Document MGQx5w4o4kYvBGOG24KwXdE0L

OPERATION RANCH HAND Ai^r Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia . 1961- 1971' William a . Buckingham, J r. OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 1982 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Buckingham, William A ., Jr. . Operation Ranch Hand. Bibliography Includes index. 1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975--Chemistry. 2. Herbi cides--War use. 3. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975--Aerial operation, American. 4. United States. Air Force--His tory--Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975.1. Title. DS559.8.C5B82 959.704*348 81-11244 AACR2 For by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 * It t Since of aviatio: ( etyofm is t or war-mi i the flow < 1 sance, the t virtually c V t1 One Southeast ik of Victual { ment to t t1 I Herb agricultui 1f ' their pote Italians t i 1936, the \ .either bet 1 the early i \ the crops 9 In li 1 states to i year, the l Americai i1 House an viewed h< 1 Cong of * tiveness ' alienate i r barism fc propagai Kennedy b requiring proval o: Vietnam, i Opei 1 January r more fro . later, sor - estimated * percent c Foreword Since the dawn of powered flight, there has been debate about the uses of aviation in war. The air weapon could be, and has been, used for a vari ety o f missions: to gain control of the skies, to bomb an enemy's population or war-making resources, to support armies and navies in battle, to interdict the flow of men and materiel to the battlefield, for observation, reconnais sance, the gathering of intelligence, to transport men and supplies, and for virtually every other aspect of modem combat. One of aviation's more unusual military applications occurred in Southeast Asia, where American and Vietnamese planes sprayed large areas of Vietnam and Laos with herbicides in an effort to deny cover and conceal ment to the enemy, and to destroy his food supply... Herbicides, or weed-killing chemicals, had long been used in American agriculture. After World War I, the military o f various nations realized their potential for war and developed techniques to use them. Although the Italians had used lethal chemicals delivered from the air in Abyssinia in 1936, the Allies and Axis in World War II abstained from using the weapon either because of legal restrictions, or to avoid retaliation in kind. During the early 1950s, the British on a limited basis employed herbicides to destroy the crops of communist insurgents in Malaya. In 1961, President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam asked the United states to conduct aerial herbicide spraying in his country. In August o f th a t' year, the South Vietnamese Air Force initiated herbicide operations with merican help. But Diem's request launched a policy debate in the White Aouse and the State and Defense Departments. On one side were those who viewed herbicides as an economical and efficient means o f stripping the Viet Cong of their jungle cover and food. Others, however, doubted the effec tiveness of such a tactic and worried that such operations would both alienate friendly Vietnamese and expose the United States to charges o f bar barism for waging a form of chemical warfare. Both sides agreed upon the propaganda risks of the issue. At last, in November 1961, President Kennedy approved the use of herbicides, but only as a limited experiment requiring South Vietnamese participation and the mission-by-mission ap proval of the United States Embassy, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, and South Vietnam's government. Operation Ranch Hand, the designation for the program, began in January 1962. Gradually limitations were relaxed and the spraying became more frequent, and covered larger areas. By the time it ended nine years later, some eighteen million gallons of chemicals had been sprayed on an estimated twenty percent of South Vietnam's jungles, including thirty-six percent of its mangrove forests. The Air Force also carried out herbicide iii operations in Laos from December 1965 to September 1969 with the permission of the Laotian government. One of a series of books detailing the Air Force's involvement in the war in Southeast Asia this volume was written by M ajor William A. Buck ingham, Jr., while assigned to the Office of Air Force History. The author rightly emphasizes that the Air Force served as an instrument o f national policy in conducting the herbicide spraying. The book is a model study o f the process by which military policy was made in the Southeast Asia War. M ajor Buckingham relates the intense controversy, both within the government and among the public, over the military, political, and ecological ef fects of the program. He connects policy to the operations, showing how pressure from scientists and disagreements among government policymakers and military leaders imposed limitations on the spraying program. He explores the technical difficulties in using herbicides: the right chemical agents had to be delivered in sufficient quantity at the optimal time o f the growing season, only against certain crops and categories o f vegetation, and only in areas where the destruction provided harm to the enemy and no danger to friendly or neutral populations.* And Major Buckingham pays tribute to the bravery of the Ranch Hand airmen who flew their planes " low and slow" over territory often heavily defended by the enemy. Remarkably, Ranch Hand's UC-123 Providers took more than seven thousand hits from ground fire, but lost only a few crews and aircraft. Indeed, the most celebrated of the planes, "Patches," survived over six-hundred hits. The Ranch Hand operation was unique in the history of American arms, and may remain so. In April 1975, President Ford formally re nounced the first use of herbicides by the United States in future wars. "A s long as this policy stands," Major Buckingham writes, "n o operation like Ranch Hand could happen again." - ] j ! \ j RICHARD H. KOHN Chief, Office of Air Force History Mi prepari Doris I ments c forts in tion, ai recollcc by Lt. i Keene, eluded 1 Historic the Off Watson My helpful Among thank Iv Falk, C Richard Bernard Lav in prepa photogn Photogr visual A Archives first-han in envirc Mer W. Cau( burdensc A. Trest through ] I am much of responsib iv A uthor's Acknowledgements Many people assisted me in researching and writing this book and in preparing it for publication, and I owe a debt of gratitude to each o f them. Doris E. Krudener initiated the research and collected many o f the docu ments on which this study is based. Especially valuable were her research ef forts in active files in the early 1970's which preserved much documenta tion, and which probably would otherwise have been lost. Many personal recollections about the early Ranch Hand operations were provided to me by Lt. Col. Carl W. Marshall, Major Charles F. Hagerty, Major Marcus B. Keene, Jr., and Dr. James W. Brown. Others who assisted my research in cluded librarians and archivists at the Army Library, the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, the Washington National Records Center, and the Office of Air Force History. At the latter location, Dr. George M. Watson and William C. Hcimdahl were very helpful. My fellow historians at the Office o f Air Force History gave me many helpful comments and words of advice as the manuscript was developed. Among those who provided extensive comments 1 would especially like to thank Maj. Gen. John W. Huston, Colonel John Schlight, Dr. Stanley L. Falk, Carl Berger, Max Rosenberg, Colonel Ray L. Bowers, Lt. Col. Richard R. Sexton, Dr. Elizabeth H. Hartsook, Jacob Van Staaveren, Bernard C. Nalty, Major Victor B. Anthony, and Capt. Earl H . TUford, Jr. Lawrence J. Paszek, Mary F. Loughlin, and Vanessa D. Allen assisted in preparing this manuscript for publication by editing the drafts, selecting photographs, and planning the graphics, layout, and design o f the book. Photographs were selected from collections held by the Defense Audio visual Agency and the Audiovisual Archives Division of the National Archives. Especially helpful in providing not only photographs but also first-hand information was Maj. Alvin L. Young, an Air Force consultant in environmental sciences. Members of the support staff in the Office o f Air Force History--Ann W. Caudle, Barbara C. Fleming, and I. Jewell Newman--performed the burdensome task of typing and retyping drafts of the manuscript. Warren A. Trest and Dr. Richard Kohn, the Chief Air Force Historian, guided it through publication. I am indebted to each of these people, and many more, and I credit much of the improvement in the book to their help. Of course, I accept responsibility for all errors which remain. v United States Air Force Historical Advisory Committee (As o f April 1, 1982) Dr. David A. Shannon University of Virginia Mr. David E. Place, The General Counsel, USAF Dr. Forrest C. Pogue Smithsonian Institution Lt General Charles G. Cleveland, USAF Commander, Air University Dr. Edward L. Homze Univeisity of Nebraska Dr. Joan Kennedy Kixmaird Trinity College Maj General Robert E. Kelley, USAF Superintendent, USAF Academy Dr. Alfred F. Hurley, Brig General, USAF (ret.) North Texas State University General Bryce Poe, II, USAF (ret.) Vacancy . ' Il ! t ; j i Author's . Foreword I. 1 II. 1 nx. i IV. I V. < VI. . 1 v n .' i vrn. 3 IX. 3 X. ] Append! 1. Chaj 2. Sum Tj Ti Ti T; T 3. Ran 4. Key N otes.. Glossary Bibliogr. Index .. vi Contents Author's Acknowledgements.................................................................. Foreword^................................................................................................... I. The Development of a Military Herbicide Capability.............. II. The Decision to Send Spray-Equipped C-123s to South V ietnam ............... . ............................................. . III. The Deployment of Spray Aircraft to South Vietnam and Initial Defoliation O perations........................................ IV. Early Evaluations and Expanded O perations.......................... V. Crop Destruction Begins and Washington Further Relaxes Controls on D efoliation............................................ VI. Ranch Hand's Mission Expands and Becomes R outine............ VII. Herbicides Reach Their Peak While the War Deepens * and W idens.............................................................................. VIII. Herbicide Use Declines............................ DC. Ranch Hand Ends Its W o rk ....................................................... X. Epilogue ......................................... Page iii 1 9 23 45 69 87 109 137 157 177 Appendices 1. Characteristics of Herbicides Used in Southeast A sia ..................... 2. Summary of Herbicide Operations Table 1--Major Herbicide Mixtures Used in V ietnam ............... Table 2--Herbicide Disseminated, Jan 62-Dec 6 4 ..................... ; Table 3--Herbicide Disseminated, Jan 65-Feb 7 1 ....................... Table 4--Acres Treated, Jan 62-Feb 7 1 ........... ........................ Table 5--Herbicide Operations in L a o s ...................................... 3. Ranch Hand Organizational Designations...................................... 4. Key Leaders ...................................................... 195 199 199 200 200 201 203 205 N otes.............................; ...................... ! ..................................1............... Glossary ..................................................................................................... Bibliographic E ssay.................................................................................... In d e x ........................................................ 207 223 229 231 vu Photographs Page A crop duster over a Mississippi cotton field; sprayplane of the early twenties; Lt. John A. M acready.................................................. 2 Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson with President Ngo D:nh Diem; Ambassador Frederick Nolting, Jr., Gen. Paul D. Harkins, and Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr in Saigon....................... ......................... 12 C-123 s at Hickam await deployment to Vietnam for defoliation activities; crewmembers board a C-123 Ranch Hand aircraft............ 18 Sec. Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Lyman L. Lcmnitzcr, and Gen. Paul D. Harkins visit Americans in Vietnam, May 9, 1962; Fairchild C -123s............................................................. 19 Sec. Zuckert congratulates Gen. LeMay on his appointment as Chief of Staff, May 22,1961; Col. Manh. Gen. Anthis, and Col. Rogers confer with Montagnard province chiefs......................... 32 Dr. James W. Brown leads a team checking the results o f defolia tion in the jungles of South Vietnam, January 1962; an RF-101 Voodoo reconnaissance p la n e............................................................... 40 A Vietnamese officer and SSgt MHo B. Coghill, 346th Troop Carrier Sq., operate a pump aboard a C-123 during a defoliation mission over South Vietnam; a Ranch Hand cockpit o f a UC-123 aircraft in South Vietnam, 1967......................... 41 An Air Force photographer records effects of defoliation; a Vietnamese soldier inspects foliage after herbicide treatm en t............ 48 Insecticide spray boom on a wing of a C-123; a Ranch Hand air- craft on an insecticide m ission............................................ ............... 52 A flight engineer operates spray console on a modified C-123; herbicide s o rtie ........................................................... 53 Leaflets dropped by C-47s during spray flights; airmen place surrender leaflets in C-47 distribution c h u te ...................................... 64 Loudspeakers aboard a C-47; Gen. LeMay on tour of South Vietnam, April 1962; Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Gen. Paul D. Harkins, and Maj. Gen. Rollen H. Anthis examine reconnaissance maps ........................................... 65 ix Soldiers of a Vietnamese Armed Propaganda Team pass leaflets to villagers enlisting their support for the government; Pres. Kennedy with Sec. McNamara and Gen. Taylor after a cabinet m eeting........ Page 77 Brush-infested area in a right of way (United States)............................. 90 Same area--one year after treatment with 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T .......... 91 j j * i i j i " Patches" prior to its retirement, 1979; an A/A45Y-1 internal spray system mounted in a UC-123K.................................................... 98 Vietnamese soldier sprays fuel oil on underbrush to set fire as a method of vegetation rem oval.......................................... j j 110j A1C Richard E. Wolfe, 12th Special Operations Squadron, checks ' herbicide level in storage tank aboard a UC-123K;A2C Ernest C. Bohn, Jr., removes hose after pumping defoliation spray into tanks of a C-123 at Da Nang AB . . . . . . ........................ .I | \ 115 * A mountainous area near Pleiku two days after B-52s dropped incendiary bombs to defoliate the a re a ................................................ 123 In Operation " Pink Rose" B-52s set fires to the heavy growth and destroyed enemy fortifications.............................................................. 126 # Contrast in sprayed areas along river b a n k s ..................................... 144 Drain tank for defoliant drums, Bien Hoa, 1968; large " Agent Orange" storage tank, Bien Hoa, 1969 ................................................ 154 \ i ii i i ; j Lawn in front of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, sprayed with 2,4-D to destroy weeds as early as March 1946; 2,4-D control of weeds--before and a fte r........................................................... . 165 " Agent Orange*1emptied from drums for pumping into railway tank cars at the Naval Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport, Miss.; " Agent Orange" prepared for transportation to the Pacific for incineration ....................................................................... 186 j j I ! Defoliant storage area at the Gulfport Seabee Center; interior of Johnston Island bunker where dioxin cannisters were sto re d ............ 187 x \ t i i ! South ea First Ra Ranchi Propose Propose ChaLa Area Bu Maps Page Southeast A sia ........................................................................................... xii First Ranch Hand Missions, 10-16 Jan 1962............... 34 Ranch Hand Targets, 14-17 Feb 1962 ..................................................... 35 Proposed Spray Area--Mekong Delta, June 1962 ................................ 66 Proposed Spray Area, IS July 1962 ......................................................... 60 Cha La Defoliation Area--An Xuyen Province.................................... 95 Area Burned in U Minh Forest Fires March-April, 1968 ....................... 141 ) M T the in: sprays insect after 1 thousa labor < metho belicvi the Ai T grove Lt. Jc J. S. : comp: the trt gallon poisoi and ir taking ment hangi] the di killed air ha sumin prove iowinj ana. < menu new ti cems acres had p ploita N purpo picied I. The Development o f a Military Herbicide Capability The problem o f controlling insects in agriculture and forestry provided the initial spur for the development of the capability to deliver chemical sprays and powders horn aircraft. Spraying poisonous liquids on leaf-eating insect pests using equipment located on the ground became accepted practice after World War 1. Foresters used engine-driven pumps and, sometimes, thousands of feet of hose to control moth infestations in tail trees, but high labor costs and the inability of spraying rigs to reach the treetops made this method unsatisfactory. An entomologist from Cleveland, C. R. Neillie, believing that airplanes could be used to dust a stand of trees, worked with the Army Air Service at McCook Field in Dayton to test the idea. The first experiments, on an infestation o f sphinx caterpillars in a grove of catalpa trees near Troy, Ohio, were conducted on August 3,1921. Lt. John A. Macready piloted a converted Curtiss JN-6 over the grove. J. S. Houser, an experienced forest entomologist, rode in the passenger's compartment. As Lieutenant Macready flew the plane about 25 feet above the treetops at a speed of 80 miles per hour, Houser turned a crank on a 32 gallon hopper attached to the right side o f the fuselage and filled with poison dust. The wind blew the resulting dense cloud of lead arsenate over and into the trees. The two men flew across the grove six times, each pass taking about nine seconds. Within two days it was obvious that this experi ment had been a resounding success. Thousands o f dead caterpillars were hanging from the trees and lying on the ground. Observations six days after the dusting showed that 99 percent o f the destructive caterpillars had been killed. Considering that the total time required to apply the dust from the air had been less than one minute, and comparing this with the time-con suming and laborious ground spraying method, the airplane had dearly proved its worth as a delivery vehicle for agricultural chemicals. The success of this early aerial dusting experiment led to the use the fol lowing year of the airplane to control leaf worms on cotton plants in Louisi ana. Air Service planes and pilots were also involved in these still experi mental, but successful, spraying flights. The commercial potential of the new technology was obvious, and, by 1924, tivilian aerial crop dusting con cerns were in existence. In 1927, commercial dusters treated about 500,000 acres with insectiddes. The early efforts using Air Service pilots and aircraft had proved the usefulness of the airplane for delivering chemicals, and ex ploitation of this new tool was soon underway.1 Meanwhile, military interest in the airplane for spraying and dusting purposes concentrated on chemical warfare applications. A study com pleted in 19333 provides a good view of the thinking in the Air Corps during 1 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1 t this period. : would find tary standpc craft of the that attack^ play the pri i Thert j lethal and i \ set forth, w ( incendiaries using chem commumca agents, the cover for tl ; Byth j chemical de *; techniques discharging ! Pilots had effects of i sion. Drills years, and tion when While ther than t the Italian combat. T much poli demned, i bombers c halted the disaster.1 1 that: Speris arw ' . lowed shea. Disag tity o f the | strarion oi j Durir. \ straint on from emp cafly, the part o f thi t DEVELOPMENT OF CAPABILITY this period. A primary assumption was that, in future wars, air forces would find chemicals to be attractive weapons, at least from a purely mili tary standpoint. Compared with the other types of weapons carried by air craft of the time, chemicals were highly destructive. Another forecast was that attack aviation, or what we today label tactical strike aircraft, would play the primary role in delivering chemicals by the spray method. The report maintained that the chemicals used would be of three types: lethal and non-Iethal agents, screening smoke, and incendiaries. One idea set forth, which was later revived and tesied in Southeast Asia, was to use incendiaries to set fires in dry, wooded areas. The authors also proposed using chemicals to deny the opposition the use of rear areas and lines of communication. While planning in the 1930s involved the use of lethal agents, the Air Force used herbicides in Southeast Asia to remove jungle cover for these identical purposes. By the 1930s the Air Corps had discovered the basic principles of aerial chemical delivery which would guide the use of herbicides in the 1960s. The techniques involved in carrying liquids in metal tanks aboard aircraft and discharging them through suitable nozzles were already well-established. Pilots had developed low-altitude delivery tactics, and they understood the effects of atmospheric convection,' wind, and temperature on a spray mis sion. Drills, tests, and exercises continued through the remaining interwar years, and the Air Corps was well-prepared to conduct this type of opera tion when World War II began. While military aerial spray activities in the United States went no fur ther than drafting plans and conducting exercises during this period, in 1936 the Italian Air Force in Ethiopia used the airplane to deliver chemicals in combat. The use o f gas during Italy's annexation of Abyssinia resulted in much political and moral condemnation of the Italians. However con demned, it was effective. One war correspondent maintained that S--SI bombers of the Italian Air Force dropping a type of mustard gas powder halted the only real Ethiopian threat of the war and saved the Italians from disaster.1 Haile Selassie in his speech to the League o f Nations maintained that: Special sprayers were installed on board aircraft so they could vaporize over vast areas of territory a fine, death-dealing rain. Croups o f nine, 15 or 18 aircraft fol lowed one another so that the fog issuing from them formed a continuous sheet.. . . These fearful tactics succeeded.. . . 4 Disagreements arose over the extent o f the Italian effort and the iden tity of the chemicals used, but this episode nevertheless was a telling demon stration of aerial delivery of chemicals in combat. During World War II, international legal restrictions and mutual re straint on the pan of participants in the conflict kept American aviators from employing their skills in the delivery of lethal chemical sprays. Ironi cally, the spray equipment and flying techniques developed in the 1930s as part of the Air Corps' most destructive weapons were used in the 1940s in THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA the Pacific to save lives. Allied forces in the tropics experienced high rates o f infection from mosquito-spread diseases. In fact, the casualties altributed to malaria and other insect-borne diseases exceeded those caused by enemy bullets. When the insecticide DDT was coupled with the proven spray capabilities of the airplane, a potent weapon was made available to use in fighting this menace.1 World War II was also significant in providing background for the future events in Southeast Asia in that experiments were conducted in spraying defoliants from aircraft for military purposes. Such experiments in 1944 at Bayport and Marathon, Honda, at the direction o f the Army Air Forces Board, tested the effectiveness of water solutions of zinc chloride and ammonium thiocyanate as defoliants o f tropical vegetation. A-20 air craft, carrying four standard 25-gallon M-10 tanks each, sprayed the test areas from altitudes of between 50 and 500 feet. Measurements were kept to determine the visibility of color changes produced in the vegetation by the spray, the increase in visibility within the forest as a result of defoliation, the change in the flammability of the foliage after treatment, and the amount of time needed for these effects to reach their maximum. The conclusions drawn from these tests were generally unfavorable to the widespread use of defoliants. Chemically induced color changes proved impractical for marking bomb lines in fluid tactical situations, because the geographical distribution of forces could change significantly in the minimum period of 24 hours the tests showed were needed for visible color changes to develop. The use of chemicals in removing jungle cover to increase visibility was considered equally impractical because of the five to seven days needed for any appreciable defoliation to occur. The tests also showed that neither- ammonium thiocyanate nor zinc chloride would increase the flammability of jungle vegetation. However, the researchers did conclude that aerial chemical spray could be used to mark rendezvous points or navigational aids on the crowns of dense jungle forests when appropriate advance notice was available. Th most important tactical application discussed in the Board's report was the use o f aerial spray to ldH or damage food crops grown by isolated Japanese units on Pacific islands. Although these World War H itests did not lead to any large-scale operational program, it will be seen that the concerns expressed and the applications investigated in 1944 were closely paralleled in South Vietnam.* Because the tactical situation and the vegetation in Korea were not condudve to the use of aerially sprayed herbicides (although mosquito spraying took place there), the next armed conflict in which herbicides found signifi cant use was the British campaign against communist guerrillas in Malaya, formally known as the Malayan Emergency. The Emergency lasted from about 1948 to about 1960, but the role of herbicides was important only after 1952--primarily in 1953 and 1954. During this period, the British'used helicopters and, occasionally, fixed-wing aircraft to spray food crops in iso lated gardens tended by the insurgents. However, the aerial spray effort was j < j J `; | \ t. j j j j j ! ! j t \ j j [ : j j * ! - DEVELOPMENT OF CAPABILITY only one part of a much larger program designed to restrict supplies o f food which could be used to support the communist insurgents. Because of the _ effectiveness of the British food control program, the insurgents, by late 1952, had been forced to withdraw from populated areas into deep jungle to ^ cultivate their own food. Food production became the determining factor affecting their ability to survive. In exploiting this situation, the British placed high priority on destroy ing the insurgents' cultivation plots hidden in the jungle. Ground troops sometimes destroyed the plots, but such use o f troops proved to be uneco nomic. As a result, S55, S51, and Whirlwind helicopters were used to spray the gardens with herbicides. The technique generally followed was to have Auster reconnaissance aircraft spot the plots and mark them, after which pairs of Hornets strafed the area to eliminate any ground resistance. The helicopters then descended over the plots and sprayed them with herbicides. At first, the British used sodium arsenite, but the danger it posed to the in digenous population was politically unacceptable. The most effective spray was a mixture of trioxene and diesolene which both killed the crops and ren dered the soil sterile for a time. As an indication of the level of intensity o f these operations, in 1953, 88 cultivation plots were destroyed, the result o f 63 hours of helicopter time devoted to spray missions. The crop destruction helped make the insur gents' jungle camps untenable, thereby forcing them to contact their sup porters in the populated areas and increasing the chance that they would en counter British forces. However, the lack of sufficient helicopters and other aircraft to adequately pursue the crop destruction mission in addition to other tactical mission requirements, plus the difficulty in distinguishing in. surgents' plots from those of the general population, resulted in crop spraymg operations being held in abeyance after about 1954.7 In the United States, research and development in chemical herbicides was undertaken during the 1950s. A considerable amount of effort also went into improving .the delivery equipment. In February, March, and April 1950, anticrop aerial spray trials were conducted at Avon Park Air Force Base, Florida, to determine whether C-47s could effectively spray undiluted chemicals from hollow cone nozzles. Later that same year, B-17 and B-26 aircraft'conducted similar tests.* There was also a need for a large capacity spray system that B-29, B-50, and C-119 aircraft could cany. An engineering study completed in 1952 laid the groundwork for the development of the MC-1 " Hourglass" system. The nickname referred to the speed with which the system was later developed and produced. By 1958, it had become a standardized item in the Air Force inventory. Built by the Hayes Aircraft Corporation o f Birmingham, Alabama, the MC-1 system included: a 1,000-gallon cylindrical aluminum tank insulated by a thick fiberglass blanket; a centrifugal pump; a control valve between the tank and the pump; a pipe assembly with fittings for six spray nozzles; %i THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA [ [ an opening for dumping the chemical contents in an emergency; an outlet for the connection o f a recirculating and heating unit; and a dual set of con trols and instruments.