Document LpoMDyGyEJxbj99nXDxdkjop3

To: EricT. Schneiderman[nysag@ag.ny.gov] Cc: Pruitt, Scott[Pruitt.Scott@epa.gov]; Amanda Hopper[ahopper@co.sutter.ca.us]; piu@doj.ca.gov[piu@doj.ca.gov]; Martinez Michael C. (ENRD)[michael.c.martinez@usdoj.gov]; Erica Zilioli[Erica.Zilioli@usdoj.gov]; brian.leahy@cdpr.ca.gov[brian. Ieahy@cdpr.ca.gov]; sectyrodriquez@calepa.ca.gov[sectyrodriquez@calepa. ca.gov]; secretary@resources.ca.gov[secretary@resources.ca.gov]; Ron Sullenger[rsullenger@co.sutter.ca.us]; Assemblymember Gailagher[assemblymember.gallagher@assembly.ca.gov]; laura.nicholson@sen.ca.gov[laura.nicholson@sen.ca.gov]; Harold Kruger[hkruger@appealdemocrat.com]; Steve Miller[smiller@appealdemocrat.com]; Judicialwatch lnfo[info@judicialwatch.org]; Sutter Buttes Tea Party[sbtp@syix.com]; Jim Whiteaker[jwhiteaker@co.sutter.ca.us]; Larry Munger[lmunger@co.sutter.ca.us]; Judicial Watch[jw@pr.judicialwatch.org]; Lou Binninger[loubinninger@gmail.com]; State of California[senator.nielsen@outreach.senate.ca.gov]; Bowles, Jack[Bowles.Jack@epa.gov]; Davis, Patrick[davis.patrick@epa.gov]; Hope, Brian[Hope.Brian@epa.gov]; Minoli, Kevin[Minoli.Kevin@epa.gov]; Estrada, Fabiola[Estrada.Fabiola@epa.gov]; Rodriguez, RobertofRodriguez.Roberto@epa.gov]; Richardson, RobinH[Richardson.RobinH@epa.gov]; Wagner, Kenneth[wagner.kenneth@epa.gov]; Jackson, Ryan[jackson.ryan@epa.gov]; britt@nasda.org[britt@nasda.org]; Dudley Hoskins[dudley@nasda.org]; amanda@nasda.org[amanda@nasda.org]; Sherman Bill (ATG)[bill.sherman@atg.wa.gov]; Nick Persampieri[nick.persampieri@vermont.gov]; Watson Laura (ATG)[lauraw2@atg.wa.gov]; andrea.baker@maryland.gov[andrea.baker@maryland.gov]; Goldberg Andy (AGO)[andy.goldberg@state.ma.us]; efernandez@ufwfoundation.org[efernandez@ufwfoundation.org]; Christine Hall[christine.hall@cei.org]; mebell@cei.org[mebell@cei.org]; Ty Cobb[ty.cobb@hoganlovells.com]; Contact[contact@aclj.org]; Chuck and Pat Miller[chucknpat@comcast.net]; headquarters@earthjustice.org[headquarters@earthjustice.org]; radcock@croplifeamerica.org[radcock@croplifeamerica.org]; willr@fb.org[willr@fb.org]; Tom Stenzel[tstenzei@unitedfresh.org]; Paul Towers[ptowers@panna.org]; pests@pesticidereform.org [pests@pesticidereform.org] From: will rogers Sent: Fri 9/1/2017 2:20:52 PM Subject: Requesting Investigation of PG&E Listed on NYSE BrownsDirtyHands.pdf ltrpuc-aes06-23-17 Brown-China Trip.pdf JW-v-EPA-Clean-Power-win-01217.pdf 35percentfullreport PG&E Taxes.pdf PG&E Corporate Tax Dodgers.pdf Immigration Global Warminq.pdf Dear AG Schneirderman, I am respectfully requesting a investigation in activities that PG&E has been participating in with former President Obama , Gov. Brown, Gov. Brown staff who have ties to PG&E, California State Agencies I Regulators and the Democrat Party which may be impacting PG&E stock prices at the New York Stock Exchange in New York State. PG&E participated in the Paris Climate Conference I Agreement as part of Gov. Brown delegation and encouraged President Trump to participate in it after it was signed into effect using false I misleading data I material from NOAA. Basically Paris Climate Agreement is nothing more than a business contract (fraudulent contract, deception, scam, crony capitalism) based on false / misleading material which is designed to defraud the US Government and US Taxpayers and benefit I profit PG&E which may of had a impact on their stock at the NYSE. So it should be investigated if the Paris Climate Conference and Agreement signing had any impact on PG&E stock prices. It similar to the Obama Administration lying about the Clean Power Act (fraudulent contract, deception, scam, 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_O01523_00000853-00001 crony capitalism) would prevent thousands of deaths by cutting CO2 emissions and using the false / misleading material to get public support for the Clean Power Act which appears was supported I congratulated by PG&E because it would have a positive impact on their stock prices at the NYSE. So it should be investigated if the Clean Power Act had any impact on the PG&E stock prices. Please see- Judicial Watch v EPA Clean Power-win. Please read the attached report: "Brown's Dirty Hands" by Consumer Watchdog. The report list out the corruption I fraud involving Gov. Brown, his staff, the State of California, the Democrat Party, PG&E and other corporations which some appear to be listed on the NYSE. This kind of high level corruption I fraud between investor owned companies on the NYSE, Gov. Brown, his staff, his family, state agencies I regulators and the Democrat Party which you belong to would obviously have a impact on the stock prices of PG&E and the other corporations listed on the NYSE in your state. If Global Warming I Climate Change is caused by CO2 emission then why is Gov. Brown and the Democrat Party helping to increase CO2 levels which this type of fraud I corruption and actions ? It appears that PG&E may have received funds for clean I green energy projects while being accused by Democrats I Liberals of being corporate tax dodgers who pay a -17% rate while giving large campaign donations to the Democrat Party which you belong to so may be the Democrat Party should be included in the investigation which becomes evident from the attached report. Receiving millions of taxpayers dollars for clean I green energy projects, while paying a -17% tax rate while giving millions of dollars campaign donations to Gov. Brown I the Democrat Party would obviously have a positive impact on PG&E stock prices at the NYSE. With Gov. Brown, the State of California and Democrat Party being involved in this kind of corruption and fraud then I do see how they could have any credibility in a lawsuit against the EPA regarding Chlorpyrifos. If you ignore this kind of fraud I corruption which is linked to NY and the Democrat Party then I don't see how you can have any credibility in any civil and/or law enforcement action. Also read attached report: "Immigration to the United States and Worldwide Greenhouse Gas Emissions" By Center for Immigration Studies. Partially States:" Immigration to the United States produces estimated four times more CO2 in the United States as they would have in their countries of origin." I totally believe this to be true because I have traveled the world, visited approximately 15 countries and lived in approximately 5 including India which has been greatly increasing CO2 emissions while participating in the Paris Climate Conference and Agreement and encouraging or basically demanding that the United States decrease theirs. Have you been one of the ones stating that Global Warming I Climate Change is a National Security Issue because if you are then you are helping create National Security Risks with your Sanctuary State and City policies which means that you lack credibility and especially integrity including with any law enforcement activities I investigation and those that you may participate in especially if you ignore corruption linked to Gov. Brown and the Democrat Party ? How can you claim to be law and order on one hand while being lawless and disorder on the other I Sincerely- Will Rogers 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000853-00002 The 35 ReitHTtCbrporateTaxMyth CbporaleTacAd^ byFalireSOOGTpm^ 2306to 2315 Mattha/vGarcher RertS Mdntyre Richard Phillips March 2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00001 The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) hasengaged in tax policy research for over thirty years. ITEP is best known for its unique microsimulation tax model, an important tool that produces critical analyses to help the public and federal, state and local lawmakers understand how current and proposed tax laws affect taxpayers at different income levels. Since the 1980s, ITEP and itssister organization Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ) have collaborated on a series of studies about the taxes paid or not paid by America's largest and most profitable corporations. Those eye-opening reports played an important role in educating lawmakers about the tax issues that were ultimately addressed in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. That path-breaking federal legislation curbed tax shelters for corporations and the well-off and cut taxeson low-and middle-income families. TTb ]A^irgbi Recalled the reports a "key turning point" in the tax reform debate that, "had the effect of touch ingaspark to ki ndling," and "helped to raise public ire against corporate tax evaders." 7teVW/^^Jw^oid that the studies, "helped propel the tax-overhaul effort, " and the Associated Press reported that they, "assured that something would be done... to make profitable companies pay their share." More recently these reports have brought the sie of offshore tex avoidance to the forefront of the public debate. This new report providesa detai led amination of what has happened to corporate taxation in recent years. It is intendedto provide context about the current stale of corporatetaxesas lawmakers consider another major overhaul of the tax code in the rami ng year. The authors thank Kayla Kitson, Aaron Mendelson, Kelsey Kober, Grace Smith, Traci Xu, and J.P. Martinez for helping to gather the data behind this report. 1616PStreet, IWVSLiite200 |Wtehir^ton, DC20036 202.299.1066 |www.itep.oig Ctjyyit ty the MtuteonTaetimaxlEcrrrricFblicy, IVtaiX)17 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00002 CCNIENTS i BeaJheSjTTTHy 1 Introduction 3 WD'sF^rg(>porateTae^ 6 TMtetfteCbrporateTai^^ 7 Tatf^^arSJioe^ln^ 10 HistoriralChTpai93TOrra^ 11 OEQipaatelrenreTae\&Fae^ 13 FbMbiTOTKF^LcwTaCfe 18 WnL^fiarttipaateW 20 AtaforEtetterMcHjre 21 Ta4^m(&[Mxm)CtkTB 22 T\Aeity4ir^Gbn3aaticr^^ 22 Tv\aity-ei(<hpaatiora^ 23 Ihirty-twQxpaaticiTsF^ 23 >irtyMQiporattaF^rigbblnrare^ 24 lhirty4jAD(jbrpaattaF^r^ APFMOE5 25 Appendix 1: Mfettablog/ 29 4p|ndk2VVyQiirf TaesChrpisF^ IrrareTaesaetteE^ (arlOE 33 4pparlix3:15fVUItirBtkxelGbrpo(attaM[l)httRa4cteFI^^ cbAretfTTHrFteb<Mte OEMHJVHBCNLM^^TnC 36 EAeFcbalQpaai^^ EdixeFedaslQipaateTa^tel^ 47 BfctirefefeslQiprateTa^teh^^ OB S USRofite&LBtareTaeWHBFagiRofiW 56 ttrny^ttnTyhte Federal tare 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00003 BOEJTlXSUMMRf Rofitotecnrporatic^ toa35 percent fechd rooms tax rateon their USprofita But many oorporationspeyfar less, or nothingat al I, because ofthemany tax loopholesand special breaks theyenjoy. This report documentsjusthcwsuooessful many Fortune500corporate ns havebeen at using loopholes and special breaksover the pastei^it years As lawmakers look to reform theoorporate taxcode, this reportshows that the focusofany overhaul should be on dosing loopholes rather than on cutting tax rates It's important to notea key pjeceofthisreport'smeM The report only indudesoorporations that wereoonsistently profitableover theeigit-\ear period from2008to 2015. In otherwords, ifafirm had a loss in even one year, it sexcluded from this report. By leaving out corporations that had losses (which means theywouldn't peyany tax), this report providesastraightfbrwd picture ofaverage effective tax ratespaid by our nation'sbig^st and consistently profitablecompanies Two hundred and fifty-eight Fortune500oompanieswereoonsistently profitable in each of theei^it yearsbetween 2008 and 2015. Most of theseoompmiesvoercludte in our Fteruary2014 report, TTE&r/ySateof Cbrporate Taxes which Iookadattheyears2008throucfi2012 Thercarenewoompaniesin the report, including Netflix, which entered the Fbrtune500after2013. Inaddition,sonreoompenieswere eduded from thestudy because they lest money in 2013,2014or 2015. Asagroup, the258OTrporationspaidaneffedi\e fete income ta<rateof21.2 percent ow theeictit-year period, slightly over half thestatutory 35 percent tax rate Eighteen of theoorporations, induding General Electric, Intemational Ptaper, Priodineoomand PG&Epaid no federal income tacatall over theei^it-^ear period. A fifth of theoorporations(48) paid an effects tax rateof less than 10 percent over that period. Of thceecorporertions in oursanptewith significant offehoreprofi^ more than half paid hi^ner oorporatetax ratestoforcjgngovernrrentewherethey operatethan they paid in the UnitedSteteson their USprofte Theaefindincprefutethe prevailing vieA/ ireide the Beltway that America'scorporate income tac ismore burdensomethan thecorporateinoometaxesb/ied by other countries, and that this purported (but feise) excess burdensorrehewmakesthe US"unoompetiti^" One hundred of the258oompenies(39peroentof them) paidzeroor less in federal income tee inat tetorepr from2008to 2015. i InstituteonTaxationaxlBsonomicFblicy | March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00004  Thesectorswith the lowestefetherorporate^ rates^ Gas and Electric (3.1 percent), Industrial Machinery(11,4peroent),Teleoommunications(11.5 percent), Oil, Gas^andPipelines (11.6 percent),and lntemetServiGesandRetailing(15.6 percent).EEcChof these industries paid, asagoup, less than half thestetutory35 percent tex rateoverthisei^it-year period. Ttetacbr^sdairrsl by theseoompaniesarehi^ily concentrated in thehandsofafe/vvery larcp oorporationsJust25oompaniesclaimed $286 billion in texbreeteover theeicht yearsbetween 2008 aid 2015. That'smorethan halfthe $527 billion in taxsubsidiesclaimed byal I of the258 companies in oursample FKeoompenies --ATO, VWFago,JP. Mor^n Chasey Verizon, and IBM --enjoyed more than $130billion in taxbreeksduringtheeight-year period. Congressshould repeal the rule alleging American multinational corporations to indefinitely "defer" UStaeson theiroffehoreprofits ThisreformwouldelfectiMely remote the tex incentix^toshift Limit theabil ity of tech and other oompaniestoieee&ecuthestockoptionsto reduce their taes by generating phantom `txEte'ihese companies ne^er incur. Hawngset `bonusdepreciaiion"onapathtowardexpirationattheendof2019, Congressshould tatethe red step aid repeal the rest ofaccelerated depreciation, too.Ataminimim, lawrrders should resistcalIstoexpand thesetaxbreefebyallcwinglbr the rrrnediateecpensingofcapital in\estments FteinsteteastrongoorporateAltematheMinimum Tacthat does thejob it v^orgiral ly designed to do. Increase transparency by requiring oountry-by-oountry publicdisclcsureofcompany financial information, including corporate income aid tex payment^ through fi I inep to theSecuritiesand Exchange Commission. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth ii ED_001523_00000854-00005 iNiimjcncN For thefirst time in more than threedecadeSiOomprehensiveoorporatetex restr^ isaserious pcesibil ity in VX^ehington. Republ can leaders in Congressand President Donald Trump haveeadn put ibrwd corporate tex plans that would cut the corporate tax rate by sb much sb half. Th is misgu ided consensus is largely the result ofa long-termsggresBi^push by corporate lobbyislson Capitol Hill to reduce thefederal corporate income tex rate based on thedaim that our corporate tex is uncompetitive and hicjn compered to otter developed mtions. Thisstudytetesa hard lookatfederal income taes paid or not paid by258ofAmerica'slafgestand most profitableoorporationsin theeicht years between 2008and 2015--and oomparesthore tex payments to theforeign texes that a multinational subset of theresmecompaniespay on their activities in the rest of theworld.TheoompaniesinourreportareallfromForture'sannual list ofAmerica's500 largest corporation^ and all of them were profitable in the UnitedStateineadnof theeight yearsanalyred. Over eicfit yearSi the258oompaniesin oursurrey reported total pretex US profitsof more than $3.8 trillion. While the federal corporate tex la/v ostensibly requires bigoorporationsto paya35 percent corporate income tex rate the258cxxporationsinourstudy on avera^paid si i^ntly more than half that amount: 212peroentoverthe2008to2015period. ManyoompeniespaidferlesSi including 18 that paid nothingatall o^ertteentineei^it->earperiod. \Afealso find that for most of the multinationals in our survey--oompaniesthat engage in significant business both in the UnitedStatesandabroad-- the UStex ratestherecompaniespaidareIoast than the natesthey feoed abroad. More than half of the multinationals in oursurvey enjoyed lower UStex rateon their USprofitsthan theforeign tax ratesthey paid on their foreign profits. There iswidevariation in taxratespaid by theoompaniessur^ed. A quarter oftheoompaniesin this study paid effectivefederal income tex rateon their USprofitedcsetothefijII 35 percent official corporate lac rate But almost ore-fifth paid less than lOperoent. One hundred of there profitable oompaniesfound ways to zero out every last dime of their teral income tex in at least oneyear during theei^nt-^ar period. There is plenty of blame toshare for tocteybsad situation. Corporatespologistswill correctly point out that loopholesand texbreafethataUcwoorporationstominimireoreliminatetheir incometaes 1 I nstituteon Taxation axl BsonomicFblicy | March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00006 anegeneral ly legal, and stem from la/vspeffied over the yeas by Corgessandsigied by varias presidents. But tat does not mean that Icw-taccorporationsbear no responsibility. The tex laASwe not enacted inawuum; they wereadopted in resporw to retetle$ corporate lobbyi^ thieateand campaigisupport Thegood re^sis that the oorporateinoomelac can be repaired. The paradeof industryepecificand eeicnmpmy^pedfctexta the oorporatetexcan--andshould--be repealed. This includes texgheewe^sasnarrcwasthe NASCAR depreciation tex break and cSbrcodcB the manufecteringdeduction. Hk^i-profile multinational corporations that haveshifted hundredsofbillionsof their US income into tex havensfor tex purposes, without engaging in any nreaningfijl activity in those tiny countries* will stopdoingso if Congressadstoend indefinite deferral of UStaxes on their offshore profits As Congress considers these steps, laAmtersaid the Securitiesand Exchange Commissionshouldact OTBIlWEWaB W/tore W WAto TaxRsbm (CTJ & ,7teGapa^TacQnitefr(CTJ& ITH3. . . tec information about hew much big companies are paying in temsand which tex breefe they're claiming Thisstudy is the latest in aseriesofoomprehenshe oorporatetex reporfsby Cittensfor TacUstioe aid the I nstituteon Taationand BconomicPolicy, beginning in 1984. Our most recent prior report, issued in 2014, covered corporatetaes in 2008 throucfi 2012 The methodological appendixat theend of thestudyexplains in moredetaiI howwe chose theoompaniesand calculated their effective tex rate Thenotesonspteiccompanies beginning on page56add moredetai Is 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The 35 Ftoomt Corporate Tac Myth 2 ED_001523_00000854-00007 V\HJSIWlN3CCFrCF&TET^^ On paperat least, federal tax law requirescorporationsto pay 35 percent oftheir profits in federal inoorre taxes In fest, whilesomeof the258corporations in thisstudy did paydoeetothe35 percent official tax rate, the\^st majority paid considerably less And some paid nothingat all. Cher theeicfit ysarsoovered by thisstudy, theaverageeffective tax rate (that is, the percentage of US pretax profits paid in federal corporate income taxes) for all 258oompan iesvvas only 212 percent Gww: The tableon this pegesummarizESwhat the258oompaniespaid (ordidn't pay) in effecthe US inoorre taxrateson their pretaxUSprofits 3Ooompmiespaideffedheeic^t-yeartaxratebefe^ effective tax ratews6.9 percent percentTheirs^erage Even worse is that 18oompaniespaid less than 0 percent over theeictit-year period. Their effective tax rateavera^ed 4 percent 66oompanies(aboutaquarterof theoompaniesin thisreport),paideffedheeic^t^^ monethan 30 percent. Theiravera^effecthetac rate\As33.6 percent. Effective tax rate gap Less than 17.9% 17.9% to30% More than 30% #of %of as as 83 32% 109 42% 66 207o 2008-15($-billicn) Refits Tax /te.Rate $12742 $107.5 84% 1,6272 393.7 242% 9092 305.7 33j8% Ae. Surprofit ($mill.) Re-tax 4fter-tax $15,352 $14,057 14,929 11,317 13,775 9,143 ^roorfess 0%to10% 18 7% 30 12% $178.0 581.0 $-72 40.5 -4.0% 69% $9,889 19,467 $10289 18,117 ArraectiaikrJkxic During the2008-2015period,ei^it-5eareffecthetax ratesfor the258oompaniesrangedfroma lew of -27.9peroentfor FEPCO Holdingstoahigh of47.3 peroentfor Molina Healthcare Heneanesome startling statistics 3 InstituteonTaxational EconomicFblicy | March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00008 18 Corporations Paying No Total Income Tax in 2008-2015 Company ($-rrillions) Ffepoo Holdings PGSEGorp. Wisconsin Energy NiSxiroe International Fper FirstEnergy Rioel ine.com Atmos Energy General Electric American Electric Ftwer F^derS^stem DukeEhergy NextEraEhergy XbI Energy Ameren CMSEhergy SempraEhergy EersouroeBergy TOPL 08-15 Profit $3,022 10,843 5,894 4,399 5,010 8,842 698 2,826 40,057 17,170 2,045 19,767 21,518 10,291 7,243 4,666 7,000 6,703 $177,995 08-15 Tax $-843 -1,569 -592 -352 -386 -465 -31 -114 -1,369 -464 -- -422 -313 -111 -48 -26 -34 -11 $-7,205 08-15 Rate -27.9% -14.5% -10.0% -8.0% -7.7% -5.3% -4.4% -4.0% -3.4% -2.7% -2.7% -2.1% -1.5% -1.1% -0.7% -0.6% --0.5% -0.2% -4.0% 100ofthe258oompaniespaid2eroor fess in federal income tee in at least ore yearffom2008to2015. Fifty-eight of theseoompaniesenjo^ed multiple notexy=ars> bringing the total number of no-texyearsto246. In theyearsthey paid no income tax, these 100 oompanieseamed$336billion in pretex USprofitsBut instead of peying$118 billion in federal incometaeSiasthe35 percent corporate tex raterequir^ these rarpaiiscpieratedso mwyec^tex breate that they reported negative taes (often receiving tec rebatechectefrom theUSTneesury),total ing$321 billion. These oompmes' "negathe rate^' mean that they mademoreafter tee than before taes in th no-tex years1 18of theseoorporationspaid testhan nothing inagecptefederal noonsteres owthe200815period. TheseoompanieSjwhose pretexUSprofitstoteiled$178 billion oyer theeicfit years inducted: Ftepoo Holdings(-27.9%),PG&E (--14.5%), I nternational F&per (-7.7%), Prioel ire.com (-4.4%), General Electric (-3.4%),and RyderSystem (-27%). ln2O15,29oompaniespaid no federal income tex, and reoehed $1.46 bill ion in texnebates In 2014,28oompaniespaid no incometac,and reoei\yed$1 billion in rebatesln2013,32companies paid no income tax, and got $3.9 billion in rebates (SeeAppendioeswith year-by-yearnesulte) 83 of the258oompaniespaid les than half the 35 peroentstatutorycorporate ta^ the eicfit-yaar period. And monethan two-thirds of theoompanieSi 181 of the258, paid effective tax ratesof lesthai half the 35 percent statutorycorporate inara least one of theei^it years. 1 Corporations can receive outrlc|it rebatesby "caryirgba"effistexbreakstoearliery^ reiundfromthe IRSfdr taespaid in thepast Inaddition,companiessorrEtirresobtainfa'onljIeaettl^^ the irecoverirgpedysas Companies then recognize tax breaks that they did not disclose in their prior financial reports toshareholdas baa th^r expected that the IFSwould not aHcwtherntokeepthemon^.Theseaettlemerrtscan produoewhatareesentially^rebates,asthe^)pendixon page29 explains In reporting their "current" income tacs paid, compmiesdo not disti nguish between the two types oftax breaks 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The 35 Ftoomt Corporate! Myth 4 ED_001523_00000854-00009 lOOQrrpenie&yirg^TacorlfSBina^ OnpervfSmllicrB) FG8Ebrp. F^ari-bldin^ V\tarai&ag/ NSuoe CUsgy FirsErergy Atmc&agy NbdEfiHgy Rioelire.OEm FFL Abbi Bang fVfeQstari SarprSrag/ (M&agy F^rriraxQapofZ^ ArericafioetrtRwer InterpibliQoip (juBDlKHEffiKri XeEnagy Dtrninicriteiras Cileyisici^staTB Cbrning Interraticrfeper G^eectric Foock StatutresGbrp. TrinitrdLBtries RRDcrrelle^re WizafTninicaticrs DIEErag/ OH* dabrrm V\strock EiiRhagy Wlliars Frar EocrIVfcbil Wrxfctrean Hr^welInterraticrBl Entergy btetflix CRR taN>&ts #cteoI lnN>Teas #c<2eo Refit Tax Rate sOrrpaVSrnillicrB) Refit Tax f^te $10,843 $-1,339 -14.3% 8 LFteiiOES 82 -101 -11.87o 2 2,641 -852 -323% 7 GrstellatictBaxfc 1,525 -176 -11.67o 2 5245 -681 -13.3% 7 Dcmtar 189 -21 -10.97o 2 3,869 -3 -9.3% 7 Fifthlhircfeirrp 1,856 -162 -8.7% 2 18229 -482 -23% 7 Flbl k&vkitepriaap 4,473 -371 -8.3/o 2 5,916 -821 -13.3% 6 SuthAesAirlines 838 -69 -82% 2 226R -122 -5.4% 6 RlrapaFinarial 1,986 -156 -7.8% 2 15,081 -3 -22% 6 G&crEregy 5,321 -389 -7.3% 2 ED --38 -9.1% 5 MIRiiOES 677 --35 -52% 2 3,303 -224 -6.3% 5 FedEx 3,914 -173 -4.4% 2 4,526 -257 -5.7% 5 FNFinmdEteioeQcip 7,982 -317 -4.0% 2 23,783 -1,021 -43% 5 AriRcWsOiaTicals 1,162 -31 -27% 2 1275 -60 -4.7% 5 SjctiShagy 1293 --32 -25% 2 4,534 -175 -3.3% 5 TnW\rrer 6,616 -100 -1.5% 2 3,063 -33 -1.1% 5 ^artatWi 101 -1 -1.1% 2 1,963 -276 -14.3% 4 l-bllcntier 12 -24 -196.9% 1 7,751 -806 -10.4% 4 FhillipsAhfeoeai -44 -130.9% 1 1270 -63 -5.3% 4 BiLilly 202 -208 -1029% 1 6,601 --252 -3.3% 4 SriAitrnDtKe 27 -14 -51.0% 1 5,533 -195 -3.3% 4 stmaOBTical 234 -82 -402% 1 7,068 -176 -23% 4 Insi^Enterpris 15 -5 -323% 1 1211 -11 -0.3% 4 leenstiuTHits 321 -81 -252% 1 2,637 -14 -0.3% 4 Healtrtxtet 34 -8 -24.3% 1 1,599 -1,024 -64.3% 3 'YtnBaxte 294 -70 -23.7% 1 10,460 -4,737 -45.3% 3 RtreiAes 386 -88 -227% 1 1,062 -429 -40.4% 3 GaplAjtaTOtNe 53 -11 -232% 1 2854 -891 -312% 3 V\llSagD 21,141 -3,967 -18.3% 1 918 -127 -13.3% 3 (Wra&chfcip 4,894 -801 -16.4% 1 743 -75 -10.1% 3 Tiaeter&s. 1230 -191 -15.3% 1 22731 -1,513 -6.7% 3 Dandaftestajiaits 191 --S -14.3% 1 3,129 -191 -6.1% 3 Qmririit^teltt^stBTB 228 --2 -127% 1 1,582 --$ -3.7% 3 Arters 34 -4 -127% 1 9,731 -291 -3.3% 3 (^teChfrarial 1259 -152 -121% 1 1,146 --28 -23% 3 CiRnt 949 -109 -11.3% 1 3,446 -43 -12% 3 JPIVbr^rGieSCb. 12,486 -1,429 -11.4% 1 4,075 --26 -0.3% 3 Msac 27^ -25 -112% 1 148 -136 -91.7% 2 Sma 533 -47 -8.3% 1 26 -1,086 -38.3% 2 TnW\rek)le 2,330 -188 -8.1% 1 4 -125 -19.4% 2 F%l iaxteBAIimirm 199 -15 -7.4% 1 2906 -510 -172% 2 Mtecn 1,153 -85 -7.4% 1 3287 -481 -14.3% 2 LG 2S -15 -6.3% 1 235 -37 -14.4% 2 HTWdin^ 3,198 -182 -5.7% 1 22R? -316 -14.3% 2 IntsraticraaBresBcnines 5,787 -321 -5.3% 1 frtiiiBdnnadpep) 5 InstituteonTaxation axl EconomicFblicy | March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00010 QrrpBrieFtyirg^TaotfSBinaflfoeOelfe^^ unravisrniicra G&itiyLink Suthan Rrl^Ajtnrration Raair DS-hfehAOk AT&T Inhb-Tafeas #ofesc _ kihb-Tafeas #ofsc Refit Tax Rate tax\oesQmoavfnillicr soe -49 -4SP% 1 l-ferris Refit 1,C91 Tax fete taxyeas --27 -25% 1 3,662 -177 -4.8% 1 Emer 1,183 --27 -23% 1 149 -7 -45% 1 AlliaWat^stamB 126 -3 -22% 1 145 -6 -4.4% 1 AthuiGlaer 159 -3 -18% 1 870 --36 -4.1% 1 Mack 5,766 --55 -1.0% 1 973 --36 -3.7% 1 /ministries 81 -0 -0.8% 1 11,991 --CD -3.5% 1 tee 907 -1 -0.1% 1 IbteM'EselOQxrnDanis $336277 $-32,122 -0J0% 216 TaxSubsidies,2008-15 ($ -millions) TTiSEECFTHECOFraWEWSUBSOB 2008-15Taxbreaks 0verthe2008to2015period, the258oompanieseamed morethan AW Vtel Is Fargo J.P. Morgan Chase &Gb. Vferun Grrniriicaticns IntemationaBusinessMadiines General Electric 38,068 31,428 22213 21,130 17,806 15,389 $3.8 trillion in pretax profits in the UnitedStates Had al I of those profits been reported to the I RSand ta>ed at thestatutory 35 percent corporate tax rate, then the258oompanieswould haepaid $1.3 bill ion in inoorre taxesoxer theei^it years But instead, theoompaniesasagroup paid just morethan 60 percent of thatamount. Theenormous amount they did EocnIVfcbil Seeing FbCRnendal Services Gap 1292 11,863 8,as not paywasdue to hundredsof bill ions ofdollars in taxsubsidies that they enjoyed. Rocter & Garble NbdEraEhergy Twenty-Fi rstCfenturyFox 8,515 7,814 7,630 Tacsubsidiesforthe258oompaiieso\ertheeightyearetotaleda staggering$527billion, induding$50 billion in 2008, $65billion in Cite Energy ten Energy Gtrrcast nrreXA&mer 7,341 7224 7,172 6,720 2009,$74 billion in 2010, $79billion in 2011,$65billion in 2012, $72billion in2013,$70billion in 2014,and$52 billion in 2015. Theseamountsare thedifferen between what the companies Southern Arerican Electric teer Lhicnfeufic UhitedTechrologies Quafrrrm 6,539 6,473 6,333 6,001 5,934 would ha^epaid if their tax billsequaled 35 pencentof their profits and what they actually paid. More than half of the total tax-subsidy dollars oxer the eight \ears --$286 bill ion--went tojust 25 companies,eachwith morethan Bebn TirreVX&merChble Intel GolchTan^chsGan_____________ 5,898 5,692 5,521 5,455 $5.4 bill ion in taxsubsidies AT&T topped the I st ofcorporate tax-subsidy recipients^ with more than $38 billion in taxsubsidies oxer theeight years Other 233 arrpenies All companies 210,791 $526,760 Other top taxsubsidy recipients included TO IsFargo ($31.4 billion), JP.Morcpn Chase ($222 billion), Verizon ($21.1 billion), IBM ($178 billion),aid Exxon Mobil ($12.9billion). 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The 35 Fteromt Corporate TacIV^ 6 ED_001523_00000854-00011 WFWIS^DSUBSDE^ Bi INDUSTRY Theeflective tax rates in our study wied widely by industry. From2008to 2015, effective industry tac rates(forour 258corporations) ranged froma lew of 3.1 percent toa high of 32.7 percent. Gasarfoetectricutilityoompenfesenjoyadthelcwesteffecthefederal texrateovertheejcfityeais* peyinga tex rateofonly 3.1 percent. This industiystaxesdecl ined steadilyover theeight years* from 12.8 percent in 2008 to1.8 percent in 2015. These resultswere largely driven by theabi I ity of these companies todaim accelerated depredation texbreefeon their capital investments Noneof the25 util ties in oursample paid monethan halfthe35peroentstatutorytax rateduring the2008to 2015 period. Otter low-tax industries^ paying les than half thestatutory 35 percent tec rateover theentire 2008to2015period, inducted: I industrial Machinery (11.4%), Teteoommunications(11.5%), Oil, Gas&Pipelines (11.6%),and lntemetServioes&Retailing(15.6%). Only twoof the industriessur^ed paid an effects tex rateof 30 percenter moreover theflill ei^it-yeer period. Effectivetacratesalso wied widelywithin industries Forexampte, over theeicfit-year period,avera^ tex rateson oil, gas & pipel ire companies ranged from 12 percent for Oneok up to 33.3 peroentfor CVR Energy.Amongaerospaoeand defensea)mpOTes*ei(^t^ rates ranged froma lew of 5.4 percent for Boeing up toahyn of 27 percent for General Dynamics Pharmaceutical giant Bi Lilly paid only 17 percent,while iteoompetitor Biogen Idee paid 35.3 percent Infect,asthedetailed industry table starting on pege36 of this report illustrates* effedhe tex rateswerwidelydi^^ in almost every industry. Thedifference in tax rates between companies* even within thesame industry, demonstrates how loopholes in our taxoodecan create hugeeomomiedistortionsbygiving someoompanesatax advantage over their competitors 3Eftedi\eCorporate TaxfeteforCcmpanesbylnclEttycri Nactferp 7 InstituteonTaxational EconomicFblicy | March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00012 BfedheGbrporaleTacFtes for258Cbrporaticns by Industry, 2008--15 $-millions Bght-YearTotats 2015 Industry Profit Tax Rat Profit Tax Re te Utilities^ gaideledit: $269,367 $8,217 3.T $39,364 $706 1.6 7o IndustriaMachinery 91,179 10,429 11.4 Zo 6,817 3,060 44.: % TeleocrrrnjiicatiorB 334,261 38,578 11.5 4 60,512 11,499 19. % l.gas&ppelres 117,722 13,635 11.6 4 4,672 412 86 7o IntemeServioes&ftailing 15,486 2,409 15.6 /o 2,831 1,478 52.: % Flblishing, printing Ztercspa&defen 1,611 200,483 290 36,698 18.0 /o 18.3 4 226 26,072 113 6,282 49' % 24/ % Frerdal 632,651 125,807 19.9 4 100,509 25,715 25f % Ticcorteticn 105,032 21,255 20.2 4 17,976 4,654 25.5 % Qarputers,offioeequip,software,dat a Chancis 244,399 76,800 49,608 15,730 20.3 4 20.5 4 27,910 10,699 5,111 2289 18.: % 21/ % Hxhold &pascnal produis 83,255 18,304 22.0 4 9,843 2,077 21/ % MisoelIaneoLEeervioes 298,589 68,503 22.9 4 42701 10,769 25: % MisoelIaneoLBTBnufecturing 123,173 28,494 23.1 20,622 5247 25/ % Rnarial casavioes 97,962 26,398 26.9 4 18,188 5245 28. % Fharrnauticats &rredical produis 69,858 19,324 27.7 4 6,648 2,542 38: % Fod&baeragss &tctam 192,203 54,167 28.2 4 26,857 9,930 37.( % EprEering&ocrBtfuiicn 10,274 2,964 28.8 /o 1,411 417 29 % fetail&wholesaldrade 643,990 199,925 31.0 4 95,177 30,971 32! % l-tealthcaie 202,285 66,206 32.7 4 32,663 12,773 39.' % ALLItCUSIRIS $3.810.577 $806.942 21.2 4 S 551.698 $141.281 25J % Profit $37,104 14,350 50,466 19,755 4,991 6 29,895 102,654 17,364 33,762 12,464 10,949 46,935 19,796 20,007 19,070 22,545 1,396 92232 29,072 $584.814 2014 2013 2008-2012 Tax F ate Refit Tax Rate Profit Tax Rate $500 2426 1 i/o 16 9% $31,955 16,105 $1,590 2,664 CP/o 65% $160,944 53,908 $5,420 2,288 3.4% 42% 6,889 1- 67o 47,304 6,549 3.87o 175,979 13,642 7.8P/0 1,929 9 37o 15,346 1,636 0.7% 77,950 9,657 12.4P/O 251 5 y/o 3235 605 8.7% 4428 75 1.7% 50 5,865 88 1.7% 19 67o 66 26341 -15 4,838 237o 8.CP/0 1,314 117,674 143 19,714 10.9P/O 165% 2ijo Z 57o 92589 15,041 62% 336,899 63,996 19.07o 3,894 Z 4% 15,126 3,634 4.07o 54,566 9,073 16.67o 7,809 Z 1% 29,830 6,498 1S7o 152,896 30,190 19.7% 3,104 2,822 97o 2F 87o 11,304 11,156 2051 2137 8.1% 92% 42333 51,307 8296 11338 19.6% 2207o 9,337 5,315 19 9% % 9% 42083 18,297 10249 3,305 4.4P/O 8.1% 166,870 64,458 38,147 14,6 2297o 227% 5,815 8,385 Z 1% 44 CP/o 12156 8218 3,617 1,467 9.8% 7.97o 47,612 35,921 11,722 6,930 24.67o 19.37o 7,931 Z 2% 26,835 6,935 5.87o 115,936 29,370 25.37o 435 30239 31 2% Z 8P/o 1,542 88,516 500 29,571 2.4P/O 3.4% 5,924 368,064 1,611 109,145 2727o 29.7% 10,713 $134.763 39 87o 23 .0% 25,813 8267 2CP/o $524.346 $111.138 1 1.2% 114,737 $2.149.719 34,454 30.07o $419.759 19.5% 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 8 ED_001523_00000854-00013 2008-15 Effective Tax Rates & Total TaxSltsidies, by Industry TacSiisic^fylrdLStry: $-millicns Industry &Company Effective TotalTax % of total % of total \Afeato looted at thesize of the total TaxRate Stteidies SUcsidieslIS. Profits tax subsidies received byeach Financial 19.9% Uti 1 it ies, gasandelectric 3.1% Tlcommunications 11.5% Misoel laneousservioes 22.9% Computers, offioeequip, software,data 20.3% Aerospaoe&defense 18.3% Ql,gas&pipelines 11.6% Ffetai 1 & wholesaletrade 31.0% Industrial Machinery 11.4% Transportation 20.2% Misoel laneousmanufturing 23.1% Food & bewerages& tobaooo 28.2% Chemicals 20.5% Household & personal products 22.0% Financial datasavioes 26.9% Pharmaoeuticals&medical products 27.7% Healthcare 32.7% IntemetServioes&Ftetailing 15.6% Hogineering&oonstruction 28.8% Publishing, printing 18.0% LIMUS1RE5 21.2% 95,620 86,062 78,413 36,003 35,932 33,471 27,568 25,471 21,484 15,506 14,616 13,104 11,150 10,836 7,888 5,126 4,594 3,011 632 273 $526,760 18.2% 16.3% 14.9% 6.8% 6.8% 6.4% 5.2% 4.8% 4.1% 2.9% 2.8% 2.5% 2.1% 2.1% 1.5% 1.0% 0.9% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 100% 16.6% 7.1% 8.8% 7.8% 6.4% 5.3% 3.1% 16.9% 2.4% 2.8% 3.2% 5.0% 2.0% 2.2% 2.6% 1.8% 5.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.0% 100% industry tor the258oompeniesin ourstudy.Among the notable finding: 55 percent of the total texsubsidies went tojust four industries: financial, util ties, telexmnunicatior^aid oil, gas & pipelines--even thouc^i theseoompeniesonlyenjoyed 35.5 peraentof the USprofitsin our sample Otter iteustriesreoetea disproportionatelysnall shareof texsubsidies Companies encpged in retail and wholesale trade* forexample, represented 17 percent of theeight-year US Financial, Utilities, Teleccnrrijncations andOil,gas&pipelines 10.57o 287,663 54.6% 35.5/0 profits in our sample, but enjoyed less than 5 percent of the tax subsidies. Itseems ratherodd, not torrention highlywasteful, that the industrieswith the largestsubsidiesareones that would seem to need them least Regulated util ities^ forexamptei mate investment decisions in concertwith their regulatorsbaeed on needsofcommunities theyser^ Oil andgasoompaniesaneso profitaolethat even President GeorgeW.Bush said they did rot read tax breaks Heoould havesid the Scmeabout teleoommunicatiorsc^ Financial oompmiesgetso much fated support that adding huge tex breekson top of that seems unnecessary. 9 InstituteonTaxation axl BsonomicFblicy | March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00014 HISICRC^OJVPA^^^ Hew do our resultsfor2008 to 2015oomparetooorporatetaxratesin earl ieryeai^?TheansiAer illustrates hoA/crporatiorBhavemanaged toget aroundsome oftheoorporatetax reformsenaoted in 1986, and hew tacavoidanoehassurged with the help of our political leaders By 1986, PresidentRonald Reagan fully repudiated hisearl ier pol icy ofshowering tax breekson corporations tepi'sTacFMormM of 1986dosed tensof billions of dollars in corporate loopholes, sc that by 1988, our survey of la^oorporaticre (published in 1989) found that theoverall effective corporate tcKratewasupto26.5peroent,oomparedtoonly14.1 percent in 1981-83.2 That imprownent occurred evai though thestatutorycorporate tec ratewescut from 46 percent to 34 peraentaspartofthe 1986 reforms3 In the 1990$ however, many oorporationsbeepi to find waysaround the 1986 reforms, abetted by changss in theteclaAsaswell asby tecravoidaicEschemesda/eed by majoraooounting firms/^sa result, in our 1996to1998survey of250cmifHii^ we found that theiraver^efediveoorporatetax rate tai fallen to only21.7 percent OurSeptember2004studyfound thatcorporateteccuteadopted in 2002 had drhen theeffecthe ratedewn to only 172 percent in 2002and 2003. Theei^it-year average rate found in thecunentstudy isonly si ichtly higher,at 212 percent /feashaneof GDP, overall federal corporatetaxcolledions in fised 2002and 2003 fell to only 124 percent. At the time, thatvastheir lowestsustained level asashareoftheeoonomysinceWorldV\far II. Corporatetees asashareofGDP reooveredsorrewhat in themid-2000safterthe2002-enacted tax breaksexpired, averaging2.3 percentofGDPfromfiscal 2004through fiscal 2008. But over the pest five fiscal years (2011 to 2015) that thisstudyexamines, total corporate income tax paymentsfell back to only 1.6 percent of GDPon average. Corporatetaxes paid for monethanaquarter of federal outlaysin the 1950sandafifth in the 1960s They began todedineduring the Nixonadministrationand remained lew in theReecpneraBy fiscal year 2015, corporate taespaid fora mere10.6 peroentof the federal governmenteeepe^ In thisoontect, it seems odd thatanyonewould insist that corporate tec reformshould be "revenue neutral." Ifwearegoingto^t our nation'sfiscal house back in order, increasing corporate income tec revenuesshould playan important role 2 The 1986 Taxftform Act wsexpected to ircresecorporate tax payrrentsbyisouta third. It ma/taedoneeMen betterthan that. 3 Thestatutory ratewas increased to 35 percent irPnesident Bi II Clinton'sl993deficit reductionact. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferoentCorporateTa<IV1yth 10 ED_001523_00000854-00015 US.COEFCROEINUVETAESVS. FOREIGNINUVETGS Corporate lobbyists relentlessly tell Congressthat oompaniesresd tacsubsidiesfrom thegovemrrentto besuocessflil. They promise morejobs iftheyget thesubsidie$and threaten economic harm iftheyare denied them A central claim in the lobbyists' arsenal is theaBsertion that their d ents need still more tax subsidies to "oompete"because USoorporatetaxesareal legedly much higher than foreign corporate taxes But the figures that most ofthesecorporations report to theirshareholders indicatetheexact opposite, that they pay highercorporate income taes in the othercountrieswhere they do business than they pay here in the US. US Rufits&US Federal InureTaes\osre Foreign Ftofite&Ft^ InureTaes, 2008-15 for curpanieswithsigTificart foreign profit^ $<rillicn LBprofits&fecferal hxrretcOGS LB profit LB tax LB rate Foreiri profits&fcr. inuretacs Rr. profit Rr.tax Ferrate LB rate -Ferrate 64withhAerLBrate(6CP/o) $751,^0 $130,312 17.3P/o $568,513 $151,867 26.7/o 43with hAerfaeigi rate(407o) 822,034 253,513 30.8P/O 91272 21.37o +95/o Trials fcr1C7mrrpanfes $1,576/104 $383,825 212% $1,010,763 $216209 2147o -o.oe/o %ttutaaageforeinenedi\etcxralee<Eecbauercge^ 4070 \Ateexamirnedthe107 companies in oursuney that hadsignificantpretcKforeigi profits (ie,equal to at least 10 percentoftheir total worldwidepnetexprofite),and oomparedtheir2008-15 US(federal & state) effectivetac ralesto theforeigi effective tax natesthey paid. Here iswhat we found: About 60 peraentof these USoompeniespaidhi^ner foreign tax rateson their foreign profitsthan they paid in UStaxeson their USprofits Overall, theeffedheforeigntexrateonthe107compmiesv^roix^ to their USeffecthetax 11 Institutes Ta^fcjnarriBuonomicRalky | March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00016 Atableshcwing USand foreign tax ratesfor each of the1O7oompaniesbeginson page53. Hcwdo thesefiguressquarewith thewell-known practioeofoorporationsshifting their profitsto countries I ite the Cayman Islandswhere theyare not taed at alI? Thefigures hereshcwwhat corporations report to theirshaneholdersas USprofitsand foreign profits^and thereforeare litely to reflect profits genuinelyeared in tire USand thceegenurelyearned offshore; respecthrely.But manyof theseoorporationsare likely to report something x^ry different to tire IRS by using \aious legal but arcarreaooounting maneuversSorreoftheprofitsoonectlyreportedtoshareholdersasUSprofitsare likely to be reported to tire IRSas profitseamed in tex4naen countries liteBermudaor the Cayman Islands,where theyare rot taxEdatall. Indeed^hispartlye&qofeimthelcweffectiveUSLinoornetaxrates that manycorporations enjoy.This"profit-shifting"problemwill existso longsour tax lawsallow oorporationsto "defer^ paying US ta>eson their "of&iore"profi^ providing an incentive to mate US profitsappeer to beeamed in offehoretex havens Thefiguresmatedear that mostAmerican oorpoiationsarepaying hi^ner taes in other countrieswhere they encage in real businessactivitiesthan they pay in UStepeson their trueUSprofits Onemynt note that paying hyner foreign taxes to do business in foreign countries rather than in tire United Stateshas rot stopped American oorporationsfromshifting operationsand jobsoversow tire pastseveral decades But this isjust moree^idenrethat oorporateinoometac levels^ rota significant determinant ofwhat companies do. I nsteed, companies ha^eshifbed jobsoverseesforavariety of non-tex reasons,such as low wegesand weeter labor aid environmental regulations in sonreountri^ a desiretosenregrcwing foreign marteteand the development ofx^stly cheeper ooslsfor shipping goods fromoreoountry toanotherthan used to be thecasa 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 12 ED_001523_00000854-00017 |-O/V03VRNEPAYliWTXBILLS Why do we find such Icwtacratesonsomaiyoornpmiesa^ indudrie^Tteoompeny-by-oo^ notesstarting on pegs56 detaiI, whereaalable, reasonswhy particularoorporationspaid low tees. Here isasummary ofseveral of tte majortex-lowering items that are repealed in thecompanies' annual reports-- plussome thataren'tdisclosed. Offshore tax sheltering. Ttehi^i-profiteoongresBionaltearin^ontex-dodgingstrategiesofApple aid ottertechcorpmiesowttepastcoupteof^ lawrrdosaidthegeneral publicwhatsome of us have been pointing out forbears: multinational oorporationsand tteiraooountingfirmshavebeoome increffiinglyaggresshre in seeking w^stoshift their USprofits>on paper, to offehore tex havens toavoid their UStexobi cations This typically invoh^s^iousartificial transactionsbetween USoorporations aid their foreignsubsidiaries, in which revenuesareshifted to low-or no-taxjurisdictions (where these oorporationsarenotactually doingany real business), whitededudionsarecreeted in the UnitedStates4 Tteood of this tex-sheltering isdifficulttodetermireprec^ sthou^ittobeenormous In November2010, tteoongresonal Joint Committeeon Taertionestimatedthat intemationaloorpofcite tax reforms proposed bySen. to Wyden (D-Ore.) would incr^US.crporateta)ebydxxjt$70 billion a year.5 Otheraial^tehavepajged theocst ofcorporafeoffehore taxsheltering aaen hi^ier than that. Presumably,theeffedsof theseoffehoresheltefsin reducing UStaeson US profitsare reflected in bottom-lineUSoorporatelaes reported in thisstudy,even thou^ioompaniesdo not directly disclose them S^dly, meet Republicans in Congress along with some Democrat^seem intent on making the problem ofoffshoretexstelteringeoi worse by repladngour current^ underwhich US. terns on offehore profitsare indefinitely "delerred,"with asocalled "territorial"s^stem in which profits that oompaniescan styteas`foregi"arepermanentlye5emptfrom UStaxes This terribleapproach along with itsoousin,a "repatriation holiday,"would enoouregeeven more offehore taxavoidance. 4 Theaeartificial transastors(cftencalled "transferpridng" abus)ae particularlysalable to corrpanieswith\di^le1ntergble property,"such as brand nanes> secret formuteforsotfeordn^ aid so forth. By transferringsuch intangiblestosubsidlariesset up in offshore ta< haaiSi companies can then hae those foieigi subsidiaries "ctage" the US parents big fes to ire the braid naresand so forth, therebyshifting US profits to the haensfor tax purposes 5wyferisinternational tax refomTsarepatofatargertaxo^feiajI bill thatheco-sponsoredwith then-Sen. Judd Gregg (R-NH)and laterwithSten. Dan Coats(R-IN). 13 InstituteonTa^bnardBuonornicRolky| March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00018 Accelerated depreciation. ThefexbAsganeralfyallcwoompeniestowriteofftheircapital investments fester than theaessteactuallywear out. This "acraterateddepreciatiori'istechnicallya tex deferral, but so longasaoompanyoontinuesto invest, the tex deferral tends to be indefinite While aooelerated depredation tec breefe haveteen availablefor decades, temporary tax provisions hae increased their cost in the pasteicfit years Inearly2008, inanattemptateoonomicstimiulusfor the fferging economy, Congressand President George WBtfih dramatical lyexpanded depreciation tec breete by creatingasupposedly temporary "50 percent bonusdepreciation" provision thatallowed companies to imrnediatefywriteoffemuchaB75 peroentof theocst of their investmentsin row equipment right a^G This prevision tee been repeatedly (tended and isset topheseda/vnand than expireat theend of2019. Thesechanges to the depreciation rules on top ofthealreadyfer toogenerous depredation deductionsallowed under preexisting law,certainly did reduce teesfor many of the companies in this study by tensof billions of dollars But I imited financial reporting mates it hard to calculateoectly howmuchofthetecbreatewidentifyaredepredation-^^ Even without bonisdepreciation,thete< lawallcMsrampaiies to tete much bigger amelerated depreciation write-offethan iseoonomicallyjustified. Thissubddydistortseoonomicbeheviorbyfevoringsome industries arrisomein\estmentsc^othefsiw06tesh^ resources^ has littteor noeffect instimulating in\estment.A recent reportfromtheCongresaonalFtesear^ re/ewirg efforts to quantify the impact ofdepreciation breaks^ found that "thestudiesoonduded thataccelerated depreciation in general isa relatively ineffecthre tool for stimulating theeoonomy.'7 Combinedwith rutesallcwirgrorporationstodedud interestecpereeSiaccelerated depreciation can result in xery law,or even neeptive' tec rateson profitsfrom particular imestmenteAoorporationcan borrow money to purchaseequipment ora bu i Id ing, deduct the interestexpenseson the debt and quickly deduct theocst of theequiprrentor building thankstoaooelerateddepreciation. The total deductions can then mete the investmmtemoreprofitoteafc^ before-tec Stock options. Most big oorporationsgive their e>ecuthes(andsorretirrEsother employees) optionsto buytheoompeny'sstockatafevorableprioeinthefijtureWhen taeoptionsare0erceed,cm^ ran tateatec deduction for thedifferenoe between what theemployeespayfor thestockand what it's worth.8 6 Under"bonusdeprecion,"inthefiistfullvearthatmostec|ui^^ isplaoed inservice; thecfeprecetionwriteoffe include: a20 percent regular write- offfor the first halfof theysar, plus50 percent bonusdepreefetion, plusa6 percentwriteofffor theseoond halfofthe first full ^eer. 7GaryGuenther,`S6ction179ardBonusDepfeciatfonB<pensingAIICMances:CunentLaw,Legislati\^^ Economic Effecte;" Congessiorai Research Service; September 10,2012 http: / /www.teorg/^/cre/misc/RL31852pdf 8 Employees erasing stock options mist report thedifferenoe between thevalueof thestockand what they payfor it aswageson their personal income tax returns 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FbroentCorporateTa<Myth 14 ED_001523_00000854-00019 Sock optioreareateo attractive trop 25Tax Savings from Stock Qotiors, 2008-15 becajsecompmiesdon't have to CCmpany (^millions) reduce the profits they report to their Facebook 2015 $1,721 2014 $1,869 2013 $609 2008-12 $1,581 8yis $5,780 shareholdersby theamount that they Gcldrrai&chsQoip 407 782 98 1,589 2,876 deducted on their tax returnsssthe JP. Magai Chase &Gb. -- 407 137 1,313 1,857 V\fellsFargo "ocst"ofthestockoptions ltdoesnot Qjaloemm 453 453 271 543 1,720 103 280 231 883 1,497 rrdcs^forcunn^totiwt Crade 124 244 250 857 1/475 stockoptions inconsistently for tax Boon Mobil 2 115 48 1,082 1,247 purposesvera^shareholderreporting or "book" purposes This non-cash "expense"should not be dedidibteforeither teKor book purpe^ teaffioftterarp^nte AriazDn.oern V\lt Disney Nike Comcast l-CA Holdings FfepsiCb 119 6 78 1,014 1,217 313 255 204 373 1,145 281 218 132 334 965 282 267 205 199 953 235 134 113 351 833 133 114 117 450 814 about inconsistency, rules in place since2006 new require companies to lower thei r "book" profits to Be someaooount of options But the bookwrite-oflsarestill usually IVkDonald's GeneralMills CBS TmeV\mer 3M Intel 51 71 93 581 796 94 75 69 475 713 88 243 148 198 677 151 179 179 116 625 154 167 92 203 616 159 122 49 283 613 considerably les than what the UhitedTechnologies 64 103 115 324 606 rompmies^a tex deductions Boeing Monsanto 157 114 128 205 604 44 72 79 362 557 rules requirethevalue of thestock optionsfor book purposes to be Uh ion Pacific TimeV\merCble Yim Brands 62 118 76 298 554 92 141 93 148 474 50 42 44 336 472 calculated--orguessed at--when theoptionsane issued, while the tex deductions reflect theactual value when theoptionsareejendsed. These 25cmpanies $5,339 $6,590 $3,658 Other233 oompanies 3,893 3,832 3,575 All 258empalies $9,233 $10/123 $7,233 Note: figures include both federal and slate taxsa/inep. $14,099 10,673 $24,771 $29,686 21,974 $51,660 Eteca^oompmies low-ball theestirrertedvBues for book purpose^ they usually end up with bigger tex deductionsthan they deduct from the profits they report toshareholders9 Sorremembersof Congresshavetetenam inconsistency. In February of2013, ^nator Carl Levin (D-MI) introduced the "Cut Unjustified LoopholesM,''which indudesa provision requiring complies to treatstock options thesare for both bookaid texpurposes^well asmakingstockoption oompensationsubjecttothe$1 million noncorporate fee cfclictiorB for topeeuti^ pay. 9 The value of these "eastaxbenefits fromstock options is reported in corporateannual reports, aid we a it into account in calculatingthe ta>es thatcompmiesactuallypay.Stee the Methodologyat theendof thisstudyformoredetails 15 InstitutesTa^ionardBuonorriicRolkyI March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00020 Levin calculatesthat ow the pesteight years US companies haeconsistently teten fer hi^er stock option tax write-oflsthan they reportedbookexpenses. 199 corporations in thesamplededceed their "esxcessstock-option tex benefits" for at least one year in the200B-15period,which lowered their taes bya total of$51.6 billion overeat years (Someother companies enjoyedstockoption benefit^ but did not dedoeethem folly.) The tex benefitsranged from hkjn$5.8 billion for Facebookover theeight years to only tinyamountsfbrafeA/companesJust 25oompaniesenjoyed 57 percent ofthe total excesstaxbenefitsfromstockoptionsdiscloeed byall of our258 companies getting $29.7 billion of the$51.6 billion total. I ndustry-specific tax breaks. ThefederaltacoodealsoprcvidestexsiJbsidiestooompeniesthat encage in certain activities Foreemple: reseerch(\^ry broadly defined); drilling for oil andcps; providingalternathesto oil and gas; making videogames; ethanol production; maintaining railroad tracks; building NASCAR race tracfe; making movies; andawicfe\anetyofactMtiestha^ interestshae persuaded Conges need tobesubsidizedthrou^n thetaxcode Oneof thesespecial interest tex breaks is of particular importance to long-time texavoider General Electric. It isoxymoronicallytitled the "actix^financinge&ception" (thejote is that financing iscpnerally consideredto beaquintesentially pesheactivity). This tex breakallcwsfinancial companies (GE ha majorfinancial branch) to pay no taxeson foreign (orostensiblyforeigi) lending and leasing apparently whilededucting the interestexpensesofen^ging in such activities from their US taxable inoonre (This isanexoeptiontothegeneral rulethat USoorporationscan defer their US.taes on offehoreprofitsonly if they tatetheform of adhe income rather^ praveincome) Thistex breakws repealed in 1986, which helped put GE backon the tax rol Is But the tax breakwes reinstated, allegedly "temporarily," in 1997,and hbeen periodically ectended ever since; atacunent cost of more than $5 billionayear.V\fe don't know how much ofthis particular texsubsidygoes to GE, but in itsannual report, GE hassingled out the potentialexpiration ofthe "acti^financing" loophole oneofthesignificant "Risk Factors!'the company tas10 Notably,the "acthefinarncing" loophole some ofdozens of narrcwly-targeted temporary texgheaA^ys thatweremadepermanentat theend of2015. These tacbreafe, known oolledhely the fasten routinely rHBAHi temporarily for decades Fterhaps the most significantstep toward tex 10 GEs2012Annual reportstates:'OEsefl^i^t^ialeisfHiKHdbecaLffiadivelxsinessinccrTeeamedand indefinitely reirusted outside the UnitedStates is taed at less than tteUSrateAsignificantportionof this reduction depends upon a prevision of UStax lav that defers the imposition of US taxon certain actKefinancial services income until that income is repatriatedto the UnitedStatesasadividend.... In theaent the prevision is not sdenctedaiter2013,... weexpect oureffectKe tax rateto i ncreaaasignificantlyafter2014." 