSTRUMENT CHECKS
2. HYDROCHLORINATION: DME CARRYOVER
QUENCH COLUMN O/H TEMPERATURES SULFURIC COLUMN TEMPERATURES
3. DISTILLATION: PRE-START UP AUDITS
NO CRITICAL INSTRUMENTS IDENTIFIED
4. PSA BED TEMPERATURES: PREVENT BED EXOTHERM DUE TO OXYGENATES
Reactive Chemicals
November 9,1994
CONFTDFNTTAI DO 006615
New Superintendent Review
CHLORINATED METHANES PLANT TRAINING PROGRAM
* YEARLY TRAINING ON REACTIVE CHEMICALS
* IPT SYSTEM IN PLACE
* PROCEDURE SYSTEM: ALL PROCEDURES DEFINE SPECIAL CONCERNS
* COMPATABILITY CHART IN CONTROL ROOM
* TRAINING AND COMMUNICATION ON DIVISION INCIDENTS
Reactive Chemicals
November 9,1994
CONFTDFNTTA! DO OOfcfelfc
New Superintendent Review