* The B-29 and B-50 could carry *an MC-1 in each of \._y their two bomb bays, and a C-119 could carry one MC-1. The Air Force eventually bought 100 units, placing them in storage, along with chemicals, : at Spokane. They later became the basis for the spray equipment installed aboard the Ranch Hand C-123s.10 In June 19S9 an experiment at Camp Drum, New York, proved the value of aerially dispensed herbicides in improving visibility for military op erations. Sugar maple foliage there hampered observation o f shell bursts on an artillery firing range and needed to be removed. As was often true later | i in Vietnam, ground access to the area was impossible, but in this case t because of unexploded artillery rounds* rather than enemy activity. The j Army Biological Warfare Laboratories sent Dr. James W. Brown, later involved in the earliest stage of the herbicide program in South Vietnam, to Camp Drum to assist in solving the problem. j j j Surplus drums of butyl esters o f 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T* were Obtained I from the Air Force's original (1952) stock. Camp Drum personnel then devised an experimental spray system for use in an H-21 helicopter. Their sys- \ ' tern consisted of two 55-gallon stainless steel tanks; a gasoline engine driven pump; and a 23-foot spray boom with 24 nozzles. The H-21 sprayed a 1 :1 i mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T on the offending vegetation from 25 to 75 feet above the treetops at.an airspeed of about 30 miles per hour. The depo- ; ; sition rate achieved was slightly more than one half-gallon per acre. The spray caused the desired effects, but not immediately. The dried leaves be gan to fall one month later." While research went on elsewhere to develop anticrop chemicals and | ] aerial delivery techniques, a unit at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, was compiling an extensive record of operational spray missions--dispensing in- j j secticides rather than herbicides. This unit, the Special Aerial Spray Flight (SASF) of the Tactical Air Command (TA Q , later provided the aircraft j ; and trained spray crews for the initial defoliation operations' in South Vietnam. The Spedal Aerial Spray Flight's origin can be traced to the successful antimosquito spray operations in the closing months of World War II. \ After the war ended, the DC Troop Carrier Command acquired the operational spray mission, and the Air Force became responsible for aerial spray \ ing when it became a separate service in 1947. In January 1948, the Special DDT Flight, as it was then known, was transferred to Langley AFB. During r j the next twelve years, the Special Aerial Spray Flight, a name it acquired in 1951, experienced many changes in its organizational assignments, but ; | Langley continued to be its home base. For much of this time, the Special i DEVELOPMENT OF CAPABILITY Aerial Spray Flight was not a unit in the normal sense--there was no perma nent organization, just a collection of personnel authorizations which dif ferent people filled each year to undertake the seasonal spray missions. Under these circumstances, retention of experienced pilots with the neces sary, highly specialized skills was a continual problem; Operationally, in the fifteen years following World War II, the Special Aerial Spray Flight and its predecessors sprayed 69 different government in stallations while flying approximately 1,200 insecticide missions, largely in the eastern United States. In addition to the normal insect control activity, the spray planes flew special missions in times o f disaster and for the pur pose of testing new insecticides and equipment. The flight was called into service to combat plagues of grasshoppers in Kearney, Nebraska, and infes tations of black flies in Maine. It also sprayed flies breeding on thousands of acres of dead fish killed by red tides along the Florida coast. The flight also participated in chemical and biological warfare research and flew sev eral missions in 1951 in cooperaton with the Biological Warfare Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland. Three C-47 aircraft were assigned to the spray mission in 1946, and the Special Aerial Spray Flight used these same planes through 1960. The only additional aircraft assigned to the unit in fourteen years were three singleengine L-20 Beavers. The equipment, allocated to the Special Aerial Spray Flight gives some indication of the relatively low priority the Air Force assigned to the spray mission during most o f the pre-Vietnam period.12' Despite the low priority, by .1959 efforts were underway to acquire spray-equipped C-123s. The need for that aircraft became.even more urgent in 1960 when the possibility arose that th Special Aerial Spray Flight might go out of business with the proposed elimination o f C-47s and L-20s from the Air Force inventory. A severe shortage of spare parts for these aircraft already existed. In light of the situation, a preliminary planning conference was convened at Langley on August 16, 1960 to discuss acquiring and equipping of C-123s. Representatives from TAC, the Army, Navy, and U.S. Department of Agriculture attended. Capt. Carl W. Marshall, the Officer in Charge of the Special Aerial Spray Flight, who was later to com mand the first Ranch Hand detachment, chaired the conference. He pro posed that the C-123 be modified to dispense both liquid and granular in secticides. The MC-1 spray system, teamed with the Navy's HIDAL (Helicopter Insecticide Disposal Apparatus, Liquid) booms, could dispense liquid insecticides. A 10,000-pound-capacity hopper with a gravity feeding system and commercial spreaders could handle granular insecticides. However, with the knowledge that C-123s were in short supply, and that very complete justification would be required to reassign any to the aerial spray mission, the conferees concluded that only one C-123 should be ob tained on a temporary basis to test both the liquid and the granular systems. If these tests proved successful, the group supported modification of three aircraft. 7 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA This planning conference had concerned itself almost entirely with the C-123 as a dispenser of insecticides; Only one brief mention was made of another possible requirement which was later to be far more important, captain Marshall at one point said that the aerial spray system installed on the C-123 should also be able to deliver biological and chemical warfare decontaminants and neutralizers, and vegetation control chemicals. These ad ditional capabilities, however, should not reduce the system's capability to spray insecticides. Almost a year after the conference, the deteriorating situ ation in South Vietnam caused the modified C-123*s. secondary capability to deliver herbicides to become very important to officials at the highest levels of the American government.13 : j I l8 8I I II S The qi Kennedy's cables had but no sens Counterinsi the Washin Kennedy aj rent S220 n the South ' dent Ngo I mand and the plan w and build 2 would have The C delayed the lion he wai Joint Chiel ious to see held its apj these trout military lea Vietnam hi rival of a r ministratioi inc Vietnai The se Vietnam to date. Walt warded a 1 meeting m operation ; should the: I II. The Decision to Send Spray-Equipped C-123s to South Vietnam The question of what to do about Vietnam was waiting for President Kennedy's attention when he took office on January 20, 1961.1 Worried cables had been flowing between Saigon and Washington for a year or so, but no sense o f urgency had yet developed. For the previous eight months, a Counterinsurgency Plan for South Vietnam had been percolating through the Washington bureaucracy, and, after just one week in office, President Kennedy approved it. The plan offered to add some $42 million to the cur* rent $220 million U.S. aid program for Vietnam to enable enlargement of the South Vietnamese military forces. In return, South Vietnamese Presi dent Ngo Dinh Diem was asked to consolidate his militaiy chain o f com mand and to institute certain civic reforms. An underlying assumption of the plan was that if Diem would take the needed corrective civic measures and build adequate military forces, then the South Vietnamese government would have the potential to handle the threat posed by the Viet Cong. The Counterinsurgency Plan soon ran into trouble as President Diem delayed the implementation of his side of the bargain in a pattern o f inac tion he was to repeat often during the remaining 33 months of his rule. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the American military mission in Saigon were anx ious to see the war against the Viet Cong accelerated, but Washington with held its approval of increased American aid as long as Diem stalled. Despite these troubles with Diem, some dements of the American government and military leadership fd t that the time to act against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam had come, that any further delay might threaten the eventual sur vival of a non-communist South Vietnam. Consequently, the Kennedy Ad ministration developed plans and made many important decisions concern ing Vietnam during its first year. The series of events which led to the decision to send C-123s to South Vietnam to spray herbicides seems to have begun on April 12,1961. On that -date, Walt W. Rostow, a foreign affairs advisor to President Kennedy, for warded a memo on Vietnam to the President.1 He proposed a high-level meeting in the near future to consider " gearing up'* the whole Vietnam operation as dcrions there had recently been hdd, and President Diem should therefore be free to undertake the reforms proposed earlier. Nine THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA specific courses of action were mentioned in his memo. The fifth one rec ommended that a military hardware research and development team go to Vietnam to work with the chief o f the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Army Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr\ in exploring the usefulness there of various " techniques and gadgets" then available or under de velopment. Aerial defoliation later became one of these unspecified "tech niques and gadgets." Later that same month, Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary o f De fense, submitted a memorandum to President Kennedy which contained the proposals of an interdepartmental task force.9These proposals comprised a multifaceted program designed to prevent a Viet Cong victory in South Vietnam. Among the military actions recommended was one to " . . . assist the G.V.N. [Government of (South) Vietnam] to establish a Combat Devel opment and Test Center in South Vietnam to develop, with the help of modem technology, new techniques for use against Viet Cong forces." President Kennedy approved this recommendation and several other quite limited military proposals contained in the task force report at a National Security Council (NSQ meeting on April 29. Shortly thereafter, the President detided to send Vice President Lyn- . don B. Johnson to reassure U.S. allies in Southeast Asia. The Vice Presidem was also to personally deliver a letter to President Diem.4 The letter, signed by the President on May 8, discussed Administration concern about events in Vietnam and the possibilities of an expanded joint U.S.-South Vietnamese program of action built on the existing Counterinsurgency Plan. Specific military measures listed in the letter as being in addition to actions in the Counterinsurgency Plan included augmenting the American personnel assigned to the MAAG; providing material support to the Vietnamese Navy's Junk Force assigned to suppress clandestine supply and infiltration by sea; jointly developing methods to control infiltration across South Vietnam's land borders; and establishing a facility to develop and test new, modem, techniques to assist in th anti-communist campaign. The letter also dealt with joint political and economic efforts, and closed with as expression of confidence in the ability o f the .South Vietnamese to handle the situation. Three days later, at the May 11 meeting o f the National Security Counc, President Kennedy made and reaffirmed several decisions of long range impact. The U.S. objective in South Vietnam was to: . . . . prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam; to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society, and to initiate, on an accelerated basis, a series of mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic, psychological and coven character designed to achieve this objective.1 The President confirmed the specific military actions previously approved at the NSC meeting on April 29 and approved five additional actions he deemed necessary because o f the increased security threat resulting from10 1 ! j j j 1 i 1 j | I | \ j ! \ j ! ; [ . j j j \ 10 events in >ecure. E tnese cti surg< and tier; trolt in S< ques These tw< cepted by deni Johi Afte: trol and the Whit< Director < initiate pi Vietnam able to tfc be assign assist the ter (CDT rnflit polit ofU By Ji and gadgt on develc ment tear ling Sout] sidered u borders.* been ship mem and componei Saigon." 1 A So a HIDAL nam alonj later, a V, dispersed target for stretch of T h a n h .T DECISION TO SEND SPRAY- C-123s TO VIETNAM events in Laos which made that country's bolder with South Vietnam less secure. Defoliation eventually came to be associated with the first two of these actions: (1) Assist the G.V.N. aimed forces to increase their border patrol and' in* surgency suppression capabilities by establishing an effective border intelligence and patrol system, by instituting regular aerial surveillance over the entire fron tier area, and by applying modem technological area-denial techniques ?o con trol the roads and trails along Vietnam's borders.. . . (2) Assist the G.V.N. to establish a Combat Development and Test Center in South Vietnam to develop, with the help of modem technology, new techni ques for use against the Viet Cong forces.* These two proposals, included in President Kennedy's May 8 letter, were ac cepted by President Diem--publicly in a joint communique with Vice Presi dent Johnson on May 13 and privately in a letter to Kennedy dated May 15.T After the NSC meeting of May 11, the focus of acdon on boraer con trol and the exploitation of technology in counterinsurgency shifted from the White House to subordinate levels of the bureaucracy. On May 16, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) was requested to initiate planning to send a team, at th e earliest possible time, to assist the Vietnamese Armed Forces in employing new techniques and devices applic able to the guerrilla struggle in which they were engaged. The team was to be assigned to the Chief, MAAG Vietnam, on temporary duty and was to assist the Vietnamese in establishing a Combat Development and .Test Cen ter (CDTQ. The mission of this group o f experts was: . . . to acquire directly, develop and/or test novel and improved weapons and military hardware for employment in the Indo-Chinese environment, subject to political-psychological restrictions (such as those imposed by Communist claims ofU .S. biological warfare in Korea).1 By July, thinking had progressed from general concepts of " techniques and gadgets" to specific proposals, including the use of defoliants. A report on developments as of July 10, 1961 stated that one research and develop ment team had given attention to the problem of more effectively control ling South Vietnam's borders against unfriendly elements. This team con sidered using chemical plant killers for clearing " fire breaks" along the borders.' Also during the week ending July 10, defoliation chemicals had been shipped to Saigon for tests by the newly established Combat Develop ment and Test Center. A few days later, another report stated that " . . . all components needed for an extensive defoliation test are now enroute to Saigon." 10 A South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) H-34 helicopter equipped with a H1DAL spray system flew the first defoliation test mission in South Viet nam along a road north of Kontum on August 10, 1961. Exactly two weeks later, a VNAF C-47 flew the first fixed-wing spray mission. Both missions dispersed the herbicide Dinoxol. President Diem personally selected the target for the C-47 mission on August 24. It consisted of a four-kilometer stretch of Route 13 about 80 km north of Saigon near the village of Chon Thanh. The Special Aerial Spray Flight provided the spray equipment used THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Top Vic President Lyndon B. Johnson with President Ngo O ih Diem; bottom, L to r Ambassador Frederick Netting, Jr, Gn. Paul D. Harkins, COMUSMACV, and LLG a Uorwi C. MeGwr, CHMAAGV, kiSugon. 12 * f in the VI semble a formerly Forces (I this and America] Presided He remai Wit] of herbi< 1961, a t : America] General Hairy D. covered t of Viet < large arc forced M said, th a vest. He destroy tl heard of ; dent Ken was cone with othc control] Neverthel Viet Conj meeting e about thi The i ington in Vietnam.: air o f ble White wrt week by v litical brea o f the sou who woulc WTiite's b airacks tri] tered by t away. The headed the deteriorate level decisi DECISION TO SEND SPRAY C-123s TO VIETNAM in the VNAF C-47 and also sent TSgt Leon O. Roe to South Vietnam to as semble and install it. Capt. Mario D. Cadori, an experienced spray pilot formerly assigned to the SASF but at that time serving in the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) area, was sent to train the South Vietnamese pilots who flew this and other C-47 test missions in low-altitude spray techniques. Although American evaluations of the results of this particular test were disappointing, President Diem was reportedly impressed by the overall results of the tests. He remained thereafter a staunch supporter of the defoliation program.11 Within a few weeks of the first test, President Diem discussed the use of herbicides with a different type o f target in mind. On September 29, 1961, at Independence Palace in Saigon, Diem and his advisors met with an American delegation which included Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting; General McGarr, chief of MAAG, Vietnam (CHMAAGV); and Adm. Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). Their discussion covered a wide range of issues, and towards the end it turned to the question of Viet Cong crops. President Diem expressed concern about there being large areas in the remote regions o f his country where the Viet Cong had forced Montagnards to clear land and plant rice. Within about a month, he said, there would be a considerable amount o f food for the enemy to har vest. He therefore proposed that immediate efforts should be made to destroy these crops before they could be harvested. Diem stated that he had heard of a " powder** which could be used to destroy the rice, but that Presi dent Kennedy would first have to authorize its use. After some discussion it was concluded that Diem's advisors had confused an available defoliant with other, more powerful, substances which probably fell into the closelycontrolled area of chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons. Nevertheless, Diem stated that he did not care what was used as long as the Viet Cong could be denied access to the crops in these remote areas.13The meeting ended without any commitment from the American representatives about this matter.13 The situation in South Vietnam again came to the forefront in Wash ington in the fall of 1961. Although the official reports of " progress'* in Vietnam at the beginning of this period were not pessimistic, there was an air of bleakness in the unofficial communications channels. Theodore H. White wrote the White House in August that the situation was getting worse week by week and that Diem's government suffered from a formidable po litical breakdown. He also reported that the Viet Cong controlled almost all of the southern Mekong Delta region and that he could find no American who would drive him outside Saigon, even by day, without a military escort. White's bleak assessment was confirmed when the number of guerrilla attacks tripled in September. That month also saw morale in Saigon shat tered by the seizure of Phuoc Thanh, a provincial capital only 52 miles away. The Viet Cong controlled the town for several hours, publicly be headed the province chief, and left before Diem's troops could arrive. This deteriorating, or, at best, stagnating situation led to another round of highlevel decision-making on Vietnam. 13 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA On October 10, a paper entitled " Concept o f Intervention in Vietnam was discussed t a meeting attended by both the Secretan o f State and Defense.'4 The main thrust of the paper, drafted mainly by Deputy Under secretary of State Alexis Johnson, presented a concept for introducing United States forces into South Vietnam, preferably under a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or United Nations umbrella, possibly in conjunction *with a similar military intervention in Laos. The military objective o f such a move would be to secure South Vietnam's borders against the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam, a mission a force o f 22,800 men could handle. However, a supplemental note to the paper issued the next day postulated that " cleaning up " the Viet Cong threat would require about 40,000 U.S. troops, and as many as 128,000 might be needed if North Vietnam and overtly intervened. Defoliation operations were one of several proposed supplemental actions which could be earned out right away while a decision was pending on the major issue o f committing large numbers of combat troops. The original Johnson paper proposed that U.S. aircraft be used to conduct a " major defoliant spray program in South iet- nam," although the aircraft would cany South Vietnamese markings and the pilots would wear civilian clothes. A supplemental note, dated Octo er 11, phrased the defoliation proposal somewhat differently: Cany out defoliant spray operations, using hired comtnerciaJ planes and pilots (CIA). These operations would initially be experimental, designed to and further develop the capability to use defoliant sprays to clear o ff j 8* access routes.1* An October 11 National Security Council meeting with President Kennedy also dealt with the Johnson paper. According to the recollection o f one o f those in attendance, the only immediate action approved oy b ro i.dent Kennedy was the sending o f the Air Force's " Jungle Jim countennsurgency squadron to South Vietnam to carry out a training mission un er the MAAG. The President deferred a decision on the major question of sending large numbers o f American troops to South Vietnam as w the other alternatives, including defoliation. Instead, President Kenn y decided to send a delegarion headed by Gen. Maxwell Taylor to :Saigon^to investigate the political and military alternative actions. He also direct e State Department to undertake related diplomatic efforts. Meanwhile, the proposal to conduct a major defoliation operation ^was being more fully developed. As early as September 23, a joint State- e ctsc message had stated that emergency actions were needed to support c government and suggested that defoliants for an operational program * eluded in a list o f items to be delivered without delay.*7 The m Development and Test Center developed a massive operational program at about the same time on the basis o f favorable results from tests on manioc and on jungle foliage. The plan had four goals: a. Stripping the Cambodian-Laotian-Nonh Vietnam border of foliage to j remove protective cover from Wet Cong reinforcements;14 14 < | f j < : ! ; j j i ) ; j * j w] as Ac Ca eg ma Countin square z In addit grove su The the fact exceeded cessive a six C-47 vided by ground-t burned \ their late defoliate Cong if ii Vietnam recognize conductor Anoi American days later Phase I, i manioc ai would beg miles of ju be epordir border are program w *Brown b error in arithr ol Corps Biol ew," April DECISION TO SEND SPRAY C-123s TO VIETNAM b. Defoliating a portion o f the Mekong Delta area known as "Zone D" in which the Viet COng have numerous bases; c. Destroying numerous abandoned manioc groves which the Viet Cong use as food sources; d. Destroying mangrove swamps wuhin which the Viet Cong take refuge. And it was to be conducted in two phases: * PHASE 1: Defoliate within 30 days twenty percent of Zone D and adjacent Cambodian border, manioc groves and mangrove swamps. PHASE II: In ninety days after completion of Phase I, defoliate remaining eighty percent of area D. the entire border, remaining manioc groves* and mangrove swamps in Viet Cong dominated areas. Counting both phases, this proposal envisioned the defoliation o f 31,250 square miles of jungle, an area equivalent to about half of South Vietnam! In addition, the proposal called for spraying 1,125 square miles of man grove swamps and 312.5 square miles of manioc. The projected cost o f the CDTC proposal--$75 to $80 million--and the fact that it would have consumed chemicals at a rate which would have exceeded the existing manufacturing capacity in the U.S. pointed up its ex cessive scope.* The proposal suggested that the spraying could be done by six C-47 aircraft with crews, maintenance personnel, and spray rigs pro vided by the U.S. Air Force, plus four Army helicopters and a number of ground-based spray units. The plan also called for the defoliated areas to be burned where they were sufficiently dry, an action which would facilitate their later use as fannland. The proposal cautioned, however, that the defoliation program would only be of value in helping to defeat the Viet Cong if it were accompanied by a vastly increased Army o f the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) offensive effort to exploit the results. The planners also recognized that such a program could expose the United States to charges o f conducting chemical or biological warfare." Another suggested defoliation program o f lesser scope devised by American officials in Saigon replaced the massive CDTC program a few days later." This more limited plan consisted of three sequential programs. Phase I, to begin within twenty days, would spray `334.5 square miles of manioc and rice crops with 2,4,5-T and cacodylic add. The second phase would begin within 65 days, last about thirty days and defoliate 200 square miles of jungle in Zone D with 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T^ This second phase would be coordinated with military actions. During Phase III, certain unspetified. border areas would be selectively defoliated. The overall cost o f the revised program was estimated at $4 million to $6.5 million, less than a tenth o f the 'Brown maintains that the excessive size and cost of this proposal may have been due to an error in arithmetic or in message transmission. See Rpn, Dr. J.W . Brown, U.S. Army Chemi cal Chips Biological Laboratories, subj: " Vegetational Spray Tests in South Vietnam, Supple ment,'*April 1962, p 68. THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA cost of the original proposal. The proposal for the reduced program also in dicated shortcomings in the use of C-47 aircraft for disseminating defoliants, and stated that aircraft in the United States (presumably, C-123s) could be equipped with the.MC-1 spray system within a few weeks if sufficient priority were assigned to the task." In a memorandum dated November 3, 1961, the Joint Chiefs o f Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, that Ad miral Felt be authorized to implement the limited, three-phased defoliation plan. The JCS memorandum also stated that these operations should be carried out M. . . in conjunction with fully coordinated attacks on Viet Cong forces." The Chiefs advised caution, however, on crop destruction: 3: The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that in conducting aerial de foliant operations against abandoned manioc (tapioca) graves or other food growing areas, care must be taken to assure that the United States does not be come the target for charges of employing chemical or biological warfare. Inter national repercussions against the United States could be most serious. In this connection, it is.recommended that the operations be covered concurrently with a publicity campaign as outlined by Task Force Vietnam in Saigon." This last recommendation may have reflected doubt on the part o f Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, over the value of a crop destruction operation in Vietnam. The previous month, he had written Gen. Maxwell Taylor, -military advisor to President Kennedy, and cautioned him against drawing too many parallels between the British experience in Malaya and the situation facing th Diem government in South Vietnam. He pointed out that food had been scarce in Malaya, and this had made the British food denial program an important and readily usable weapon. General Lemnitzer contrasted this with the relative plenty in South Vietnam, thereby questioning the wisdom of conducting a food denial campaign there." Secretary McNamara responded to the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs on November 7. He, too, was concerned about the possibility o f an adverse propaganda impact, but he did not limit his concern to the food denial phase. He stated that the American Embassy in Saigon had been asked to comment on the possibility of persuading President Diem to assume responsibility for the proposed program and to issue an explicit public statement which would include the assertion, believed at that time, that the spray would not be harmful to livestock or humans. Pending the solution to this problem of defending the defoliation program against adverse propaganda, Secretary McNamara said that he could not decide whether or not to cany it out. He did, however, recognize the restraints im posed by time on any attempt to attack the fast-maturing Viet Cong crops. Accordingly, to preserve his options, Secretary McNamara directed the Air Force " . . . to provide, on a priority basis, the required aircraft, person nel, and chemicals." He assigned operational control of the project to Q N C P A C ." 16 DECISION TO SEND SPRAY C-I23s TO VIETNAM One week later, William P. Bundy, Acting Assistant Secretary of De fense for International Security Affairs, forwarded a memorandum to Sec retary McNamara on the defoliation question which summarized recent developments and further examined the rationale for the program. In de scribing the food denial aspect of the proposal, Bundy stated that the actual spraying for this phase would be carried out by Vietnamese helicopters and personnel, although the use of U.S. Marine helicopters from Okinawa o r . Japan was still under consideration. Air Force C-123s would undertake the other two phases involving the removal o f jungle cover. The Tactical Air Command had been notified on November 9 to modify six C-123s for spraying purposes and had been directed to send the planes to Southeast Asia to join the Jungle Jim unit already in South Vietnam. Bundy also reported that the Air Force had procured, from the Army, the chemicals re quired for the first phase of the operation and that they were being flown to Vietnam. Ships would transport the chemicals for subsequent phases. In ad dition, spray rigs for use on VNAF H-34 helicopters had been requested from CINCPAC resources; they would be available within one week. Bundy confirmed that Admiral Felt had assumed operational control of defoliant operations in accordance with McNamara's directive and had, in turn, delegated planning and coordinating responsibility to the Grief, MAAG Vietnam. Bundy also outlined the various favorable and unfavorable aspects of the proposed defoliation program in more detail. On the plus side, he noted that U.S. diplomatic and military representatives in South Vietnam had recommended approval without reservation. In addition, preliminary tests were favorable, and approval would comply with President Diem's wishes. ' The negative aspects included the distinct probability that the North Viet namese would exploit propaganda aspects of a defoliation program by mak ing charges of chemical or biological warfare. Bundy also pointed out that for the plan to produce any military benefits, the South Vietnamese would have to provide ground troops and a coordinated plan to use them. In con clusion, Bundy stated that from the military standpoint, the program should be approved. However, in light of the political and psychological warfare risks involved, be recommended that President Kennedy be asked to give the final clearance.*4 As William Bundy had suggested, the defoliation proposal was sent to President Kennedy for a final determination. In making his decision, the President had before him the written recommendations of both the Depart ments of State and Defense. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, presented the Defense Department's position. He repeated most o f the arguments which Bundy set forth but developed them more fully. He emphasized to the President that the proposed defoliation program would incorporate discriminative target selection and mission execution. He was, however, more concerned than Bundy with the political warfare aspects of the problem. He reported to the President that Radio Hanoi had announced 17 1i ar ; :: il THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ^; Top; C-123 at Htckim AFQ, await daptoymant to Vlatnam tor datofiation cavitias; bottone a awtnambara beare a C-123 Ranch Hand aircraft. 18 DECISION TO SEND SPRAY C-123I TO VIETNAM w P * --r:i.ir?.i. *. - ^ ,,. S i i mr^ BS "W T * ' *V_~ Ih iP 11 te ? !IS i*f Top: Sec. Robert S. McNamara. Gen. Lyman L Lemnitzer (3d from right), Gen. Paul 0 . Harkins, visit Americans in Vietnam, May 9, 1962; bottone Fairchild C-123s. THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA on November 6 that the South Vietnamese had used " poison gas" on the rice crop near Tay Ninh, making.people 31. Gilpatric conceded that killing crops in the remote areas o f South Vietnam inhabited by Montagnards made sense militarily, but he was concerned about the possible effects on Montagnard attitudes and worried that " . 