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferoentCorporateTa<Myth 16 ED_001523_00000854-00021 fairnessthat Congreoould tatewould te to fevercmrd eliminate thotexedendoe^ it mate permanent arri allow the rest of theextenderetoeDpireonoeand forali. WJ11IW ttiBIW IfOililsliliiO ||||||||j||||||||||i|^ J|||||||||||J||^^ ||l|lili||i|||i^^ |fli|i|||iitlt||iioii||^^ ||||j|||||||ll||^^||||||^^ l||||||||is||i||||||||^^ |f|||li|i|li|||||||l^^ What about the AM T? TheoorpofateAtematheMinimumTcK(AMT)w0Bfwead in 1986to ensure that profitebteoorporations paysome substantial amount in income taes no mutter ho/v many fax breaks theyenjoy under the r^laroorporatetaxThecorporate^ (unlitettemudi-rralgred personal AMT) was particularly designed tocurb leesing taxsheltersthat had allowed oorporationssuch as General Electric tocMoid most orali of their regular tax liabilities But bAsenacted in 1993and 1997at the behest cfcorporate lobbyistesharpty^ AMT,and new hardlyany rompaniespaythe fax In fast, manyaregettingrebatesfbr pestAMT payments In late2001, US HoifieofItepresentatiMesteadereattemptedto repeal theoorporateAMT entirelyand gheoompanies instant refondsforanyAM they had paidsinoe 1986. Publicoutcrystopped that outregeousplan, but theAMT remainsashell of itstbrmerself thatwill nequiresubstantial reform if it is to onoeacpin achieve itsgoal ofcurbing corporate faxa/oidance. 17 InstitutesTa^fcjnardBuonomicFblkyI March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00022 WHOIX^FraVIOWCF^TET^ Low-aid no-texoompantomay be happyabout theirability toavoid hugeemounfe in ta*ese^ery year, but our current corporate i noome tax mess is not good for the rest of us The losers under th is system include: The general public. Asashareoftheeoonomy,oorporatetexpaymentehavefallendraiiatt the last quartercentury.So oneobviousgroup o IceersfromgrcwingoorporatetexsMoida^ is the general public, which has to pey morefor--and/or get less in--publ icservioes, oretefacemounting national debt burdens that must be paid for in thefijture. Disadvantaged companies. Almcstasobvousshowthewide\arationintaxratesarnong industries^ andamongoompantowithin particular industries, ghesrelatively hi^i-texoompantoand industrtoa legitimateoomplaint that federal tex policy is helping their oompetitoisat their expense. The tebleon page8shcwed hcwwidely industry tac rates\ary.Thedetailed industry tablesstarting on page 36show thatdiscrepancieswithin industrtoato abound. For example: Honeywell Intemationaland Deereboth produce industrial machinery.But over the2008-15 period, Deerepaid31 peraentofiteprofiteinUSoorporateinoorreta>es,whiteHoneywellpaida tac rate of only 14.9 percent /tercspaoegiant Boeing paid an e^it-year federal tex rateof5.4 percent,while competitor General Dynamics paid 27.0 percent Household produdsmater Kimberly-Clark paid an eight-year rateof 16.9 percent,while competitor Clorox paid 28.1 percent PharmaoeuticalfinTiBi Lilly paid 17peroent of itsei^it-yearUSprofitsin federal income taes, while Biogen I DEC paid 35.3 percent TirreV\famerCablepaid 7.8 percent overeat years, while itsoompetitor Comcast paid 23.9 percent The U.S. economy. Besidesbeing unfair, thefad that thegovemnrentisoffering much lar^r tex subsidies tosomeoompaniesand industries than others sato poor economic policy. Such as^tem artificially boostethe rateof return for tax-favored indudrtoandoompmtoand reduoesthe relative rate of return for these industriesand oompan tothatare lessfavored. Tobesure* oompento tint pish for tax breeksarguethat the"incenti^s"will encourac^usefulactivities. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<IV1yth 18 ED_001523_00000854-00023 But the idea that thegoremment should tell businesseswhat kincfcof investments to rrateconfl idswith our besiceoonomic phi loeophy that consumer demandaid free marteteshould be the test ofwhch private investmmtemctesense Tobesure; most of the time; tex breatedon't hare much effect on bushessbehaviorAfteralI, companies don't lobby to harethegoremmenttell themwhat to do.Why would they? Instead, th^/ak forsubsidies to re/vard them for doing what they would doanyvtey Thus toa lags degrm, corporate tax subside simply an economically usefeswesteof resources Indeed, oorporateeecutives (opposed to their lobbyists) often insist that tacsubsidiesarenot the basis for their investmentdecisions Other things theysay,usually matte-much more; including demand for their product production oostsand so forth. But retail corporatetaxsubsidiesaremerely useless Making some kincfc of investments more profitebtethan others throirfi tex breekswill sometimesshift capital away from what'smost economically beneficial and into Icwer-yieldactivities Asa result, theflcwof capital isdiverted in 1a/or of those industries that hare been mostaggressire in the political martetplaoeofV\feshington,D.C.,at theexpense of long-termeoonomicgrcwth. State governments and state taxpayers. Theloopholesthatreduoefederalcorporateinoome taescut statecorporate income taxes, toasincrestateoorporartetexs^emBgenera tatefederal tole inoome astheirslarting point in computing taxableoorporateprofits11 Tht^when thefederal goremmentallcMS oorporationstowrite offtheir machinery fester than it wearsout or toshift US profitsorereeasortosheltereamin^fromoil drilling, moststetesautomatically doso,too. It'sa mathematical truism that Icwaid dediningstatererenusfromcorporateincomete^mea^ state ta>eson other state texpayersor diminished steteand local publicservices. The i ntegrity of the tax system and public trust therein. Ordinary texpayersharea right to besuspiciousanderen outraged about a texoode thatseemsso tilted toward pol itically well-connected companies Inatex^stem that by necessity must rely hea/ily on thevoluntary oompl ianoeoftensof millions of honest taxpayers^ maintainingpublic trust isessential --and that trust isendancpred by the specter ofwidespread corporate texavoidance. The feet that the tewallowsAmerica'sbiggest companies toshelter almost halfof their US profitsfrom tex, whiIe ordinarywage-earners hareto report erery penny of their earning has to undermine publ ic respect for the texs^stem 11 O\<mhepaslctaade,caTparHeBhatew.MrmByaress^ profits not only of&ore, but also fromstates that would tax then intestates that don't Inaddition, most statesateo provide their own set of business tex breaks or ctHtarBnts beyond the federal ores, although these often invoke tacs other then corporate income ta*s 19 InstituteonTa^ionarriBuonornicRolky| March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00024 AHJEAFOEEET1H3DI93HJRE Determining lax rates paid by thenation'sbiggsstand most profitebleoorporationsshouldn't be hard. La/vmaters> themediaand thegeneral publicshould al I h^astraightfonAardv^ of knowing whether our taxs^temrequiresoompanies lite General Electric to pay their feirshareBut infect, it'san incredibly difficult enterprise. Even veteran anal\stsstruggle to understand the often cryptic disclosures in oorporateannual reports And manyamateursoomeupwith (and unfortunately publish) hugely mistaken results The fact that it tookusso much tirreand effort to complete this report illustrates how desirable it would be ifcompanies would providethepublicwithdearerandmoredetailed information about their federal income taxes The best wey to provide themedfe tawmatetsand the public the information they need to mate informed decisionsabout our nation's taxcodewould beta requirecompanies to publicly disclose key financial data on aoountry-by-oountry basis Ideally, thiswould include thedisclosureoftotal revenues, profit, income tax paid, taxcash expense stated capital, accumulated earning numberofemployees onafull-time basis and book \alueoftangibleassetsonaoountry-by-oountrybasis For many companies thatwill already hae to file oountry-by-oountry reports to the Internal RsrenueScrvioe (IRS) in the coming years providing this information in financial staterrentswould represent I ittle to noadditional cost. Ataminrrernwereed astra^itfbrward sfetarent ofwhat they paid in federal taeson their USprofits aid thereeeorewhy thosetexesdifferedfromthestatutory35percenter informationwould be a major help, not only toanal>stebut also to policymaters AMinirruinBenchmaik forGorporateTaxDisclosure inAmual Financial Reports 1 Pretax profits as reported tosharehokters 2 Income taxes on those profits-- (a) Irocmetaespaidorp^dateonretumforyeajrdudirgeffecfeof canytahs (b) Irocmetaxesdefened (not yetpaidandnotp^ableon return foryear) US profits Ch US profits Foreign profits Qi foreign profits ToUSgo/t Tostatego/ts Toforeigngcvte ToUSgcvt EyUSgo/t B/stetego/ts B/foreignga/ts B/USgo/t Tostatego/ts B/stetego/ts 3 Detailscn inoome taxes paid and not paid (a) Ustcfal significant itarsreduargcrirneasirgtaxd^ corrparedtoprofite reported aboe(wi th doHararounte) (b) Taxcbleirocrre(profitsiesiterrsiistedebcxe) (c) Tacpadorp^dnleonretumfor^earbeforecredite, including the effectsofcarTycads (d) Qeditstetenon return fortaoble^ear(li^ingdetailsanddollar amounts) including theeffedsofcanyoads (e) T^aftercredits(shouldequal Iine2(a)doove) Qi USprofits USfederal stete USfederal USfederal USfederal stete stete stete USfederal stete Qi foreign profits Freigngo/ts USfederal USstate Freigngo/ts Freigngcvts Freigngcvts USfederal USfederal USfederal USstate USstate USstate Freigngo/ts USfederal USstate Notes:'Significant" meerearyitenn that reducescrraessestadofeirranneby more than3peroent,cr in thecareof^ percent. Itarsnotlistedsepaiatelybecaugeth^arenot "significant" dnould be reported in theaggregate.Ta< iters that undercurrent reporting arenot I isted in the footnote, forexarple, ^benefits frcmstockoptiorB, should be included in the ta<figuresreported under theruiesoutlireddcove. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferoentCorporateTa<Myth 20 ED_001523_00000854-00025 T4XRKRM (&CEFCRM) CPT1CNS More than thirty ^eareafter major loophofedosirgoorpoiatetaxreformswere under Ronald Reagan in 1986, manyofthe problemsthat those reformsvoedesigned toaddresshavereemerged--along with a dizzyingarrayofna/vcorporate ta*re\/oidanoetechniques But these problemscan be resolved. The discussion of ta<gi\mAa\sel^vhere in this report providesa clear roadmap to the types of reforms laA/makersshould consider: Repeal ing the ruleallcwing USoorporationsto"cfefer" their UStaeson their offehore profits so there would be no tex incentive toshift profits to offehore tex havensor jobs to Icwer-tex countries. Ftelatedly, oompaniesshould be required to immediately paywhat they ewe on their unrepatriated earning Limitingtheabilityoftechandotheroompaniestoueeeecutivestockoptionstoreduoetteir tee by generating phantom "costs?' theseoompanies never actually incur. Hah/ingset "bonus depreciation"onapath tewardexpirationat theend of 2019, Congressoould Wette red step aid repeal the rest ofaccelerated depreciation, too.Ataminimm, la/wTEters should notopand thesetex bresfebyallcwirgfor tte irnr^ investments FteinslatingastrongoorporateAlternathe M inimum Tacthat really does thejob it was originally designed to do. Increase transparency by requiring oountry-by-oountry publicdisclosureof company financial information, throu^ filings to tteSScuritiesarriExrdi^^ (seepacp20) &lly, theeeeensible proposalsbear I ittle resemblanceto the "reform" ideasput forth bysorrerrembers of Congress Corporatetex legislation row being promoted by many on Capitol Hill seemsfixated on themisguided notion thatasagroup,oorporationsarencweither paying the perfect amount in federal incomete^orarepayingtoomuch MaiymembereofCongre$seem intent on rrekingchanges that would mateiteesierandmorelucrattefor companies toshift taxable profit^and potentially jobs overseas Lswmatersshould reject the push toaterr itorial texs^temor tte implementation of border adjustment, both ofwhichwould I itely increase^ not decrease, offehoretexavoidanoe. Real, revenie-rasrgoorporatetax reform iswhat mostAmericHBwaitaid what our country rate2 Our elected officialsshould stop kowtowirg to tte loophole lobbyislsand stand up for tte majority ofAmericans 12CTJscarpB\eplaiforfeir, laerw-raising ^nsfonri cm be fort atwww.dj.org/pdf/<^ 21 InstituteOTTa^imarriEconomfc 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00026 \SKBf->BK!ErAIIJ3CN^^ Gtrrpary (Smllicrs) Nfetflix Axteraons C&onEhergy FGSBjap. WsrrsinEhergy CbnstellatiorBaxte Internat icnaBusines&fchines QjalOErrrn OereolidatecEdisai Sxithem Sarpnfnergy FFL Harris Xsl Energy LFfeuroes 29QxporatiorB Rying No Inocme Tac in201 2015Rofit 2015Tax 2015F^te Gtrrpary ($-millicns) 2015Ftofit 97 34 1,861 --28 -4 --236 -28.7% BxonlVbbil -12.7% Ctrninicrffeuroes -12.7% FfepoeFbldincp 159 2,746 435 850 962 509 5,787 2,993 1,760 3,662 1,135 913 1,091 1,525 556 -89 -51 -321 -166 -86 -177 -49 --26 -27 -36 -11 -10.3% StateSreetOap. -10.1% DIEEhergy -93% FteirairarhapofArerica -53% Areren -53% Eeraourofregy -4.9% AtrrceEhergy -4.3% (MEhergy -4.3% DikSrergy -23% Neouroe -2.5% Spthergy -2.4% Willans -20% TOOL 1,CE5 954 493 916 1,382 594 772 3,840 334 359 87 $37,891 2015Tax -2 --26 -3 -6 -3 -1 -2 -2 -- -- -- -- -- -- $-1,496 2015F&te -1.0% -1.0% -0.7% -0.6% -0.3% -0.3% -02% -0.1% -- -- -- -- -- -- -33% 28(bporatiorEREyirgND InocmeTax in201 Gtrrpary (Smlliars) 2014Rufit 2014Tax 2014F^te Gtrrpary ($millicrs) 2014Plfit Fhillips-Wil-feuaai 34 -44 -130.9% ArRodudsSOiemica 548 FirstEnergy 243 -132 -54.3% Sarprnergy 941 Ffepoa-bldirxp 406 -137 -33.7% DtminicnFfeuns 1,748 CderFtestairaits 191 -28 -14.6% TrrArre- 4,616 CRR Orrrixnity Ffealth$ste7s 1,790 228 -235 -13.1% OOTlidatecEclison -29 -127% fVfer$6tee 1,601 270 Rilineotm 73 -9 -123% Wlliars 3267 WsoensirEhergy 872 -44 -5.1% eraourofhergy 1273 XlBrergy 1,536 -73 -4.8% StafStreeCbrp. 1,097 FGSBjap. 1,836 -84 -4.6% Atrrczheigy 471 Areren 1,001 -37 -3.7% Q/SEhagy 703 ClBloerrm 3213 -98 -3.1% Dik&ergy 3,544 InteipiblicGoip 365 -6 -1.6% Nbde^rergy 3,674 l M-r-negy 1251 -16 -13% Nsuoe 830 TOTOL $37,623 2014Tax -6 -10 -11 --26 -9 -1 -9 -3 -1 -- -- -- -- -- $-1,048 2014F^te -1.1% -1.1% -0.3% -03% -03% -03% -03% -0.3% -0.3% -- -- -- -- -- -28% 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferoentCorporateTa<Myth 22 ED_001523_00000854-00027 32CbrporationsFryingNo IrccmeTax in201 Ctrrpary ($millkns) Internat icnaFper Contar FFL 2013Rofit 2013Tax 2013Rate Ctrrpary ($millicns) 489 -697 -1425% Netflix 35 -15 -41.0% Dik&ergy 195 -75 -38.57o Sfcectrhergy 2013Rofit 158 3,357 981 FfepmHoldin^ Rioeline.OEm FirstEnergy RRDarci ley&Src FGRFTbrp Arcen Wnctetrean JP.Moigaihe&C. IVteaic F^nsurannxpofArcica Sarprnergy WsocnsirEhergy NadEhfnergy 438 -128 38 -9 500 -118 66 -15 1,122 -218 8M -118 228 -27 12,486 -1,4a 228 --25 473 -52 883 -70 810 -50 2,452 -145 432% Boeing -24.6P/O XlBtergy -236% Milans -a.3% ArcicarfiectricFtwer -194% V\streck -14.7% NiSxroe -11.9% WizniirrrnriicaticrB -11.4% dei^stan -11.2% RircipalFinarcial -11.0% Cbleyisior^staTB -7.9% Check -6.0% Atrrcnergy -5.97o CMEEhergy WL 5,946 1,425 721 2,081 614 762 12,282 299 1,090 197 427 365 720 $52,651 2013Tax 2013Rate -9 -5.7% -123 -3.7% --32 -3.4% -199 -3.3% -^46 -3.2% -17 -2.4% -45 -2.2% -13 -2.2% -16 -2.1% -197 -1.6% -4 -1.3% -10 -0.9% -1 -0.6% -1 -0.3% -- -- -- -- $-3305 -74% Corporations Raying No Income Tax in 2012 CCmpany ($<nillions) Fabook Dominion Ffesouroes Texlnstrunents 2012 Profit 2012 Tax 1,062 -4a 392 -125 321 -81 2012 Rate Qrrpany ($-millions) -40.4% BereouroeEhergy -32.0% Praxair -25.2% Cneok 2012 Profit 792 870 571 HealthNet Principal financial Ffepoo Holdings NiSource Wsoonsin Energy Ccle^isionSystems Rubi ic&rvioeBiterpriGnoup FirstEnergy SempraEhergy IVDUFteeouroes McKesson FGSEOorp. SouthwestAirlines LG 34 896 480 620 786 43 2,013 1295 404 344 1,153 1,034 673 229 -8 -146 -76 -95 -113 -6 -204 -ia -36 -27 -85 -74 -45 -15 -24.9% Entergy -16.3% DISHNetwork -15.8% Vtestrock -15.3% American Electric Rower -14.3% DukeEhergy -12.9% R/derSystem -10.1% Trinity Industries -9.4% Coming -8.9% InterpdolicGoup -7.8% Qualcomm -7.4% Consolidated Edison -7.2% Priceline.com -6.7% NextEraEhergy -6.5% FFL IODOL 1,296 973 369 1,787 1,792 230 369 495 363 3,525 1,712 84 2,589 996 $30,593 2012 Tax -38 -36 -a -48 -36 -13 -52 -46 -5 -6 -4 -3 -27 -13 -1 -4 -- $-2,039 2012 Rate -4.8% -4.1% -3.8% -3.7% -3.7% -3.5% -2.9% -2.6% -23% -1.7% -0.8% -0.8% -0.8% -0.8% -0.7% -0.2% -- -6.7% 23 Institutes Ta^ionardEuonorricFblkyl March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00028 Qrrpary ($nillicrB) VMsrnsinEhergy LFteouroes Wnctetrean Pitr^Bj/ves FirstEnergy Traelers. Boeing R'ioelire.oem IntemationaFfeper RRDorrelle/Sons FG8ffiorp. Qieok FCAHoldincp Fec& CfenturJnk DaorEnergy 32GbtporatiorB R^ing Nb IrccmeTac in 2011 2011 Refit 2011 Tac 2011 Rate Qrrpary ($millicrs) 2011 Refit 715 --7^ -31,97o ArFtalcts8Chernicals 614 296 -90 -30.37o AtrrcdErergy 306 417 - -23.57o AT&T 11,994 386 -88 -22.7% Anaen 834 1,440 -243 -16.970 NSouroe 468 1230 -191 -15.57o IVDJFteuroes 333 5,105 -641 -126% Danaher 1,183 139 -15 -10.6% Dtk&iagy 1,759 893 -78 -8.7% InteipiblkQoip 407 131 -10 -7.97o Ffeinajrai^upofATerica 453 1,146 -77 -6.7% NadEhfneigy 2,441 583 -35 -6.1% ^aiarlXteh 50 3,198 -182 -5.7% DtrninionFfeiKES 2,153 2,706 -135 -5.O7o OEblansici^stiaiB 401 992 -49 -4.97o Vtestnock 163 3,459 -154 -4.4% Qoming 966 TOTL $47,362 2011 Tac --Z -11 -422 -27 -14 -8 -27 -37 -6 -7 -35 -0 -13 -2 -0 -2 $-2350 2011l^te ^.CP/o -3.7% -3.57o -3.2% -3.O7o -257o -23P/o -21% -1.57o -1.4% -1.4% -0.8P/0 -O.67o -0.4% -02% -02% -62% 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 24 ED_001523_00000854-00029 Appendix 1: MEIHTCKEf Thisstudy Bai in-depth lookatcorporatetaesover thepssteight >ears. It issimilar toaseriesofwidelycitedand influential studiesby Citizens for Tadustioeand the I nstituteon Taxational Economic Pol icy,starting in the 1980sand most recently in 2014. The new report oovers258 largeFortune 500 corporations,andanal^ theirUSprofitsandoorporateinoometa>esfrom2008to2015. CM the eicht-year period, theseoompaiiesreported $3.8 trill ion in pretac US profits>and, on average paid tax on just over half thatamount 1. Gwarg Our report is brad on oorporateannual reportstoshareholdersand thesimilar 10-Kforms that oorporationsare required to file with theSecuritiesand Excha^ Commission. Vterelied on electronic versions ofthese reportsfrom theoompanies, websitesor from theSECwebsite. we pursued our analysis, wegradually el iminatedoompaiiesfrom thestudy based on two criteria: either (1) aoompaiy lest money in any oneof theei^it years; or (2) aoompaiy'sreport did not provide sufficient information for lb toaocurately determine itedomestic profit income tate or both. This left uswith the258oompaiiesin our report. Someoompaiiesdid not report datafor al I of theeight years between 2008aid 2015, either because their initial publ ic offering ooourredafter2008or because theywerespun offof perwtoompanteafter2008. XAfeinduded theseoompaiiesin thesampleonly if they reported dataforat Ieest6of the8yeas The total ret federal income taes reported by our258companiesover theeicht yearsanounted to4O percentofall ret federal corporate income tacool lections in that period. 2 Conceptually,our method for computing effective corporate ratewesstraightforward. First,a oompmy'sdomesticprofitv^determinedand then c^^ local taxesweresubtractedtogive is ret US pretax profits beforefederal income taes (Weecduded foreign profitssince US incometa>es rarely apply to them, because the ta>esareindefinitelyTteferredforareoffeet by creditsfor taxespaid to foreign governments) \Afethen determined a company'sfederal current income taes Current taesare those thataoompany is obi icprted topay during theysar; they do not include ta>es"deferred''due to varioiB federal "tec inoentix^sTarchcBaorelerated depredation. Finally,wedivided current UStaesby pretax US profits to determireeffecthre tax rate13 13 Theefectivefederal neons ^rateswe report in thisstucyshould not beconted with ai tan that cxxrfBnes include in their annual reports with theunfortunataysimitaname"effectheta<rate"ThislatternirrteisaaxglornerationofU.S,stateaTdforeign incorretaes, including incorre taespaidand incorre taesnot paid (ija, deferred). It ismesningless forurKtastaTdirgwftacompeniesactielly pey in UStaes 25 InstituteonTa^fonardBuonomicRolky| March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00030 A. Issues in measuring profits. ThepretaxUSprofitsreportedinthestudyaregenerailyastheoompentediscloeedttem In afewcases^ ifoompaniesdid notseparateUS pretexprofitefrom foreign, but foreign profitswereobviouslysnail, we madeour cwn geographicallocation, baaed on ageogaphic breakdown of operating profitsmimsa proratedshareofanyexpenses not included therein (eg., overhead or interest), orweestimated foreign profitsbasedon reported foreign taesor reported foreign revernuesasashareof total worldwide profits Manycompanies report "nonoontrolling interest" income; which is usually included in total reported pre tax income This is inoomeofasubsidiary that is not taxable inoomeof the parentoompany.When substantial nonoontroll ing inoomewasdiscloeed, wesubtraded it from US and/or foreign pretax income Wheresignificant, weadjisted reported pretax profitsforseveral items to reduoedistortions. I n the second half of2008, the USfirnancial system imploded, tekingour economy down with it. By thefourth quarter of2008, roorekrwforsurehowttefed^governrrant'sfirandal rescue plan would work. Many bante predicted big future loan lcsses,and tookbig bookwriteoffefor these pessimisticestimates Commodity prioesfor thir^liteoil andgesand metafeplummeted,and manyoompaniesthat owned such ssrefe booted "impairment chargesTfor their supposed long-term decline in value. Companies that had acquired "goodwill" and other "interngibleasseterfrom mergerscalculated theestimated future retumsontheseaeselsand if thesewere lower than their "canyin^ their booted tookbig book "impairmentchanges"AII of these bookwrite-offewerenon-CTh and tai noeffect on eithercurrent income ta^oraoompany'scsh flow. As it turned out, the financial rescue plan, supplemented by the best partsof theeoonomicstimulus programadopted in early2009, acoeeded in averting the Depression that manyeoornomistehad worried oould havehappened. Commodity prices recovered, thestock rrartet boomed,and oorporateprofits zoomed upward. But in oneof theodditiesof bookaooounting, the impaimnentchargesoould not be reversed. Hereishcwwedealtwith theaeoctraordinary non-cten charge^ pte "restructuring charge^" that would otherwise distort annual reported book profitsand effective tax rate: 1. Smoothing adjustments Someof ouradjustmentesimply reassign bootedeqoensesto theyearsthat theecpensesvrereaotually incurred. These `temcothing"adjustmentsavoid abericitionsin oneyaartothenext a b85Es"by financial companies: Fitter than usingestimatesoffuture losses;we generally replaoed companies' projected future Ion losseswith actual loan chargeoffe less 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 26 ED_001523_00000854-00031 recopies O\er time; thetwoappr^^ but using actual loenchar^-offeismore aocurateandaoicfe^-to-^oer distortions Typically,financial oompaniesprovidesufficient information toallcw this kind ofadjustment to deallocated geographically. b 'FsMir/rgcfsfgss'fSometimesoomipaiiesannounoeaplanfo (suchasthe cost of laying offemplo>eesover the next fewysars) and will bookachargefor the total expected cost in they of theannounoerrent In caseswherethoerestruduringchargsvora^ distorted ^r-by-^r income; we reallocated theoosteto they the money wspent (allocated geographically). 2. "Impairments" Companies that booted "impairment" changestypically went togreet lengths toaesure imestorsand stockanalysts that these charges had no real effect on theoompioe'earning Somecompmie^^ excluded impairment chargesfrom thegeographical location of their pretax income. Forexample, Conooo-Ffiillipsaesignedits2008pretax profitstothroegeographicafees"Uni^^ and "Goodwill impairment," implying that thegoodwill impairment charge; if ithadanyreeledstenoe atall, was not related toanything on this planet. Inaddition, many analyste havecriticid these non cash impairment chargesasmisleecling, andean "acharade"14 Hoe is hcwwe treated "impairment chags": a Impairmentchargesforgoodwill (andintangibleaeselswith indefinite I rs) do not affect future book income; since they are not arortizablecMer time. Weadded these chargesbackto reported profit^ allocating them geographically based on geographic information thatoompaniessupplied, or a last resort by geographic re^nueshares b. Impairment charges toassets (tangibleor intangible) thataredepredableoramortizableon the bootewill affect future book inoomesorre/vhat (by reducing future bookwriteoff and thusincreasingfuturebookprofits).Butbig impairment changesstill hu^ly distort current yearbook profit Soasageneral rule, wealso added these back to reported profite if thechargesweresigiificant c Cceat: In^iiraifeof^teteldforsleonvwrenotlctttak All significant adjustments to profits made in thestudyare reported in theoompeny-by-oompeny notes 14 Oreartcledoecritegocriwill irrpaimient charg"aludiCTOBcharade" "which aeyoreand result ofan arbitrary recalculation ofan arbitrary calculation." 27 InstituteOTTa^imarriEoenomfc 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00032 B. Issues in measuring federal income taxes. The primarysourcefor current federal incoTEteesv^sthecompanies' income tec notesto their financial statements From reported current te^ ^subtracted "ocoesstec benefits" from stock options (if any),which reduced companies' tex payments tut which are not reportedcsa reduction incurrent tees, butare instead reportedseparately (typically in companies' csh-flcwstatemente). XA^divided theteK benefitefromstockoptionsbetwemfederalcndstateteDesb^ statutory tax rates(using a national aoagefor thestates) .Al I of the non-trivial tex bernefitsfrom stockoptiorethatwfoundare reported in thecompmy4Dy<x^ 3. Negates titrates A "necpthre''eifedhre tex ratemeans thatac^ a tec rebate Th scan occur by carrying back ee$tex cteductionsand /or credits toan earl ier ysar or ysarsand reoeivinga tec refund check from the US Treasury Department. Napthre tec ratescan also result from recognition of tax benefits daimed on earlier years' tec returns^ tut not reported $ tec reduction in earlierannual reporte becalm companies did not expect that the IRSwouldallcwthe tec benefits. Ifand when these "uncertain tex bernefite''are recognized, they reducreaoompanies reported current income tax in the yearthat they are recognized. See theapperndix on pe^SOforaOlerdisciEsionof'tinoertaintex benefits" 4.^e^fecfveaxrates Tenof thecompanies in ourstudy reporteflecthreeight-yea' USfederal income tec ratesthatare slightly higher than the35 percent official corporate tec rate Indeed, in particularysarssome companiesreport effects US.tec ratesthataremuch hi^rthm 35 percmt Ths phmorr^ usually die to tee thatweredeferred in the past but thateventuallycamedue Such "turnaround^' often involve smeterated depreciation teebreefe, which usually do rot tumaroundso tongas oompeniesareoontinuing to increese or maintain their investrrentsin plantand equipment. But these tec breafecan turn around if row irnvestmentsfell off (forexample, becausea badeoonomy mateoontirnuedne^irnvestrirentstemporarily unprofitable). BecaLBesonreoompaniesdo business in multiple industries^ our industry daesificationsarefer from perfect Vtegenerally, tut notalwa^besedthemon Fortune's industry classifications 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 28 ED_001523_00000854-00033 ^P0<3DC2: Wythe "cunenf'fedaal nnre taesthatoornoataedsdcse in thararnjal reportsarethebest (aidcnly)meesureofwhat cnp^ (orcbit pey) in federal irrare tax Someaialydsand journal ists* along with some corporations, haeoomplained that the "current income taxes?'reported by oorporationsunder oath in theirannual reportsarenotatruerreesureoftheinoorre taes that oorporationsactually pey.Thisoomiplaint is mostly incorrect Infect, `tunentinoometaes" withasometirres importait downward adjist^ thatwe mate for "ecoessstockoption tac benefits*" areagood cBBgsrmtofcompanies' tacsituations* aid are theonlyaolablenrecsureofwhat corporations pey in income taes broken down by peymentsto thefederal government,state govemmentsand foreign governments Our report focussson thefederal income tac that oompaniesanecurrently paying on their USprofits So we look at the current federal tac ecpense portion of the income tax prevision in the financial statements The "deferred"portion of the tac provision is tac based on thecurrent year income but rot dueyet becaieeof thedifferenoesbetween calculating inoomefor financial stetementpurpceesand for tac purposes When those timing differences turn around, if they ever do, the reted taes will be reflected in thecunenttacecpense.15 Thefederal current tacecpense isjist easilywhat thecompmyexpecteitecunrt tote when it files its tac return. If thecalculation of the income tac provision wesdone perfectly, thecunent tac ecpense (after adjusting for ecoesstock option taxbenefits) would eactly equal the total amount of tax shown on the tac return. But the income tac provision is calculated in February as the company is preparing its 10-K for filing with tteSscuritiesand Exchange Commission (SEC),aid theoompany'stac return isn't usually filed until September.While theoompany'stac return is prepared over thoseseveral months* thincpwill tefoundthatweren'taooountedforinttefinancialstaterrentinoometacprcMision, aid numbers thatwereestimated in Februay will be refined for theactual return. Thosesmall differences will be included in ttefollcwingyeafecunenttacexpensei but tte impart (especiallytecaLeewe lookat the ratesovera period of years). If the differences in any oneyearwere material, accounting ruleswould requiietteoompeny to restate their prior ^ear financials 15 CompaniesalsoeKplain in their taxfootnotewhy the income tax provision sn'tooctly 33% (theUSstatutory rate) in their "rate reconciliation." Itmight show, forearph that "USBusiness Crdite' reduced their total worldwideeffectKe tax rateby4.4%or that "Taxon Global Activities' reduced their total worldwideeffectivetax rateby 19.7% But thisdisdosureisa reconciliationof theirworldwideeffective rate, bed on the total of current aid deferred taes, aid doesn'ttelI you much, ifanything, aboutwhat they areoerrentlypaying in UStates 29 InstituteonTaxationarriEconomicM 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00034 ThecorrplaintetharajnwtincDmete"^ main points: A. Excess stock option tax benefits: Thefirst,easily dismissed complaint isthat"current inoometaes" donotirdudesomeofthetacbenefitethatOTrporationsen^^ stockoptions That iscertainly true. But ourstudy doessubtract thcee"exoes6stockoption tex benefits" fromcurrent income taes in the tex resulted B. Dubious tax benefits: Amoreinteresting,butalsoflaAedafgumenta^insttheu9eof current income taxes (lessstockoption tac benefits) invol^s theacoounting treatment ofdubious tex benefits that oompeniesdaim on theirtacretumsbutarenot allowed to report on their books until aid if these daimedtexbenefitearedlow^ Dubious tex benefits^ officially kncwn as "uncertain tex positions^ "unrecognized tex benefits"are tex reductionsthat oorporatioredaim when they file their tax returns but which they expect the IRS (or other taxing authority) to disallew. Forexanple'Suppoeeaoorporationon its2013 tex return tellsthe IRB that it cwes$700million infederal income texforthe^.Buttheoorporaiion'stexsteff believes that on audit, theoorporationwill most I itely ewean additional $300 million, because$300 million in tex benefits that theoompanydairred on its tax retumareunl ikely to beapprovedby the IRS ^sa result, theoorpoiation'scurrent income tex for 2013 that it reportstoshareholders(aid thatwecakulatein our reports) will be$1,000 million, the amount that theoorporationecpectetoadu^ income taxes16 After that, two thir^ in general, can happen: 1. More often than not. Suppcsethat,astheoorpoicrtion'staxstaiTpredicted,the IRS in2015 disallcwsthe$300millionindubioustexbenefitsclaimBdontheoompany's2013texretum.lnthis case* the$1,000million in reported current income texfor 2013will turnout to havebeen correct. In2015, whmthedubioustexbentfifearedsallcMHitheoom have topeybackthe $300 mil I ion (pits interest and penalties) to the IRS Fteasonablyenou^i, theoorporationwill not report that 2015peyback in ite2015annual report toshareholders^sinoe it had already reported itaspaid backin2013. 16DifcioOEtobenefiteaertboekedatheraoenentora"dBfaW'ta<benefituntHarriiftheylotheirdu^^ lnits2012anmal report, Argen offeisaconci pla^tion of how dubious tax benefits are treated in financial statements `V\fe roecgni the taxbenefitfroman uncertain tax position only if it is more I ikely than not that the tacpcsitbnwill besustai redon anination by the taxingauthorities based on the technical meritsof the position.... Thearrountof UTBs [unrecognidtaxbenefits] isadjustedasappropriateforchangesinfctsand cirarnstanoesj such assignificant arnendmentstoecisting ta< law, new regulations or interpretationsby the taxingauthoritie^ new information obtainedduringataxeriination,orrelutionof0ariinaton.'Arrgen2O1510-K, p. 54 (pdf p. 56). 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FteroentCorporateTa<Myth 30 ED_001523_00000854-00035 2. Occasionally. Suppose instead that to thesurpriseof theoorporation'slaxstaff, the IRS in 2015 aHowssorreor part of the $300 million in dubious tex benefitsdairred back in 2013. In thiscase* theoorporationwill reduce its2O15"currentinoometaf reported toshareholdersby theallowed amount of thedubious tac benefits prwioislyclairred on theoorporation's2013 tex return. But,arguesomeanalysls> isn'ttheri^itanswertogobackand reassign theeventuallyallowed dubious tac benefitsto 2013, theyeartheyweredainredon theoorporation'slacreturri?Thea is no,for two reasons: First, booking theoorporation'stacwindfoll in 2015, the year it wesal lowed by the IRS; mates logical sense That'sbecauaeuntil the IRSallcwed thedubioustex benefits; itwas thejudgment ofthe oomperiy'stexexperlsthat the companywas probablynot lecpllyentitled to those tex benefits In essence, the IRS'sallowarnoeofall or pertofthedubioustexbenefitsdaimedontheoompeny's2O13 tacretum isthesameastheoorporationreoeivinganunexpectedtacrefund in2015. It'sas if theoompany had initially borrowed the moneyfromthe IRS; but expected to p^r it back (with interestj.When and if the I RS "forgi\es"part orall ofthe "loan," then theoompanyrecognizes the tac benefit. Lilovisa suppose you borrowmoney from you employerwith theexpedation that you'll pay it back But later,youremployerforghresyour debt Youdidn't have to declare the loan as incomewhen you borrowed the mon^r, but you do haeto dedare it a incomewhen the loan is forgiwi. Second, even ifone bel ieved that the2015 taxwindfal I oight to be reassigned to 2013, there issimply noway todoso. That'sbecaLeeoorpoiationsdo not disdoeesufficient information in theirannual reports to rrEtesuch a retroacthre reallocation.17 17QxnpmiesdoprovideinfoiTTTationonthegrcwthordeclirBintheariountofdubioL6te<benefitstheyhaveoutsteidirQ.T^ providedona geographicbasis, hcwea: Moreen it does rt distinguish between beneffe^ (which reduces thearount of outstanding dubious tax benefits) aid benefits notallowed (which also reduced theariountcfouteteTdingdubioiste<benefits).Forthsetwo reasons, the currently provided information on dubioustexbenefits is usetefor ourgoal ofrressuring US income tees paid on US profits 31 InstituteOTTaxatiOTarriEconomfc 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00036 C. A final point here, regarding a potentially useful measure called "cash income taxes paid": In theirannualrepoi^toshareholder^corporationsatoreports^^ income tees paid." Cash income tees paid is ret ofstockoption tec benefitsand doesnot include "deferred" tees18 Unite current tees^ however, cash income teespaidsubtradsdubious tec benefits that are My to be reared later (and adds thosedubioustax benefits ifand when theyare later reversed). "Cash income tees paid" issometimes interesting, but it isusslessfor purpceesof measuring thefederal income tees that USmultinational oorporationspayon their USprofits That'sbecause"cash income tees paicf'are not broken da/vn by teeing jurisdiction. I nstead, this measure lumps together USfederal income tees, USslateincometeesi and foreign income tees Sincemost big oorporationsare multinationals these days, and almost all aresubject to both federal and state income tees^ that'sa fetal defect.19 Even for purely domesticoorporationSi "cash income tees paid" isa problematic measure It often fails to match income inagten yearwith the taxes paid for that year (sinoeoompaniesdon'tsettleupwith the I RS until after agten yser isover). Thecash peymentsmadeduring theysar include quarterly estimated teepaymentsfor thecurrentysar,balanoesdieon tecretumsfor prior years and any reflincteor addition al teesduerea result of tec retumeOTinationsorloscarrybacte Tobesu^ if Wi income tees paid"werereportedbytecingjurisdictionandbetterlintedwiththe pretec income in agiven year, then thismEasureoould be ireful. Butasof new, it is not, except in oneway: itsupporte our ireofcurrent teesreamereureofhcMmuch in teescorporationsare really paying. If you oompareaoompany'stotal current tee (aftersubtracting theeresstock benefits) tocreh tee paid overaperiodofysarSiyouwill see that theyaregenerallyvery dose. Thedifferenoes^ ifany,suggest that the effedwerateoorporationsarepayingmaybeev^ les than what weSecalculated. 18Bothcunentandcash income taesalsoincludeiefundsoftaespaid in the pest ifaoompeny "carries back" "tax Ice^'toealier^easand^sa refund ofprerioislypaidta^Thiscanoccurevenifaoompanyreportsbookprofits.Cunentandcashincometajesalsoaitomaticdyindu^ payments of taxes "deferred" in the pest in the relatively unusual occasions when those "cteferred" fees aaually goto ae not offeet by additional fe deferrals. ("Deferred fees" ae fees that are not paid in the current year, but may or may not core die in future yeas). 19Thegoodnewsrepdirgworldwide"c^incometa>epaid"isthat,ovadime,thGyareusuallyvaysimilatoworldwide"M^ (less stockoption tax terefits). In fct, forthe258corporationsin ourstudy,theoverall differencebetween worldwidera^^ current feesover the2008-15 period was fess than 1 percent ^individual complies, the&5earcurrertandc^fe<figureswerealsoquitesimilarinmo6tCTes.ForhalfcftheconT3anie^ worldwide current aid cash effective tex ratesvrereeffientially identical (plusorminisl percerrta^point).For70percentofthecompaiie^ the 8-yearworldwide currentand cash effective tax rateswerewithin 3 percentapppointsofeach other,andfor 84 percentof the conpaniestheS-yearworldwide current aid cafe effective femateswerewithin 5 peroentagepointsofeachother. Forthe handful ofoutlieis,goingbaafewmioreyeas usually bringscash and current fees backintolirewith oneanother. The refativeygrallexceptioregenerallyaeemstoirwlvecor^ that arevery aggressive in chiming dubious taxbenefits year afteryear.Snce it fees time for the feeauthorities to disallowthesedubious tax benefits, worldwidecsEfe fees paid over time bysuch companisare typically somewhat lower than "current income fees" (lesstockoption benefits). 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferoentCorporateTadV1yth 32 ED_001523_00000854-00037 4PFEMHX3: Rfteen multinational cnpaaticrs that cbrot prcvicteplaEible^ographb bre^ctwTsof their preta< profits Noticeablymissing from oursampleof258profitebleoompmesaresore multinational corporations, aril aAppleaid M icrceoft Theyaeecduded becaeewedo not tel iee thegeographic breakdown of their profitsbetween the USand foreign countries that they report toshareholders For multinational oompeniesj weareat the mercy ofoompaniesaccuratelyallocatingtheir pretax profits between USand foreign in theirannual reports Hardlyanyonebut uscaresabout thisgeographicbook allocation, yet fortunatelyfor it appears that thegreat majority ofcompanieswe reeeonably honest about it Even oompaniesthatareshfting US profits to offehore tex havensgenerally do not matethe implausibledaim to theirshareholdersthatsuch USprofitswereactually "foreign." SorreoompanieSi however, report ^ographic profit al locations that we find to be obviously ridiculous I ndicatonsof ridiculousness include: Aoompanyreportsthatall oreven more than all of its pretex profitsweforeigi, even thou^i most of itsrevenuesandaseetearein the UnitedStetes AoompanyreportsUStaesthatarea\eryhi^ishareofwhat it calls its US profits^ white itsforeigi taesareavery Icwshareofwhat it calls itsforeigi profits. Aoompenyadmitsthat it hasused texschemes to move profits to Icw-or no-tex jurisdictions A company hasa largeamount of "unrecognized tex benefits?' relatke to thecurrent income taes it repcrte These"UTBs?'aretax reductions that companies hsMcdaimad on their tex retumsbut do not expect to beal lowed when their retumsareaidited (and ae this notallcwed to be reported as tex ssMngs to their shareholders). Asubstantial portion of UTBs invoheschenrestoshift profitsto tex taes Inour piwiousoorporatestudie^wgener^ out sute suspicious oompm with grave reservations^ we included some potential "liar companies?' that wehic^ily suspected madealot more in the USand lessovereeesthan they reported to their shareholders I n our current report, we havedone tetter.Wehave left out of our main analysis 15 companieswhose geographicallocationsweclo not trust (and that we hi^ily suspect haveshifted asigiificant portion of their USprofitSi on paper, into tex havens) AAfehave included in thisappendixsome information on 33 InstituteOTTa^iOTarriEcorOT 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00038 these 15oompanies Inatableon this page, weshcwtheworldwidepnetaxprofitsforthesesiEpidous oompaniesoverthe2008-15period,alongwith their worldwide income tepesand worldwideeffecth^ tax rate Herearesomsof thespecific reonswhy weanesuspidoifiof the 15 multinational oompan ieswe ecduded from our main study: 15 multinational corporations that do not provide Abbott Laboratoriessa>s that only plausible geographic breakdowns of their pretax profits I 7 percent of its2008-15pretax Cmoanv Broaton Vtetem Digital h^App Argen Apple Gfelgsns Qlreri Stores Vtetem Uhion EMD Jbhnsm &Johnsm Abbott Laboratories Mbcsdl Cfeoo Systems All 15 companies 2008-15Wbrldwide pretax profits $4.1 9.3 4.3 43.5 23.6 305.7 102.1 9.7 58.1 8.8 23.1 131.0 38.4 188.3 77.5 $ 1 027 6 Worldwide cash income tax rate 3.2% 4.4% 11.1% 11.8% 152% 16.5% 16570 17.8% 17.8% 18.1% 18.1% 182% 19.5% 19.8% 20.6% 17 5% profitswereeamed in the United State despite the fed that itsa>s4O percent of its revenueswere in the US The company also says that its current US federal income tax rate on that tinyshare of its profitswas98 percent! In contrast, Abbottsatys its foreign current tax rate on its purported foreign profitswasonly 162 percent Amgen says that only 38 percent of its profitswereeamed in the US, despite the feet that itsays78 percent of its revenues were in the US Itdaimstohavepaida25.3 percent tax rate in the US on its US profits, while peyinga mere 5.3 percent tax rate on itsforeign profits NOTE: "Cash" hcorre taxes differ from "current" income taxes primaily because they are net of "unrecognized tax benefits." "UTBs" are tax reductions that companies have claimed on their tax returns (aid have reduced their actual tax payments), but are not allowed to be reported as lowering taxes to their shareholders because companies expect that the tax benefits will not be allowed when their returns are audited (e.g., by the IRS). Cash income taxes include U.S. federal & state taxes aid foreign taxes. The total "cash" taxes paid by these 15 companies were 11 percent less than the "current" taxes Appleclaimsto havepaida4O percent US tax rate on itsdaimed US profits but only 5.8 percent on itsforeign profits The lew "foreign" rate mainly reflects the feet that Apple, for tax purposes has moved about two-thirdsof itsworldwide profits to Ireland, where those profits are taxed neither by I reland nor by the US orany othergovernment 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferoentCorporateTa<Myth 34 ED_001523_00000854-00039  Celgenesctysthat 60 percent of ite revenueswe in theUS,butonly 12 percent of its profitswe US Using Ce^ne'sbreekdown of profit, itsUStex rateon USprofitswouldbe39.5 percent, while its foreign tex rateon "foreign" profitswould beonly 4.1 percent. Cisoosa^sthat its UStaeswe57.3 percent of its US profited while itsforeign tax ratewesa mere72 permit eBcydaimstohavepaida UStex rateof50.1 peraenton itsUSprofits^whilepayingonlya5.1 percent foreign tex rateon its purported foreign profits (d3ayss^onlyaquarterof itsworldwide profits we earned in the US,even though itss^shalf of itsrevenueswere in the US). EMCdaimstohavepaida34.5peroentUStexrateon itsdainredUSprofitSiiensusaforeigitex rateon foreign profitsof only 9.4 percent. GileedSdenoesclairnstohavepaida34peroentUStexrateonitsUSprofits>\ensusaforeigitex rate of only 1.9 percent Googledaimsto have paid a UStex rateof 34.3 percent, \ersusaforeigi tex rateof only 5.5 percent MicrcHrftsa^thatonlyaqiiarterofitsprofitsareintheUS,eventhou^itsayst^ its revenuesare in the US Microsoft would lite us to believe that itsUStex rateon itsUSprofitswas 45.7 percent, while it's foreign tex rateon foreign profitswesonly 9.6 percent NetAppclairnstohavepaida53.7 percent taxrateon itsUSprofits>butonly7.0peroenton itspurported foreign profits Itsa^sthathalfof itsreveniesareintheUS,butonlyasixth of itsproffe \AtestemDigital dainBtohavepaidaUStexrateof50.7percent,\ersusaforeigi tex rateofonly 3.0 percent. \Atestem Union daimsa UStex rateof75.6 percent on its US profited \ersusaforeign tex rateofonly 6.6 permit 35 InstitutesTa^fcjnarriBuonomicRalkyI March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00040 S-milliorB IncLBtry&Qxrpan/ Aercepace&deferBe Berg LHtecfTedncfcges RitaellCbilre L-3Gmnnicatiors Ryttan IxbrihropGunren ReciscnCcStjserts LaWesdIVbrtin S4C AlientTah^stems Gaaal Dearies lercspeoe&delerBe Chemicals ArRalris&ChsTicals Cfelenas IVteaic EsstnmChartal Rarair QRnt ShawinAAHIiars fvfarsnto Bnfeb FFGInlBtries CFInlsinesHblciirgs Chemicals Qxrputeis, offioeequip, softxAsre, data Cbmirg Oekmrn Intetnaticral BusressIVkhres Rtna/Bevies l-bnis Intel Qade T&aslrsbirrenis CA QgiizritTedTDlogy&luticrs Cbrnputejs, offioeequip,soffeAEte, data Bigineering&oorEtructiai MR TutorFferini QaitaSarices BrccrOcip .hjoteBgireerirgGup Bigineering&oorEtruction Financial ferarareGapofArata SfateStieetCbip. RindpeilRrErnal FNCfirercialSavioesGap Loans AtuQilla^Er JP. Mct^nGees&Cb. V\llsFago TiaieletsCta I_______ Rtafit Effective Federal Corporate Inocme Tax Retesen258 MajorCorporatiors, 2008-2015 by IndiEtry Expt-Year Totals Tax Rate Rofit 2015 Tax Rate Rofit 2014 Tax Rate Refit 2013 Tax 40,026.7 24,4212 6,315.0 7,613.8 21,037.0 21,383.0 12,428.8 35,509.0 4,074.0 2,954.1 24,720.3 200,482.7 2,146.7 2,546.2 1,134.0 1,461.6 4,335.8 4,712.0 3,001.2 8,880.6 1,043.1 7632 6,674.2 36,6984 54% 104% 18.0% 19.2% 22.0% 24.1% 25.0% 25.6% 25.8% 27.0% 18.3% 6,828.0 2,819.0 8232 481.6 2,4820 2,7060 1,015.9 4$60 171.0 $5.0 3,511.3 26,072.1 10660 $4.0 1582 38.5 718.1 207.0 5^59 13170 427 272 7773 6,282.0 $.5% 9.4% 2% 8.07o $9% 7.6P/0 $2% 33.6% 2507o 102% 22.1% 24.1% 6,7797 4240,8 751.0 738.9 2868.0 28970 21122 5369.0 697.0 143.0 3278.4 29,895.2 $17 $3.8 105.0 72.9 798.1 6$.O 5152 2020.0 835 $.8 787.4 5,864.6 8.6% 62% 14.0% 9.6% 27.8% 21.4% 24.4% 37.6% 91% $3% 24.0% 19.6% 5,916.0 3,6229 745.6 855.7 26120 2751.0 21557 42520 171.0 5035 32$.O 26,841.3 -199.0 $0.9 143.6 181.7 7098 760.0 4918 12040 40.0 1469 838.0 4,837.5 4,117.4 2,857.3 6,814.1 5,134.0 6,142.3 8,678.0 7,294.6 15,236.3 4,649.3 4,135.5 11,741.6 76,8004 439.5 326.3 912.7 723.0 1,036.3 1,602.0 1,4672 3,241.4 1,0402 1,169.0 3,772.2 15,729.8 10.7% 11.4% 134% 14.1% 16.9% 18.5% 20.1% 21.3% 224% 28.3% 32.1% 20.57o 727.7 221.8 $8.9 5360 950.3 10000 1,488.7 2,1552 734.9 8012 964.5 10,6992 1407 18.8 619 87.0 1893 218.0 3255 638.6 185.5 1580 256.9 2,289.1 $0% 857o 937o 14.6% 19.97o 15.7% 21.97o 29.6% 252% 19.7% $.5% 214% 518.0 5202 301.1 621.0 974.4 2718.0 12082 2383.5 905.6 3E.5 10560 12464.4 -62 942 46.0 64.0 $5.4 778.0 $1.5 $8.5 2$.3 1$.O 638.0 3,103.5 -1.1% 18.1% 153% 10.$% 272% $.6% $.8% 24.7% 263% $.0% 326% 24.9% 4$5 789.1 2$3 1,4070 871.0 939.0 1,0529 23167 7102 536.4 2031.0 11,303.9 $2 61.1 -20 143.0 $.0 160.0 190.7 $6.7 219.1 15BO 6303 2,051.0 7,458.0 20,581.7 64,728.0 3,408.7 5,877.6 77,498.3 39,856.5 16,387.1 5,733.2 2,869.6 244,398.6 71.0 1,269.7 4,849.0 7962 1,492.5 21,603.3 11,643.2 4,954.1 1,913.2 1,015.7 49,607.8 1.0% 6.2% 7.5% 234% $4% 27.9% 29.2% 30.2% 334% 35.4% 20.3% 406.0 2,993.0 5,787.0 4859 1,000.6 8,787.5 3,783.5 3218.0 679.7 679.1 27,910.3 40.0 -1660 -321.0 115.6 -27.0 2696.5 1,198.5 1,034.0 2817 2587 5,110.9 9.9% -5.37o -557o 2387o -257o $.7% 31.7% 32.1% 41.47o $.1% 18.3% 23520 3213.0 6368.0 360.5 443.0 11,518.1 4,9525 2684.0 700.5 5102 33,761.8 $.0 -S8.0 1,134.0 71.7 1500 3273.1 13512 8$.O $1.5 187.8 7,809.3 1.6% -3.1% 163% 19.9% $.9% 283% $.4% $.6% 402% 343% $.1% 1$20 3,798.0 6,679.0 $1.3 7231 9314.5 5,103.3 1507.0 667.0 495.0 $,830.2 3.0 1080 1,4060 783 213.0 26805 1,4063 215.0 1850 193.7 6,497.8 2,653.0 1,065.1 2,248.8 1,782.7 2,524.1 10,273.8 591.6 298.1 639.9 558.1 876.3 2,964.0 22.3% 28.07o 28.57o 31.3% 34.7% 28.8% 571.1 702 253.3 213.8 267.5 I4IO.9 161.6 53 853 96.0 71.8 417.1 283% 7.67o 33.CP/0 382% $9% 29.6% 4$3 159.5 2867 253.9 $99 1,396.2 140.4 444 72.9 74.0 103.6 4354 329% 27.9% $.4% $.1% $.4% 31.2% $19 1189 4856 2172 3$.6 1,542.2 W6 $1 1709 $.6 124.0 500.1 3,774.3 10,3102 7,790.0 32,952.7 11,0552 1,630.0 114,769.5 185,024.8 30,729.0 14.1 5652 5144 2,724.7 1,276.2 190.8 17,956.3 33,330.6 5,870.5 04% 55% 6.6% 8.3% 11.5% 11.7% 15.6% 18.0% 19.1% 493.3 1,025.1 1,406.1 5343.O $6.0 294.4 224147 31,044.4 4,621.0 -1.4 -5.9 169.9 903.0 79.0 43.9 3I6O.O 10,447.4 1008O -0.37o -087o 121% 1697o 2187o 14.97o 14.1% 33.7/0 $.5% 768.9 1,097.5 1,474.5 52728 I3O5.O 2145 $,$1.0 31,475.4 4098.9 215 -0.5 S93 1,0608 370.0 $.8 1273.4 6,916.4 1,1689 28% -0.0% 67% $.1% $.4% 159% 6,3/o 221% $.9% 4732 1,486.7 1,0002 51280 1,751.0 218.5 12486.0 $3759 4304.0 -SO 07 -28 $.0 171.0 $0 -1,4203 4,3769 1,014.0 fte -33% 14.4% 19.3/0 212% 272% 27.5% 228% 283% $.4% $2% $.0% 18.0% 15.4% 7.7% -112% 102% 6.4% 17.0% 18.1% 15.6% $.1% 303% 31.0% 18.1% 02% 2.8% 21.1% 27.8% $5% $.9% 27.6% 14,3/o 27.7% $1% 21.8% $8% $.6% $2% $.1% 37.7% 324% -11.0% 7.4% -09% 1.9% 9.5% 133% -11.4% 149% 21.1% Rofit 2008-2012 Tax $,473.0 13,7385 30921 5517.5 13,075.0 13,OSO 7,1420 $9220 3,035.0 20125 14,707.7 117,6742 -202.1 1,4875 727.1 1,1685 2,109.7 3,1250 1,7233 3039.6 8863 5S4 4271.5 19,714.3 24132 13$3 5,6$8 25IO.O 3,316,7 3,631.0 3544.9 8,$1.0 2298.7 2500.3 6,790,0 42,332.9 228 1S3 828 9.0 525.7 446.0 6=0.5 10470 319.4 7$.O 2247.0 8,286.1 3,438.0 577.7 45$4.0 2281.0 3,6$9 470482 $0173 8978.1 3,6859 1,1552 152,8962 -10.0 1,43.7 2,6$.O 533.7 1,1365 129442 7,087.3 2086.1 1,164.9 375.5 30,189.8 1$37 7165 12183 1,067.8 10682 5,924.5 169.0 223 30.8 334.5 577.0 1,611.5 20$9 07D1O 3,8192 172089 7,6$2 8726 $5879 $,1201 16,405.1 45.9 462.0 255.0 6S.9 W2 79.1 14,922 110509 2$9.6 Rate -1.0% 10.9% 182% 212% 161% 240% 242% 18.4% $.5% 270% $.5% 16.8% 95% 11.5% 14.5% 17.1% 15.7% 123% 19.7% 19.7% 152% $2% $.1% 19.6% -03% 13.5% 5.5% $.5% 31.9% 27.1% 272% 327% 3I.5/0 $5% 19.7% 13.4% $7% $.5/o 31.5% 34.5/0 27.2% 25% 6.9% 6.7% 3.9% 8.5% 9.1% $7% 124% 15.5/0 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 36 ED_O01523_00000854-00041 I - ' - .. S-milliorB Industry&Oxnpany EBSTCtup. Afew/Otrporaticn RfthlhiidE&rrop WRfeWey GothmSctHOap USBrcorp CpitalCfeFineraal l-BRHock UrniGap DeojrRrErdal&Moes OBrlesStwb F^rrcrd^YEsHraxial ArericarRrErcialGap RrWhfBscuoes financial Financial DataServices AretaiBpreas fvtetaCt Alicmbla^stsTS Rsetv Msa Finarcial DataServices Food&btages&toten QrstellaticnBa-rfe QxaCbla Onerai Mils Klbgg CrrptelIScLp CtnAjaFoeds AdisrCrselsMdlrri Ffepdb l-birrel Foods Hbtee/ JMSnrter AtriaQap f^nddsArHicar Fbod&baerages&tabaooo Health cae QnmnityHtelth Sostare Cavita KAFbtrge Og-B Ihhetsall-telthServoes LdxtatoiyC&p.afAierica ClEstDicgTstics Atra UtBrtl-feaith VXlFbht LHted-telthQoip HdthNet Hrrea Cnteia IVblinal-teiltae Healthcare Household&persanal prodicfe Effective RedenilCbrporate Inocme Tax Rates on258 MajorQxporations. 