1 . the use of chemicals to destroy, food supplies is perhaps the worst application in the eyes o f th e . world." Another shortcoming was that Diem had no known plans to resettle the Montagnards.. However, Gilpatric calculated that a crop destruc tion program could have a net favorable effect and the public relations dif ficulties could be mitigated if the problem of resettling and feeding the Montagnards could be solved. GOpatric likewise had substantial reservations about using defoliants in a major effort to clear Zone D near Saigon and to control South Vietnam's borders. His concern in both cases stemmed from a lack of confidence in the ARVN's capability to exploit the defoliation missions with ground ac tion, without which defoliation alone would be o f little or no value. In re gard to the mounting of an-organized ground attack in Zone D, he said " . . . it seems clear that it would be a stem test o f Vietnamese capab3ities and probably beyond what they coulc attempt in. the present state of morale and organization." Similarly, concerning border control he stated, " Mere clearing will not accomplish a great deal, unless we are ready with helicopters and/or border patrol forces to patrol the areas and do a job." Both of these proposals for the use o f defoliants, in GEpatric's view, should be delayed pending the development of realistic plans along with the demonstration of a willingness and ability on the part o f the South Vietnamese to properly exploit these aspects o f the defoliation program. The one proposed use of defoliants about which G3patric expressed an unreservedly positive view to the President was the clearing o f key routes. He noted that such clearing would forestall ambushes and allow freer movement on transportation arteries and that this use o f defoliants would not be substantially different from what was already being done in clearing rights of way in the United States. GBpatric's view was that using defoliants on a modest basis to dear vegetation away from roads, railroads, and canals would be a desirable first use and a low-risk method for testing world reaction. A significant and unresolved issue which Secretary Gilpatric described for the President concerned the markings to be carried on the defoliation aircraft and the nationality of the crews which would fly them. He noted again that the food denial operations could be carried out by South Vietnamese air craft and crews but that the other missions would have to be flown by some one else. A possibility he mentioned was placing South Vietnamese markings on the aircraft (presumably Air Force C-I23s) and having them flown by " covert" aircrews. Because of the nature of the aircraft, however, he did not feel that such measures would effectively disguise the U.S. role in the operation. He therefore recommended against the covert approach. 20 .f | j i 1 ] j ; j 1 * j j j ; j I ] 1 t \ : ' j j r20 DECISION TO SEND SPRAY C-123s TO VIETNAM In his summary, Secretary Gilpatric presented to President Kennedy the Department of Defense view that there were two possible alternative decisions: a. To avoid the use of this material wholly on grounds of net advene local reaction, and particularly of worldwide disapproval, On this, we have no clear judgment, since it depends on factors that can best be assessed by the Depart ment of State. b. To go ahead with a selective and carefully controlled program starting with the clearance of key routes, proceeding thereafter to food denial only if the most careful basis of resettlement and alternative food supply has been created, and holding Zone D and the border areas until we have realistic possibilities of immediate military exploitation. The Department of Defense preferred the second option. Gilpatric also em phasized his department's view that the use o f defoliants should be closely controlled by Washington with " careful prior consideration and authoriza tion" of the operational plans developed by CINCPAC and U .S. repre sentatives in Saigon." Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed the State Department's views on defoliation, and they were generally in agreement with Gflpatric's memorandum. Secretary Rusk told the President, " The use o f defoliant does not violate any rule of international law concerning the conduct of chemical warfare and is an accepted tactic of war." He cited the British crop-spraying operations in Malaya as a precedent. However, he warned that the United States would probably become the target of an in tense " germ warfare" campaign initiated by communist nations, and, perhaps, echoed by some neutral countries. Nevertheless, Rusk expressed the view that: . . . successful plant-killing operations in Viet-Nam, carefully coordinated with and intidental ro larger operations, can be of substantial assistance in the control and defeat of the Viet Cong. Accordingly, Secretary Rusk seconded Gilpatric's recommendation for a limited initial defoliation program restricted to transportation routes, with dose control and supervision retained in Washington.3* President Kennedy accepted the joint recommendation of the Depart ments of State and Defense on November 30, 1961. His decision was straightforward and followed very closely the views o f Gilpatric and Rusk: The President has approved the recommendation of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to participate in a selective and carefully controlled joint program of defoliant operations in Viet Nam starting with the clearance of key routes and proceeding thereafter to food denial only if the most careful basis of resettlement and alternative food supply has been created. Operations in Zone D and the border areas shall not be undertaken until there are realistic possibilities o f immediate military exploitation. The President further agreed that there should be careful prior considera tion and authorization by Washington of any plans developed by CINCPAC and the country team under this authority before such plans are executed." THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA President Kennedy bad committed the United States to a course o f action which led to the extensive Ranch Hand defoliation and crop destruction operation in Southeast Asia. At the time of his decision, Vietnam was by no means the most critical foreign and military policy problem facing President Kennedy's still-new administration. During the summer o f 1961 the Soviet Union had precipitated a serious confrontation over continued Western presence in Berlin and affirmed an intention to unilaterally abrogate all Western rights there. The United States' response to this challenge included increasing draft calls, extending the tours o f duty o f servicemen, and calling up re serves. As a result, U.S. conventional forces were stretched thin. The Soviets had also unilaterally resumed atmospheric nuclear tests at the same time negotiations were underway to reach an agreement banning such tests. And, during April, when many important decisions involving Vietnam were being made, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba was failing. The situation in Laos was equally troubling. The pro-Western faction there, supported by the United States, suffered serious setbacks at the hands of Laotian forces supported by the Soviet Union. The United States almost sent troops into Laos in 1961, and many o f the important decisions of that year regarding South Vietnam were made in light of, and, to some extent, in response to the more serious situation in Laos. Even limiting the focus to South Vietnam, defoliation was a relatively minor issue in 1961. Much weightier options were under consideration. Just a few days before President Kennedy decided to use herbicides, he had faced a crucial decision on the issue of sending American troops to South Vietnam.11 By contrast, defoliation was a lower priority issue. 22 III. The Deployment o f Spray Aircraft to South Vietnam and Initial D efoliation Operations As mentioned earlier, with Secretary McNamara's decision to send herbicides and spray planes to South Vietnam, the Tactical Air Command had been given the mission of providing six C-123s and support sufficient for four months o f field operations.1Inquiries relative to the spray capabili ties of the C-223 had begun in July, and it was no surprise to the Special Aerial Spray Flight when the formal tasking came. The SASF at Langley already had two C-123s at Middletown, Pennsylvania, undergoing modifications to equip them for future insecticide operations in the United States. These two aircraft, however, were old and six of TAC's better C-I23swere selected from those on hand at Pope AFB, North Carolina. The six planes were sent to Olmsted AFB, Pennsylvania, for the installation of MC-1 " Hourglass" spray tanks. Mechanics there also removed all un necessary equipment; installed aluminum alloy armor plating under and alongside the cockpit; placed in the cargo compartment an engine oil supply replenishment system consisting of a 55-gallon drum, a hand pump, and plumbing to each engine; and added the necessary lines and interconnec tions to allow the 1,000-gallon spray tank to be used for additional fuel. The SASF placed its other airplanes, with the exception of the two C-123s at Middletown, in flyable storage.3 SA SFs six pilots and twelve enlisted men provided the nucleus of the original spray'detachment deployed to South Vietnam. Volunteers from Pope AFB supplemented them. Maj. Charles F. Hagerty, then a captain at Pope, recalled that Capt. Carl W. Marshall, the SASF commander, had interviewed people at Pope who had earlier volunteered for Jungle Jim, the Air Force's counterinsurgency force, but who had not been selected to join that organization. Major Hagerty remembered that the Jungle Jim interview, conducted several months earlier, .had consisted o f ten questions and a " no" answer to any one was disqualifying. The first question was, " Would you go on a mission with extensive TDY?" Their difficulty increased, with the last two questions being something like " Would you wear civilian clothes?" and " Would you go knowing that if you were captured your gov ernment would disclaim any knowledge of you?" According to Major Hagerty's recollection, only bachelors were selected for Jungle Jim. (He was married.) However, the names of those who had volunteered were 23 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA retained, forming the pool from which Captain Marshall made his selec tions for the defoliation mission.1 Captain Marshall experienced no difficulty in obtaining volunteers, in spite of the fact that the men were initially told that they would wear civilian clothes, fly aircraft without USAF markings, and would not be acknowl edged as members of the U.S. military' if they were captured. The pilots ob tained from Pope were experienced in the C-123, but of the fourteen pilots on the first deployment, only eight had experience in aerial spraying. And, with only about two weeks from the time they were selected until they left, there was no time for training until they reached the Philippines.4 The personnel selected for the deployment were told they were going TDY to Southeast Asia for some 120 days, but only those with a " need-toknow" found out that their destination was South Vietnam. The men re ceived instructions to tell their families even less--that they would be going on extended temporary duty, but could not reveal their destination. They were also told not to write letters home until they received the " next brief ing," which, in the recollection of Major Hagerty, they never received. There was, therefore, no officially sanctioned way for the defoliation per sonnel to communicate with their families until they returned from Viet nam. As a practical matter, their families learned where the men were and how they were getting along from other Air Force personnel, such as those assigned to the Mule Train C-123 transport unit, who knew the defoliation crews and-came into contact with them in South Vietnam.1 Including aircrew members and support and maintenance personnel, 19 officers and 50 enlisted men went to Southeast Asia on the original defol iation deployment. Several C-124 transports carried some of the men along with spare parts for the Ct123. On November 28, 1961, the six spray-equip ped C-123s with 36 persons on board departed Pope AFB for Travis AFB, California. For the purposes o f the deployment, they were included under the existing Farm Gate operations plan. On this long overland leg the crews kept careful records of fuel and oil consumption so as to enable them to plan for the extended overwater flights in their route across the Pacific. One hitch in the planning developed because filling the 1,000-gallon internal spray tank with fuel placed the C-123 at about 2,000 pounds over its design gross weight. They were not allowed to exceed this gross weight limit on the first overland leg, but the limit had to be exceeded for the trans-Padfic flight to provide adequate reserve fuel. Therefore, the C-123's partem of fuel consumption at the higher weight could only be estimated prior to actu ally flying the leg from Travis to Hickaxn AFB, Hawaii.4 In spite of the earlier talk about " sanitizing" the crews and aircraft, little bad been done as they began their deployment flight. The crewmembers 24 INITIAL DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS wore uniforms and were readily identifiable by their names and ranks. The aircraft still carried large " U.S. Air Force'* markings and identification numbers. The flight did provide itself with a limited amount of cover by list ing fictitious numbers and types of aircraft on flight plans and filing encoded position reports.7 In addition, aircraft parking areas at each enroute stop were to have special security arrangements. Obtaining the needed security caused Cap tain Marshall some degree of difficulty. An earlier message alerting the en route bases about the special needs of the spray aircraft was evidently either not received or xnisrouted at some of the bases. This placed Captain Mar shall in the difficult position of having to request unusual arrangements upon arrival at each base, while, at the same time, being unable to reveal de tails o f the classified mission which made them necessary.' At 0400, Pacific Standard Time, on November 30, 1961, the six spray aircraft departed Travis AFB for the flight to Hickam. About thirty min utes after takeoff, the number two aircraft experienced icing problems, de clared an emergency, and returned immediately to Travis accompanied by the number three aircraft. The remaining four planes proceeded to Hickam along the planned route. They flew at altitudes of 6,000 to 3,000 feet and at an initial speed of 130 knots, when they were heavy with fuel. Their speed increased to about 160 knots as their load lightened, near Hawaii. The heat ers were turned off shortly after takeoff to conserve fuel which did not con tribute to the aircrew's comfort in the early morning cold. And, in addition, the C-123s lacked autopilots and had to be entirely hand-flown, a factor which contributed to fatigue. The time en route from Travis to Hickam for the first four aircraft was sixteen hours and thirty minutes. The plane with the least amount of fuel re maining on arrival at Hickam had 3,000 pounds, or enough for about two more hours of flight. This proved the C-123 to be far more capable than had been thought. On the following day, the other two spray aircraft made the crossing in seventeen hours and thirty minutes without further dif ficulties.' The flight departed Hickam for Johnston Island ,at 0800 Hawaii time on December 3. After a short refuelling stop, they proceeded to Wake Island. During aircraft inspections there, crewmembers discovered that a cylinder, on one engine of the lead aircraft would have to be replaced. Because the necessary aircraft mechanics and spare parts were with the flight, they accomplished the cylinder change in record time. On December 5, the deployment leg between Wake and Guam was traversed without inci dent. A t 0830 on the morning of December 6, the flight took off on the final segment of its journey, Guam to Clark AFB in the Philippines. Some three hours after takeoff, an oil leak developed in the number two engine o f the lead aircraft. The crew was able to keep the ofl supply in the affected engine at a safe level by using the oil replenishment system installed in the cargo compartment. Ail six C-I23s landed in formation at Clark at 1600 hours on 25 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA December 6. They were to remain for a month awaiting orders to enter South Vietnam.10 Although the delay in the Philippines was frustrating, Captain Mar* shall used it to advantage. He obtained an area near th coast to practice spray patterns. Chemicals were not used on these practice runs. Some mem bers of the detachment made trips to Saigon in other aircraft to inspect fa cilities and make plans for beginning operations there. Also during m December 1961, a separate operations plan was published for the aerial spray operation, bestowing upon it the name Project Ranch Hand. At this time Ranch Hand's formal organizational title was Tactical Air Force Transport Squadron Provisional 1." While the aircraft waited at Clark for clearance to enter South Viet nam, high-level officials were still deciding whether their entry would be overt or covert, and how to handle the public affairs aspects o f the opera tion. Although the final Defense Department recommendation12 upon which President Kennedy had based his decision authorizing a defoliation operation11 called for the overt approach, Secretary McNamara continued to hold open the option of disguising the defoliation program as a South Vietnamese operation. In a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on No vember 27, 1961, McNamara had informed the Chiefs o f his recommenda tion to the President that the defoliation program be approved. He had di rected them to proceed with planning based on the assumption that the South Vietnamese would conduct crop destruction missions using their own helicopters and that U.S. Air Force aircraft and crews would fly defoliation missions to remove jungle cover. At the same time, he had told the Joint Chiefs to develop an alternate plan whereby the defoliation missions also would be flown under South Vietnamese auspices with their markings on the aircraft and a South Vietnamese officer on the crew as the ostensible " aircraft commander." He had, in addition, directed that no publicity be given to U.S. participation in defoliation or crop destruction operations.14 In a message dated December 3, Ambassador Nolting in Saigon contin ued to recommend that the Ranch Hand aircraft carry civilian markings and their crews wear civilian clothes. His recommendation anticipated political problems with the International Control Commission (ICQ established under the Geneva Accords o f 1954. The ICC had the authority to inspect shipments of military equipment entering South Vietnam. A shipment of 15,000 pounds of cacodylic add (blue*) and 20,000 gallons o f pink* and green* herbicides for use in crop destruction had by this time arrived unan nounced in Saigon by military aircraft, and had bypassed ICC inspection. A "See Appendix 2, Table 1. p. 199. 26 INITIAL DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS large sea shipment could not be hidden from the commission's scrutiny. Ambassador Noiting was concerned that when the shipment of chemicals for use in defoliation arrived by commercial ship consigned to the MAAG, he would be unable to fit it under an existing ICC credit or justification o f title. He therefore recommended that these chemicals be manifested as civilian cargo consigned to the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in South Vietnam, exempting them from inspection. " Civilian" aircraft and crews would, he felt, be necessary to maintain consistency with " civilian" chemicals. He noted that both MAAG and USOM favored this course of action.19 The public affairs aspect of the Ranch Hand operation also troubled other high-level policy makers. On December 1, Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, an advisor to the Secretary of Defense, penned a warning addressed to Secretary Mcrfamara and Deputy Secretary GOpatric in which he cautioned them about the potential adverse publicity which could be generated by the planned defoliation operation in Vietnam. Lansdale was concerned about the lack of a " . . . sound information foundation to assure public sup port. . . . " He noted that during the Korean War, the communists had been able to convince many people around the world that the U.S. had engaged in biological warfare even though that charge was without founda tion. In the case of defoliants in Vietnam, he pointed out that the U.S. would admit to spraying a chemical from the air which kills something (plants) and would therefore be vulnerable to a more serious psychological attack, very likely accompanied by unfavorable reaction from the U.S. media. Lansdale felt that the existing plan--to have President Diem and his government announce that South Vietnam had asked the United States to spray defoliants--was not strong enough. He predicted that this approach would not be effective in the U.S., among allies, or elsewhere in the world. Diem's image as a " . . . cornered and power-mad dictator . . . " made such a request from him an insufficient public justification for the program. General lansdale concluded his memorandum by suggesting that either he or a working group from the Department of Defense set about immediately to plan " . . . effective psychological support. . . " for the defoliation program. In his opinion there were good reasons for using defoliants and they should be presented, allowing the U.S. to undertake the defoliation program with much more firmness.1* Three days after Lansdale wrote his memo, Eugene M. Zuckert, the Secretary of the Air Force, sent a letter to Secretary McNamara expressing similar sentiments. Secretary Zuckert told the Secretary of Defense that he was " . . . seriously concerned . . . " about the lack of a specific assign ment of responsibility for the development of cover stories for some of the planned or contemplated Vietnam operations. He. mentioned specifically the current preparations for the defoliation operation which had resulted in ad hoc and uncoordinated public statements. Like Lansdale, he died the 27 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA biological and chemical warfare implications of the Ranch Hand operation which the communists were already exploiting and stated his belief that " . . . we are dealing with a high degree of psychological warfare . . . . " Secretary Zuckert noted that his staff had talked with General Lansdale and William P. Bundy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna tional Security Affairs, who both agreed that the public relations aspect of the defoliation program was inadequately covered. He closed his letter by calling for a well-developed plan with a dear point of authority responsible for preventing the release of conflicting stories.17 On the 12th of December, a memorandum sent to William P . Bundy by Philip F. Hilbert, the Deputy for Requirements Review in the Office o f the Under Secretary of the Air Force, indicated that the Air Force position on the manner of introducing Ranch Hand aircraft had hardened against the covert approach. Mr. Hilbert noted that " we" (presumably the rivilian leadership of the Air Force) had been disturbed by Ambassador Nolting's December 3 message recommending the airplanes be introduced bearing civilian markings with the crews wearing civilian dothing. It would be possi ble, Hubert conceded, for the U.S. to transfer title to the aircraft to the South Vietnamese or to devdop some other cover, although the unique nature of the spray-equipped C-123s would dearly indicate that they had come from the U.S. Air Force. However, Hilbert maintained, 11 . . . the status of the crews in these circumstances would require considerable thought to insure that adequate protection both to the U.S. and to the in dividual was provided . . . . " In regard to spraying and transport ac tivities, the Air Force position was: " . . . we believe that the 0 1 2 3 units can best be used in an overt role in which there is no question of the status o f crews or aircraft . . . . " Air Force wishes were heeded, for, on December 14, 1961 a joint State-Defense message announced that * * . . . the identity of United States crews and aircraft participating in the spraying operations of the defoliation program will not be disguised . . . .M,i * The question of the covert or overt status o f the Ranch Hand aircraft and crews had been settled, but Ambassador Nolting's problems with the ICC still had to be addressed. On January 4, 1962, Deputy Secretary of Defense GBpatric responded to Secretary Zuckert's letter and set out the future Defense Department policy covering public relations and security aspects of Vietnam operations. He stated that the United States and the South Vietnamese had a " . . . good, legally sound . . . " public justification for challenges to the increased level of U.S. military aid. This justification was that North Vietnam had committed acts o f aggression against South Vietnam in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords and that the United States was responding to South Vietnamese requests to assist it in legitimate self-defense measures. Accordingly, Secretary Gilpatric informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries o f the Army, Navy, and Air Force that future arrivals of U.S personnel and equipment would not be 28 INITIAL DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS announced by the South Vietnamese government to the ICC; nor would the United States admit that the Geneva Accords were being violated. American officials would respond to questions with the following statement:- The United States has acceded to GVN's request for expanded aid in men and material and is determined to help preserve its independence. This is the sole ob jective of the United States. The United States will terminate these measures as soon as North Vietnam ends its acts o f aggression.1' Secretary Zuckert's concern over the lack of a central point ofjesponability for developing cover stories or public explanations for U.S. activities in Vietnam was answered by the designation o f the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the official responsible for such matters, in coordination with affected Service Secretaries and the Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Public Affairs* However, the Secretary o f Defense would have to approve all proposed cover stories, explanations, statements of no comment, or combinations thereof. Thus, defoliation program concerns led to a restate ment o f the U.S. policy toward the Geneva Accords, the removal o f ICC in spection power over shipments of U.S. military personnel and equipment, and the designation of a central point of authority for developing cover stories for U.S. operations in South Vietnam.10 On December 4, 1961, the Secretary of Defense met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and set December 15 as the target date for beginning defolia tion operations. At the same time, he granted his prior approval for the defoliation of "key routes," with the proviso that CINCPAC submit de tailed plans and the Joint Chiefs approve them. Secretary McNamara, how ever, asked to be informed when these "key route" plans were submitted and approved.1* In addition to .the previously discussed problem of developing a public relations approach to the Ranch Hand program, delays encountered in ship ping chemicals to South Vietnam and producing a final target list kept the Joint Chiefs from meeting the target date. The shipment of the chemicals proved to be the most formidable obstacle to immediate commencement o f spray operations. Twenty thousand gallons of pink and green herbicides and fifteen thousand pounds o f cacodylic acid were already in Saigon. They had been sent for use in a crop destruction operation which waited for Pres ident Kennedy's approval and which could not then be conducted because that year's rice crop had already matured in the target areas. The Defense Department was procuring additional chemicals for Ranch Hand use in the defoliation of Viet Cong base areas, border regions, and transportation routes. These chemicals, 80,000 gallons of pink and 128,000 gallons of purple, combined with the shipment earmarked for crop destruction, cost about 52,5 million, or about SI 1 per gallon. . The acquisition of defoliants occurred on an expedited basis. As rap idly as truckload lots accumulated, shipments left the factories for the docks at Oakland, California, where port workers loaded 111,000 gallons of purple and 49,000 gallons of pink on the SS Sooner State which sailed for 29 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Saigon on December IS, 1961 and arrived on January 3, 1962. The remain t ing chemicals, 17,000 gallons o f purple and 31,000 gallons of pink, were V loaded on the USNS 5 .0 . Bland which had a sailing date later in December. The drums carried no military markings and were consigned only to " Coun try 77," a shipping designation for Vietnam.*2 The option of airlifting some of these defoliation chemicals received consideration for a time. Headquarters, USAF alerted the Military Air Transport Service to ready twenty-five C-124 Globemaster transports to airlift, over the weekend of December 16-17, the chemicals awaiting ship ment on the Bland. The airlift, however, was not ordered, perhaps because final mission plans for the use o f the chemicals had yet to be developed and approved.2* On December 16, 1961 Secretary McNamara held a conference in Hawaii with Pacific area military commanders. The conference provided him with another opportunity to examine Ranch Hand preparations and o f 200 it northeas ence in along th lines o f Sec indicate! Severely tted ope gether c Bien He start o f reached ants ini ernmem make further decisions affecting the operations. Background documents prepared for this conference noted that Thirteenth Air Force and the Ranch Hand detachment had been alerted and were capable of beginning defoliant operations in South Vietnam within 24 hours of receiving orders to do so. General McGarr, head of the MAAG in Saigon, informed Secretary McNamara during the conference that a joint U.S.-Vietnamese p lan n in g committee was selecting key routes to be defoliated and expected to complete its work by December 20. Vietnamese authorities had designated one individual from the J3 (operations) section of their Joint General Staff (JGS) to work with U.S. officials to develop detailed plans, and an initial meeting had taken place on December 8. He noted that the development of a final plan was being " aggressively pursued." McNamara explained that the defoliants would be used initially in road clearing because the chemicals presented a " ticklish" problem and road clearance offered the least potential trouble. He stated his desire to see the project get underway quickly, but he did not think it would be necessary to airlift the defoliants. Secretary McNamara also observed that he would be liberal in interpreting the phrase " key routes." Defoliants could be applied, he said, around ammunition storage sites and Jungle Jim operating loca tions as well as along roads and trails. He anticipated quick approval of specific defoliation plans once they were submitted.*4 Obtaining the final approval for the initial defoliation missions was not as simple a matter as Secretary McNamara had indicated in his meeting with the Joint Chiefs on December 4. Admiral Felt forwarded the plan to the JCS on December 28, 1961, and the Chiefs added their approval in a memo to the Secretary of Defense on January 2, 1962. They noted that an imple menting message was ready for dispatch upon the receipt of his approval and notice of final interagency coordination by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The plan as finally approved by the Departments of State and Defense called for defoliating areas to a depth . j j j | t j j ; l I I i ; ; j j .; Th withoui same d outside planes: pied b) as, init Tan Sc Fi On tht chemic began these t m aps; on the comin o f init review propa: tions i nounc wanes need t Ii the fo South 30 INITIAL DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS of 200 meters on both sides o f about 300 miles o f strategic roads north and `northeast of Saigon. The ultimate goal was to reduce the Viet Cong pres ence in Zone D, one of their most secure base areas. By clearing vegetation along these roads, the potential for ambushes would lessen, thereby opening lines of communication." Secretary McNamara did not approve the plan as routinely as he had indicated earlier. Instead, he sought President Kennedy's concurrence. Severely paring the proposal, on January 3, 1962, Kennedy authorized lim ited operations of an experimental nature against separate targets which to gether comprised about 16 o f the almost 60 miles along Route 15 between Bien Hoa and Vung Tau. Thus, the last barrier in Washington blocking the start of the Ranch Hand program fell, but the way this last decision was reached demonstrated again the extreme caution toward the use of defoli ants initially displayed by leaders at the highest levels of American gov ernment." The directive to deploy three o f the six Ranch Hand C-123s to Saigon without delay reached Clark in the early hours on January 7. A t 0900 that same day, the aircraft departed the Philippines, arriving at Tan Son Nhut outside Saigon at 1630 in the afternoon. The crews parked the Ranch Hand planes in a secure fenced area on the field, sharing the space normally occu pied by President Diem's personal aircraft. They then settled in at the Held as, initially, all Ranch Hand personnel were restricted to the confines o f Tan Son Nhut and quartered in an on-base " tent city" near the runway.27 Final preparation for the first missions occupied the next several days. On the night of January 8, the Sooner State arrived at Saigon with die chemicals to be used on the road clearing missions; off-loading o f the drums began on the 9th. Photo reconnaissance missions along Route 15 during these two days double-checked target information previously obtained from maps and ground surveys. Ranch Hand and VNAF pilots received briefings on the 9th to lay the basis for teamwork and coordination during the up coming spray missions. Also on the 9th, province chiefs and representatives of interested South Vietnamese government agencies held a meeting to review plans, for warning the local population and countering Viet Cong propaganda. On the 3rd, Secretary of State Dean Rusk had cabled instruc tions to the American Embassy in Saigon to " . . . make no advance an nouncement other than local warnings, in low key, to population which will witness process. . . . " The South Vietnamese maintained that they would need three days to psychologically prepare the people in the target areas." In spite of Rusk's wishes, the South Vietnamese government released the following announcement oh January 10, and it appeared the next day in South Vietnamese newspapers: 31 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Top: Sac. Zuckert congratult G oa LtM sy on his appointment as Chief of Staff, May 22. 1961; bottom. L to n C o l Manh, Gen. Anthia, and COL Rogers confer with Montagnard province chiefs. 32 du ve; un mi ay na a chi sw pa BX ica iat str wH a rri' Be Rai Route l aba in crops. 7 in g o n e scientist Eetnclc, stages o A nth is, Vieman, tionai p. because system l been use peisonn< o f the B ^asnon w*tth pin] o f Janua 200 gallc Probably however, tepkeem p te se fa j kegw for INITIAL DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS SAIGON (VP)---The Republic of Vietnam today announced plans to con* duct an experiment to rid certain key communications routes of thick, tropical vegetation, U.S. assistance has bees sought to aid Vietnamese personnel in this undertaking. The purpose of this operation is to improve the country's economy by per* mining free communications along these routes and by making additional land available for cultivation and other uses. In addition, it will facilitate the Viet namese Army's task of keeping these avenues of communication, free of Viet Cong harrassraents. Commercial weed-kiQing chemicals will be used in experiments. These chemicals are used widely in North America, Europe, Africa, and the USSR for such purposes as ridding com fields of weeds, renovating weed-infested grazing pastures and clearing irrigation ditches.' The chemical will be supplied by the United States at the request o f the Viet- wttiw Government. The Government emphasized thax neither of the two chan- icals is toxic, and that neither will harm wild life, domestic animal, human be ings, or the'soiL There will be little, If any, effect on plants outride the sprayed strip. If the results of this initial operation are satisfactory, extensive operations will be conducted to clear roads and railroads linking key cities of Vietnam. Clearance of tropical growth along these routes will ease greatly the task of maintaining road systems and railroad beds and will permit the construction o f .new roads.1* , < Ranch Hand pilots flew familiarization flights over the target areas along Route IS on January 10 and 11 to determine specific checkpoints for preci sion in turning the spray on and off so as to avoid inadvertently spraying crops. The first defoliant was actually released from an Air Force C-123 dur ing one of these flights on January 10. On January 9, Dr. James W. Brown, a scientist from the U.S. Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratories at Fort Detrick, Maryland, who was responsible for the scientific aspects of the early stages of the defoliation program, had asked' Brigadier General Rollen H. Axxthis, the commander of 2d ADVON (Air Force headquarters in South Vietnam), to authorize a mission the next day. Dr. Brown felt that a func tional pretest would be necessary before formally beginning the test series because neither the purple defoliant nor the C-123 with the Hourglass spray system had been used in Vietnam before, nor bad a spray-equipped C-123' been used to deliver this specific chemical mixture. That afternoon Air Force personnel loaded four drums of purple herbicide (about 200 gallons) on one of the Ranch Hand C-123s for a flight the next morning. The spray target was north of Route 15, adjacent to a swath which a VNAF C-47 had sprayed with pink on December 29. The flight took place as planned on the morning of January 10, 1962, with the Ranch Hand C-123 spraying less than the full 200 gallons on the target. The effect of the spray was later rated a* poor, probably because the spray deposit was sublethal. The purple herbicide, however, did dissolve the rubber seals in the spray system, requiring their replacement with neoprene seals which were unaffected by the chemical. These familiarization flights left the Ranch Hand aircraft and crews ready to begin formal operations on the 13th.10 33 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES {N SOUTHEAST ASIA ' FIRST RANCH HAND MISSIONS 10-16 JAN 1962 I I THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Capt. Carl Marshall and Capt. William F. Robinson*- Jr., flew the two missions along Route 15 on January 13* 1962 which formally inaugurated the Ranch Hand program. They sprayed the first load between 0805 and 0825 from an altitude of 150 feet at an airspeed of 130 knots. The tank dis charged its 960 gallons of purple herbicide in a total of 490 seconds o f actual spraying time, for a flow rate of about .8 gallons per acre. The distance be tween flight centers (swath width) was 500 feet for the first flight, but the crew decreased this to 400 feet for the second flight because the heavy herbi cide sank faster than expected, reducing the width o f the area on the ground covered by a single spray application. The narrower swath width prevented gaps between sprayed areas. Captains Marshall and Robinson delivered the second load between 0940 and 0955 using a different C-123 and a higher pump pressure. This time the total " spray-on" time to expend the 960 gal lons was 450 seconds, resulting in a flow rale o f about 1.05 gallons per acre. During this run, the pilot of an observation plane flying slightly above the spray aircraft reported that some o f the spray was rising rather than sinking to the ground--it was being deposited on his windshield. The sun had been up long enough to warm the air near the ground, disrupting the early morn ing temperature inversion and generating thermal updrafts which dissipated the spray rather than allowing it to fall on the target vegetation. Dr. Brown and the Ranch Hand personnel were well aware of the need to spray only during inversion conditions which lasted from shortly before sunset to shortly after sunrise, but they evidently had difficulty, initially, in getting this point across to some of the other U.S. officials in South Vietnam.11 Immediately, 2d ADVON reported these first two missions as com pletely successful, at least from a spray delivery standpoint. It would take time to determine the effect of the defoliant on the target vegetation. In ideal weather, the Ranch Hand pilots encountered no problems in acquiring the targets, enabling them to dispense the defoliant precisely over the areas previously designated by the Vietnamese authorities. ARVN armored vehicles patrolled the entire length o f Route 15 during the spray operations but reported no Viet Cong ground fire. In addition, VNAF AD-6s provided fighter cover for both sorties. A Farm Gate SC-47 dropped 65,000 leaflets along Route 15 and made voice broadcasts over the towns o f Baria and Long Thanh. Vietnamese observers, photographers, representatives from the MAAG, and Dr. Brown were passengers on these first missions. As on future spray missions, a Vietnamese was on board as the " aircraft com mander," but he exercised no real authority." . The first series of Ranch Hand missions along Route 15 continued for three days, and 2d ADVON reported them all as completely successful. As on the first day, armored vehicles patrolled Route 15 and VNAF AD-6s provided fighter cover; they noted no enemy military activity. The mission on the 16th completed the initial authorized spray work which, in ten sor ties, used 7,920 gallons of herbicide and covered 6,920 acres. Within hours o f the completion of the last mission, Admiral Felt dispatched a message to 36 ^ INITIAL DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS General McGarr in Vietnam informing him t h a t " . . . Washington] D.C. approval necessary before carrying out any defoliant operations beyond those currently authorized. . . . " Ranch Hand was again under very tight high-level control." The precision required on Ranch Hand missions had highlighted the lack of cartographic information in Vietnam. Old and inaccurate, the smallscale maps made it difficult for Ranch Hand pilots to identify precisely spray-on and spray-off points--a crucial necessity if damage to civilian crops and rubber plantations were to be avoided. To fill this need, Ranch Hand requested 1:25,000 photo coverage o f all target areas. RF-101 Voodoo reconnaissance planes flew these photo missions, landing at. Tan Son Nhut and providing one copy of their film to Ranch Hand while send ing another to Japan for use in making permanent maps. First Lieutenant Marcus B. Keene, Jr., prepared mosaics of the general target areas from these aerial photos. A representative from the South Viet namese Joint General Staff took the mosaics to the province chiefs respon sible for the areas under consideration. The various province chiefs then marked on the photos the areas they wanted sprayed and the areas they did not want treated with herbicides. Because the province chiefs wanted to avoid damage to their agricultural areas, the Ranch Hand spray missions, especially along roads, were " choppy" and composed o f alternate strips o f treated and untreated areas. From the marked photos, Lieutenant Keene produced sets of coordinates defining the targets, which the Air Force sec tion of the MAAG then forwarded to higher level commanders for final ap proval." The responsibility for flying the C-123 during the crucial spraying part of each mission was shared between the pilot and the copilot. The pilot had control o f the switches which started and stopped the spray and which dumped the load of herbicide in an emergency. The responsibility o f the air craft commander on these missions was great--only a few days were needed before the action of the herbidde showed exactly where the load had been delivered there could be no doubt whether the spray had been on or off the target. The copilot was primarily responsible for handling emergencies, such as determining the malfunctioning engine in case o f an engine failure, applying power to the good engine, and shutting down the bad one. Consid ering the low altitude at which Ranch Hand flew, the copilot's reaction in such an emergency had to be immediate and correct the first time; there would be no chance to rectify a mistake, t h e copilot also had to anticipate pull-ups at the end of each spray run and apply the necessary power for a turn. During the spray run, he kept the airspeed at 130 knots to achieve the planned herbicide application rate." The role of the South Vietnamese " aircraft commander" was not so clear. He had no actual authority over the mission, and the Ranch Hand crews felt he was carried solely to enable the U.S. to state in the event of criticism that the spray program was " their doings, not ours." At first, the 37 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Ranch Hand personnel thought their Vietnamese " aircraft commander*' was a rated pilot, which would have been consistent with his official role. However, on one mission, Captain Marshall, after using much persuasion, coaxed one of them into the left seat so that the Vietnamese could get an idea of what it was like to fly the C-123. His erratic handling of the controls soon convinced the American crew that he was not a pilot, and they subse quently learned that the VNAF had been sending them navigators to fill the U.5. requirement that a Vietnamese be on board for each mission. Later,the VNAF.sent anyone who happened to be available, whether officer or enlisted.1* The conditions under which Ranch Hand operated at first can best be described as ad hoc. Nothing followed established procedures and stand ards familiar in the U.S., and there was a great deal o f improvisation. Co ordination with Farm Gate pilots took place at the Majestic Hotel in down town Saigon for want of a better place at Tan Son Nhut. Current intelligence on enemy emplacements was seldom available to Ranch Hand before their missions, and weather services weren't much better. Major Hagerty recalled landing at one of the fields outside Saigon and meeting an Air Force weather observer who had spent his whole tour in Vietnam without any equipment. When they touched down the weather observer questioned them about the winds and visibility they had experienced and the clouds they had encoun tered. Then, when the Ranch Hand crew was ready to depart, the weather observer gave them a weather briefing based upon the best information he had, which was simply a recapitulation of what the crew had told him when they landed." Ranch Hand's living conditions were also somewhat haphazard. The . officers remained in the on-base tents for about a week before they were allowed to move downtown. Collectively, they rented an apartment bund ing near the Cho Lon area of Saigon for their quarters. The enlisted men re mained at Tan Son Nhut. Off base, Ranch Hand personnel were allowed to wear civilian clothes and spend " green" U.S. currency on the local econ omy. Improvisation provided both conveniences and necessities. For exam ple, the men fabricated their own washing machine out o f a 55-gaUon drum attached to the rear of a tractor. And, as no safes were available. Lieutenant Keene stored his extensive reconnaissance photo collection in empty aircraft parts containers which were kept under guard. To combat the intense heat, Ranch Hand crews sometimes improvised their own tropical flying gear from t-shirts and bermuda shorts." Ranch Hand was in the curious position of having many bosses--TAC, 2d ADVON, MAAG Vietnam, 13th AF, PACAF--but none who effec tivelysupervised them. Because o f the unique nature of their mission, lowlevel flying and the dispensing of chemical sprays, their immediate chain of command lacked the necessary expertise. As one favorable result, the Ranch Hand unit maintained its integrity and its personnel were not drawn o ff to work on other missions. However; because their actual work load was 38 INITIAL DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS tight, only three or four hours on the few scheduled spraying days, some Ranch Hand pilots tried to obtain flying time with the Mule Train detach ment which flew C-123s around South Vietnam on cargo missions." Although policies varied on the public release of information, the Ranch Hand mission was very sensitive. While a photographer f-c m Life magazine had been invited to photograph some of the January missions, a photographer from Time created quite a stir when he took unauthorized telephoto shots of the planes in their secure parking area. It was impossible, however, to hide Ranch Hand's nature from people who had access to Tan Son Nhut. The vapors from the herbicide had killed the vegetation around their parking area, including two large flame trees next to their hangar. Such difficulties regarding the public information aspects o f their job was compounded by the fact that not all of the members o f the American mili tary community in South Vietnam supported their mission. A t a party given for Ranch Hand by Ambassador Nolting in about February 1962, an Amer ican Navy officer asked how they could manage to sleep at night knowing they were such " violent men." 4* During the latc-January break in operations, Ranch Hand pilots and crews used their available flying time to practice spray techniques and to be come familiar with flyjng over the southern portions o f Vietnam. Thir teenth Air Force also requested authority from PACAF during this lull to use the three Ranch Hand aircraft left at Clark for " . . . mosquito con trol and other operations in the Philippines as deemed advisable and neces sary. . . . '**' PACAF passed this request to CINCPAC, and Admiral Felt responded with a series of questions about how such operations would be funded, what precautions would be taken to minimize the possibility of claims against the U.S., and what effect the possible need to decontaminate the aircraft plumbing and spray system after mosquito control operations would have on the operational readiness of Ranch Hand aircraft for their primary herbicide mission. The Admiral also noted that Washington ap proval for resuming and extending defoliation operations in South Vietnam was expected, and that these new operations might require all six o f the spray-equipped C-123s currently in the Pacific area.42 On February 2, 1962, the six became five as Ranch Hand lost one o f its aircraft and crews during a training mission. The aircraft's crew, Capt. Fergus C. Groves, II, Capt. Robert D. Larson, and SSgt MHo B. Coghill, became the first Air Force fatalities in Vietnam. Their plane crashed in an inaccessible area near Route IS between Bien Hoa and Vung Tau. Another aircraft which circled the crash site immediately after the plane went down reported that the "bad guys" were all over the wreckage. The search party had to be escorted to the crash site by a company of ARVN troops. Arriving they found that someone had removed tie plane's spray nozzles and broken into the crewmembers' escape and evasion kits. There was no evidence of sabotage, engine failure, or hits by ground fire; the cause of the crash was never officially fixed. As a result of the crash, however, Thirteenth Air 39 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA I. \ Topi Or. James W. Brawn loads a team checking the results of defoliation in tha jungles of South Vietnam, January 1962; bottone an RF-101 Voodoo reconnaissance plana. P. 41 (top): a Vietnamese officer (l) and SSgt Milo B. Cogfrill, 346th Troop Carrier, Sq^ operate a pump aboard a C-123 during a defoliation mission over South Vietnam; bottom: a Ranch Hand cockpit of a UC-123 aircraft in South Vietnam, 1967. 40 / a HE a ir f o r c e a n d HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Force requested fighter cover by Farm Gate aircraft for all future Ranch Hand training missions. One o f the three C-123s which had been left in the Philippines flew to Tan Son Nhut to return the Ranch Hand strength in - South Vietnam to three aircraft.41 Two weeks earlier, on January 15, 1962, Secretary McNamara had convened his Pacific area military commanders in Hawaii for a second con ference at which he gave instructions that the next phase of the defoliation program should be a very limited set o f experiments to test herbicides and delivery vehicles in a representative variety o f terrain and vegetation types encountered in South Vietnam. He wanted these new targets to be specific small areas, not 16 miles o f roadway. It would be acceptable to proceed slowly in order to test all spray environments and gather data on the effects o f defoliation on combat operations. McNamara tasked A d m ira l Felt with selecting the test areas and forwarding his recommendations to Washington for approval.44 A t the conclusion o f the conference, Felt cabled General McGair requesting a list of limited areas containing vegetation types which bad not been sprayed during the operations along Route 15. CINCPAC em phasized, as had McNamara, that: . . . these additional operations are to be limited in scope and will be conducted solely for purpose of evaluating effectiveness defoliant against different types vegetation under varying conditions/*. The answer to this cable came from Vietnam within 36 hours, propos ing seven additional areas for defoliation. The two targets heading McGarris j list were stretches of Highway 1 east o f Saigon and Highway 14 north of the i city. Spraying these two targets would strip the principal species o f vegeta- { tion present in South Vietnam. The previous ,areas sprayed along Route 15 bad consisted of scrub growth, palmgrove, mangrove, and scattered hard wood trees. The dense rain forest and moderate undergrowth along the Route 14 segment would provide vegetation typical o f the plateau region, while the proposed stretch o f Route 1 consisted mainly of uncanopied forest containing heavy undergrowth. McGarr also recommended five other areas. One, a mangrove forest in the far southern portion of the Ca Mau penin- ' sula, would be cleared to provide a secure route from the coast to Binh Hung, the home base o f Father Hoa--one o f the few strong pro-govern ment leaders in the Delta. (Father Hoa was a Catholic priest who had led a group of North Vietnamese to the South at the conclusion of the war be tween the French and the Viet Minh in 1954.) At that time, cargo had to be dropped to Father Hoa's forces by air, and defoliation would hopefully enable lighters to ferTy supplies from ships off the coast without so great a risk of Viet Cong ambush. The other four vegetation enveloped targets were the rapidly expanding Bien Hoa Air Base (to be sprayed by VNAF helicopters), the ammunition dump at Than Tuy Ha, the two Cambodian | border outposts at Dinh Tien Hoang and Bu Jaxnap (considered as one j target), and the Nhon Co airstrip.44 j Admiral Felt's response to this proposal indicated displeasure at the ex- j tent of the area to be covered. He noted that the total length of roads to be 42 cleared came to siderably beyon SECDEF at 15. port initial test ' Cambodia. Hov Hoa area and ax McGarr to revi: ments of key re climatic conditit type of vegetatk General Me miral Felt concu final high-level 2 the approval of < P. Bundy, the E urity Affairs. H President were s for President Ke necessity for exp wanted the conn dum so that the would do. His s proval to the pis In his letter the initial defoli; would be require fective the defol lions effects froi and that reactioi expected, the me 21, Radio Moscc chemical warfan January 19 and : natural resources lysis viewed the < theme begun as e Secretary M the targets propo the Cambodian 1 ' cleared along Ro Partment of Stan as follows: The great weaied in prev dude ihe varie INITIAL DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS cleared came to approximately 80 miles, and that this would b e 14. . . con siderably beyond the program of 'very limited character* described by SECDEF at 15 Jan meeting. . . . " Also, he stated that he could not sup port initial test operations around outposts anywhere near the border with Cambodia. However, Felt was pleased with the targets selected in the Father Hoa area and around ammunition depots and airfields. He directed General McGarr to revise the proposal in order to select " . . . a few small seg ments of key routes which win provide the desired variety o f growths and climatic conditions. . . . " He imposed a maximum o f ten miles for each type of vegetation target.47 General McGarr revised his proposal according to these criteria. Ad miral Felt concurred and forwarded a more limited plan to Washington for final high-level approval on January 24.- By January 27 the plan had gained the approval of General Lemnitzer, 'acting for the Joint Chiefs, and William P. Bundy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Sec urity Affairs. However, the approvals of the Secretary o f Defense and the President were still needed. Mr. McNamara rejected a draft memorandum for President Kennedy on January 30, because it did not clearly explain the necessity for expanding the experimental spraying program and because he wanted the comments of the Department of State included in the memoran dum so that the President would not have to read two papers when one would do. His subordinates made these changes, McNamara added his ap proval to the plan, forwarding it to the President on February 2.4a In his letter to President Kennedy, Mr. McNamara noted that although the initial defoliation operations were over, a second spraying o f the areas would be required three weeks after the first. It was too soon to tell how ef fective the defoliant had been. He also stated that no adverse public rela tions effects from the first series of tests had appeared in South Vietnam, and that reaction from foreign non-communist nations had been light. As expected, the media reaction in communist nations was hostile. Oh January 21, Radio Moscow accused the U.S. and South Vietnam o f undertaking a chemical warfare program to destroy food. Radio Hanoi broadcasts on January 19 and 24 emphasized the use of toxic chemical sprays to destroy natural resources and crops. Radio Peking issued similar comments. Ana lysts viewed the communist reaction as the intensification o f a propaganda theme begun as early as November 6, 1961. Secretary McNamara recommended that President Kennedy approve the targets proposed by General McGarr and his staff, with the exception of the Cambodian border outposts and with the total length of areas to be cleared along Routes 1 and 14 reduced to 17 miles. He noted that the De partment of State concurred in this recommendation. His justification was as follows: The p eal variety of vegetation found in Vietnam indudes species never treated in previous herbicide tests. The limited areas already sprayed do not in dude the variety of vegetation and conditions required for a full evaluation of 43 TH E AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA th e effectiveness of the chemicals employed a x i posable operational concepts for Their use. It is important that we test all conditions of vegetation, as well as the effectiveness o f defoliant techniques in specific situations, before proceeding with a larger scale program.4* Within a few days President Kennedy approved these recommenda tions, subject to the understanding that the ground rules for the new operations would remain the same as for the first set o f targets. The letter communicating the President's approval did not elaborate on these " ground rules." but presumably the President meant to limit additional missfonsTto iteep them experimental in nature, and not to extend them without his spe cific approval. The Ranch Hand detachment once again had been given a mission to perform, but its actions were stiff severely limited.1* Notice of this decision reached Vietnam on February 8, 1962, and the Ranch Hand crews flew the authorized spray missions on February 14-17. O n the fourteenth, they sprayed a target along Route 14 which was approxi mately 10 miles long by 400 yards wide and totalled 1,300 acres. That same day they sprayed about 900 acres surrounding the Nhon Co airfield. Activ ity on the 15th consisted of spraying a stretch of Route 1 of the same dimen sions and area as the target along Route 14 on the previous day. Father H oa's area was sprayed on the 16th and 17th, with 2,700 acres covered the first day and 1,600 acres on the second. In all, these February operations took 12 sorties, used 154 drums of purple herbicide (about 8,470 gallons), and covered 7,800 acres. The weather was good for all missions, and no hostile activity was observed.11 With the exception of the Bien Hoa airfield and the Than Tuy H a am munition storage area which were to be treated by VNAF helicopters, the spray missions on February 17 completed the initial coverage o f ail the tar gets authorized by President Kennedy. Ranch Hand aircraft resprayed the areas along Route 15 on March 20 after which dare herbicide operations . were suspended for five months while the whole spray program was re-eval uated. Ranch Hand was entering an extended period during which its future was very uncertain." ! I Even b dais at high fectiveness argument u.* tions had bt not surprise ccived high fense in H a able potent: ured by the: other hand, questions: f under the v defoliation At the military con xion progra would be oi mary 12. T scrutiny in tailed repor t>pes of foli appraisal o CINCPAC rum? but th The Fe a brrifmg b; 'On Febn M ^ury Assise masd under hi ur-usd to exist nitf& al matte VvuAiancc Cos h r tp s i, for a to CT- vtJMUSMAO .* Tismes, US *r. Aimv office (Wi IV. Early Evaluations and . Expanded Operations Even before the early 1962 herbicide missions ended, American offi cials a t high levels had expressed a great deal of interest in learning the ef fectiveness of this new chemical counterinsurgency tool. An important argument used in obtaining President Kennedy's approval for these opera tions bad been that they were to be limited experiments. It was, therefore, not surprising that the evaluation of these first Ranch Hand missions re ceived high priority. A t the January conference held by the Secretary o f De fense in Hawaii, Ambassador Nolting expressed his view that the most valu' able potential contribution of defoliants to the war effort would be meas ured by their success in preventing ambushes. Secretary McNamara, on the other hand, felt that the evaluation o f defoliation should address two major questions: first, what will defoliants do to the vegetation native to Vietnam under the variety of conditions found there, and second, what effects does defoliation have on operations?1 " At the next meeting in Hawaii between McNamara and his Pacific area military commanders on February 19, 1962, the effectiveness of the defolia tion program was again discussed. A message indicating that the program would be on the agenda passed from the Joint Chiefs to CINCPAC on Feb ruary 12. The Chiefs stated that defoliant operations were receiving dose scrutiny in Washington, and they asked Admiral F dt to send them a de tailed report describing the effectiveness of various chemical combinations, types of foliage, and stages of growth. In addition, they requested a realistic appraisal of defoliation in combating the activities of the Viet Cong.1 CINCPAC delegated the task of drafting this report to .CHMAAG, Vietnam? but the scheduled, conference took place before he could finish it.1 The February discussion in Hawaii concerning Ranch Hand began with a breifing by Maj. Gen. Charles J. Timxnes, an Army officer from Vietnam 'On February 8, 1962, CINCPAC with the approval of his superiors established the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV or MACV) as a subordinate unified com mand under his control. The Military Assistance'Advisory Croup, Vietnam (MAAGV) con tinued to exist until May IS, 1964, but it was made subordinate to MACV in advisory and op erational matters. Therefore, after February 8, 1962, the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) was die senior U.S. commander in Vietnam. However, for a time some messages and documents meant for the senior commander were addressed to CHMAAG, probably out of habit. Gen. Paul O. 'Harkins, USA, served as COMUSMACV from February 8, 1962 until 20 June 1964. On July 1, 1962, Maj. Gen. Charles J. Timmes, USA, became CHMAAG, Vietnam, succeeding Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, also an Army officer. See Maj. Gen. George S. Eckhardt, Vietnam Studies: Command and Control 195&-I969. (Washington: Department of the Army, 1974), pp 25-33,42, 89. 45 THE AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA who would later become Chief of the MAAG there. He Tepoited that 90% to 95% of the sprayed mangroves along Route 15 had lost their leaves. Other vegetation was deteriorating, but since many plants were in their dor mant season, the chemicals were less effective. The spray worked well on the mangrove because it grew in swampy areas where die availability of water in both the wet and dry seasons allowed it to grow constantly. Secre tary McNamara asked General Timmes if the effect o f the chemical on the dormant species should be considered " certain but slow** or simply " uncer tain." The general replied that it was " certain but slow.