2008-2015 by Industry Bit-Year Totals Refit Tax 18,531.0 3,837.0 3,297.4 7022 11,009.0 2,387.0 4,411.7 1,023.6 50,2104 12,118.9 49,331.0 12,191.0 31,122.5 8,602.2 5,122.1 1,469.1 5,9824 1,897.4 22,538.1 7459.6 12,806.6 4,257.5 3,800.3 1,354.2 4,698.8 1,710.1 11,753.6 4,354.9 632,650.8 125,807.5 Rate 20.7% 21.3% 21.7% 23.2% 24.1% 24.7% 27.6% 28.7% 31.7% 33.1% 33.2% 35.6% 36.4% 37.1% 19.9% Rollt 2,810.0 373.6 2X8O 687.6 3,455.0 7X0.0 6,157.5 538.5 600.4 3,469.0 2,180.0 755.4 611.0 1,9152 100,509.2 2015 Tax 535.0 983 6620 177.7 709.0 15660 1091.0 1672 2305 1245.0 740D 273.1 2160 724.8 25,714.5 Rate 8% 25.0% 39.0% 258% 20.3% 25.8% 32.3% 31.1% 40.6% 35.9% 33.9% 35.1% 33.7% 37.3% 25.6% Refit 2617.0 623.9 1,702.0 906.3 6,7820 7,5920 6,0225 6480 67.3 3,7.0 2043.0 6873 571.0 20805 102,6542 2014 Tax 5510 1154 4240 2547 12513 1,888.0 1034.0 2455 128.4 1215.0 747.0 2544 2350 7935 21,055.6 Rate 21.1% 183% 240% 261% 18.6% 252% 321% 37.9% 190.7% 34.4% 36.6% 37.0% 46.4% 38.1% 20.5% Refit 28120 6114 2295.0 5935 6,446,0 7X7.0 5,3228 718.0 980.9 3,833.0 15480 503.0 654.0 1,8308 92,588.8 2013 Tax 1,004.0 68.4 494.0 112.3 2536.0 1,885.0 1,330.0 1953 277.9 1,0X0 598.0 180.7 308.0 6828 15,040.9 41,674.7 16,648.7 3,299.6 6,274.9 30,063.9 97,961.8 9,577.2 4,178.9 892.5 1,975.9 9,774.0 26,398.5 23.0% 25.1% 27.0% 31.6% 32.5% 26.9% 6,47.2 30X3 784.1 S88.6 6,628.5 18,187.6 20021 6123 305.6 3,6 1,9215 5,245.1 32.6% 19.1% 39.CP/O 28.7% 29.0% 28.8% 7,749.9 3225.3 691.6 970.1 73696 20,006.5 20913 9323 196.4 3161 2278.6 5,814.7 27.0% 289% 2B4% 326% 309% 29.1% 6,1576 2966.3 533.5 8169 1,681.8 12,156.1 1,6605 9943 174.3 2X0 5068 3,616.8 5,590.6 23,845.9 15,295.4 8,748.3 7,279.7 7,200.8 11,180.0 26,3934 5,508.0 7,623.5 5,449.9 47,468.0 20,619.0 192,202.5 414.3 4,853.8 3,155.5 1,971.6 1,696.7 1,7934 2,950.0 7432.8 1,604.3 2,2712 1,8414 16,583.0 7,5994 54,167.3 7.4% 20.4% 20.6% 22.5% 23.3% 24.9% 264% 28.2% 29.1% 29.8% 33.8% 34.9% 36.9% 28.2% 599.3 1,694.8 1695.0 497.5 820.0 700.7 1,138.0 2,821.9 9792 1,313.9 0227 7,627.0 5,846.6 26,856.6 -573 711.0 4120 200.4 241.0 295.8 270.0 1,033.0 2306 3885 3403 2516.0 3298.9 9,930.2 -00% .0% 21.7% 403% 29.4% 2% 23.7% .6% 28.7% 29.6% .s% 33.0% .4% 37.0% 475.0 15603 1,6654 4874 9672 8952 2167.0 23821 861.4 12777 4838 7X3.0 20396 22,545.1 1305 867.0 331.0 2910 2412 281.6 6410 1X97 244.1 3414 1429 2350.0 799.1 7,9314 27.5% 55.6% 19.9% 599% 24.9% 31.4% 296% 53.3% 263% 7% 293% 323% 392% 35.2% 2013.6 2385.4 2144.4 2085.3 793.1 1,064,7 1,4950 2968.7 7505 12126 8058 6,5X0 2609.6 26,864.7 876 713.0 469.4 2822 258.1 3805 348.0 9952 212.0 3326 2X4 2o.o 551.4 6,9354 2,683.5 6,359.3 19,1164 14436.6 5,156.0 6,109.1 7,8674 22,564.1 1,859.7 35,1172 61,900.0 1,685.9 14,5304 2,010.5 888.8 202284.9 237.1 1475.5 4,696.2 4,091.2 1,546.6 1,873.3 2,423.5 7,290.8 632.8 12,167.0 22,194.9 630.0 5,689.7 836.6 420.8 66,206.0 8.8% 23.2% 24.6% 28.3% 30.0% 30.7% 30.8% 32.3% 34.0% 34.6% 35.9% 374% 39.2% 41.6% 47.3% 32.7% 393.0 745.6 3,461.7 2,888.9 1,003.9 5621 1,021.9 4,133.0 294.6 4514.6 9,060.0 433.6 2343.6 691.3 315.4 32,663.1 7.0 160.0 1,064.7 1,848.7 324.6 2075 223.9 1,753.1 1228 1,917.4 4,1550 253.9 1,054.6 311.3 165.4 12,772.7 23% 21.5% 39.8% .3% 32.3% 339% 222% .4% 41.7% .5% 41.8% .6% 45.0% 45.0% S.4% 39.1% 2X0 1,1465 2243.6 29075 8377 7295 766.0 3,423.0 201.6 43IO.3 9085.0 2152 2,091.1 4543 1328 29,072.1 -29.0 159.9 8052 1,0X3 220.1 2.7 204.0 1,198.8 472 15910 3883.0 0 996.1 2093 696 10,713.0 -127% 132% 359% 362% .3% 31.4% .6% 350% .4% 369% 41.4% 399% 47.6% 46.1% .4% 36.8% 2.3 9388 2884.3 9027 794.4 8162 12367 28992 2023 3,7623 8,678.0 257.6 18694 233.5 808 25,812.6 9.1 3043 7335 363.0 239.9 2225 4137 8329 94.0 12015 3,004.0 785 588.4 1156 666 8,266.5 fte 357% 112% 21.5% 18.9% 38.9% 250% .6% 272% .3% 27.6% 3% 359% 47.1% 373% 16.2% 27.0% 33.5% 327% 34.4% 30.1% 29.8% 4.3% 290% 21.9% 13.5% 325% 330% .3% 33.5% 2% 27.4% 322% 318% 21.1% 25.8% 4.0% 324% .4% 402% 302% 27.3% 335% .7% 465% 31.9% 34.6% 305% 31.5% 439% 81.1% 32.0% 2008-2012 Refit Tax 102920 1,697.0 1,6835 425.1 4,804.0 807.0 22243 4780 33,5.5 7JSD.7 ,7120 6,462.0 13,6197 33172 3217.6 861.1 4243.8 1200 11,709.1 3,90.6 60356 2,172.5 13545 646.1 28328 921.1 5597.I 2,153.8 336,898.5 63,9964 213400 7,0078 1X04 3,4993 14,384.0 47,611.5 3,7332 1,60.0 216.3 10953 5,067.0 11,721.8 24727 182055 9X0.6 5,678.1 4,6993 4,5402 6380.0 18220.7 20169 3819.3 3237.6 oo ,123.3 115,9362 2535 2.X2.8 1,943.1 1,197.1 9X3 8X6 1,691.0 4,1340 8676 1208.6 1,096.8 9,651.0 2,950.0 29,370.3 102 3,55 X.8 7,7375 252O.O 4,0013 4,8428 12,8.8 1,1612 22,5300 33,887.0 7795 823 601.4 3X8 114,737.0 253.0 8604 2,062.8 1,6272 762.0 12146 15780 3,505.9 3688 7,457.1 11,1X0 2118 3,050.6 200.4 W3 34,453.8 Rate 16.5% .3% 168% 21.5% 228% 242% 24.4% .8% .5% .7% 31.3% 34.8% 325% .5% 19.0% 17.5% 227% w/o 31.3% 352% 24.6% 10.3% 14.1% .3% 21.1% .3% 18.8% .5% 227% .7% 31.6% 330% 37.0% 1% 25.3% 130% 24.4% 19.9% 210% 302% .4% 326% 290% 31.8% 331% 329% 272% 37.1% .3% .4% 30.0% 37 Institutes TaxationardEuonorriicFt>lky| March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00042 I / S-milliorB .. Industry&Cbrnpany KhberlyO-rk Rader &Gtntte or Household&pasanal proctcts Industrial madiinety GEraalHedric Haisyflell htetnatcral yGotal RoAsaie Ctrer Frterl-mifin tea InciBtrial madihety InternetServioes&Retai ling Rioelire.ccm feebook Internet Servioes&Retai ling MisoellareaBrnariuladijring International Ftper Vfetrcck Leu Silas Trhity Industries Fhillip&Xnl-teLBen Ball Nte Carter Arpterol Ftar EtniaRxknellAjtoTaticn TteirroFteerSctetifc 3VI \F FtdegirgQxp. ofArata FbloR*h lauan Fbriey-C&fcn lllrasTcoIWute Etrris BrascnHedrt MisoellaieaBrrEnulctijring Misoelleneoussetvioes InterpddicGap (TA /'EM Industries fc& Caten testajiants TmeVlferrer TwentyfiistCtntuiyFar VtyndanWxldMdeCb^^ Maxm V\stelVr0gaTEnt Yim Bends VLtDerey OmiocmQcip LH ted Frce! Sente Effective FederirICbrporate lnocmeTaxRateson258 MajorCOrporaticns, 2008-2015 by Indistry Efit-Year Totals Rollt Tax 10,685.7 1,803.7 66,989.5 14,931.0 5,579.7 1,569.0 83,254.9 18,303.6 fete 16.9% 22.3% 28.1% 22.0% Rofit 401.4 8,$4.0 877.8 9,843.2 2015 Tax 1924 1,673.0 211.8 2,077.2 Rate 47.9% 19.5% 24.1% 21.1% Rofit 153.4 8,611.0 8083 10,948.7 2014 Tax 319.4 22720 2303 2,821.7 Rate $.9% $.4% $5% 25.8% Refit 1,6627 8,768.0 724.9 11,155.6 2013 Tax 338.7 1,606.0 221.9 2,136.6 40,057.1 16,519.5 3,474.3 1,590.0 4,584.5 5,369.8 19,5842 91,1794 -1,369.0 2,460.5 633.1 290.8 1,038.3 1,300.5 6,074.7 10,428.9 -34% 14.9% 18.2% 18.3% 22.6% 24.2% 31.0% 114% 14.9 3297.0 313.1 213.6 518.7 650.3 16062 6,816.9 1,519.0 7190 23.5 .4 1146 223.3 361.7 3,050.5 373.0% 21.8% 7.5% $.4% 22.1% 348% 20.0% 44.7% 583.1 3318.6 2882 225.0 783.9 7$.6 3,149.6 14,350.0 51.0 661.6 805 552 219.4 166.4 1,1915 2,425.7 0.9% 19.9% 279% 24.5% $.0% 21.9% 378% 16.9% 6463.5 29278 525.1 225.4 7.6 1,160.4 4,0132 16,105.0 85.0 563.8 1256 53.3 1339 349.5 1,363.1 2,664.3 697.6 14,787.9 15,485.5 -30.9 2,439.9 2,409.0 -4.4% 16.57o 15.6% .o 2,8020 2631.0 4.3 1,474.0 1,478.3 14.8% 26% 52.2% 73.5 4,918.0 4,991.5 -90 $0.0 251.0 -123% 5.3% 5.0% $.1 3,197.0 3,235.1 -9.4 614.0 604.6 5,010.0 3,056.1 945.8 4,122.1 984.5 1,962.8 10,279.0 9,287.2 1,293.8 5,453.3 1,437.8 3,270.8 6,560.5 23,7944 4,955.5 2,868.0 4,6.2 6,562.2 11,211.9 1,658.7 14,422.1 123,172.7 -386.0 134.3 102.6 593.9 177.9 354.8 1,911.9 1,918.9 279.6 1,210.6 339.7 785.1 1,609.8 5,860.6 1,229.4 7324 1,065.1 1,928.5 3,297.2 488.0 4,860.0 28,494.1 -7.7% 4.4% 10.8% 144% 18.1% 18.2% 18.6% 20.7% 21.6% 22.2% 23.6% 24.0% 24.5% 24.6% 24.8% 25.5% 26.3% 294% 294% 294% 33.7% 23.1% 1,1350 603.0 171.5 1223.8 91.9 43.1 933.6 1286.3 1372 1,579.1 24.5 615.6 851.7 4,319.7 7792 615.0 278.0 1,078.8 1=975 2524 2,815.0 20,621.9 62.0 233 2.1 $02 2.3 8.5 71.6 395.8 20 5218 $.5 2283 1288 1210.6 1478 200.1 78.0 360.9 4865 702 904.0 5,247.4 55% 3.9% 12% 21.3% 25% .7% 7.7% 28.6% 18.3% 33.0% 243.1% $.4% 15.1% 27.8% 19.0% 31.0% 281% 335% 3O.0/o 278% 32.1% 25.4% 566.0 052.6 61.0 1,0362 34.0 $5.0 1,924.7 1,4083 167.0 1,284.0 81.4 6026 1,1296 37359 606.0 $3.3 $6.4 1,179.1 1,624.7 214.1 2067.0 19,796.0 175.0 7.4 14.8 3025 -415 $.3 415.7 253.4 33.1 4824 15.4 194.7 390.4 964.9 1523 175.0 154.4 $5.4 385.7 82.0 7420 5,315.3 315% 1.1% 242% 32% -133.9% 137% 21.6/0 17.8% 198% 37.6% 18.9% 323% 34.6% $.8% $.3% 300% $.3% 327% $.7% $.6% 36.4% 26.9% 489.0 6138 827 SEBO 46.3 241.4 2984.8 10406 156.4 8488 $.5 5335 909.5 3,118.9 721.3 404.0 664.9 1,0065 13842 99?? 1,664.0 18,297.3 -697.0 -13.3 .0 134.8 852 37.4 149.8 2520 $.1 191.4 -14.5 138.1 234.0 871.9 199.0 1232 1829 9A55 3902 658 704.0 3,305.3 2,360.9 13,044.7 696.0 16,9772 3,545.2 31,0484 39,722.0 3,831.1 18,2614 10,5474 3,226.4 62,566.8 4,753.9 39,4422 1228 698.5 84.2 2,246.0 471.7 4,147.2 6,273.0 712.7 4,260.4 2,642.9 8354 17,217.1 1,312.1 11,005.1 52% 54% 12.1% 13.2% 13.3% 13.4% 15.8% 18.6% 23.3% 25.1% 25.9% 27.5% 27.6% 27.9% 4325 1,974.4 572 2895.8 0.9 43729 3,485.6 7169 1,989.4 936.7 451.7 12184.9 716.4 6200.0 1C9.4 1542 18 5105 746 719.1 466.0 167.9 368.4 179.6 2457 3023.1 3198 1,634.0 25.3% 7.8% 3.1% 17.6% 16.5% .4% 13.4% 23.4% 180% 192% 54.4% 322% 44.6% $.1% 3652 1,790.0 110.1 2339.9 191.1 4,615.5 9,720.0 657.9 2816.5 1,804.1 536.0 8352 6382 4,$3.5 -5.8 -235.0 32.0 7528 -27.9 -o 891.0 147.9 979.5 9.9 215.0 2721.1 $1.6 9320 -1.6% -13.1% 291% 322% -14.6% -0.6% 92% 225% 348% 227% 425% $.1% $.0% $.3% 2$3 2451.6 97.7 2839.4 185.7 49II.9 52$9 55 30338 99 449.6 8,531.6 5428 5035.0 46.9 2726 15.3 587.6 335 323.0 1,178.0 101.6 3238 380.7 1226 21853 215.0 2181.0 fete 18.6% 18.3% .6% 19.2% 1.3% 18.9% $.9% $.7% 17.6% 30.1% $.7% 16.5% -24.6% 192% 18.7% -1425% -22% 121% 24.1% 184.0% 15.5% 5.0% 15.4% 16.0% 225% -41.0% 27.4% 224% $.0% 27.6% $.5% 27.5% $.4% $2% $6% 423% 18.1% 182% 11.1% 15.7% $.7% 16.4% 6.7% 225% 18.8% 10.6% 397% 27.3% $.6% .6% 37.4% 2008-2012 Refit Tax 7,0922 9832 41,046.5 9,383.0 3,168.7 906.0 51,307.4 11,268.2 27,752.5 6976.0 2347.9 9$.O 25224 28005 10,$22 53,907.5 -3,054.0 5.O 6.5 1259 5/0.3 5$3 3,158.4 2,288.4 557.0 3870.9 4,427.9 -168 91.9 75.1 2830.0 1,186.6 630.7 1306.1 8124 1,406.3 4,435.8 4,852.0 8332 1,741.4 12965 1519.1 3,669.7 125899 28520 1235.7 2516.9 32978 6,605.6 939.9 7006.1 64457.6 74.0 1168 757 -106.6 1350 2726 1274.7 1,020.7 195.4 15.0 279.4 224.0 8.6 2313.1 730.3 234.1 649.8 916.7 2,034.8 269.9 25.O 14,626.2 1304.9 6828.7 431.0 8,9020 27175 17,148.0 212895 1,9158 ,421.7 6846.7 1,819.1 31,015.0 2855.4 22,753.7 -27.6 506.7 350 395.1 394.5 3,126.1 3,738.0 22 2591.7 1,6728 252.1 83875 445.7 6258.1 Rate 13.9% 229% $6% 22.0% -110% 7.3% 172% 13.0% 226% 19.9% $.8% 4.2% -3.0% 24% 1.7% 2S% 98% 120% -7.9% 16.6% 19.4% $.7% 21.0% $.6/0 09% 21.0% 14.7% 242% 220% $.ff/o 189% $.6% 27.6% .6% $.7% 31.7% 22.7% -21% 7.4% 8.1% 4.4% 14.0/o 182% 17.6% 15.4% 24.9% 24.4% 139% 27.0% 156% 27.0/0 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 38 ED_001523_00000854-00043 IncLBtry&Qrrpany AjtoratcC&taRwesing Dsea^iyCbTrrurkaticrs, Ire. Z'pollcGcip MCtnalcfs H/fiSOellaneOllSSen4CeS Oil, gas& pipelines Check tecnBiagy Wilms Sectia&etgy MUfeecuraes BocnIVtbii Gtnsol&ietgy l-biljFrcnfer OR&etgy Oil, gas& pipelines Phatmaoeuticals&medical products Bi Lilly Merck Begat Idee Phairraceuticals&medical products Riddling, printhg RREtrrelfey&STS Rfclishng, printing Retail &v\holesale trade Ar^nicm fetflix Cte/sGtreralStois V\fes30 Irternaticnal Axhscrs ScnicAjfciTDthe S^erterfedt QnplAjfcnrtke Mkfeaen Aigas InsicfitBiteiprisES CbelVfeikl-Hdirg MuyAjtcmetkeQcip, Ire. Krcga ArcwHeetrcxKS Stpfes feiare Steel &Alniun Aiixter Intematicnal AjtcKhticn LKXorpoiciticn IVtecy's Qttiiral Health DkksSfxxtirgGaxis AkerreAjfofels CfellyAjfcnrtke CtetedAfelesale Genurefets Lrritad Baids IX FlblbaperlVfertels HI HHS fit Effective Fetten11 Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 MajorCbrporations. 2008-:2O15bylndistry Expt-Year Totals Tax fete Profit Tax fete Profit Tax fete Refit Tax 14,398.8 4,342.2 30.2% 19637 522.4 .0% 1,8638 335.0 287% 1899.6 6532 7,031.6 2,355.6 33.57o 12231 2981 24.1% 1,1922 5342 420% 1,043,6 2966 5,755.6 1,968.2 34.2% 119.0 465 1% 359.0 1139 320% $10 171.7 21,379.6 7,808.0 36.0% 2,467.1 1,030.0 410% 25458 1,0662 41.9% 27567 1,161.6 298,589.1 68,503.2 22.9% 42,7014 10,769.3 25.2% 46,935.0 9,3374 19.9% 42,082.7 10,249.1 3,976.2 21,692.3 8,943.9 6,511.0 2,953.7 60,481.7 3,550.3 7,065.7 2,547.6 117,7224 49.0 368.3 516.0 455.0 277.3 8,226.7 544.9 2,3484 849.3 13,634.8 12% 1.7% 5.8% 7.0% 9.4% 13.6% 15.3% 33.2% 33.3% 11.6% 384.7 1361.4 86.7 3690 175.8 1593 380.1 1,074.8 2.6 4,671.6 132 -235.6 -- -- 595 -1.7 21.4 4.4 75.0 412.2 3.4% -127% -- -- 338% -1.0% 6.5% 44.7% 31.3% 8.8% 467.5 4297.5 3267.0 9M.0 6.6 9,5=89 1757 3825 255.0 19,754.7 2 1545 -00 1.0 28.8 12809 135 762 1,928.8 22% 3.6% -0.3% 0.1% 71% 142% 7.7% 76.6% 290% 9.8% 427.1 1,784.7 721.4 934.0 410.9 9357.3 57.4 1,120.7 5329 15,346.5 -12 69.7 -17.0 -32.0 455 10333 43 237.9 59 1,636.4 15,117.5 41,404.3 13,335.9 69,857.6 2,571.0 12,039.0 4,713.8 19,323.8 17.0% 29.1% 35.0% 27.7% 1,169.3 2,117.0 3361.6 6,647.9 6605 7320 1,149.4 2,541.9 530% 340% 342% 38.2% 12065 153550 2538.9 19,070.3 168.9 7,136.0 1,0798 8,384.7 140% 46.3% 430% 44.0% 2705.0 36460 1,867.3 8,218.3 259.1 $8.0 610.1 1467.2 1,610.8 1,610.8 2904 2904 18.0% 18.0% 225.7 225.7 1125 112.5 49.9% .0% 58 49.9 859.7% 5.8 49.9 889.7% 656 65.6 -153 -15.3 6,237.5 1,494.2 1,6294 2,092.8 796.0 799.9 432.3 1,068.0 11,703.1 3,689.3 577.2 426.4 953.3 16,2184 2,593.8 6,160.8 3,446.6 1,271.5 3,881.3 2,470.8 12,315.0 11,266.5 3,103.4 4,471.8 6,781.6 1 3,832.0 6,818.6 8,945.8 16,952.0 17,348.9 674.5 203.1 242.1 352.8 1354 137.9 82.2 2152 2,496.0 800.8 126.8 97.5 227.5 3,945.6 656.9 1,616.5 9484 350.1 1,074.2 688.5 3,496.0 3,221.3 891.5 1,288.8 1,956.1 4,020.0 1,993.7 2,621.7 4,994.3 5,113.1 10.8% 13.6% 14.9% 16.9% 17.0% 17.2% 19.0% 20.2% 21.3% 21.7% 22.0% 22.9% 23.9% 24.3% 25.3% 26.2% 27.5% 27.5% 27.7% 27.9% 284% 28.6% 28.7% 28.8% 28.8% 29.1% 29.2% 29.3% 29.5% 29.5% 19696 972 3402 284.6 33.9 138.7 97.3 215.0 2,407.1 514.0 88.0 782 264.0 3,073.8 4.6 460.9 4255 1602 691.7 4554 1,611.4 1981.7 505.0 670.6 1,424.0 2,457.9 9035 1,583.1 2,905.1 2831.7 1166 -279 o 445 -4.3 332 33.4 652 6680 137.4 23.9 17.6 81.1 6128 77.6 49.9 1295 583 2202 1265 510.4 6837 1585 2320 4524 694.9 3036 495.1 938.6 7581 5.9% -28.7% 16.5% 156P/o -12.7% .1% 312% .0% 27.0% 7% 27.1% 2.0% 397% 20.9% 293% 10.8% 30.4% 36.4% 31.8% 278% 31.7% 29.5% 31.4% 34.0% 31.8% 28.5% 330% 318% 32.5% 0% 228.0 325.1 275.6 3208 1560 1560 898 1752 1803.0 557.5 865 615 176.6 2599.0 334.0 538.8 463.3 184.3 6532 439.7 23024 16590 5278 703.9 1,187.4 2062.5 12488 1,4224 2779.6 2491.9 209.0 7.1 46.6 648 31.1 359 23.4 48.1 453.0 1535 29 197 407 8M.0 960 1168 1532 333 206.0 1302 731.4 381.0 177.6 196.1 3566 ^35 209.9 418.4 818.1 7542 91.7% 22% 16.0% 202% 190% 230% 294% 27.4% 25.1% 270% 310% 320% 230% .0% 28.7% 230% 33.1% 18.1% 313% 293% 310% .0% 33.7% 27.0% 302% .0% 160% 294% 294% .0% 6725 1561 2012 334.0 1359 123.4 1.6 1778 1,453.0 5223 93.0 622 161.6 22455 3124 8448 4335 181.4 5772 313.6 21918 I52O.7 523.0 5867 1,0258 1071.6 2153 12312 25342 23805 345 -90 =2,6 45.7 11.0 .4 37 =2.3 4.0 173.0 27.0 17.0 413 6115 792 191.1 W5 356 181.4 100.0 816.8 87 18 1893 3228 $1.6 2923 3772 7475 7255 fete 34.4% 284% .0% 422% 24.4% -0.0% 3.0% -2.4% -3.4% 11.1% 110% IS/o ZS/o 0% 10.7% 90% 150% 340% 17.9% -230% -23.0% 5.1% -5.7% 212% 137% 8.1% 270% 235.7% 230% .0% .1% 29.1% 270% 250% 272% 25.4% 220% 270% 190% 31.4% 29.1% 370% 2% 250% .0% 310% .0% 1190% .0% .0% 0% Refit 8,671.6 35897 4,765.6 13,6129 166,869.9 137486 45667 4,314.0 10003 41,3662 2987.1 4,487.7 1$D2 77,949.7 100368 286.3 55961 35,921.1 1,3137 1,313.7 3,367.4 9138 8124 1,1535 4702 381.9 243.6 4699 3010.0 2095.4 3097 224.6 351.1 8,3.O 1,6828 4,316.4 21242 7457 19892 12222 6209.4 60051 1547.6 25287 3,1443 7359.0 44.0 4,709.0 86831 9,6449 Tax 2,631.6 1258.7 1635.1 4550.1 38,1474 fete .0% .0% 34.0% .4% 22.0% $8 3/9.6 5C.0 483.0 143.4 58342 5068 13072 4322 9,657.3 1.0% 20% 11.1% 11.0% 70% 14.1% 16.0% .1% .4% 124% 1,482.5 3,606.0 1,844,4 6,929.9 140% 170% 320% 19.0% 143,3 143.3 10.0% 10.0% 314.4 232.9 969 1978 977 31.4 217 $.6 901.0 3398 49.1 433 64.4 18873 4040 12587 5452 222.9 463.6 3318 1,437.4 1,767.9 =21.6 671.4 8222 2,177.0 1,1879 1,3399 2,490.1 2,875.4 90% 250% 11.0% 17.1% .0% 82% 8.0% 127% 14.0% 162% 150% 19.0% 18.0% 227% 240% .0% 257% .0% .0% .0% .1% .4% 272% .0% .1% .0% 270% .0% 287% .0% 39 Instituted TaxationarriEooeorricra 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00044 S-milliore IndLBtry&Ompary Taget AjtcZsne HenrySthan TETiSXK^^n Uitedhtetual Foods BblterGtera W-f/hrt Stores Bglols VWV.Qargsr CteTS&Mnor Narctetrcm TtaotorSfl^QoTpery BblterTres Cfvhx V/feigrem Qmcp White Op EbdE&th&B^orri HxreCtepot Restores TeCteta Q^kerBectric Eyre CtSCaTak WdeFoodsMatet LhitedStaticras OBJrc. Etest Buy Lome's BpresSrpts fetail&wholesale tract Teleoorrmriicaticns Cctfe/isicnS^tteTB TrrAretQble Wndstreem AKT CtentuyLrik VferizriCTnincaticns DEH/btAork Ctnrast TelecarrrruiicatiorB Transportation derS^dem (3< hbriblkSouthtem JB.HjstTrergoortSavtes IhcnFtedfic SuffMestAriires CHRbrtsriWxIdMcfe Transportation Utilities, gasaid electric Ftepoal-bldincp RSBSbrp. Wscrsr&egy Eff^ive Federal Corporate Inacme Tax Rates on258 MajorObrporations, 2008-2015 by Industry I_______ Ekfit-Year Totals Rrafit Tax 32,087.0 9,476.0 10,429.1 3,103.9 3,130.8 946.9 6,112.5 1,863.0 1,073.1 3274 9,156.1 2,7994 139,743.0 43/480.0 2,098.8 655.6 7/481.0 1,357.5 2,343.3 &5& 7,628.0 2/432.0 3,025.8 971.0 5,347.1 1,726.3 5,085.8 1,644.3 26,280.0 8,503.0 4,163.8 1,351.3 11,619.8 3,792.8 12,003.9 3,947.8 10,123.0 3,357.6 48,671.9 16,154.9 8,667.6 2,893.2 961.3 321.8 879.7 295.7 1,220.6 418.9 49,704.8 17,274.8 4,399.5 1,532.5 1,3144 465.3 6,293.4 2,263.6 9,702.4 3,536.1 26,542.3 9,8434 17,907.7 7,109.0 643,989.9 199,925.2 fete 29.5/0 29.8% 30.2% 30.5/0 30.57 30.6% 31.1% 31.2% 31.37 31.4% 31.9% 32.1% 32.3% 32.3% 324% 32.5/0 32.6% 32.9% 33.2% 33.2% 334% 33.5/0 33.6% 34.3% 34.8% 34.8% 354% 36.0% 36.4% 37.1% 39.7% 31.0% Rofit 4285.0 1,613.0 533.8 29.7 213.8 1,764.6 16,053.0 216.4 1,1588 1561 956.6 634.9 433.8 970.3 2,604.0 538.0 1,024.7 1,380.8 12892 9,741.0 15820 189.3 1351 183.6 8,0830 807.9 115.0 380.1 1251.5 4,171.0 3,7002 95,1772 Tax 16520 4825 161.1 238.0 58.6 5788 55620 72.3 3898 6)2 189.6 2029 1163 297.5 846.0 175.1 3887 3948 380.5 3228.0 4627 71.3 462 587 2960.0 3009 67.3 1532 347.0 1,688.0 1,673.9 30,970.6 Rate $.67o 29.4% $2% BOOM 27.4% 32.37o 34.6% 33.4% 33.6% 38.6% 19.6% 320% i 30.7% 32.3/0 3257o 37.97o 28.6% 2957o 33.1% 292% 37.7% 342% 320% 3567o 372% 5857o 46.47o 27.7% 4057o 4527o 32.57o Profit 32760 1,4996 4928 5626 188.9 1$62 17,820.0 209.7 12332 145.4 1,138.8 535.7 9058 9309 3277.0 541.8 1313.5 1,787.6 1,4419 8,844.0 1,4539 98.7 1294 184.6 7201.3 857.6 1864 3252 1,078.0 4,065.0 29159 92,232.2 Tax 1,074.0 497.3 147.0 258.7 64.8 533.0 6,165.0 71.1 9.7 51.7 3788 1958 3214 287.7 1207.0 153.7 397.5 515.6 21 2884.0 474.7 32.4 447 774 2493.3 3516 72.3 147.5 354.0 1,475.0 1238.1 30,239.1 Rate 3287o 332% 29.8% 4607o 34.3% 33.4% 34.6P/O 33.97o 3267o 3557o 33.37o 34.67o 3557o 30.97o 3687o 284% 30.3% 2887o 34.1% 326% 326% 328% 34.6P/0 41.97o 34.6P/0 41.07o 3687o 45.4% 328% 36.4% 4257o 32.8% Rofit 3,8360 1,451.4 7.8 7627 1537 1,5272 18,693.0 171.8 1,135.4 1819 1,129.0 5025 9085 7625 3343.0 4692 13505 1,7617 1,5522 7,424.0 13129 1215 1208 190.1 7,101.7 815.4 1902 7602 590.0 3,470.0 28727 88,516.4 Tax 1213.0 411.6 1325 2254 425 505.1 6,377.0 81.1 3490 57.7 3600 139.1 293.5 254.4 1,122.0 1479 4665 $9.7 499.0 2533.0 464.0 413 47.8 743 2571.7 290.4 669 273.9 306.0 13420 1,448.1 29,570.9 2/455.1 20,926.0 2,793.5 141,623.7 8,606.8 81,518.0 11/4582 64,8792 334260.5 8.6 1,632.0 220.8 11,5004 725.1 7,401.0 1,554.5 15,535.8 38,578.1 0.4% 7.8% 7.9% 8.1% 84% 9.1% 13.6% 23.9/0 US1/ 327.8 2,898,9 21.4 18,953.0 12120 23,80.0 1,114.1 121468 60,512.0 0.1 367.9 9.1 2496.0 28.0 5,476.0 145.0 29768 11/498.9 0.07o 12.7% 4257o 132% 23% 23.07o 13.0% 24.57o 19.0% 4224 3,174.4 762 17,3114 1,0720 15,193.0 1254.6 11961.8 50/465.8 5.8 2464 08 1,609.0 18.0 2657.0 1803 21712 6,888.5 1.4% 787o 1.0% 9.37o 1.7% 1757o 14.4% 182% 13.67o 1967 2964.1 2275 192717 1215.0 122620 1,1303 10,0162 47,303.5 -12 554.1 -27.0 3,013.0 1.0 -197.0 1627 3,0135 6,549.1 2,044.6 21,006.5 20,455.9 3,542.2 44,615.8 8/459.0 4,907.6 105,031.6 -549 3,530.5 4,069.9 731.1 9,282.8 2,006.0 1,689.2 21,254.6 -2.7% 16.8% 19.9% 20.6% 20.8% 23.7% 34.4% 20.2% 4025 3,013.7 2,383.4 670.1 7,7 3,3660 654.1 17,975.5 0.8 6157 4934 1496 1,8497 1292.0 2527 4,653.9 02% 202% 20.7% 2237o 24.8% 38.4% 38.6% 25.9% 239.6 29545 30294 537.8 8,124.4 1,787.0 611.6 17,364.3 -08 723.5 698.4 117.0 1931.4 206.0 2182 3,893.7 -037o 24.67o 23.1% 1997o 238% 11.4% 357% 2247 299.4 28372 2873.6 538.6 68621 1,165.0 5496 15,125.5 -4,0 oeo2 $3.6 oe.1 1,675.1 3550 157.8 3,633.9 3,022.0 10,843.0 5,894.3 -843.0 -1,569.0 -591.6 -27.9% -14.5/0 -10.0% 435.0 850.0 9516 -3.0 -89.0 -97.4 -0.7% -1057o -10.1% 6.0 13360 8723 -137.0 -84.0 -44.1 -33.7% -467o -5.1% 438.0 1,1220 839.9 -128.0 -218.0 -602 fete 316% 2B4% 28.37o 2957o 27.67o 33.1% 34.1% 472% 30.7% 31.7% 3197o 27.7% 3267o 34.7% 33.67o 3157o 34.3% 3237o 321% 33.7% 35.37o 34.CP/O 39.6% 39.1% 362% 3567o 3527o 3607o 5197o 38.7% 50.4% 33.4% -0.6% 18.7% -11.97o 15.8% 0.1% -1.6% 14.4% 30.1% 13.8% -1.3% 23.37o 23.1% 23.4% 24.4% 3057o 267% 24.0% -292% -19.4% -6.07o Rofit 20,690.0 5,834.8 1,636.4 4,757.4 5168 4268.1 87,187.0 15309 3,S,6 874.0 4,$6.6 13227 3,099.0 24220 17,056.0 2614.8 7922O 7,073.8 5039.7 226629 43I8.7 5518 4.4 6623 27,318.8 1918.6 8229 4,877,8 6,782.9 14,846.3 8,419.0 368,0642 Tax 5,537.0 1,712.5 5063 1,W9 161.5 1,182.5 25376.0 431.1 1,194.8 256.1 1503.6 4333 992.1 794.6 5328.0 874.6 2,50.0 2,467.7 10560 7,$99 1,491.8 176.8 157.0 2085 9249.8 $97 258.7 1,689.0 2529.1 5038.4 2,7490 109,144.6 1,5082 11,890.6 24684 $,087.7 5,107.8 30203.0 70591 30,754.3 175,9792 3.8 463.6 2379 4,32.4 678.1 -6350 10064 7,3743 13,641.6 1,073.1 12,171.0 12,1695 1,7457 221726 21420 3,0923 54,566.2 -609 1,528.0 22145 338.4 3,828.6 1$.O 1,0604 9,073.0 1,7430 7,035.0 32205 -5/5.0 -1,178.0 -3099 Rate 23.8/0 29.4/0 3097o 24.0% 31.37o 27.7% 291% 2577o 30.4% 29.3/0 342% 3287o 320% 328% 312% 33.4/0 321% 34.97o 34.07o 3337o 34.57o 3207o 31.87o 31.57o 339% 30.7% 31.47o 34.67o 37.37o 36.07o 327% 29.7% 0.37o 39% 9.67o 5.1% 13.37o -18% 13.4% 240% 7.8% -4.7% 1267o 182% 19.47o 173% 7.37o 34.37o 16.6% -3307o -167% -124% 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 40 ED_001523_00000854-00045 S-milliorB Industry&axnpany NSxkb FiisEtegy AntB&Etgy ArericaiBectrcRMer CLteBieigy NsdBa&agy XBiagy Anaen O&etgy SarpraEragy &etuoe&Etgy CtrtekfetaEison FR. DE&erg/ Bttetgy Lftscuraes Suiten Bcn Dxrinicnf%auoes Sana FU^iavoe&TterprGcip LG Utilities, gandelectrc AL NIERE Effective FederalCbrporate lnocmeTaxRateson258 MajorQxporations, 2008-2015 by Industry I_______ Efit-YearTotals Atfit Tax 4,399.1 -352.2 8,842.0 -465.0 2,826.3 -114.2 17,1704 -463.7 19,767.5 -422.0 21,518.0 -313.0 10,290.6 -1114 7,243.0 -48.0 4,666.0 -26.0 7,000.0 -340 6,703.2 -11.1 12,329.0 103.0 7,106.0 87.0 7,478.0 253.0 12,461.7 824.0 3,680.2 2792 24,587.0 2,036.0 26,422.3 3,350.3 19,240.0 2,468.1 5,275.0 808.0 18,001.9 2,935.9 2,600.5 4362 269,367.1 8,216.5 Fte -8.0% S.M -40% SM -2.1% -1.5% -1.1% SM -0.6% -0.5% -02% 0.8% 12% 3.4% 6.6% 7.6% 8.3% 12.7% 12.8% 15.3% 16.3% 16.8% 3.1% Aot 333.9 83.0 506.5 2,608.4 330.0 3,999.0 1,521.9 916.0 7720 1,1352 1,381.9 1,760.0 913.0 954.0 1,147.0 556.0 3,6320 3,416.0 2,745.5 1,0820 2,505.5 388.5 39,364.1 2015 Tax -- 1.0 -- 107.3 -- 10.0 -36.1 -20 -- -49.0 -17 -.o -o -3.0 772 -11.0 -177.0 407.0 -255 3820 240.5 890 7064 Rate -- 0.1% -- 4.1% -- 03% -24% -02% -- -43% -0.1% -43% -28% -0.3% 6.7% -20% -m 11.9% -10% 353% 9.3% 229% 1.8% Aot 829.8 213.0 471.3 2465.0 3514.0 3,674.0 1535.9 1,001.0 703.0 911.5 12725 1,601.0 1,127.0 1251.0 1,685.7 874.0 2915.0 2444.0 1,748.0 790.0 2398.0 4753 37,104.2 2014 Tax -- -1320 -- 51.0 -- -- -732 -37.0 -- -.0 -35 -00 43.0 -16.0 90.1 113.0 175.0 121.0 -11.0 38.0 335,0 5 499.8 Rate -- -54.3% -- 21% -- -- -48% -3.7% -- -1.1% -03% -0.6% 3.8% -1.3% 5.3% 129% 60% 50% -0.6% 48% 14.0% 19.0% 1.3% Aofit 7624 530.0 365.1 2081.0 3,357.0 24520 1,424.5 804.0 723.0 8826 1229.1 1387.0 195.0 906.0 1277.1 469.0 2569,0 220 2571.0 677.0 2013.0 321.1 31,954.8 2013 Tax -159 -118.0 -- -45.0 -123.0 -145.0 -432 -118.0 -- -70.0 13.3 2 -75.0 74.0 88.3 i.o 353.0 744.0 317.0 161.0 7.0 43.9 1,590.3 $3,810,577 $806,942 21.2% $551,698 $141,281 25.6% $584,814 $134,763 23.0% $524,346 $111,138 fte -21% -23.6% -- -22% -3.7% -5.9% -32% -14.7% -- -7.9% 1.1% 205% -385% 82% 6.9% 354% 14.1% 267% 123% 238% 242% 13.7% 5.0% 21.2% 2008-2012 Aofit Tax 2473.0 -3363 7236.0 -216.0 1,486.4 -1142 10,016.0 -577.0 9,033.5 -2900 11,433.0 -178.0 5805.3 44.1 44920 1C9.0 2471.0 -26.0 400.7 95.0 2819.7 -19.3 75810 -87.0 43410 145.0 4067.0 1980 8,351.9 8.4 1,7812 112 15,441.0 1,675.0 17,970.3 2,078.3 12,175.5 2,188.6 2733.0 227.0 0,995.4 1,873.4 1,415.6 212.8 160,943.9 5,420.0 $2,149,719 $419,759 Rate -13.6% -30% -7.7% -5.8% -3.3% -1.6% 08% 24% -1.1% 24% -0.7% -1.1% 30% 4.5% 68% 0.6% 10.8% 11.6% 18.0% 8.3% 17.0% 15.0% 3.4% 19.5% 41 Instituten TaxationarriEuoncm^ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00046 Ctrrpany Ffepcol-bldings RG8EGap. WtacranErercy NSbute Intenaticna! F%per FisBet Rkelire.ccm AtncsEreigy Gffeial Electric ArericsnBectricFbAer F^cterS^ter DieEretgy NsraErery >tel Energy Arerat CtEhagy Serpa Energy BasiioeEretg/ Qtfe/isicn Sitare FrsjtrneGcipofArenca Cfarrol datedEcfcn Owing FR. Creek Daon Energy DIEEhetgy Wstrock InterpiblicQoip OEB Being StateStroetQirp. WlliaTB Qakxrrm RircipalFinercial Stagy ^Ectra&engy GrstdlationBiarte IntematicnaLsnesEfykhines LFfeuoes TrretAnerCeble VMncfettean 8T RCfinariaiS&vioesQap Sbuttem Ontujnk Orrrruaityl-fealthS^teTB WizmOnmnicatiaTS MDFuoes LhitedTedrolcges ArFtods&OsTcab Arazaiam La/iStraas Cfelare Effectif FederalQxporate InocmeTaxRateson258 Majortbrporations, 2008-2015 (by8-year tax rate) Ekit-YearTotals Profit Tax 3,022.0 -843.0 10,843.0 -1,569.0 5894.3 -591.6 4,399.1 -3522 5,010.0 -3860 8,842.0 -4650 697.6 -30.9 2,826.3 -1142 40,057.1 -1,369.0 17,170.4 -463.7 2044.6 -54.9 19,767.5 -4220 21,518.0 -313.0 10,290.6 -111.4 7,243.0 -48.0 4,666.0 -26.0 7,000.0 -34.0 6,7032 -11.1 2,455.1 8.6 3,774.3 14.1 12,329.0 103.0 7,458.0 71.0 7,106.0 87.0 3,9762 49.0 21,692.3 368.3 7,478.0 253.0 3,056.1 134.3 2,360.9 1228 13,044.7 698.5 40,026.7 21467 10,3102 5652 8,943.9 5160 20,581.7 1,269.7 7,790.0 514.4 12,461.7 824.0 6,511.0 455.0 5,590.6 414.3 64,728.0 4,849.0 3,6802 2792 20,926.0 1,6320 2,793.5 220.8 141,623.7 11,500.4 32,952.7 2724.7 24,587.0 20360 8,606.8 725.1 2,683.5 237.1 81,518.0 7,401.0 2,953.7 277.3 24,4212 25462 4,117.4 439.5 6,237.5 674.5 945.8 102.6 2857.3 326.3 F&te -27.9% -14.5>/o -1O.0>/o -8.0% -7.7% -5.3% -4.4% -4.0% -3.4% -2.7% -27% -2.1% -1.5>/o -1.1% -0.7% -0.6% -0.0% -02% 0.4% 0.4% 0.8% 1.0% 12% 12% 1.7% 3.4% 4.4% 52% 5.4% 5.4% 5.0% 5.8% 62% 66% 66% 7.0% 7.4% 7.0% 7.6% 7.8% 7.9% 8.1% 8.3% 8.3% 8.4% 8.8% 9.1% 9.4% 10.4% 10.7% 10.8% 10.8% 11.4% Profit 435.0 oo 9616 333.9 1,1350 8630 29.0 3035 14.9 2SB.4 4025 3&10.0 3e.o 1,5340 96.0 7720 1,1352 1,3819 327.8 4933 1,700.0 406.0 9130 384.7 1,861.4 954.0 6030 4325 1,974.4 6,828.0 1,025.1 86.7 280 1,406.1 1,147.0 3E80 529.3 5,787.0 5030 2896.9 21.4 18,953.0 5,3130 3,6320 12120 303.0 23,810.0 175.8 2819.0 727.7 1,969.6 171.5 221.8 2015 Tax Rate -30 -0.7% -89.0 -10.5% -97.4 -10.1% -- -- 620 5.5% 1.0 0.1% 43 14.8% -- -- 15490 rm 1073 4.1% 08 02% -- -- 10.0 0.3% -36.1 -24% -20 -02% -- -- -49.0 -4.3% -1.7 -0.1% 0.1 0.0% -1.4 -0.3% -860 40.0 -4S>/o 9.9% -o -28% 132 3.4% -2356 -127% -30 -0.3% 233 39% 109.4 25.3% 1542 7.8% 1,966.0 28.8% -5.9 -0.6% -- -- -1660 -5.5% 1699 121% 772 6.7% -- -- -573 -321.0 -98% -5.5% -11.0 -20% 3679 127% 9.1 425!% 2496.0 132% 933.0 16.9% -177.0 -4.8% 28.0 23% 7.0 23% 5,476.0 230% 505 338% 281.0 9.4% 149.7 23.6% 116.6 5.9% 21 12% 188 8.5% profit 406.0 1,836.0 8723 8298 506.0 213.0 735 4713 53$.1 2,466.0 3)5440 3,674.0 13359 1,001.0 703.0 9415 12725 422.4 768.9 1,601.0 22620 1,127.0 4675 4297.5 1251.0 0526 32 1,790.0 6,779.7 1,097.5 3267.0 3213.0 1,474.5 1)885.7 904.0 475.0 690BO 874.0 3,174.4 762 17311.4 5272.8 2,915.0 1,0720 228.0 15,193.0 406.6 4240.8 548.0 228.0 61.0 3D2 2014 Tax -137.0 -84.0 -44.1 -- 175.0 -1320 -90 -- 51.0 51.0 -08 -- -- -732 -37.0 -- -10.0 -35 5.8 21.5 -90 38.0 43.0 102 154.5 -16.0 7.4 -5.8 -2350 581.7 -0.5 -90 -98.0 99.3 90.1 1.0 130.5 1,134.0 113.0 246.4 0.8 1,639.0 1,0638 175.0 18.0 -29.0 2,667.0 28.8 263.8 -62 2090 14.8 942 Rate -337% -4.6% -5.1% -- 315% -54.3% -123% -- 09% 21% -0.3% -- -- -4.8% -37% -- -1.1% -0.3% 1.4% 28% -0.6% 1.6% 38% 22% 3.6% -1.3% 1.1% -1.6% -131% 8.6% -0.0% -0.3% -31% 6.7% 53% 0.1% 275% 163% 129% 78% 1.0% 93% 23.1% 6.0% 1.7% -127% 175% 7.1% 62% -1.1% 91.7% 242% 18.1% Profit 438.0 1,1220 839.9 7E24 489.0 500.0 38.1 3651 6,463.5 2081.0 299.4 32570 24020 1,0.5 804.0 723.0 1229.1 196.7 4732 1,387.0 12620 195.0 427.1 1,784.7 906.0 613.8 238.3 2451.6 5,946.0 1,4867 721.4 3,798.0 1,0902 1277.1 934.0 2043.6 6,679.0 469.0 2S64.1 227.5 19271.7 5,128.0 2569.0 1215.0 226.3 12282.0 410.9 3,6229 428.5 6725 827 789.1 2013 Tax -1230 -218.0 -532 -15.9 -697.0 -118.0 -94 -- 850 -45.0 -4.0 -123.0 -145.0 -462 -118.0 -- -70.0 133 -12 -ED 285.0 3.0 -75.0 -12 69.7 74.0 -133 469 2726 -199.0 109.7 -17.0 108.0 -98 883 -320 87.6 1,406.0 1660 554.1 -27.0 3,043.0 98.0 363.0 1.0 9.1 -197.0 455 3339 662 345 10.0 61.1 Rate -292% -19.4% -6.0% -21% -142.5% -23.6% -24.6% -- 1.3% -22% -1.3% -3.7% -5.9% -32% -14.7% -- -7.9% 1.1% -0.6% -11.0% 23.5% 02% -38.5% -0.3% 3.9% 82% -22% 182% 11.1% -3.3% 7.4% -24% 28% -0.9% 6.9% -3.4% 4.3% 21.1% 354?% 18.7% -11.9% 15.8% 1.9% 14.1% 0.1% 4.0% -1.6% 11.1% 14.4% 15.4% 5.1% 121% 7.7% 2008-2012 Profit Tax 1,743.0 -575.0 7,OSO -1,178.0 32335 -3999 2473.0 -3363 2830.0 74.0 7236.0 -216.0 557.0 -168 1,4864 -1142 27,752.5 -3,054.0 10,016.0 -577.0 1,073.1 -539 9,0365 -299.0 11,433.0 -178.0 5,8353 44.1 4,4920 109.0 2471.0 -o 4,040.7 95.0 2819.7 -193 1,5382 38 20689 459 7,581.0 -87.0 3,438.0 -10.0 4,841.0 145.0 269 268 13,748.6 379.6 4,367.0 198.0 1,1866 1,3049 6,828.7 1168 -275 536.7 23,473.0 -2021 6,701.0 4620 4,8887 5E.0 10,577.7 1,425.7 38192 255.0 8,3519 0684 4,314.0 4860 24727 45294.0 2680.0 1,7812 112 11,890.6 463.6 24.4 2379 86,087.7 42624 172089 6629 15,441.0 1,675.0 5,1078 678.1 1,9062 233.0 30203.0 -6350 1,9633 143.4 137385 1,497.5 24132 229S 3367.4 314.4 633.7 75.7 1,3263 15Z3 Rate -33.0% -16.7% -124% -13.6% 26% -3.0% -3.0% -7.7% -11.0% -58% -4.7% -33% -1.6% 0.8% 24% -1.1% 24% -0.7% 0.3% 23% -1.1% -03% 30% 1.0% 28% 4.5% 9.8% -21% 7.4% -1.0% 6.9% 11.1% 135% 6.7% 6.8% 11.3% 10.3% 5.8% 0.6% 39% 9.6% 5.1% 39% 10.8% 133% 130% -18% 7.3% 10.9% 9.5% 9.3% 120% 11.5% 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 42 ED_001523_00000854-00047 Grrpany Losas MirGfel la^er M Industries Belcn DrninicnFsoiroes fe& C&tfenFfesteuante Trre\Arn=r Msaic D&irtjAak Natfiix &xcnK/bbil EstrrenCharical Trini tylnlstries Cy'sGerefal Stores t-tneywel I International Sets Gansai Berg/ JP. IVbgaiCha&Cb. TAenty-firstCfentuyFox Rial cS&viBiteipriGap Facok LG oe< Wsoo International Raxair KrrteriyOatk BiLilly Artersrs SncAjtcrroti FtctaelICbilire WIIsFaga RR Darelley&Srs FhillipsAnHasai Bail JayGobai FbAsaie QRrt Nte WxhaiiWrldA/id^^ aerterhi TraetersGts L-3Ctrrmjiicatiors NarfolkSbutten ShetwinWIlians QoqalAjfcmate GaGda Ffeythn GOeralMIIs JB HjatTra^ortSavioes Cbreter BSSIOap. Lhion Pacific Effective FederalGotporate InocmeTaxRateson258 Majortbrporations, 2008-2015 (by8-year tax rate) Eglit-YearTotals Profit Tax 11,0552 1,2762 1,630.0 190.8 696.0 842 26,422.3 3,350.3 19,240.0 2,468.1 16,9772 2,246.0 3,5152 471.7 31,048.4 4,1472 6,814.1 9127 11,4582 1,554.5 1,4942 203.1 60,481.7 8,226.7 5,134.0 723.0 4,1221 593.9 1,629.4 2421 16,519.5 2,460.5 5^275.0 808.0 3,550.3 544.9 114,769.5 17,9563 39,7220 6273.0 18,001.9 2,935.9 14,787.9 2,439.9 2,600.5 4362 21,006.5 3,530.5 2092.8 352.8 6,1423 1,0363 10,685.7 1,803.7 15,117.5 2,571.0 796.0 135.4 799.9 137.9 6,315.0 1,134.0 185,024.8 33,330.6 1,610.8 290.4 984.5 177.9 1,9528 354.8 3,474.3 633.1 1,590.0 290.8 8,678.0 1,602.0 10279.0 1,911.9 3,831.1 7127 4323 822 30,729.0 5,870.5 7,613.8 1,461.6 20,455.9 4,069.9 7,294.6 1,4672 1,068.0 2152 23,845.9 4,853.8 21,037.0 4,335.8 15295.4 3,1555 3,5422 731.1 9,2872 1,9169 18,531.0 3,837.0 44,615.8 9,2828 Rate 11.57o 11.7% 121% 127% 128% 132% 163% 13.4% 164% 13.6% 166% 13.6% 14.1% 14.4% 14.9% 14.9% 153% 153% 156% 15.8% 163% 16.57 168% 168% 169% 169% 16.9% 17.0% 17.0% 17.2% 160% 160% 160% 161% 162% 162% 163% 1&97o 18.6% 166% 19.0% 19.1% 19.2% 19.9% 20.1% 20.2% 20.4% 20.6% 20.6% 266% 267% 20.7% 20.8% Profit 366.0 294.4 572 3,416.0 2,7455 28968 453.9 4,372.9 668.9 1,114.1 972 1593 596.0 12238 3402 3297.0 1,0820 330.1 22,414.7 3485.6 25965 28020 388.5 303.7 284.6 960.3 401.4 1,1693 33.9 138.7 8252 31,04.4 225.7 91.9 43.1 3131 2136 1,390.0 9336 716.9 97.3 4,621.0 481.6 2,383.4 1,488.7 245.0 1,6948 2,482.0 1,896.0 670.1 13863 2810.0 7-4567 2015 Tax 79.0 439 18 407.0 -265 5105 74.6 719.1 619 145.0 -27.9 -1.7 87.0 2B02 56.0 719.0 3820 21.4 3,163.0 466.0 2105 1,474.0 89.0 615.7 445 1893 1924 6635 -4.3 362 1582 10,447.4 1125 23 85 235 56.4 218.0 71.6 1679 30.4 1,098.0 385 493.4 3255 652 711.0 718.1 4120 149.6 3958 585.0 1349.7 Rate 21.6% 14.97o 31% 11.9% -1.07o 17.67o 16.57o 16.4% 9.37o 13.07o -28.7% -1.07o 14.67o 21.37o 16.57o 21.87o 353% 6.57o 14.1% 134% 9.37o 3207o 2297o 2327o 15.67o 19.97o 47.97o 56.57o -127% 26.1% 1927o 33.7% 49.97o 257o 19.7% 7.57o 26.4% 15.7% 7.7% 234% 3127o 2387o 8.07o 23.77o 21.97o 26.6% 4207o 28.97o 21.7% 2237o 28.67o 23.87o 21.87o profit 1305.0 2145 110.1 2444.0 1,748.0 2339.9 191.1 4,615.5 301.1 12546 325.1 9598.9 621.0 1,0862 275.6 33I8.6 790.0 175.7 23331.0 9,723.0 2398.0 4,918.0 4753 2,951.5 3238 974.4 1,529.4 126.5 1560 1350 751.0 31,475.4 58 31.0 D 2882 225.0 2718.0 1321.7 6579 898 4398.9 7589 3,029.4 1262 1752 1,563.3 2838.0 1,665.4 5878 1,408.3 2617.0 8,121.4 2014 Tax 370.0 38.8 32.0 121.0 -11.0 7528 -27.9 -25D 46.0 13 7.1 1,3639 61.0 3025 46.6 6616 38.0 13.5 1273.4 891.0 336.0 2B3.0 90.5 726.5 61.8 265.4 319.4 168.9 31.1 36.9 105.0 6,96.4 49.9 -44.5 36.3 5 $2 778.0 415.7 147.9 28.4 1,1689 729 698.4 251.5 48.1 867.0 798.1 331.0 117.0 253.4 551.0 1,961.4 Rate 28.4% 159% 29.1% 5.0% -0.6% 3227o -14.67o -06% 153% 14.4% 22% 142% 1037o 292% 1697o 1997o 487o 7.7% 637o 92% 14.0% 537o 19.0% 21.67o 232% 2727o 2397o 14.0% 1997o 23.67o 14.0% 221% 860.7% -13097o 13.7% 2797o 2157o 28.67o 21.6% 2257o 29.4% 2397o 9.67o 23.1% 2387o 27.47o 55.67o 278% 1997o 1997o 1787o 21.1% 238% Profit 1,751.0 218.5 97.7 2,3320 2571.0 2839.4 1857 4,911.9 2233 1,130.3 158.1 9,357.3 1,407.0 559.0 2312 2S7.8 677.0 57.4 12483.0 5226.9 20130 3,197.0 321.1 28372 331.0 871.0 1,6627 2,735.0 135.9 123.4 745.6 29,3759 656 46.3 211.4 5251 225.4 939.0 29816 510.5 1.6 4,831.0 855.7 28736 1,CE9 177.8 2,385.4 26120 2144.4 538.6 1,60.6 28120 6^62.1 2013 Tax 171.0 29.0 153 744.0 317.0 587.6 305 3.O -25.0 1627 -00 1,033.3 143.0 1318 426 553.8 161.0 43 -1,4293 1,178.0 487.0 614.0 439 W2 45.7 o 308.7 250.1 11.0 33.4 143.6 4376.9 -15.3 852 374 125.6 533 163.0 1498 101.6 3.7 1,014.0 181.7 OE3.6 1907 423 713.0 7098 469.4 126.1 2520 1,001.0 1,675.1 Rate 98% 1337o 15.7% 28.7% 123% 23.7% 16.4% 6.7% -1127o 14.4% -5.7% 1107o 1027o 21.1% 212% 18.97o 2387o 7.57o -11.4% 2257o 2127o 192% 137% 2337o 137% 6.4% 18.67o 9.67o 8.1% 27.07o 19.37o 14.97o -23.37o 181.07o 15.57o 2397o 237% 17.07o 5.07o 18.87o 2S.7% 21.1% 212% 231% 18.1% 2387o 29.97o 2727o 21.97o 234% 15.4% 357% 21.4% 2008-2012 Profit Tax 7,6832 8726 &B2 79.1 431.0 o 17,9703 2078.3 121755 21.6 8,9020 3B5.1 27175 3915 17,148.0 3,125.1 5,6238 8298 7,950.1 1,066.4 9138 2329 41,3062 58312 2510.0 429D 1,303.1 -106.6 8124 969 6,976.0 KD 2726.0 227.0 2987.1 5358 33,5379 21,2895 14.9E2 3,738.0 1Q9954 1873.4 3,870.9 919 1,415.6 2128 12171.0 1K0 1,1535 1978 3,346.7 25.7 7,0922 9832 10,0668 1,4825 4702 97.7 381.9 31.4 3,9921 727.1 93,129.1 11^.9 1,313.7 1433 8124 136.0 1,4063 2726 2317.9 4065 926.0 1259 3,631.0 446.0 4,4368 1274.7 1,9158 2962 2436 21.7 16,405.1 2589.6 5,5175 1.16B5 121695 2214.5 3,5449 469.9 6995 e 182355 25628 13075.0 2109.7 9,590.6 13431 1,745.7 338.4 4.8^0 1,003.7 102920 1,697.0 221726 3806.6 Rate 8.67o 9.1% 8.1% 11.6% 18D% 4.4% 14.57o 1827o 14.87o 134% 25.57o 14.1% 17.1% -797o 11.97o 7.57o 8.37o 16.97o 25.1% 17.67o 17.07o 24% 15.07o 1267o 17.1% 15.7% 13.97o 14.87o 23.87o 827o 1827o 124% 10.97o 16.67o 19.4% 1727o 1367o 1237o 28.77o 15.4% 8.97o 15.87o 2127o 1827o 19.77o 1277o 14.1% 16.1% 23.37o 19.4% 21.07o 16.57o 17.37o 43 Instituted TaxafonardEoonc^ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00048 Ctrrpany Mbrsaito AetaryGbrporaticn Mtesron Arphrol FfthlhirdBaroorp Airgas ll'BTtBltap'BS NerthopGirnren Ftar Ftocter&Grbie MR Solito tel logg C&T Gbte-Mkk Holding Arencan Bpte ra/ila V\R Berkley QrrpbellSbip Varm AtreyBoAes Carter SbuthAest Airlines ZtiiryAjtcrrDtioeGoip, Ire. Gbrcast Racial Aitarsiion GokfrenSdrQoip RecsicnQstparte FOrterl-femifin Kogar TbarroFidnerSentific HCAHoldirgs 3M US Bancorp \F GbrAgaFoecfc Lockheed IVbrtin \Ateteh/ferajm=nt lyfestetd AncwBectranics l-ferris F&tagingCbrp. cfArenca SMS AlliaitTechs^srs dim Barte Staples FbloFlph Laren ArcherCtenielsMdland Garerai D/rarics AhareEtaS^terB Ffel iaroeSteel &Alimlnm \AtDi=rey Anixterlntematicnal Effectue FederalCbtporate InocmeTaxRateson258 Majortbrporations, 2008-2015 (by8-year tax rate) Eyit-YearTotals Profit Tax 15,236.3 3,241.4 3,297.4 7022 11,703.1 2,496.0 1,293.8 279.6 11,009.0 2387.0 3,689.3 572 21,383.0 800.8 126.8 4,7120 5,453.3 1,210.6 66,989.5 14,931.0 2,653.0 591.6 4,649.3 1,0402 8,748.3 1,971.6 4,584.5 1,038.3 426.4 97.5 41,674.7 6,359.3 9,5H2 1,475.5 4,411.7 1,0236 7,279.7 1,6967 18,261.4 4,260.4 3,408.7 7962 1,437.8 339.7 8,459.0 20060 953.3 227.5 64,8792 15,535.8 3,270.8 785.1 50,210.4 121169 12,428.8 3,0012 5,369.8 1,300.5 16218.4 3,945.6 6,560.5 1,609.8 19,116.4 4,6962 23,794.4 5,860.6 49,331.0 12191.0 4,955.5 1,229.4 7,200.8 1,7934 35,509.0 8,8866 10,547.4 2,6129 16,648.7 4,1769 2593.8 656.9 5,877.6 1,4925 2868.0 7324 4,074.0 1,0431 2954.1 7632 3,226.4 835.4 6,160.8 1,6165 4,0462 1,065.1 11,180.0 2950.0 24,720.3 6,6742 3,299.6 892.5 24466 948.4 62566.8 17,217.1 1,271.5 350.1 Rate 21.3% 21.3% 21.3% 21.6% 21.7% 21.7% 220% 220% 222% 223% 223% 224% 225>/o 226% 229% 23.0% 232% 232% 233% 23.3% 234% 236% 237% 239% 239% 24.0% 24.1% 24.1% 24.2% 24.3% 24.5% 24.6% 24.6% 24.7% 24.8% 24.9% 25.0% 25.1% 25.1% 253% 254% .5% 256% 258% 259% 262% 26.3% 264% 27.0% 27.0% 27.5>/,, 27.5% 27.5% Profit 2,1552 373.6 2,407.1 1372 22B.0 514.0 88.0 2,706.0 1,579.1 8,564.0 571.1 734.9 497.5 518.7 782 64272 745.6 687.6 833.0 1,989.4 485.9 24.5 3365.0 264.0 121468 645.6 3455.0 1,0159 660.3 3,073.8 851.7 3461.7 4,319.7 7500.0 7792 700.7 4903.0 936.7 3,369.3 264.6 1,090.6 615.0 171.0 50 451.7 463.9 278.0 1,138.0 35113 784.1 425.5 121849 1632 2015 Tax 638.6 983 6530 250 6820 137.4 239 237.0 $1.8 1,673.0 161.6 1855 230.4 114.6 17.6 2,0921 163.0 177.7 241.0 3SB4 115.6 $5 1,232.0 81.1 2976.8 2283 709.0 23 628 1288 1,064.7 1210.6 ijgo 1478 2958 1317.0 179.6 623 77.6 -27.0 200.1 427 272 215.7 499 78.0 270.0 7773 305.6 1295 3,91 583 Rate 6% 25.07o 27.37o 18.37o 3007 7% 27.1% 7.67o 3307o 19.57o 28.37o 2% 40.37o 221% 2257o 3267o 21.57o 25.87o 29.4% 18.57o 23.87o 2431% 38.4% 7% 24.57o 354% 23.57o 262% 34.87o 23.97o 15.1% 308% 27.87o 25.87o 19.07o 36.67o 192% 19.1% 29.37o -257o 31.07o 25.07o 102% 54.4% 10.87o 28.1% 237% 221% 39.07o 30.4% 322% 36.4% profit 2383.5 239 1833.0 167.0 1,7020 $75 865 2897.0 1,284.0 8,611.0 4263 905.6 487.4 7839 615 7,749.9 1,146.5 9063 9672 2816.5 3635 81.4 1,787.0 176.6 11J9618 6326 6,7829 2,1122 758.6 2^9.0 1,129.6 2243.6 3,736.9 76320 633.0 8952 5269.0 1 834.1 3225.3 334.0 443.0 5833 697.0 143.0 536.0 5388 54 2167.0 3278.4 691.6 4633 108362 1843 2014 Tax 588.5 115.4 453.0 33.1 4240 153.5 Z9 633.0 4824 22720 140.4 2563 291.9 219.4 19.7 20913 153.9 254.7 2412 979.5 71.7 15.4 238.0 40.7 21712 194.7 1,2613 5152 166.4 824.0 390.4 8352 964.9 1,888.0 1323 281.6 2033.0 409.9 9623 96.0 153.0 175.0 63.5 36.8 215.0 116.8 154.4 641.0 787.4 196.4 1532 2721.1 33.3 Rate 24.7% 183% 25.1% 198% 249% 27.0% 31.0% 21.4% 37.6% 4% 329% 283% $9% 28.0% 320% 27.0% 132% 28.1% 249% 348% 199% 189% 11.4% 23.0% 182% 323% 18.6% 24.4% 219% 9% 34.6% 36.9% 258% 252% 253% 31.4% 37.6% 227% 289% 28.7% 339% 0% 9.1% 258% 42.5% 23.0% 26.3% 29.6% 24.0% 28.4% 33.1% 25.1% 18.1% Profit 2,346.7 611.4 1,4530 156.4 22S6.0 $23 98.0 2,751.0 848.8 8,768.0 391.9 7102 2,085.3 759.6 622 6,157.6 968.8 503.5 798.1 3,0838 281.3 36.5 1,1650 161.6 10,0162 5335 6,446.0 2,158.7 1,163.4 2245.5 909.5 2,884.3 3,118.9 7,$7.0 721.3 1,064.7 42$0 960.9 2903.3 3124 7231 404.0 171.0 508.5 449.6 844.8 4.9 1,495.0 3223.0 5335 4335 8,531.6 181.4 2013 Tax 3.7 4 484.0 25.1 494.0 173.0 27.0 703.0 191.4 1,606.0 123.6 249.1 2822 1339 17.0 1J0035 3043 1123 25B.1 3238 783 -14.5 5.0 413 3,013.5 138.1 2508.0 4918 3495 6115 204.0 7335 8719 1 885.0 199.0 3635 1204.0 383.7 9943 792 213.0 1232 40.0 1469 1226 191.1 1829 348.0 838.0 1743 1235 2,1853 6 Rate 15.6% 112% .% 16.0% 21.5% 1% 29.1% 27.6% 225% 18% 8% 1% 135% 17.6% 27% 27.0% 4% 18.9% 5% 10.6% 27.8% -41.0% 5% .6% 1% 27.4% 9% 228% 1% 272% 224% 4% 0% 0% 27.6% 9% .% 7% 5% 4% 2.5% 5% 4% 292% 27% 26% 25% .% 0% 7% 2.8% 6% 19.6% 20082012 Profit Tax 8,1.0 1,647.6 1,6835 4.1 6,010.0 901.0 8332 1964 4,804.0 837.0 2,095.4 38 309.7 49.1 13,02.0 3,12.0 1,741.4 15.0 41,0465 92.O 13.7 169.0 228.7 349.4 5,678.1 1,197.1 2522.4 5703 224.6 433 21,340.0 3,7332 3$85 3.4 2224.3 4789 4,6993 9633 10,421.7 2591.7 22510 530.7 12965 279.4 21420 1550 1.1 64.4 ,7543 7,374.3 1,519.1 224.0 ,$65 7,640.7 7,1420 1,73 28305 S83 8,330.0 1 887.3 57 86 10,368 2,092.8 125899 2313.1 712.0 6,4620 2,8$O 7303 4,5402 855.6 2,9220 3339.6 6,846.7 1,6728 7,0978 1,610.0 1^828 404.0 3020.9 1,1.5 1235.7 234.1 3,C.0 8968 2,025 5B2.4 1,819.1 2$1 4,346.4 12B.7 25169 6498 6,3.O 1,691.0 14,707.7 42715 1290.4 2163 21242 5452 31,015.0 82875 745.7 2229 Rate 19.7% .% 14.9% .6% 16.8% 162% 15.8% 24.0% 0.9% 229% 134% 152% 21.1% 226% 19.% 17.5% 24.4% 21.5% .3% 24.9% % 21.5% 7.3% 18.3% 24.0% 14.7% 228% 242% 19.9% 227% 242% 19.9% 3% 242% 6% 18.8% 18.4% 24.4% 227% 24.0% 31.9% 18.9% 5% 27.0% 139% 0% 8% 5% 0% 16.8% 7% 27.0% 9% 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 44 ED_001523_00000854-00049 Gxrpany OrnitxrnGtoip CpitalQeFreraal Ajtchteiticn IKXbrpoiaticn Intel United Fltel S&vioe Tutor Ftemi Clorox RpsGb FRSInlBtries Ogn Ktey's CUntaSavicES Ctetdirall-tealth HSRBkxk Dck's^xrthgGxxte MmeAuto Prts CFbillyAjtcrrotixe QstoWolesale Mack Hanel Faxte Qade GauireFterts LrnitedBtaxte l-briey-C&yKtecn IllrasloolWxte BllS IX FIblixaperlVbttete Tagst Ajtcre Hateey Lhiyeisall-tealthSteivioes AJcrraticCSta Recessing TexsIrebuTBite l-tenryStein Arerisxiofegsn United Ptual Faxte CollaGsieral LdxxatotyGap. ofAnerica Q FPtRTprri~iCS DBeie wa-fyfertao Sglds BnntQtxp \AWQairgsr Owere&Mrcr Fsetv UimQap hbrc&rcm TtadorSqslyGtrrpany CFInSetresl-bldirgs CollaTtee Effectue FederalQxporate InermeTax Rateson258 MajorQxporations, 2008-2015 (by8-year tax rate) Eiit-YearTotals Refit Tax 4,753.9 1,3121 31,122.5 8,6022 3,891.3 1,074.2 2,470.8 688.5 77,498.3 21,603.3 39,4422 11,0051 1,065.1 298.1 5,579.7 1,569.0 26,393.4 7,4328 4,135.5 1,169.0 14,436.6 4,0912 12,315.0 3,496.0 2248.8 639.9 11,266.5 3221.3 5,122.1 1,469.1 3,103.4 891.5 4,471.8 1,288.8 6,781.6 1,9561 13,8320 4,020.0 41,404.3 12039.0 5,508.0 1,604.3 39,856.5 11,6432 6,818.6 1,993.7 8,945.8 2621.7 RRR?? 1,9285 11,211.9 3,297.2 1,658.7 488.0 16,9520 4,994.3 17,348.9 5,1121 32087.0 9,476.0 10,429.1 3,103.9 7,623.5 2,2712 5,156.0 1,5466 14,398.8 4,3422 16,387.1 4,954.1 3,130.8 9469 6,112.5 1,863.0 1,073.1 9,156.1 "SHA 2799.4 6,109.1 1,873.3 7,867.4 2,423.5 19,5842 6,074.7 139,743.0 43,480.0 2098.8 655.6 1,7827 558.1 7,481.0 2,343.3 1,357.5 425.8 6,274.9 1,975.9 5,982.4 1,897.4 7,628.0 2,4320 3,025.8 971.0 11,741.6 3,7722 5,347.1 1,7263 Rate 27.6% 27.6% 27.7% 27.9% 27.9% 27.9% 28.0% 28.1% 282% 28.3% 28.3% 28.4% 28.5% 28.6% 28.7% 28.7% 28.8% 28.8% 29.1% 29.1% 29.1% 29.2% 29.2% 29.3% 29.4% 29.4% 29.4% 29.5>/o 29.5% 29.5>/o 29.8% 29.8% 30.0% 302% 302% 30.2% 3O.5>/o 3O.5>/o 30.6% 30.7% 308% 31.0% 31.1% 31.2% 31.3% 31.3% 31.4% 31.5>/o 31.7% 31.9% 321% 321% 323% Refit 716.4 6,1575 601.7 4S.4 8,787.5 6,250.0 702 877.8 2,8210 8012 2,8889 1,611.4 258.3 1,981.7 538.5 505.0 670.6 1,0.0 2,4579 2,117.0 9792 3,783.5 0BO.5 1,583.1 1,0788 1,5975 2$4 2,206.1 2,831.7 4285.0 1,613.0 1,3139 1,0039 1,963.7 3218.0 533.8 29.7 213.8 1,764.6 5621 1,0219 1,8092 16,063.0 216.4 2438 1,1588 1531 S88.6 600.4 063.6 634.9 064.5 4338 2015 Tax 3198 1091.0 2202 1265 2OE6.5 1,634.0 53 2118 1,083.0 158.0 1,0.7 510.4 853 583.7 1672 1585 2220 462.4 6949 7320 283.6 1,108.5 308.6 406.1 3639 4855 702 088.6 758.1 1,6$0 4825 3885 324.6 $24 1,084.0 161.1 238.0 58.6 578.8 2375 225.9 361.7 55020 723 08.0 3893 602 283.6 2835 189.6 TP 9 256.9 1163 Rate 44.6% 323% 316% 27.8% .7% i% 7.6% 24.1% 36.6% 19.7% 36.3% 31.7% 330% 29.5% 31.1% 31.4% 34.6% 31.8% 28.3% 34.6% 28.7% 31.7% 330% 31.3% 335% 30.5% 27.8% 323% .8% 38.6% 29.4% 29.6% 323% e% 321% 2% 800.3% 27.4% 328% 36.9% 222% 23.0% 34.6% 334% 382% 336% 38.6% 28.7% 40.6% 19.6% 320% e% .8% Refit 6382 6,0225 6S2 439.7 115 1 4503.5 1505 8083 273821 3235 2,907.5 232.4 286.7 1,659.0 6.O $78 7089 1,187.4 2,C$5 15366.0 861.4 4,962.5 1248.8 1,4224 1,179.1 1,624.7 244.1 2779.6 2491.9 3276.0 1,409.8 1277.7 837.7 1,863.8 2,684.0 4028 ggpg 1889 15062 7295 766.0 3,149.6 17300.0 209.7 2539 12582 145.4 970.1 673 1,138.8 57 1,956.0 0058 2014 Tax 331.6 1,934.0 206.0 1302 3273.1 0820 44.4 230.3 12697 128.0 1,C$3 731.4 729 381.0 245.5 177.6 106.1 36B6 626.5 7,136.0 244.1 1^512 209.9 418.4 385.4 385.7 $0 818.1 7542 1,074.0 497.3 341.4 230.1 5S.0 823.0 147.0 258.7 64.8 533.0 228.7 234.0 1,1915 6,1650 71.1 74.0 409.7 51.7 316.1 128.4 378.8 195.8 688.0 321.4 Rate $0% 321% 315% 29.6% 283% 233% 279% 285% 53.3% 39.0% 362% 318% 25.4% 23.0% 379% 33.7% 279% 2% 5% 465% 283% 39.4% 168% 29.4% 327% 23.7% 33.6% 29.4% 303% 328% 332% .7% 26.3% 28.7% .6% 298% 46.0% 343% 33.4% 31.4% .6% 378% 34.6% 339% 29.1% 326% 35.5% 326% 100.7% 333% 34.6% 326% 35.5% Refit 5128 5,3228 5772 3136 9,314.5 5,835.0 118.9 724.9 2^087 505.4 0027 2,191.8 485.6 1,620.7 718.0 $3.0 5687 1,025.8 1,971.6 3,646.0 750.5 5,108.3 2153 12312 1,006.5 1,3842 2222 242 2380.5 3,836.0 1,451.4 12126 794.4 1,809.6 1,507.0 467.8 7627 1537 1,$72 8162 1236.7 4,032 18,668.0 171.8 2172 1,1354 181.9 816.9 080.9 1,129.0 5025 2081.0 008.5 2013 Tax 215.0 1360.0 181.4 100.0 2,680.5 2181.0 28.1 2219 0062 1530 363.0 8168 1709 488.7 1053 1338 1893 3228 $1.6 56BD 2120 1,406.3 2023 3772 2AS.5 3002 658 7475 7255 1213.0 411.6 3326 2399 2532 215.0 1325 225.4 42.5 505.1 2225 413.7 1263.1 6377.0 81.1 $.6 349.0 57.7 2809 2779 360.0 139.1 6803 2065 Rate 39.6% 25.6% 31.4% 29.1% 28.9% 37.4% 236% .6% 335% .3% 402% 37.3% 352% 2% 272% 25.6% 333% 31.5% .5% 15.6% 282% 27.6% 1192% .6% .4% 282% 29.6% 28.9% .5% 31.6% 28.4% 27.4% 2% 34.4% 14.3% 28.3% 29.5% 27.6% 331% 27.3% 335% 337% 34.1% 472% i% .7% 31.7% 34.4% 28.3% 31.9% 27.7% 31.0% $6% 20082012 Refit Tax 2833.4 445.7 13619.7 33172 1,3592 466.6 12322 3318 478482 12,9442 22753.7 6258.1 716.5 2203 316B7 005.0 18230.7 4,134.9 2300.3 7.O 7,7375 1,6272 6209.4 1,437.4 12183 3108 6,005.1 1,767.9 3217.6 861.1 1,547.6 4216 2$87 671.4 3,144.3 8222 7360.0 2177.0 20283.3 3,608.0 29169 7.6 26,0173 7,087.3 4,404.0 1,187.9 4,709.0 1330.9 32978 916.7 6,606.6 2CB4.8 939.9 ^99 8,683.1 2,400.1 9,6449 2875.4 20,600.0 5537.O 5,8348 1,7125 38193 1208.6 25000 8,671.6 7620 2031.6 8,978.1 2J885.1 1,686.4 5063 4,757.4 1,140.9 516.8 1615 4,268.1 1,1825 4,0013 1214.6 4,8E8 1578.9 10,5822 3,158.4 87,187.0 25376.0 1,5009 431.1 1,0678 3345 3028.6 1,194.8 874.0 255.1 34093 1,0.3 42438 1210.6 4,308.6 15066 1,3227 4333 6,700.0 2247.0 3009.0 0021 Rate 15.6% 24.4% 238% sr% 27.1% 27.5% .7% 28.6% 227% 292% 21.0% 23.1% 25.5% 29.4% .8% 272% .6% .1% 29.6% 17.8% 29.7% 272% 27.0% .3% 27.8% .8% .7% .7% 29.8% .8% 294?% 31.6% 2% .3% 321% .9% 24.0% 31.3% 27.7% .4% 326% .8% .1% .7% 31.3% .4% .3% 31.3% .5% 342% 328% .1% 320% 45 Institutes TaxationardEooncm^ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00050 Gxrpany Aetna CWlax Wgern G&rEStep Visa hfchlb Gp CfeaerAreraS&vioes EtedBath&B^crd rtrreCpot (-bUjfrcntier CharlesSttwb C/RErerg/ CA FtStres TechCla DoryChTninicaticrs, Ire QajterBoetric EmanBectric dMSritter U-feFbintl-tealth ApolloQoip 3/rrex CH.RrKr\AiidMcte WFbint Jtats&giresingQap GSQraTEtk WMeRntelVfertet AltriaQoip Segaiktec GtgiizaitTectTOlogySblutiaTS LhitedSteiticreis F^mrdkrEsFrercia! Lhited-teithGap Gbati, Inc. ArericenFnaraalGoip EtetSy MCCnalcf F^nakteArerican FrenklhFsjjOES Laoefe l-fealthNat HiTBna ExpeEtripts (intere (VH ire hfe taie L258OENIW4E5 Effective FederalGorporate InxmeTaxRateson258 Majortbrporations, 2008-2015 (by8-year tax rate) Sit-YearTotals Profit Tax 22,561.1 7,290.8 5,085.8 1,644.3 26,280.0 8,5030 4,163.8 1,351.3 30,063.9 9,774.0 11,619.8 3,7928 12,003.9 3,947.8 22,538.1 7,459.6 10,123.0 3,357.6 48,671.9 16,154.9 7,0.7 2,348.4 12,806.6 4,257.5 2,547.6 849.3 5,7332 1,9132 8,667.6 2,8932 961.3 321.8 7,031.6 2,355.6 879.7 295.7 14,422.1 4,860.0 5,449.9 1,841.4 1,859.7 6328 5,755.6 1,9682 1,220.6 418.9 4,907.6 1,6892 35,1172 12,167.0 2,534.1 876.3 49,704.8 17,274.8 4,389.5 1,5325 47,468.0 16,5830 13,335.9 4,7138 2,869.6 1,0157 1,314.4 465.3 3,800.3 1,3542 61,900.0 22,194.9 6,293.4 2,263.6 4,698.8 1,710.1 9,702.4 3,5361 21,379.6 7,8080 20,619.0 7,599.4 11,753.6 4,354.9 26,542.3 9,8434 1,685.9 630.0 14,530.4 5,689.7 17,907.7 7,109.0 2,010.5 836.6 888.8 420.8 Rate 323% 323% 324% 325% 325% 326% 329% 33.1% 332% 332% 332% 332% 333% 334% 334% 335% 335% 336% 33.7% 338% 34.0% 34.2% 34.3% 34.4% 34.6% 34.7% 34.8% 34.8% 34.9% 35.3% 35.4% 35.4% 35.6% 35.9% 360% 364% 364% 36.5% 369% 37.1% 37.1% 37.4% 392% 39.7% 41.6% 47.3% Profit 4,133.0 970.3 2604.0 538.0 6,65 1,024.7 1,3898 3,466.0 10892 9,741.0 1,0748 2189.0 239.6 679.7 1,S20 189.3 10.1 1351 2,815.0 9227 294.6 119.0 1836 654.1 4,514.6 257.5 8,0830 837.9 7,627.0 53616 679.1 115.0 755.4 9,960.0 330.1 641.0 12515 2,467.1 5,816.6 1,9452 4,171.0 4336 2343.6 3,7302 691.3 315.4 2015 Tax 1,753.1 2975 86.0 175.1 1^215 388.7 3948 135.0 3835 3228.0 483.4 740.0 75.0 281.7 4627 713 296.1 462 904.0 3103 1228 465 58.7 2527 1,917.4 718 2,960.0 3009 2016.0 1,149.4 258.7 673 273.1 4,155.0 1532 216.0 347.0 1,080.0 3298.9 7248 10880 2539 1,054.6 1,673.9 3113 1654 Rate 424?% 30.7% 325% 325% 29.0% 37.9% 28.6% 35.9% 29.5% 33.1% 44.7% 339% 31.3% 41.4% 292% 37.7% 24.1% 342% 321% 36.9% 41.7% 39.1% 320% 38.6% 425% sp/o 36.6% 372% 330% 342% 38.1% 58.5% 36.1% 41.8% 46.4% 33.7% 27.7% 41.8% .4% 273% 40.5% 58.6% 45.0% 452% 45.0% $4% profit 3,423.0 9809 3277.0 5418 7069.6 1313.5 1,787.6 3027.0 1,441.9 8844.0 3825 2043.0 255.0 7005 1,453.9 .7 1,1222 129.4 2,037.0 4838 201.6 360.0 184.6 611.6 43IO.3 269.9 72)1.3 857.6 7283.0 2536.9 5402 1864 W3 9085.0 3252 571.0 1,078.0 2545.8 2089.6 2080.5 4,055.0 2152 2091.1 2915.9 4543 1328 2014 Tax 1,1988 287.7 12)7.0 153.7 2278.6 397.5 515.6 1215.0 4S21 2884.0 2928 747.0 762 281.5 474.7 324 5042 44.7 7420 1429 472 113.9 77.4 2182 10910 103.6 24983 351.6 2300.0 1,0798 187.8 723 254.4 3,883.0 147.5 o 354.0 10662 799.1 798.5 1,475.0 85.9 996.1 1238.1 209.3 69.6 Rate 350% 309% 368% 28.4% 309% 303% 288% 34.4% 34.1% 326% 76.6% 36.6% 299% 402% 326% 328% 42.3% 34.6% 36.4% 295% 23.4% 326% 419% 35.7% 369% 38.4% 34.6% 41.0% 323% 43.0% 348% 388% 37.0% 41.4% 45.4% 46.4% 328% 419% 392% 38.1% 36.4% 399% 47.6% 5% 46.1% $4% Profit 28992 7625 3,313.0 4692 10618 1,359.5 1,761.7 3,8330 1,5522 7,4240 1,120.7 1,648.0 5^9 667.0 1,3129 121.5 1,0436 120.8 10640 805.8 2023 $1.0 190.1 549.6 3,7623 328.6 7,101.7 815.4 6,506.0 10673 496.0 1902 508.0 8,678.0 7602 6540 oo 2,7537 2,609.6 1,830.8 3,470.0 257.6 106914 2,8727 263.5 808 2013 Tax 829 2614 1,1220 1479 5068 4685 569.7 1060O 499.0 2533.0 267.9 598.0 3AS9 1850 464.0 413 296.6 478 704.0 2594 94.0 171.7 743 1578 12)1.5 124.0 2071.7 290.4 2o.o 640.1 198.7 669 1807 3,004.0 2739 308.0 306.0 1,161.6 5514 6823 13120 785 588.4 1,448.1 115.6 656 $3,810,577 $806,942 212% $551,698 $141,281 25.6% $584,814 $134,763 23.0% $524,346 $111,138 Rate 28.7% 34.7% 336% 31.5% 30.1% 34.3% 323% 27.6% 321% 33.7% 239% 36.3% 49.9% 27.7% 35.3% 34.0% 28.4% 39.6% 423%, 322% 46.5% 330% 39.1% 28.7% 31.9% 37.7% 362% 3567% 31.8% 34.3% 39.1% 352% 359% 34.6% 36.0% 47.1% 51.9% 422?