**4 After hearing this report, Mr. McNamara stated that he was dissatis fied with the results of Ranch Hand. He requested a complete technical report, including photographs before and after the application o f the chem icals. This report, he said, should be prepared by a technician who could tell him exactly about the attempts, goals, and results. The Secretary also observed that the defoliation project, in his opinion, had not been managed very well. Although no one criticized the Air Force crews for their handling of the spray missions, General O'Donnell, the PACAF commander, stated that the spray program had been " a blooper from start to finish/* presumably agreeing with Secretary McNamara's assessment o f the pro gram's management. McNamara emphasized that Ranch Hand was not a scientific experiment for scientific purposes but rather a program intended to affect military operations, and the report he had order! should state the operational results of the missions.1 Ambassador Nolting raised one other topic at this meeting relating to the Ranch Hand program. He reported that the local people had lodged many complaints of damage to their trees and crops. The South Vietnamese had established a board to rule on these claims, but the Viet Cong were readily exploiting the situation and blaming the herbicide missions for any and all dying plants. The Ambassador noted that disallowed claims would antagonize the claimants. Investigations by that time had reduced claims for spray damage to 200,000 Vietnamese piasters (about $5700).* Within a few days of this February meeting, ground reconnaissance re vealed that little or no military advantage had resulted from the January de foliation missions along Route 15, and the U;S. advisors concluded that the trees would have to be destroyed for any useful effect to be achieved. Fighter planes were sent to drop napalm in an unsuccessful attempt to ignite the defoliated areas. The napalm canisters fell through the canopy intact and ignited, with no significant effects, only after hitting the ground. On the other hand, the crowns of the trees did bum when the canisters tumbled on top of the canopy and scattered their load of flaming napalm in the treetops. The main problem was that pilots could not consistently drop napalm canisters so that they would tumble on the canopy. Moreover, the fires which did start were not self-sustaining.7 Between the February and March meetings with the Secretary of Defense, Gen. Paul D. Harkins, COMUSMACV, issued a preliminary : j ? ! j j { 46 S evaluation < eluded that horizontalt noted that hardy new s belonging t< exploiting f< areas, Hark order to ad At abo W. Brown * Advanced I nam coveri Brown's vie pact o f the areas. He ct Th. 5-T, an if: (1) He noted t) chemicals w swampy are; Dccember-I herbicides.: mem as a li areas spraye Dr. Brc information mems a fte r! factors he ft eluded in th Defense on u:s about tfc observing the timing o Brown cauti dances from hardwood fc ani branche temporary ir to new i been kfl - .ocked by t EARLY EVALUATION evaluation of. defoliation based upon detailed ground observation. He con cluded that defoliation as yet yielded no military advantage. Improvements in horizontal visibility were negligible, in vertical visibility only slight. Observers noted that the majority of plants in the sprayed areas were alive with many hardy new shoots. Also, they saw some obvious damage to small garden plots belonging to the local Vietnamese, a development the Viet Cong were fully exploiting for its propaganda value. In light of the failure to bum defoliated areas, Harkins felt that hand clearing or bulldozers would have to be used in order to achieve results of any military significance.1 At about the same time that Harkins issued his evaluation, Dr. James W. Brown also produced a preliminary report summarizing his work for the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) on defoliation in South Viet nam covering mid-July 1961 to mid-February 1962. As a scientist, Dr. Brown's views reflected the technical aspects o f defoliation and not the im pact of the Ranch Hand program on combat operations in the sprayed areas. He concluded: The chemicals recommended for use, namely, the esters of 2,4-D and 2,4, 5-T, are sufficiently active to kill a majority of species encountered in Vietnam if: (1) They are applied property to the vegetation (2) They are applied during a period of active growth of the vegetation.* He noted that missions flown by Air Force C-123s had proven that the chemicals would work effectively on actively growing mangrove trees in swampy areas, but that the dormant state o f upland vegetation during the Deccrober-Febroary dry season had seriously limited the effects of the herbicides. He also cited the lack of calibration o f the C-I23 spray equip ment as a limiting factor in arriving at firm conclusions based on the test areas sprayed to date. Dr. Brown expanded these views and provided much more background information in the two volumes he wrote on the early defoliation experi ments after he returned to the United States. In these later volumes he cited factors he felt had impeded the conduct and evaluation o f the tests. He in cluded in those factors the limited expertise available in the Department of Defense on the subject o f herbicides, the lack of knowledge among botan ists about the spedes of vegetation encountered in Vietnam, the inhibition on observing the sprayed areas caused by the presence of the Viet Cong, and the riming of the missions with the South Vietnamese growing season. Dr. Brown cautioned that the greatest effect to be expected under any circum stances from chemical sprays would be similar to the condition of a U.S. hardwood forest in winter; that is, the leaves might be gone, but the trunks and branches would remain. Even this condition, he said, would be only temporary in the absence o f repeated sprayings, because seeds would give rise to new plants in the defoliated areas, and understory plants which had not been killed would be able to grow rapidly in the sunlight previously blocked by the taller trees.10 IX. Ranch Hand Ends Its Work The publication of the MRI report on the ecological effects of herbi cides in late 1967 did hot dampen the concern o f scientists. The Board of Directors o f the American Association for the Advancement of Science re viewed the MRI report along with the comments o f the*National Academy of Sciences and issued a statement of its own in July 1968. The AAAS board agreed that many questions about the ecological effects o f herbicides re mained unanswered and recommended an international field study under the sponsorship of the United Nations to analyze the long-range effects of the herbicides and to determine what steps should be taken, to protect the future of Vietnam's ecology. They were especially concerned about arsenical herbicides, such as agent blue, and urged that the use of this type of herbi cide be stopped until more was known about the ultimate fate of the arsenic in these chemicals once it was released on the land. They also called for the declassification of data revealing the dates and locations of herbicide mis sions and identifying the chemicals applied in each instance to help scientists in their studies. Supplementary statements by various groups of scientists ranged from calling for an end to the entire herbicide program to arguing that using 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T on forests was a military device for saving lives which caused a level of harm to the environment which was unprec edentedly low, presumably compared to alternatives such as high explosives or napalm.1 In July, to further its call for a United Nations sponsored investigation, the AAAS sent letters to that international body and to the U.S. Depart ments o f State and Defense. The U.N. response was noncommittal, stating only that the Secretary General was paying very dose attention to the matter of chemical^ and bacteriological weapons. The State Department's answer noted that there were differences of opinion even among the members o f the AAAS concerning herbicides, but it acknowledged that ultimate effects could only be determined by a long term study in Vietnam. State favored such a study and promised cooperation, but it also noted that, at present, research work in combat areas would be difficult. The Defense Department's reply to the AAAS, signed by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, agreed with the idea o f conducting a systematic sdentific investigation o f long-range herbidde effects in Viet nam, but only after the return of peaceful conditions to the country had made such studies feasible. Foster said that his department continued to be confident that herbicides would not have a long-term negative impact on South Vietnam's people or interests. On the subject of herbicides containing arsenic, Foster said that Malaysian rubber and oil palm plantations had 157 T H E AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA KZpioyed them for more than 20 years with no adverse effects at rates five : : six times greater than those used in South Vietnam. This AAAS attempt -- 1968 to stan an extensive scientific investigation failed, but it was by no means the last such effort.1 Shortly after this exchange o f letters, on September IS, 1968, the worl o f the Herbicide Policy Review Committee, which Ambassador Bunker had appointed, was reported to the press in Saigon. Three scientific papers ac companied the press release describing the committee's report, one by Dr. F. H . Tschiriey and the other two by Dr. C. E. Minarik and Dr. Robert A* Darrow. Tschiriey had made brief air and ground surveys o f both mangrove and semideciduous forests. He based his conclusions on his prior experience plus these limited observations: There was no great effect, he said, on higher plants and animals from the increased wind speed and ground tem perature in defoliated areas. Some lower life forms dependent on specific microclimatic niches might suffer temporary effects. Tschiriey asserted that herbicide use would not significantly hasten the laterization of soil in Viet nam. Only about 30% of the soil was of the type susceptible to laterization. and defoliation did not produce bare dirt which might increase the evapora tion rate of ground water, possibly hastening the precipitation o f ferrous iron and its oxidization into the insoluble ferric form. Tschiriey said that twenty years was a conservative estimate o f the time it would take the man grove areas to return to their original condition. Because o f the increasing fish catches near sprayed mangrove forests, herbicides had probably not seriously affected the aquatic food chain. On the other hand, bird and in vertebrate populations had probably decreased in mangrove areas. In semi* deciduous forests, Tschiriey found that single sprayings had had no great or lasting effects, but that repeated applications o f herbicide would probably have a far greater impact, with the most serious danger being posed by the invasion of bamboo.1 Minarik and Darrow examined the toxicity of the herbicides in use in Vietnam. They quoted the conclusions o f the MRI report concerning 2,-J-D and 2,4,5-T that the toxicity of these two chemicals was veiy low, although there might be a problem with fish and fish foods under some conditions. Additionally, they presented data not available to the MRI researchers which showed very little fish toxicity from the dosage of agent orange being used in Vietnam. On the potential danger from agents white and blue, they con cluded that neither of these herbicide formulations posed a safety hazard a> they were being used in Vietnam/ These same two scientists examined the persistence of herbicides in sol and water and, again, they found no cause for concern. Because of microbe action, the butyl esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T used in orange decomposed rapidly in the soil and disappeared within one to three months at the appli cation rates used in Vietnam. The picloram in white was somewhat more persistent because microbes did not act on it as quickly. Tests in Puerto Rico using direct applications of picloram to soil at rates four to six times great 158 than those emplo: pant seedlings, so; ditional tests on sc double application seventeen months 1 blue, Minarik ane j crops could be saJ | ' rates greater than 1 ! from defoliated ai v sorption by vegeta i cal breakdown thi i toxic in the waters * In the latter i adopted, w ithout : United Nations C " resolution did not J. nam, its passage ecological issues, another iesoluuoi chemical, biologic also considered ei treaty which `the ; banned u . . . tl :i and all analogou ; methods of warfai ] " merit by theU .N . Protocol did not i i ally in the United - vegetation/ Since the AA United Nations or bicides in Vietnam At its annual mee ` AAAS staff to coi study. The presidr * January 1969, reqi the ecological effe soon as conditions request, and the o: Another pair iniit. Professor E, original scientists ] controversy, had c Vietnam. He view assessment by Am -; 77R * RANCH HAND ENDS than those employed in Vietnam had shown that only the most sensitive plant seedlings, soybeans, suffered ill effects six to twelve months later. A d ditional tests on soil taken from targets in Vietnam sprayed with single and double applications of white showed no effects on bean seedlings eleven to seventeen months after the spraying. Concerning the cacodylic acid used in blue, Minarik and Darrow said that field tests had shown that sensitive crops could be safely planted within days of a spraying with blue even at rates greater than those normally used in Vietnam. As to the water draining from defoliated areas, they said that so little herbicide remained after ab sorption by vegetation, adsorption by soil, and microbial and photochemi cal breakdown that it was very unlikely that enough would remain to be toxic in the watershed drainage from defoliated areas.9 In the latter part o f 1968, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, without objection, a resolution calling for the convening o f a United Nations Conference on Human Environment in 1972. While this resolution did not specifically address the question of herbicides in Viet nam, its passage indicated that the world body had become attuned to ecological issues. At about the same time, the General Assembly passed another resolution asking the Secretary General to prepare a report on chemical, biological, and bacteriological weapons. The General Assembly also considered endorsing the Geneva Protocol of 1925, an international treaty which the United States had not ratified. The Geneva Protocol banned " . . . the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices and of. bacteriological methods of waifare." While the U.S. was prepared to support an endorse ment by the U.N. of this treaty, the American position was that the Geneva Protocol did not apply to herbicides, chemicals which were used domestic ally in the United States, USSR, and other countries to control unwanted vegetation.4 Since the AAAS had been unsuccessful in its attempts to persuade the United Nations or the United States to sponsor an on-the-spot study of her bicides in Vietnam, the organization decided to attempt such a study itself. At its annual meeting in December 1968, the board of directors asked the ' AAAS staff to convene an ad hoc group to prepare specific plans for a field study. The president of the association wrote to the Secretary o f State in January 1969, requesting his help in assuring that a comprehensive study of the ecological effects of herbicides in Vietnam would be undertaken " as soon as conditions permit." By June no reply had come to this latest AAAS request, and the organization's efforts were temporarily at a standstill.7 Another pair of scientists did not wait for the AAAS actions to bear fruit. Professor E. W. Pfeiffer of the University o f Montana, one o f the original scientists pressing the AAAS to become involved in the herbicide controversy, had consistently called for objective scientific field studies in Vietnam. He viewed the MRI report of 1967 as a " snow job," and the assessment by Ambassador Bunker's committee the following year as too TH E AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA general. Besides his activities within the AAAS on the herbicide quesucPfeiffer was also involved in 1968 in an attempt to get the Society for SocL Responsibility in Science (SSRS) to organize a study in Vietnam. In 1968, Pfeiffer announced his intention to conduct a reconnaissance in Vietnam under SSRS auspices, and, from March 17 to April 1, X969* and Professor G. H. Orians of the University of Washington, S eattle,^ conduct limited research in Vietnam. MACV assisted them by allo'wsf them to fly on defoliation missions, inspect sprayed areas from boats helicopters, and talk with biologists in Saigon. Because of the brevity of fe. Pfeiffer and Orians visit, the information they collected was mocb restricted to qualitative data and hearsay. In their preliminary report afterwards, the two scientists acknowledge that a guerrilla war lacking clear battle lines and fixed military targets the inherent property of causing the destruction o f lives and ecological cob munitites as the two sides sought to deny cover and resources and inflict ovualties on each other. They reported that the Central Highlands were reced ing agent white in a higher proportion than previously because of white'i lower volatility. They found no evidence o f adverse effects on bird life.o: mammals from the use of agent blue (cacodylic arid) which had been esv ployed primarily against rice and other crops. Economic costs of herbhe: use were in some cases very high, and they cited the costly effects of acr. dental damage to rubber trees. Also, they determined that the defoliaticr program posed a potential threat to the South Vietnamese timber indusrn since repeated applications of herbicide could kill about one half of the commercially valuable trees in the sprayed areas. Upon his return from Vietnam, Professor Pfeiffer told the press c New York that it was " completely unrealistic" to expect American com manders in Vietnam to stop defoliation missions because the use of the* chemicals unquestionably saved American lives. He said that he had set; few living plants on a journey by boat from Saigon to the ocean, but thr. :* the vegetation along the way had* not been killed, he would probably no: have survived the journey.' As the Nixon Administration began to implement its policy' of reducing the American presence in South Vietnam, Ranch Hand came under incra? ing pressure to cut back on its operations. On August 20, 1969, Adm. Joke S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, requested General Abrams' reaction to a pro posal to reduce herbicide operations to 25% of their current level by July 1. 1970.' On September 6, Abrams replied that the planned priority targets in the herbicide program for calendar year 1969 would require as a minimum the current average of four hundred sorties per month. Plans for 1970 wet 160 - x yd complete, r.c border areas -Jirements near The accelerating; Tridental herbic h? current level f sore likely in the * as continually r -ft c as quickly as t] 4 On Septemt 'JS* uon and request * July." General a Hand sorties fro October, by 20 c for the month ol .7 aircraft into line FI 1969, the 12th S' 4* units along with tune, the spray j cause the base h The remain! emion had a lii press coverage c magazine corres] ember, and, in I ponied the u n i t . On Novemt T tendon to resub; warfare to the S Armed the star chemicals and e hibited all uses biological warfaj tnai the Genevi events. This mu Nations when, General Assemfc io all chemicals U.S. offici* international coi no power to res. 'oie. Still, this r 'o be borne if ti For the per force to buy 52*. % i RANCH HAND ENDS not yet complete, but MACV expected continued high demand for defoliat ing border areas and infiltration routes and spraying enemy crops. Re quirements near populated areas would drop as pacification progressed. The accelerating shift to border areas was expected to reduce problems from accidental herbicide damage. Abrams concluded that a reduction to 25% of the tuirent level was unrealistic and that a shrinkage to 70% or 75% was more likely in the period before July 1. He assured his superior that his staff was continually reviewing the herbicide program with the object o f reducing it as quickly as the tactical situation would permit.1* On September 18, 1969, McCain concurred in Abrams' recommenda tion and requested that herbicide operations be cut by 30% by the following July,11' General Abrams then directed Seventh Air Force to reduce Ranch Hand sorties from the 400-per-month level which was to continue through October, by 20 d r 30 sorties per month so as to arrive at a 280-sortie figure for the month of July 1970 and afterwards.13 To bring the number of spray aircraft into line with these reduced herbicide requirements, in November 1969, the 12th SOS transferred eleven of its twenty-five UC-123Ks to other units along with eleven officers and two flight engineers. At about the same time, the spray planes lost the use of Nha Trang as a turnaround point be cause the base had been turned over to the VNAF. The remaining Ranch Hand personnel could probably tell that their op eration had a limited future after these reductions were achieved, because press coverage of the controversy over herbicides was increasing. A Time magazine correspondent flew two combat sorties with Ranch Hand in Nov ember, and, in December, an NBC reporter and television film crew accom panied the unit on two missions.11 On November 25, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon announced his in tention to resubmit the Geneva Protocol outlawing chemical and biological warfare to the Senate for ratification. At the same time, the President reaf firmed the standing U.S. policy of renouncing the first use o f deadly chemicals and extended it to include incapacitating agents. Also, he pro hibited all uses of lethal biological weapons and " all other methods of biological warfare." However, it was still the position of the United States that the Geneva Protocol did not apply to herbicides and riot control agents. This interpretation suffered overwhelming rejection by the United Nations when, in December 1969, both a committee and the full U.N. General Assembly adopted resolutions declaring that the protocol applied to all chemicals used in warfare, with no exceptions for herbicides and tear gas. U.S. officials quickly declared that the U.N. action did not reflect an international consensus and that, in any event, the General Assembly had no power to resolve questions o f international law such as this by majority vote. .Still, this action by the United Nations added to the political burdens to be borne if the herbicide program in South Vietnam were to continue." For the period July 1970 through June 1971, MACV requested the Air Force to buy S27 million worth o f herbicides to support the planned level of TH E A IR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA spray activity. The Department of Defense, however, disapproved th- Force's, herbicide procurement request, cutting it back by almost 90^ v ^ continuing at the then current consumption rate would have e x h a u s * " herbicide stocks by the end of November 1970, Headquarters, United i ' - t Air Force asked PACAF and MACV in early February 1970 to comm-- three alternatives: ' " ** 1. Continue spray operations at the present.rate until exhausting the supply o f herbicides and then withdraw the 12th SOS from South Vietnam. 2. Operate a t the present rate through June 1970 and then reduce the lih SOS to the minimum level needed to meet emergency spray requirements. 3. Reduce the 12th SOS to eight aircraft and ration herbicide missions so *i to consume all the herbicide stocks by the end*o f June 1971." MACV protested the drastic reduction in herbicide operations thi: cutback in funding would cause. The view o f the American headquar.cn a Saigon was that the problem of providing an adequate level of su n p u a.. and security in South Vietnam was becoming more critical as Arocnce forces withdrew from the country. The Command again died the far tactical commanders credited herbicides with being one of the mos: e.-nomical and effective means of increasing visibility and assisting l-. maintenance of the security o f lines o f communication, widely separate * stallations, and base camps. If more money could not be found to s u rr^ herbiride operations at the level originally requested, MACV wanted t? u-> herbiride resources for use only against priority targets. The Ranch Huaircraft could fly airlift missions when not needed for these priori'.) tx biride targets." Although more money for herbicides was not fo n h c e c ^ the Air Force was able to fulfill MACV's request for a continuing capable* to spray high priority targets. In late March, Headquarters, United S:m Air Force directed that the 12th SOS would be reduced to eight aircrai: > the end of June. Two of these aircraft were to be configured for sprays; ? sectirides. This force of Ranch Hand planes would be able to meet MAO > priority needs within budgetary limitations." While plans for the reduction in forces went ahead, the problem ei ground fire continued to plague Ranch Hand in the early months of 19~C- * spray mission of five UC-I23Ks over a target in the U Minh Forest or. uary 19 received fourteen hits from the ground. Less than a week later, another target in IV Corps, one spray plane had to shut down an enpr.r in land at Binh Thuy because o f damage from ground fire. The worst inosrr. o f the period occurred on February 21 over a defoliation tare al-"i 1 eanal in IV Corps. Three Ranch Hand planes were struck thirty-one t^rand one of them lost its entire electrical system. Ranch Hand still em r'"rheavy suppression tactics over targets where significant ground ** likely, but a new wrinkle was tried in early 1970. On a few missions. dropped tear gas bombs on the target ten minutes or less before planes began their run. The fighters then returned.and flew ten o: seconds ahead of the UC-123Ks dispensing ordinary explosive CBl > - use of tear gas in conjunction with Ranch Hand missions soon endec 162 f <L On April 6 , 197 aircraft to Da In . .^jial crop destrui valley of Quanj A V;-i and ten Cobra I 'Sgn over the targe | . T03 the Ranch H .ii ezjpons fire. The lea I -- ^m der o f the D; i through the s 4 x-rdde load and fit i UC-123K had be % --rd 37 hits over thi I % -X> t The controversy c f s JUnch Hand operati ' - k. Diane Courtney Health, had presen :: .-rz.'.::, could cause n '$ azrinistered in relari ? :r?jty Secretary of D 4 c sasure that orange l r ur. pending a dccisii ; nether 2,4,J-T couli : Ltiard said further tl ~:inue, but that the . * orange must not ; Lech Hand operation i irziiy taking place in : A r^ous year.* Dr. Lee A. DuBric - study questioning tl ;*T comments and an e - the president o f tl ` sent their joint rep ^ officials, memben "The Courtney study bad beginning on June 26. u c that country. See Rpr ** The Toxicology, Enviro Dioxin, Oct. 1978, RANCH HAND ENDS On April 6, 1970, Seventh Air Force ordered Ranch Hand to deploy .-- aircraft to Da Nang to augment the four spray planes already there for crop destruction operation planned for April 10 and 11 in the Be *.r valley of Quang Ngai Province. Four F-100 fighters along with six ,,j and ten Cobra helicopter gunships accompanied this seven-ship forl-'ion over the target. Very early in the spray run, enemy gunners opened H"on the Ranch Hand planes with intense small arms and automatic l^pons fire. The lead aircraft, piloted by Lt. Col. Warren P. Fisher, the --sunander of the Da Nang detachment, lost its right piston engine about juay through the spray run. Colonel Fisher dumped the remainder o f his ^icid e load and flew to Chu Lai where he made an emergency landing. His UC-123K had been hit twelve times, and the seven planes together re-jved 37 hits over this crop target.'* The controversy over the use of herbicides also continued as reductions a Ranch Hand operations were argued. In the fall of 1969, a report authored pyK. Diane Courtney and others, and prepared for the National Institutes of Health, had presented evidence that 2,4,5-T, a component o f herbicide , orange, could cause malformed babies and stillbirths in mice when it was. administered in relatively high doses. 20 In response to this report, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, had directed the Joint Chiefs toinsure that orange would be sprayed only in areas remote from popula tion pending a decision by the appropriate government agencies about tether 2,4,5-T could remain on the U.S. domestic market. Secretary Packard said further that the normal use of herbicides white or blue could continue, but that the large-scale substitution of these two herbicides for agent orange must hot occur.21 This restriction did not significantly affect Ranch Hand operations, since most defoliation missions by this time were already taking place in remote areas due to President Thieu's request of the previous year.* Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, the science advisor to President Nixon, referred the study questioning the safety of 2,4,5-T to the Weed Society of America for comments and an evaluation. On December 22, 1969, Glenn C. Klingman, the president of the organization, along with a group o f other scien tists sent their joint reply to Dr. DuBridge with copies to various govern ment officials, members of Congress, and chemical companies. Kingman's T h e Counney study had been preceded fay published reports in South Vietnamese news papers beginning on June 26, 1969, alleging that herbicide orange had caused human birth de fects in that country. See Rpn, USAF Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory, fubj: The Toxicology, Environmental Fate, and Human Risk o f Herbicide Orange and Us Associated Dioxin, Oct. 1978, p V-14. TH E AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA group of reviewers saw multiple problems with using the Courtney stui a basis for determining the hazard to human populations posed bv ">i ^ * Their first criticism was over the use o f dimethylsulfoxide (DMSO) aTa ^ vent for the herbicide in these tests.. They said that because DMSO rapidly absorbed and transported to all parts o f the body, it was like!) u x the 2,4,5-T reached internal organs that it would not have otherwise. a>*- they criticized the use o f subcutaneous injections as a completely ani&u treatment method when compared with natural exposures to 2,4,5-T. la ^ dition, Klingman's group argued that oral dosages used in the test weree* sive when compared with normal exposures. They concluded that the by the Courtney group did not support the conclusion that 2,4,5-T comre. uted to birth defects when used as instructed on the product's label and ttr* advocated a review of the restrictions which had been placed on the be biride. 11 Within a few days o f the KUngman letter, the AAAS adopted an 07? mg view concerning herbicides in Vietnam. On December 27, 1969. u* AAAS Council adopted a resolution which stated that recent studio bit shown that both 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T could cause birth deformities in ctro> mental animals, thus supporting the conclusion that 2,4,5-T posed a p-ns able threat to man, while 2,4-D was a possible danger. The AA\S maintained that the levels of application of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T in V s iia were greater than the normal dose rates in civilian usage and that the* t c birides might be causing birth defects in human babies there. The resduu concluded by calling on the Department of Defense to cease immd x -t* using these two chemicals in Vietnam. 23 On January 19, 1970, an assistant to Dr. DuBridge wrote to Adr=ra McCain asking for his opinion of the merits o f investigating alle g ro s n* human birth defects caused by herbicides and pesticides in South W .u s . McCain replied within a few weeks and said that every reasonable should be made to either prove or disprove these allegations. However. ** thought it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conduct a stud> ^ 1 would have any scientific validity, and the result o f an inconclushe efVr would simply be to intensify the controversy over herbicides without ally resolving anything. The foremost problem would be collect!? ** about birth deformities in South Vietnam where few births took n hospitals and where records were generally incomplete or nonexistent McCain also noted that the herbicide program had been under * n recent years by portions o f the U.S. scientific community, antiw ar and the National Liberation Front (NLF), the political arm 0 : w Cong. He said that rumors of birth defects caused by herbicides ti- ~ cently become more numerous and that antiwar activists were exploiting the issue. Viet Cong propaganda had been directed towar mg resentment over the use of herbicides through the spreading 0 . like " . . . U.S. poison substances have killed fetuses and serious!