% 21.1% 37.3% 38.7% 30.5% 31.5% 53.4% 439% 81.1% 212% 2008-2012 Profit Tax 12,1088 3525.9 2422.0 794.6 170550 5023.0 2,6148 874.6 14,384.0 5,067.0 7,9220 2540.0 7,0738 2,467.7 11,709.1 3,910.6 5,839.7 10860 226629 7039.9 4,487.7 10072 6,985.6 2,1725 1,5332 4322 3685.9 1,164.9 4,318.7 1,491.8 5518 1768 3639.7 1058.7 494.4 1570 7,906.1 2010.0 3237.6 1098.8 1,1612 3688 4,765.6 1036.1 6623 2385 3,0923 10604 22,530.0 10SB2 27,3188 5na 9249.8 1,918.6 589.7 28,0620 90510 50BB.1 1,844.4 1,1552 3755 8229 2587 1,8545 646.1 33,887.0 11,1529 4,8778 10890 2,8328 921.1 6,7829 2029.1 135129 4009.1 10,1233 2,960.0 5,897.1 2,153.8 14,8463 5038.4 779.5 2118 8026.3 3,060.6 8,419.0 2749.0 601.4 200.4 359.8 1293 $2,149,719 $419,759 Rate 290% 328% 312% 334% 352% 321% 34.9% 33.7% 34.0% 33.3% 201% 31.3% 28.4% 31.6% 34.5% 320% 35.3% 31.8% 31.7% 339% 31.8% 31.3% 31.5% 34.3% 33.1% 34.8% 339% 30.7% 37.0% 329% 325% 31.4% 34.8% 329% 34.6% 325% 37.3% 334% 291% 36.5% 36.0% 272% 37.1% 327% 33.3% 334% 19.5% 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 46 ED_001523_00000854-00051 Smilers Grrpary 3M MIndJstries AisroeAjtoRte Afra AlRuioes ArRaicts&Chencals Ai^b Alem/Cbrpaation AlmCBtaS^tere AliaitTeda^stare AtriaQap Arn.crm Arerai ArercanBectricFtwer ArercanBpess ArercarfinarcialQap Arerisajroaigsn Arpherol Arbraos Aiixler International 4polbQoip AcherCnielsIVicllard ArcwBectroncs AthurGbl laer AbjryAJaretireQap, Ire. AIST AireeBiagy AjtcnraticDala Passing AjfcRtion Alteare Ball BB&ICbrp. EfeJEath&Ebyond Bans Efest Biy BgLols Biogai Idsc Bang CHFtbiracnWjrIdwKte CA C&la/isicn Sitare QrrpbellSip CfepitalOePrercial Cdinall-tealth CrMax Effective FederalGbrporate InermeTaxRateson258MajorCrporations,2008-2015 (alphabetical) B^it-Yeer Totals Refit Tax 23,7944 5,860.6 696.0 842 4/4718 1388.8 22,561.1 739O.8 3,6802 279.2 4,1174 439.5 3,6893 800.8 3297.4 702.2 3,299.6 892.5 2.951.1 7632 47/468.0 16,583.0 6237.5 6745 7,243.0 -48.0 17,1704 -463.7 41,674.7 9,5772 4,6983 1,710.1 6,112.5 1,863.0 1293.8 279.6 796.0 135.4 1271.5 350.1 5,755.6 1,9682 11,180.0 2,950.0 2,593.8 656.9 1,630.0 190.8 953.3 227.5 141,623.7 11,500.4 23263 -1142 143983 4,342.2 3,881.3 1,0742 10/129.1 3,103.9 1,952.8 3548 18,531.0 3,837.0 10,123.0 3,357.6 1,658.7 488.0 9,7024 3,536.1 2,0983 655.6 133359 4,713.8 40,026.7 2,146.7 4,907.6 1,6892 5,7332 1,9132 2/455.1 8.6 7379.7 1,696.7 31,1225 8,602.2 113665 332I.3 5,0853 1,6443 Rite 246>/o 121% 28.8% 323% 7.6% 10.7% 21.7% 21.3% 27.0% 25.8% 349% 10.8% -0.7% -27% 23.0% 36.4% 30.5% 21.6% 17.0% 27.5% 342% 26.4% 25.3% 11.7% 23.9% 81% -40% 302% 27.7% 29.8% 182% 20.7% 332% 29.4% 36.4% 312% 35.3% 5.4% 34.4% 33.4% 04% 23.3% 27.6% 28.6% 323% Refit 4,019.7 572 670.6 4,133.0 556.0 727.7 514.0 373.6 784.1 266.0 7,627.0 1,960.6 916.0 2,608.4 6,4272 641.0 29.7 1372 33.9 1602 119.0 1,138.0 261.6 291.4 264.0 18,953.0 533.5 1,963.7 691.7 1,643.0 43.1 2,810.0 12892 2524 1251.5 216.4 3,361.6 6,828.0 664.1 679.7 327.8 820.0 6,157.5 1,981.7 970.3 2015 Tax 1210.6 1.8 222.0 1,753.1 -11.0 149.7 137.4 98.3 305.6 272 2516.0 116.6 -20 107.3 2092.1 216.0 238.0 25.0 -4.3 583 46.5 270.0 77.6 43.9 81.1 2496.0 -- 522.4 2202 482.5 8.5 585.0 380.5 702 317.0 72.3 1,149.4 1,966.0 252.7 281.7 0.1 241.0 1,991.0 5837 297.5 Rate 27.8% 3.1% 34.0/0 424% -20% 20.6% 26.7% 25.0% 39.0% 102% 33.0% 5.9% -02% 4.1% 32.6% 33.7% 800.3% 18.3% -127% 36.4% 39.1% 23.7% 29.3% 14.9% 30.7% 132% -- 26.3% 31.8% 29.4% 19.7% 2O.3/0 29.5% 27.3% 27.7% 33.4% 312% 28.3% 38.3/0 41.4% 0.0% 29.4% 32.3/0 29.3/0 30.7% Refit 3,735.9 110.1 703.9 3,3.0 874.0 518.0 557.5 628.9 691.6 143.0 7283.0 228.0 1,001.0 2,465.0 7,7499 571.0 562.6 167.0 156.0 181.3 353.0 2,167.0 331.0 244.5 176.6 17,311.4 471.3 1,863.8 6532 1,499.8 266.0 2,617.0 1,441.9 244.1 1,078.0 299.7 2538.9 6,779.7 611.6 700.5 2.4 9672 6,922.5 1,659.0 980.9 2014 Tax 961.9 320 196.1 1,198.8 113.0 -62 150.5 115.4 196.4 36.8 2,360.0 209.0 -37.0 51.0 2,091.3 266.0 258.7 33.1 31.1 33.3 113.9 11.0 96.0 38.8 40.7 1,609.0 -- 536.0 206.0 497.3 36.3 551.0 4921 820 354.0 71.1 1,079.8 5817 2182 281.5 5.8 2412 1,984.0 381.0 287.7 Rte 25.8% 29.1% 279% 36.0% 129% -1.1% 27.0% 18.3% 28.4% 25.8% 323% 91.7% -3.7% 21% 27.0% 46.4% 46.0% 19.8% 19.9% 18.1% 326% 29.6% 28.7% 15.9% 23.0% 9.3% -- 28.7% 31.5% 332% 13.7% 21.1% 31.1% 33.6% 328% 33.9% 43.0% 8.6% 36.7% 402% 1.4% 24.9% 321% 23.0% 30.9% Refit 3,118.9 97.7 57 2,8992 469.0 8.5 522.3 611.4 533.5 533.5 6,506.0 672.5 804.0 2,081.0 6,157.6 664.0 762.7 156.4 136.9 181.4 521.0 1,496.0 312.4 218.5 161.6 19,271.7 366.1 1,899.6 5772 1,451.4 241.4 28120 1,5522 2222 590.0 171.8 1,867.3 5,916.0 549.6 667.0 196.7 793.1 5,3228 1,620.7 762.5 2013 Tax 871.9 15.3 189.3 8329 166.0 662 173.0 68.4 174.3 1469 2066.0 34.5 -118.0 -45.0 1,660.5 308.0 225.4 25.1 11.0 36.6 171.7 018.0 792 29.0 41.3 3,043.0 -- 6532 181.4 411.6 37.4 1,004.0 9.0 66.8 306.0 81.1 10.1 -199.0 157.8 185.0 -12 258.1 1,360.0 488.7 264.4 Rate 28.0% 15.7% 33.3% 287% 35.4% 15.4% 33.1% 112% 327% 292% 31.8% 5.1% -14.7% -22% 27.0% 47.1% 29.5% 16.0% 8.1% 19.6% 33.0% 23.3% 25.4% 13.3% 25.6% 15.8% -- 34.4% 31.4% 28.4% 15.5% 35.7% 321% 29.6% 51.9% 472% 34.3% -3.3% 28.7% 27.7% -0.6% 325% 25.6% 302% 34.7% 2008-2012 Refit Tax 12,589.9 2,813.1 431.0 36.0 25287 671.4 12,1088 3,536.9 1,7812 112 2,4132 229.8 2095.4 339.8 1,683.5 425.1 1290.4 216.3 205 5524 26,0620 9,661.0 3,367.4 314.4 4,4920 109.0 10,016.0 -577.0 21,310.0 3,7332 28328 921.1 4,757.4 1,14)3 8332 196.4 4702 97.7 745.7 2229 4,765.6 1,636.1 6,380.0 1,691.0 1,6828 404.0 8726 79.1 361.1 1.4 86,087.7 4,3624 1,486.4 -1142 8,671.6 2,631.6 1,9592 466.6 5,834.8 1,7125 1,403.3 2726 102920 1,607.0 5,839.7 1,986.0 939.9 260.9 6,7829 2,529.1 1,530.9 431.1 5,$8.1 1,814.4 20,473.0 -202.1 3,0923 1,060.4 3,6859 1,1649 1,5382 3.8 4,699.3 966.3 13,619.7 3,3172 6,005.1 1,767.9 220 791.6 Rte 223% 8.1% 26.6% 29.0% 0.6% 9.5% 162% 25.3% 16.8% 27.0% 37.0% 9.3% 24% -5.8% 17.5% 325% 24.0% 23.6% 20.8% 29.9% 04.3% 26.5% 24.0% 9.1% 18.3% 5.1% -7.7% 30.3% 23.8% 29.4% 19.4% 16.5% 34.0% 28.7% 37.3% 28.7% 329% -1.0% 01.3% 31.6% 0.3% 20.3% 24.4% 29.4% 328% 47 Institutes Ta^ionardEuoncmcra 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00052 1 Smilers Cfcrrpary Qy'sGneialSaes ( Hs Cfelane Gter GiturJnk OElnitnesHlings CharleEfchA} Ogra Goot CMSEreigy Osti, Ire. QraCbla CgiizatTecfrolog/SluticrE Ctrrct Orrrririityl-tealthSstaTB CtiAgiaFocb Ctneol Bregy CtneolicfetedBfecn Grtel lat orBancfc Qxe4Vterkl-bldirQ Cbming GtdmWiolesale < OuRBregy OEaarBrk andre DarcfenFtelauranfe DTIta Bae Deen Bregy Dkk'sSretingGtafc DferreFrarHl3avioes DferjeryCrrrmratiar, Im DEHhfetyok DollarCrea! DblIarTioe DtmnlcnFteuroes Dtrrtar ber Dlffiregy DJeBregy QRrt fetnrrOrrrKal Bnfeb BiUlly Effective FfederalGbtporate 1rxxrreTaxRatesoe258IVtajorGotporat'OT 2008-2015 (alphabetical) Bit-Yeer Totals Rtit Tax 1,6294 242.1 13,044.7 698.5 2,857.3 326.3 2,0105 836.6 8.606.8 725.1 11,741.6 3,772.2 12,806.6 4257.5 14/436.6 4,091.2 5579.7 1,569.0 4,666.0 -26.0 6293.4 2263.6 23,845.9 4(853.8 2569.6 1,015.7 64,8792 15,535.8 2,6835 237.1 7200.8 1,793.4 3,550.3 5449 12,329.0 103.0 5,590.6 4143 426.4 97.5 7(458.0 71.0 13,832.0 4,020.0 21,0065 3,530.5 2,547.6 849.3 49,704.8 172748 92872 1,918.9 3,5452 471.7 63593 1,475.5 193842 6,074.7 21,6923 368.3 3,1034 891.5 22,538.1 7459.6 7,031.6 2,355.6 11(4582 1,5545 9,156.1 2.799.4 5,347.1 1,726.3 19240.0 2,468.1 1437.8 339.7 4,584.5 1,038.3 7478.0 253.0 19,7675 -422.0 8,678.0 1,602.0 5,134.0 723.0 4,6493 1,0402 15,1175 2,571.0 Rite 149% 5.4% 11.4% 41.6P/O 8.4% 32.1% 332% 28.3% 28.1% -O.6P/0 36.0% 20.4% 35.4% 23.9% 8.8P/0 249% 15.3% O.8P/0 7.4% 22.9% 1.0% 29.1% 16.8% 33.3% 348P% 20.7% 13.3% 232% 31.0% 1.7% 28.7% 33.1% 33.5% 13.6% 30.6% 32.3% 128% 23.6% 226% 3.4% -2.1% 18.5% 141% 224?% 17.0% Refit 3102 1,974.4 221.8 691.3 12120 964.5 21800 2,888.9 877.8 7720 330.1 1,694.8 679.1 12,146.8 303.0 700.7 330.1 1,760.0 $9.3 782 406.0 2,457.9 3,043.7 239.6 8,083.0 1,386.3 450.9 745.6 1,8092 1,861.4 535.0 3,469.0 1226.1 1,114.1 1,764.6 433.8 2,745.5 24.5 518.7 954.0 3,810.0 1,390.0 $6.0 734.9 1,1693 2015 Tax $.0 1542 18.8 311.3 28.0 233.9 740.0 1,048.7 211.8 -- 1$2 711.0 238.7 2976.8 7.0 296.8 21.4 -86.0 -57.3 17.6 40.0 694.9 615.7 75.0 2960.0 396.8 74.6 160.0 361.7 -236.6 1$5 1245.0 296.1 145.0 578.8 116.3 -26.5 $.5 114.6 -3.0 -- 218.0 87.0 185.5 660.5 Rate 16.5% 7.8% 8.5% 45.0% 23% 26.6% 33.9% 36.3% 24.1% -- 46.4% 42$% 38.1% 24.5% 23% 422% 6.5% -4.9% -9.6% 22.5% 9.9% 28.3% 202% 31.3% 36.6% 28.6% 16.5% 21.5% 20.0% -127% 31.4% 36.9% 24.1% 13.0% 32.8% 26.$% -1.0% 243.1% 22.1% -0.3% -- 15.7% 14.6% 252% $.5% Refit 275.6 1,790.0 5332 454.3 1,072.0 1^66.0 2043.0 2907.5 808.3 703.0 3252 1,$0.3 5402 11,961.8 228.0 8962 175.7 1,601.0 475.0 61.5 2362.0 2062.5 2951.5 255.0 7201.3 1,408.3 191.1 1,146.5 3,149.6 4297.5 527.8 3,527.0 1,1922 1251.6 1,$62 905.8 1,748.0 81.4 783.9 1251.0 3,514.0 2718.0 621.0 905.6 1206.5 2014 Tax 46.6 -235.0 942 209.3 18.0 638.0 747.0 1,0623 230.3 -- 147.5 867.0 187.8 2,1712 -29.0 281.6 13.5 -9.0 1305 19.7 38.0 626.5 726.5 762 2493.3 2$.4 -27.9 1$.9 1,191.5 151.5 177.6 1215.0 5342 1803 533.0 321.4 -11.0 15.4 219.4 -16.0 -- 778.0 64.0 253.3 168.9 Fte 16.9% -13.1% 18.1% 46.1% 1.7% 32.6% 36.6% 362% 28.5% -- 45.4% 55.6% 34.8% 182% -127% 31.4% 7.7% -0.6% 27.5% 320% 1.6% $5% 24.6% 29.9% 34.6% 17.8% -14.6% 132% 37.8% 3.6% 33.7% 34.4% 423% 14.4% 33.4% 35.5% -0.6% 18.9% 28.0% -1.3% -- 28.6% 10.3% 28.3% 14.0% Refit 2012 2451.6 789.1 263.5 1215.0 2031.0 1,648.0 902.7 724.9 720.0 7602 2385.4 496.0 10,0162 226.3 1,064.7 57.4 1,387.0 2043.6 622 12320 1,971.6 2,8372 532.9 7,101.7 1,640.6 185.7 9B8.8 4,0432 1,784.7 523.0 3,833.0 1,043.6 1,1303 1^272 908.5 2571.0 35.5 7$.6 906.0 3,357.0 939.0 1,407.0 7102 2705.0 2013 Tax 426 2726 61.1 115.6 1.0 630.3 $8.0 363.0 221.9 -- 273.9 713.0 198.7 3,013.5 9.1 $3.5 4.3 285.0 87.6 17.0 3.0 521.6 6602 265.9 2571.7 2520 $5 304.3 1,363.1 $.7 133.8 1,O$.O 296.6 1627 535.1 296.5 317.0 -14.5 133.9 74.0 -123.0 160.0 143.0 2S.1 2$.1 Rate 212% 11.1% 7.7% 43.9% 0.1% 31.0% 36.3% 402% 30.6% -- 36.0% 29.9% 39.1% 30.1% 4.0% 33.9% 7.5% 23.5% 4.3% 27.3% 02% 26$% 23.3% 49.9% 362% 15.4% 16.4% 324% 33.7% 3.9% 25.6% 27.6% 28.4% 14.4% 33.1% 326% 123% -41.0% 17.6% 82% -3.7% 17.0% 102% 35.1% 9.6% 2008-2012 Refit Tax 8124 96.9 6,828.7 536.7 1,303.3 1523 601.4 233.4 5,107.8 678.1 6,790.0 2247.0 6,985.6 2,1725 7,737.5 1,6272 3,168.7 905.0 2,471.0 -26.0 4,877.8 1,6899 18,2355 2,$28 1,1552 375.5 $,754.3 7,374.3 15262 233.0 4,5102 865.6 2,987.1 535.8 7,$1.0 -87.0 2,4727 2$.5 224.6 43.3 3,438.0 -10.0 7,350.0 2,177.0 12,171.0 1,528.0 1(5202 4322 27,318.8 9249.8 4,8520 1,020.7 2,717.5 394.5 3,528.5 $3.4 10,$22 3,1$4 13,748.6 379.6 1,517.6 4216 11,709.1 3,910.6 3,$9.7 12587 7,959.1 1,066.4 4258.1 1,1825 3,$9.0 9921 12,175.5 2,188.6 1,296.5 279.4 2,5224 570.3 4,367.0 198.0 9,003.5 -299.0 3,$1.0 446.0 2510.0 429.0 2298.7 $9.4 10,036.8 1,4825 Fte 11.9% 7.4% 11.9% $.3% 13.3% $.1% 31.3% 21.0% 28$% -1.1% 34.6% 14.1% 32$% 24.0% 13.0% 18.8% 16.9% -1.1% 103% 193% -03% 29.6% 126% $4% $.9% 21.0% 14.$% 24.4% 29.$% 2$% 272% $7% $.$% 13.4% 27.7% 32$% 18$% 21.$% 22$% 4.$% -3.$% 12$% 17.1% 152% 14.$% The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 48 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00053 SmllicrB Qmpary BroaGap BneracnBectric Entergy BeiuioeBiergy Eden BpreStripIs EocnMtl Foetock fcE< FifthlhirdEBnoap Ris&egy Rserv FbAr\e RanklnFteeuices &nfcp Gap GreralDyrancs GnaalBectrt G&iaalMIIs GfenuireFarts GblchmadTeQap Ga/sarBedric GoplAJcmothe l-BRBock |-riey-Da/icfcn l-ferris KAFbldings HsalthNat FiryShein l-tershey |-bll\Frcntier HmeDpot Harevwdllntematicnal l-brrrd Foods Hmara IllraslcolWxfe Iraiit Enterprises Intel tnterrsHorEBLBireKtehires Internat ionaIFteper InterpiblicGap JB FintTrareportSfervioes JM Sorter JP. MsrpTGase&Cb. JtasBigineerin3ap Effective FederalCbrporate lrYxrreTaxRatoe258Majoi<^^ Bit-Yeer Totals Profit Tax 1,782.7 558.1 14422.1 4,860.0 12/461.7 824.0 6,7032 -11.1 26.422.3 3,350.3 17,907.7 7,109.0 60481.7 82.7 14,787.9 2439.9 16,9772 2246.0 11,009.0 2387.0 8,842.0 -465.0 62745 1,975.9 1,590.0 290.8 11,753.6 4,351.9 4,163.8 1,351.3 12,0035 3,947.8 24,720.3 6,674.2 40,057.1 -1,369.0 152954 3,155.5 6,818.6 1,993.7 502104 12118.9 879.7 295.7 1,068.0 2152 5,122.1 1469.1 6,5622 1,928.5 5,877.6 1,492.5 19,1164 4,6962 1,6855 630.0 3,1308 916.9 7,6235 2,271.2 7,065.7 2,348.4 48,6715 16,154.9 16,5195 2460.5 5,508.0 1,604.3 14,5304 5,689.7 112115 32972 5772 126.8 77^3 64,728.0 21,603.3 4,849.0 5,010.0 -386.0 2,3605 1228 3,5422 731.1 54495 1,841.4 114,7695 17,956.3 2,^41 876.3 Rite 31.3% 33.7% 6.6% -02% 127% 39.7% 13.6P/O 16.5% 132% 21.7% -5.3% 31.5% 18.3% 37.1% 325% 329% 27.0% -3.4% 20.6% 292% 24.1% 33.6% 202% 28.7% 29.4% 25.4% 24.6% 374% 302% 29.8% 332% 332% 14.9% 29.1% 392% 294% 220% 27.9% 7.5% -7.7% 52% 20.0% 33.8% 15.6% 34.7% Refit 243.8 2,815.0 1,147.0 1,381.9 3,416.0 3,7002 159.3 2,8020 2,805.8 2208.0 863.0 S88.6 213.6 1,9152 538.0 1,380.8 3,511.3 14.9 1,806.0 020.5 3,455.0 135.1 245.0 538.5 1,078.8 1,000.6 3,461.7 433.6 533.8 1,313.9 1,074.8 9,741.0 3297.0 9792 2,313.6 1,5975 88.0 8,787.5 5,787.0 1,135.0 4325 670.1 0227 22,414.7 267.5 2015 Tax 93.0 904.0 772 -1.7 407.0 1,673.9 -1.7 1,474.0 510.5 662.0 1.0 283.6 564 724.8 175.1 394.8 777.3 1,549.0 412.0 303.6 709.0 462 652 1672 360.9 -27.0 1,064.7 253.9 161.1 388.5 480.4 3228.0 719.0 280.6 1,054.6 486.5 23.9 2606.5 -321.0 620 109.4 1496 310.3 3,160.0 71.8 Rate 382% 32.1% 6.7% -0.1% 11.9% 452% -1.0% 52.6% 17.6% 30.0% 0.1% 28.7% 26.4% 37.3% 32.3% 28.3% rm 10,3733% 21.7% 33.3% 20.5% 312% 26.6% 31.1% 33.3% -23% 30.3/0 588% 302% 29.3% 44.7% 33.1% 21.3% 28.7% 45.3% 30.3/o 27.1% 30.7% -5.3/0 5.3/0 25.3% 22.3% 36.9% 14.1% 26.3/0 Refit 253.9 2,037.0 1,685.7 12725 2444.0 2915.9 9,598.9 4,918.0 2339.9 1,702.0 213.0 970.1 225.0 2080.5 5418 1,787.6 3278.4 5,826.1 1,665.4 1218.8 6,782.9 129.4 1752 618.0 1,179.1 443.0 22436 2152 4S2.8 1277.7 382.5 8,814.0 3,318.6 861.4 2091.1 1,624.7 865 11,548.1 6,968.0 533.0 3662 587.8 483.8 20,331.0 269.9 2914 Tax 74.0 7420 90.1 -3.5 121.0 1238.1 1,360.9 260.0 7528 424.0 -1320 316.1 552 798.5 153.7 515.6 787.4 51.0 331.0 209.9 1,261.3 44.7 48.1 245.5 385.4 153.0 8052 85.9 147.0 311.4 2928 2881.0 661.6 244.1 996.1 385.7 26.9 3273.1 1,131.0 175.0 -5.8 117.0 1429 1273.4 103.6 2008-2015 (alphabetical) Rte 29.1% 36.4% 5.3% -0.3% 5.0% 425% 142% 5.3% 322% 24.9% -54.3/0 326% 24.5% 38.1% 28.4% 28.8% 24.0% 0.9% 19.9% 16.8% 18.6% 31.6% 27.4% 37.9% 327% 33.9% 35.9% 39.9% 29.8% 26.7% 76.6% 326% 19.9% 28.3% 47.6% 23.7% 31.0% 28.3% 16.3% 31.5% -1.6% 19.9% 29.5% 6.3% 38.4% Refit 2172 1,661.0 1277.1 1229.1 25920 28727 9,357.3 3,197.0 2839.4 2296.0 530.0 816.9 225.4 1,830.8 4692 1,761.7 3223.0 6,463.5 2144.4 245.3 6,446.0 120.8 177.8 718.0 1,006.5 723.1 2881.3 257.6 467.8 12126 1,120.7 7,424.0 2927.8 753.5 1,869.4 1,3812 .o 9,314.5 6,679.0 489.0 238.3 538.6 805.8 12486.0 328.6 2013 Tax Rate .6 26.1% 704.0 423% 88.3 6.9% 13.3 1.1% 744.0 287% 1,448.1 50.4% 1,033.3 11.0% 614.0 192% 587.6 23.7% 491.0 21.5% -118.0 -23.6% 280.9 31.4% 53.3 PR? fi 23.7% 37.3% 147.9 31.5% 539.7 323% 838.0 260% 85.0 1.3% 469.4 21.9% 2023 1192% 2538.0 38.9% 47.8 39.0% 423 23.8% 195.3 272% 266.5 26.4% 213.0 29.5% 733.5 25.4% 78.5 30.5% 1325 283% 3326 27.4% 267.9 23.3% 2533.0 33.7% 553.8 I8.3/0 2120 282% 538.4 31.3/0 3002 282% 27.0 29.1% 2689.5 283% 1,406.0 21.1% -697.0 --1423% 46.9 182% 126.1 23.4% 239.4 322% -1,429.3 -11.4% 124.0 37.7% 2008-2012 Refit Tax 1,067.8 331.5 7,906.1 2,510.0 8,361.9 568.4 2,819.7 -19.3 17,970.3 2,078.3 8,419.0 2749.0 41,3662 5,8312 3,870.9 91.9 8,9020 306.1 4,804.0 807.0 7236.0 -216.0 3,499.3 1,006.3 926.0 125.9 5,897.1 2,153.8 2,614.8 874.6 7,073.8 2,467.7 14,707.7 4271.5 27,7525 -3,064.0 9,500.6 1,913.1 4,404.0 1,187.9 33,526.5 7,610.7 491.4 157.0 469.9 .6 3,217.6 861.1 3297.8 916.7 3,629.9 1,1565 10,533.8 2,0028 779.5 211.8 1,636.4 506.3 3,819.3 1238.6 4,487.7 1,3072 22,6629 7,539.9 6,976.0 526.0 2,916.9 867.6 82.3 3,0.6 6,605.6 2,031.8 309.7 49.1 47,8182 129142 45294.0 2,630.0 2,830.0 74.0 1,304.9 -27.6 1,745.7 338.4 3237.6 1,008.8 ,537.9 14,9622 1,6682 577.0 Rte 31.3% 31.7% 6.8% -0.7% 11.6% 327% 14.1% 24% 4.4% 16.8% -3.0% 31.3% 13.6% 36.5% 33.4% 31.9% 29.0% -11.0% 20.3% 27.0% 228% 31.8% 127% 26.8% 27.8% 31.9% 19.9% 272% 30.9% 31.6% 29.1% 33.3% 7.5% 29.7% 37.1% 308% 15.8% 27.1% 5.8% 26% -21% 19.4% 33.9% 25.1% 31.8% 49 Institutes Ta^ionardEuonom^ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00054 Smilers Cfcrrpary yGcbal fllcgg KnteifyClark Ktfs Ktcgar L-3GtrrrrinicatiQrB LctaaatoryCtrp. ofArnica La/iStiaj LifePintl-fealth LintedBarb LKXbrporation LaMrdlVfertin Losas Lowe's hcs IVtetaChri MECnalcfs MTtesn MUFteuioes IVbck IVblinal-feal tirate Mrsatto IVtac Nstflix hbcBa&iagy Nte NSOuioe Narcfcticm NarfolkSuthern NarthiqcGurrnan MR OmocrrTGap Qrnk Qade OFfeillyAjtcrrcthe QAHB&Mnor Parar Rd^ingGbrp. ofArenca Fatteri-fennifin F^oal-bldings F^sGb FG8B3ip. Fhillipe-Wil-bun Pitney Bowes FbOEnariSaviOEgaoip Effective FederaIGbiporate IncorreTaxRatesoe258IVtajorG0fpof^ 2008-2015 (alphabetical) Bfrt-Year Totals Profit Tax Rite 3474.3 633.1 182% 8,748.3 1,971.6 225% 10,685.7 1,803.7 169% 11,619.8 3,792.8 326% 162184 3,945.6 243% 7,613.8 1461.6 192% 6,109.1 1,873.3 30.7% 945.8 102.6 10.8% 1,859.7 632.8 340% 8,945.8 2,621.7 29.3% 247O.8 688.5 27.9% 35,509.0 8,880.6 25.0% 11,0552 12762 11.5% 26,542.3 9,8434 37.1% 12,315.0 3,496.0 284?% 16,648.7 4,178.9 25.1% 21,379.6 7,806.0 365% 11,703.1 2,496.0 21.3% 2.953.7 277.3 9.4% 414043 12,039.0 29.1% 8883 420.8 47.3% 15236.3 3241.4 21.3% 6,814.1 9127 134% 1,4942 203.1 13.0% 21,518.0 -313.0 -1.5% 10,279.0 1,911.9 18.0% 4,399.1 -352.2 -8.0% 7,628.0 2432O 31.9% 20455.9 4,069.9 19.9% 21,383.0 4,712.0 220% 2,653.0 591.6 223% 4,7535 1,3121 27.0% 3,9762 49.0 12% 39,856.5 11,6432 292% 6,781.6 1,9561 268% 1,357.5 425.8 31.4% 54553 1210.6 222% 2,868.0 7324 25.5% 5,369.8 1,300.5 24.2% 3,022.0 -843.0 -27.9% 26393.4 74328 28.2% 10,843.0 -1,569.0 -14.5% 984.5 177.9 18.1% 3408.7 7962 234% 32,952.7 27247 8.5/0 Refit 313.1 497.5 401.4 1,004.7 3,073.8 481.6 5621 171.5 294.6 1,583.1 455.4 4,966.0 366.0 4,171.0 1,611.4 3,3093 2,467.1 2,407.1 175B 2,117.0 315.4 2,1552 668.9 972 3,969.0 983.6 333.9 966.6 2,383.4 2,706.0 571.1 716.4 384.7 3,783.5 1,424.0 1561 1,579.1 645.0 650.3 435.0 2,821.9 850.0 91.9 485.9 5,343.0 2015 Tax 23.5 200.4 192.4 388.7 6C.8 38.5 207.5 21 122.8 495.1 126.5 1,817.0 79.0 1,688.0 510.4 642.3 1,030.0 668.0 595 732.0 166.4 638.6 61.9 -27.9 10.0 71.6 -- 189.6 4.4 207.0 161.6 319.8 132 1,198.5 462.4 602 521.8 200.1 226.3 -3.0 1,033.0 -89.0 23 115.6 903.0 Rate 7.5% 40.3% 47.9% 37.9% 20.9% 8.0% 36.9% 12% 41.7% 31.3% 27.8% 36.6% 21.6% 40.5% 31.7% 19.1% 41.8% 27.3% 33.8% 34.6% 52.4% 29.6% 9.3% -28.7% 0.3% 7.7% -- 19.6% 20.7% 7.6% 28.3% 44.6% 3.4% 31.7% 31.8% 38.6% 33.0% 31.0% 34.8% -0.7% 36.6% -10.5% 25% 23.8% 16.9% Refit 2882 487.4 1,529.4 1,313.5 25990 758.9 729.5 61.0 201.6 1,422.4 439.7 5,369.0 1,305.0 4,065.0 2302.4 3225.3 2515.8 1,808.0 406.6 15,355.0 132.8 2383.5 301.1 325.1 3,674.0 1,901.7 829.8 1,138.8 3,029.4 2897.0 426.3 6382 467.5 4,962.5 1,187.4 145.4 1284.0 583.3 758.6 406.0 2382.1 1,836.0 34.0 360.5 5272.8 2014 Tax 805 291.9 319.4 397.5 804.0 729 228.7 14.8 472 418.4 1302 2000.0 370.0 1,475.0 731.4 9623 1,0662 453.0 28.8 7,136.0 69.6 588.5 46.0 7.1 -- 415.7 -- 378.8 698.4 620.0 140.4 331.6 102 1,9512 368.6 51.7 4824 175.0 166.4 -137.0 1269.7 -84.0 -44.5 71.7 1,060.8 Rte 27.9% 599% 20.9% 30.3% 30.9% 9.6% 31.4% 042% 23.4% 29.4% 29.6% 37.6% 28.4% 36.4% 31.8% 28.9% 41.9% 25.1% 7.1% 46.6% 524% 24.7% 15.3% 22% -- 21.6% -- 33.3% 23.1% 21.4% 329% 520% 22% 39.4% 302% 35.6% 37.6% 30.0% 21.9% -33.7% 53.3% -4.6% -130.9% 19.9% 20.1% Refit 525.1 2085.3 1,662.7 12695 2245.5 865.7 8162 82.7 202.3 12312 343.6 42520 1,751.0 3,470.0 2191.8 2966.3 2753.7 1,453.0 410.9 3,646.0 808 23167 223.3 158.1 24520 2984.8 762.4 1,129.0 2873.6 2751.0 391.9 52.8 427.1 5,103.3 1,025.8 181.9 818.8 404.0 1,160.4 438.0 2968.7 1,1220 46.3 281.3 5,128.0 2013 Tax Rate 125.6 23.9% 2822 13.6% 308.7 18.0% 466.5 34.3% 611.5 272% 181.7 212% 2225 27.3% 10.0 121% 94.0 46.5% 3772 30.0% 100.0 29.1% 1204.0 283% 171.0 9.8% 1,3120 38.7% 816.8 37.3% 991.3 33.5% 1,161.6 422% 484.0 33.3% 45.5 11.1% 668.0 15.0% 66.6 81.1% 366.7 15.0% -25.0 -112% -9.0 -5.7% -145.0 -5.9% 1498 5.0% -15.9 -21% 360.0 31.9% 663.6 23.1% 760.0 27.0% 120.6 30.8% 215.0 39.0% -12 -0.3% 1,406.3 27.0% 3228 31.5% 57.7 31.7% 191.4 225% 1232 30.5% 319.5 30.1% -128.0 -292% 9962 33.5% -218.0 -19.4% 852 184.0% 78.3 27.8% 98.0 1.9% 2008-2012 Refit Tax 2347.9 403.5 5,678.1 1,197.1 7,0922 9832 7,9020 2,510.0 8,300.0 1,887.3 5,517.5 1,168.5 4,001.3 1214.6 630.7 75.7 1,1612 368.8 4,709.0 1,330.9 12322 331.8 20,9220 3,839.6 7,6332 6632 143463 5,338.4 6209.4 1,437.4 7,097.8 1,610.0 13,6129 4,560.1 6,040.0 901.0 1,960.3 143.4 20286.3 3,603.0 369.8 120.3 8,361.0 1,617.6 5,620.8 829.8 913.8 2329 11,433.0 -178.0 4,435.8 1274.7 2473.0 -336.3 4,393.6 1,533.6 12169.5 2214.5 13,029.0 3,125.0 1263.7 169.0 2866.4 445.7 2696.9 26.8 26,017.3 7,087.3 3,144.3 8222 874.0 256.1 1,741.4 15.0 1235.7 234.1 2800.5 558.3 1,743.0 -575.0 18220.7 4,134.9 7,035.0 -1,178.0 8124 136.0 2281.0 530.7 17208.9 6629 Rte 172% 21.1% 13.9% 321% 227% 212% 30.4% 120% 31.8% 28.3% 26.9% 18.4% 8.0% 36.0% 23.1% 227% 33.4% 14.9% 7.3% 17.8% 33.4% 19.7% 14.8% 25.5% -1.0% 28.7% -13.0% 312% 182% 04.0% 13.4% 15.0% 1.0% 272% 26.1% 29.3% 0.9% 18.9% 19.9% -33.0% 227% -16.7% 16.0% 23.3% 3.9% The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 50 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00055 SmllicrB Grrpary FtfoRlph Laren FFGIrdunes FR. Raxair RedsionCxtparte Ftelrecrm RirapaFrandal Recter&G&rte RtcSfervceBiterpreeOap RJolixSuperlVfartets Qaknrm QanlaSavioes Oast Diuretics RRDmelley&SjB F^mrdresFrarcial Fttern FferajaroeQtipcfArerica RanoeSeel 8Airririrn F^nokfeArerican FbckAellAjfcrratiQn RxkAellGblIre RoeScres cterS^en S\C Sana SarptaEretgy SerwhWIliaTB SncAjtcrrDti\e Suttern SouthAestriines S^artarRtr S^ectraBiergy Stofes StateSreetCbrp. S/rrex Targai Tedi Data Teaslnstrurente 7hetrroFTer3entific TrreWrrer TiriArrerCcble TX TradaSpalyOrrpaTy TiaetersSa Trinity Industries Effective FederalCbrporate IncomeTaxRateson258MajcrOxporationB,2008-2015 (alphabetical) Bit-Yea-Totals Profit Tax 4,0462 1,065.1 4,1355 1,169.0 7,106.0 87.0 6,1423 1,036.3 12,428.8 3,0012 697.6 -30.9 7,790.0 5144 66,989.5 14,931.0 18,001.9 2,935.9 17,348.9 5,113.1 20,581.7 1269.7 2248.8 639.9 7,867.4 2423.5 1,6103 290.4 3,800.3 1,3542 21,037.0 4,335.8 3,774.3 141 3446.6 948.4 20,619.0 7,599.4 3270.8 785.1 6315.0 1,1340 8,667.6 2,893.2 2,044.6 -649 4,074.0 1,043.1 5275.0 808.0 7,000.0 -340 7294.6 14672 799.9 137.9 24,587.0 2,036.0 8459.0 2,006.0 432.3 82.2 6,511.0 455.0 6,1603 1,616.5 103102 565.2 1220.6 418.9 32,087.0 9,476.0 9613 321.8 16387.1 4,951.1 6,560.5 1,609.8 31,0484 4,1472 20,926.0 1,632.0 16,952.0 4,9943 3,0253 971.0 30,729.0 5,870.5 4,122.1 593.9 Rite 26.3% 28.3% 12% 16.9% 241% -4.4% 6.6% 22.3% 1&3% 29.5% 62% 28.5% 30.8% 18.0% 35.6% 20.6% 0.4% 27.5% 36.9% 240% 18.0% 33.4% -27% 25.6% 15.3% -0.5% 20.1% 172% 8.3% 23.7% 19.0% 7.0% 262% 5.5% 343% 29.5% 33.5% 302% 245% 13.4% 7.8% 29.5% 321% 19.1% 144% Refit 278.0 8012 913.0 960.3 1,015.9 29.0 1,406.1 8,564.0 2,396.5 2,831.7 2,998.0 258.3 1,021.9 225.7 755.4 2,4820 493.3 4255 5,816.6 815.6 82 1,5820 4025 171.0 1,0820 1,1352 1,488.7 138.7 3,6620 3,366.0 97.3 369.0 460.9 1,025.1 183.6 4285.0 189.3 32180 851.7 4,3729 2,896.9 2,905.1 631.9 4,621.0 1223.8 2015 Tax 78.0 15BO -26.0 189.3 265.9 4.3 169.9 1,673.0 210.5 758.1 -166.0 85.3 226.9 112.5 273.1 718.1 -1.4 129.5 3^98.9 228.3 1582 462.7 0.8 427 382.0 -49.0 325.5 362 -177.0 1,2320 30.4 -- 499 -5.9 587 1,662.0 71.3 1,031.0 128.8 719.1 367.9 968.6 202.9 1,098.0 2602 Rate 28.1% 19.7% -28% 19.9% 262% 14.8% 12.1% 19.5% 9.3% 26.8% -5.5% 33.0% 222% 499% 36.1% 28.9% -0.3% 30.4% .4% 36.4% 192% 292% 02% 25.0% 35.3% -4.3% 21.9% 26.1% -4.8% 38.4% 312% -- 10.8% -0.6% 32.0% 38.6% 37.7% 32.1% 15.1% 16.4% 12.7% 32.3% 32.0% 23.8% 21.3% Refit 586.4 328.5 1,127.0 974.4 21122 73.5 1,474.5 8,611.0 2398.0 24919 3213.0 286.7 766.0 5.8 687.3 2868.0 768.9 463.3 2069.6 602.6 751.0 1,453.9 269.6 697.0 790.0 911.5 12082 1560 2915.0 1,787.0 89.8 904.0 508.8 1,097.5 181.6 3276.0 98.7 2681.0 1,129.6 4,615.5 3,174.4 2779.6 566.7 4,898.9 1,0362 2014 Tax 154.4 128.0 43.0 266.4 5152 -9.0 99.3 22720 335.0 7512 -.O 729 204.0 499 254.4 798.1 21.5 1532 799.1 191.7 105.0 474.7 -0.8 63.5 38.0 -10.0 251.5 36.9 175.0 203.0 26.4 1.0 116.8 -0.5 77.4 1,074.0 324 820.0 390.4 -26.0 246.4 818.1 195.8 1,168.9 3925 Rte 26.3% 39.0% 3.8% 272% 24.4% -123% 6.7% 26.4% 14.0% 30.3% -3.1% 25.4% 26.6% 859.7% 37.0% 27.8% 28% 33.1% 392% 323% 14.0% 326% -0.3% 9.1% 4.8% -1.1% 20.8% 23.6% 6.0% 11.4% 29.4% 0.1% 23.0% -0.0% 41.9% 328% 328% 30.6% 31.6% -0.6% 7.8% 29.4% 31.6% 23.9% 292% Refit 661.9 535.4 196.0 871.0 2,158.7 38.1 1,0902 8,768.0 2013.0 2380.5 3,798.0 485.6 12367 65.6 538.0 26120 4732 433.5 2609.6 538.5 745.6 1,3129 299.4 171.0 677.0 882.6 1,0529 123.4 2569.0 1,165.0 1.6 981.0 814.8 1,4867 190.1 3,836.0 121.5 1,507.0 909.5 4,911.9 2964.1 25842 532.5 4,804.0 5590 2013 Tax Rate 1829 27.5% 153.0 30.3% -75.0 -38.5% 56.0 6.4% 4918 228% -9.4 -24.6% -9.8 -0.9% 1,606.0 18.3% 487.0 242% 725.5 30.5% 108.0 28% 170.9 352% 413.7 33.5% -15.3 -23.3% 180.7 35.9% 709.8 272% -52.0 -11.0% 120.5 27.8% 551.4 21.1% 138.1 27.4% 143.6 19.3% 464.0 35.3% -4.0 -1.3% 40.0 23.4% 161.0 23.8% -70.0 -7.9% 190.7 18.1% 33.4 27.0% 363.0 14.1% 365.0 30.5% 3.7 235.7% -320 -3.4% 191.1 226% 109.7 7.4% 74.3 39.1% 1213.0 31.6% 41.3 34.0% 215.0 14.3% 204.0 224% 328.0 6.7% 554.1 18.7% 747.5 23.9% 139.1 27.7% 1,014.0 21.1% 134.8 24.1% 2008-2012 Refit Tax 2516.9 619.8 2500.3 730.0 4,841.0 145.0 3,346.7 525.7 7,1420 1,728.3 557.0 -16.8 3,8192 255.0 41,046.5 9,380.0 10,995.4 1,873.4 9,614.9 2,875.4 10,577.7 1,425.7 1218.3 310.8 4,8128 1,578.9 1,313.7 143.3 1,854.5 616.1 13,075.0 2,109.7 2038.9 45.9 21242 5152 10,123.3 2,963.0 1,519.1 224.0 3,9921 727.1 4,318.7 1,491.8 1,073.1 -53.9 3,035.0 896.8 2726.0 227.0 4,010.7 96.0 3,514.9 699.5 381.9 31.4 15,441.0 1,675.0 21420 156.0 243.6 21.7 4,314.0 486.0 4,316.4 1258.7 6,701.0 4620 6623 208.5 20,690.0 5,537.0 551.8 176.8 8,978.1 2,885.1 3,669.7 886.6 17,148.0 3,126.1 11,800.6 463.6 8,683.1 2,490.1 1,3227 433.3 16,405.1 2,589.6 1,303.1 -103.6 Rte 25.8% 292% 3.0% 15.7% 242% -3.0% 6.7% 229% 17.0% 29.8% 13.5% 25.5% 326% 10.9% 34.8% 16.1% 23% 25.7% 29.1% 14.7% 182% 34.5% -4.7% 29.5% 8.3% 24% 19.7% 82% 10.8% 7.3% 8.9% 11.3% 29.0% 6.9% 31.5% 26.8% 320% 321% 242% 182% 3.9% 28.7% 328% 15.8% -7.9% 51 Instituted Ta^ionardEuoncmcra 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00056 $millicns Qrrpary Tutor Fferini Tv^tyfiistCfentiryFcK USE&mp LG Lhicnftcfc LhitedhtutFoocfc LhitedRoel3BMoe LhitedSatioreis IhtedTafrcfcges Lhited-fealtHSap Lhhesal FtealthS&vioes UrrnQap \yferizrCimrLricatiorE \F Maim Msa \AR Berkley WA/Qainger V\gem VtUVfertSaes VttDs'ey WMeManagamnt WlFbrit V\HsFago Wsoolntematicnal Wstrock WrfeRxxblVfertet Wiliam Wrrfetiean WiranEheigy \ATHWxldMd3t^^ XelEreigy YimBtaxfc AL258O3VR0NE Effective FederalCbrporate InocmeTaxRateson258MajorQxporatiorB, 2008-2015 (alphabetical STt-'ifear Totals Rtit Tax Rite 1,065.1 298.1 28.0% 39,722.0 6,273.0 15.8% 49,331.0 12,191.0 247% 2,600.5 4362 16.8% 44,615.8 9,282.8 20.8% 1,073.1 327.4 30.5% 394422 11,005.1 27.9% 1314.4 465.3 35.4?% 24,4212 2,546.2 10.4?% 61.900.0 22,194.9 35.9% 5,156.0 1,546.6 30.0?% 5.982.4 1,897.4 31.7% 81,518.0 74OI.O 9.1% 4,955.5 1229.4 248% 182614 4,260.4 23.3?% 30,063.9 9,774.0 325% 4411.7 1,023.6 232% 7,481.0 2,343.3 31.3?% 26280.0 8,503.0 324?% 139,743.0 43480.0 31.1% 62,566.8 17217.1 27.5% IO3474 2,642.9 25.1% 35,1172 12,167.0 348% 185,024.8 33,330.6 18.0% 2,092.8 352.8 16.9% 3,056.1 134.3 44?% 4,399.5 1,5325 348% 8,943.9 516.0 5.8% 2,7935 220.8 7.9% 5,894.3 -591.6 -10.0% 3,831.1 7127 188% 10290.6 -111.4 -1.1% 3226.4 835.4 25.9% Refit 702 3,485.6 7,o.o 388.5 7,453.7 213.8 6260.0 115.0 2,819.0 9,960.0 1,003.9 600.4 23,810.0 7792 1,909.4 6,628.5 687.6 1,1588 2,604.0 16,063.0 12,184.9 0367 4,514.6 31,044.4 284.6 603.0 807.9 .7 21.4 961.6 716.9 1,3249 451.7 2015 Tax 5.3 466.0 1,963.0 89.0 1367 586 1,634.0 67.3 264.0 4,155.0 324.6 280.5 5,476.0 147.8 368.4 1,921.5 177.7 389.8 816.0 5,532.0 3,923.1 179.6 1,917.4 10,447.4 44.5 23.3 300.9 -- 9.1 -97.4 167.9 -36.1 245.7 Rate 7.6% 13.4% 25.8% 22.9% 24.8% 27.4% 26.1% 588% 9.4% 41.8/0 32.3% 40.6% 23.0% 19.0% 18.8% 29.8% 25.8% 33.8/0 32.8% 34.8/0 322% 192% 428% 33.7% 15.8% 3.9% 372% -- 428% -10.1% 23.4% -24% 54.4% Refit 1595 9,720.0 7,502.0 475.3 8,124.4 188.9 4,538.5 186.4 42408 9,385.0 837.7 67.3 15,193.0 603.0 2816.5 7,369.6 906.3 1,2382 3277.0 17,800.0 10,8352 1,804.1 4,310.3 31,475.4 320.8 662.6 867.6 3257.0 762 872.3 667.9 1,536.9 536.0 2014 Tax 44.4 891.0 1,888.0 90.5 1,931.4 64.8 9320 723 263.8 3,883.0 223.1 128.4 2667.0 1523 979.5 2278.6 254.7 409.7 1207.0 6,165.0 2,721.1 409.9 1,591.0 6,916.4 64.8 7.4 351.6 -9.0 0.8 -44.1 147.9 -732 215.0 Rte 27.9% 92% 252% 19.0% 23.8% 34.3% 20.3% 38.8% 62% 41.4% 26.3% 190.7% 17.5% 25.3% 34.8% 30.9% 28.1% 326% 36.8% 34.6% 25.1% 227% 36.9% 221% 202% 1.1% 41.0% -0.3% 1.0% -5.1% 225% -4.8% 425% Refit 118.9 5226.9 7,527.0 321.1 6,8621 153.7 5,835.0 1902 3,6229 8,678.0 794.4 980.9 122820 721.3 3,033.8 1,681.8 $8.5 1,135.4 3,343.0 18,693.0 8,531.6 959.9 3,7623 29,375.9 334.0 613.8 815.4 721.4 227.5 839.9 510.5 1,424.5 449.6 2013 Tax Rate 28.1 23.6% 1,178.0 225% 1,885.0 25.0% 43.9 13.7% 1,675.1 24.4% 425 27.6% 2181.0 37.4% 66.9 352% 5209 14.4% 3,004.0 34.6% 239.9 302% 277.9 283% -197.0 -1.6% 199.0 27.6% 320.8 10.6% 536.8 30.1% 1123 18.9% 349.0 30.7% 1,1220 33.6% 6,377.0 34.1% 2,185.3 25.6% 380.7 39.7% I3OI.5 31.9% 4,376.9 14.9% 45.7 13.7% -13.3 -22% 290.4 35.6% -17.0 -24% -27.0 -11.9% -532 -6.0% 101.6 18.8% -462 -32% 1226 27.3% 2008-2012 Refit Tax 716.5 233.3 21289.5 3,738.0 26,7120 6,4620 1,415.6 2128 22,1726 3,826.6 516.8 161.5 22,753.7 6258.1 8229 238.7 13,738.5 1,497.5 33,887.0 11,152.9 2523.0 7620 4243.8 1210.6 30233.0 -535.0 28520 730.3 10,4217 2,591.7 14,384.0 5,067.0 2224.3 478.9 3,928.6 1,194.8 17,056.0 5,328.0 87,187.0 25,376.0 31,015.0 8,387.5 6,846.7 1,6728 22530.0 7,457.1 98,129.1 11,559.9 1,153.5 197.8 1,1866 116.8 1,918.6 $9.7 4,868.7 5120 2468.4 237.9 3233.5 -399.9 1,915.8 2952 5,805.3 44.1 1,819.1 2521 I $3,810,577 $806,942 212% $551,698 $141^81 25.8% $584,814 $134,763 23.0% $524,346 $111,138 212% $2,149,719 $419,7$ Rte 30.7% 17.6% 242% 15.0% 17.3% 31.3% 27.5% 31.4% 10.9% 329% 302% 28.5% -1.8% 25.6% 24.9% 352% 21.5% 30.4% 312% 29.1% 27.0% 24.4% 33.1% 124% 17.1% 9.8% 30.7% 11.1% 9.6% -124% 15.4% 0.8% 13.9% 19.5% 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 52 ED_001523_00000854-00057 US Profits&US Federai IrccmeTaxesverasRreigi Profits&Foreigi InocmeTaxes, 2008-15tbroorT|3anies with foreign pretax profitsat least 1OE/Oof total worldwide pretax profits, $-milli 1 Gorpary VWWtSas Cnaal Efedre JP. IVbgaiCToe&Q). IWcn Interratioreil BsneMkHres MndHsIti Rteer&G&rte (tetoWxfesaie AdertaielsIVidlaTcl FfepsCb IWtedTWolajES LHtedftioel&vioe Mack CMdrmSMBQap Intel Rk Hrey/vell International QRnt Cnaal Canaries ATBricmBpess Ole 3M [tee InternralFper Ttei&ta Mrald's Bi Lilly TX BroenBoetrc Qgna WrrtalyOark Nife AriwBoetrcnits HliroeTodWl L-3Gtnrnjncaticns Grerai Mills Cip DiteEreigy CK TeOElretnjrmls Viarm FFOnditries QrrioarGcip felk MmBaxte GfenuireFrte UBprofits&federal+state norme taxes US profit US tax UBrate $145,059 $48,796 33.6% 40,375 -1,061 -2.6P/0 121,514 24,731 20.3% 11,973 2766 23.1% 63,753 6,874 10.3% 11,680 3,635 31.1% 69,017 16,959 24.6% 14,518 4,706 324% 11,354 3,124 275% 27277 8,316 30.57o 24,736 21 11.6% 40,460 12023 29.7% 41,600 12285 29.5/0 528 14,767 27.9% 77,712 21,817 28.1% 17,460 2,729 15.6% 16,778 2719 162% 8,763 1,687 193% 24,808 6,757 272% 42,973 10,876 253% 41,953 13,740 328% 24214 6280 25.9% 20217 6,707 332% 4,914 -482 -98% 6,457 1,912 29.6% 977 338 34.6% 22508 8,986 39.7% 15,350 2804 183% 17,9 6,022 335% 14,853 5291 35.6% 14,667 4,322 295% 11,081 2149 195% 10,650 2283 21.4% 2708 766 28.3% 11,681 3,766 322% 7,863 1,711 21.8% 15,563 3,423 220% 12411 4,355 35.1% 19,889 -300 -15% 13,379 1,083 7.7% 16,412 4,979 303% 18,795 4,794 255% 4,308 1,337 31.1% 4,900 1,459 29.8% 8,991 2214 24.6% 3261 890 27.1% 7,141 2316 324% Fbteigiprofi1s&for. norme taxes For. profit For. tax For. rate $42,692 $11562 27.1% 85,495 27,726 32.4% 59,592 12965 21.7% 4,811 576 12.0% 86,183 21,639 25.1% 1,665 214 12.8% 45244 11,087 24.5% 6,009 2,084 34.7% 6,916 1296 18.7% 38,450 6,186 16.1% 32680 9,739 298% 5,063 1,379 27.3% 31,351 6,667 212% 33,364 8,620 25.8% 27,001 5,076 18.8% 4,5 1,578 34.6% 16,837 3,662 21.7% 17,991 4,017 22.3% 3,889 i,o 272% 6,647 3,376 .8% 50561 8,306 16.4% 24,123 6,455 26.8% 9,837 3,495 365% 3200 728 22.8% 2013 514 26.6% 1,090 263 242% 35,361 8,001 22.6% 17,662 4591 26.0% 3,608 1,012 28.1% 12,183 3,600 295% 2015 565 28.0% 7,522 2,677 368% 15295 3,470 22.7% 2142 513 25.4% 8,163 1,974 242% 1,553 3 23.1% 2906 1,778 7^ 26.1% 691 389% 4,021 980 24.4% 2209 494 22.4% 8,371 1201 143% 3,579 1270 355% 5,633 1,492 26.5% 6,923 2,1 31.8% 3,380 9 28.4% 9,607 2,3 24.6% 913 252 27.6% UBrate -Foriate +6.6% -35.0% -1.4% +11.1% -14.8% +18.3% +0.1% -23% +8.9% +14.4% -182% +24% +8.3% +21% +9.3% -19.0% -5.3% -3.1% +0.1% -25.5% +16.3% -0.8% -24% -32.6% +3.0% +10.4% +17.1% -7.7% +5.4% +6.1% +1.4% -16.1% -1.3% +3.0% +8.1% -1.4% -4.1% -3.8% -25.9P/O -14.7% +16.0% -10.0% +4.6% -2.0% -3.8% +26% +4.9% 53 InstituteOTTatimarriEnncr 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00058 US Profits&US Federal InocrreTaxesversLsFbreigi Profits&Fbreign InocmeTaxes, 2008-15 forarrpanies with foreign pretax profitsat least 10P/oof total worldwide pretaxprofits, $million GOrpery IhenroFisherSeritifc te^Ehag/ IVbrranto Frar LhirOip Raair RREhTt^/&8re FbrterHanrifin Jta6EhgreerrgGup SateSrOEOtp. G&TEStop ArFtodicts&Gnffricais SrpaEhagy AjbBicQiiaR'aEHrg FFL %rre< feirajia^GapofATHra Ms fell feawhWIlHTB VF &r0llSip FfenryShein Dw tec ftraftat Garing InteqxblioQcip Eroleb OEanoe Ranklinfeuroes IG PtedscnOEtparte Mtetaferd Oor Anixter International Rtn^&Mes f^cfer^ten SpedraErajy FbbfelphLaien Bn fededlAJarrtcn linsQntEntapis Began Icfec Rillijs-Wil-fewi G^izantTstrologySiuticrB IiSias USprofils&federal+state inoone taxes I profit I tax I rate 6,707 1,756 262% 21,763 439 20% 15,487 3,492 225% 5,642 1,400 24.8% 6,517 1,897 29.1% 6268 1,162 18.5% 1,662 312 20.6% 5,512 1,473 26.6% 2691 1,043 38.8% 10,920 1,175 10.8% 4299 1,486 34.6% 4,186 508 121% 7,CEO -14 -02% 14,786 4,730 320% 7,199 180 25% 1,301 499 38.4% 3,774 14 0.4% 31,303 11,108 35.4% 2083 435 21.4% 7,557 1,730 229% 5,125 1,399 27.3% 7,465 1,882 252% 3,310 1,127 340% 4,635 1,089 23.5% 7,036 1,135 16.1% 5,236 825 15.8% 7,532 145 1.9% 2419 181 75% 4,781 1,175 24.6% 2945 414 14.1% 12,311 4,912 39.9% 2774 610 220% 12,705 3277 25.8% 16,816 4,346 25.8% 5,758 1,747 30.3% 1,315 304 29.9% 3,512 929 282% 2003 -7 -03% 6,587 531 8.1% 4273 1292 302% 1,713 542 31.7% 3285 799 24.3% 590 139 23.6% 13,567 4,945 36.4% 1,013 206 20.4% 3,102 919 1248 81 402% 95% Foreign profits&for. inoane taxes For. profit For. tax For. rate 4252 1,429 33.6% 3,526 886 25.1% 7,032 2,346 29.6% 6,054 1,542 25.3% 1,436 302 21.0% 10,444 2,683 25.7% 1,132 368 32.5% 4,384 1259 28.7% 1,727 399 23.1% 9277 2,026 21.8% 562 253 45.1% 5,770 1,431 24.8% 3711 868 23.4% 1,739 544 31.3% 5,875 455 747 127% 126 27.7% 2,104 501 23.8% 7,762 1,510 19.5% 2,383 639 26.8% 1,026 338 33.0% 4,735 677 14.3% 1,087 428 39.4% 1,042 263 252% 3,003 734 23.7% 7,979 1,684 21.1% 1,519 237 15.6% 13,986 1,942 13.9% 1,922 679 35.3% 3241 1,148 35.4% 2,727 675 24.8% 8,063 909 11.3% 557 228 40.9% 2,105 487 23.1% 9,672 2,951 30.5% 932 319 342% 573 212 37.0% 844 335 39.7% 406 65 16.1% 4239 489 11.5% 2,569 354 21.9% 742 238 32.0% 3,418 528 15.4% 282 106 36.3% 4,967 1,858 396 8.0% 301 162% 7261 1,497 20.6% 1,061 335 31.5% USiate -Foriate -7.4% -23.1% -7.0% -0.7% +8.1% -72% -11.9% -2.1% +15.8% -11.1% -10.5% -127% -23.6% +0.7% -102% +10.6% -23.4% +15.9% -5.4% -10.1% +13.0% -142% +8.8% -0.3% -5.0% +02% -120% -27.8% -10.9% -10.7% +28.6% -18.9% +2.7% -4.7% -3.9% -7.0% -13.5% -16.4% -3.5% +8.3% -0.4% +8.9% -127% +28.4% +42% +19.6% -22.1% 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FferogntCorporateTa<Myth 54 ED_001523_00000854-00059 US Prufits&US Federal InocmeTaxesverasRxeigi Profits&Rxeigi InocmeTaxes, 2008-15 forarrpanies with foreign pretaxprofitsat least 1(%of total woridwidepretaxptufi^ Gorpary CA Rome Wstrock QEriaSfervioes dyGctal Rtire.ain A^w^htpaatim Onii Im QaDvH/iTTrmit^ Ire. LKXhporaticn V^rriiaiWrl^^ AliaieCata^sters Arphend Totalsfor 1O7ormpaiies USprofils&federal+state norme taxes U5 profit US tax US rate 6,002 2182 36.4% 1,622 323 19.SP/0 3,117 195 6.3% 2316 737 31.4% 3,540 699 19.7% 758 29 3.97o 3270 724 221% 6,650 2621 39.4% 7,410 2734 36.97o 2595 813 31.3% 3,956 838 212% 3,441 1,034 30.1% 1,268 254 20.0% $1,576,404 $383,825 24.3% Foreign profits&for. norme taxes For. profit For. tax For. rate 3,318 607 18.3% 3,134 865 27.6% 476 91 192% 382 133 34.8% 1,765 568 31.6% 12270 2,317 18.9% 918 232 25.3% 2166 58 2.7% 3,429 939 27.4% 503 107 21.4% 1,538 375 24.4% 1,513 473 31.3% 4,792 1,136 23.7% $1,010,763 $246,209 244% US rate -Ferrate +18.1% -7.7% -13.0% -3.4% -11.9% -15.0% -32% +36.7% +9.5% +10.0% -32% -12% -3.7% -0.0% 64with lcwerlrate(60%) 43 with Icwer foreign rate (40%) $754,370 822,034 $130,312 253,513 17.3% 30.8% $568,543 442,220 $151,937 94,272 26.7% 21.3% -9.4% +9.5% %thataverageforeigneffectiwtaxrateex3eecfeaverageU6taxrate(107cc6.): +0% 55 Institutes Ta^ionardEsonomicFlkyl March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000854-00060 3M: The hicfi tax rate in2008 reflectsa turnaround of deferred taxes ^structuring charts vrae taken in2008and 2009. Pretax profits forest) year v\ereadjusted for the actual utilization of the company's restructuring reserves, which increased pretax profits in 2008and decreased them in2010 and2009. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation taxcredit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $630.4mi I lien and $1^.3 mi 11 ion, respectively. Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $616million from 2008to 2015. ABM Industries: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend in October of the years listed. Excess benefits from stockoptions reduced federal and state taes by $7 million from2008to 2015. Advance Auto Parte: Deferred taesexplain most of the oompany'ssrrall taxbreaks ineach year, driven largely by accelerated depreciation. Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $92million from2008to 2015. Aetna: Theoompany'shyitaxratesin2015and2014 reflect the nondeductible Health Insurers Fee, and the lew rate in 2010 isexplained by deferred taes Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $322 million from2008to 2015. AGL Resources: The lew tax rates in most yearsare explained by deferred taes, primari ly related toaooelerated depreciation. Thehyi ratein2013reflectsaturra'oiridof deferred taes Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $7 million from2008to 2015. Air Productsand Chemicals: Thecompany'sfiscal year ends inSeptoober of the year I isted. Deferred taesexplain most of the company's tax breaks The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $74millfonfrom2008 to 2015. Excess benefits from stockoptions reduced federal and state taes by $268million from2008to 2015. Airgas: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend in March following theyeas listed. Deferral, primarily due toaooelerated depreciation, explains most of theoompany'staxbreeks. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $28 million from2008to 2015. Excess benefits from stock 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA options reduced federal and state taes by$133 million from 2008to 2015. Alleghany Corporation: Fteported pretax profits in2008 wereadjusted upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment. Alliance DataSystems: Thehic^i taxrate in2015 reflects an increase in deferred taxassets Excess benefits fromstock options reduced federal andstatetaesby$131 million from 2008to 2015. Al I iant Techsystems: Fteported pretaxprofits in2008and 2014wereadjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairments The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction and the research arfo experimentation taxcredit reduced taes from2008to 2015 by $712 mi 11 ion and $35.5 million, fecteral and state taxes by $18.4 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. Altria Group: The hyi tax rates in 2011 and 2012 reflect a turnaround in deferred tax The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taes by $1.086bi 11 ion from 2008to 2015. Amazon: Fteported total current incometaeswereadjusted in order tosepaate federal and state taesfor2008throuc^i 2011. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taes by $74.6million from 2013 to 2015. Eeess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $1217billion from2008to2015. Ameren: Fteported pretax profits in 2012and2010were adjusted upwardforancn-cashgoo^ impairment Deferred taesexplain most of the company's tax breaks in each yea", driven largely by accelerated depreciation. American Electric Power: Deferred taes, driven primari ly byaccelerated depreciation, explain most ofthe company's lew rates American Bqpress: Incomewasadjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments in al I eyit years Fteported pretax profits in 2015wereadjusted upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment Sxcesstaxbenefitsfromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $319million from 2008to 2015. American Financial Group: Theoompany reports nonoont rolling interest income in al I ejcfit years Pretax Tte35FferoentCorporateTaclVlyth 56 ED_001523_00000854-00061 inoorrewesadjusted tosxdude this inoorre. Thehyn tax rates in2008,2013and2014ae related to deferred taxassets. AirerisourwBergen: Excess tax benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taxes by $275.6 million from 2008to 2015. Amphenol: Excess tax benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taxes by $1492million from2008to 2015. Andereons: ported pretax profits in2015wereadjusted ipAad foranomcash impairment ofgoodwill. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $8 mil lion from2008to 2015. Excess tax benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $8.6 million from2008to 2015. Anixter International: Excesstaxbenefitsfromstock options reduced federal and state taxes by $34.3 million from 2008to 2015. Anthem: Theoompanyw0sprwicLBlykncwnasV\fellpoint The company recorded restructuring charges in 2011 and 2012. Pretax incomewesadjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring payments, which had theeffect of increasing income in 2011 and 2012and decreasing inoorre in 2013. Eeess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and statetaesby $297million from 2008to2015. Apollo Group: Thecompeny'sfiscal ^earsend inAigustof the \ears listed. Incomewasadjusted to reflect thetimingof restructuring charge payments for 2011 thrcx#i2015. Eeess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $50.5 million from2008to2015. Archer Daniels Midland: Thecompeny'sfiscal ^earsend in Junefollcwing the^ears I isted for2008 througi 2011. Data 1br2O12w0sfor the transition period fromJinethrough December, and fiscal ^rs2013througi2015end in December. ArrowElectronics: Fteported pretax profits in2008were adjusted upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment. Eeess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $33.5 million from2008to2015. Asbury Automotive Group: Fteported pretax profits in 2008wereadjusted upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment Eeess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $20 million from2008to 2015. 57 InstituteOTTaxatiOTarriEcor^ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA AT&T: Thecompeny reports nonoontrol ling interest income in al I eic^t ^ears Pretax incomewasadjusted to edude this income Excess tax benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taesby$14.1 million from 2008to 2015. Atmos Energy: The company's fiscal \earsend in Septsnber of the^eas listed. Mcstoftheoompany'stax breaksweredue to deferrals related todgoreciation. Automatic Data Processing: Thecompeny'sfiscal ^ears end inJunefollcwing the^earslisted. Sported pretaxprofits in 2012wereadjusted upward fora non-cashgoodwill impairment The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taes by$1654million from2008to 2015. Eeess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $180.3million from2008to 2015. Autoration: Fteported pretax profits in2008wereadjusted upward fora non-cash impairment ofgoodwill and franchise hearts Ee$ tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $91.5 mi 11 ion from2008to 2015. Autozone: Theoompany'sfiscal ^eersend in August of the years listed. Mostofthecompaiy'staxsa/in^weredieto deferred taes associated with inventory valuation and accelerated dgcreciation. Excesstaxbenefitsfromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $277 mi 11ion from 2008to 2015. Bal I: The Domestic Product ion Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation taxcredit reduced taes from 2C08to2015by$45millionand$48million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $100 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. BB&T: Because the company doesnot disclose USand foreign pretax income, thestudyestimated foreign pretax income based on rgcorted current foreign inoorre taes. The study adjusted US pretax inoorre by replacing the company's provision for loan losseswith actual charges net of recoveries. This had theeffect of increasing pretax income in2010,2009 and 2008and decreasing it in 2011 and 2012 fed Bath & Beyond: The company's feed ^earends in February following the years I isted. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $67 million from2008to 2015. ED_001523_00000854-00062 Bemis: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $42 mi I lien from2008to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $92 mi 11 ion from 2008to 2015. Best Buy: Theoompany'sfiscal yearends in January following theyearslisted. Sported pretaxprofits in 2008were adjusted upward fora ncn-cash goodwill impairment. Income wasadjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments from2008to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $24 mi I lion from 2008to 2015. Big Lots: The company's fiscal year ends inJhnuary following the years listed. Thecompany's tax rates reflect smell sa/ingsfrom deferred taxes, mostly due toacoelerated dqereciation. Thehyi rate in 2013 reftectsa turnaround of deferred taxes Exrestax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $36million from2008to 2015. The Work Opportunity Tax Credit and other employment credits reduced federal and state taes by$12million from2008to 2015. Biogen Idee: Thecompeny reportsnoncontrolling interest income in most years Pretax incomewasadjusted toadude this income. Incomewasalsoadjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring cha^ payments between 2010and2012. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $320.6 million from 2013 to 2015. Bess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $397.9 million from2008to2015. Boeing: The DomesticProductbn Activities Deduction reduced taesby$330.5million from 2013 to 2015. The research and experimentation credit reduced taxes by $1.36 billion from 2008to 2015.. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $604 million from 2008to 2015. C.H. Robinson: Because theoompany doesnot disclose US and foreign pretax income, thestudyestimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $106 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. CA: The company's fiscal yearsend in March following the yeas listed. Thehigi rate in 2008 reflectsa tumaound in deferred taxes The Domestic Production Activities 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA Deduction reduced taesby$133millionfrom2008to2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $24 mi 11 ion from2008to 2015. Cablevision Systems: Sported pretax profits in 2008 wereadjusted upward fora non-cashgoodwill impairment charcp. The researchand experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by$14.6 million from2008to 2O15.Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $7.3 million from2013to2015. Campbell Soup: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend in August of the years listed. TteDonesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $160.1 million from2008to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stockoptions reduced federal and state taxes by $87 million from 2013 to 2015. Capital One: Fteported pretax profitswereadjusted for the timing of payments for credit losses Deferred taesexplain most of the company's low tax rate in 2010, and accumulating deferred taxassetsexplain theoompany'shigh rates in 2008 and 2015. Cardinal Health: Tteoompany'sfiscal yearsend injure following the years listed. Sported pretax profits in 2012 were adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairments U.S taxes on foreign profits weresutotracted from reported tax in 2009 througn 2012. Sxces tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $68 million from 2013to 2015. CarMax: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend in February following the years listed. Ttehyc rate in 2008 reflectsa turnaround in deferred taes related to "partnership basis" and "stock oompensation." Excesstax benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taxes by $152 mi I lien from2008to 2015. Casey's General Stores: Theoompany'sfiscal yearends in April following theyears listed. Deferral, drixan mainly by accelerated depreciation, explains most of the tax breaks inall eyit yeas Eess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $12.7 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. CES: Sported pretaxprofits in2008,2009and2015were adjusted upward for non-cashgoodwill and intangibleasset impairments Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $676.7 from2008 to 2015. The35FferoentCorporateTacMyth 58 ED_001523_00000854-00063 Celanese: Sported total current income taeswere adjusted in order to^saatefederal andstate taxes. The company's income tax notedid not distinguish between federal and stale taes, so thestudy estimated tie fecteral and stateshareof current US taes Centene: Sported pretac profits in 2012and2015were adjusted ipwadforanoT-cashgoodwill impairment. The company's hicfi rates in2008and2013throi^i2015ae likelydri\enbyaturnarcxjndofcfeferredtaxes.Exoessta< benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taxes by $69.9 million from2008to2015. CenturyLink: Fteported pretax profits in2013wasadjusled upward fora norrcashgoodwill impairment Thecompeny maintainsan allowance for doubtful accounts Thestudy adjusted USand foreign pretax income by replacing the company's provision fordoubtful accountswith actual charges net of reooeries This had theeffect of decreasing pretaxprofitsin2008and increasing them inall other \ears Accelerated depreciation saed the arnpany substantial amounts in 201 Othrou^i 2012. Exres tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by$172million from 2008to 2010. CF Industries Holdings: Thecompany reports nonoontrolling interest income in al I eyit^ears Pretax income wasadjusted toexdude this income. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $215.8 million from2008to 2015. Excess tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $141.7 million from 2008to 2015. CharlesSchwab: Excess tax benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $61 million from 2008to 2010. Cigna: Pretac inoorrewasadjisted to reflect the timing of charges for GMDB contracts inall eight years Incomewas also adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge paymentsforall eic^t years. Excess tax berefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $111 million from 2008to 2015. Clorox: Resorted pretax profits in 2010wereadjusted upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment charge. The company's feed yearsend in Jureof the years listed. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taxes by 59 InstitutemTaxationart 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA March2017 $147.6from2008to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by$150 million from 2008to 2015. CMS Energy: Accelerated dgnreciationsaed tfecompany substantial amounts inall ei^nt years. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $3.0and $9.0 million in2010and2009. Coach: Excess tax benefits fromstock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $176.7 mi 11 ion from 2008to 2015. Coca-Cola: Sported pretac profits in2008wereadjusted upwati fora non-cash impairment charcp. Accelerated depredation saed the company substantial amounts in 2010 and2009. Inoonewasalsoadjisted to reflect tie timing of restructuring cha^ payments for 2012throu^i 2015. Cognizant Technology Solutions: Fteported total current income taxes wereadjusted in order toseparate fecteral and state taxes. The high tac rate in 2012 reflectsa turnaround of deferred tac. Excess tax berefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taxes by $295.8 million from 2008to 2015. Comcast: Thecompeny reports noncontrollirg interest incomefrom 2010 to 2015. Pretax inoorrewasadjusted to educte this inoorre Accelerated depreciation saed the company substantial amounts in most years Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taxes by $953.1 million from2008to2015. Community Health Systems: Thecompany reports noncontrol ling interest income in al I eicfit years Pretax incomewasadjusted toexdude this inoorre. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taxes by $24million from2008 to 2013. ConAgra Foods: IncorrewesadjiEted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments for2013throucfi 2015. Excess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taxes by $122 mi 11ion from2008to 2015. Consol Energy: Because thecompanydoes not disdose US and foregi pretax inoorre, thestudy estirrated foregi pretac inoorrebased on reported current foreign income taxes. Fteported pretaeprofits in 2015 wereadjusted upward foranon-cash impairment charge The DonesticProducticn Activities [Deduction reduced taxes by $54.4million from ED_001523_00000854-00064 2008 to 2015. Exoe tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by$63.4 million from2008to 2015. Consol dated Edison : Accelerated depreciation saved the oernpanysifcstantial amants in al I years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taes by $15.4 million in2013. Constellation Brands Thecompeny'sfiscal yearsend in Rdsruary following the years listed. Exoess tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $393 million from2008to 2015,and $203 million in2015alone. Core-Mark Holding: Excesstaxbenefitsfromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $129 million from 2008to 2015. Coming: Deferral explains most of theoompany's low tax rates Costco Wholesale: Theoompany'sfiscal yearends in August of the years listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $393 mi I lion from 2008to 2015. CSX: Accelerated depreciation saed the company substantial amonts in all eicjit years Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal andstatetaesby$211 million from2008to 2015. CVR Energy: Fteported pretac profits in2008wereadjusted upward fora non-cash impairment ctarge. Theoompany reports nonoontrol ling interest incomefrom 2011 to 2015. Pretar incomewasadjusted to exclude this income. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $63.7 million from2008to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal andstatetaesby$2.1 million in 2011. CVS Caremark: Bess tax benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $444million from2008to 2015. Danaher: InoorrewesadjiEted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments inall eight years. Darden Restaurants: Thecompai/sfecal yearsend in May fol lowing the years listed. Unspecified `federal income taxcredits" reduced taes by $419million from 2008to 2015. Deferred taes, predominantlyaccelerated dqcreciation, 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA explain the remainderofthe company's lowtax rate in 2009. Excess tar benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $138 mi 11ion from2008to 2015. DaVita: Theoompany repofenoncontrollirg interest income inall eight yeas. Pretax incomewasadjusted to exclude this inoorre. Fteported pretax profits in 2011 and 2015 wereadjusted upward for non-cash impairmentsofgoodwill and otter intangible assets Deferred taes, predominantly accelerated dgcreciation, account for most of theoompany's tar breaks in most yeas. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taesby $213.7 million from2008to 2015. Deere: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in October of the yeas listed. Sported pretacprofits in 2009,2010,2012 2013 and 2014v\ereadjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairments Wind energy production taxcredits reduced taes by $30 mi Ilion, $26 mi I lion, and $14 mi Ilion in 2010, 2009and2008. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $152 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2013. Excess tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $320.8million from2008to 2015. Devon Energy: Thestudy reversed impairrentsforthe carryingvalueofoil and cpspropertiesandgoodwill in 2008, 2009,2012,2013,2014and 2015. Excess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $94 million from2008to 2015. Dick'sSporting Goods: Fteported pretaxprofits in2008 wereadjusted upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment. Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in January following the years listed. Excess tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taesby $171.7 million from2008to2015. Discover Financial Services: Theoompany'shyi rate in 2008 reffeotsa turnaround of deferred fecteral income taes Discovery Communications: Theoompany's hyi rates in2009,2012and 2014 reflect turnarounds of deferred federal inoorre taes The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $266.8million from2008to 2015. Bcess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $171 million from2010to 2015. Dish Network: Fteported pretax profits in 2010 November 1,2011 and2009wereadjusted for I iticption settlements Deferred taes reduced thecompany's tax rate in most yeas The35FferomtCorporateTa<IVIyth 60 ED_001523_00000854-00065 Dollar General: Because the company does not disclose US and foreign pretac inoorre, thestudy estirrated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign inoorre taxes. Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend in January following the \ears listed. Bcess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $197.9million from2008to 2015. Dollar Tree: Thecompany's fiscal yearsend in January following the^ears listed. Thecompany's hyi tax rates in 2010and 2014 reflect tumaroundsofdeferred taxes. Bess tac benefits from stockoptions reduced federal and state taes by $762 million from2008to2015. Dominion Resources: restructuring chargeswere taken in2010. Retax profits wereadjusted for theactual utilization of the company's restructuring reserves, which increased pretaxprofits in2010. Thestudy reversed impairmentsfor the (carrying'value ofoi I and gas properties in 2009,2010and 2015. Accelerated depreciation saed thecompenysubstantial amounts in al I eic^t ^ears The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $20.1, $54.3and $13.1 million in 2010,2009and2008. Excess tax benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $36.9 million from 2008to 2015. Domtar: Fteported total current income taeswereadjusted in orctertoseparatefederal and state taes. Reported pretax profits in2008wereadjusted upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment. The Domestic Reduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $48 million from2008 to2015. Dover: Deferred taesexplain most of thecompany's lew tax rate in2010. The Domestic Reduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby$136.9from2008to 2015. The research and experimentation taxcredit reduced taes by $30.1 from2008 to 2015. Bcess tac benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taesby $88.3 million from2008to2015. DTE Energy: Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in most ^ears The Domestic Reduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $49 mi Ilion from2008 to 2013. Duke Energy: Ttecompaiy'sresultsfor2012were adjusted to include halfofthe inoorreand tax ofProgress Energy,which itaoquiredmidw^throi^the^ Fteported pretaxprofits in 2009and 2010 vraeadjisted ipward fora non-cash goodwill impairment. Accelerated depreciation 61 InstituteonTa^ionardBuoncrricFblky | March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA saved the company substantial amounts in most \eas. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $18.0 million in2008. Dupont: Deferred taesexplain the negate tax rate in 2010 and the hii rate in 2011 .Accelerated depreciation is the primary factor in these tax deferrals. Factorable taxsettlerents reduced Dupont'staes in2008,2010and2012. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $183.9millionfrom2011 to2015. Etman Chemical : Thecompany's lew tac ratesaredue primarily to deferred taes, mainly accelerated depreciation. General business creditsexplain most of the lew rates in 2008. The Domestic Reduction Activities Deduction reduced taes by $90 mi 11 ion from2008 to 2015. Ecolab: ported total current incometaeswereadjusted inorderto^caatefechd and state taes. The Domestic Reduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $180.9 million from2008 to 2015. The research and experimentation taccredit reduced taxoeby$45.3million from 2011 to2015. Excess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $246.9 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. Eli Li I ly: ported pretac profits in 2009and2008were adjusted by moving the cost ofa I tieption settlement to2009, the^ear it was paid, from2008, thenar it was booked. Dferra explains thecompany's lew tac rates in2008and 2010, and an accumulation ofdeferred tacaetsexplains the hicfi rate in2015. Emcor Group: Ftepoited pretaeprofits in 2009and 2010 wereadjusted upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taes by $30.4million from 201 Oto 2015. Bccess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $302million from2008to 2015. Emerson Electric: Fteported profits in 2012and 2011 were adjusted upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment charge. Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend inSeptemberof the^ears listed. A turnaround of deferred taes explains the company's hk^r tac rate in 2010and 2012 The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taes by $2972mi 11 ion from 2008to 2015. Entergy: Fteportedpretacprofitsfor20122013,2014and 2015 wereadjusted upward fora non-cash asset impairment. ED_001523_00000854-00066 Because the company does not disclose U.S and foreign pretax inoorre, thestudy estimated foreign pretax inoorre based on reported current foreign inoorre taes Deferred taesexplain thei r lew tax rates in most \ears, drhen mainly by accelerated depreciation. Exelon: Deferred taxoeexpfein most of theoompany's lew rates Accelerated depreciation saved theoompany substantial amounts over theeiit \ears. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $227.8 million from 2008to 2015. Beess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $71 million from 2008to 2012 ExpressScripts: TtecompenymaintainsanallcwarKBfor doubtful accounts Thestudyadjusted US and foreign pretax inoorre by replacing the company's provision for doubtful accountswith actual charges net of recoveries. This had the effect ofdecreasing pretax profits in2010,2011,2014and 2015and increasing them inall other\ears. Deferred taes explain meet of the company's taxbreats from2008to 2011, and deferred taxa^tsexplain the hi rates from 2012 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $382.9mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. Ewon Mobil: Accelerated depreciation saved theoompany substantial amounts in most \ears. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $1.15billion from2008to 2015. Evereource Energy: Theoompanychanged its narrefrom Northeast Utilities in 2015. Accelerated depreciation provided theoompany with substantial taxsa/inep in each \ear. Beess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $26.7 mi 11 ion from 2008to 2015. Facebook: The high tax rate in 2015 isexplained byan accumulation ofdeferred taxassets The researchand experimentation taxcredit reduoed taes by $2952million from 2010to 2015. Bxcess tax benefits fromstock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $5.78 billion from 2010 to 2015. FedEx: Thecompany'sfiscal \earends in Ma/ fol lowing the yeats I isted. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in all eignt ^ears Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral andstatetaesby$191 million from2008to 2015. Fifth Third Bancorp: Thestudyadjusted US pretax income by replacing tte company's prevision for loan losses with actual cha^s ret of recoveries. This had theeffect of increasing pretax income in 2009and 2008and decreasing it in2010thror#r2015. Reported profits in2008wereadjusted upwardforancn-cashgociclwill impairment charge. First Energy: Accelerated depreciation saved theoompany substantial amounts over theeynt \ears. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taesby $26million from2008to 2011. Fiserv: Because theoompany does not discloseforeign pretax inoorre, thestudyestimated foreign inoorre based on reported current foreign income taes. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by$109.4 million from 2012 to 2015. Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $69million from 2008to 2015. Flowserve: Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $66.1 million from 2008to 2015. Franklin Resources: Theoompany reportsnonoontrolling interest income in al I ei^nt years Pretax incomewasadjusted toexdude this income. Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $122.5 mi 11 ion from2008to 2015. Gamestop: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in January following thenars listed. Beess tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $77.6 million from 2008to 2015. The hyi tac rate in 2012 isexplained by an accumulation ofdeferred taxassets. Gap: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in January following the \ears listed. Theoompany'shign tac rate in2009 reflectsa turnaround of deferred taes related toaooelerated depreciation. Beess tac benefitsfromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $190millfon from2008to 2015. General Dynamics: Fteported profits in 2012were adjusted upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment charcp. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taes by $469.5 million from2008to 2015. Bxcess tac benefits from stockoptions reduced fecteral and state taes by $290million from2008to 2015. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA The35FbroentCorporateTaclVlyth ED_001523_00000854-00067 General Electric: Thestudyadjusted US pretac inoorre by replacing ttecompany'sprcvision for loan leaseswith actual charges net of recoveries This had theeffect of reducing inoorre in 2010 througn2012and increasing it2008,2009, 2013and2014. General Mills: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend in Mey following the^ears listed. Deferred taesexplain much of the low ratethecompany paid in 2010. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $353 million from2008to 2015. Bcoess tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and slate taes by $713million from 2008to 2015. ^structuring cha^svraetaten inmost^ears between 2008and 2015. Pretac profits foreach \earwere adjusted for tire actual uti I ration of tire company's restructuring reserves, which increased pretac profits in 2008, 2011 and2014and decreased them inall other\ears. Pretac income in 2014wasadjusted upward fora non-cash impairment of intangibleassets. Genuine Parte: Because the company did not disclose US and foreign pretac inoorrefor2008and2009, thestudy estimated foreign pretac inoorre bared on reported current foreign inoorretaes Pretac profitsvrereadjusted forepenres booted but not \et recognized for taes. Thisadjustment decreared pretac profits in2009,2013and2015and increased pretac profits in all other ^ears Bccesstac benefits from stockoptions reduced federal and state taes by $56.1 million from2008to2015. Goldman Sachs Group: Thehign tac rates in2012and 2013 reflect a turnaround of deferred taes Bccess tac benefits from stockoptions reduced federal and state taes by $2876 billion from 2008to2015. Graybar Electric: Deferral, primarily due toaooelerated dgcreciation, explains tire company's relatively low tac rate in 2010. Group 1 Automotive: Ffeported pretacprofits in2008, 2013,2014and2015wereadjusted upward for non-cash impairments of franchise rignts Bccess tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $12 mi I lion from 2008to 2015. H&RBIock: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend inApril following the\earslisted. Thestudyadjusted US. pretac income to replace provision for loan losses with actual charges 63 InstituteonTa^ionarriE^ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA March2017 ret of recoveries Thecompany's lew tac rate in 2009 is primarily due to deferred taes, and thehign rates in 2012and 2014 reflect a turnaround of deferred taes Excess tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by$112 million from2008to2012 Harley-Davidson: restructuring charcpsweretaten in each ^between 2008and 2013. Pretac profits foreadn^ear wereadjusted for tireactual utilization of thecompany's restructuring reserves, which increased pretac profits in2008, 2009arnd2011 and decreased them in2010,2012and 2013. Sported pretacprofits in2009werealsoadjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. Tire DomesticProduction Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation taccredit reduced taesfrom2008to2015by$1229million and $36.8million, respectively. Beres tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $58.5 million from 2008to 2015. Harris: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend inJuneorJulyofthe \ears listed. Sported pretaeprofits in2009and2015were adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairments Tire Domestic Product ion Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation (accredit reduced taesfrom2008to 2015by $136.6 million and $74.4 million, respectively. HCA Holdings: Because thecompany does not disclose US and foreign pretac income for2008 througn 2010, the study estimated foreign pretac income bared on reported current foreign income taes. Thecompany reports noncontrolling interest income inall eiept \ears Pretac incomewasadjusted toexdudethis income. Thecompany maintainsanallcwanrefor doubtful accounts Thestudy adjusted US and foreign pretac income by replacing the company's provision for doubtful accountswith actual chargeret of recoveries. Thishad theeffect ofdecreasing pretac profits in 2010and2014and increasing them inall other ^ears Bccess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $833mi 11 ion from2008to 2015. Health Net: Fteportedpretaeprofits in2009and2010were adjusted up^d fora non-cash goodwill impairment Bccess tac benefits fromstockoptions reduced federal and state taes by $16.5million from2008to 2015. HenrySchein: TTnecwpanyreportenoncontrolling interest income inalleiept \ears Pretacinoorrewasadjusted toexdude this income. Bccess tac benefits from stock options ED_001523_00000854-00068 reduoed fecteral and state taes by $69.8 million from2008to 2015. Hershey: Theoompany's relatively hii tax rates in2008 throui 2010aedriven bya turnaround ofdeferred taxes. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduoed taes by $189.3 mi 11 ion from2008to 2015. Bxoeoe tax benefits from stock options reduoed federal and state taes by $181.8 million from2008to2015. HollyFrontier: Thecompanywasformerlyknciwnas Holly. Theoompany reports nonoontrol ling interest inoorre inall eifit \ears. Pretax inoorrewasadjusted toedude this inoorre The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduoed taesby$168.6million from2008to 2015. Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $332million from2008to2015. Home Depot: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in January following the^ears I isted. Theoompany's hii tax rate in 2008 is die toatumaround of deferred taes. Honeywell International: Deferred taesaxplain most of the company's low tax rates in most \oers A turnaround of deferred taxexplains tloehii rate in2011. Bxcess tax benefits from stockoptions reduoed fecteral and state taes by $448 million from2008to2015. Hormel Foods: Because theoompany does not disclose US and foreign pretax inoorre, thestudy estirrated foreign pretax inoorre based on reported current foreign inoorre taes. Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in October of the\eas I isted. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby$136.9million from2008to 2015. Bxcess tax benefits from stockoptions reduoed fecteral and state taes by $116.9 million from 2008to2015. Humana: Thecompy'shiitaxratesin2010,2012,2014 and 2015aredie to turnarounds of deferred taes Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $892million from2008 to 2015. 111 inois Tool Works: Fteported pretax profits in2009were adjusted upward fora ncmashgoocIwW impairment. A turnaround of deferred taes explains the compeny'shii tax rate in2009, and aturnaround ofdeferred taxalso increases the2010 rate. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduoed taesby$248.6million from2008to 2015. Bxcess tax 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $118million from 2008 to 2015. I nsight Enterprises: Fteported pretax profits in 2008were adjusted ipv\ardforanon-cashgoodwill impairment charge. Deferred taesexplain the necptive tax rate in 2009, and explain most of the company's taxbreeks in 2010. Beess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $7 million from2008to2015. intel: A turnaround ofdeferred taesexplainstheoompany's hi^n tax rate in2008. Deferred taes, primarilyaccelerated dgnreciation, explain most of theoompany's taxbreaks in 2009. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction and the research ard experimentation taxcredit reduoed taesfrom 2008to 2015 by $2.08 billion and $1.5billion, respectively. Beess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $613 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. international Business Machines (IBM) : Deferred taessaed theoompany substantial amounts in most \ears, in pal due toaooelerated depreciation taxbreaks International Paper: ported pretax profits in2008were adjusted ip^d fora non-cash goodwill impairment charge. Deferred taesexplain theoompany's necptive tax rates in 2010and 2011. The necptive rate in2013 isexplained bya settlement of taxaudits The company's hi tax rate in2008 is die toatumaround of deferred taes Alternative fuel mixturecredits reduced taesby$133million in 2009. Cellulcsicbio-fijel credits reduced taesby $40 million in 2010. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduoed taes by $109 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. Interpublic: Theoompany reportsnoncontrollirg interest inoorre inall eight \ears. Pretax inoorrewasadjusted to edude this inoorre Deferred taesexplain most offre company's tax breaks inall eiit ^ears Beess tax benefitsfrom stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $54.6million from 201 Oto 2015. J.B. Hunt Transport Services: Deferred taesexplain most of theoompany'stax breaks in all eiit ^ears Bxoess tax benefitsfrom stock options reduoed fecteral and state taxes by $124.3million from2008to 2015. J.M. Smucker: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in April following the^ears listed. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduoed taxes by $169 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. The35FferoentCc>rporateTaxlVlyth 64 ED_001523_00000854-00069 Bcess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $35.9million from 2008 to 2015. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.: Thestudy adjusted US and foreigi pretax inoorreby replacing thecompany's provision for loan losseswithactual charges net of recoveries. Thishad theeffect of increasing pretax inoorre in 2009and 2008and decreasing it in 2010 througi 2015. The negative rate in 2013 isexplained by deferred taes Bcess tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $1.86 billion from 2008to 2015. Jacobs Engineering Group: Theoompany'sfiscal years end in October of the years I isted. Thecompany's high tax rate in 2010 is due to a turnaround of deferred taes, driven primarily byaccelerated dgcreciation. Bccess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral andstate taesby $60.1 million from2008to 2015. Joy Global: Reported pretaxprofits in2013and2015wae adjusted ipwad for non-cash irrpairments ofgoodwill and trademarks. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $72.9 million from2009to2015. Bccesstac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $68.3 million from2008to2015. Kellogg: restructuring chargsswere taken in2013 through 2015. Pretax profits foreach yearv\eraadjusted for theactual utilization of thecompany's restructuring reserves, which increased pretaeprofits in 2013and2014and decreased them in 2015. Thehicfi rates in2O12,2O14and2O15ae0<plained by turnaroundsof deferred taes. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $160.8from2009to 2015. Bccess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $90 mi 11 ion from2008 to 2015. Kimberly-Clark: Thehic|i rate in 2015 isacplained bya turnaround of deferred taes. Bccess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $212 mi I lion from 2008to 2015. Kohl's: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend inJbmay following the yeas listed. Thehign rates in2012and2015are<plained by turnaroundsof deferred taes. Beesstac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $16million from2009to 2015. Kroger: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend inJbniBryfollowing the yeas listed. Ffeported pretaeprofits in 2009and 2010 were 65 InstituteOTTa^ionarriECnrOT 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA adjusted ipward for non-cash goodwill impairments The hyn rate in2010 isexplained bya turnaround ofdeferred taes. The DomesticProcbction Activities Deduction reduced taes by $87.8 from 2011 to 2015. Bccess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $200 million from2008to2015. L-3 Communications: Fteported pretaeprofits in 2015 wereadjusted upward fora non-cashgoodwill impairment. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction and the reseach and eeperimentation tac credit reduced taes from 2008to2015by$126.9millionand$178.6million, fecteral and state taes by $73 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. Laboratory Corp, of America: Thehyi rate in 2015 is explained byaturnaround ofdeferred taes. Beesstac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $70.4 million from2008to2015. Levi Strauss: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend in November of tire yeas listed. Tire company's higi tac rate in 2009 is driven bya turnaround of deferred taes Bccess tac benefits fromstock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $4 million from2012to2015. Limited Brands: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend inJhnuary following the years listed. Boess tac benefits from stock options reduced federal andstate taes by $334.1 million from 2008to 2015. LKQ Corp: Bccess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by$111.5million from2008to 2015. Lockheed Martin: Because thecompany does not disclose US and foregi pretax income, thestudy estimated foregi pretac inoorrebesed on reported current foreigi income taes. More than 75 percent ofttre company'sworldwidesales were to the US government in each year. Accelerated depreciation saed the company substantial amounts in 2008 through 2011. The hyi tax rates in 2014and 2015ae explained by deferred taxassets. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction and the resffirch and experimentation taccredit reduced taesfrom2008to2015by$704million and$390million, respectively. Bccess tac benefits from stock options radioed federal and state taes by $21.0and $92.0 million in 2009and2008. ED_001523_00000854-00070 Loews: Theoompany reportsnonoontrolling interest income inall eight \ears. Prta* inoorrewasadjusted to exclude this inoorre. Sported pretax profits in 2008and 2013 wereadjusted upward for non-cashgoodwill impairment charges Sported pretax profits in2008,2009,2012and 2013 wereadjusted foran impairment of natural cpsandoil properties The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby$11.7million in2008. Eeess tax benefits from stockoptions reduoed federal and state taes by $7 million from2008to2010. Lowe's: The higi tax rates in most \easaeexplained by deferred taxassets Bxcess tax benefits fromstock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $1.0 and $1.0 mi 11 ion in 2010and2008. Macy's: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in January following the^ears I isted. Fteported pretax profits in2008wereadjusted foragoodwill impairment Accelerated deprecation reduoed the company's taes in 2008. Eeess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $185 mi 11ion from 2010to2015. Mastercard: Sported pretax profits in each oftloeeit \earev\ereadjusted to mctheoest of litigation settlerents to the\earswhen the money wesactuallyspent. Excess tax benefits fromstock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $346 million from2008to2015. McDonalds: Eeess tax benefitsfrom stock options reduced fecteral and stale taes by $795.8million from2008to 2015. McKesson: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in Mach following the^ears I isted. Pretax incomewasadjusted to reflect the timing ofcharges for I itiption settlements MDU Resources: Reported pretaxprofits in20122009, and2008wereadjusted forai impairment of natural gasarnd oil properties The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduoed taes by$10million from2008to 2015. Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $122 million from2008 to2015. Merck: Theoompany recorded restructuringcharges in 2010,2009and 2008. Thestudy adjusted U.S pretax profits for the current effect of those charges, which increased rgsorted US profits in2008 througn 2011 and reduced than in 2012. Deferred taesexplain most of theoompany's tax breaks in 2009and 2008. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA Molina Healthcare: Fteported pretax profits in 2011 were adjusted upward fora ncn-cashgocic^ impairment charge. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $18.3 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. Monsanto: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in August of the \ears listed. Theoompany recorded restructuring charges in 2009,2010and 2015. Thestudy adjusted US pretax profits for thecurrenteffect of thoaecharges, which increased reported US profits in 2009and 2015, and reduoed them in 2010througn2012 The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation taxcredit reduoed taes from2008to 2015by$414millionand$182 million, respectixrely. Eeess tax benefitsfrom stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $557mi 11 ion from2008to 2015. Mosaic: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in Ma/fol Icwing the \earslisted from2008to 2012 The data for2013 represents the transition period fromJine througn December, and the oompany's2014and 2015 fcal yearsend in Deoanber. Excess tac benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and statetaesby $23 million from 2008to 2010. Percentage depletion reduces theoompany's taes in each ^ear. Netflix: Thehign tac rate in 2012 isexplained by deferred tax assets The research and experimentation tax credit reduoed taes by $802million from2008to 2O15.Bxcess tax benefits fromstock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $381.9 million from2008 to2015. Thernegatixre rates in 2013and 2015areexplained by theseaeesstaxbenefitsfromstock options NexEra Energy: Deferred tax benefitsexplain most of the company's tax benefits Nike: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in Mey fol Icwing the \ears I isted. Bxcess tax benefitsfrom stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $965.1 million from2008to 2015. N Source: Accelerated depreciation sared the company substantial amounts in most ^ears The DorroeticProduction Activities Deduction reduoed taesby$12and$1.8million in 2009and2008. Nordstrom: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend inJhnuary following the^ears listed. Thehign tax rates in 2008and2009 areexplained by deferred taxassets. Bxcess tax benefits from TheRsroentQxporateTacMyth 66 ED_001523_00000854-00071 stock options reduoed federal and state taes by $133 million from 2008to 2015. Norfolk Southern : Accelerated depreciation predicted the companywith substantial taxsa/inep in each \ear. Beess tax benefits fromstock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $300 million from2008 to2015. Northrop Grumman: Fteported pretax profits in2008 wereadjusted upwatiforanon-cashgoodwill impairment charge. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduoed taes from2008to 2015 by $293mi 11 ion aid $261 million, respectively. Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $361 million from 2008to 2015. NVR: Bxcess tax benefitsfrom stockoptions reduoed federal and state taes by $271 million from 2008to 2015. Omnicom Group: Theoompany repcrrtsnoncontrollirg interest income inall eiit^ears Pretax incomewasadjusted to exclude this income. Beess tax benefits fromstock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $267.8million from2008to 2015. Oneok: Theoompany reportsnonoontrolling interest inoorre inall eight \ears. Pretax inoorrewasadjisted to exclude this inoorre. Fteported pretax inoorre in 2012was adjusted qswardforancnoeshgoodwill impairment Deferred taesexplain most of the company's tax breaks inall ei^nt \eas. Boe tax benefits from stock options reduoed federal and state taes by $21 million from2011 to 2013. Oracle: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in Mey tbl Icwing the \ears Iisted. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taes by$1233billion from2008to 2015. Bcess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $1.475billion from2008to2015. O'Reilly Automotive: Bxcess taxbenefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $235.6 million from 2008to 2015. Owens & Minor: Bxcesstaxbenefitsfromstockoptions reduoed fecteral and state taes by $13.7 million from2008to 2015. Paccar: The high tax rate in 2014 isexplained by a turnaround of deferred taes The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $108.3 million from 67 InstituteOTTa^ionarriBnrOT 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA 2012 to 2015. The research and experimentation taxcredit reduoed taes by $17.4 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2011.Boeoe tax benefitsfrom stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $7.1 and$3.8million in 2009and 2008. Packaging Corp, of America: The DcirresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taes by $77.8 mi 11 ion from 2008to 2015. Boeoe tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $33.4 million from2008to 2015. Parker Hannifin: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend inJuneof the^ears listed, ported pretax incomewasadjusted upward in 2013fora ncn-cashgoodwill impairment The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduoed taes from2008to 2015 by $1052mi 11 ion and $95.9 mi 11 ion, respectively. [Excess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $210.7 million from2008to2015. Pepco Holdings: Aooelerated depreciation provided the companywith substantial taxsawings in most ^ears The company recorded restructuring charges in2010. Thestudy adjusted US pretax profits for thecurrent effect of those charges, which increased r^orted US profits in2010and decreased profits in 2011. PepsiCo: Bcess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $814 mi 11 ion from2008to 2015. PG&E Corp: Aooelerated depreciation saed theoompany substantial anoints in al I eight ^ears Pitney Bow: The company recorded restructuring charges inall eighths. Thestudyadjusted US pretax profits forthecunent effect of those charges, which increased reported US profits in2008,2010,2011 and 2014and decreased them in2009,2012,2013and2015. PNC Financial Services Group: Thestudyadjusted US and foreign pretax income to replace provision for loan losses with actual charges net of recoveries. Pretax income in 2012 wasadjusted upwatiforarmcashgoodwill impairment Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taes by $114 mi 11ion from2008to 2015. Polo Ralph Lauren: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in March following the^ears listed. Bxcess tax benefits from stockoptions reduoed federal and state taes by $2127 million from2008to2015. ED_001523_00000854-00072 PPG Industries: Thecompany rqxirtsncnocnM interest income inall eigit^ars Pretax incomewesadjusted toexdude this income PPL: Accelerated depreciation seed the company substantial amounts in most years. The Domestic Reduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $31 million from2008 to 2010. Pracai r: Bcess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $337million from 2008to 2015. Precision Castparts: lfor2008to 2014, thecompany's fiscal yearsend in March following the^ears listed. The numbersfor2015are for the transition period from April 2015 througi January 2016. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taesby $302.7 million from 2008to 2015. Bcess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $169.8million from2008to 2015. Priceline.com: Bcess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $181.1 million from 2008to 2015. Principal Financial: Thecompany reportsnoncontrollirg interest income inall eigit^ears Pretax incomewesadjusted toexdude this income. Bcess tax benefits fromstock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $52.6million from2008to 2015. Procter & Gamble: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend injure following the^ears listed. Fteported pretaeprofits in2012and 2011 wereadjusted upwati fora non-cash goodwill impairment. PublicService Enterprise Group: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taesby $103 million from2008to 2015. Bcess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal andstate taesby$11 million from 2008 to 2015. PublixSuper Markets: Thecompanyenjo^edsmall deferred tac benefits, primarily from accelerated depreciation, in2009throigh2011 and in2015. Qualcomm: The hyi tax rate in 2010 isacplained by deferred tacassets The research and experimentation tac credit reduced taesby $440millionfrom2012to2015. Bcess tac benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $1.497bi 11 ion from2008 to 2015. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA QuantaServices: Thecompany reportsnoncontrolling interest inoorre in 2009 througi 2015. Pretax incomewas adjusted toaclucte this income. Fteported pretax inoorre in 2015wasadjusted upward foranon-cashgoodwill impairment The DomesticPrcducticn Activities Deduction reduced taes by $43.8million from2008to 2015. Bcess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $10.5 million from2008to2015. Quest Diagnostics: The company rqxirtencnccntrcfl interest income in al I eigit ^ears Pretax incomewasadjusted toaclucte this income. Deferred taes reduced thecompany's tac ratesl ight ly in most ^ears Bcess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $26.3 million from 2008to 2015. R.R. Donnelley&Sons: The company reports noncontrolling interest income inall ei^it\eas Pretac income wasadjusted toaclucte this inoorre. Inoomewas adjusted to reflect thetimingof restructuring cta^ payments in all eicfit ^ears Thestudy adjusted reported pretac income upward for non-cash goodwill impairment charges ineech \earfrom2008throucfi 2012and in 2014. A turnaround of deferred taesecplainsthe hyi rate in 2009. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taes by $382 million from2009to 2015. Bccess tac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $23 mi 11ion from 2008to 2015. Raytheon: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation taxcredit reduced taes from2008 to 2015by$406.4million and $221.1 million, respectixrely. Bcess tax benefitsfromstockoptions reduced fecteral and state taes by $224mi 11 ion from2008to 2015. Reinsurance Group of America: Deferred taesexplain the company's lew rates in most \ears. The high rate in 2009 is explained byaturnaround ofdeferred taes Bcess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $126 million from2008to2015. RelianceSteel & Aluminum: Becausethecompany does not disclose US and foreigi pretax income for2008, the study estimated foreigi pretax income in that ^ear based on reported current foreigi income taes The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taesby $48million from2008to 2015. Bcess tax benefits from stockoptions reduced fecteral and stale taesby $15.7 million from 2008to The35FferogntCorporateTaclVlyth 68 ED_001523_00000854-00073 2015. Pretax inoorre in 2013and 2O15w0sadjusted ipwad for non-cash impairrrentsof indefinite-lived intangibleaets Reynolds American: Sported pretax profits in 2008 through 2013 v\ereadjusted ipwad for non-cash impaiirrentscfgocdwillar^^ Inoorre wes adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring cha^ payments inall eight years. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduoed taxes by $495 million from2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taxes by $ mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. Rockwell Autonation: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in September of the years listed The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $63million from2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefitsfrom stockoptions reduced federd and state taxes by $154 mi 11 ion from 2008to 2015. Rockwell Collins: TheDorresticProduction Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation taxcredit reduoed taxesfrom2008to 2015 by $1202mi 11ion and $192.8 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $71 million from 2008to 2015. RossStores: Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $173.9 mi 11 ion from2008 to 2015. RyderSystem: Accelerated dqireciation explains most of the company's tax breaks in most years. Exoess tax benefits from stockoptions reduoed federal and state taes by $13.7 million from2008to2015. SAIC: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in January fol Icwing the yeas I isted. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction and the research arfo experimentation taxcredit reduoed taxesfrom2008to 2015 by $22 mi 11ion and $42 million, respectively. Bxcess taxbenefits fromstock options reduced fecteral aixl state taes by $116 mi 11 ion from2008to 2015. Scana: Deferred taes, primarilyaoeeferated depreciation, explain the lew rales in most years The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $56million from2008 to 2015. Sempra Energy: Theoompany reportsnorcontrolling interest income inall eight years Pretax incomewasadjusted to exclude this inoorre. Deferred taxes, primarilyaccelerated 69 InstituteOTTaxatimarriEcnr^ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA depreciation, explain the lew rales in most yeas. Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taxes by $52million in2015. Sherwin-Williams: The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduoed taxes by $1589mi 11 ion from2008to 2015. Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $3629from 2008to 2015. Sonic Automotive: Reported pretax profits in 2008were adjusted foragoodwi II impairment Southern: Tteoompany'slcwratesprirra'ilyreflecls deferred taes Accelerated depreciation saed theoompany substantial aroints in al I eight yeas. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taes by $182and $10.9million in2009and2008. Southwest Airlines: Theoompany's lew rales in most yeas primarily reflect deferred taxes Acoelerated dqcreciation was the most common souroe ofdeferred taxsa/inep in each year. Thehigh rate in 2015 isexplained bya turnaround of deferred taxes. Spartan Nash: The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduoed taes by $0.8 million from2011 to 2015. Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral aid state taes by $5.4 mi 11ion from2008to 2015. Spectra Energy: Thecompaiy reportsnonoontrolling interest inoorre in al I eight years Pretax incomewasadjusted toexdude this inoorre. Theoompany's lew ratesprimarily reflect deferred taes Accelerated dqcreciation was the most important source of deferred taxsa/ings in most years The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $25million from2008 to 2012. Staples: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend in January following the yeas listed. Thecompany'shigh tax rate in 2009 reflectsa turnaround of deferred taes, mostly related toaccelerated depreciation. Bxcess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $24 million from2008to 2015. StateStreet: Theoompany's high tax rate in2008 reflectsa turnaround of deferred taes, mostly related toaooelerated depreciation. Deferred taeswereprimarily responsiblefor the company's lew rate in 2009. Bess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by$186 million from 2012to2015. ED_001523_00000854-00074 Synnex: Thecompeny'sfiscal ^earends in November oftte \ears listed. A turnaround of deferred taesexplains the company's hicfi tax rate in 2008. Excess tax benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taxes by $44 mi I lion from 2008to 2015. Target: Theoompany's fiscal ^earsend in Fdoruary following the years listed. Deferred taxes, primarily accelerated dqoreciation, explainsvirtuallyall of Target's tax breaksfrom 2008 to 2012. Tech Data: Theoompany'sfiscal yearsend inJhnuary following the ^ears listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $11.4 million from 2008to 2015. Texas Instruments: TheDorresticProduction Activities Deduction and the reseachandexpeimentaticn taxcredit reduced taxesfrom2008to 2015 by $477mi 11ion and $459 million, respectively. Excess taxbenefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $365million from2008to 2015. Thermo Fisher Scientific: TteDomesticProductbn Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $236.5 million from 2008to 2015. Eeess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal arfo state taes by $243.8mi 11 ion from2008 to 2015. Time Warner: Thecompany recorded restructuring cter^sinalleigit\eas,andttestudymadeadjiBtrrentsto pretax incorreeech\ear to reflect thetimingofpayments. The study also adjusted2008 inoorre ipvo'd fora noncesh goodwill impairment. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $848 million from2008 to 2015. Eeess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $625mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. Time Warner Cable: Thestudy adjusted 2008 income upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment Excess tax benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $474millionfrom2008to2015. TJX: Theoompany's fiscal \earsend in January following the ^ears listed. Thecompany reduced its tax rateby deferring taes in each \ear. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $415.4million from2008to 2015. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA T ractor Supply Company: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $147.9 million from 2008to 2015. T ravelers Cos.: Because the company did not disclose US and foreign pretax inoomefor2008, thestudyestirrated foreign pretax income based on rgnorted current foreign income taes Eeess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $243.5mi 11 ion from 2008to 2015. Tutor Perini: Thestudy adjusted 2012and2008 income upward for non-cash impairmentsofgoodwill and other intangible assets The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taes by $14.9 mi 11 ion from 2011 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $2.9 mi 11 ion from 2008to 2015. Twenty-First Century Fox: Thecrimpanywesformerly known as News Corporation, ported profits in 2008and 2011 wereadjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairment cta^s Thecompany reports nonoontrolling interest income in al I eigit ^ears Pretax incomewasadjusted toaxdude this income. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby$372.7million from2012to 2015. U.S. Bancorp: Pretax income wasadjusted ineach^earby replacing thecempany'snon-cash "provision for credit losses" with actual "charcpofls, net of recoveries" Thisadjustment increased pretax income in 2008througi 2010, and reduced income in 2011 through 2015. Thecompany reports nonoontrolling interest income in each ^ear. Pretax income wasadjusted toexdude this income/ loss The Company has investments in Variable Interest Entities (VIB) that generate low-income hexsing taxcreditsand rehabilitation tax credits Restated in itstaefootnote, "theCompany's investments in theseentitiesaredesigned togeneratea return primarily throi#i the real ration offederal and state income taxcredits overspecified time periods" The company real rad federal and state income tax credits related to these investments of $8.774billion from2008to 2015. UGI: Most of tte company's tax breaksoomethrou^n tax sa/inep from accelerated depreciation and book/tax differences in regulatory assets Thecompany reportsa ncmontrolling interest loss in2012and noncontrolling interest income in al I otter\ears. Pretax inoorrewasadjusted toaxdude this income/ loss Eeess tax benefits from stock TtefecaitCorpnrateTacMyth 70 ED_001523_00000854-00075 options reduoed federal and state taes by $46.3 million from 2008to 2015. Union Pacific: Accelerated depreciation aooountsfbrmuch of the company's tax breaks Exoess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $554 mi I lion from 2008to 2015. United Natural Foods: Bicess taibenefitsfromstock options reduced federal and state taes by $13.9 million from 2008to 2015. United Parcel Service: Retex income in2012was adjusted upvodsforamarfr-to-mar^ dqcreciation saved theoompany substantial amounts from 2008 to 2012. Exoe tax benefits from stock options reduoed federal and state taes by$18million from2008to 2012 United Stationers: Pretax profitsfor2010and 2011 were adjusted for the actual uti I ration offre company's restructuring reserves, which increased prtai profits in 2010 and decreased them in 2011. Pretax inoorre in 2015 was adjusted ipwad for non-cash npairrrentsofgoodwill and otter intangible assets Exoess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal arfe state taes by $194 mi 11 ion from2008 to 2015. United Technologies: Exoess tai benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taes by $606 mi I lion from 2008to 2015. UnitedHealth Group: Pretax incorrefor2010was adjusted upward fora non-cash goodwill impairment charcp Beess tai benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taesby $127.1 million from2008to2010. Unum: Pretax incomewasadjusted for claim reserves in each of theeight ^ears This increased pretax income in2009 througn 2012and reduoed it in2008and 2013 througn 2015. Verizon Communications: Theoompany reports nonoontrolling interest income in al I eiit^ears Pretax inoorrewasadjusted toadudethis inoorre. From 2010 to 2015, wedisrecprded non-cash charges that Verizon booted to reflect reduoed assumptionsabout the future return on its pension and otter retirerent plans. Verizon itselfdisregards these non-cash charges in its Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA presentation, because they distort its real financial results In its 2010 report, the company changed itsaooounting method for 71 Instituted Ta^ionarriBuonomcRnlky I March2017 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA pensions, and retroactively restated its pretax profits for2009 and2008. The restatement had I ittle effect for2009. For2008, our report uses the profitsactually rgoorted in the company's 2008 report. Accelerated depreciation and amort ration comprised most of theoompany's taxsubsidies ln2008and again in 2010, the company divested substantial assets usinga technique known asa "reverse Morris trust" transaction, sa/ingan estimated $1.5 billion in federal andstate income taxes. VF: Prtai inoomefor2009,2010,2014and2015was adjusted upward for non-cash impairmentsofgoodwill and other intangibleassets The relatively hign tax rate in 2010 compared to the prior two \eas isexplained by the turnaround ofamortration deductions, theaocrual of compensation not \et deductible, and an increase in net operating losses not yet utilized. Exoess tax benefits fromstock options reduced federal and state taxes by $287.4 million from 2008to 2015. Viacom: Thecompany'sfiscal yearsend inSfeptonter of the \ears listed. Before2010, the fiscal \earsencted in Deoarber, so fiscal ^ear2010 tee only 9 months for Viacom. The oompany'soomparatively hii tax rates in 201 Oand 2014 reflect a turnaround of deferred taxes related toaooelerated depreciation. The DomesticProduction Activities Deduction reduoed taxes by $595 million from 2008to 2015. Exoess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral andstate taxes by $274millionfrom2011 to2015. Visa: Pretax incomewasadjusted inall eight \eas to reflect thetimingof payments related to Iiticption charges The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taesby $264million in2014,$191 million ofwhich was related to prior fiscal ^ears Exoess tax benefits from stock options reduoed fecteral and state taxes by $358mi 11 ion from2009to 2015. W.R. Berkley: Because theoompany does not discloseUS and foreign prtai income, thestudy estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. Sported total current inoorre taxeswereadjusted in order to separate federal and state taxes The lower rate in2010was primarilya result of unreal rad investment cpinsthat were recorded for book purposes but ae not yet taxable and the deductibility of loss resaves that were recorded as book penses in prior^ears ED_001523_00000854-00076 W.W. Grainger: Excess taxbenefitsfromstockoptions reduced federal and state tares by $289.5million from2008to 2015. Walgreens: Thecompany'sfiscal ^earsend in August oftte years I isted. Accelerated depreciation and book/tax differences in accounting for inventorysignificantly reduced tine company's rate in2009. Wal-Mart: Theoompany's fiscal ^earsend in January following tte^eas listed. Accelerated depreciation saved the companysubstantial amounts in2008through 2011. Walt Disney: Thecompany'sfiscal ^earsend in Octoberof the^ears I isted. The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $1.481 billion from2008to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $1.145 bi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. Wte Management: Rqcorted pretax inoorrewas adjusted inward in 2013througn2015fornon-cash impairments togoodwi II and the carrying value of oil and gas properties Thecompany'sbig^st taxsiteidy is related to the accelerated dqcreciation of property, plant, and equipment. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $69 mi 11 ion from 2008 to 2015. WEC Energy Group: Thecompany wasfonraly known asWisconsin Energy. Accelerated depredation saed the companysubstantial amounts in al I e^nt ^ears The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $54 million from2008to 2012. Wells Fargo: Becaee thecompany does not disclose US and foreign pretac income, thestudy estimated foreign pretac income based on rgcorted current foreign income taxes Pretac incomewasadjusted by replacing theoompany's non cash "provision for loan losses" with actual "charge-ofis, net of reoo^ries" Thisadjustment reduced pretax profits in 2010 througn 2015and increased than in 2008and 2009. Accelerated dqcreciation saed thecompany significant amounts behAeen 2008and 2012. Exres tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $1.72billion from2008to 2015. Wesco International: The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $5 million from2008 to 2012. Excess tax benefits from stockoptions reduced federal and state taxes by $42.3 million from2008to 2015. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA Westrock: Thecompany'sfiscal ^earsend inSeptemberof the^ears I isted. V\festrock is the product ofa 2015 merger between Meadwestvaoo and Rock-Tenn. Accelerated depreciation explains most of the company's lew tax rates The DorresticProduction Activities Deduction reduced taxes by$20millionand$3million in2015and2014.Bccesstac benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taxes by $66million from2008to 2015. Whole Foods Market: Because thecompany does not disclose US and foreign pretax inoorre, thestudyestimated foreign pretac income based on rgcorted current foreign inoorre taes Breess tax benefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state taes by $138.8 mi 11 ion from2008to 2015. Williams: Thecompany reportsnonoontrolling interest income from2008to 2014andanonoontrolling interest loss in 2015. Pretax inoorrewasadjusted toexducte this income/loss Sported pretax profits in2010and2015were adjusted ipvo'd for nonesh goodwill impairment charges Thestudy also reversed non-cash impairments for the carrying value of oil and cps properties in 2008,2009and 2010. Windstream: Theoompany's Icwtax rate in most ^ears is almost entirely drhen by theacoelerated depreciation writeofls they enjoy on theirproperty, plant,andequipment. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taes by $18.9 million from 2013to 2015. From 2011 to 2015,we disregarded non-cash charges that thecompany booked to reflect reduced assumptionsabout the future return on its pension and other rati rerrent plans Wyndham Worldwide: Pretac incomefor2008was adjusted upwa'd for non-cash goodwill impairment charges Thestudy adjusted US pretac inoorre by replacing the company's provision for loan losses with actual charges net of recoveries Bccesstac benefitsfromstockoptions reduced fecteral and state tares by $131 million from2008to 2015. Xcel Energy: Theoompany's low tacratesarealmost enti rely driven by theacoelerated dqcreciation writeoffe they enjoy on their property, plant, and equipment. Yum Brands: Pretac income for2009wasadjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairment charges Excess taxbenefits from stock options reduced fecteral and state tares by $472 million from2008to2015. The35FferoentCorporateTa<IVIyth 72 ED_001523_00000854-00077 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA BY LI A TUG ER /Consumer Watchdog August 2016 ED_001523_00000855-00001 TABLE OF CONTENTS BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 2 3 7 8 9 1 0 1 2 1 3 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 3 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TIMELINE BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS - ALL IN THE FAMILY - LITTLE SISTER - STACKING THE P UC - THE FERRON FACTOR - BROWN'S "HANDS" -DEREGULATION - C H A RT- B R0 W N ' 8 HANDS: AN INSIDER NETWORK - LUBRICATING BIG OIL FOR BIG BUCKS - FRACKED UP - SEVERANCE DOWN - A CHANGE IN CLIMATE: SB 350 - UTILITY FAVORS - RELIABILITY FOR DECADES TO COME - BR OWN' S SECRETS CONCLUSION APPENDIX A - ENERGY COMPANY CONTRIBUTIONS-TOTAL APPENDIX B - TIMELINE OF ENERGY CONTRIBUTIONS AND FAVORS ENDNOTES 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED 001523 00000855-00002 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Governor Jerry Brown paints himself a foe of climate change. But an exhaustive review of company donations, publicly released emails and documents at PUCPapers.org.COUrt filings, and media reports show that fossil fuel and fossil fuel-reliant companies have supported Brown in close proximity to actions that he and his Administration have taken on their behalf. Twenty-six energy companies with business before the state greased the skids via $9.85 million in political donations to Brown's gubernatorial cam paigns, ballot initiatives, favorite causes such as the Oakland Military Institute and Oakland School for the Arts, and the Califor - nia Democratic Party since Brown's run for office in 2010, according to campaign reports. The three major investor-owned utilities, Edison International, parent of Southern California Edison (SCE), Pacific Gas & Elec tric (PG&E) and Sempra, parent of Southern California Gas (SoCalGas) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), contributed nearly $6 million of the total. The three utilities and Chevron also made the biggest donations of any energy companies to the State Democratic Party. Donations were often made within days or weeks of winning government favors. The evidence points to Brown and his operatives using the Democratic Party as a political slush fund to receive contributions in amounts greater than permitted to his candidate committee, and masking money from unpopular energy entities. The timing of donations suggests that the Brown Administration used the Democratic Party as a pass-through to Brown commit tees as reward for legislative or regulatory action on behalf of these companies. For example, at the end of December 2013, three months after weakened fracking legislation was chaptered, Chevron donated $350,000 to the Democratic Party. One week later, the party donated $300,000 to Brown for Governor 2014, while Chevron donated $54,400 to the campaign that day-...the maxi mum amount allowed. Weeks later, Brown came out against an oil severance tax, or well-head tax, that would have produced billions for the state's coffers. Chevron had long opposed the tax. These 26 companies have found support in the Brown Administration by virtue of Brown's own staffers. Brown's executive secretary Nancy McFadden, and his former cabinet secretary Dana Williamson, both held high-level positions at Pacific Gas & Electric. The Democratic Party paid them both for consulting and fund-raising services, while they worked for Brown. McFadden and Williamson worked for the Party at various times between June 5, 2013 and March 25, 2016, Democratic Party spending records show. Between 2011 and 2014, the energy companies gave $4.4 million to the California Democratic Party, while the Democratic Party donated $4.7 million to Brown's relection. This review helps explain how the Brown Administration, despite its public posture hostile to the oil industry, privately aided oil companies at key junctures while receiving major oil industry contributions. Brown quashed the oil severance tax as Democratic Party support built for it. He rejected a fracking moratorium. He refused a Senate compromise with Assembly moderates on the climate change bill, SB 350, to slash petroleum use in cars. Brown turned SB 350 instead into a Christmas tree for utilities by granting them billions in new business and entre into a vast, largely unregulated regional grid. Utilities responded in kind with big contributions. In this pay-to-play environment, ratepayers also got the short end of the stick. Under Brown, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) has granted the three biggest investor-owned utilities in the state more than a combined $130 bil lion in rate hikes approved from 2011 through 2015, according to PUC 748 annual reports. California tops the nation in excess electricity generating capacity. In the last few years, energy regulators have approved billing Southern California ratepayers alone at least $10 billion over the next two decades for four natural gas-fired power plants at Otay Mesa, Carlsbad, Huntington Beach, and Alamitos, locking the state into fossil-fuel natural gas instead of embracing renewable alternatives like rooftop solar and bat tery storage to avoid building new plants. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00003 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Energy Companies Have Given Big Dollars and Received Big Favors Southern California Edison donated SI30,000 to the California Democratic Party on the same day former PUC President Mi chael Peevey cut a secret deal with an SCE executive in a Warsaw, Poland hotel room to make ratepayers, not shareholders, cover 70 percent of the $4.7 billion cost to close the fatally flawed San Onofre nuclear plant. Peevey is now under criminal investigation for conspiring to obstruct justice by illegally engaging in and concealing ex parte communications, and inappropriately interfering with the San Onofre settlement process by pushing SCE to fund $25 million of greenhouse gas research at UCLA in exchange for the deal.1 In the media's glare, the case has been reopened. But Brown backed the dirty deal, telling Edison's CEO personally, according to an email by the CEO uncovered by the Public Records Act, that the Governor was willing to tell the media that SCE was acting responsibly and had done all the right things in closing San Onofre. Brown praised Peevey subsequently in a taped interview with the Mercury News where he called Peevey "a very effective leader" who "gets things done."2 Emails from PG&E's former top lobbyist Brian Cherry to his boss claim that Brown personally intervened with a PUC Com missioner to persuade him to approve a natural-gas fired power plant called Oakley for the utility. Ina January 1, 2013 email, Cherry described a New Year's Eve dinner with Peevey where the pair shared "a dram or two of Johnnie Walker Blue Label." According to Cherry, Peevey reminded him "how he and Governor Brown used every ounce of persuasion to get [PUC Com - missioner Mark] Ferron to change his mind and vote for Oakley.. .Jerry's direct plea was decisive."3 PG&E donated $20,000 to the California Democratic Party the day after the PUC voted for the project. An appeals court would later strike the PUC deci sion down because the utility had not proved the plant's necessity. PG&E's vice president Nancy McFadden was named Brown's executive secretary. PG&E gave $25,000 to the Democratic Party days before Brown's election. While Cherry and Peevey fed names to McFadden to appoint the critical swing-vote com missioner in February 2011 to the PUC who could cast pro-utility votes, PG&E donated $75,000 to the Party. The same day that Brown appointed ex-banker Mark Ferron to the commission, PG&E donated another $41,500. The appointment bolstered PG&E's sagging stock price and also lifted the value of up to one million dollars in PG&E stock options held by Nancy McFad den. Lawmakers sent Brown a package of six PUC reform bills in 2015 which would have increased oversight, transparency and accountability at the PUC, and received unanimous, bipartisan support. Brown vetoed the reform bills on October 12, 2015. One week later, PG&E donated $50,000 to the Democratic Party. In December, PG&E donated another $175,000 to the Party. Brown's climate change bill, SB 350, gave utilities a monopoly on electric vehicle infrastructure and large-scale renewable en ergy projects to the disadvantage of rooftop solar, which was never added to the state's renewable portfolio standard. Three weeks after an eleventh hour amendment setting the stage for utilities to have access to a regional grid, PG&E donated $80,000 to the Democratic Party. The utility donated another $50,000 two weeks after the bill was chaptered. Stock prices of California's three investor-owned utilities increased by at least 14 percent within two months. Occidental Petroleum's attorney, former Governor Gray Davis, successfully pressured Brown to fire two oil and gas regula tors who wanted oil companies to prove their wells wouldn't contaminate groundwater under federal law before getting waste injection permits, and had overhauled well safety to the disliking of oil companies. They had tried to enforce requirements for injection wells after a Chevron worker was killed when he fell into a sinkhole filled with oil waste. Two months later, Brown's new oil and gas supervisor granted Occidental a permit to frack in Kern County without an environmental review to protect aquifers, violating EPA standards. Four days after that, Occidental contributed $250,000 to Prop 30, Brown's effort to raise taxes. The same day of the contribution, Brown bragged about expedited permitting in Sacramento where he reaffirmed his support of all forms of energy development. "There are going to be screw-ups. There are going to be bankruptcies. There will be indictments and there will be deaths. But we're going to keep going," he said.' Occidental made a second $250,000 donation to Prop 30 seven months later. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00004 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Sempra donated SI 15,000 to the California Democratic Party a week before PUC President Michael Picker reversed a nega tive PUC decision and approved an SDG&E gas-fired power plant in Carlsbad. Chevron, which produces and sells natural gas in California, contributed S215,000 the day before the approval. The Carlsbad plant was approved without first considering renewable resources and energy storage. Former PUC President Peevey had long been working to pave the way for the plant, emails show. He had encouraged Sempra to lobby the city of Carlsbad aggressively. Onjanuary, 17, 2014, Peevey wrote Sempra's CEO about James Avery, SDG&E's chief development officer. " I just want you to know that Jim Avery did an outstanding job of managing the situation in Carlsbad, getting the city to support a new plant, etc. And he did it quickly. A tough assignment, very well done. My best."5 Power plant developer NRG wasn't a Brown donor until the company cut a sweetheart deal with the PUC to settle its case against NRG for electricity price manipulation, touted as a win by the Governor's office.6 The company agreed to spend $100 million out of a $120 million fine to install electric vehicle charging stations. The release quoted Peevey saying that the deal would "launch a virtuous circle" in which Californians would get comfortable driving EVs, while companies would invest in building the state's needed electric vehicle infrastructure.' "It will create jobs in California, help clean our air, and support at tainment of OUT greenhouse gas reduction goals," the release said. Brown simultaneously issued an executive order to reach the state's goal of 1.5 million zero-emission vehicles on California roads by 2025. The punishment looked a lot like a no bid contract. Two months later, NRGbegan donations to Brown, his causes, and his party that would come to <5105,000. A lawsuit against the PUC, filed by electric charging station competitor Ecotality, called the deal illegal because it awarded a monopoly to an out-of state company. As of 2015, NRG had not reached benchmarks for the work that was supposed to constitute their fine, and the PUC has not taken action. Brown's sister has profited from his policies toward Sempra, parent of SoCalGas and SDG&E. Sempra invited Kathleen Brown onto Sempra's board of directors in June 2013, after the utilities had enjoyed two and a half years of favorable treatment under her brother's governorship. Sempra paid Kathleen Brown a total of $691,300 in stock and cash for her work from 2013 through 2015. Brown's Administration has taken extraordinary steps to keep open Sempra's biggest natural gas storage asset in the West, Aliso Canyon, following the biggest methane gas leak from a well blowout in US history. Months into the efforts to stop the leak, Brown issued an executive order keeping any investigation of the causes and whether it could or should be shut down se cret.8 During Brown's Administration, Sempra's stock has risen 116 percent, the most by far of the three investor-owned utilities. Brown's sister Kathleen holds $749,000 worth of stock in real estate and oil company Forestar Group ... which owns 700 acres next to Porter Ranch where it plans to build a luxury home community, and another 1,000 acres of oil and gas interests in Cali fornia. She was on the board of directors, but stepped down one month after Brown issued his declaration of emergency at Aliso Canyon, which ensured secrecy around the investigation, and the true threat of the wells to the real estate value in the area.9 She now sits on the board of Renew Financial, a funder of renewable energy projects that stands to gain from new utility business spurred by legislation (SB 350) that increases renewables to 50 percent of California's electricity generation by 2030. In 2012, 16 energy companies donated $ 1.2 million to Prop 30, Brown's initiative to raise taxes. A large chunk of that sum came from just two companies, Occidental and California oil and gas producer Aera Energy. The passage of Prop 30 in Novem ber 2012 cemented Brown's national reputation as a budget-balancing governor after the election, likely saving the Brown Admin istration from presiding over persistent state budget problems and economic turmoil. Fracking legislation was introduced barely a month later, and the Brown Administration helped to dramatically scale it back. On May 24, 2013, Chevron donated $135,000 to the California Democratic Party. That same day, lawmakers exempted an common method of well stimulation from the fracking legislation. After the bill passed with an amendment dropping a morato rium on permits, Occidental gave $100,000 to one of Brown's favorite causes, the Oakland Military Institute. Brown signed the weakened bill. On December 23, 2013, Chevron donated $350,000 to the Democratic Party. On December 30, the Democratic Party donated $300,000 to Brown for Governor 2014, while Chevron donated the maximum to Brown's campaign, $54,400, on the same day. In early 2014, Brown then came out publicly to oppose a proposed oil severance tax. consumerwatchdog, org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00005 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Brown has protected the oil and gas industry and its fossil fuel-reliant clients via a coterie of regulators and key staff. Many of them walked through the revolving door of government to business and back again. Some feathered their nests during Califor nia's energy crisis, and some continue to do favors for one another. Current PUC Commissioner Liane Randolph was previously appointed by Brown as general counsel at the Natural Resources Agency, where she delivered ultimatums to the two oil well regulators ultimately fired by Brown for refusing oil company demands for weakened well safety standards. Previously, Randolph was an attorney at Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, where her clients included Chevron and the Western States Petroleum Association. Former PUC President Michael Peevey, currently under criminal investigation for secret backroom dealing with the utilities and rigging of proceedings that cost ratepayers billions, was a trusted Brown Administration confidante. The PUC in par - ticular has shielded companies from tough regulation and public investigations that assign blame and responsibility for disasters and near disasters, and that hold companies and their executives responsible. These key regulators have allowed utilities to raise connection fees and lower payments to customers who generate their own solar power, and have endorsed building new fossil fuel power plants even without proven need, eschewing renewablealternatives. Regulators have been willing to overlook utility negligence in accidents that put profits ahead of safety. They have protected utilities from fines that could have been much bigger, permitted more natural gas plants than necessary, and have scuttled or sup pressed public investigations into disasters and near disasters. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA consumerwatchdog, org ED_001523_00000855-00006 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 'I t - mKcteiii iB ACTION ' 1 ' ' " ' ' ' ' -1/5/11 DONATION......... n.... * f .. B : - ... , . -3/22/11 3/22/11 A 1 IIcBWIj bkI Bros h 4pp.mt jo , : , , , , . . 1< I ... >r -,|, . , , ' . 1 .............. ' 1 S in4nipiilaBBtt.;33MWW^ - 11/3/111/13/12 o': >.,' |/1E/n Bill '-< 1/25/12 mx r ( > . -3/23/12 OSMWBl B-.. 5/31/ 2 - bBI SIS/Wy^^ i ,, ,,. i,|( : 0^. nr9 : Ou du. miiiu' d;u, 1*1 C I'nsidctit 1`i-ewj cuts ., - 3/26/13" "3/26/13 J (..diforniu hetmu ralir J'urtc ill ,d with SCE i-sivutBi-. in War..., l'i>l.ifi<l, in Iwa ,.i ,0-..!, I.in p.m r- in i i>w "'0" , of ih S4.7 bilhmi i km o! <!o-uiu <h< ... .... San Oiiufri.' ihkIc.ii plain. mi' , . < I < > .i I i ' in 5/20/13 5/24/13 5/24/0 /aelsing I................... . ? .... .... s - Soidd lhsoti .intioiiiiccs cio-un- ufsati ( hmfrr -6/7/13" i > > l.ii,,. f l-idi s!'. J 'i-'ip-.. - 6/18/13 'mT'.i l'.hn.n 7/2/13 j'. i. I .>.,! Ii, -9/20/13' 1(1/9 213 ,e BMKI 4 Of - << K *ir Gi 4 n-, . f O.i I,,, Miin,. h, >> m. i'. -mi ,i> .i . .u> isso,or . / IJsnaeratfe \ ....... ! . - 1/9/14 BB&xxx: S300/|00i i .. 12/30/13 SE Bwwn ioe iMwiriBt i#BB. - /- - fer oBWB .-wie 9/4/15 40 a Begiotts! gtii/ ailowoj fut wore piojets ifcipeoft 9/29/15 # Cilibnij, JSnacrtitIBny * . . *. 1 h -10/12/15 -10/22/15 ; 12/ 10/ 15 CaliforniM nocrauc Biitty wnsuman*2^^ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00007 FULL REPORT 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 8 All in the Family The Brown family has long been connected to fossil fuels and utilities. Some portion of the Brown family's wealth comes from Indonesian oil. It began with Jerry Brown's father,Governor "Pat" Brown, who after stepping down from office in 1967 helped Indonesian generals who had overthrown Sukarno, the dictator who had nationalized Royal Dutch Shell's oil holdings. Brown reportedly organized a consortium of banks to lend$ 12 billion to the military junta.10 The generals gave Brown control of a California oil trading company and half-ownership of a Hong Kong office. The offices earned a fee for each barrel traded, or as the Sacramento Bee's Dan Walters put it, got "a little taste, as they might say in the Mafia." When Chevron built an El Segundo refinery to bring in Alaskan crude during Jerry Brown's first administra tion, the state's Air Resources Board, run by Brown's former campaign manager, passed an air-quality stan dard for sulfur that Chevron couldn't quite meet with Alaskan crude, but that Indonesian oil could. That move helped secured the Brown family's oil wealth. The Brown family had ties with the utility industry too. Brown's late sister, Cynthia Kelly, wasmarried to Joe Kelly, a long-time top PG&E attorney.11 While Jerry Brown served as Governor in the 1970s and 80s, his father "Pat" also worked for Sempra's pre decessor, Pacific Gas & Electric and Pacific Lighting, to sell Californians on the alleged need for LNG from Indonesia, according to the Ventura County Star.1'2 Brown's fascination with fossil fuels is still evident. In 2014, he inappropriately directed his Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resources to map any oil or gas that might underlie his own family ranch and quickly received a 51- page report plus personalized satelliteimaged oil and gas drilling map for the area. Brown's State Oil & Gas Supervisor, Steve Bohlen, had made the mistake of emailing the report to Brown, creat ing an official record. When Brown found out, he threatened to fire Steve Bohlen, according to a lawsuit against the state filed by the R. Rex Parris law firm on behalf of Kern County farmers over rushing through waste injection permits for oil companies. Bohlen woundup resigning.13 consumerwatchdog, org ED_001523_00000855-00008 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 9 While there are no oil or gas prospects under Brown's ranch, he does have one investment that could grow in value thanks to a fossil fuel. Brown's Statement of Economic Interests reveals a real es tate investment in Edgewater Park Plaza, worth between $ 100,000 and SI million, that Brown shares in East Oakland with Phil Tagami, a friend and one of Brown's longtime financial supporters. Tagami won significant business with the city of Oakland when Brown was mayor. Now, Tagami's real estate company, Cal ifornia Capital and Investment Group (CCIG), which owns Edgewater, stands to make significant profit from a plan to ship coal out of the former Oakland Army Base. CCIG is developing part of the former base and has plans to lease a new terminal to a company that wants to ship coal from Utah to Asian markets. Brown has refused to answer local law maker and environmentalists' calls that he oppose the deal that would release coal dust along the East Bay transporta tion route, polluting the air and threaten ing public health. Little Sister Perhaps the most problematic family connection to the utility and oil business today is Jerry Brown's sister Kathleen Brown. In 2013, she left Goldman Sachs' Chicago office, where she chaired regional investment banking, for a Los Angeles partnership in the lobbying and law firm of Manatt Phelps & Phillips. Manatt represents energy companies among others. When Brown joined Manatt, The Wall Street Journal reported that Kathleen Brown was especially interested in the energy sector because it was undergoing "transformational change."15 That year Sempra, parent of Southern California Gas and San Diego Gas & Electric, invited her onto its board. Sempra wanted Kathleen Brown for "her extensive experience in both the public and private financial sectors, as well as in-depth knowledge of California government processes," according to its 2015 proxy statement. Brown sits on Sempra's environmental, health, safety and technology committee, as well as its corporate governance committee, and LNG joint venture and financing committee. Sempra paid Brown a total of $691,000 in a combination of stock, cash, and other remuneration for her directorship between 2013 and 2015, according to SEC filings.16 The environmental committee on which Brown sits would be responsible for pin pointing the reasons for the well blowout at SoCalGas's Aliso Canyon storage facility. She has reason to want to defend SoCalGas, given her position and size able Sempra investment. Her brother issued a carefully worded declaration assuring the public that a PUC "investi gation" was underway and that oil and gas regulators would perform a technical review of what went wrong. However, the review will release only the results to the public, effectively sealing evidence in the investigation from the public. No information about the review has yet been released. It has become imperative for the Admin istration to justify keeping Aliso open, not for reasons of energy reliability but for commercial priorities. Aliso Canyon markets itself as a place for big compa nies that buy natural gas when the price is right to store it there for a fee.17 But the Administration has played the "reli ability" card. Southern California Edison and other companies maintained that "the loss of natural gas to those [power] stations could ultimately lead to supply shortages and possibly electricity black - outs."18 Energy regulators produced a biased report, largely authored by Southern California Gas, stating that the state couldn't do without Aliso Canyon and could experience up to 14 days of blackouts this summer without it. The study left out that California has excess natural gas storage capacity, according to the Energy Information Administration, while utilities them selves report that natural gas usage is in steady modest decline.19 The report also left out other gas storage facilities that could substitute, and understated existing pipeline capacity to bring in gas on demand.20 At a California Senate hearing in May on Aliso Canyon, utility executives them selves began to back-pedal on the verac ity of the report's threat of blackouts. A Southern California Edison executive said, "the natural gas pipeline network in the LA basin was sufficient to meet demand" as long as the right amounts of gas were ordered at the right time, the Los Angeles Times reported.21 At the same time, one subject regula tors don't want to discuss is culpability for poor maintenance of wells at Aliso Canyon that led to the well blowout. Governor Brown ensured that Sempra's dirty laundry about its safety culture will never be aired. The only agency that can launch a formal public investigation is the PUC. Brown's declaration about the PUC investigation served to give regulators cover, with no timeline or obligation to inform the public whether any SoCalGas negligence played a role in the disaster. The PUC has declined to even accept a petition from Consumer Watchdog and the law offices of Aguirre & Severson to open a public investiga tion into the causes of the Aliso Canyon blowout, a violation of the California Constitution that guarantees the public the right to petition.22 By law, the PUC must accept a public petition and rule either for or against a public investiga tion. They are doing neither. consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00009 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 10 Meantime, Sempra's stock has risen 116 percent under the Brown Administra tion, according to Bloomberg. Kathleen Brown has one more invest ment that makes the situation even more fraught. As of mid-2015, Kathleen Brown held $ 749,000 worth of stock in a real estate and oil company called Forestar Group, according to Bloom berg. She became a company director in 2007, resigning in 2016. Forestar Group's2014 annual report specifically targeted increased regulation as a threat to royalties earned from its oil-rich land dueto the impact on "the timing and cost of extractive activities." Forestar, which owns 1,000 acres of oil and gas interests in California, also owns 700 acres of land next to Aliso Canyon and is planning a 285-acre luxury home community called "Hidden Creeks Estates" near Porter Ranch, the commu nity most affected by the well blow out at Aliso Canyon. Forestar would have an interest in promoting the idea that the natural gas storage field, studded with wells as old as a century, is perfectly safe for natural gas injections, in order to preserve and maximize the value of its investment. Kathleen Brown resigned from that company's board a month after Jerry Brown declared a state of emergency at Porter Ranch in January 2016. She now sits on the board of Renew Financial, a funder of renewable energy projects that stands to gain from new utility business spurred by Governor Brown's signature on legislation (SB 350) that increases renewables to 50 percent of California's electricity generation by 2030. Stacking the PUC When Brown took office in 2010, it wasn't clear what he would do with the PUC. But he inherited a PUC President, Michael Peevey, who had been serv ing since he was appointed by Gover nor Gray Davis. Brown kept Peevey on; he had known him for years. He admired Peevey, comparing him to John There are going to be screw-ups. There are going to be bankruptcies. There will be indictments and there will be deaths. But we're going to keep going-" Brown onfracking and waste injection permits Bryson, Brown's PUC president during his first administration.23 Bryson, who went on to become Chairman, CEO and President of Edison International, SCE's parent, was one of the principal architects of the electricity deregulation disaster two decades ago.24 Peevey too was a cheerleader. Peevey had become an electricity broker after leaving Edison, leading the charge for deregulation in 1995, and had made millions of dollars off of it. According to an investor research analysis that year by Bernstein Research, "Brown is a close friend of commission president Mi chael Peevey, who has endorsed Brown's candidacy for Governor."25 In fact, right before starting his career at Edison, Peevey had worked from 1973 to 1983 as president of the California Coalition for Environment and Economic Balance, a non profit that Pat Brown had founded to make "environmental and economic balance a reality," according to its mis sion statement.26 Peevey's CCEEB leadership overlapped with Jerry Brown's first and second terms as California Governor. Under Peevey, in 1979, oil and gas companies and utilities, and later investment banks, funded an offshoot called the California Foundation for the Environment and Economy (CFEE). The foundation made a name for itself taking PUC officials like Peevey, state politicians, and utility executives on free domestic and foreign junkets where they could rub shoulders and cut deals about which ratepayers knew nothing and that were not neces sarily in their interests.27 Wall Street analysts at Bernstein Re search expected no change in the "cur rent leadership and policies of the Com mission" under Brown. Industry was clearly excited about Peevey's friendship with Brown. A 1977 photo of Brown with PG&E employees at The Geysers, the company's controversial geother mal field, showed just how far back that friendship went. It was forwarded to the PUC's executive director Paul Clanon in 2010. "This is a classic! Paul ... please for ward to Peevey. Thanks," read the email from PG&E's lobbyist Brian Cherry.28 With Peevey in place, Brown appointed two commissioners that were viewed as consumer-friendly. Wall Street was spec ulating wildly about who Brown would appoint and if they would be environ mental advocates. In mid-January 2011, Brian Cherry was already forwarding Peevey PG&E's own investment analysis warning that Wall Street banks were fretting that Brown's picks might not maintain a "balance" between the need for regulatory oversight while still allow ing utilities to earn a reasonable rate of return. Peevey's advice to Cherry in an consumerwatchdog, org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00010 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 11 email was: "You should find away to get this info to Brown as he makes his deci sions on Commissioners ASAP. Probably best coming from a non- utility source, such as investment bankers)." In re sponse Cherry wrote Peevey: " Done."29 Nevertheless, on January 25, 201 1, Brown appointed Michael Florio, a former senior attorney for The Util ity Reform Network, and Catherine Sandoval, a law school professor. The day after the appointments, on January 26, 2011, PG&E's investment analyst reported continued UBS and Deutsche Bank speculation on California utilities, including whether Peevey would remain president and if the third commissioner Brown picked would make the PUC far too consumer-oriented to the detriment of investors. Onjanuary 27, 201 1 the senior invest ment analyst at PG&E reportedJP Mor gan had downgraded PG&E and Edison stock from a "buy" to "hold." Nancy McFadden, whom Brown had hired as his Executive Secretary in charge of appointments, legislation, and policy from PG&E where she was execu tive vice president, had her own interest in the price of PG&E stock. She joined Brown's staff with a $1 million cash bonus from PG&E and up to $ 1 million in PG&E stock options. The utility, a big Democratic Party donor, had given $25,000 to the Democratic Party days before his election. When PG&E's stock was downgraded following the Florio and Sandoval appointments, Peevey advised Cherry, "This information should go to the Governor's Office, probably best to Nancy McF. Jerry has to be made aware that actions have consequences and the economy is best off with a stable utility sector, "so Emails produced by the Public Utilities Commission through Public Records Act requests show Cherry and Peevey call ing McFadden the utility's "back door route" on PUC appointments.31 Evi dence shows that McFadden intervened in the decision on whom to appoint to the CPUC, though public officials are prohibited from using their official positions for personal financial benefit. Cherry wrote Peevey, "Nancy asks if you have any names you would recommend. You can call her directly if you like."32 In March 2011 Jerry Brown appointed a long-time investment banker, Mark Ferron, formerly of Deutsche Bank, to the PUC. A pro-utility majority on the commission was assured. PG&E's sag ging stock jumped, benefitting McFad den as much as it did PG&E. A conflict of interest complaint filed in early 2016 by Consumer Watchdog with the Fair Political Practices Commission about McFadden's improper involve ment in the appointment fell outside the statute of limitations, although McFad den is being investigated for her failure to fully disclose her stock holdings in PG&E. ' Arnold Schwarzenegger's chief of staff, then a consultant to McKinsey, Alston & Bird and other well-heeled outlets, and started her own consulting firms, Caliber Strategies, and SPK Consulting. PG&E would be a client. Brown's next picks for the PUC would also be influenced by Kennedy, via McFadden, to ensure that a majority of commissioners would con tinue to vote in the interests of industry. As Peevey fomented scandal, Brown would appoint Michael Picker, a former aide and another product of the revolving door to the PUC, to replace Ferron in 2014. Picker's association with Jerry Brown and friendship with Susan Kennedy went way back; Kennedy told Jeff McDonald of the San Diego Union Tribune that Picker had been her "very first boss in politics" when she came to California a quarter of a century ago. 34 Picker served as deputy assistant for toxic substance control under Brown in 1981. McFadden herself was a product of the revolving door, first working as a senior advisor to Governor Gray Davis, before taking a job at PG&E, and then working for Brown. She didn't land the Brown appointment as Executive Secretary by chance. In the Davis administration, McFadden worked under Susan Ken nedy, a long-time political hand who had been executive director of the Cali fornia Democratic Party. Kennedy was Davis's cabinet secretary and handled the worst of the California energy crisis by pushing legislators to arrange the sale of billions in bonds to buy power, and advocating to hike rates to save the utili ties. McFadden was her protg. After Davis appointed Kennedy to the PUC, McFadden left for PG&E. According to one insider, Kennedy had arranged for McFadden to get the job at PG&E in government relations. In 2006, after three years as a PUC com missioner working alongside Michael Peevey, Kennedy became Governor 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00011 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 12 He would go on to be chief of staff for Sacramento Mayor Joe Sernajr., and found Lincoln Crow Strategic Commu nications, a policy, media and campaign strategy group, in 2000. When Ken nedy became Schwarzenegger's chief of staff, she hired Picker as an advisor on renewable energy, and passed him on as an advisor to the incoming Brown Administration. Brown would make Picker PUC President once Peevey stepped down under a cloud of corruption at the end of 2014. Picker would continue to run the PUC in Peevey's image. Peevey, and then Picker, would push a building spree of fossil fuel-fired gas power plants. In 2013, Robert Weisenmiller, elevated by Brown to Chair of the California Energy Commission, maintained that natural gas was "the operational glue" of the California grid.35 The Ferron Factor The appointment of ex-Deutsche Banker Mark Ferron to the PUC served as a vaccination against tough enforce ment. Emails and other documents at PUCPapers.org reveal that Ferron was far more interested in delivering guaran teed, gold-plated rates of return to Wall Street and shareholders than he was in regulatory oversight. Ferron and other commissioners and high-level staffers met with Wall Street analysts regularly and discussed pending business before the commission. In one such exchange, between a Morgan Stan ley banker and Ferron on September 26, 2012, the banker confirmed a broad and detailed list of questions to pass along to all the commissioners who would meet with him for three hours. Prior to that meeting, Ferron wrote Morgan Stanley that he had one "stipu - lation"--that he be put on the distri bution list for research on California utilities.36 The quid pro quo was the free provision of exclusive reports so Ferron could track Wall Street's view of the financial health of utilities in exchange for information on how the PUC was ap proaching specific rate and enforcement cases and other business. Among the questions, Morgan Stanley wanted to know what the "hold up" was for a Southern California Edison rate hike, where the "various" investigations into PG&E's deadly San Bruno explo sion stood, and if regulators were plan ning to come to settlement.37 In a memorandum to other commission ers on October 3, 2012, Ferron made the case that holding SCE and PG&E responsible for these disasters would af fect investor perception of California as an "unfriendly place."39He claimed that this would lead to a higher "risk pre - mium" on borrowed money for utilities, which would "cost ratepayers multiple billions in added expense." Morgan Stanley's analysis of the Cali fornia visit, emailed to a select group on October 4, 2012, said, "The key takeaway from our meeting with all the Commissioner offices at the CPUC is that regulation will remain balanced." Ferron and others had evidently signaled that PG&E would not face excessive fines for its lethal San Bruno pipeline ex plosion. "A settlement relating to the San Bruno explosion is progressing" Morgan Stanley wrote. "We believe our $500mn fine estimate remains appropri ate." On the San Onofre scandal, the PUC appears to have told Wall Street not to fret. "Conversely, a San Onofre investi gation is likely, but the CPUC appears to be reserving judgment on the cause/ recovery. As a result we do not expect a near-term EPS [earnings per share] hit to EIX/SRE [Edison International/ SCE]" the analysis continued.38 A PUC administrative law judge would go on to cancel the last phase of the public inves tigation into who was responsible for the radioactive steam leak that permanently shuttered the facility. Ferron reinforced the tradition Peevey had begun in appeasing Wall Street. In a 2010 email, Brian Cherry praised Peevey's performance in a videoconfer ence and Q&A with a Morgan Stanley analyst. Peevey had told bankers that he had no plans to "shrink" generous rates of return, and that low fuel prices meant utilities had extra money to engage in "asset development initiatives." No rate payer refunds were in the offing. Cherry wrote in an email to Peevey, "Looks like your interview got rave reviews."40 Peevey initiated Michael Picker into the ways of Wall Street as well, asking bank ers to arrange a trip to New York for him. In June 2014, Picker went on a per sonal Wall Street road show, complete with a banker-supplied sedan, for a "full day of 1x1 meetings + intimate group meeting."41 On the list were ten invest ment companies, including Goldman Sachs and Prudential. Picker continued to meet with bankers like UBS in Sacra mento. In August 2014, Picker wrote an email expressing "my deep gratitude" to 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00012 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 13 UBS honcho Julien Dumoulin-Smith, "whose many research products already reach my inbox in great profusion daily." Dumoulin-Smith would later write, "It's been described that you are cut from a different cloth from other CPUC folks. I tend to agree." He thanked Picker for his "insight," calling it a "refresh ing change from a lot of folks we meet with." Experts, including the National Consumer Law Center's Charlie Harak in an interview given to the San Diego Union Tribune, say there is no reason for regulators to meet with investors or rat ing agency analysts, unless it's to extract inside information. A cache of Public Records Act emails and other documents available at PUCPapers.org show that Picker met with Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, UBS, and Credit Suisse representatives at West Coast spots like San Francisco's acclaimed Vietnamese restaurant, the Slanted Door. While Picker championed California utilities, PG&E, Sempra, and SCE donated heavily to the California Democratic Party. Sempra donated 865,000 to the party in May 2014, and Southern California Edison donated SI 30,000 in May and June, as Peevey made arrangements for Picker's visit to Wall Street. PG&E made a 825,000 donation to the Oakland School for the Arts on July 3, a week after Picker's visit, and donations to the party totaling 8435,000 between July and October. Brown's "Hands" Publicly released emailsconfirm that Brown remains loyal to old aides and associates, and tolerates their corruption. Michael Peevey, under criminal investi gation for his deal to require 70 percent of the cost of closing San Onofre to be paid by ratepayers, in exchange for a generous SCE grant to UCLA, was well known for quid pro quos.N favorite tactic was trading PUC support in regulatory matters for utility contributions to `non profit' organizations set up by Peevey and the utilities to fund extra-curricular PUC activities. According to Senator Jerry Hill, Peevey had approved the spending of a total of 8160 million in ratepayer money to create seven `non profits,' including the California Clean Energy Fund on whose board Peevey sat with PG&E appointees.43 Peevey had demanded that the utility contribute 830 million to the Fund as a condition of his support for PG&E's bankruptcy reorga nizationplan. Brown's hands would show up at a goodbye dinner for Peevey in February 2015. Susan Kennedy, Peevey's former fellow commissioner who had told him that she had been so "proud to be your wingman,"47 handled invitations and rsvps. Michael Picker, Peevey's successor at the PUC, was the official sponsor, who would report that various organizations paid at least 855,000 in sponsorships for the dinner.48 When Peevey decided to create a "PUC Foundation" that would raise money ostensibly for educational purposes, he demanded money from utilities to attend the fundraiser. PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E each bought a 820,000 table for the night ofJanuary 27, 2011. Brown had planned to attend. But as soon as San Francisco Chronicle columnists Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross panned the fundraiser as a way to create a slush fund to "pay for activities not covered by agency coffers," Brown was out.44 "Brown is not coming," Peevey emailed that afternoon to his friend, PG&E lob - byist Brian Cherry. "Too much stuffin the Chron Matier and Ross, editorial. Ugh."43 While he wouldn't be seen with Peevey in public that January night in 2011, Brown praised him to the San Jose Mercu ry News editorial board in a taped video interview in August 2014. "I would say he's a very effective leader, hegets things done." PUC Director of Policy and Plan ning, Marzia Zafar, recommended that PG&E's senior director of regulatory relations read the article and watch the video, according to an email from the PUCPapers.org. "The article in this weekend's San Jose Mercury .News features Gov. Brown talking about how great Pres. Peevey is but you have to watch the video to get a sense of Gov. Brown's con fidence in Pres. Peevey," she said. "The video is the best. He says that he has to go back all the way to his first term in the late 70s to find an equally effective leader for the PUC." The invitation read, "You're invited to join us in honoring Mike Peevey. A lifetime of service to the people of Cali fornia."49 By then his own staff, outraged by his facilitation of PG&E judge shop ping in a rate case and lax regulation of PG&E prior to the San Bruno disaster, described Peevey as "something like an untouchable mob boss."50 Brown would defend him to the last. Brown's sister Kathleen, Robert Weisenmiller, chair of the California Energy' Commission, Michael Picker who had assumed Peevey's position as PUC President, and about 200 other friends and energy industry contacts did attend the 250-dollar-a-plate dinner. Peevey was disgraced in public, but privately he was still very much in with the circle of Brown insiders who controlled the PUC. Deregulation A few of Brown's hands in attendance had profited from the energy crisis. I n fact, Peevey himself was one of the chief architects of California's deregula tion disaster. After leaving Edison, he founded New Energy Ventures in 1995. The electricity broker got paid by clients for a portion of what was saved on their energy bills. Unisource Energy, parent of Tuscon Electric Power, invested 840 million in the venture, and guaranteed another 826 million in debt.51 Shortly after Governor Pete Wilson signed deregulation legislation in 1996, Peevey complained that "the flood gates have not opened as much as I had hoped" when it came to commercial customers consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00013 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 14 peeling away from utilities to buy power from him.52 By 1997, he was touting cheap coal and nuclear power, as well as hydropower, to customers. He boasted about selling power from Quebec to a Rhode Island utility. "This historic sale and purchase signals the end of regulated monopolies in the electricity marketplace and the be ginning of customer choice, competition and lower energy prices," he Said.53 In 1999, he and his partners sold the firm for about $100 million to AES, the global power company that would feature in federal investigations of collu sion to drive up power prices during the California electricity crisis. Peevey and his wife, Carol Liu, then just elected to the state Assembly, had investments in AES, Enron and Unisource. They would sell more than $200,000 in PG&E and Edison International stock in 2000......just in time to avoid the worst of the crisis.54 In 2001, Governor Gray Davis turned to Peevey to help craft a way out of the crisis. Traders selling on the spot market had spiked electricity prices so much that the legislature passed a law putting the state in charge of buying power for SCE and PG&E, which were teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. Davis would assign Peevey to sort through and choose the bidders vying to sell power to the state, ultimately signing long-term power contracts for $43 billion.55 Utilities were allowed to bill customers $20 billion for "stranded assets," mean ing assets like nuclear plants they were unable to sell off prior to the energy crisis. Meanwhile, energy marauders gouged consumers in 2000 and 2001 for at least an extra $40 billion beyond the marginal cost of generating power, according to a 2003 report by the Public Policy Institute of California.56 Then, in 2002, Davis made Peevey president of the PUC-..... to reconsolidate utility control over power generation. One of his first acts would be to saddle ratepayers with an additional $8.2 bil lion to bring PG&E out of bankruptcy. Robert Weisenmiller, Former California Energy Commission advisor during Brown's first administration, founded MRW & Associates in 1986 to provide energy consulting to businesses, includ ing utilities. Peevey consulted Weisen miller on exemptions to get his clients out of paying a so-called "competitive transition charge" to pay for utilities' unmarketable assets, even if customers switched to different providers. "It's be come kind of a parlor game to guess who the ... exemptions are meant for and who else might try to use them for their own advantage," Weisenmiller quipped to the Public Utilities Fortnightly newsletter inl996.57 Mark Ferron, too, made money off the energy crisis. He worked for Deutsche Bank's London office from 1996-2009, the last several years as Chief Operating Officer overseeing all operations, includ ing energy investments. Deutsche Bank had been snagged in California's elec tricity crisis, from its lobbyists expressing interest in 2001 in buying California's grid to its Deutsche Bank Energy' Trad ing division paying a $1.6 million fine in 2009 to settle allegations of California market manipulation. After leaving Deutsche Bank he had settled in Mill Valley, California. Ferron founded the Silicon Valley Social Venture Fund that calls itself a "donor network" contribut ing its financial, intellectual, and human capital to "make a difference" in Silicon Valley and beyond.58 Ferron had also donated $25,900 to Jerry Brown's 2010 campaign, according to state records. Insiders would go on to award contracts to favorites, and bilk ratepayers. In 2012, the state settled a case over price manipulation during the energy crisis with power plant developer NRG that looked a lot more like a sweetheart con tract than a punishment8. The company agreed to spend $100 million out of a $120 million fine to install electric ve hicle charging stations. The release from the Governor's Office quoted Peevey saying that the deal would "launch a virtuous circle" in which Californians would get comfortable driving EVs, while companies would invest in build ing the state's needed electric vehicle infrastructure. "It will create jobs in California, help clean our air, and