> milk secretions of mothers, rendering them unable to feed their b a b ^ 164 ' it -t. 0*. hai dal ad- as- idy 'b* 'ey er asJlC id :ri* )b- Lso am erj p l. ral of m. jrt he ch >n :u!ta in in cs, let e- :ly Top: lawn in from of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, sprayed with 2.4-0 to destroy weeds *a eflriy March 1946; bottom: 2,4-0 control of weeds--before and after. 15- ;es id K sbbhw TH E AIR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA In short, McCain viewed conducting a scientifically valid stud\ c' able birth defects caused by herbicides in Vietnam as completely able. As an alternative, he suggested a study o f the possibility 0f Vc=^ defects from herbicides in the United States where essentially the sair- pounds had been in use for more than 2 0 years and where medical rseti were much better." ---------- In early April 1970, the Department o f Defense learned tha: o= u* morning of April 15, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfa.*r vu Secretary o f the Interior, and the Secretary o f Agriculture planned tc nounce in a joint statement, immediate suspension o f aU use of 2,4 .5-? n cept for carefully controlled and registered applications on non-cnip to t such as ranges and pastures. The Director of Defense Research and neering, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., informed Secretary o f Defense Mchs t Laird and reminded him that 2,4,5-T was a major component of the h r s dde orange being used in Vietnam at the current rate o f 150,000-200.Ctr Ions' per month. Foster noted that agent white could be substiiu:* orange, but only about 100,000 gallons o f white were in Vietnam, c r ^ i for approximately fifteen more days of defoliation spraying ax the level of operations. Dow Chemical Company could produce over 200.CO. p . Ions of white if given thirty days to do so. However, Foster pointed o--: : u white was somewhat more expensive than orange and was also more pcrj* ent in the soil, increasing the likelihood that long-term ecological would result if white replaced orange in large quantities. As Foster saw the situation, the Defense Department had three caowr. concerning the future of agent orange. First, it could continue the p n m policy which stated that this chemical could only be used in areas nsa. from population. Or, Secretary Laird could endorse the positions o' 'V other three executive departments and direct that orange be applied or.1-v sparsely populated, non-agricultiiral areas while at the same time a ponds, lakes, and rivers. Finally, Laird could temporarily suspend :.v o f orange pending further study and the establishment o f specific p i d s w for future use. Foster argued against the first two options beau* nr* would probably cause adverse public reaction. Also, the second cttw* would be confusing without specific criteria for immediate use in a inquiries. The Chairman o f the JCS favored the second option. because he felt that restrictions tighter than those governing civilian 2,4,5-T should not apply to military uses and because a temporan fru i tion, once in place, would be very difficult to remove. Foster, on tfc- cth'~ hand, favored the last option. He felt it would be quite difficult ic criteria applicable to civilian uses of 2,4,5-T in the United Stales io operations in Southeast Asia.** Foster's view prevailed, and, on A?^-j* 1970, the Deputy Secretary o f Defense informed the Joint Chiefs tha: Department o f Defense will temporarily suspend the use of 2,4 ,5-T in all military operations pending a more thorough evaluation e- atuarion." " The JCS mess ..icd both CINCF impact of this Z-ded that the bi ... previous polic] saiiies Gess than -x > t. he asked 1 c^stitute. Admira] -m * for herbicide; orange or prom -a s in Vietnan K^es/* % On May 14, li JCS, petitioned -t*nted this as ti 3-5 sate defoliation -4 Hr said that endin tz important capa * asps, storage loc frer military pers Lij helped to sav ceance, since defol cr four weeks with Because no d wheeler, the Chair criiest possible de ally came on Jun< r-oounring that D v continue the sus Ranch Hand : renher use of the 1 \7nl 19. Since ora A nously planned for nhausting stocks c rply at Phu Cat! y Jed UC-123K, s and then retu chemical tank flew its last d `Between the origii <aenan ground operai including the she opinion costs for .'5 ****=$. and the prevail ** *y unnecessary cot & **"* *=neraied controvc RANCH HAND ENDS The JCS message directing the suspension of herbicide orange use also asked both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV for their evaluation of the military of this action. 27 General Abrams replied within d a p and recom mended that the ban on orange be lifted to allow it to be sprayed, as under the previous policy, on enemy-controlled areas with very low population densities (less than eight inhabitants per square kilometer). As an alter native, he asked for 128,(XX) gallons per month o f white or a suitable substitute. Admiral McCain on April 24 reaffirmed the operational require ment for herbicides and endorsed Abrams1 call for removing the restriction on orange or procuring a substitute. He also objected to. the limitations on orange m Vietnam being greater than those on 2,4,5-T in the United Stares." On May 14, 1970, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, as acting Chairman of the JCS, petitioned Secretary Laird to lift the temporary ban on orange. He presented this as the best of three options, with the other two being to terminate defoliation operations or to buy enough white to replace the orange. He said that ending all defoliation would take away from General Abrams an important capability to reduce jungle concealment and expose enemy camps, storage locations, and lines o f communication. Defoliation enabled fewer military personnel to provide security around fixed installations and had helped to save lives. Moorer did not favor white as a substitute for orange, since defoliation took four months with white as compared to three or four weeks with orange." Because no decision was immediately forthcoming, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, the Chairman o f the JCS, wrote to Laird on June 2 asking for the eariiest possible decision on the continued use o f orange:" The answer fi nally came on June 22, 1970, in a JCS message to CINCPAC and MACV announcing that Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard had decided to continue the suspension of orange." *. Ranch Hand received notification o f the original prohibition against rartner use of the herbicide orange through Seventh Air Force channels on ' , , Sfore orange was no longer available, all defoliation missions pre viously planned for this herbicide mixture had to be shifted to white. After exhausting stocks of white at Bien Hoa, the unit began drawing down the supply at Phu Cat. The procedure used was to start from Bien Hoa with a oaded UC-123K, spray the target, land at Phu Cat for more fuel and herbia e, and then return to Bien Hoa where the crews parked the planes with their chemical tanks full for the next day's flights. On May 9, 1970, Ranch wand flew its last defoliation (but not crop destruction) mission o f the war, *Between the original ban on orange and this June decision by Secretary Packard, the American ground operation in Cambodia and the accompanying campus protests in the United States, including the shooting deaths of students at Kent State University, had-occurred. The public opinion costs for the Administration m continuing the war in Southeast Asia were in creasing, and the prevailing atmosphere was against malting any decisions which would gener ate any unnecessary controversy. Lifting the restrictions on herbicide orange would certainly have generated controversy. 167 r , | , ' l I- 1 1L J . I . J I J P 4 . TH E A IR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA spraying 2,500 gallons of herbicide white near Bu Nard airfield At *point, Ranch Hand found itself with nothing to spray. Approved *CTol ^ gets against which herbicide blue could be used were not yet at a su ffi^ T advanced stage of maturity. 32 Since the 12th SOS had no herbicide missions to fly for a while j** enth Air Force directed the unit to prepare for leaflet drops and flare cm sions in support of the ground operation which was then underway in bodia. Ranch Hand, which by this time had only six herbicide 13?* UC-I23Ks plus the two used for spraying malathion to control m osqa* began leaflet operations on May II. On May j-.. flare drops began Cambodia. These leaflet and flare missions continued until July 4 and L t* spectively.*1 Because of the dedine in Ranch Hand's herbicide mission and the * companying reduction in the number o f spray aircraft, it became in n ingly unnecessary to have a separate squadron devoted solely 10 ihu p* pose. Oh July 2, 1970, PACAF approved the inactivation of the 12th SOI The 315th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) then ordered the Ranch H ai planes and crews to relocate from Bien H oa to Phan Rang where they become A Flight of the 310th Tactical Airlift Squadron. This mo\c toa place on July 8 , 9, and 10, and the 12th Special Operations Squadron ter ally passed out of existence as a separate organization on July 31, 19^: - In early July, Ranch Hand had received word to prepare to resura: s mg herbicide missions. This presented a problem--the crews had lost w-w* o f their proficiency in spray tactics during the previous two months some of the newly arrived crew members had no combat experience ir. tenwork. To remedy this situation, Ranch Hand began flying spray tresu missions from its new base at Phan Rang on July 16, 1970. Another d e to future herbidde operations was the fact that the South V ie m r province chief would not allow Ranch Hand to store herbidde at hi home base of Phan Rang longer than overnight. The remaining hcrS.* stocks were at Da Nang, Phu Cat, and Bien Hoa. As a result, the uni: crcw only fly herbidde missions on alternate days with the intervening da> to fly to one of the storage locations to load herbiddes for the next m aM On July 17, 1970, General Abrams permanently cancelled an> tea* fixed-wing defoliation missions. On July 20, Ranch Hand flew aci^-vs tr first crop destruction target since the break in spray operations in Ma* July 22,' the unit sprayed another area o f crops about 20 miles west o' ^ Trang. Ground fire was intense over both of them. To counter ground on future missions, Ranch Hand employed heavy suppression. Tactici *r* also changed. Prior to that time, the planes flying crop destruction nuia*1 had maintained a rather loose formation because of the irregular patter: -1 agricultural fields in the target areas. Individual aircraft might breai nr? completely from the formation to spray isolated fidds. After expencaa^ heavy ground fire in late July, future flights o f crop destruction flew a tighter form a tio n so that the suppression of ground fire b> the * companying fighters would have the greatest possible effect. 33 Another event1 South Vietnam t the Advanceme v\AS Board of Di : ii-vard with develc { of herbicides or t ocaied $80,000 f< testing to head th< given to this -i iS-x literature and c -2 \ and other .1 .vch twenty-one s f *~ciarion.w f The next stage I 5:- a thirty-day sui i -sst informed the 1 -odd soon be an 2 -h no official sta i . . . " State alsc * * * * . . . to deter Tr: Defense Depa: * u?n in South Vien r ?: that such effon , .'editions had reti i fcsbassy in Saigon i retaining accommi - the various offic v isested a positivt v^ntists had no of v closure of dassi *iition, officials `i ^^panraent had dt i - -mer in the wan Upon their an -* ?* Ur. John D. C Jr., a Vale v f ia n c e from th 3 in hdicopt i finals and used 1 ^ to America i ^ Ambassador v howeve "v"1y missions in d j was at that 3 '**> aeled this dr Another event which helped to hasten Ranch Hand's demise was a visit to South Vietnam by a group of scientists from the American Association for the Advancement of Science. At its meeting in December 1969, the AAAS Board of Directors had charged Professor Matthew S. Meseison of Harvard yith developing a plan for a study o f the effects o f the large scale use of herbicides on South Vietnam's ecology and population. The AAAS allocated $80,000 for the project. Meseison selected Professor A rthur H. Westing to head the AAAS Herbicide Assessment Commisson (H A Q , the name given to this activity. To begin its work, the HAC reviewed the scien tific literature and consulted with knowledgeable individuals from the U.S., Vietnam, and other countries. In June 1970, the HAC held a conference at which twenty-one specialists identified the areas which needed further in vestigation.** The next stage o f the H A Cs activities was a trip to Vietnam in August for a thirty-day survey of conditions there. On July 25, the State Depart ment informed the American Embassy in Saigon that a four-man team would soon be arriving from the AAAS, M . . . a private organization with no official status, but with high standing within scientific community . . . . " State also informed Saigon that the purpose o f this suvey would be " . . . to determine feasibility of detailed study at a later date . . . The Defense Department's view, however, was still that the military situa tion in South Vietnam was not conducive to conducting scientific studies, but that such efforts would be welcomed and supported later after peaceful conditions had returned to the country. The State Department asked the Embassy in Saigon to meet the Meseison group at the airport, assist them in obtaining accommodations and transportation, and provide introductions to the various officials and scientists they desired to meet. Although State suggested a positive approach to this group's visit, it emphasized that these scientists had no official status and that the normal directives governing the disclosure of classified information to private individuals would apply. In addition, officials from the State Department, AID, and the Defense Departmenthad dearly explained the difficulties this survey team would en counter in the wartime conditions prevailing in South Vietnam. 57 Upon their, arrival in Vietnam, Meselson's team, which included West ing, Dr. JohnD. Constable o f the Harvard Medical School, and Robert E. Cook, Jr., a Yale graduate student in ecology, received a great deal o f assistance front the American Embassy and MACV. In Vietnam, they traveled in helicopters, small boats, and automobiles provided by American officials and ustd government-facilities for their meals and lodging. Their accesss to Americans in South Vietnam was extensive, including meetings with Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams. A serious conflict developed, howettr, over the issue of access to information about specific spray missions including dates, locations, and chemicals used. This infor mation was at that time classified confidential. Meselson's. team felt that they needed this data to correlate the samples they collected with the types 169 TH E A IR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA J and amounts of spray received in the area. Meselson pressured Embawv .* the existing bir fidals in Saigon, including Ambassador Bunker, to give the information - cr disprove a c him, but MACV and CINCPAC strongly resisted. The MACV in fo rm al and they sugg office was suspicious o f leaks and the possible inadvertent release r; } Finally, the re; classified information. The office felt that since the Meselson team 4 population woi working together so closely, showing the data to one of them would be no v; desiructio; same as giving it to all four. Following a query by CINCPAC on August li the Joint Chiefs reaffirmed the decision not to release classified herbicdr mission data to Meselson, citing the additional argument that his team's tr? to Vietnam was only a survey visit and that the detailed information hr V4 * sought would only be applicable to a later, extensive study and not to in feasibility survey he was supposedly doing. Although Meselson did not | With agent that time receive the data he wanted, Science magazine published an * 4 fectively termini count of the episode and thereby added to the negative public rducc* fallout the herbicide program was generating." * In November 1970, Meselson and Constable wrote to Ambassain* % sures also put ar 4 On June 16, .19 | visor, wrote to 3 Bunker informing him that on August 21 and 28 they had flown over c 1 nam be complet area of Quang Ngai Province sprayed by Ranch Hand crop destruction o sions a few days before. They said that American officials had told the? that this was a crop production area for the Viet Cong and the North Vr- s to be formally s 1 controversy over He said that a namese Army and that most of the destroyed food had been destined tr arguments again! enemy soldiers. Meselson and Constable disagreed with this interprets:, *: for defoliation, l arguing that the number of civilian dwellings in the target area and the nur ber and size of the flelds were more consistent with a population of Monu; tionable*while th view a week later nards growing just enough food to feed themselves. They said that their <* President for Nal servations of this one target lent credence to previous studies which t*: maintained that nearly all of the food destroyed by chemical crop dcstru. tion would have been eaten by local civilians rather than enemy soldsm They strongly urged Ambassador Bunker to review the crop desirucu-v program in light of this challenge to its basic justification." Meselson*s group presented a preliminary report on their trip to u~* AAAS meeting on December 30, 1970. They said that their inspection o sprayed mangrove areas had revealed little regeneration of the fores: a::r three or more years. In sprayed tropical hardwood forests, they found Uvareas of dead trees where bamboo had spread over the forest floor. Ts* bamboo, they feared, would retard the regeneration of the larger trrr They also feared that the sudden death o f many trees might have relc-i^v the plant nutrients contained in the vegetation too quickly and that tr<T-rains could have carried them away, seriously lowering the soil's fer.D> (This phenomenon is known as " nutrient dumping.**) Meselson and his leagues also looked into the possibility that either or both 2,4,5-T and it* ** sodaled dioxin had caused birth defects in South Vietnam. They found t On July 6 , 197' the value of the h ^ tary effort in- S CINCPAC provi ; destruction on Ji i destruction was a : Vietnam and had most efficient anc namese could not troops. To suppor several incidents, i role in Gen. Vang missions which had both he and A bra combat support an lion programs. 44 Laird replied tc He basically repeat *The data Meselson sought is currently available in unclassified form on the HERE> '** maintained by Na; onal Archives Machine Readable Archives Division. *Sainst crops were i i and m Corps areas 170 y RANCH HAND ENDS the existing birth records in South Vietnam were inadequate to either prove or disprove a connection between the herbicide program and birth defects, and they suggested alternate approaches to investigating this question, finally, the report repeated Meselson's earlier assertion that the civilian population would have consumed nearly all of the food destroyed by the crop destruction program.4* With agent orange banned and the fixed-wing defoliation program ef fectively terminated, it was only a matter of time before the political pres sures also put an end to crop destruction, Ranch Hand's remaining mission. On June 16, 1970, Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Jr., a White House scientific ad visor, wrote to Dr. Lee A. DuBridge urging that crop destruction in Viet nam be completely halted. Bennett argued that the Geneva Protocol, soon to be formally submitted to the Senate, would likely become embroiled in controversy over th continued use of tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam. He said that although he had not been able to produce convincing arguments against the military effectiveness o f tear gas and herbicides used for defoliation, he thought that the benefits o f crop destruction were ques tionable while the political costs were high. 41 DuBridge endorsed Bennett's view a week later in a letter to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. 43 On July 6 , 1970, President Nixon himself asked Secretary Laird to assess the value of the herbicide crop destruction program to the overall U.S. mili tary effort in Southeast Asia. 43 At the request o f the Joint Chiefs, CINCPAC provided a detailed evaluation and justification for crop destruction on July 11. Admiral McCain repeated the claim that crop destruction was an integral part of the resources denial program in South Vietnam and had been since 1962. He said that crop destruction was the most efficient and effective method to keep food which the South Viet namese could not seize through ground operations from reaching enemy troops. To support his view of the value of crop destruction, McCain cited several incidents, including one in Laos where he attributed a significant role in Gen. Vang Pao's capture of the Plain of Jars to crop destruction missions which had taken place in August 1969. In short, McCain said that both he and Abrams considered crop destruction an essential element of combat support and an important part of the pacification and Vietnamization programs. 44 Laird replied to Nixon by way of a memo to Kissinger on July 18, 1970. He basically repeated CINCPAC's arguments, stating that herbicides used igainst crops were an integral part of the resources denial program in I, II - ind III Corps areas of South Vietnam. He said that crop destruction had 171 T H E A IR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA adversely affected the enemy through lowering morale, increasing tions, and putting an added strain on the supply system. .In summary felt that crop destruction had proven itself " an effective adjunct to our tcr^ military effort in Southeast Asia. " 41 ** President Nixon did not decide to end the crop destruction program x that time, and the political fallout from herbicides continued through latter part of 1970. During the week of October 19, the American or*i media reported on an unauthorized use o f herbicide orange in the area ci operations o f the U.S. Army's Americal Division. An investigation s MACV revealed that on several occasions during June, July, and Aupis 1970, personnel of the Americal Division had dispensed approximate 5,500 gallons of orange by hand pump and helicopter spray over remat areas of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces to defoliate base perimc.sn and to destroy crops. The division chemical officer had ordered the use c* orange in violation of MACV directives, but he had done so with the a?, proval of the division's operations officer and had falsified chemical report! to hide his actions. Furthermore, chemical officers at XXIV Corps r ? MACV had known o f the situation but had taken no action either to reprc it or to stop it; One of the factors which may have led to this unauihona* use of orange was the fact that stocks of white, a substitute for orange, h*: been depleted in May. New shipments of white did not arrive until October 1970. To prevent such incidents from recurring, all stocks of orar.p possessed by U.S. units within South Vietnam were consolidated at centra; storage points where they were under tighter controls. 44 In early December 1970, Ambassador Bunker and General Abaca decided, on the basis of a report prepared by their staffs in Saigon, to com pletely phase out the crop destruction program. General Abrams stopped any further procurement of white and blue herbicides. The herbicide strcti on hand in South Vietnam were adequate to defoliate base perimeters arJ to carry out highly selective crop destruction missions until about Mu 1971. In accordance with the precedent set when they suspended the fixed wing defoliation portion of the herbicide program earlier in 1970, Bunker and Abrams planned to make no public announcement of their decision to end crop destruction. This, they felt, would allow them to quietly, orderiv and rapidly phase out the program while preserving the option to resucc destroying crops in the future if this became necessary. 47 Additional factors leading to this decision may have included the ur. successful effort during the summer of 1970 by Senators Gaylord Nclw. and Charles Goodeil to persuade the Senaie to cut off all funds for furtr.r crop destruction operations. Although their attem p t garnered only two votes, it did add to the controversy. Also, prior to the Bunker ana Abrams decision, a committee of South Vietnamese appointed by Presidm: Thieu had concluded, that herbicides had destroyed twenty percent of Vietnam's forests. They had urged President Thieu to ask the American u stop the spraying. 41 172 * Events in wu-ever. On No on's science adv ! and recommend as: Ana. David .s ale Assessment t Committee and t l 2 level of dioxin % fniied States. I I experimental ani 'i cause damage tc quantities. Also, > tutes for orange j picloram was p ^ policy combinec I the upcoming hi propose to Nixc f those chemicals .,J ening restrictioi On Deceml JCS and the Sec J piy the South V fcvel based on \ rJ ays later, Dr. adopting the po cam only under :? the Joint Chiefs ting their endon They said that .:l had been used ii X the current Dep > to one part per ] | cause some of i j^ cls of dioxin, V *vel of dioxin ci > that the sdentifi 7. ^axin was weak ca the use of or fiorida, which t ; :"s past eight ye acre during < Actable dioxin h tr.t animals livin i eg orange in an i c 5 the option t< 1 RANCH HAND ENDS Events in Washington compressed the Bunker-Abrams timetable, however. On November 20, 1970, Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., President Nix on's science advisor and Dr. DuBridge's successor, wrote to Dr. Kissinger and recommended the reconsideration o f U.S. herbicide policies in South east Asia. David said that he had reason to believe that the AAAS' Herbi cide Assessment Commission would report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to the public that the herbicide orange in Vietnam contained a level of dioxin higher than the level permitted for herbicides in use in the United States. Dioxin was at that time known to cause birth defects in experimental animals, and researchers suspected the chemical was able to cause damage to human fetuses if ingested by their mothers in sufficient quantities. Also, David informed Kissinger that all of the candidate substi tutes for orange had drawbacks--2,4-D was a suspected carcinogen and picloraxn was persistent and a soil sterilant. David felt that the current policy combined with these scientific findings might cause trouble during the upcoming hearings on the Geneva Protocol, and he urged Kissinger to propose to Nixon that the U.S. state that it would only spray in Vietnam those chemicals approved for use in the United States under the same gov erning restrictions.4' On December 7, 1970, Secretary Laird informed the Chairman o f the JCS and the Secretary of the Army that he had decided to continue to sup ply the South Vietnamese with both riot control agents and herbicides at a level based on appropriate military and economic considerations. 30 Three days later, Dr. Kissinger asked Secretary Laird to assess the impact of adopting the policy proposed, by Dr. David, that is to use herbicides in Viet nam only under the same rules applicable in the United State. Laird asked the Joint Chiefs for their opinion, and they replied on December 18, reitera ting their endorsement of the military value of herbicides in Southeast Asia. They said that there were no direct parallels between the ways herbicides had been used in Southeast Asia and normal domestic uses.. Complying with the current Department of Agriculture standards of no more than one-half to one part per million (ppm) of dioxin in 2,4,5-T would not be feasible be.cause some of the orange in storage in South Vietnam contained higher levels of dioxin, and no testing facilities existed in Vietnam to determine the level of dioxin contamination in each drum. In any event, the Chiefs argued that the scientific evidence concerning the alleged danger from 2 ,4,5-T and . dioxin was weak and did not justify a continuation of the suspension placed on the use of orange. They cited a study done o f a test range at Eglin AFB, Florida, which had received more than 500 pounds of orange per acre over the past eight years, compared with about 25 pounds o f herbicide deposited per acre during a single spraying in Vietnam. Investigators had found no de tectable dioxin in the soil of this test area, and there were no abnormalties in the anim als living there. In short, the JCS saw no factual basis for restrict ing orange in areas remote from population, and they argued for maintain ing the option to continue the herbicide program. 31 173 TH E A IR FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA After receiving the views of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary Laird re.;*onded to Dr. Kissinger, but he did not adopt the JCS position. He sai-* nat the overall military impact of implementing Dr. David's policy record mendation would be minimal considering that 95% of the South Vietru. mese population lived in relatively secure areas and that the rapid proereu of the pacification program had made herbicides relatively less important. However, Laird said that the option of conducting future herbicide opera-' tions had to be preserved and that the South Vietnamese needed to be pro vided with the capability to do so. He specifically disagreed with the JCS on the matter o f herbicide orange, saying that the adverse political and psychological costs of using the 1.63 million gallons of the chemical then is South Vietnam would outweigh the dollar value o f its original purchase price (about $ 1 2 million) and the expense o f disposing o f it (estimated a: over $ 6 million). He told Kissinger that he had directed the JCS to produce a plan for disposing of all orange not meeting U.S. Department of Agriculture standards and had derided to continue the ban on orange use pending further studies. Secretary Laird further stated that if President Nixon so directed, he would be willing to apply Department of A griculture standards to future herbicide operations in South Vietnam." Three days after the Joint Chiefs sent their first memo on herbicides to Secretary Laird, the Chairman of the JCS sent another stating that the Chiefs did not agree with Laird's announced derision to make the tempo rary ban on herbicide orange permanent.* Admiral Moorer emphasized again that in the Chiefs view every new study had not only failed to support the original suspension of orange, but had shown that the risk of human in jury from this herbicide was even less than originally suspected. He also outlined again the problem of disposing of the 1 .6 million lio n s of orange in Vietnam and the 800,000 gallons in the U.S. He said, " . . . if, for purely public relations reasons, you determine it necessary to make the ban on orange permanent . . . , " essentially the same techniques used in destroying mustard gas. would be needed, at a probable cost in excess of S10 million." The protests of the Joint Chiefs were to no avail. On December 22. 1970, Laird informed Nixon that, in the future, the use of herbicides ir. V ietn am would be in strict conformance with policies governing their use in the United States and that the ban on herbicide orange would remain in ef fect. He mentioned to the President that Ambassador Bunker and G enen: Abrams had decided on an orderly yet rapid phase-out in spraying other herbicides, but they also retained the option to continue their use if necessary to protect American lives. Laird said that during this phase-out period, herbicide use would be restricted to remote, unpopulated areas ar.J the vicinities of firebases and U.S. installations, limitations similar to the *Dr. David had proposed this change on December 18. 