sup port attainment of our greenhouse gas reduction goals," the release said. NRG had never donated a dime to Brown, his causes, or the Democratic Party. That changed within two months of the settlement. The company would go on to donate a total of $ 105,000. Electric charging competitor Ecotality was so incensed that it filed a lawsuit against the PUC, calling the deal illegal because it awarded a monopoly to an out- of-state company. As of 2015, NRG still hasn't delivered on the work it prom ised. And under PUC President Michael Picker, the company has not been held accountable. Picker has continued in Peevey's foot steps. Under Picker, the PUC approved a spate of natural gas power plants for SCE when a boom in solar energy and other renewables and an oversupply of natural gas has raised serious ques tions about the state's need for them, especially when power plant capacity is currently underutilized.59 At the same time as SCE got its wish for new power plants, Kennedy was awarded a $100 million contract to install storage bat teries for the utility. She had chatted up Picker in emails about the technology she was developing. Companies like hers, she wrote, "are the pioneers who will bring these technologies to market by offering them to conservative utilities as a grid service."60 Her company, Advanced Microgrid Solutions, had star power, but little else. The company was cofounded with Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, a previous chair of the CEC who had worked for PG&E for two decades. The company had no track record or projects in the works, ac cording to SCE testimony given before a PUC law judge in 2015 on procurement plans. "We looked at the personnel as to whether or not they had the expertise to do what they said they would do," said SCE's Colin Cushnie, vice president of 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00014 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 15 BROWN'S hands: an insider network 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA consumerwatchdog, org ED_001523_00000855-00015 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 16 I would say he's a very e f f ective leader, he gets things done..." energy procurement and management at SCE. "Andin total, they were deemed to be sufficient to be able to make con tracts."61 Lubricating Big Oil For Big Bucks At the beginning of his administration, Brown appointed oil and gas regulators who were admired by environmentalists for their diligence. That soon changed under pressure from the industry. Gray Davis had served as Jerry Brown's chief of staff in the 1970s and 80s. As Occi - dental's counsel in 2011, Davis pres sured Brown to give the oil industry a break. According to depositions and declarations in the RICO lawsuit against oil companies, Brown, and the state, California oil and gas regulators were prevented by Brown's operatives from stopping oil waste injections into unpro tected aquifers. The regulators repeat edly warned that Brown's orders to skip provisions of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act and to dole out oil and gas in jection permits to oil companies without sufficient review would violate both state and federal laws protecting groundwater. In a declaration signed by Derek Chernow, former acting director and chief deputy director of the California Department of Conservation, Chernow described how he lost his job trying to protect that groundwater.62 "I under stood that one of my job duties was to ensure and improve California's com pliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act. This is a Federal law that requires protection of groundwater from under ground injections of waste water from oil production processes. This water...is so dirty, it cannot be used for hydraulic fracturing and must be disposed of in a manner that prevents it from migrating into fresh water." The need to protect groundwater became more urgent in 2011 when oil companies upped their requests for injection well permits. The US Environ mental Protection Agency had advised Chernow and his state oil and gas su pervisor, Elena Miller, that the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR) had no authority under state law to issue gas waste injection permits under the Safe Drinking Water Act. The California Independent Petroleum Asso ciation then sponsored a bill introduced by Senator Michael Rubio. later hired as Chevron's director of California gov ernmental affairs--to give DOGGR that authority. Chernow and Miller required wells to be remediated prior to injections, and the US EPA, which had audited California to ensure full compliance with federal rules on protecting water, agreed. Oil companies didn't want to hear that. They started pressuring Miller for per mits up front, with no testing, surveying or required environmental documenta tion. In early October 2011, Chernow de scribed a weekly meeting with Secretary John Laird of the California Natural Resources Agency. "During the meet ing, Laird took a call from Governor Brown," he wrote. "Laird finished the call and, when he hung up, he told me the Governor just received a call from Gray Davis who served as counsel for Occidental. Occidental wanted Gover nor Brown to fire me and the State Oil & Gas supervisor because of the alleged delays in permitting." Later that month, Brown's office re quested documentation about Occiden tai's waste gas disposal wells, operations, and permitting process, which Chernow supplied, stating in an email that he would be "willing to follow any direction as required..." On October 19, media reports appeared in which Occidental complained of being hurt by a hold up in permits. Chernow reported that Gov ernor Brown's office and his energy advi sor, Cli f Rfechtscha f f,enheduled a meeting with him around October 28, 2011. Future PUC Commissioner Liane Randolph, then deputy secretary and general counsel at the California Natural Resources Agency, attended the meeting where Rechtschaffen told the group that the Governor "wanted to do things a different way."63 He turned the meeting over to Randolph. "Randolph slid a piece of paper over to Miller and Chernow," the RICO complaint said. The document, called the "Temporary Assistance Program," looked a lot like what the petroleum industry wanted. It proposed that regulators approve injec tion well permits without complete engi neering studies or well casing diagrams. That meant oil companies would be allowed to inject contaminated waste water underground before any remedia tion of damaged well casings. "During the meeting Rechtschaffen stated that DOGGR must immediately fast track permit approval," Chernow stated in his declaration. consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00016 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 17 Chernow sent a memo to the Brown Administration about the proposal. He explained that the proposal violated both state and federal rules requiring complete review before injections started. Environ mentalists, he said, "will argue, correctly, that the laws...are intended to prevent damage before it occurs." In a meeting on November 2 attended by Miller, Chernow, Liane Randolph and natural resources undersecretary Janelle Beland, and which Rechtschaffen joined by phone, "Rechtschaffen started yelling..... he was angry about the memo randum... He further yelled at them that they had their orders," the lawsuit said. M i I ler told Rechtschaffen that the proposal violated the Safe Water Drink ing Act, and that the EPA had agreed that the proposal, passed on to them by Chernow, was modeled on the Western States Petroleum Association proposal that DOGGR had already rejected. "Rechtschaffen told Miller and Cher now this was an order from Governor Brown. He also notified Miller that she must make a public statement about the policy change," the lawsuit said. After Rechtschaffen hung up, "Randolph tried to reassure them and said it was their job to assume the Governor has a higher purpose. Randolph also told them that they were to do what the Governor sees fit even if they don't know the reason." The next day, November 3, Chernow was fired. Ultimately, the oil industry was allowed to drill more than 2,400 injection wells for the disposal of its toxic waste into the state's protected aquifers. They included aquifers with water clean enough to drink or use for crop irriga tion, according to the Sacramento Bee.M An Associated Press analysis found that 46 percent of those injection wells either got permits or began injections under Governor Jerry Brown.65 After Chernow was fired, Brown as signed Rechtschaffen to temporarily take over Chernow's job. Two months later in January 2012, Brown's new oil and gas supervisor granted Occidental a permit to frack in Kern County without an environmen tal review that should have protected aquifers. Four days after that, Occiden tal contributed 5250,000 to Prop 30, Brown's ballot initiative to raise taxes. It made a second 5250,000 donation to Prop 30 seven months later. Thousands of aquifers were ultimately polluted. The Administration has submitted an application to the US EPA for an exemption for fracking and waste dis posal into aquifers in San Luis Obispo's Arroyo Grande oilfield and is preparing another for the Round Mountain oil field in Kern.66 Fracked Up Oil money also shaped California's efforts to enact legislation to regulate fracking in the state and shut down plans to enact an oil extraction tax. Hopes had run high that Governor Brown would accept an outright ban on fracking in California. Not only did Brown oppose such a ban, disappointing environmentalists, but his office report edly significantly weakened legislation regulating fracking. The involvement of Brown's executive secretary Nancy McFadden, who held stock in Linn En ergy, a company that would benefit from less oversight, is the subject of a pending FairPolitical Practices Commission com plaint filed by Consumer Watchdog. Introduced at the end of 2012 by Sen. Fran Pavley, SB 4 would have regulated fracking through permitting, monitor ing of environmental effects, and public disclosure of fracking chemicals. March 2013 amendments included language to place a moratorium on fracking until the practice could be studied and deemed safe for the environment. The Western States Petroleum Association, Occiden tal, Chevron and other oil companies swung into action. Jerry's plea was decisive...." -former PG&E lobbyist Brian Cherry, now under criminal investigation, on Brown's lobbying ofa PUG Commis sioner to approve a billion-do liar natural gas-firedpowerplant that ajuebp would later determine was unnecessary. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00017 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 18 Oil companies did not want the legisla tion to expand to include lucrative and long-standing cyclic steam and steam flooding extraction techniques. Sources in the Capitol report that Brown Admin - istration officials, including McFadden, sought amendments to weaken the bill. By May 24, 2013, Senate amendments specifically exempted steam injection from the bill. Chevron donated SI35,000 to the California Democratic Party that same day. On June 8, the moratorium on fracking permits was dropped. Occidental gave the Governor 827,200 on June 29. After the bill was signed by the governor on September 20 Occidental gave another SI00,000 to the Oakland Military Institute on October 9. Between the bill's introduction and its chaptering, energy' companies had donated more than 8700,000 to Brown's campaign. McFadden reported holdings valued up to SI00,000 in Linn Energy when she began working for Brown, a company that would acquire Berry Petroleum and its 3,000 California fracking wells. lowed. Brown then came out against the oil severance tax in January 2014, just as Democratic support was building for a revived legislative and potential ballot measure campaign to enact a version of SB 241. "I don't think this is the year for new taxes," he said after he released his proposed 2014-2015 budget.67 "When I went up and down the state campaign ing for Proposition 30, I said it was tem porary and it is going to be temporary. I just think we need everything we can to live within our means before going back again to try and get more taxes." A Change in Climate: SB 350 SB 350 was introduced in February 2015. It doubled energy efficiency in buildings, and increased the state's renewable energy requirement to half of the state's electricity by 2030. It also proposed to slash in half the amount of petroleum to be used in cars. There was a lot for utilities to like. It gave them billions in new business updating the grid for electric vehicles and providing charging stations, and carte blanche for new renewable projects and transmission lines. It also allowed rooftop solar to be excluded from the new renewable energy standard. And an amendment in the last days of session opened the door to a regional Western grid where utilities could import and export electricity with little regulation. SCE donated 8130,000 to the California Democratic Party two weeks after SB 350 was introduced in February 2015. Within weeks of the September 2015 amendment to the bill authorizing Cali fornia's integration into a larger Western grid, PG&E donated 880,000 to the California Democratic Party. The oil industry spent millions lobbying to prevent a reduction in the use of pe troleum in cars, but Senate pro Tempore Kevin de Leon fashioned a compromise with moderates in the Assembly that included checks and balances on the Air Resources Board.68 It was Brown's eleventh hour decision to reject De Leon's compromise. Brown summed it Severance Down Save California, every other major oil producing state has a well-head, or oil severance, tax. SB 241 would have im posed an oil severance tax in California. The bill passed a Senate committee in May 2013 but was placed on the Senate Appropriations "suspense file" on May 20. If the measure had been enacted, it would have generated revenue gains of 8814 billion in 2013-14 and S1.5 billion in 2014-15. SB 241 was shelved just four days before Chevron's SI35,000 dona tion to the Democratic Party. In December 2013, three months after weakened fracking legislation was chaptered, Chevron donated 8350,000 to the Democratic Party. One week later, the Party donated another S300,000 to Brown for Governor 2014, while Chev ron donated S54,400 to the campaign that day...... the maximum amount al - cansumarwai^^ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00018 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 19 up like this: "No company wants to see its business cut 50% just because some governor of California says, `Hey, that's what we're going to do.'"69 That left lob byists and staffers close to the deal disap pointed, calling the decision inexplicable and wrong-headed. At the signing of the scaled-back bill, Brown said he planned to use his executive power through the Air Resources Board to keep rolling the ball forward, but a subsequent court decision raised questions about his abil ity to do so. Addressing lawmakers on why he did not want to add any limits on ARB, he said, "I love the Legislature but I don't want to entrust you with too much power."'0 But the bill Brown signed was a Christ mas tree for the utilities. A regional West ern grid has been a long-held goal of the utilities, dating back to electricity deregu lation. In 1996, PG&E vice president Jim Macias talked of "tremendous advantag es of having interconnection of states." The idea of a Western grid was a casu alty of the failure of deregulation, but Brown revived it in last-minute amend ments to SB 350 that created a study and road ahead for the concept. A Cali fornia Independent System Operator (CAISO) study supporting the concept was released in July 2016. Governor Brown was pushing legislation to estab lish the Western grid in the last month of the legislative session in August 2016, but was forced to pull back in the face of legislative opposition. The Western grid is a dream for utilities. Utilities would be able to continue to justify their traditional business model of building large power plants and other infrastructure paid for by ratepayers, while discouraging wide installation of rooftop solar and the adoption of smaller-scale battery storage technol ogy that could avoid the need for new gas- fired power plants. The shift to a Western grid also opens California up to the import of cheap but dirty coal-fired power, the pricing of which would be largely opaque to ratepayers. Berkshire Hathaway's PacifiCorp, a giant power producer running plants in six western states, is entering the market. A half a dozen other utilities are also lining up. According to its own factsheet, 62 per - cent of the power PacifiCorp generates comes from coal.72 One of the regulators who is backing this regionalization is Mark Ferron. After he stepped down from the PUC for health reasons in 2014, Brown reappointed him to the CAISO that manages California's electricity grid. It has sponsored about 190 transmission development projects since 2006 worth about S7.5 billion -virtually all of them to the financial benefit of investor- owned utilities that typically realize their highest guaranteed profit on transmission lines. According to a presentation that Ferron gave in March 2016, "west-wide coordination enables increased reduction in carbon emissions" and "consumers across the region will save millions of dollars per year."73 Utility Favors One of the biggest problems facing the Brown Administration in 2011 was what to do about PG&E in the wake of the le thal San Bruno explosion that had killed eight and levelled a neighborhood the year before. Brown himself apparently wanted to mitigate the damage. Emails released in 2015 by the City of San Bruno showed that Governor Brown's of fice choreographed statements by Peevey and Commissioner Mike Florio about the public investigation into San Bruno. The Governor's staff knew in advance about a pending statement from Florio, seen as more pro-ratepayer than others, and Peevey about the commission's consideration of a fine against the utility in January 2012, according to Jeff Mc Donald of the San Diego Union Tribune. "...Peevey and Florio are expected to issue a joint press release today stating their intent to work jointly to resolve the pending San Bruno and other investiga tions," wrote then PG&E vice president Thomas Bottorff to PG&E's chairman Anthony Earley. "Peevey will not be ceding control of the [investigation] to consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00019 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 20 "Occidental wanted Governor Brown to f ire me and the State Oil & Gas Supervisor..." Florio," the email said. "The Governor's Office is aware of and approved the joint statement."74 Susan Kennedy too was working to help PG&E. PG&E was a client of Kennedy's Caliber Strategies. A March 2012 email from Kennedy to PG&E lobbyist Brian Cherry indicated she had spoken with Peevey about the San Bruno explosion. "Peevey liked the idea of an indepen - dent forensic analysis," her email said. "New CPSD [Consumer Protection and Safety Division] director might present an opportunity to dump Overland," she wrote. Overland was an independent consultant who had audited the util ity after the explosion. It discovered that ratepayer money was used to pad executive bonuses and pay shareholders instead of for safety. 75 Kennedy did not succeed in dumping Overland, but it was clear that Kennedy was working to shield PG&E from scandal.76 Under the Brown Administration, PG&E was let off the hook for the diversion of ratepayer money.77 In May 2013, PUC staff recommended that PG&E pay $2.25 billion for failing to maintain its gas main in San Bruno. Behind the scenes, that fine was knocked down to $1.6 billion in 2015. PG&E was allowed to use most of the "fine" to pay for the very upgrades that customers had ostensibly financed through their rates for decades, but that the PUC and PG&E had never tracked.78 The PUC's Office of Ratepayer Advo cates, customers' only representation within the PUC, had said customers shouldn't pay a dime "given PG&E's mismanagement of its pipeline system and that customers have already paid for the costs of such pipeline mainte - nance and upgrades." Michael Picker defended the fine. "The purpose of a fine is todeter behavior," he told the Los Angeles Times's Ivan Penn in response to a question about the fine's size. " It's not revenge. We didn't want to fine them just to punish them."78 Brown also appears to have played an instrumental role in helping Peevey muscle PUC votes for fossil fuel projects that weren't necessarily needed. PG&E wanted to build the Oakley gas-fired plant, but Mark Ferron didn't think it was needed. According to a January 1, 2013 email from former PG&E lobby ist Brian Cherry to his boss, Cherry and Peevey spent New Year's Eve sipping Johnny Walker Blue Label. Cherry wrote, "he reminded me how he and Governor Brown used every ounce of persuasion to get [commissioner Mark] Ferron to change his mind and vote for Oakley...Jerry's direct plea ...was decisive. Peevey suggested that Tony [Earley, PG&E CEO] call the Governor personally and thank him."80 A day after the PUC voted yes, PG&E sent a S20,000 check to the California Demo cratic Party. In February 2014, an appeals court judge threw out the PUC decision on Oakley. The judge said that PG&E had not proven that a plant in Contra Costa County was needed. CAISO claimed that the plant would be needed by 2020 to back up wind and solar plants, but supplied no evidence to the judge. On top of that, no one from CAISO would testify in court.81 Brown also pushed for power plant op erator AES to renovate two natural gas- fired power plants in Huntington Beach for SCE, approved by the PUC, over the objections ofJ.P. Morgan, which controlled the rights to the plant's output. "Any attempt by JPMorgan Venture to stand in the way of this important con - tract should be soundly rejected," Brown wrote to the FERC on November 28, 2012.82 SCE had donated $50,000 to the Democratic Party on November 6, 2012. The evidence of Brown's intervention in the approval of unnecessary, pollut ing natural gas power plants and the continued flow of utility money into the coffers of the California Democratic Party and his own causes, raises trou bling questions about whether Brown has intervened elsewhere. On March 7, 2015, an administrative law judge at the PUC ruled against an updated S2 billion natural gas power plant at Carlsbad for SDG&E. Instead the judge said SDG&E could buy more power from wind and solar sources.83 On May 21, the PUC reversed that decision, which is now in litigation.84 Sempra made large dona tions totaling SI 15,000 to the California Democratic Party a week before the PUC reversal. Could Governor Brown have intervened there too? Reliability for Decades To Come In March 2013, Michael Peevey struck a secret deal in a Warsaw hotel room to put S3.3 billion worth of the S4.7 billion cost to close down defective nuclear gen erators at San Onofre onto ratepayers. He pressured SCE to give UCLA a $25 million grant to study global warming as part of the deal. The PUC gave SCE a wrist slap -- later fining Edison $16.7 million for failing to report the private talks. On June 6, 2013 Edison International CEO Ted Craver turned to Jerry Brown to defend the settlement and Peevey's consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00020 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 21 responsible for determining the need for power plants. Weisenmiller's letter was inappropriate. But all the regula tory agencies were working in tandem to satisfy Brown's apparent appetite for natural gas power plants to fill the void left by the shuttering of San Onofre, despite the fact that the state is required to up its energy from renewable sources to 50 percent by 2030. actions. Senator Barbara Boxer had evidence that Edison may have lied to federal regulators about what it knew of the faulty equipment before it was turned on, and she was demanding a criminal investigation.85 Craver reached Brown by phone as the Governor was meeting with President Obama at Ran cho Mirage. Afterwards, Craver emailed his board that Brown had "indicated a willingness" to tell the media that he thought the company was acting respon sibly and focused on the right things, Craver wrote. "He said what we were doing seemed right under the circum stances, good to reduce uncertainty... " Craver described Brown taking a "swipe" at the Nuclear Regulatory Com mission for "bungling the process which was going to cause harm to California." Craverwrote that Brown "fished for whether we were going to blast NRC or Boxer; I said, `No,' I didn't see any mile age in that."86 In a statement released the next day, Brown directed energy regulators to come up with a long-term plan ensur ing electricity "reliability for decades to come" in the wake of San Onofre's closure.87 In October 2013, Robert Weisenmiller told Mart Lifsher of the Los Angeles Times "that Brown cornered him in August and bluntly warned him to `make sure the lights don't go out down there' in Southern California."88 An industry publication, California Current got a hold of a draft copy of the long term plan and published it in September 2013. The plan indicated that SDG&E's proposal for the Pio Pico natural gas power plant in Otay Mesa and the Carlsbad plant was as good as approved. A reporter spilling the beans like that bothered regulators. California Current "makes it sound like Pio Pico and Carlsbad are done deals...wrote CEC advisor Kevin Barker to top regulators at the PUC, and the CAISO.89 "It'll be good to reiterate that these are options during the [energy policy] presentation and that it says timely decision for Pio Pico, not approval." In March of 2013 the PUC had re jected approval of the Pio Pico plant on grounds that it would not be needed until at least 2018, and that would leave room for enough renewable energy to come on line. Peevey went to work to reverse that decision. In February, 2014 the PUC approved Pio Pico after Peevey pushed it through with help from Weisenmiller, who wrote a letter sup porting the project at Peevey's request.90 The CEC is responsible for environ mental permitting of large thermal plants, forecasting state energy demand, promoting energy efficiency standards, renewable energy, and renewable transportation technologies. It is not By November 2013, the PUC would approve four new natural gas power plants for SCE, and another for SCE in Oxnard in May 2016. Each of those projects cost roughly $1.5 to S2 billion a piece and ratepayers will pay for them. The fundamental question remains whether these investments are really needed, or whether the state could have relied more heavily on solar power, including rooftop generation. In just the last three years, California's share of solar power production has jumped from under one percent to 6.7 percent in 2015, according to California's Inde pendent System Operator. That doesn't count rooftop solar and smaller com mercial installations. Battery storage is a technology ripe for utilizing to store renewable energy, and leaps in energy efficiency, and newtime-of-use rates, can also shave demand.91 Instead, under the Brown Administra tion, the amount of power that Califor nia generates from natural gas rose from 45 percent to 60 percent between 2011 and 2015, largely justified by the deci - sion to close San Onofre. Ironically, the CAISO estimates that a crash in natural gas prices means that the amount of money uti I ties can make off of sei I i ng electricity from natural gas power plants is substantially below their fixed costs.92 New gas-fired capacity "does not appear to be needed at this time," the CAISO wrote in a May report. The bad news is that Southern Californians will be paying at least $10 billion for the next 20 years for new natural gas plants whether they are needed or not. consumerwatchdog, org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00021 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 22 Worse, ratepayers are also picking up the tab for duds. In the wake of the energy crisis, the California legislature and regulators suspended a requirement that utilities must justify what they build as "useful and in use" before ratepay ers pay to jumpstart new power plants. Under Peevey, and then Picker, build ing new natural gas-fired power plants without having to prove demand became a convenient way to pad the pockets of utility shareholders. The Los Angeles Times has reported that Californians are paying billions of dol lars for the now-shuttered San Onofre plant, tens of millions for an Edison coal plant in Nevada that was found to be in violation of the Clean Air Act and closed, and more for never-completed PG&E transmission lines after partners pulled out or permits were denied. An upgrade at Aliso Canyon will cost SoCalGas customers another S200 million, whether the natural gas storage facility is shuttered as area residents want, or not. 93 Brown's Secrets Even as Brown has broadened the use of fossil fuels, he has tried to keep details of crooked deals under wraps. PUC President Michael Picker declined to reopen the San Onofre settlement despite the fact that a public investiga tion into the causes of the San Onofre leak was abruptly cancelled by a PUC administrative law judge, and despite the absence of a PUC determination on whether SCE acted reasonably in deploying defective steam generators in the first place. " I can't say I find a basis in the record to do that," Picker told the Los Angeles Times' Ivan Penn at the end of 2015. "I don't think it's the greatest settlement, but on balance it's a fair and reasonable settlement." 94 Under legal pressure and intense media scrutiny, the PUC was forced to reverse itself and reopen the case. But the PUC still refuses to release dozens of emails on the subject between Picker and the Governor's office, accord ing to attorney Mike Aguirre who has sued to get them. Brown has so far au thorized the PUC to spend SI2.3 million on outside counsel to prevent the emails release.95 It is unclear whether Brown even has the power to approve such spending. According to the California Department of General Services, the PUC signed contracts with private law firms that they were not permitted to ex - ecute, among a host of other problems. The audit by DGS found that the PUC didn't maintain required paperwork and paid vendors even when the work was not performed to specifications, accord ing to the Los Angeles Times. The report "referenced more serious issues that were not made publicly available," the Times wrote.96 ing Public Records Act denials to judicial review. But more substantive reforms from the 2015 legislation, including Superior Court review of PUC deci sions, are not included. Nothing in the proposed reforms would flip the PUC's priorities so ratepayers no longer take a backseat to investors.98 On October 12, 2015, Brown vetoed six bills meant to reform the PUC by making it easier to sue the commission, appointing an inspector general within the State Auditor's Office to oversee the PUC, and by requiring legislative review if the agency hired outside counsel for criminal investigations. He called many of the reforms "unworkable." They were no doubt unworkable for utilities. A week after the veto, PG&E donated $550,000 to the California Democratic Party. Two months later, it donated another SI75,000 to the PartyT Now, Brown is working with legislators on a proposal to revamp the agency that critics say is more cosmetic than substan tive. The plan targets low-hanging fruit, strengthening ex parte rules and subject consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00022 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 23 B ROWN ' 8 DIRTY HAND 8 CONCLUSION While Governor Brown has taken oil and gas companies to task over climate change, his Administration has helped oil companies that have contributed to his campaigns at key junctures: compromising well safety that led to the methane leak at Aliso by the firing of tough well regulators, stopping momentum for a well-head tax, permitting fracking to continue in the state, and deciding to abandon legislative reforms that could have reduced petroleum usage in the state. The oil and gas companies have funneled major contributions to Brown, often through the Democratic Party, in return for the favoritism his Administration has shown them. With regards to utilities, the corruption so well documented under former PUG President Michael Peevey, who is now under criminal investigation for his coziness with utilities, has continued through the Brown Administration, just in more surreptitious ways. Brown, his appointees and aides have protected the old guard at the PUG, the proliferation of fossil fuel powered natural gas plants, and utility investors. Utilities have responded in kind with large, well-timed donations. Twenty six energy companies that have contributed to Brown and his causes have shaped a legacy that is one of a governor who has time and again chosen the interests of dirty energy companies and their investors over the environment and the consumer. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA consumerwatchdog, org ED_001523_00000855-00023 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 24 APPENDIX A - ENERGY COMPANY CONTRIBUTIONS - TOTAL Prop 30 Props 1&2 Brown 2010 Brown 2014 California Oakland Military Oakland School Governors 2011 California State Democratic Party Institute for the Arts Inaugural Protocol Committee Foundation TOTALS Aera Energy 1 $300,000.00 $250.000.00 $550,000.00 $15,000.00 $15,000.00 Anschutz Entertainment Group $10,000.00 } $10,000.00 Berkshire Hathaway Energy Berry Petroleum 1 $50,000.00 } $5000.00 g} $5,000.00 $50,000.00 Breitburn Operating $29.750.00 $29,750.00 CA Independent Petroleum Association 1 $9,918.00 } $100,000.00 $5,917.77 } $5,000.00 } $120,835.77 Calpine Corporation $50,000.00 $6,000.00 $56,000.00 Chevron } $54,400.00 } $1,337,500.00 } $65,000.00 }} $25,000.00 }} $5,000.00 } $1,486,900.00 Clean Energy $25.900.00 $32,400.00 $100,000.00 $60,000.00 $218,300.00 ConocoPhillips 1 $50,000.00 } $100,000.00 } $150,000.00 ExxonMobil $20,000.00 $20,000.00 Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas 1 $100,000.00 $100,000.00 Macpherson Oil $50.000.00 $50,000.00 Manatt. Phelps & Phillips } $5,000.00 } $5,000.00 Naftex Operating Co $10,000.00 $10,000.00 NRG $30,000.00 } $25,000.00 } $10,000.00 }} $20,000.00 } } $25,000.00 } $110,000.00 Oberon Fuels Occidental (Subsidiaries and Associates) $1,000.00 I $500,000.00 $94,950.00 }} $27,200.00 !} $217,400.00 } $235,000.00 d:$1,000.00}Y $1,074,550.00 Paci f ic Coast Energy |g$5,^0;00hY $5,250.00 PG&E (Subsidiaries and Associates) Sempra 1 $25,000.00 : $112,145.00}} $54,200.00 }} $2,574,924.00 } $32,400.00 $53,200 $1.294,000.00 $75,000.00 }} $125,000.00 } $2,966,269.00 }}$1;379;600.00} Signal Hill Petroleum 1 $20,000.00 $20,000.00 SoCalEdison/Edison (Subsidiaries and Associates) Sun Edison 1 $10,000.00 $58,500.00 $54,400.00 $1,500,195.00 g$1-613,095;0a $10,000.00 Tesoro $25,000.00 $25,000.00 Vaquero Energy I $35,000.00 $35,000.00 VENOCO $25.000.00 $25,000.00 World Oil : $5,000.00 1 $5,000.00 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA consumerwatchdog, org ED_001523_00000855-00024 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 25 TIMELINE OF ENERGY INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS & FAVORS Date of contribution Amount 4/3/09 4/29/09 I L00 '1 '.00 5/2/09 i S25.000.00 I 5/2/09 J '.00 5/12/09-5'13/09 6/9/09 8/31/09 11/20/09 11/20/09 12/14/09 12/29/09 12/31/09 j S43.000.00 I '.00 I S2.500.00 I S8.000.00 j S9.000.00 j S1.000.00 j Si 0.000.00 i j S25.000.00 2/19/10 - 2/24/10 3/1/10 3/10/10 3/10/10 S40.000.00 I j 00 ! S1.500.00 f j 00 I S4.000.00 3/10/10 3/10/10 j S8.000.00 ! S22.160.00 I 3/10/10 3/10/10 3/10/10 3/10/10 3/10/10 ||||^ 3/16/10 3/29/10 j S6.000.00 j S2.000.00 I S12.000.00 j S250.00 j S6.500.00 S10.000.00 I SI. 000. OO I S2.500.00 1 3/30/10 4/7/10 4/7/10 4/9/10 4/12/10 i S75.000.00 i '.00 I j S35.000.00 I S60.000.00 !i j OO 4/13/10 4/22/10 4/29/10 4/29/10 5/19/10 S40.000.00 I j S1.500.00 ! S10.679.87 I j S4.320.13 I S1.000.00 I 5/21/10 5/21/10 5/21/10 5/21/10 I '.00 j 00 j 00 j S45.000.00 I Recipient California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 California Democratic Party California Democratic Party Brown For Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 California Democratic Party Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 California Democratic Party Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party Brown for Governor 2010 California Democratic Party Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 Brown for Governor 2010 California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party Donated By i Sempra Chevron ConocoPhillips SoCalEdison ? Sempra SoCalEdison i Chevron Multiple Occidental Employees t Occidental PG&E Senior Vice President - Thomas E Bottorff I PG&E Sempra i Sempra Multiple PG&E Executives and Vice Presidents PG&E Senior Vice President - Rand L Rosenberg Edison International Civic Action Committee i Edison International Southern California Edison - i Chairman and CEO - John E. Bryson Multiple Occidental Employees Multiple PG&E Executives, Vice Presidents , and s Employees Occidental I PG&E PG&E CEO and Chairman - Peter A Darbee i PG&E Political Affairs Manager - Dana Williamson Sempra i SoCalEdison PG&E Vice President - Brian Cherry i Edison International Southern California Edison - i Chairman and CEO - John E. Bryson PG&E Chevron Policy Govt. & Public Affairs SoCalEdison s Sempra Edison International Business Executive - Robert Adler Sempra SoCalEdison Employees I PG&E PG&E s Occidental Chairman & Chief Executive - Ray R. Irani Chevron Policy Govt. & Public Affairs s Sempra SoCalEdison i SoCalEdison consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00025 BROWN'S DIRTY HANOS 26 FAVORS timeline of energy industry contributions & Date of contribution 5/28/10 5/28/10 6'7/10 7'15'10 -7'23'10 7'23/10 7/26/10 7/29/10 7/29/10-8/6/10 8/18/10 8/26/10 9/1/10 9/1/10 9/2/10-9/3/10 9/3/10 9/8/10 9/8/10 9/25/10 9/26/10 9/27/10 10/11/10 10/13/10 10/16/10 10/16/10 10/20/10- 10/25/10 10/21/10 10/26/10 10/28'10 10/28/2010- 10/29/10 10/29/10 10/30/10 11/2/10 1/5/11 1/6/11 1/18/11 1/27/11 1/28/11 2/17/11 3/9/11 3/16/11 3/21/11 3/22/11 3/22/11 3/22/11 Amount Recipient Donated By $4.100.00 Brown for Governor 2010 Occidental $10.900.00 Brown for Governor 2010 Occidental $25.000.00 Brown for Governor 2010 SoCalEdison S3.500.00 Brown for Governor 2010 SoCalEdison Employees $2,000.00 Brown for Governor 2010 Edison International Employees $2.500.00 Brown for Governor 2010 i SoCalEdison CEO $1,000.00 Brown for Governor 2010 Edison International Southern California Edison Chairman and CEO - John E. Bryson $4.500.00 Brown for Governor 2010 i SoCalEdison Employees $25,000.00 Brown for Governor 2010 Occidental $75.000.00 California Democratic Party PG&E $21,800.00 Brown for Governor 2010 Occidental $5.000.00 Brown for Governor 2010 i PG&E- Director, Workforce Development - Van Ton i Quinlivan $1,150.00 Brown for Governor 2010 Multiple Occidental Employees $5.000.00 California Democratic Party i ConocoPhillips $125,000.00 California Democratic Party PG&E $100.000.00 California Democratic Party i PG&E $2.500.00 Brown for Governor 2010 PG&E- SVP Public Affairs - Nancy E. Mcfadden $10,000.00 Brown for Governor 2010 s PG&E- Director, Workforce Development - Van Ton- Quinlivan $25.000.00 California Democratic Party Occidental $10.000.00 Brown for Governor 2010 s PG&E Former Executive - Daniel D Richard $2.000.00 Slllillll $50.000.00 Brown for Governor 2010 California Democratic Party Edison International Southern California Edison Chairman and CEO - John E. Bryson i PG&E $22,000.00 California Democratic Party Sempra $3.015.00 Brown for Governor 2010 ? PG&E Employees $15.220.13 Brown for Governor 2010 PG&E $25.900 Brown for Governor 2010 i Clean Energy $25.900.00 Brown for Governor 2010 Sempra $32.400.00 California Democratic Party i Clean Energy $7.400.00 California Democratic Party Occidental $25.000.00 California Democratic Party I PG&E $50.000.00 California Democratic Party SoCalEdison BROWN APPOINTS PG&E's MCFADDEN AS EXEC SECY $5.000.00 Governor's 2011 Inaugural Committee World Oil Cherry Fingers McF as "Back Door Route" to PUC Appts. Cherry Advises Peevey to Cail McF with Names $25.000.00 Oakland Military Institute i Clean Energy $75,000.00 California Democratic Party PG&E $10.000.00 Oakland Military Institute f Chevron $50,000.00 California Democratic Party SoCalEdison $25.000.00 Oakland Military Institute Occidental $6,500.00 California Democratic Party PG&E $35.000.00 California Democratic Party I PG&E BROWN APPOINTS EX-BANKER FERRON TO PUC consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00026 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 27 TIMELINE OF ENERGY INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS & FAVORS Date of contribution Amount 3/25/11 4/11/11 j S5.000.00 I 325,000.00 4/12'11 4/12/11 4/25/11 4'25/11 5/6/11 340.000.00 I I 345,000.00 I S5.000.00 I I 325,000.00 350.000.00 I 5/6/11 5/10/11 I 350,000.00 325.000.00 I 5/13/11 5/20/11 5/27/11 6/1/11 6/13/11 j 325.000.00 I 350.000.00 I I St000.00 I 310.000.00 I 315,000.00 7/26/11 9/10/11 310.000.00 I I $383.00 9/10/11 I S678.50 I 9/15/11 i 325.000.00 9/15/11 9/30/11 11/3/11 310.000.00 I ! 325,000.00 ! 12/12/11 12'16/11 1/13/12 1;13/12 1/19/12 1/25'12 1/27/12 1/30/12 2/3/12 2/6/12 2/6/12 2/10/12 2/10/12 2/20/12 2/27/12 3/9/12 3/9/12 3/12/12 3/12/12 3/15/12 3/16/12 3/17/12 3/17/12 3/17/12 I 335.000.00 i S5.000.00 I J 250.000.00 ! 325.000.00 I ! 325,000.00 I 400.000.00 I I 375.000.00 i 325.000.00 I I 310,000.00 ! 380.000.00 360,000.00 I 325.000.00 I I S195.00 j 310.000.00 I I $6.000.00 j 325.000.00 I i 325.000.00 330.000.00 I ! 325,000.00 I 325.000.00 I 360,000.00 i 325.000.00 I j 365.000.00 $5.000.00 I Recipient Governor's 2011 Inaugural Committee Oakland Military Institute California Democratic Party California Democratic Party Oakland School for the Arts Oakland School for the Arts California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party Oakland School for the Arts California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party OIL REGULATORS FIRED California Democratic Party California Democratic Party Prop 30 California Democratic Party California Democratic Party Oakland Military Institute Prop 30 California Democratic Party Oakland Military Institute California Democratic Party California Democratic Party Prop 30 California Democratic Party Oakland Military Institute California Democratic Party Prop 30 California Democratic Party California Democratic Party California Democratic Party Oakland Military Institute California Democratic Party Prop 30 California Democratic Party Prop 30 Donated By i Chevron PG&E s Sempra Sempra t Chevron PG&E s Chevron Policy Govt. & Public Affairs Chevron Policy Govt. & Public Affairs PG&E Clean Energy ? SoCalEdison Sempra i SoCalEdison SoCalEdison I PG&E PG&E PG&E ConocoPhillips I PG&E SoCalEdison Sempra ? Sempra Occidental i SoCalEdison Sempra i Occidental Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas PG&E Clean Energy I PG&E PG&E PG&E SoCalEdison ? Chevron PG&E ConocoPhillips Occidental i ConocoPhillips Occidental PG&E SoCalEdison CONOCO Phillips SoCalEdison t Sun Edison consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00027 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 28 TIMELINE OF ENERGY INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS & FAVORS Date of contribution Amount 3/17/12 3/23/12 S25.000.00 1 j 3/23'12 j Recipient Prop 30 NRG GETS SWEETHEART EV ELECTRIFICATION DEAL NRG SETTLES CA PRICE MANIPULATION SUIT 3/26/12 j 5.000.00 Oakland School for the Arts t 3/27/12 3/28/12 j S125.000.00 Si 00.000.00 Prop 30 California Democratic Party t 3/29/12 4/11/12 4/17/12 I 5,469.00 I S25.000.00 I S45,000.00 Prop 30 Prop 30 t California Democratic Party 4/19/12 4/19/12 5/2/12 j S21.250.00 ! 3.750.00 i 5.000.00 Prop 30 i Prop 30 California Democratic Party t 5/11/12 j S25.000.00 Oakland School for the Arts 5/16/12 5/16/12 Si00.000.00 j 5,000.00 California Democratic Party i California Democratic Party 5/19/12 I 5.000.00 Prop 30 i 5/31/12 ! 5,000.00 Oakland School for the Arts 6/5/12 I S10.000.00 I Oakland School for the Arts i 6/20/12 6/26/12 j S75,000.00 j 3112.00 California Democratic Party California Democratic Party i 6/26/12 I S150.000.00 California Democratic Party 6/30/12 7/17/12 I 0.000.00 I 5.000.00 California Democratic Party i California Democratic Party 7/26/12 j S225.000.00 California Democratic Party t 7/26/12 7/26/12 j S15.000.00 j 5.000.00 California Democratic Party California Democratic Party i 8/16/12 S250.000.00 Prop 30 8/17/12 j S20.000.00 California Democratic Party i 8/21/12 j S5.000.00 California Democratic Party 8/24/12 j S10.000.00 I Prop 30 i 8/30'12 9/24/12 j S125.000.00 I S25.000.00 Prop 30 Brown for Governor 2014 i 9/27/12 j S25.000.00 Brown for Governor 2014 10/2/12 j . 000.00 Prop 30 ? 10/8/12 I S100.000.00 Brown: Yes on Props 1 & 2 10/10/12 i S25.000.00 California Democratic Party * 10/10/12 S10,000.00 California Democratic Party 10/19/12 j S25.000.00 California Democratic Party i 10/22/12 10/26/12 10/29/12 j S25.000.00 1.000.00 j S4.449.00 Prop 30 Brown for Governor 2014 Prop 30 10/29/12 10/29/12 j 0.000.00 j 0,000.00 California Democratic Party i California Democratic Party 10/30/12 10/30/12 I 3.5OO.OO j S25.000.00 Prop 30 s Prop 30 Donated By Vaquero Energy Chevron Aera Energy Sempra CA Independent Petroleum Association VENOCO Sempra Breitburn Operating Paci f ic Coast Energy Sempra PG&E Chevron ConocoPhillips Berry Petroleum NRG Clean Energy SoCalEdison PG&E PG&E Sempra PG&E PG&E Sempra SoCalEdison Occidental PG&E Calpine Corporation Signal Hill Petroleum Aera Energy Sempra Tesoro Oberon Fuels CA Independent Petroleum Association NRG PG&E Sempra Macpherson Oil Sempra CA Independent Petroleum Association SoCalEdison SoCalEdison Breitburn Operating Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00028 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 29 timeline of energy industry contributions & FAVORS Date of contribution 10/30/12 10/30/12 10/30/12 10/30/12 11/2/12 11/5/12 11/5/12 11/6/12 11/20/12 12/3/12 12/19/12 12/20/12 12/21/12 12/27/12 1/4/13 1/18/13 2/19/13 3/12/13 3/20/13 3/22/13 3/26/13 3/26/13 4/5/13 4/15/13 4/24/13 5/20/13 ||||||^^ 5/24/13 5/24/13 6/4/13 6/6/13 6/7/13 6/7/13 6/7/13 6/7/13 6/7/13 6/18/13 6/25/13 6/27/13 6/27/13 6/29/13 6/29/13 7/2/13 7/29/13 Amount $25.000.00 $10,000.00 $1.500.00 $10.000.00 $10.000.00 $15.000.00 $15.000.00 $50.000.00 $40.000.00 $5.000.00 $20.000.00 $5,000.00 $25.000.00 $25,000.00 $7.000.00 $25.000.00 $25.000.00 $65.000.00 $05.000.00 $25,000.00 $5.000.00 $25,000.00 $25.000.00 $135.000.00 $25.000.00 $5.000.00 $65,000.00 $25.000.00 $10.000.00 $50,000.00 $10.000.00 $5.000.00 $27.200.00 $65.000.00 $125.000.00 Recipient Prop 30 t Prop 30 Prop 30 t Prop 30 Prop 30 t Prop 30 California Democratic Party i California Democratic Party California Democratic Party i SB 4 FRACKING BILL INTRODUCED Oakland Military Institute i PUC APPROVES OAKLEY GAS PLANT FOR PGE California Democratic Party i Oakland Military Institute California Democratic Party i Oakland Military Institute California Democratic Party s California Democratic Party California Democratic Party t PUC REJECTS SDG&E PIO PICO PLANT AT OTAY MESA California Democratic Party i California Democratic Party PEEVEY/SCE SECRET DEAL ON SAN ONOFRE Oakland Military Institute Oakland School for the Arts i Oakland School for the Arts SB 241 OIL TAX GOES INTO SUSPENSE FILE Oakland Military Institute California Democratic Party i SB 4 EXEMPTS CYCLIC STEAM FROM REGS California Democratic Party i BROWN TELLS SCE HE WILL SUPPORT CROOKED DEAL Oakland School for the Arts s California Democratic Party Oakland School for the Arts i BROWN DIRECTS REGULATORS TO ENSURE ELECTRIC POWER "RELIABILITY FOR DECADES TO COME" SCE ANNOUNCES CLOSURE OF SAN ONOFRE SB4 DROPS MORATORIUM ON PERMITS California Democratic Party i California Democratic Party California Democratic Party i Brown for Governor 2014 Brown for Governor 2014 i California Democratic Party California Democratic Party i Donated By Macpherson Oil Naftex Operating Co Pacific Coast Energy Vaquero Energy Signal Hill Petroleum Berry Petroleum Sempra SoCalEdison Sempra Occidental PG&E NRG Calpine Corporation Clean Energy PG&E Occidental PG&E SoCalEdison SoCalEdison Chevron Chevron Clean Energy PG&E Chevron SoCalEdison NRG PG&E PG&E SoCalEdison Sempra Sempra NRG Occidental Sempra PG&E consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00029 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 30 TIMELINE OF ENERGY INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS S FAVORS Date of contribution 8/9/13 9/19/13 9/20/13 10/9/13 11/1/13 11/6/13 11/11/13 11/14/13 11/21/13 12/11/13 12/23/13 12/30/13 12/30/13 12/30/13 12/30/13 1/9/14 1/21/14 1/21/14 1/29/14 2/5/14 2/6/14 3/13/14 3/13/14 3/13/14 3/17/14 3/17/14 3/26/14 4/8/14 4/9/14 4/15/14 4/25/14 4/28/14 5/6/14 5/7/14 5/8/14 5/13/14 5/20/14 6/11/14 6/20/14 6/23/14 7/3'14 7/21/14 7/28/14 7/28/14 8/13/14 Amount Recipient $25.000.00 Brown for Governor 2014 $25.000.00 Brown for Governor 2014 SB 4 CHAPTERED $100.000.00 I Oakland Military Institute $65,000.00 California Democratic Party $10.000.00 California Democratic Party i $10,000.00 Brown for Governor 2014 $80.500.00 California Democratic Party t $2.000.00 Brown for Governor 2014 $5.000.00 Oakland Military Institute t $350,000.00 California Democratic Party $27.200.00 Brown for Governor 2014 t $27,200.00 Brown for Governor 2014 $27.200.00 Brown for Governor 2014 t $2.200.00 Brown for Governor 2014 $10.000.00 I California Democratic Party i $5,000.00 Oakland Military Institute $5.000.00 Oakland Military Institute ? $10,000.00 California Democratic Party PUC APPROVES SDGE/CALPINE PLANT AT OTAY MESA 1 APPEALS COURT OVERTURNS PUC OAKLEY DECISION $10.000.00 California Democratic Party i $10.000.00 California Democratic Party PUC TELLS SCE/SDGE REPLACE SAN ONOFRE POWER $60,000.00 California Democratic Party $50.000.00 I California Democratic Party i $105,000.00 California Democratic Party $50.000.00 I California Democratic Party i $10,000.00 California Democratic Party $15.000.00 California Democratic Party ? $5,000.00 Oakland School for the Arts $5.000.00 Oakland Military Institute ? PUC PREZ PEEVEY SETS UP WALL ST VISIT FOR PICKER $27.200.00 Brown for Governor 2014 t $65.000.00 California Democratic Party $65.000.00 California Democratic Party $5,917.77 California Democratic Party $10.000.00 Oakland Military Institute t $65,000.00 California Democratic Party PICKER TALKS UP UTILITIES TO WALL ST INVESTORS I $25,000.00 Oakland School for the Arts $30.000.00 I California Democratic Party i $70,000.00 California Democratic Party $125.000.00 I California Democratic Party i $10.000.00 California Democratic Party Donated By PG&E SoCalEdison Occidental PG&E Sempra ExxonMobil PG&E PG&E Occidental Chevron Chevron Chevron SoCalEdison SoCalEdison Sempra AES Clean Energy PG&E PG&E PG&E Occidental Occidental Chevron Sempra SoCalEdison PG&E NRG Calpine Corporation PG&E Sempra SoCalEdison CA Independent Petroleum Association Clean Energy SoCalEdison PG&E Chevron Policy Govt. & Public Affairs PG&E PG&E PG&E consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00030 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 3 1 TIMELINE OF ENERGY INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTION SSFAVORsH Date of contribution 9/2/14 9/10/14 9/25/14 9/26/14 10/8/14 10/10/14 10/15/14 10/21/14 10/22'14 10/22/14 10/24/14 1/15/15 1/26'15 2/2'15 2'4'15 2/4/15 2/11/15 2/24/15 3/2/15 3/6/15 3/6/15 3/6'15 3/30/15 4/2/15 4'7/15 4'8/15 5/7/15 5/12/15 5'21/15 5/27/15 6/5/15 6/17/15 6/17/15 8/6'15 9/4/15 9/11/15 9/29/15 9/29/15 10/7/15 10/12'15 10/19/15 10/23/15 11/19/15 12/10/15 Amount Recipient i California Democratic Party $150,000.00 California Democratic Party $5.000.00 t Brown for Governor 2014 i $25,000.00 Brown for Governor 2014 $10.000.00 s Brown for Governor 2014 t $250,000.00 Props 1 & 2 $75.000.00 i California Democratic Party i $27.200.00 Brown for Governor 2014 $5.000.00 i California Democratic Party i $100,000.00 California Democratic Party $40.000.00 t California Democratic Party i $5,000.00 Oakland Military Institute $1.000.00 i Oakland Military Institute i $25,000.00 Oakland Military Institute $5.000.00 i Oakland Military Institute i $10.000.00 Oakland Military Institute $5.000.00 i Oakland Military Institute i SB 350 CLIMATE CHANGE BILL INTRODUCED $5.000.00 'i Oakland School for the Arts i $65,000.00 California Democratic Party $65,000.00 i California Democratic Party i PUC PROPOSES DENYING SDGE CARLSBAD PLANT $50.000.00 i California Democratic Party i $65,000.00 California Democratic Party $215.000.00 California Democratic Party t PICKER ISSUES CONDITIONAL APPROVAL ON CARLSBAD $25.000.00 i California Democratic Party i $5.000.00 Oakland School for the Arts i PUC APPROVES CARLSBAD PLANT FOR SDGE/NRG 1 $25,000.00 Oakland School for the Arts $35.000.00 i California Democratic Party i $10,000.00 California Democratic Party $50.000.00 5 California Democratic Party i $20.000.00 California Democratic Party 1 REGIONAL ISO WRITTEN INTO SB 350 LEGISLATORS STRIKE SB 350 SLASHING OIL IN HALF $5.000.00 i California Democratic Party s $75.000.00 California Democratic Party 1 SB 350 CHAPTERED I BROWN VETOES SIX BILLS TO REFORM PUC $50.000.00 t California Democratic Party i SOCALGAS AL1SO CANYON BLOWOUT DISCOVERED I PUC APPROVES NEW NATGAS PLANTS FOR SCE AT ALAMITOS, HUNGTINGTON BEACH, STANTON $175.000.00 i California Democratic Party i Donated By PG&E PG&E Berkshire Hathaway Energy NRG ExxonMobil Aera Energy PG&E Sempra Sempra SoCalEdison Sempra NRG Calpine Corporation Clean Energy CA Independent Petroleum Association Chevron AES Chevron SoCalEdison SoCalEdison Sempra Sempra Chevron PG&E NRG PG&E PG&E SoCalEdison SoCalEdison Calpine Corporation PG&E PG&E PG&E PG&E consumerwatchdog.org 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00031 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 32 APPENDIX B - ENERGY COMPANY CONTRIBUTIONS - INDIVIDUAL Date of contribution Amount Recipient 12/23/15 S75.000.00 California Democratic Party 12/29/15 S65.000.00 i California Democratic Party t 1/6/16 ILO BROWN DECLARES ALISO CANYON STATE OF EMERGENCY 1/17/16 S25.000.00 1 California State Protocol Foundation t 2/1/16 $10,000.00 Oakland Military Institute 2/15/16 $5.000.00 I Oakland Military Institute i 3/2/16 $5,000.00 Oakland School for the Arts 3/11/16 $25.000.00 I California Democratic Party i 3/25/16 $21,750.00 California Democratic Party 3/25/16 >100.000.00 I California Democratic Party 4/21/16 $65.000.00 California Democratic Party 4/21/16 $65.000.00 I California Democratic Party i ......... . , . . 