174 in force in th e U tem porary risks t use, a n d 'b e c a u t increased enem y P ublic anne last week o f Deo ^ e substance o f the possibility o i tions." In additi l wanted an y plan ; ize it s u b m itte d : ' Defense released 4 Secretary * taken steps n policies gove involved in S ; States popufc hies. Deputy orange, and foliants (blu< General the herbicide It is imi September is During the destruction son * only six in Dec< total of 133 soi ride mission of January 7, 191 Packard ordere lions by U.S. f sion on Januar * toe 310th TAS 1971. This rele duties. The twe On February aboard." * `Admiral Mc< r!ems stored in ! :~5uied to the dm Sscome involved ij the idea in i major politic Jl>` 12, 1971. RANCH HAND ENDS in force in the United States. Also, he recognized that there could be some temporary risks to American forces because o f these decisions on herbicide use, and he cautioned Nixon that the policy might need to be reassessed if increased enemy activity threatened American forces as they witbcr^w. 14 Public announcements of these policy decisions occurred during the last week of December 1970. A White House statement on the 26th revealed the substance of Laird's December 22 memo to Nixon, without mentioning the possibility of reassessing herbicide policy in light o f future enemy ac tions." In addition, Secretary Laird learned on the 2Sth that the President wanted any plans to extend or expand the herbicide program or to Vietnamize it submitted for his personal approval." . On the 29th, the Department o f Defense released the following statement: Secretary o f Defense Melvin R. Laird has, as we have previously reported, taken sups to insure that herbicide usage in South Vietnam win conform to the policies governing usage in the United States. As a result, the stresses and risks involved in South Vietnam will be no greater than those sustained by the United States population and the United States environment in normal peace-time activ ities. Deputy Secretary David Packard last spring restricted all use o f defoliant orange, and that ban remains in effect, in addition, at that time use o f other de foliants (blue and white) was strictly limited to areas remote from population. General Abrams is now initiating in South Vietnam an orderly phase out o f the herbicide operations to be completed by next spring. It is important to note that estimated herbicide coverage for 1970 through September is 75 percent less than for the same period in 1969." During the last quarter of 1970, Ranch Hand flew only forty-three crop destruction sorties, with nineteen in October, eighteen in November, and only six in December. By way of contrast, the two insecticide aircraft flew a total of 133 sorties during this same period." The last Ranch Hand herbi cide mission of the war sprayed a crop target in Ninh Thuan Province on January 7, 1971." On January 16, Deputy Secretary o f Defense David Packard ordered the immediate termination of all crop destruction opera tions by U.S. forces." The Joint Chiefs informed CINCPAC of this deci sion on January 22." Since there was no further mission for Ranch Hand, the 310th TAS absorbed its A Flight spray planes and crews on January 28, 1971. This released the six herbicide spray UC-123Ks for cargo hauling duties. The two insecticide aircraft continued their mosquito spray mission. On February 11, 1971, one of the two crashed, killing all five men aboard.* `Admiral McCain on June 27, 1971, proposed a new use for the herbicides and spray systems stored in South Vietnam--against opium poppies, the source o f heroin, which con tributed to the drug abuse problem in the United States. The United Nations, he said, might become involved in this effort. The JCS responded on July 3 and stated that they would ex amine the idea in collaboration with the State Department and the Secretary o f Defense, but that major political barriers existed. See Item o f Interest AFXOOSO, M aj. R.C. Pyatt, July 12, 1971. 175 Appendix 2 Summary o f Herbicide Operations TABLE L --MAJOR HERBICIDE MIXTURES USED IN VIETNAM M ilitary Color Code or Trade Name* Pink Green Pink-Green mixture Dinoxol Trinoxol Purple Blue Orange Orange 11 W hite Composition 1active ingredients) 607* n-buryl ester o f 2,4,5-T 407* isobutyl ester of 2,4,5-T 1007 n-butyl ester o f 2,4,5-T 807* n-butyl ester o f 2,4,5-T 20% isobmyi ester of 2,4,5-T 507* butyoxyethanol ester of 2,4-D 507* butyoxyethanol ester o f 2,4,5-T 1007* butyoxyethanol ester bf 2,4,5-T 507 n-butyl ester of 2,4-D 307* n-butyl ester o f 2,4,5-T 20% isobutyl ester of 2,4,5-T 1007 sodium sah of cacodylic add 507* n-butyl ester of 2,4-D 507* n-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T 50% n-butyl ester of 2,4-D 50% Uooctyi ester of 2,4;5-T 807* triisopropanolamine salt of 2,4-D 207* triisopropanolamine sah of pidoram Source: Tbc Committee on the Effects of Herbicides in Vietnam, National Research Council, The E ffects o f Herbicides in South Vietnam: Pan A (Washington, D .C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1974), p II--4; rprt, Review and Evaluation of ARPA "D efoliation" Program in South Vietnam 11962], pp 31-32; rprt, Capt. Alvin L. Young, et of, USAF Occupa tional and Environmental Health Laboratory, The Toxicology, Environmental Fate, and Human Risk of Herbicide Orange and Its Associated Dioxin, O ct. 78, p 1-7 (hereafter cited as USAF OEHL Report). "Herbicide drums were identified by a four-inch-wide circular band of paint colored in correspondence with these color codes. TABLE 2.--HERBICIDE DISSEMINATED IN SOUTH VIETNAM JAN 1962-DEC 1964 M ilitary H erbicide Blue Green Pink Purple T o ta l Gallons o f F orm ulation 5,200 8,208 122,792 145,000 281,200 Source: USAF OEHL Report, p 1-9. Pounds A ctive Ingredient 10,000 66,980 1,001,980 1,180,300 259,260 199 mmem N otes Chapter I The D evelopm ent o f a M ilitary Herbicide Capability -1. Eldon W. Downs and George F. Lemmer, " Origins o f Aerial Crop Dusting," A g ricultural H istory, Vol 39, No 3 (Jul 1965), pp 123-135. 1 Ltr, Chief, Air Corps to Chemical War fare Technical Committee, subj: Dispersion of Chemicals from A ircraft, Oct 2, 1933. 3. Edward J . Ne, " Gas Stopped Ethi opians: W ar Correspondent Tells How Air man Burned Enemies* Feet," Associated Press dispatch, 1936, quoted in rprt, " Use of Gas in Ethiopia--1936," Chemical W arfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, MD, undated, pp 1-3. 4. " Selassie Speaks,** Time, Jul 13, 1936, quoted in rprt, " Use o f Gas in Ethiopia-- 1936,** p 6. 5. Col O. B, Schleuder and Capt W. N. Sullivan, " Spraying o f DDT from Airplanes,** The A ir Surgeon's Bulletin, Vol 2, No 3 (Mar 1945), pp 67-68. 6. Rprt, Army Air Forces Board, Orlando, FL, " Marking and Defoliation o f Tropical Vegetation,*' Dec 18, 1944. 7. Royal Air Force, The Malayan Emer gency, 1948-1960,] (London: Ministry o f Defence, Jun 1970), pp 113-114, 152; U .S. Aerospace. Studies Institute, The Accom plishm ents o fAirpow er in the Malayan Emer gency (1948-1960), (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, May 1963), p 57. 8. Rprt, Wright Air Development Center, W right-Pattenon AFB, OH, subj: Engineer ing Study on a Large Capacity Spray System Installation for A ircraft, Jun 3, 1952. 9. Ibid. 10. Technical Study, Kent Irish, Dep Commander, Scientific Activities, Biological Warfare Laboratories, Fort Detrick, MD, " Anticrop Agent Munition Systems,'* Jul 1958; Dorothy L. Miller, H istory o f A ir Force Participation in the Biological Warfare Program, 1951-1954, (Historical Division, Air Materiel Command, 1957), pp 117-120. 11. Rprt, Dr. J. W . Brown, U.S. Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratories, subj: Vegetaiional Spray Tests in South Viet nam, Supplement, Apr 1962, pp 21-31. 12. John I. Lumpkin and Mary J. Konopnicki, M ilitary A erial Spray Operations, 1946-1960, (HQ TAC Historical Division, ca 1961). 13. Minutes, C-I23 Aerial Spray System Preliminary Planning Coni, Langley AFB, VA, Aug 29, 1960. Chapter II ' The D ecision to Send Spray-Equipped C-223s to South Vietnam 1. For a detailed discussion o f the Kennedy 5. NSAM No 52, May II, 1961. Administration's decision to intervene in 6. Ibid.; memo. Task Force Draft, subj: A South Vietnam, see U nited States- Vietnam Program of Action to Prevent Communist Relations 1945-1967 (W ashington: U.S. Gov Domination o f South Vietnam, pp 4-5. ernment Printing Office, 1971), Books 2 (TV.B.I), 11 and 12, from which much o f this account has been extracted. 7. Ltr, Pres Ngo Dinh Diem to Pres John F. Kennedy. May 15, 1961. 8. Ltr, Brig Gen Edward G. Lansdale, Z Memo, W a.t W. Rostow to the Presi dent, no subj, A pr. 12, 1961. 3. Memo, Task Force Draft for the Presi dent, subj: A Program o f Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam, Apr 26, 1961. Asst SECDEF, to Dir/Defensc Research and Engineering (DDR&E), subj: Combat Devel opment and Test Center, Vietnam, May 16, 1961. 9. JCS 2343/3, Status Report on the Pres idential Program for Vietnam as o f July 10, 4. L tr, Pres John F. Kennedy to Pres Ngo 1961, Jul 21, 1961. Dinh Diem, May 8, 1961. 10. JCS 2343/12, Status Report on the ' 207 Presidential Program for Vietnam as of July 21,1961, Aug 15,1961. In both o f these status reports, paragraph number 20 de scribed activities o f the CDTC, including de- foEaiioo. Later, defoliation to remove jungle cover came to be known as CDTC Task Number 20, and " 20" was often used in the designation o f defoliation projects. 11. Rprt, Review and Evaluation o f ARPA/ * O SD '" Defoliation** Program in South Viet nam, (1962), App A: Target Evaluation D ata, p 1; rprt, author not indiratrd, subj: Herbi cide Operations in the Republic o f Vietnam, (1965), Supporting Document #1 of CHECO Report, H erbicide O perations in Southeast A sia July 1961-J u m 1967, p 2; rp rt, D r J . W . . Brown, U.S. Army Chemical Corps Biologi cal Laboratories, Fort Detrick, MD, subj: Vegetmional Spray Tests in South Vietnam, Apr 1962,vpp 9, 10, 59-46. Nine tests o f spraying herbicides from the air took place in South Vietnam before, the Ranch Hand planes arrived. Seven involved a 0-47; one, an AD-6 fighter plane; and one, an H-34 beficopcer. See Brown, above, pp 39-45. 12. American advisors found out in the summer o f 1961 that th e VNAF was usmg na- P*iw rockets, and 20-nun rice paddir* in an attempt to deny rice to the Viet Cong. This use o f ordnance was so unsuccess ful that the advisors were able to persuade the VNAF to abandon this tactic. See Reference Book for the Meeting with the Secretary of Defense. Oct. 8* 1962. 13. MR, Office o f the Chief. MAAGV, m bj: Meeting Held at Independence Palace, Saigon, Vietnam on Friday, Sept 29, 1961 (Adm Fdt*s Visit), p 22. 14. Memo, U. Alexis Johnson, subj: Con cept for Intervention in Vietnam, Oct 10, 1961, with two supplemental notes dated Oct 11,1961. 15. The GPO edition o f the Pentagon P apes (cited earlier) on page 79 o f Section IV.B.1 (Book 2) describes the U . Alexis John son paper as luring only two " Specific Ac- 10 P*ei !;.* tions to be Taken Now" concernm*\---- L nether o f which has to do with Odeumu However, the Johnson paper tad.* pages 7 and 8 five different "Specific t o , to be Taken Now," three of whkb, ttsyos the defoliation proposal, relate speedkah* South Vietnam. 16. MR Roswdl L. CUparic. sub?: Sores Vietnam, Q g 11,1961. 17. Msg. DEPTEL337, Sep 2 3 .19M. cm* in JCS 2343/197, F * 14,1961, p 10. 18. JCS 2343/27, Summary of U o Courses o f Action in Vietnam. Tre \ " Undertake Defoliant Spray Props*. * Oct 19,1961. 19. Msg, CHMAAGVto SECDEF. Da, E% 164449, O a 22, 1961, referenced in K3M 765-61, Fort MAAG Vietnam Spec; F t* d u e MAP Request, Nov 3,1961. 20. M ono, ColW .W .Bnmdays. De'Vcial Programs, to Asst SECDEF ISA et m. m bj: South Vietnam Defafinion Project. Cre 23, 1961. 21. JCSM-765-61, Fust MAAG \* tx m Special Procedure MAP Request, No ) 1961. 22. Memo, Gen L. 1 Lnrnmnr. tr Cre* Taylor, subj: Counterinsurgency O p ra * in South Vietnam, O a 12,1961. 23. Memo, See Robert S. M cN ism v SAF and CJCS, m bj: Chemical Dciare.. Spraying Equipment and Aircraft. Vreea*. Nov 7,1961. 24. Memo, W nBunP. Bundy to SECD17. subj: Defofiutt Operations in Vmna* Nov 14, 1961, 25. Memo, pep SECDEF to the Prender, subj: Defoliation Operazioes in V n ra r N o v 2 1 ,1961. 26. Memo, SECSTATE to ibe P r a 4 s subj: Defoliant Opcraricni in V arcai Nov 24, 1961. 27. NSAM No 115, m bj: Defofiant O re tiona in Vietnam, Nov 30, 1961. 28. NSAM No 111, subj: Firs Phare & Viemam Program, Nov 22* 1961. Chapter III The D eploym ent o f Spray A ircraft to South Vietnam . and Initial D efoliation Operations . 1. Memo, See R oberts. McNamara to SAF and CJCS, m bj: Chemical Defoliant, Spray ing Equipment and Aircraft, Vietnam, Nov 7, 1961. 208 2. Cape George T . Adams. TAC Ae-re Spray Flight Operations m Southern: Aus, 961-1964 (TAC/SASF, undated*. p r -* (hereafter died aa Adams monograph!: *= ,, author with L t Col 1 fShF (Ret.). May 9 , 19T yarshsll intvw). }. Adams monograph, ^ M a j Charles F . Hag V gt 11, 1977 (hereafter me*w. M). arshall mtvw. 5. Hagerty intvw; inrra %(jjcus B. Kcmf, Jr. US ACT(hereafter died asKf Adams monograph, Keene intvw; msg, ^ t to PACAF, 11062. 7. MarhsaQ intvw; Ke tSAF #111537, Dee 1,19 I, Msg,TflcAFTrwpS 1108252 Dee 61. 9. Marshall intvw; Ke aooograph, pp 4-5. 10. Adamsmonograph II. Marshall intvw; K ooograph, p 3; msg, Prw I to PACAF, 11082 G-97, Nov 24, 1961, a t VON to 13 AF, 31115Z 11 Memo, DepSECE ohj: Defoliation Oper Nov 21,196113. NSAM No 115, su . tans in Vietnam, Nov 3< 14. Norn to Control 1 South Vietnam, Nov 28, of SECDEF to Secret and Air Force and CJC asm, Nov 29, 1961; start Up, Dec 5,1961. 15. Msg, AMEMBAf STATE, 0302552 Dec PACAF to 13 AF* PFOC Dec 61; memo, Philip F Requirement Review, O Ass SECDEF ISA, subj 16. Memo, Brig Gen Sec McNamara and D q Psychological Support 1 tiou, Vietnam, Dee 1,1! 17. Lsr, SAF Engeae DEF, subj: none, Dec 4 18. M ono, Phifip F . * Bundy, mbj: none, Dee State-Defense Menage med in memo. Haydn SECDEF ISA to Philip tofiam Operations in V 19. Memo, Dep SB Setraaries o f Army, h mbj: Publie Affairs a a Operations in Vietnam, Notes to Pages 24-37 n r, author with Lx C d Carl W . Marshall, USAF (Ret.), May 9,1977 (baeafter d ied as MmhiQ intvw). 3. Adams monograph, p 3; intvw, author wkh ^taj Charles F. Hagerty, USAF (Ret.), May 11 1977 (hereafter died as Hagexty intvw). 4. Marshall intvw. 5. Hagerty intvw; intvw, author with Ma] Marcus B. Keene, J r., USAF (R et.), May 10, 1977 (hereafter died as Keene intvw). 6. Adams monograph, pp H Marshall intvw; Keene intvw; nag, Tac A F Trnsp- Sq prow 1 to PACAF. 1108252 Dec 61. 7. MnhsaD intvw; Keene intvw; photo, USAF 111337, Dec 1,1961. 8. Msg,Tac A F lh isp S q Prowl to PACAF, 110623Z Dec 61. 9. Marshall intvw; Keene intvw; Adams monograph , pp 4-3. 10. Adams monograph, pp 3-6. 11. Marshall intvw; Keene intvw; Adams monograph , p 3; msg, Tac AF T nup Sq Ptov 1 to PACAF. 110825Z Dec 61; TAC SO G-97, Nov 24, 1961, died in mag, 2d AD- VON to 13 AF; 3111552 Mar 62. 12. M e w , Dep SECDEF to the President, subj: Defoliation Operations in Vietnam, Nov 21,1961. 13. NSAM No 113, subj: Defoliant Opera tions in Vietnam, Nov 30, 1961. 14. Note to Control Division (JCS), snbj; South Vietnam, Nov 28,1961; memo, Office o f SECDEF to Secretaries o f Army, Navy, and A h Force and CJCS, subj: South Viet nam, Nov 29, 1961; status rprt, Project BeefUp, Dec 3.1961. 13. Msg, AMEMBASSY Saigon to SEC STATE, 0302332 Dec 61, quoted in msg, PACAF to 13 A F. PFOCC-S-61-168,0402202 Dee 61; m e w , PhiBp F. Hbest, Deputy for Requirements Review, Office, Under SAF, to Asst SECDEF ISA, subj: none, Dec 13,1961. 16. Memo, Brig Gen Edward Tansriaie to Sec McNamara and Dep Sec Gpatrie, subj: Psychological Support for Defoliant O p e thin, Vietnam, Dec 1,1961. 17. U r, SAF Eugene M. Zuckert to SEC DEF, subj: none, Dec 4,1961. 18. Memo, Philip F. Hbest to WEam P . Bundy, subj: none. Dec 12,1961; msg. Joint State-Defense Message 1781, Dec 14, 1961, eked b m e w , Haydn WBSams, Dep Asst SECDEF ISA to Philip F. H ben, subj: Defofiant Operations in Vietnam, Jan 10, 1962. 19. Memo, Dep SECDEF to CJCS and Secretaries of Army, Navy, and A ir Force, subj: PnbEc Affairs and Security Aspects of Operations b Vietnam, Jan 4, 1962. 20. Jbid.; m e w . Asst SECDEF ISA to SECDEF, subjr none, S -l-18298/6*1, Jan 2, 1962; m ono, Dep SECDEF to SAF, subj: Public Affairs and Security Aspects o f Opr erions in Vtitnam , Jan 4, 1962. 21. M e w , L t Col Sidney B. Berry, Jr, M3 A id to SECDEF, to Secretaries o f Army, Navy, and Air Force and CJCS, subj: South Vietnam, Dec 6,1961. 22. M e w r Philip F. Hbest to Ask SEC DEF ISA^ subj: none, Dec 13,1961. 23. SECDEF Book for December (1961)* Mtg, .Tab B-8-G -1; Talking Paper, subj: Status o f Chcmirah for Defoliation. 24. L tr, U .G en Lionel C . McGarr to Adm H . D . Feh, subj: none, Dec IS, 1961; MR, RAdm L . C. Heinz, snbj: Conference on Vietnam at CXNCPAC Hemdquarten on 16 Dec 61, Dec 20. 1961; Record, SECDEF Conf, HQ CINCPAC, Dec 16,1961. 25. JCSM -2-62, MAAGV Special Proce- dnre MAP Request, Jan 2, 1962; msg, CINC PAC to CHMAAGV, 2822432 Dec 61, died m JCSM-2-62; status rprt, Dept o f State, Task Force Vietnam, subj: lim nicrions to Amb Ntdring, Jan 4, 1962. 26. M e w , SECDEF to the President, subj: Defoliant Operations m Vietnam, Feb 2, 1962. 27. Adams monograph, p 6; Marshall intvw. 28. T alk in t Paper, subj: Defoliation (Ranch Hand),Tab 3(B) o f PACAF SECDEF Book for January Mtg, January 1962; msg, SECSTATE to AMEMBASSY Saigon, 04Q314Z Jan62. 29. Rprt, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Report Concerning the Psychological Aspects o f the Use o f Defoliants b die Republic o f Viet nam, Mar 22, 1963, p A -l. 30. Talking Paper, subj: Defoliation (Ranch Hand), Tab 3(B) o f PACAF SECDEF Book for January M tg, January 1962; rprt, Dr j . W , Brown, U i . Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratories, Fort Detrick, MD, subj: Vegetarional Spray Tests b South Viet nam, A pr 1962, pp 87, 88, 113, 114; Keene btvw . 31. Rprt, Dr J. W. Brown, U.S. Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratories, Fort Detrick MD, subj: Vegetarional Spray Tests b South Vietnam, Apr 1962, pp 114-- 113; Marshall intvw. 3 1 Msg. 2d ADVON JOC to PACAF, subj: Ranch Hand Final Strike Report, 13Q34QZ Jan 62; Marshall intvw. 33. Msg, 2d ADVON JOC to PACAF, subj: Ranch Hand Final Strike Repent, 1403332 Jan 62; msg. 2d ADVON JOC to PACAF, subj: Ranch Hand Final Strike Report, 1303132 Jan 62; msg, 2d ADVON Notes to Pages 34-49 JOC to PACAF, subj: Ranch Hand Final Strike Report 160701Z Jan 62; msg, O N C PAC to CHMAAGV, subj: Defoliant Opera tions, 160434Z Jan 62; msg, CHMAAGV to CINCPACi 22093SZ Jan 62; status rprt. Operations Dktotite J-3, JCS, subj: Proj ect Beef-Up. Jin 17. 1962; memo unsigned, subj: Status of Air Force Actions, South Vietnam, is o f 19 Jan 1962; Marshall intvw; H tperry intvw. 34. Keene intvw. 33. H tfcrty imvw. 36. Marshall mtvw; Hagerty intvw. 37. H aierty intvw; Keene mtvw. 38. Marshall mtvw; Keene mtvw. 39. Hagerty intvw; Marshall intvw. 40. Marshall mtvw; Keene intvw. 41. Msg, PACAF to O N CPA C, subj: Use of Ranch Hand C-123*, 28194SZ Jan 62. 42. Msg, ONCPAC to PACAF, subj: UtiBzatioo C-123 Spray Equipped A cft, 3020S7Z Jan 62. 43. Marshall intvw; Keene, mtvw; Adams monograph , p 8; rprt, Air Force Study Group on Vietnam, Office, SAF, May 1964; msg, 13 AF to PACAF, Q30833Z Fd> 62; msg. 2d ADVON to CSAF, subj: Progress Report Number Three o f M ajor Aircraft Accident Involving C-123B 36-G70, Feb 2, 1962, 111005Z Feb 62. 44. Record, 2d SECDEF Conf, HQ ONCPAC, Jan 25, 1962, pp 3-5, 3-6,3-9. 45. Msg, ONCPAC to CHMAAGV, subj: Defoliant Operations, 160454Z Jan 62. 46. Msg. CHMAAGV to ONCPAC. 171329Z Jan 62. 47. Msg, ON CPA C to CHMAAGV,subj* Defoliant Test, 19C322Z Jan 62. 48. Msg. CHMAAGV, 220935Z Jan 62; msg, ONCPAC, 240350Z Jan 62; (Prcdas two messages died in msg, JCS to ONCPAC. 032258Z Feb 62); memo; RAdm L . C. H ear to Asst SECDEF ISA, subj: Defoliant Opra tions in Vietnam, Jan 25,1962; memo, U Col S. B. Boxy, Jr, to William P . Bundy, Jan 30. 1962; memo. Sec Robert S. McNamara to Pres John F. Kennedy, subj: Defoliant Oper ations in Vietnam, Feb 2, 1962. 49. Memo,SECDEF to the Presided,subj Defoliant Operations in Vietnam, Feb 1 1962. 50. Memo, Bromley Smith, B ate Sec.NSC, to SECDEF. Feb 5. 1962. 51. Msg. 2d ADVON to PACAF, cub; Ranch Hand, 180618Z Feb 62. 52. Status rprt, Operations Directorate, J-3, JCS, isb j: Project Beef-Up, Mar 2a, 1962. . Chapter IV Earfy Evaluations and Expanded Operations 1. MR, RAdm L . C Heinz, subj: Confer cm. Mar 1962. This report may have be* ence oo Vietnam, Pearl Harbor, 15 January drafted by Brig Gen Fred J. D dm ort; wt* 1962, Jan 17, 1962. headed a team which produced a more d r 1 Msg. JCS to ONCPAC, JCS 3250, tailed report based on observations made e 122235Z Feb 62. A p ril See rprt, Laszlo Hadik, Stanley % 3. Msg. ADMINO ONCPAC to CHMA Dziubas, and Susan Herbert, Institute fc AGV, subj: Defoliant Operations 13Q349Z D efen* Analyses, C onsrainaon the Uses c ` Feb 62. Weapons and Tactics in Cotauerinstafetun 4. Record, 3d SECDEF Conf. HQ O N C rprt R-117, Jun 1966, p 10 (hereafter died * PAC, Feb 19, 1962, p 3-8. Hadik, at aL, Ceuistrama). 3. A id., pp 3-9,3-10; hr, Lt Gen Thomas 9. Rprt, D r James W. Brawn, Dcp Clue:. S. Moorman to Brig G at RoQea H. A nthis, O ops D m soo, U . Anny Qtemiral C orr a . Feb 62. Biological Laboratories, Fort D etriei. MT & Record, 3d SECDEF Conf, HQ CINC- subj: Prefiminary Report o f Vegeiauns PAC, Feb 19, 1962, p 3-10; status rprt, Proj- Spray Testa, Mar 8, 1962, p 2. * t " Beef-Up" , Feb 14; 1962, p 4. 10. Rprt, Dr James W. Brawn, UJS. Are* 7. Keene fattvw; SECDEF Book for Mar Chemical Corps Biological Laboratories. 1962 Mlg, Tab C, subj: Ranch Hand Defo Fort Detrick, MD, subj: Vegetations! Sp* liant Operations, ca. Mar 1962. T ests in South Vietnam, A pr 1962, pp 13-2* 8. SECDEF Book for Mar 1962 Mtg, Tab C, subj: Ranch Hand DefoEam Operations, 11. A f t, pp 77, 133* .c 12. Mag, CMUSMACV to O N C PA C . 210 2310452 Mar 62. 13. Keene intvw; rprt to South Vietnam, Apr 1 1962; msg, 13 AF to 1 UM^y*s Visit to SVN, 21 14. Record, 5th SE< COMUSMACV, Saigon, 1962. 15. Record. 5th SEC COMUSMACV, Saigon, 1962. 16. Rprt, Brig Gen Free jabj: Review and Evahuti "Defohatkm" Program, pp7, 10, 51. (H ereafto1*34S.78 rprt.) 17. Ibid., p 37, chap I, 18. Ib id ., App C , p 5. 19. A f t, App C , p 3. 20. L tr,M ajG eaR .G .> to ONCPAC, mbj: Opa-a Dcfofiadon, Jun 9, 1962. 21. U r, ONCPAC to J and Operational Evainatic Program in South Vietnam 22. Memo, U Gen Tho to PFDAL and PFDOP, su OEF Mtg, Feb 23,1962. 23. SECDEF Book for Section II, Tab 5(C), subj: foSani Operations, oo: M ar 24. Mtg, TAC to CSA Krad, 10I853Z Mar 62. 25. Mlg, COMUSMACV itb j: In a e a * in A irlift Ca; 120711Z Mar 62. 26. Msg, PACAF to TAC of Ranch Hand C -123,150 27. Msg, TAC to CSA1 H od, 2Q21QSZ M ar 62. 2*. Msg, PACAF to 1 Mar 62. 29. Msg, 2d ADVON to 1 Mar 62. 31. HQ TAC OPORD 49-< HQ TAC to 9AF, subj: Ran , 192338Z A pr 62. 32. Msg, PACAF to TAC, of Ranch Hand Aircraft, .2421 33. Msg, PACAF to CH Kacb Hand A ncraft Ron Apr 62. 34. Msg, TAC to 9AF e t a Hand Rotation, 23233Z Apr 33. Msg, PACAF to TAC Apr 62; msg, TAC to HQ &193SZ A pr 62. 36. Hagerty intvw; Adana >1L HQ 9 \c. tt. Lies iC. Ctf 30. te tb; X .., *} - 1 ti. L > K >tx* Or * U (9 ic' rt. x i. T an UT. N o ta to P a g a 49-63 *ilO*SZ M tf 62. 37. Ms*, COMUSMACV to O N CPA C, "lJ. Keene intvw; rp it, CSAF, subj: Visit 13Q255Z Jun 62; ms*. COMUSMACV to tab Vietnam, A pr 16-21, 1962, Apr 24, CXNCPAC, m bj: D efoliation, 140137Z I&: msg, 13 AF to PACAF, m bj: Gen Jul 62. toy's Visit to SVN, 2104552 Apr 62. 38. Ms*, O N CPA C to JCS, m bj: Defo 14, Record, 5th SECDEF C ocf, HQ liant Herbicide Program, 160155Z Jun 62; COMUSMACV, Saigon, Vietnam, May 11, memo, RAdm L. C. Heinz to Michael V. 1961 Record, 5th SECDEF Conf, HQ F o ra m i, m bj: Use o f tfe b id d e , Jo n 23, 1962. COMUSMACV, Saigon, Vietnam, May 14, 39. Msg, COMUSMACV to CXNCPAC, I9SL m bj: Report of Defoliation, 061315Z Sep 62. 1$. Rprt, Brig Gen Fred J . Dehnore, et aL, 40. Msg, COMUSMACV to CXNCPAC, rij: Renew and Evaluation o f ARPA/OSD 2209232 Jun 62. -Oefo&ation" Program, oa. Apr 28, 1962, 41. Msg, O N CPA C to JCS, subj: Defo- jp 7, 10, 51. (Hereafter died n Ddxnore Em t/H erbiade Program, 2700202 Jun 62; jpi.) _ ..0 4 -7 7 1 -6 2 , DefoEast/Herbidde Program 17. Ibid., p 37, chap 1, p 18. for South Vietnam. Jul 2,1962. I t Ibid., App C , p 5. 42. Memo, SECDEF to the President, 19. Ibid., App C , p 3. SECDEF Control Number 4654, Aug 1, 2D. U r, Maj Gen R. G . Wcede, CS MACV, 1962. a ONCPAC, subj: Operational Evalnaacn- 43. NSAM No 178, McGeorge Bundy to ScfoBaion, Jun 9, 1962. SECSTATE and SECDEF, m bj: Destruction 21. U r, CXNCPAC to JCS, subj: Review o f Mangrove Swamps in South Vietnam, ed Operational Evaluation o f Defoliation Aug 9,. 1962. ?rppim in South Vietnam, Jul 17, 1962. 44. Memo, Frank K. Sloan, Acting Asst 22. Memo, L t Gen Thomas S. Moorman SECDEF ISA, to CJCS, m bj: Herbicide o PFDAL and PFDOP, subj: Notes on SEC Operations in South Vietnam. Aug 14, 1962. DF Mtg, Feb 23, 1962. 45. Memo, Col William P . Brooks, Jr, to 23. SECDEF Book for Mar 1962 Mtg, Gen Paul D. Harkins, subj: Discussion with Vcrioo H, Tab 5(C), subj: Ranch Hand De- the Political Counsellor to the Presidency, btam Operations, oa. Mar 1962. Ngo Dmh Nhu, Aug 2, 1962. 2.Mig, TAC to CSAF, atb j: Ranch 46. Msg, 13AF to PACAF, 2S1200Z Hod, 1018532 M ir 62. Aug 62; MACV Summary o f Highlights, 23. M u, COMUSMACV to ONCPAC,' Feb 8, 1962-Feb 7, 1963, p 56. cfcj: Increase in Airlift Capability in SVN, 47. Msg, PACAF to 13AF t t aL* m bj: USTUZMar 62. Ranch Hand Deployment, 02040QZ Aug 62; 26. Ms*, PACAF to TAC, subj: Retention ms*. OSD to COMUSMACV, 222244Z Aug ofRanch Hand C-123,15Q300Z Mar 62. 62; msg, 13AF to PACAF, m bj: Ranch 27. Ms*, TAC to CSAF, subj: Ranch H and, 2706282 Aug 62; msg, COM Had, 2Q21Q3Z Mar 62. USMACV to OSD, 078522 Sep 62; msg, 3 . Mi*. PACAF to TAC, 2Q2Q25Z PACAF to Det 3 1 WW t t aL, subj; Execu- Hua don/Fxag Order for PACAF OPORD 106-62 Mi*, 2d ADVON to 13 AF, 3111552 (Ranch Hand), eo. Sep 7,1962; msg, PACAF Hu 62. to 13AF t t aL, m bj: Frag Order Nr 2 for 30. Marshall mtvw; Hageny intvw. PACAF OPORD 106-62 (Ranch Hand), 31. HQ TAC OPORD 49-62, cited in s 082150Z Sep 62; msg, PACAF to USAF, HQTAC to 9AF, m bj: Ranch Hand Ri subj: COIN 'Activities for Week P mHw* Sep 192338Z Apr 62. 32. Ms*. PACAF to TAC, b j: Rotai 13, 1417202 Sep 62; Hageny intvw. 48. Msg, PACAF To USAF, m bj: COIN Ranch Hand Aircraft, 2420202 Apr 63 Activities for Week Ending Sep 13, 1417202 .33. Mi*, PACAF to O NCPAC, o Sep 62; MACV Summary o f Highlights, Feb 8 Hand Airoaft Rocatxm, 2317 4*62. K Mi*, TA C to 9AF ef ei., mbj: Ra 1962-Feb 7, 1963, pp 56-57; msg, COMUS MACV to CXNCPAC, 040156Z Oct 62; rp n . Task Force Saigon Herbicide Evaluation Rotation, 2523302 Apr 62. 33. Mi*. PACAF to TAC a 4 . 2705 Team, subj: Evaluation o f Herbicide Opera tions in the Republic o f Vietnam (Sep 1962- J ? asg, TAC t HQ USAF <r Sep 1963), O a 10, 1963, pp 34-35. a Apr O . " Htferty mtvw; Adams mooofrs 49. Msg, COMUSMACV to CXNCPAC, subj: Defoliation, 1806122 Jul 62. 5 a Mag, CXNCPAC to COMUSMACV, 211 N oi to P i s subj: Mangrove D efoliant O perations, 210227Z Aug 62; msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, subj: D efoliation Targets, 300924Z Aug 62. 31. Msg. CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Defoliam /H erbidde Operations, 01Q247Z Sep 62. 52. Msg. COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, subj: Defoliation Targets, Q31L5GZ O a 62. 53. M ano, CJCS to SECDEF, subj: DefoEtnt/H erbidde Program for South Vietnam, CM-6-62, Oct 6,1962. 54. Memo, CJCS to SECDEF, subj: Addi tional Targets for Defofiant/Herbidde Pro gram in South Vietnam. Oct 15, 1962. 55. Memo, RAdm L . C Heinz to Asst SECDEF ISA, Oct 31, 1962; h r. U . Atads Johnson to Rocwefl L . Gilpatric, Nov 9, '1962. 56. Memo, SECDEF to the P ren d ati, subj: DefoOant/Herbidde Program is S o c t \ * nun, Nov 16, 1962. 57. Msg, Dept o f State to AMEM&w? Saigon, Joint State-Defense M ena \ s Nov 30, 1962. 58. Adams monograph, p 13. 59. U r, MACRD to OSD/ARPA f t subj: Transmittal o f Special Report, o f Targets 20-7 and 20-8,** Feb 1,1963 60. Rprt, Task Force Saigon Evaluation Team, subj: Evaluation of H*tk cide Operations in the Republic of (Sep 1962-Sep 1963), O a 10.1963. pp >4. f* h r, MACRD to OSD/ARPA cf a ., w*, T rassnittal o f Special Repon, MA tu a * Targets 20-7 and 20-8/* Feb 1, 1963. 61. U r, MACJ3 to CINCPAC sub] Or foBation-Opentioaal Evaluation (Jas ;) 1962-March 1962 Operation), Dec 27.1*2 Chapter V Crop D estruction Begins and Washington Further Relaxes C ontrols on D efoliation 1. MR, Col Virgil R. C hiton, MACRDCH, Aug 12,1961; Trip Report - South Viet nam, Dr. J. W. Brown; Dec 1961. 2. MR, Office o f the Chief, MAAGV, subj: Meeting Held at Independence Palace, Saigon, Vietnam on Friday, 29 September 1961 (Adm Fdt*s Visit), p 22. 3. MR, SECDEF to SAF and CJCS, subj: Chemical Defoliant. Spraying Equipment andA iroafL, Vietnam, Nov 7 , 196L 4. NSAM No 115, subj: Defoliant Opera tions in Vietnam, Nov 30, 1961. 5. Project Beef-Up Status Report, Feb 7, 1962. 6. Record, 4th SECDEF Conf, HQ. CINC PAC, Mar 21. 1962. 7. Statu Rprt, Tarie Force Vietnam, Dept o f State, subj: Instructions to Amb Noiting, A pr 18, 1962. p 5. 8. Status Rprt, Tarit Force Vietnam, Dept o f Stare, subj: Instructions to Arab Nobing, May 2. 1962. p 5. 9. Msg,.Saifon to State 121, Jul 7, 1962, m g , CINCPAC to JCS, 130043Z Jul 62, both cited in JCSM 563-62; memo, to SEC DEF, subj: Chemical Crop Destruction, South Vietnam, Jul 28, 1962. 10. MR, subj: Meeting Gia Long Palace, Saigon - 18 July 1962, Jul 31, 1962. 11. Record, 6th SECDEF Conf, HQ CINCPAC, Jul 23, 1962. 12. U r, Amt SECDEF ISA to SECDEF, A u g i, 1962. 212 13. U r, Roger HOsman to Gov H arn es, a b j: Crop Destruction in South Vietnam. J* 28, 1962. 14. Memo, DDRftE to SECDEF. m t. Chemical Crop Destruction. South V irtues Aug 4,1962. 15, Memo* . SECDEF to the Prr*k-.-. subj: Chemical Crop Destruction, Vietnam. Aug 8,1961 ____ 16. Msg, Saigon to State EMBTEL Aug 8, 1962, died in Talking Papa Ci W . H . Shea, Jr, USN, JC S/J-3, b j: C nr Destruction, Aug 23, 1961 17. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Imp*: VC Fbod Denial, 212321Z Aug 61 18. M ii, Saigon to State #171* Aug 2!. 1962, cited in Talking Paper for JCS. 7, Crop Destruction, Aug 23, 1961 19. Memo, SECSTATE Dean Rusk to Pw John F. Kennedy, subj: VIETNAM: Pro;*' for G o p Destruction. Aug 23, 1961 20. U r, Roger HDsman 10 W. Atrr; Harriman, subj: Crop Destruction in Sot fkrntm , Aug 24, 1961 21. Memo, Dep SECDEF to CJCS, sub: Tvm ipii Omo iW wwiw i Project in S ees Wetaam, A itg27, 1961 2 1 Memo, RosweS L . Gilpstric to V M ess Johnson, subj: Chemical Crop IV ruction Project in South Vietnam, Aug T . hg, Saigon to State 1233, Sep 1 ,19C . COMUSMACV to JCS. 01(77152 rp 6 1 cited in H ad 24. U r, W . Averefl , GSpaxrie, Sep 6 ,1 9 25. Msg, COMUSh tOlOOZSep 62. 26. Msg, Saigon tc 961 died in Hadik >19. 27. Msg, State to 9C , died in HadQ >20. 28. J N i 29. Msg, Saigon to 30. JCSM-7S1-61 aructios, South Viete 31. Memo, Mkfcar Averefl Hanhnan, Oc 3 1 Msg, Joint ! J4 H O a 3 ,1961 d u sm otti; p 2 1 . 33. R prt, MACV ! Feb 8, 1962-Feb 7,1! 34. U r, CINCPAC d . subj; Summary o; SECDEF C onf, O a ! 33.. Msg, Saigon 1961 died in CM-: Destruction, Nov 17, & Msg, Joint S 95, Nov 8, 1962 S anti o f Crop Desti 37. Msg. AMEM1 STATE, 26I23QZ h Fd J. Dehnore, s 00 Crop Destruction Sc o f Vietnam, a t. 1 Gen Fred J . Dehnoct tik, subj: Destructi Nov 61 39. Msg, New De 1961 40. Msg. s e c s : 280156Z Nov 62. 41. Msg. Saigon 1 R and 1. Adama m ooof 1 M . pp 16-1' ration o f H ebidde Be o f Vianam (Se 1963), O tt 10, 1963 Notes to Pages 76-88 Sep 62, died in Hadik, e t aL, C onstraints 24. U r, W . Averdl Harriman to Roswdi L. GUpatrie, Sep 6,1962. 25. Msg, COMUSMACV to ONCPAC, 14010CZ Sep 62. 26. Msg, Saigon to State #304, Sep 15, 1962, cited in Hadik, et aL, C onstraints p 19. 27. Msg, State to Saigon #364, Sep 25, 1962, died in Hadik, et aL, Constraints, p 20. 23. Ibid. 29. Msg, Saigon to State, 261I40Z Sep 62. 30. JCSM-751-62, Chemical Crop De- tn c d o n , Sooth Vietnam, Sep 29, 1962. 31. Memo, Michael V. Forrests! to W . Averdl Hardman, Oct 3, 1962. 32. Msg, John State-Defense Menage #402, Oct 3,1962, d ted in Hadik, et aL, Consaubas p 21. 33. Rprt, MACV Summary .of Highlights. Feb 8, 1962-Feb 7, 1963. p 60. 34. U r, ONCPAC to ONCUSARPAC et eL, snbj: Summary o f D ensons Taken a t 7th SECDEF Coni, Oct 8, 1962. 35. Msg, Saigon to State #483, Nov 6, 1962, cited in CM -I22-62, Status' o f Crop D om inion, Nov 17, 1962. 36. Msg, Joint State-Defense to Saigon #495. Nov 8, 1962, dted in CM-122-62, Status of Crop Destruction, Nov 17, 1962. 37. Msg, AMEMBASSY Saigon to SEC STATE, 251230Z Nov 62; rprt. Brig Gen Fined J . Ddmore, subj: Preliminary Report on Crop Destruction Program (2R62) Repub lic o f Vietnam, ea. Nov 21, 1962; rp n , Brig Gen Fted J. Ddmore and D r Charies E. Mins ik , subj: Destruction o f V kt Cong O ops Republic o f Vietnam: Attack of Target 2-1, 21 and 23 November 1962, Dec 17, 1962. 33. Msg, Saigon to SECSTATE, 261201Z Nov 62. 39. M ig, New D dhi to State 12070, Nov 27, 1962. 40. Msg, SECSTATS to O N C PA C , 2801562 Nov 62. 41. M ig. Saigon to SECSTATE, 030908Z Dec 62. 42. Msg, Saigon to State, EMBTEL #560, Nov 30, 1962, dted in Hadik, et aL, Con m o n o ; p 23. ___ 43. Msg, SECSTATE12to Saigon, DEPTEL #567, Nov 30, 1962. 44. Congressional Record - Seriate, Mar 4, 1963, pp 3452-3465. 45. S t. Louis Post-Despatch, Feb 6, 1963, as reprinted in C o n p ra io n d Record-Senate, Mar 4, 1963, p 3458, 46. U r, Robert W . Kartenmeicr to Pres John F. Kennedy, Mar 7, 1963. 47. JCSM-302-63, Defoliation and Crop Desauction in South Vietnam, A pr 17, 1963. 43. U r, WUHam P . Bundy to Robert W. K anrnm rirr, Mar 16, 1963. 49. R pn, Hadik, et aL, Constraints, p 26. SOL U r, ONCPAC to JCS, subj: Report Concerning the Psychological Aspects o f the Use of Defofiams in the Republic o f Viet nam, M ar 22, 1963. _____ 51. Msg, State to Saigon. DEPTEL #872, Mar 15, 1963, d ted in Hadik, e t aL, Con- strvents. p 24. ___ 32. Msg, Saigon to SECSTATE, EMBTEL #824, Mar 20, 1963, d ted in Hadik, et aL, Constraints, p 26, 33. Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, 230049Z Mar 63, dted in Hadik, et aL, Constraints, p 26. 34. Msg, ONCPAC to JCS, 301639Z Mar 63, died in Hadik, at aL, Constraints, p 26. 33. Memorandum o f Conversation, Dept o f State, subj: Stoarion in Vietnam, A pr 4, 1963. 36. JCSM-302-63, DefoBatioo and Crop Desm icriog in South Vietnam, A pr 17,1963. ' 37. U r, William P . Bundy to W. Averdl Haniman, A pr 19, 1963. 38. Msg, JCS to ONCPAC, 022032Z May 63, dted in Hadik, e t aL, Constraints, P30. 39. Msg, SECSTATE to AMEMBASSY Saigon, DEPTEL #1053, May 7, 1963. C h a p ia V I Ranch H and's M ission Expands and Becomes R outine 1. Adams tonognph, pp 14-15. 2. Ib id ., pp 16-17; ip rt, HQ MACV, Eval uation o f Hertndde Oprerions in the RepubSc o f Vietnam (September 1962-Scptember 1963), O a 10, 1963, p 35 (hereafter dted as O kndm k Report); fist, source unknown, o f herbicide projects completed by Ranch Hand January 1962-May 1965 (hereafter d ted as Ranch Hand Projects List). 3. Adams monograph, p 17. N o taio 4. M is, Task Force Saigon 1151, Jul 30, 1963; neg, D EPTEL1147, Aug 2, 1963, both a te d in Oleadmk Report, p 6. 5. Okaebuk Report, passim. 6. Adams monograph, pp 17-18; Ranch Hand Projects List. 7. Adams monograph, pp 18-19; Hagerty intvw; EOTR, Capt E. D . Stammer, Jul 27, 1964. 8. Adams monograph , pp 19, 20, 22; Ranch Hand Projects List. 9. Adams monograph, pp 22-23. 10L Pact Sheet, subj: W cahinpon P ost Re port o f Defoliation Damage at Cha La Out post An Xuyca Province, HQ MACV, May 31, 1964. 11. Ib id .. Annex B. 12. W ashington P ost, May 27, 1964. 13. Msg. JCS to O N CPA C 261937Z May 64. 14. Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, subj: Jim Lucas Story on Defoliation o f Friendly Azea, 280421Z May 64. 15. Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, subj: Jim L u o s Story on Defofiation o f Fremdly Area, 031238Z Jun 64. 16. L tr, Senior Advisor U .S. Advisory Team 59 to Senior Advisor 21st Infantry Division, subj: Report o f Defoliation Dam ages at Cha La, An Xuyen Province, Jun 10, 1964; msg. Draft Airgrxm Saigon to State, sabj: Newt Report Alleging Defoliation Damage to Model H am let's Crops Jun 19, 1964. 17. Adams monograph, pp 22-23. 13. Ib id ,, p 23; EOTR, Capt E . D . Stam - mer, Jul 27,1964. 19. Hagerty intvw; Adams monograph , pp 23-24. 20. EOTR, Capt E . Stammer, Jul 27, 1964; Adams monograph, pp 24-25. 21. Adams monograph, pp 26-27. 22. Msg, CSAF to PACAF, subj: PCS o f Ranch Hand, 141617Z Dee 63; EOTR, Capt E . Stammer, Jul 27, 1964; EOTR, Capt John R . Spey, Jul 30,1963; Adams monograph, p 28. 23. Adams monograph, p 27; EOTR, Capt Eugene D. Stammer, Jul 27, 1964. 24. Rprt, Capt Alan R . Kidd, U3AF, subj: A/A45Y-1 Internal. Defoliant Spray System as Modified for and Field Tested by Ranch Hand, Del 1, 315 TCG, V ietn am ,. . Aug 1964; EOTR, Cape E . Stammer, Jul 27, 1964. 25. Rprt, MACJ325 (Col Edwin M. Sayre) to A nt CSAF, J-3 , subj: Herbicide Program in RVN, Dec 18, 1964; Ranch Hand Projects L fe. 26. Rprt, MACJ325 to A ss CSAF, J-3, suoi, nertnode Program in RVN, u 27. Msg, AMEMBASSY Safe in sn - STATE, 19Q245Z Jun 63. ** * 28. Memo, William P . Bundy to u - , Forrestal, Jun 20, 1963; CM-718-m y Z Z Vietnam, Gen MaxweS D . Taylor r i o J u l6. 1963; O kaebukRepon, pp53 29. Msg. SECSTATE to Stagon, Jan 12,1964. , 30. Msg, Vice CSAF to C3NCPAC. ai CVC 3-3-46, e a f t b 64. 'V 31. Info Brief, compiled by LxCol Pm! c Canan, CBR/N Ops, Apr 6, 1965, cam Hadik t t aL, Constraints, p 41; DJSU* 139-66, Crop Destruction in Vietnam, Jk ^ 1966, end " Crop Destruction is 32. Ibid, 33. Msg, SECSTATE to AMEMBASSl Saigon, 1294, Jul 29, 1964. 34. Rprt, MAGJ323 to Asst CSAF. J-1 subj: Herbicide Program in RVN. Ore It 1964. 35. Msg, PACAF to CSAF, 1400RZ M r 64; msg, 2d Air Div to CSAF, subj: SECT*? Meeting - Saigon - 10 March. lOtiJL* Mar 64. 36. Rprt, MACJ325 to A m CSAF. M subj: Hertridde Program in RVN, Dec it. 1964; info brief, onrnpflnd by Lt Col Pau! C CuHan, CBR/N Ops, Apr 6, 1963, cacd Hadik, er aL, Constraints, p 41. 37. Ranch H ind Projects List; hr. MAC 325 to Asst CSAF, J-3, subj: Herbicide Pi gram in RVN, Dec 18,1964; Project CHECD Southeast Asia Report, H erbksdt O ptimum in Southeast Asia, Jttfy 1961-Junt i* m O a 1], 1967, pp 13-14 (hereafter cited * 1967 CHECO Report). 38. Memo, CSAF to JCS, subj: Rrraar hwj gpntfi Vietnam CmrpaigB, Feb 21* He* 39. Rprt, E . R. Van Sant tad C. K. N* o b , OASD ISA OFEA, subj: Posabflipo at Economic Pressures Against North Vkmae Sep 3, 1964; memo, Dir/OfSce of F o ra r Economic Affaire to Dep Am Sec (R ep* Affairs) ISA, subj: Pombie EconomL* Ph* sires Against North Vietnam, Sep 3 .19M 40. Rprt, D r Harold HaQ, ARPA a h : A Proposal for Recooriderarion o f a Counterinsurgency Program for South M m, O a 13,1964. 41. Memo, R. L . Spool to Dr H rre: Brawn, Jan 4, 1965; memo. RAda F. i Bkmm to Dir/ARPA, subj: Cmmuu ? qxHnOriBty for Cbunterinsurgeocy, Nf* 1964; memo, S. J . Dehchman to Dr Hate* Hall, subj: Further Comments " A D . Strategy Campaign hi the Rcpubfic of nam ." Jan 7,1963. 214 He 1. LIT, Snior Adra USMACV, Subj: D d Ktnb Province,Dec 14, to COMUSMACV, su Lni Seoet Zooe, Dec 2. MR. MACJ324* Bei Loi Forest by Fire 3. Memo, Chief E Conflagration o f a P fr--*tv>( A m CSAF, J Sufi, sub: D esm ctt Fue, Dec 29,1964; mi Am CSAF, J-3 , sub Loi Woods, ca, Dec ( 4. Memo, MCJ3 __A--IU! TAi Pariffcation Aspect! Defoliation, Feb 17, Dir/Opetatiotts to V doo Report, Boi Loi Senior Advisor in C subj: Evaluation Re] Loi Woods, M ar 22, 3. Ltr, CO III C subj: Report on tfai and Destruction P h i Mar 20, 1965; mem cation Aspects o f Be Feb 17,1965; h r. So COMUSMACV, a Defoliation o f BoiL 6. Ltr, 2d A ir MACD, sabj: After Woods, Apr 6, 196 PP 17-18. 7. Ltr, 2d Air MACV, J-3 , subj: J 1965. 1 Ltr, 2d Air COMUSMACV, ml Boi Loi Woods, Ap 9. Info Sheet, UJ and School, subj: Mar 7. 1966. 10. Draft mamn a b j: Defofiaxiao A I*bfic of South Vk mea 3 in 1967 1963. 11. JM&; 1967 C 12. Memo, Dept b j: Propoaed Qd Geneva Protocol, J Herbicides Reach Their Peak W hile the W ar D eepens and W idens 1. U r, Senior Advisor IQ Corps to COM 13. Msg. Saigon to State EMBTEL 123, USMACV, Subj: Defoliation Request, T*y Jul 1963, d ied in DJSM -139-66, Crop De Ninb Province, Dec 14,1964; h r, Q C RVNAF struction in Vietnam, Jan 28,1966. . to COMUSMACV, subj: 20T Project in Boi 14. Rprt, MACJ311, subj: Evaluation o f Loi Secret Zone, Dec 21, 1964. Crop Destruction in RVN, Aug 6, 1963. 2. MR, MACJ324, subj: Destruction o f 15. Msg, Joint State-Dcfcnie/USIA mes Boi Loi Forest by Fire, Dee 17,1964. sage 1370 to Saigon, A ug 7, 1963, cited in 3. M ono, Chief ESSG to MACJ3, subj: DJSM-139-66. Cbeftagration o f a Forest Area, 28 Dee 64; 16. Target Status Summary (MACV). memo, A sa CSAF, J-3 to MACV Chief o f Crop Target N r. 2-24, co. Nov 18,1965. Staff, subj: Destruction o f Boi Loi Forest by Foe, Dec 29,1964; memo, A srt CSAF, J-2 to 17. 1967 CHECO R eport, pp 20-22. g. Msg, AMEMBASSY Vientiane to SEC Asa CSAF, J-3 , subj: VC Base Area Boi STATE, 11U27Z Jan 63. Loi Woods, cs. Dee 64. . 19. Msg. O N CPA C to AMEMBASSY 4. Memo, MACJ3 to MACJ3, subj: Brief Vientiane, <7720502 Nov 63, tited in Project ing Notes for Boi Loi Woods Defoliation Re CHECO Southeast A na Report, 7 i& r quest, Jan 27, 1963; memo, MACJ3, subj: /found, Sep 6, 1966, p 5. ' -`fication Aspects of Boi Loi Forest 20. Msg. SECSTATE lo AMEMBASSY '(Ration, Feb 17, J965; h r, 2d Air Div Vientiane, Joint State-Defense Message, ^ O p e ra tio n s to MACJ3t-sib j: A fter Ae 2301302 Nov 6$, d tetl in Project CHECO on Report, Boi Loi Woods,~Apr 6,1963; hr, Southeast Asia Report, Tiger /round, Sep 6, verier Advisor 111 Corps to COMUSMACV, 1966, pp 7-8. subj; Evaluation Report, Defoliation. of Boi 21. _Rprt, author unknown, subj: Defolia Loi Woods, Mar 22, 1963. tion Operations in Laos, Supporting Docu 3. U r, CG IQ Corps to CIC, RVNAF, ment 17 to 1967 CHECO Report, os. Jim 30, subj: Report oo the Results of DefoRstion 1966. aod Destruction Plan o f Boi Lor Secret Zone, 22. Msg, COMUSMACV to AMEM Mar 20, 1965;' memo, MACJ3, subj: Pacifi BASSY Vientiane, 0714302 May 66; nug. cation Aspects of Boi Loi F ores Defoliation, A M EM BA SSY V ie n tia n e to C O M Feb 17,1965; hr, Senior Advisor IQ Corps to USMACV, 1803182 May 66. COMUSMACV, subj: Evaluation Report, 23. M * . COMUSMACV to O N C PA C DefoRsrionof Boi Loi Woods, Mar 22, 1963. subj: Crop Destruction, 2903432 May 66. 6. U r, 2d Air Div D ir/O pentions to 24. JCS 2344/123, Crop D estruction, MACJ3, subj: After Action Report, B d Loi Jul 23,1966. Woods, Apr 6, 1965; 1967 CHECO Report, 25. Msg, JCS to O N C P A C subj; Crop pp 17-18. Destruction, 261640Z Jul 66. 7. U r, 2d Air Div D fr/O pentieos to 26. Rprt, L . Goure, A. J . Rssao, and D. MACV, J-3, subj: Boi Loi Woods, Mar 12, Scott, Some Findings o f the Vret Con* 1963. M otivation and M orale Study; Ju n e- 8. U r, 2d Air Div Dir/Opcretions to Deeember 1965, (RM -491M SA/ARPA), COMUSMACV, subj: After-Action Report, Feb 1966. Boi Loi Woods, Apr 6, 1963. 27. Rprt, C1CV, subj; Evaluation o f Her 9. Info Sheet, U.S. Army Chemical Center bicide Operations in RVN, Jul 12, 1966. a d School, subj: Operations in Vietnam, 28. JCSM-862-65, C1NCPAC Require- Mar 7,1966. ment for a Means o f Destroying Forest/ 10. Draft manuscript, origin unknown, Jungle Growth by Fire, Dec 7, 1965. subj: DefoRation & Ranch Hand m the Re 29. Rprt, Special Aerial Spray Flight to 2d public o f South Viet Nam, Supporting Doc A ir Div, subj: End o f l^roject Report, Project ument 13 in 1967 CHECO Report, ea. Jul 20-69, d m Pong Mountain. Feb 23, 1966; 55. Target Status Summary, Target Number 11- JbidA 1967 CHECO Report, pp 19-20. 20-69, ea. Feb 1966. 12. Memo, Dept of Stale Legal Adviser, 30. Memo, MACCOC13 to M ACCOC mbj: Proposed Q&A's for Hearings oo the cbj: Burning o f Chu Pong M ountain, Geneva Protocol, Jan 21,1971. Mar 15, 1966. 215 >>W * V *>* * '*+*"?V'"V ifii . v* i_ * . t s* '*"*- ,- r j- ,, N oto to Pago lZ.\K 31. 1967 CHECO Report, pp 39-40. 32. Ibid~t pp 24-28. 33. Summary o f Actions by the JCS at Their Meeting Wednesday. 21 Sep 66. 34. Ltr, SECDEF to SECSTATE. O a 4. 1966. 35. U r. SECSTATE to SECDEF. Nov IS, 1966 36. Msg, State to AMEMBASSY Slagon, Joint State-Defense Message 91707, subj; Defoliation in the DMZ, Nov 26,1966. 37. DJSM-196-67. D efoliation O p en dons in the DMZ and NVN, Jan 13, 1967; 1967 CHECO R ep o t, pp. 28-29. 38. Msg, SECSTATE to AMEMBASSY Slagon, subj: D efoliation O perations, 121S08Z Jim 67; msg, State 422808, 172309Z Aug 67. 39. 1967 CHECO Repon, pp 28-29. j 40. 2b, pp 29-31. 41. IbicL, p 32; hist, 12th ACS, Jan-Sep 1967, p 4. 42. 1967 CHECO Repon, p 32. 43. Hist, 12th ACS, Jan-Sep and Oct-Dee 1967; Project CHECO Southeast Asia Re p o n , Ranch Hand Herbicide Operations in * SE A . Jul 13, 1971 (hereafter died as 1971 . CHECO Repon). 44. Hist, 12th ACS, Jan-Sep 1967, pp 810.12. 45. Memo, Dept o f State Legal AO n e . subj: Proposed, Q&A's for Hearings oq * Geneva Protocol, Jan 21,1971. i%ii t/yr W1A-WVAcpon. pp iHO, 47. Hist, MACV, 1966, pp 403-4; i**. A H jC/DCS Materiel Management, t : Supply 1 Jan 65- 31 Dee 69, O a 2 1 .1950. -p 5-1-3. 5-JV -2,5-4V -4. 48. L tr, See o f A ffia ta n e to SECDEF. Jan 26, 1967; h r. See o f Agriculture to Dv Office o f Emergency Plantan*. Jan 2 6 .19T. m en, SECDEF to CJCS, subj: Herbiodr Requirements for Southeast Asia, Mar 14. 1967; h r, Dir/Office o f Emergency Plaasag to SECDEF, Mar 20, 1967; msg. ICS v> CIN CPA C, subj: H erbicide Prograa. 271623Z Feb 69. 49. Rprt, Anthony J. R os, A S ta a te* Analysis o f the U .S. Crop Spreym t Proyrm bt South Vietnam, (RM-5430-1SA/ARPAL O ct 67; rp n , Runcfl Betts and Frank Denn*. A n Evaluation o f C hem ksi Crop Destructom hi Vietnam, (RM-5446-ZSA/ARPAL O a 4* (hereafter dted as Betts and Demos). 50. Betts and D euten, pp v-xi. 51. R pn, ASD/SA, Somheast Ada Ambr a s Report, Control No 6-810, Ndv 67. 52. L tr, SECDEF to CJCS, Nov 21,196*. 53. JCSM-719-S7, Review o f Crop De* snuctkm Operarions* in South Vfcmoa. Dec 29. 1967. Chapter V m H erbicide Use D cc& us ` 1. Rpn, 834th Air Div, subj: Ranch Hand Stndy, Sep 12, 1967, died in Corona Harvest Report. Defoliation Operations in Southeast Aria, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, M ar 1970, pp 20-22 (hereafter d ied as Corona H a m s Report). 2. Ltr, 7AF to AFGP, subj: VNAF Partic ipation in the Herbicide and A b a sh Mos quito Spray Program, Aug 26, 1967. 3. Ltr, AFCP/XPR to 7AF, subj: VNAF Participation in the Herbicide and Aircraft Mosquito Spray Program, Oct 21,1967. 4. " FAS Statement oa Biological and Chemical Warfare,'* Bulletin o f th e A tom ic Scientists (O a 1964), pp 46-47. This and the following right footnotes are died in rp n . Science Poficy Research Division, LC, subj: A Technological Assessment of the Vietnam 216 DefoBast M atter, Aug 8 ,1 9 0 . 5. " Scientisti Protest V ia Crop Destro; don,** S aetee, Jan 21, 1966, p 309. 6. " Scientists Speak O uton CB Weapons.- Bulletin o f the A tom ic Sciu itisss (Nov 1946l. p 39; >*CB-Encerint Wedge,** The A'atom. Jan 16.1967, p 68; " 5000 S d am ai A it B*= oq Gas m Vietnam," Washington Poe. Feb 15, 1967, p A -l. 7. M unita o f the Meeting of the AAAS Council, Washington, D .& , Dee 30, 1** p9. 8. Ltr, Don K. P ria to See McNamin. Sep 13, 1967. r 9. L tr, Dr John S. Foster, Jr, to Don t W ee, Sep 20. 1967. 10. R pn, " Assessment o f Ecakopoi El- teas o f Extensive o r Repeated Use of Hat* es,** Midwest Resa Order No 1086, AD8 pp 290-292. 11. 77mr,Fri> 23,19 12. tfem + eck , Feb 13. Rptt, Sdfore F son, LC, sabj: A Ted of the Vietnam Defol 1969, pp 39-41 (hereafo al Assessment). 14. R pn, Craig C. < Bentley, Forest Service culture. Forest Foe as Jua 1970. App A . 15. Hist, 12th ACS, p p 7 -ia 16. R pn, 7AF/DOA fofiarion Program 7A1 Mar 1969; rp n , CINC urenent of Progress in 1961, p 28. 17. 1971 CHECO Ri 13. Msg, MACV t Herbicide Repon, M s ACS, A pr-Jun 1968. 19. H itt, 12th ACS CHECO R epon, pp 21 subj: Hertrtde-DefoE 1967-Feb 1969, e a Ms Feme Directorate o f ments, Jul-Dec 1967. 20. R p tt, AMEMBi of the Herbicide Po& May28, 1969, p L 21. Ib id ., pp 6-7. 22. Ib id ., pp 3 ,9 . 23. Ib id ., pp 3-ffl, aoodaE.n. 1. " O a the Use Vietnam,** A Statement n a a n o f the America) Advancement o f Soexv Uul 19.1968), pp 254-3 imi Atsciuncnt, pp 44- 2. Technological Asa 1 Ibid., pp 50-51. 4. Rptt, MACV, C3u tit n , subj: Toxidry oj RVN, by Dr C. E. Mina row, Apr 3,1968. Notes to Pages 140-161 odes," Midwest Research Institute, ARPA 25. Ib id ., p 26. Onkr N 1036, AD824314, Dec 1, 1967, 26. Ib id ., pp m, iv, vi, 26,34, 36. pp 290-292. 27. Mag, AMEMBASSY Saigon to SEC- 11. Tim e, Feb 23, 1968, p 70. STATE, subj: Herbicides, I91300Z Sep 68. 12. Nrmweek , Feb 26, 1968, p 56. 28. 1971 CHECO Report, pp 22-23. 13. Rprt, Sdencr Policy Research Divi- 29. H bt, 12th SOS, Jul-Sep 1968, pp 2 ,3 ; oo, LC, snbj: A Technological Assessment lust. 12th SOS, Oct-Dec 1968; p 3. of the Vietnam Defoliant M atter, Aug 8, 30. Hist, 12th SOS, Jul-Sep 1968, p 10. 1969, pp 39-41 (hereafter died as T echnolof 31. /M L, p 9. fed Assessment). 32. Rprt, 7AF/DOA, subj: H erttode-D e- 14. Rpn, Craig C Chandler and Jay R. foBation Program 7AF, 1967-Feb 1969, co. Bentley, Forest Service, UJ>. Dept o f Agri Mar 1969. culture, Forest Fire as a Military Weapon, 33. Hist, 12th SOS, Oct-Dec 1968, p 10; Jon 1970. App A. faht, 12th SOS, Jul-Sep 1968, p 9. 15. H itt, 12th ACS, laa'1 -M ar 31, 1968, 34. H ist, 12th SOS, O ct-D ec 1968, pp7-ia ' pp 11-13. 16. Rpit, 7AF/DOA, snbj: Hexbidde-De- 35. U r, 355 TFW /DCO to 7AF/TACD, foEsrion Program 7AF, 1967-Feb 1969, oa. subj; F-4 Defoliant .Spray, J in ' 22, 1970; Mir 1969; rpn, QNCPAC Quarterly Meas msg, 366 TFW to 7AF/TACPS, subj: F-4 urement o f Progress in SEA, July-Scptcxober Defoliant Spray, 15Q50QZ Jul 69; msg, 366 1968, p 28. TFW to 7AF/DO/DM , subj: F-4D Defolia 17. 1971 CHECO Report, p 23. tion Capability, 011I30Z Feb 69. IS. Msg. MACV to USARPAC,' snbj: 36. Rprt, 7AF/DOA, subj: Herbicide- Ho biade Repent, May 25, 1968; hist, 12th DefoBatxai Program 7AF, 1967-Feb 1969, ACS, Apr-Jun 1968. ca. Mar 1969, pp 2, 51,54. 19. Hist, 12th ACS, A pr-Jon 1968; 1971 37. H is, 12th SOS, Jin-M ar 1969, pp 5-6. CHECO Repost, pp 21-22; rprt, 7AF/DOA, 38. H is, 12th SOS, A pr-Jun 1969, pp 3, zbj: Herbicide-Defoliation Program 7AF, 4-5. 1967-Feb 1969, ca. Mar 1969, p 16; hist. Air 39. H is, 315th SOW, Oct-Dec 1969, p 19; Force Directorate o f Operational Require 1971 CHECO Report, p 75; h is, 315th SOW, ments, Jul-Dec 1967. Jul-Sep 1969, pp 20-22. 20. Rprt, AMEMBASSY Saigon, Report 40. Rprt, MACJ3-053, subj: Vietnam Lea- of the Herbicide Policy Review Committee, sons Learned N o. 74: Accidental Herbicide Mgy 28, 1969, p L Damage, Sep 15, 1969; rp rt, Robert A . Dar- 21. Ibid., pp 6-7. tow, Reed C. Bunker, and J. Ray Frank, 22. /M L, pp 3 ,9 .' snbj: Report o f Trip to Republic o f Vietnam, 23. Ibid., pp 3 -3 , Appendices C, D, 15 Ang-2 Sep 69, Sep 23, 1969, pp 10,19. aodE 24. ZMf.,pp&*a. 41. Ibid., pp 11-12. 42. /M L, pp 17-18. Chapter IX Ranch H and Ends Its W ork 1. "O n the Use o f H erbiddes in - Vietnam,'*A .Statement by the B ond o f Dt- reoon of the American Association for the Advancement o f Science, Science, Voi 161, W 19, 1968), pp 254-5. Cited in Technolog, m A ttesane, pp 44-45. 2. Technological A n n an cn t, pp 46-47. 3. Ibid., pp 50-51. < Rprt, MACV, Chemical Operations Disubj: T oddty of H erbiddes in Urn ha *VN, by Dr C E Minarik and D r R. A . Dar * .A p r3 , 1968. 5. Rprt, MACV, Chemical Operations Di vision, m bjrPersisence o f Herbicides in Soil and W ater, by Dr C. E Mmarik and Dr R. A . D am m , Apr 6, 1968. 6. Technological Asrcssnent, pp 22-53. 7. /M L, pp 34-58. S. /M L , pp 38-60. 9. Msg, QNCPAC to COMUSMACV, 200531Z Aug 69. IE Msg, COMUSACV . to CXNCPAC, subj: Pfaasedown o f Defoliation Operations, 060907Z Sep 69. 217 N o ta to P a m i&i . p . 11. M is. CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, . 32. Hut, 12th SOS,Apr-Jtm 1970.pp *&;; 130S30Z Sep 69. 33. Ibid., pp 9-14, 3U hist, 31Wi TAS a 12. Mss. COMUSMACV to 7AF. sobj: Flight, Jul-Sep 1970, p L Phasedown o f D efoliation O perations, 34. Hist, 310th TAS A Flight. Jat-k* 16I406Z Sep 69. 1970, pp N, 3,4. 13. H ot. 12th SOS, Oct-Dec 1969; pp 4 .5 , 35. JbkL, pp 7-9; 1971 CHECO B o * . 7 ,1 0 . p2S. 14. " U .N . Rebuffs United States on Tear 36. Prefimmary Rpet, Manhew S. Vkw Gas Uk : Vote Declares Geneva Pact Also son, e t a t, subj: Herbicide A s s e s s C o Bans Defoliants,*1N ew York Timex, Dec 11, m non o f the American A norinioo tv tv 1969; " United States Criticizes Vote in U .N. Advancement o f Science, Dec 30,197% TT"; on Meaning o f Chemical Warfare Ban,** New CHECO Report, pp 46-53. York Tim ex Dec 12, 1969; Statement by 37. Msg, SECSTATE to AMEM&ASft SECSTATE WUfiam P . Rogers on Mar 5, Saigon, subj: American Asmdarioo far a* 1971 fat Hearings before the Committee on vancement o f Science (AAAS) Hcrbwaw Foreign Relations, United Statcs*Senate, 91st Commission, 250U3Z Jul 70. Congress, first sessioa, pp 2 ,3 . 38. Philip M. Boffey, "H erbicide V * 15. Msg, CSAF to CXNCPACAF, m bj: nam: AAAS Study Rims Imo a Mfea* Herbicide Operations, 022006Z Feb 70. Roadblock," Science, Vol 170 (O a 2. l?Xk 16. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, pp 42-45; msg, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Vk^ snbj: Herbicide Operations, 24Q227Z Feb 70.- biode Survey by Mesebon Team in W a a t. 17. Msg, CSAF to O N CPA C, sobj: 1101212 Aug 70; Note on telephone o x * r Herbicide Operations, 31200QZ Mar 70, cited addons with Col B. M. Whycuria. MAO fat .1971 CHECO Report, pp 24-25. J3-09, Aug 12, 1970, author unknown; vox 18. Hist, 12th SOS, Jan-M ar 1970, pp 8, JCS to ONCPAC, subj: Herbicide Survp n 12-14. Mesdson Team in Vietnam, 150043Z Aug T 19. s t, 12th SOS, A pr-Jun 1970, p 9; 39. L tr, Manhew S. Meseisoo and iota 1971 CHECO Report, p 25. Cot m frfe to Amb Ellsworth Banker. Not 12. 20. In its piepub&cation form, this study ' 1970. by K. Diane Courtney, D . W . Gaytor, M. D . .40. Prrifamnary Rprt, Matthew S. M ae Hogan, H. L . Falk, R. R. Bates, and L ion, er aL, subj: Herbicide Assessment Co Mfacbdl vas titled 'Teratogenic Evaluation ""Aw of the American Association for tm o f 2 A 5 -T ." It was published in Science Advancement o f Scimcc, Dec 30, 1970. under the same title in Vo! 168, May 15,1970, 4L Ltr, Ivin L . Bennm, Jr, to Lee A pp 864-866. DoBridge. Jun 16, 1970. 21. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, snbj: Restric 42. L tr, Lee A. DuBridge to Henry A. k- tion on Use o f Defoliants and Herbiddcs, ringer, m bj: Daconrinuapcc o f Arnioo 042341Z Nov 69. W arfare in Vietnam, Jun 23,1970. 22. L tr, Glenn C Kfingman, et a t , to D r 43. JCS 2472/649, Note by the S e c re t Lee A . Dufiridgs, Dee 22, 1969. to JCS on the U.S. A nrioop Warfare Pre- 23. Resolution by the AAAS Council, gram in Vietnam, Jul 2 4 ,197a Dee 27, 1969. 44. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, mbj: US 24. JCSM -77-70, Proposed Study o f Anticrop Warfare Program, 1110Q5Z Jul 7S Alleged Generic Effects, Feb 27, 1970. 45. Memo, Melvin R. Laird to Henry A 25. M ono, DDR&E to SECDEF, subj: Ksringet, subj: United States Anticrop War Herbicide Operatioos fat Southeast Aria, cu. fare Program in Vietnam, Jul 18, 1970. A pr 15.1970. 46. Pomi Paper, author unknown, mb; 26. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, snbj: Resoic- Recent Use o f Herbicide Orange., Oct 24. tfon on Uae of Herbicide Orange, 152135Z 1970; msg, COMUSMACV To CINCPAC. Apr 70. m bj: Uae o f Herbicide Orange, 2203231? (X? 27. Ibid. 70; msg, CINCPAC to JCS, snbj: Use of 28. Background Paper on JCS 1837/252 Herbicide Orange, 220011Z Nov 70. an. AFXPFCM, May 11, 1970. CINCPAC to JCS, snbj: Uae o f Hesbiririe 29. JCSM -232-70, Use o f Herbicide Orange, May 14,1970. utge, 2Q206Z Nov 7 a r 7. Msg, AMEMBASSY Simon to SEC- ^ 30. CM-5245-70, Use o f Herbicide Or ange, Jun 2, 1970. 09043CZ Dec 70. 31. Briefing notes, author unknown, subj: 48. Frank Mtnkiewiez ta d Tom Brado. Disposition o f Herbicide Orange, go. Feb " The Defoliation Deception,** Weahmpm 1971. P ost, Dec 29, 1970, p 15. 218 49. L tr, Edward E . issinfcr, m bj: U S . juth Vietnam, Nov : 50. Memo, SECDI uri CJCS, m bj: Sup bntroi Agents and tec 7 ,197a 51. JCSM-575-7Q, Jse o f Herbicides in i 52. M emo, Melvin Sssnger, subj' P olk ierbides io South 970. 53. CM-45I-70, I -- ' 1 1970: 1. Memo, WSEai M. Nixon, snbj: Tto 1971. 2. Memo, M dvii Nixon, m bj: The ( 1971. 3. Memo, ASD/ Policy Regarding t Southeast Asia, Ms 4. Memo, SECD Regarding the Use Aria, Mar 18,1971 5. Ltr, Sen J . N uca, A pr 15, 1 Committee on Ft States Senate, The 92nd Congress, fi 1971. 6. M emo,DepS o f Herbicides in Re 1971. 7. Msg. MACV Mar 71, cited fat G but probably DOE Herbicide Orange, 8. Chronology, aWy DOD/1SA, s ride Orange, no db 9. JCSM-191-7 of Herbicide Oran i a Msg. COMI nag, COMUSMA eit*4 B known but proba! N o ts to Pages 173-181 49. U r, Edward E . David, Jr, to Henry A . jOssnger, subj: UJ5. Use o f H erbicida in Sooth Vietnam, Nov 20, 1970. 50. Memo, SECDEF to See o f the Anny sod CJCS. subj: Support o f RVN with Riot Control Agenta and Hobkadea/DefoKanta, Dec 7 ,197a 51. JC5M-575-7Q, Poficy Regarding the Ure of H erbicida in the RVN, Dec 18,1970. 52. Memo, Mdvm R. Latid to Henry A . Khuager, subj: Policy Regarding the Use o f Herbicida in South Vietnam, ca. mid-Dec 1970. 53. CM -4JI-70, H erbicida Use in Viet nam, Dec 21, 1970; chronology DOD/ISA, mbj: Herbicide A ctions. Mar 10, 1972. 54. Memo, Mdvm R. Laird to Richard M. ffooc, subj: Policy Regarding Use o f Heria- d d a in South Vietnam, Dec 22,1970. 53. White House Statement, D a 26, 1970. 56. Memo, Henry A . Kissinger to Melvin R. Laird, subj: Policy Regarding the Use of H a b id d o in Vietnam, D a 28, 1970. 37. Statement, Jerry W. Friedhrira, Act ing A m SECDEF for Public Affairs, Dec 29, 1970. 38. Hist, 310th TAS A Flight, O et-D a 1970, p 19. 39. 1971 CHECO Report, pp 32, 104. 60. Memo, Dep SECDEF to CJCS, sobj: Use o f H erbidda m Republic o f Vietnam, Jan 16,1971. 61. Msg. JCS to G N CPA C, m bj: Poficy Regardmg the Use o f Herbicides in Vietnam, 232238Z Jan 71. 62. H ist, 310th TAS, Jan-M ar 1971, p 6. Chapter X E p ilo g u e 1. Memo, William P . Rogers to Richard M. N oon, subj: Tbe Geneva Protocol, Feb 2, 1971. 2. Memo, Melvin R. Laird to Richard M. Nixon, subj: Tbe Geneva Protocol, FA 19, 1971. 3. Memo, ASD/ISA to SECDEF, subj: Poficy Regarding tbe Use o f Bcrbiridrs in Southeast Asia, M ar 17,1971. 4. Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, sobj: Poficy Regarding the Use o f H crbidda in Southeast Asia, Mar 18,1971. 5. L tr, Sea J . Wfifiam FUbright to Pres Nbcoo, A pr 13, 1971; Hearings before the C om m itta on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. 77b* Geneva Protocol o f-1925, 92nd Congress, firs m rion, March 5-26, 1971. 6. Memo, Dep SECDEF to JCS, subj: Use o f H crbidda in Republic o f Vietnam, Jan 16, 1971. 7. Msg, MACV to CXNCPAC, 081337Z Mar 71, cited in Chronology, origin unknown but probably DOD/ISA, subj: Dispostkm of Herbicide Orange, no*date. S. Chroooiofy, origin unknown but prob ably DOD/ISA, m bj; Disposition of H abidde Orange, no ***** 9. JCSM -rl9l-71, Plan for the Disposition o f H erbkide Orange, A pr 23, 1971. 10. Msg. COMUSMACV, 1611452A pr 71; msg, COMUSMACV, 290041Z A pr 71, both cited b Summary o f Actions, author un known but probably DOD/ISA, m bj: Poficy Regarding Use o f Herbicides, or. Jua 27, 1971. 11. Msg, AMEMBASSY Saigon to SECSTATE, m bj: Herbicides, 2811452 Apr 71. 12. Memo, Principal Dep Asst SECDEF for Publie AfErin to VNTF/ISA, Apr 26, 1971. 13. Memo, ASD/ISA to SECDEF, subj: Poficy Reporting Use of H erbidda in South Vietnam, May 6,1971. 14. Memo, SECDEF to tbe President, sobj: Poficy Regarding tbe Use o f H crbidda in Vietnam, May 13,1971. 13. Memo, SECSTATE to the President, subj: DOD Request for A uthority to Con tinue Use o f H erbidda in Viet-Nam, Jun 24, 1971. 16. M ono, ASD/ISA to SECDEF, m bj: Plan for Vktnamgarion o f Herbicide Capabifides, Jul 21.1971. 17. L tr, Mdvm R. Laird to Wfifiam P . Rogers, Jul 24, 1971. I t. L tr, Wfifiam P . Rogers to Mdvm R. Laird, Jul 30. 1971. 19. Msg, AMEMBASSY Saigon to SECSTATE, m bj: Defense Department Plan for Viemandzarion o f Herbicides, 07081QZ Aug 71; Ouooology, author unknown, but prob ably DOD/ISA, m bj: Summary o f Actions: Poficy Regarding Use o f Herbicides, or. Jun 27, 1971; msg. COMUSMACV to MACV, m bj: Uae of H erbidda. 3007492 Jun 1971. 20. L tr, Mdvm R. Laird to Wfifiam P. 219 t i ! if m No<*i h i D i a Rogers, Aug 9,1971. 21. Chronology, author unknown but probably DOD/1SA, subj: Herbicide Ac* ticeo, M ar 10, 1972. 22. Memo, Henry A. Kissinger to SEC* Ford,'Slaiffnm t on th efin m ^ 1925 and the Biological Wc b m . finn, Jan 22,1975. STATE and SECDEF, subj: Herbicides in Vietnam, Aug IS, 1971; See NSSM 112, Henry A . Kinmger to SECDEF and SEC STATE, ef a/., subj: U .S. Post-Vietnam PoScy on Um o f Riot Control Agents and Herbiddes in W ar, Jan 7,1971; h r, Henry A . Kissinger to SECSTATE and SECDEF, subj: 1925 Geneva Protocol, Jon 28, 1971. 23. Msg, SECSTATE to Saigon, subj: Use o f Herbicides, 2Q2Q37Z Aug 71. 24. M en, ASD/ISA to SECDEF, m bj: Uses in War of Chemical Hrt*adn Control Agents, Apr 8, 39. Rprt, Capt Alvin L \o m * * ^ USAF Occupational and Health Laboratory. subj: The To Environmental Fate, and Huzzas Herbidde Orange and Us Amoamm Oct 1978, pp n-1 - IM f (b ra fu r m USAF OEHL Repon); hist, AFLCCT pp 52-60; "Vietnam Herfakide h n Sea," WsAmgron Star, Sept 7, i f r , , v Plan for the Disposition o f Herbicide Or* p , Aug 31,1971. 25. M ono, DDRAE to SECDEF. subj: Disposition o f Herbicide Orange Stocks in Vietnam, Sep 3,1971. See also tp tt, Raymond A. M3kr; ca fice o f H atcry, Air Force Cm* mand, Wiigfat-Panenoa Air ham ism OH, m bj: The Disponi o f H o b o fe O m ^ 1971-1979. 26. Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, subj: D b- 40. Pnfafic Law 91-441, Sgw g iu . poritiou o f H ertridde Orange, Sep 13,1971. 84 Star 9U . 27. JCSM -290-71,. Disposition o f Herbi 41. L tr, PhiBp Handler to the P m * * cide Orange, Sep 27, 1971. the Senate. Speaker o f the Home o ' t ^ - 23. Memo, SECSTATE to the President , m atativo, and SECDEF, Feb 12.1t a cm* m bj: Vlctnamization o f Herbicide Oper- after dted as Handler letter). riww Cm 3Q 1971. 42. Rprt, National Academy f Scemm 29. JCSM-478-71, Urn o f Herbicides, m bj: The Effects of Herbiddes ia Sem* Nov 1,1971. nam, P art A, Summary and OpotWw p . 30. Memo, Dep SECDEF to the President, Feb 1974, pp sd-xxiv (hereafter o u d m W subj: Use o f Herbicides, Nov 3,1971; See N a Report). Besides the summary \t*nm m tional Academy o f Sciences, The E ffects o f NAS also pobhsbed several ohm i wms H erbicides in South Vietnam, P ert A : Sum* big papers oo such subjects as the b w v mm7 mud Conclusions, 1974, PP H-3, HI-34. herbidde development, economic v tm me 31. Memo, Henry A . Kissinger to SEC- settlement changes, and the bebefw r r * m STATE and SECDEF, m bj: Herbicides in and behavior of lowland Yiemauan* Tw Vietnam, NSDM 141, Nov 26, 1971. . NAS Report can be obtained through uv v* 32. Memo, ASD/ISA to SECDEF, m bj: Technical Information Sen* ** Ifcrtad dcs in Vietnam, Dec 1,1971; chronol order number for tba summary votao* a ogy, author unknown but probably D O D / 774749. B A , subj; Herbidde A a k g o , M ar 10, 1972; 43. letter. memo, SECSTATE to the President, m bj: 44. Ibid.; NAS Report, P pS -l - S-t* Herbicides in Vietnam, Feb 4, 1972. 45. Larry Greea," 4i Veterans * 33. Memo, SECSTATE to the President, Reportedly Show Indkations of Vm H r*, m bj: Herirfddes b Vietnam, Feb 4,1972. dde Poisoning." Lor A ngels Tuna, M r 1' 34. Memo, Henry A . Kissinger to SEC 1978, p 16. STATE a d SECDEF, m bj; Herbiddes in Vietnam and NSDM 141, NSDM 152, 46. USAF OEHL Report, pp V I-> * 47. Myra MacPhenon. " Hooonag 7L Feb 14,1972. Extra Measure o f Sacrifice': The h n * * 35. Memo, Ronald L Spiers, Chairman, Salutes tb `Spedai Heroism' of Sen* r m NSC 1PMG, to Henry A . Kissinger, subj: Unpopular War," W ashmfion P oe. M* NSSM 112, U .S. Post-Vietnam Policy on Use o f Riot Control Agents and H obiddes fat 19, pp D -l. D-10. II. "A ir Forca Plans Health Sei' * W ar, Dec 1 ,1971. 36. Rprt, ESSO, m bj: Herbiddes and Mflkary O perations, Vol 1, main paper, Ftb 1972, pp ix-x. odien of 'Agent Orange.* * * * ? * t, Jun 5. 1979. p A- nag. O a V * M A JC O M , ._. . m__bjA: nH4eArbMidd(eO%nes* * * 220 H rtada aD*C* *N*at.ional Acadet Ip-il.Rpu. Revie--ind. -DefoBatioa" Progtan na.p5. 3. Odd^., oPofoi-d. tec cm pjMimVietnam, Natta Appendix 1 Notes to Pages 193-198 1, Geotttey E . The E ffects o f The E ffects o f H erbicides in South Vietnam; h rb kid a in South Vietnam, Part B , Work- . Part A , (W ashington, D .C.: National Acad- g papas; A n H tstoriad Survey o f the De* a n y o f Scicncn, 1974), pp U -2I, 31; Floyd niopm ent o f H erbicides, (W ashington, M. Ashton and Akten S. Grafts, M ode o fA c n e , : National Acadony o f Soaices, Feb ' don o f H erbicides, (New York: John WOey& 1574). . Sans, 1973), pp 266-288. R pit, Review and Evaluation o f A SPA 3. The Committee on the Effects o f HerH> "Defofiadon" Program in South Vietnam, odes in Vietnam, The E ffects o f Herbicides (1962), p 5. ' * South Vietnam: Part A , p 13-13; Ashton 3. Ib id ., p a . and Crafts, pp 4 -418. 4. The Committee on the Effects o f Hob- 6. Ashton and Crafts, pp 147-160. fcs in Vietnam, National Research Council,