4/25/16 U 50 000.00 California Democratic Party 5/20/16 S50.000.00 I California Democratic Party s 5/26/16 ! $10.076.549.40 1 PC APPROVES SCE/NRG OXNARD PLANT Donated By SoCalEdison SoCalEdison NRG Chevron AES Chevron PG&E PG&E PG&E Sempra Sempra Chevron SoCalEdison 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA consumerwatchdog, erg ED_001523_00000855-00032 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 33 1 McDonald, Jeff,& Young,Ricky. 5 Emails retrieved from www. "State investigator lays out developing PUCpapers,org a searchable online data criminal case against former PUC presi base of emails and other documents pro dent." Los Angeles Times, December 29, duced primarily under the Public Records 2015. Retrieved from http://www.latimes. Act and in litigation concerning state offi com/business/la-fi-watchdog-peeyey- cials, energy regulators and the companies 2015123 O-story. htnil they regulate, https://pucp apers.org/wp- c o n t e n t / u p 1 o a d s / 2 01 6 / 04/ P 2 Richman, Josh, & Calefati, Production-01.,08.16-OCR.d-2 Peevey-to- Jessica. "Gov Jerry Brown defends CPUC SDGE-on-Carlsbad-promo great-iob.pdf president, Delta tunnel plan." Mercury News, September 15, 2014. Retrieved 6 SNL Power Daily with Market from http: / /www.mercurynews.com/ Report, March 26, 2012, "NRG Energy California/ci 26347 380/gov-jerry-brown- settles Calif. Power crisis lawsuit with electric defends-cpuc-president-delta-tunnel vehicle funding plan," and Lynch, Loretta M. "Time for California to claim energy 3 McDonald, Jeff."Brown is no crisis refunds." San Francisco Chroni- de, stranger to CPUC involvement." San June 12, 2015. Retrieved from http:// Diego Union-Tribune, December 7, www.sfchronicle.com/opin.ion/article/ 2015. Retrieved from http://www.sand- Time-fbr-California-to-daim-energy-crisis- iegou bune.com/news/20 1 5 / refunds-6 322 63 2 php dec/07/brown-cpuc-san-bruno-emails/ 7 Press Release. "Governor Brown 4 Draft S econd Amended Announces 8120 Million Settlement To Complaint. Committee to Protect Our Fund Electric Car Charging Stations Agricultural Water v. Gas Com- parties. Across California." Office of Governor United States District Court Eastern Edmund G. Brown Jr., March 23, 2012. District of California. Retrieved from Retrieved from https: / /www. goy, ca,gov/ http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/ new's.phppid--17463 resources/ricolawsuit2ndamendedcom- plaint.pdf and Mishak, MichaelJ. ".Brown 8 Press Release. "Governor Brown ordered firing of regulator who took hard Issues Order on Aliso Canyon Gas Leak." line on oil firms." Los Angeles Times, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., January 29, 2012. Retrieved from http:/ / January 6. 2016. Retrieved from https:// artides.latimes.com/2012/jan/29/local/ www.gov,ca.gov/news,php?id--19264 la-me-oil-201 201 29/2 9 Armstrong, Jim, et al. "Jerry Brown's Ties to the Oil and Gas Industry." Public Accountability Initiative, December 17, 2015. Retrieved from http://public- accountability.org/2015/12/ierry-browns- ties-to-the-oil-and-gas-industry/ 10 'Elie Washington Times, April 20, 2010, "Jerry Brow'n, oil baron; Little-known foreign oil holdings might taint decisions," and Pearce, Laer. "Crazifornia Exclusive! Jerry Brown, Oil Baron." Crazifornia, April 16, 2010. Retrieved from http://crazifor- n ia. c om / 2 01 0 / 047 1 6/ c raziforn ia- exelu sive-jerry-bro wn-oil-barron/ 11 Megerian, Chris. "Cynthia Kelly dies at 81; older sister of Gov. Jerry Brown. " Los Angeles Times, March 30, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/ local/political/la-me-pc-jerry-brown-sister-. dies-201503 3 O-story. html 12 Ventura County Star, January 19, 2007, "Links to LNG Proposal of 27 Years Ago Surface." 13 Pollak, Joel B. "Officialn Jerry BrownOil Scandal Resigns." Breitbart, December 1,2015. Retrieved from www.bre- itbart.com/big-government/2015/1 2/01 / erry-brown-oi l-scandal-resiqns-official / 14 Gammon, Robert. "Governor Jerry Brown Has Financial Link to Oakland Coal." Oakland Magazine, May 12, 2016. Retrieved from www.oaklandmag azine, coni/ Governor-Jerry-Brown-Has- Fintmcial-Link-to-Oakland-Coal/ cansumsrw^ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00033 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 34 15 Smith, Jennifer. "Comings & 22 Press Release. "WatchdogsPetition Goings: Kathleen Brown Returns to Law." PUC For Open Investigation On Porter 'I'he Wall Street Journal, September 8, Ranch Leak; Decry Secrecy & Question 2013. Retrieved from www.wsj.com/arti- Lack of Transparency." Consumer cles/SB 100014241278873 238646045790 Watchdog, February 1, 2016. Re- trieved 63030380912894 from http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/ newsrelease/watchdogs-petition-puc-open- 16 Street, Chriss W. "Jerry Brown: i lives tigati on-port er-ranch-leak-de cry Another Energy Conflict of Interest." secrecy-question-lack- Brietbart, December 21, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.breitbart.com/califoF 23 Richman,Josh, & Calefati, Jessica. nia/2015/ 12/21 /jerry-brown-another- "Gov.Jerry Brown defends CPUC presi enerqy-confI ict-i nterest / dent, Delta tunnel plan." Mercury News, September 15, 2014. Retrieved from 17 Retrieved from SoCalGas http://www.mercurynews.com/califomia/ website August 4, 2016. https:// ci 26347 380/gov-jerry-brown-defends- w w w. s o c a 1 g a s. c o m / fo r - y o u r - b u s i cpuc-president-delta-tunnel r vices/ natural-gas-storage 24 Wasserman, Harvey. "Our Fake Energy Crisis What Really Happened 18 Factsheet. "The Importance in California." 2001. Retrieved from of the Al iso Storage Facility." Retrieved h 11 p s: / / r a t i c a 1. o r g / r a tv i 11 e / de re g / from SoCalGas website August 4, 2016. FakeEnergyCrisis.html https://www.socalgas.com/documents/ news-room/aliso-canyon-value-of-facility- 25 Article retrieved from https: / /puc- fact-sheet.pdf papers.org/wp-content/uploads/20,16/04/ SB GTS 0456527.pdf 19 'Fucker, Liza. "Living Without Aliso Canyon's Natural Gas." Capitol 26 "Corrupt CPUC Chair Peevy and Watchdog, February 23, 2016. Retrieved Utility Controlled Commission Delays Full from h ttp: / / capitolwatchdog, org/ article / Probe of NUKE Plant." lndybay,August3, living-without-aliso-canyons-natural-gas 2012. Retrievedfrom https: / /www.indybay. org/ n e w site ms / 2 01 2 Z 08 / 03 /18 718782. 20 Nemec, Richard. "SoCal Activists uhu Pressu re Officialto Shut Aliso Canyon NatGasStorage." Natural Gas Intel, July 2 7 D ocument retrieved from 5, 2016. Retrieved from http://www. h 11 p s: / Z p u c p a p e r s. o r g / w p - c o n t ent/ naturalgasintel.com/articles/ 1 06960- socabactiyist^^ aliso-canyon-natgas-storage 28 Emails retrievedfrom https://puc- papers.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04Z 21 Penn, Ivan. "Senators ques SB GTS 0447883.pdf tion energy agencies about Aliso Canyon report." LA Times, May 10, 2016. 29 Documents including emails Retrieved from http: / / www.latimes. retrieved from https:ZZpucpapers.org/ gom/busin^^ wp-content/uploads A 20160510-snap-story.html 001-11D C O M Mi E N T S T O S C E 3 -1 6 - 16DecfofMariaSeversoi:-tofr QA 4 R, pdf 30 Documents including emails retrieved from h 11p s : / /pu cp ap e rs, org/ wp-content/uploads/2016/05AR 14-11 - 0 0 1 -HD C O M M E N T S T O S C E 3 -1 6 - IbDeclofMciriaSeyeo^ IbnA C R. pdf 31 Email retrievedfrom https://puc- papers.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ Back-door-route-for-appoin;tment,pdf 32 Fair Political Practices Commission Complaint. March 11, 2016. Retrieved from http://www.consumerwatchdog. org/resources/mcfaddenfppccomplaintcpuc.pdf 33 "California Public Utilities Commission 'Ferms of Governors and Commissioners si nee 1911." CPUC, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ uploadedFiles blic Website/ Content/About Us / Organization / Commissioners/Commissioners.pdf 34 McDonald, Jeff. "CPUC boss and energy innovator were friendly." San Diego Union-Tribune, February 12, 2016. Retrievedfrom http://www.sandi- egouniontribune.com/news/2016/febZ 12/ cpuc-Sulliyan-kennedy-emailsZ 35 "Workshop on Southern California Electricity Infrastructure and Reliability Issues." California Energy Commission. Retrieved from http : / / www,energy.ca.gov/ 20 1 3 energypol 1 ' / ' " mi 7 '11 " 1 2 . u : I - shop/2013-09-09 trariscript.pdf 36 Email retrievedfrom https://puc- papers.org/wp-con tent/uploads/2016/07 / dragged-8QCR.pdf 37 Email retrievedfrom https://puc- papers.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07 / L.LLdwfrfo_ to df cansumarwal^^ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00034 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 35 3 8 E m a i 1 r e t r i e v e d fr o m 46 Email retrievedfrom https://puc- h t tp s : / / p u c p ap e r s ,o r g / wp - papers.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ c o n t en t/ u p 1 o a d s / 2 0 1 6 / 0 7/ SB GTS 0340761.pdf SCANO7182016140524-QCR.pdf 47 Lifsher, Marc. "To cheers and 3 9 Rep or t re tri eve d from jeers, Michael Peevey presides over final https://pucpapers.org/wp-content/ PUC meeting." Los Angeles Times, u p 1 o a d s / 2 0 1 6 / 0 7 / C o m m i s s i o n e r - December 18,2014. Retrievedfromhttp:// Ferrons-Report-on-Meetings-with-Utility- www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-peeyey- Inyestors-October-3-2013-OCR.pdf depar ory.html 40 Emails re trie ved from 48 Van Derbeken, Jaxon. "How h 11p s : / / p u cpapers.org/wp-conte n t / banquet for ex-PUC head Peevey went uploa sour for UC Berkeley."SF Gate, April 1, 2015. Retrieved from www, sfeate. com/ b ayarea/article/H. ow-dinner-fbr-ex-PUC- 41 Presentation retrieved from head-Peevey-hit-nerve-at-UC-6166762. h 11p s : / / p u cp ap e rs, o r g / wp - c o n tent/ php and Van Derbeken, Jaxon. "UC uploeP ' 'VfotA'/.//_ Gm_ fo KjJm Berkeley public policy school spurns cash FLORjOzandfEEVEWD^ from Peevey dinner" SF Gate, March 17, INSIDE-INFC wx 2015. Retrievedfrom http://www, sfgate com/bayarea/article/UC-Berkeley-public- 42 McDonald, Jeff."CPUC meets policy-school-spurns-cash-from-6140546, with Wall Street types, too." San Diego Blip Union-Tribune, May 2, 2016. Retrieved from http: / / www.sandiegounion- 49 Avalos, George. "Disgraced PUC tribu ray / 02 / boss Michael Peevey to be honored by cpuc-wall-street/ cronies." Silicon Beat, February 10, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.siliconbeat. 43 SNL Power Daily with Market com/201 5/02/ 1 0 /disgrace d-puc-boss- Report, January 28, 2014, "Calif. Senate peeyey-to-be-honored-by-cronies/ passes bill to keep PUC commissioners out of institutions they create" 50 Van Derbeken, Jaxon. "PG&E's Judge Shopping Outrages State PUC 44 Mader, Phil, & Ross, Andy. Employees." Consumer Cal, September "CPUC Foundation to raise money 20, 2014. Retrievedfrom https://consum- from utilities." San Francisco Chronicle. ercal.org/pges-judge-shopping-outrages- January 26, 2011. Retrieved from http:// state-puc-employees/ www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/ articl idation-to-raise- 51 Forbes, February 22, 1999, "We'll m,on,ev-ft'oin-utilities-2478264.php Make It Up On Volume." 45 Documents including emails retrieved from https://pucpapers.org/ wp-content/uploads/ . 11-001-IIDCOMMENTSTOSCE3- GT' op I U--- a:-; : i : PartlOCR.pdf 52 San Jose Mercury News, May 21, 1996, "Big Electricity Users Will Save." 53 Inside Energy, The Energy Report, August 4, 1997, "First competitive retail power in U.S. delivered to a factory in Rhode Island." 54 Los Angeles 'Finies, January 26, 2001, "The California Energy Crisis," and January 8, 2001, "California and the West; Lawmakers Contending with Power Crisis Have Holdings in Electric Firms." 55 North County Tinies, February 2, 2001, "California Governor Signs Measure to Buy Emergency Power." 56 McSwain, Dan. "California energy dreami ng costs consumers bi 11 ions. " San Diego Union- Tribune, September 19, 2015. Retrieved from http://www. saiidiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/ sep/ 1 9/state-renewable-energy-oyerhaul- consumers-cost/ 57 Exceptions to the Rule: Bypassing the California Transition Charge, Public Utilities Fort- nightly, November 15, 1996 58 Mark J. Ferron Linked! n Profile page. Retrieved from https.:.//www,linke- din .com/ in / marki f erron 59 Groom, Nichola. "Unlikely casu alty in California's renewable energy boom: natural g." Reuters, June 9,2016. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/ article / us-california-energy-analy-sis- dUSKCNOYVOBX 60 Young, Ricky. "Insider pushed her firm's grid service." San Diego Union-Tribune, June 29, 2015. Retrieved from h ttp : / / ww w. san di egou nion- t r i b u n e. c o m / n e w s / 2 0 1 5 / j u n / 2 9 / ams-susan-kennedy-picker-email-ex-parte/ 61 Application of Southern California Edison Company (U338E) for Approval of the Results of Its 2013 Local Capacity Requirements Request for Offers for the Western Los Angeles Basin. 2015. Retrieved from http://www.consumer- watchdog.org/resources/scecushnietesti mony.pdf cansumsrwaichdaawra 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000855-00035 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 36 6 2 D r a ft S e c o n d A m e n d e d 68 Megerian, Chris, & Mason, Complaint. Committee to Protect Our Melanie. "Governor, top lawmakers ready Agricultural Water v. Gas Companies. to modify climate change measure as nego United States District Court Eastern tiations continue." Los Angeles Times, Division of California. Retrieved from September 8, 2015. Retrievedfrom http:// http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/ www.latimes,com/local/political/la-me-pc- resources/ricolawsuit2n.damendedcom- climate-change-amendments-california- plaint.pdf and Declaration of Derek 20150908-story.html Chernow. Retrieved from www.consum erwatch dog, org/resources/ricolawsuit- 69 Skelton, George. "The time is 2ndamendedcomplaint.pdf and Draft ripe for a tax on oil extraction to pay for Second Amended Complaint. Retrieved California road repairs." Los Angeles from http: / / www, consumerwat chdog. Times, September 16, 2015 Retrievedfrom org/resources/sacpages36-37.pdf http://www.latimes.com/local/califomia/ la-me-cap-2015091 7-colurnn.htnil 63 Draft Second Amended Complaint. Retrievedfrom www.consum- 70 Megerian, Chris, & PanzarJavier. erwatchdog.org/resources/ricolawsuit2n- "Gov.Brown signs climate change bill to spur damen.de dcomplaint.pdf renewable energy, efficiencytandards. " Les Angeles Times, October 7, 2015. Retrieved 64 Kretzmann, Hollin. "Oil from http://www.latimes.com/politics/la- industry's toxic wastewater threatens pol-sac-jerry-brown-climate-change-renew- California water supplies." Sacramento able-energy-20151007-story.htrnl Bee, February 21, 2015. Retrievedfrom http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/ 71 Crawford, Jonathan. "California soapbox/article 107 18264,html Power Cases Nearing End 16 Years After Crisis." Bloom- berg, May 13, 2016. 65 "AP: Oil Drilling Waste Dumped Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg. Into Calif. Aquifers Used For Irrigation, com/news/arti -1 3 / california- Drinking Water." CBS Los Angeles, power-cases-coining-to-an-end-16-years- February 5, 2015. Retrievedfrom http:// after-crisis losangeles.cbsl ocal.com/2015/02/05/ap- oi]-drilling-waste-dumped-into-calif-aqui - 7 2 Factsheet Retrieved from fers-used-for-irrigation-drinking-water/ PacifiCorpwebsite August 4,2016. http:// www.paciflcorp.co m /co n t e n t / d a m / 66 Department of Conservation. p aci fic orp / do c / Ab o u t Us/Company Retrieved from California Department Oyeryiew/PC-FactSheet-Final Web, pdf of Conservation website August 4, 2016 http://www.conserv a ti on.ca.gov/dog/ 73 Presentation. Ferron,Mark. "Now Pages/Aquifer Exemptions.aspx Comes the Hard Part: Making California's Clean Energy Future a Reality." March 4, 67 Howard, John. "Brown: 2016. Retrieved from http://climateprot Thumbs down on oil severance tax." ection .org/ wp-content/uploads/2016/03 / Capitol Weekly, January 9, 2014. Mark-Ferron-Ou r-Future-Elec trici ty- Retrievedfrom http://capitolweeMy.net/ System-.pdf brown-thumbs-oil-severance 74 McDonald, Jeff. "Brown is no stranger to CPUC involvement."San Diego UnionTribune,December 7,2015. Retrievedfrom http: / / www. sandiegouniontribune. com/ news/20 1 5/ dec/07 /brown-cpuc-sanbruno-emails/ and Documents including emails retrieved from https://puepapers. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/1-30 OCR.pdf 75 Mercer, Brandon. "S10 Million Ifo Upgrade San Bruno Pipeline Diverted While PG&E Execs Got Bonuses Before Deadly Explosion SaysPUC Chief." CBS SF Bay Area, March 27, 2015. Retrieved from http: / /san.francisco.cbslocal. com/2015/03/27/ I 0-million-to-upgrade- san-bruno-pip eline-diverted-while-pge- execs-got-bonuses-before-deadly-explosion- says-puc-chief/ 76 "UTILITIES: PG&E discloses more improper communications with Calif. Officials.'Green-wire, December 23,2014 77 CBS SF Bay Area, March 27, 2015. Retrieved from http : / / saufran ci sco.cbslocal. co m i 11i on -1o -u p grade - s a n-brun o-pip e1 in e- di ver ted-while-pge-execs-go t-b on use s- before-deadly-explosion-says-puc-chief/ 78 Pickoff-White,Lisa. "Bill Blocking PG&E From Deducting JJ 115 Million of San Bruno Fine Fails." KQED, September 4, 2015. Retrievedfrom http://ww2.kqed. org/news/201 5/07/ 14/bill-would-block- pge-from-deducting-115-million-ofrsan- brunozfine/ 79 Penn, Ivan. "Q&A PUC's Michael Picker on San Onofre, San Bruno and California'senergy outlook." Los Angeles Times, December 30, 2015. Retrievedfrom http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi - picker-q-a-1^1 ; d 1 H-stQry.htm] 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA cansumsrwaKhdaarra ED_001523_00000855-00036 BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS 37 80 McDonald, Jeff."Brown is no stranger to CPUC involvement." San Diego Union-Tribune, December 7, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.sand- i e go u n i o n t r i b u n e. c o dec/07/brown-cpuc-san-bruno-emails/ 87 Press Release. "Governor Brown Issues Statement on Permanent Closure of San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant." Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., May 7, 2013. Retrievedfrom https://www.goy. ca.gov/news.php7id--18084 94 Penn, Ivan. "Q&A PUC's Michael Picker on San Onofre, San Bruno and California'senergy outlook." Los Angeles Times, December 30, 2015. Retrievedfrom http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi- picker-q-a-20151231 -story.htrnl 81 Egelko, Bob. "Court rejects 88 Lifsher, Marc. "Replacing the PUC'sapproval of Oakley PG&E plant." power from San Onofre will be a chal San Francisco Chroni- cle, February lenge." Los Angeles Times, October 13, 6, 2014. Retrieved from http://www. 2013. Retrievedfrom http://www.latimes. s fg a t e. c o m / b a y ar e a / a r tide/ C o u rt - can/busi^ rejects-PUC-s-approval-of-Oakley-PG- 20131014-story.litrnl amp-E-5212289.php 89 Emails retrievedfrom https://puc- 82 Goldberg, Keith. "JPMorgan papers.org/ wp-content/uploads/ 2016/07 / Emails Sought by FERC Are Privileged, SCAN07182016140619-OCR-1 .pdf Judge Says." Law 360. November 30, 2012. Retrievedfrom http://www.law360. 90 Lee, Morgan. "Peevey rallied Pio corn/ articles/397 765 /jpmorgan-emails- Pico approval." San Diego Union-Tribune, sought-by-ferc-are-privilegedJudge-says February 28, 2015. Retrievedfrom www. sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/ 83 Lifsher, Marc. "PUC judge feb/28/peevey-ral;lied-pio-pico-approval/ rejects Carlsbad power contract." Los Angeles Times, March 7, 2015. Retrieved 91 Danko, Pete. "Solar Surges from http://www.latimes.com/busr Past Wind, Hydro as California's No. 1 ness/la-fi-puc-rejects-power-contract- Renewable Energy Source." KQED News, 201,5 0 3 06-story .html January 11, 2016. Retrievedfrom http:// ww2.kqed.org/news/20 16/01 / 1 1 / solar- 84 Hsu, Tiffany. "PUC approves power-califbrnia-top-source-of-renewable- plan to replace San Diego County natural energy gas power plant." Los Angeles Times, May 21, 2015. Retrieved from www.latim.es. 92 Groom, Nichola. "Unlikely casu cgm/busjinss^^ alty in California's renew'able energy 2015 05 2 2-s tOBchtml boom: natural gas." Reuters, June 9, 2016. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/ 85 McDonald, Jeff "It's not just a r t i c 1 e / u s - c a1 i fo rn i a- e n e rgy - a n a1 y s i s - the steam generators that failed." San idUSKCNOYVOBX Diego Union-Tribune, January 30, 2016. Retrievedfrom http://www.sand- 93 Penn, Ivan. "From useful to waste i e g o u n i o n t r i b u n e. c o ful: How utility ratepayers have borne the ian/30/san-onofre-anniversary/ brunt of failed projects." Los Angeles Times, June 5, 2016. Retrievedfrom www, 86 Email retrieved from https:// latjm^con^^ kpb s. me di a, c1 i e n ts. e 11i n gt o n c m. s. c om/ 20160605-snap-story.html news/documents/2015/ 1 1 /23/email,pdf 95 McDonald, Jeff "CPUC now wants$12.3 million for legal fees." San Diego Union-Tribune, April 5, 2016 Retrieved by http://www,sandiegounion- t ribune.com /news/ 2016/apr/05 / cpuc-legal-fees-increase/ 96 McDonald, Jeff. "First audit in 20 years finds a lot wrong with the agency that regulates your ut i 111 les. " Los Angeles Times, June 29, 2016. Retrievedfrom http://www. latimes.com/business/la-fi-puc-audit- 20160629-snap-story.html 97 Shallenberger, Krysti. "CA Gov. Brown vetoes6 CPUC reform bills." Utility Dive, October 12, 2015. Retrievedfrom http://www.utili tydive. com / news/ca-gov-brown-vetoe s6-cpuc-reform-biUs/4071 63/ and http:// www.sacbee.com/news/politics-governm.ent/capitol-alert/artid.e38487060.htm.l 98 Megerian, Chris, & Mason, Melanie. "Agrand bargain? Gov.Jerry Brow'll in talks with oil companies about climate change programs." Los Angeles 'Finies, July 7,2016. Retrieved from http:// www.utilitvdive.com/news/ca-gov-brown- vetoes-6-cpuc-reform.-bill.s/407163/ 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA cansumsrwa^ ED_001523_00000855-00037 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA /Consumer Watchdog August 2016 ED_001523_00000855-00038 Backgrounder August 2008 Immigration to the United States and World Wide Greenhouse Gas Emissions By Leon Kolankiewicz and Steven A. Camarota The findings of this study indicate that future levels of immigration will have a significant impact on efforts to reduce global CO2 emissions. Immigration to the United States significantly increases world-wide CQ emissions because it transfers population from lower-polluting parts of the world to the United States, which is a higherpolluting country. On average immigrants increase their emissions four-fold by coming to America. Among the findings: Theestimated CO2 emissions of the average immigrant (legal or illegal) in the United States are 18 percent less than those of the average native-born American. However, immigrants in the United States produce an estimated four times more CO 2 in the United States as they would have in their countries of origin. U.S. immigrants produce an estimated 637 million metric tons of CO 2 emissions annually -- equal to Great Britain and Sweden combined. Theestimated 637 tons of CO2 U.S. immigrants produce annually is 482 million tons more than they would have produced had they remained in their home countries. If the 482 million ton increase in global CO2 emissions caused by immigration to the United States were a separate country, it would rank 10th in the world in emissions. The impact of immigration to the United States on global emissions is equal to approximately 5 percent of the increase in annual world-wide CO2 emissions since 1980. Of the CO2emissions caused by immigrants, 83 percent is estimated to come from legal immigrants and 17 percent from illegal immigrants. Legal immigrants have a much larger impact because they have higher incomes and resulting emissions, and they are more numerous than illegal immigrants. Theabove figures do not include the impact of children born to immigrants in the United States. If they were included, the impact would be much higher. Assuming no change in U.S. immigration policy, 30 million new legal and illegal immigrants are expected to settle in the United States in the next 20 years. In recant years, increases in U.S. CO2 emissions have bean driven entirely by population increasesas per capita emissions have stabilized. Leon Kolankiewicz is an environmental scientist, planner, and consultant whose work has included analyses of the environmental impactsof alternate energy technologies, including their greenhouse gasemi&ons Steven A. Camarota is the Director of Search at the Center for Immigration Studies 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000856-00001 Center for Immigration Studies Introduction The small body of research on immigration's environmental impact in the United States has tended to focus on the effects of the population growth induced by immigrants and their U.S.-born offspring on the U.S. environment alone.1 In contrast, the present population grew by an almost identical amount. This is powerful direct evidence that increases in U.S. CO 2 emissions are driven by population increases as per capita emissions have stabilized.7 Adding more people to the United States, at least recently, has meant a proportional increase in emissions. study attempts to quantify the direct contribution of immigrants in the United States to growing U.S. and Comparing U.S. Emissions to global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Since American emissions per capita are much higher than almost all of Immigrant-Sending Countries the immigrant-sending countries, immigration to the Research by the Center for Immigration Studies, the United States has significant implications for world Ftew Hispanic Center, and the Census Bureau shows wide emissions. that new immigration and births to immigrants are Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the most the determinate factors in future U.S. population important of which is CO 2, raise the concentration of growth. Immigration is now the driving force behind these gases in the earth's atmosphere. Most scientists continued U.S. population growth, accounting directly think this increase is causing average global temperatures (immigration itself) and indirectly (through births to to rise. There is concern that warming in turn may trigger immigrants) for at least three-quarters of our annual far-reaching, long-term effects on the Earth's cl mate and increase of three million residents. TheCenter for biosphere, and consequently, on human civilization. 2 Immigration Studies has projected that if the current Thus, the impact of U.S. immigration on annual CO 2 level of (legal and illegal) immigration continues, the emissions san important research question. U.S. population will grow from 300 million in 2007 to 468 million by 2060. Longer-range projections done by U.S. Population Growth Drives the Census Bureau show a U .S. population by 2100 of between 571 million and 1.18 billion using the Bureau's Increasing CO2 Emissions middle or high range immigration scenario. 8 The U.S. population would grow some even without immigration, Thdarge population and comparative prosperity of but there is no question that immigration is the primary the United States are underpinned by the consumption reason the U.S. population continues to increase by of fossil fuels on a prodigious scale. In one year alone about three million each year. (2006), Americans burned 1.1 billion tons of coal, 7.6 Of course, if immigrants had remained in their billion barrels of petroleum, and 21.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.3 home counties they would still have produced some CO2, but as we will see, their output would have been A fundamental consequence of the combustion a great deal less because immigration represents a largeof coal, oil, and natural gas to generate electricity, run scale population transfer from the less consuming, less cars, and heat homes is the release of CO 2 into the atmosphere.4 Total U .S. emissions of CO 2 have been industrial zed, and less CO2emitting parts of the world to one of the highest consuming, most industrial zed, the highest in the world for many years -- until just high CO 2 emitting parts of the world -- the United recently. It now spears that in 2006 China surpassed the United States in annual CO 2 emissions.5 However, States. Table 1 compares per c^cita C (Remissions in the United States with per capita CO2 emissions in the topthe United States sti II leads the world's largest economies 25 immigrant-sending countries. in per capita emissions. China'sannual per capita CO 2 emissions in 2005 were just four tons, below the global Table 1 shows extreme varidcility in per capita CO2 emission rates from country to country. More average and only one-fifth of America's per capita emissions of 20 tons.6 developed countries of origin -- such as Canada, In recant years U.S. per capita CO 2emissions European countries, and Japan -- have higher annual per capita CO2emissions, though with the exception of have held steady and the rise in overall U.S. emissions Canada, even the industrialized countries such as Great is ent i rely due to population growth. The link between Britain, Germany, and Italy all have much lower per population and CO2emissions isshown in a 2002 study capita emissions than the United States. Less-developed that found GHG emissions in the United States from countries from Asia and Latin America, which are the fossil fuel combustion grew by al most 13 percent from 1990 to 2000. Over the same time period, the U.S. primary immigrant-sending counties, have much lower annual per capita CO 2emissions than does the United 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000856-00002 Center for Immigration Studies States. The most extreme example, Haiti, has a per capita What is most important about the table is that CO2 emissions rate of barely more than 1/100 that of it shows that almost all of the top immigrant-sending the United States. In contrast, Canada's per capita CO2 countries to the United States have dramatically lower emissions are comparable to America's, which is not CO2 emissions per c^oita. By and large, people who surprising considering the similarly large size and migrate to the United States aspire to improve their advanced level of development of this neighboring material standard of living, and as noted above, this North American country. generally entails a higher level of energy consumption and, thus, CO 2 emissions. If Table 1 indicated that U.S. CO2emissions per Table 1. Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita from Fossil Fuel Consumption: Comparison Between U.S. and Top-25 Countries of Origin of Immigrants in the U.S. capita were lower or even the same as the primary immigrant-sending countries, it is likely that immigration to the United States would have little or no Country Annual CO2 Emissions per Capita (Metric Tons per Person, 2005^ U.S. CO2 Emissions per Capita/Sending Country CO2 Emissions per Capita (2005) effect on world-wide GHG emissions, although total U.S. emissions would still rise dramatically. But, in fact, the United States has much higher per United States Mexico Chinah India 20.14 3.75 4.07 1.07 1.0x 5.4 x 4.9 x 18.8x capita CO2 emissions -- five times higher -- than the world average (20 vs. four metric tons annually). Asa result, immigration to the United Philippines 0.89 22.6 x States has sign ifcant implications for Vietnam El Salvador 0.96 0.92 21,0x 21.9 x world-wide CO2 emissions. Cuba Former USSR 2.91 11.88 6.9 x 1.7x Methodology for Korea Dominican Republic 10.27 1.95 2.0 x 10.3x Estimating Immigrant Canada Guatemala Colombia United Kingdom Jamaica 19.24 0.90 1.36 9.55 4.22 1.0x 22.4 x 14.8 x 2.1 x 4.8 x CO2 Emissions Ore obstacle to estimating annual immigrant and native-born per capita CO2emission rates is that there are no Germany 10.24 2.0 x data that disaggregate rates of these Haiti Honduras Poland Italy Ecuador Iran Peru Brazil Japan 0.21 0.99 7.38 8.35 1.79 6.96 1.12 1.94 9.65 96.0 x 20.3 x 2.7 x 2.4 x 11.3x 2.9 x 18.0x 10.4 x 2.1 x two population cohorts. For that matter, there are also no data that break down per capita CO 2 emission rates along other important categories of the United States, such as by urban vs. suburban vs. rural, rich vs. poor, apartment dwellers vs. homeowners, or by ethnic/racial origin. Oneway around this absence of data is to use Notes: Top-25 countries of origin of immigrant population in the United States, as listed in "Immigrants in the United States, 2007: A Profile of annual income as a surrogate for annual CO2 emissions. Thereis a America's Foreign-Born Population.'9 Countries of origin are listed in order of the size of their immigrant population in the United States. Per capita CO2 emissions from U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 2007.10 aSee endnote 10. b Does not include Taiwan or Hong Kong. c Includes Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Lithuania, and other former Soviet states. strong positive correlation between income and CO2emissions, especially those associated with fossil fuel consumption; that is, an increase in income is associated with an increase, though not necessarily a proportionate increase, in carbon emissions.11 Higher-income Americans simply 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000856-00003 Center for Immigration Studies tend to consume more fossil energy than lower-income Americans, such as by driving instead of taking the bus, longer commutes to larger homes in distant suburbs (large, detached dwellings that take more energy to heat and cool), consuming more goods and services with substantial energy "embodied" in their manufacture production and delivery, taking more airline flights, etc. Rather than assuming that all immigrants in the United States have the same annual per capita CO2 emissions as native-born Americans or the average for the United States as a whole, this study postulates a broad correlation between a person's annual income and his or her annual CO2emissions. This premise is explored and supported by Table2, which lists the per c^cita income and per capita CO2emissions for each of the 25 countries Table 2. Comparison of per Capita Incomes and per Capita CQ Emissions Between U.S. and Top-25 Countries of Origin of Immigrants in the U.S. Country Purchasing Power Parity: Gross National Income per Capita (Dollars, 2005)a U.S. per Capita Purchasing Power Parity/Sending Country per Capita Purchasing Power Parity U.S. CO2 Emissions per Capita/Sending Country CO, Emissions per Papita (2005) United States Mexico China0 India Philippines Vietnam El Salvador Cuba Former USSR0 Korea Dominican Republic Canada Guatemala Colombia United Kingdom Jamaica Germany Haiti Honduras Poland Italy Ecuador Iran Peru Brazil Japan $41,950 $10,030 $6,600 $3,460 $5,300 $3,010 $5,120 $5,200c $10,640 $21,850 $7,150 $32,220 $4,410 $7,420 $32,690 $4,110 $29,210 $1,840 $2,900 $13,490 $28,840 $4,070 $8,050 $5,830 $8,230 $31,410 1.0x 4.2 x 6.4 x 12.1 x 7.9 x 13.9x 18.4x 8.1 x 3.9 x 1.9x 5.9 x 1.3x 9.5 x 5.7 x 1.3x 10.2x 1.4x 22.8 x 14.5 x 3.1 x 1.5x 10.3x 5.2 x 7.2 x 5.1 x 1.3x 1.0x 5.4 x 4.9 x 18.8x 22.6 x 21,0x 21.9 x 6.9 x 1.7x 2.0 x 10.3x 1.0x 22.4 x 14.8 x 2.1 x 4.8 x 2.0 x 96.0 x 20.3 x 2.7 x 2.4 x 11.3x 2.9 x 18.0x 10.4x 2.1 x Notes: * Per capita income data from World Bank, 2007.13 Purchasing power parity is the true exchange rate of different currencies based on differences in standard of living and overall pricing among different nations. b Does not include Taiwan or Hong Kong. c Exact figure not tabulated or provided by Cuban government. Gross national income per capita estimated by the World Bank (2007) to be global lower middle-income ($876-$3,465). For this analysis, the midpoint of this range was used, and then multiplied by 2.4, which was the average factor of increase between gross national per capita income and purchasing power parity for all Latin American countries in the table with a gross national income per capita below $3,465. d Includes Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Lithuania, and other former Soviet states. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000856-00004 Center for Immigration Studies listed in Table 1. This comparison is useful because it income increases, per capita CO 2 emissions increase as depicts the correlation between per capita income and well, although not always in lockstep. In th is study then, per capita CO2emissions from fossil fuel consumption in the same relationship is assumed to hold for different countries from three continents. Figure 1 (p. 6) isascatter populations of immigrants in the United States. plot, in which forali countries except Haiti (astatistical That carbon dioxide emissions are a function of outlier), per capita income ratios (X or horizontal axis) income means that they do not conform to a pattern are plotted against per capita CO 2emissions ratios (Y that environmental economists have observed with or vertical axis). In country after country, as per capita other pollutantsand "negativeexternalities." As national Table 3. Estimated per Capita Income and CQ Emissions by Immigrants' Countries of Origin Number of Immigrants in U.S. (1,000s) Average Annual Income in U.S. Immigrant Income Relative to Average US. Income (Not Native Income) Per Capita CO2 Emissions in Country of Origin (Tons) Per Capita CO2 Emissions in U.S. (tons) Average U.S. Mexico China India Philippines Vietnam El Salvador Cuba Former USSR15 Korea Dominican Republic Canada Guatemala Colombia United Kingdom Jamaica Germany Haiti Honduras Poland Italy Ecuador Iran Peru Brazil Japan All other countries All Immigrants 11,671 2,007 1,704 1,665 999 998 980 973 906 856 699 681 669 590 550 514 514 439 427 418 411 371 354 338 286 7,260 37,280 $35,038 $18,636 $37,943 $50,466 $35,389 $34,867 $20,509 $27,835 $35,007 $35,733 $18,582 $52,015 $18,115 $27,251 $50,791 $32,054 $38,815 $31,264 $19,766 $30,073 $30,734 $27,348 $48,358 $31,163 $30,657 $41,448 $36,816 $29,692 100% 53.2 % 108.3% 144.0 % 101.0% 99.5 % 58.5 % 79.4 % 99.9 % 102.0% 53.0 % 148.5 % 51.7% 77.8 % 145.0 % 91.5% 110.8% 89.2 % 56.4 % 85.8 % 87.7 % 78.1 % 138.0% 88.9 % 87.5 % 118.3% 105.1 % 84.7 % 20.14 3.75 5.90 1.07 0.89 0.96 0.92 2.91 9.02 10.27 1.95 19.24 0.90 1.36 9.55 4.22 10.24 0.21 0.99 7.38 8.35 1.79 6.96 1.12 1.94 9.65 4.19 4.19 20.14 10.71 21.81 29.01 20.34 20.04 11.79 16.00 20.12 20.54 10.68 29.90 10.41 15.66 29.19 18.43 22.31 17.97 11.36 17.29 17.67 15.72 27.80 17.91 17.62 23.82 21.16 17.10 Notes:a Includes immigrants from Taiwan and Hong Kong, apportioned according to their relative frequency in the United States. b Includes immigrants from Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Lithuania, and all other republics formerly in the Soviet Union, apportioned according to their relative frequency in the United States. c Includes air immigrants from other countries not specifically listed in the top-25 countries, broken down (and apportioned according to their relative frequency) by the following regions: Europe, South Asia, East-Southeast Asia, Middle East, Central America, Caribbean, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Oceana Source of "Number of immigrants" and "Average income in U.S." columns: Center for Immigration Studies analysis of March 2007 Current Population Survey (CPS). I ncome figures reflect total income for persons 18 years of age and older. 9 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000856-00005 Center for Immigration Studies economies' incomes and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with the highest number of immigrants in the United increase at first, pollution and environmental blight States (Mexico) to the country in 25 th place (Japan). often increase initially but later decrease as incomes After Japan, an entry for "all other countries" is listed, continue to grow. When graphed, this relationship takes referring to the more than 100 countries that collectively the form of an inverted or upside-down "U." Because account for about a fifth of immigrants to U.S. shores.14 of its similarity to the pattern of inequality and income Thesecond column in Table 3 lists the number first articulated by Nobel Prize-winning economist of immigrants in the United States from the country Simon Kuznets, this pattern of pollution and income identified in the first column as of 200715 The figures in has been dubbed the "Environmental Kuznets Curve" this column do not irdute children born to immigrants (EKC). However, while any number of air and water in the United States. The third column displays the pollutants and aesthetic/ecological assaults, ranging averageannual income of immigrants in the United from rampant deforestation to litter, display this pattern, States from each country. The fourth column compares peak pollution levels occur at different income levels for this income to the average U.S. income in 2007; a figure different pollutants, societies, and time periods.12 above 100 percent (like Canada) means immigrants TheEKC explains societies' behavior when from the country in question earn more on average appl ied to toxic contaminants that are a visible nuisance than Americans do; a figure below 100 percent (like and health threat to large numbers of people, such as Honduras) means they havea lower annual income than lead, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide polluting the Americans on average. air, or raw sewage and industrial effluent defiling water The fifth column is per capita CO 2 emissions bodies. It is less applcable in the case of pollutants or in the immigrants' countries of origin, while the sixth damage that are hidden, dispersed, or cumulative, like and final column is the estimated annual per capita CQ from carbon dioxide emissions or extravagant energy emissions in the United States based on the countries' use. average annual incomes. Comparing columns five and Table 3 (p. 5) uses the average annual per capita six shows the estimated increase in CO 2 emissions that incomes of immigrants in the United States to estimate occurred by the act of immigrating to and living in the immigrants' CO 2 emissions in 2007. These emissions United States. There is clearly great variation in the income are compared to per capita emissions in the immigrant's and CO2output of immigrants in the United States. For home country. The first column lists each immigrant example, Mexican immigrants are estimated to produce home country in descending order, from the country only about half as much CO 2 as the average person in the United States. However, Figure 1. Income vs. CO, Emissions this is still more than double the output of the average person in Mexico. Canadian immigrants on the other hand produce almost 50 percent more in CO 2 emissions as the average person in the United States. The final row of Table 3 shows that the average per capita CO2emissionsforall immigrants in the United States was 4.19 metric tons in their sanding countries. In the United States, those same immigrants had estimated emissions of 17.1 tons, about four times as high as the average per capita emissions in their countries of origin. Thus, the 37.3 million legal and illegal immigrants now living in the United States in 2007 produced about four times as 9 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000856-00006 Center for Immigration Studies much CO2 they would have had they stayed in their compared to just native-born Americans they produce home countries. 82 percent as much. Table4 shows by how many times immigrants OveralI, the more than 37 million immigrants in the United States increased their per capita CO 2 (legal and illegal) living in the United States account for emissions relative to average annual per capita emissions an estimated 637 million metric tons of CO 2emissions in their countries of origin. It is a measure of just how each year or 10.7 percent of the U.S. total of 5,957 much emissions have increased because of immigration million metric tons. This issomewhat below their total to the United States. share of the total population because of their lower It should be noted that native-born Americans average income. Based on estimates developed by the haveaslightly higher annual per capita income ($36,008) Center for Immigration Studies we est mate that of the than the overall average in the United States ($35,038) 637 million tons of CO 2 emitted by immigrants, 83 shown in Table 3. This is because the overall American perait is from legal immigrantsand 17 percent is from average includes both native-born and foreign-born illegal immigrants. Although about 30 perait of the Americans' incomes and the inclusion of immigrants 37.3 million immigrants living in the United States in pulls the national average down somewhat. Thus, while March 2007 are est mated to be illegal aliens, they have Table 3 shows that immigrants on average produce much lower average incomes than legal immigrants. 16 about 85 percent as much CO 2 as the average person For this reason illegal immigrants produce a smaller (immigrant or native-born) living in the United States, share of CO 2 emissions than legal immigrants. Illegal immigrants also produce significantly less than native born Americans. Table 4. Factor of Increase in CQ Emissions Country Estimated per Capita CO Emissions of Immigrants in U.S. / per Capita CO2 Emissions of Countries of Origin Mexico China India Philippines Vietnam El Salvador Cuba Former USSR Korea Dominican Republic Canada Guatemala Colombia United Kingdom Jamaica Germany Haiti Honduras Poland Italy Ecuador Iran Peru Brazil Japan All other countries All immigrants 2.9 x 3.7 x 27.1 x 22.9 x 20.9 x 12.x 5.5 x 2.2 x 2.0 x 5.5 x 1.6x 11.6x 11.5x 3.1 x 4.4 x 2.2 x 85.6 x 11.5x 2.3 x 2.1 x 8.8 x 4.0 x 16.0 x 9.1 x 2.5 x 5.1 x 4.1 x Impact of U.S. Immigration on Global Emissions It is instructive to put the estimated output of immigrants into context. The estimated 637 million tons of CO 2 emissions generated by immigrants is roughly equal to the annual CO 2 emissions of Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela combined (the three largest emitting countries in South America). It is also equal to the CQemissions of Great Britain and Sweden together. If immigrants in the United States were a separate country, they would rank seventh in world CO 2 emissions, behind China, the United States, Russia, Japan, India, and Germany. Of course, if immigrants had stayed in their home countries, they also would have produced greenhouse gases. If the current stock of immigrants in the United States had stayed in their countries of origin rather than migrating to the United States, their estimated annual CO2 emissions would have been only 155 metric tons, assuming these immigrants had the average level of CQ emissions for a person living in their home countries. This is 482 million tons less than the estimated 637 tons they will produce in the United States. This482 million ton increase represents the impact of immigration on global emissions. It is equal to approximately 5 percent of the increase in annual world-wide CO 2 emissions since 1980.17 If the482 million ton increase in global CO2 emissions caused by immigration to the United States were a separate country, it would rank 10th in the world. Immigration to the United States thus 9 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000856-00007 Center for Immigration Studies has sign ifcant implications for global greenhouse gas immigration and population growth contribute to emissions. And it is the total output that matters to CQ greenhouse gas em issions. concentrations in the atmosphere, because CO2 emitted anywhere is dispersed everywhere. Conclusion It should be noted that Tables 3 and 4 are based on the assumption that immigrants in the United States Ovsral I, our findings indicate that the average immigrant would have emitted CO2at rates like the average person (legal or illegal) in the United States produces somewhat in their country of origin if they had remained there. less CO2 than the average native-born American. However, in certain cases, particularly Asian countries, However, immigrants in the United States produce this assumption may understate immigrants' actual about four times more CO2 in the United States as they emission rates if they had stayed in their home countries would have in their countries of origin. Theestimated because immigrants in the United States from several 637 metric tons of CO2 U .S. immigrants produce is 482 Asian countries are more educated than is the average million tons more than they would have produced had person in their home countries. Higher education they remained in their home countries. This482 million levels should result in higher incomes and higher CO 2 ton increase represents about 5 percent of the increase emissions in their home countries. This would mean in annual world-wide CO2 emissions since 1980. These that the immigrant-induced increase in global emissions figures do not include the impact of children born to would be lower than estimated above. However, there is immigrants in the United States. If they were included, astrong reason to believe that even if C (Remissions were the impact would beeven higher. higher for immigrants from these countries it would not When it comes to dealing with global warming, significantly change the above estimates. environmentalists in the United States have generally If we assume that immigrants from India chosen to adopt what might be described as piecemeal would have produced three times the CO 2 emissions efforts to oppose new sources of fossi I fuel-based energy, as the average person in that country and that those such as the construction of new coal-fired power plants. from China, the Philippines, and Vietnam would They have also supported energy conservation/efficiency have doubled, it changes the underlying findings only (e.g., compact fluorescent light bulbs) and more use of slightly.18 Even making this assumption of much higher renewable sources like wind and solar energy. But they emissions in their home countries would still mean that have assiduously avoided the underlying issue of growing immigrants overall would produce 3.7 times as much energy demand driven by immigration-fueled population CO2 in the United States as they would have in their growth. In response to concerns over immigrant-induced home counties. Thiss very similar to the 4.1-fold population growth, some American environmentalists increase found in Table4. It must be remembered that have even argued that it does not matter where on the highly educated immigrants from Asia account for a Earth people live because the world's environment is so modest share of al I immigrants in this country. It also interconnected. This anales has shown that when it should be remembered that immigrants from the largest comes to CO 2 emissions it matters a great deal where sending country, Mexico, have very similar education people live. Per escita CO 2emissionsare dramatically levels to the average person in that country. Moreover, higher in the United States than in almost every even if their emissions were much higher in their home immigrant-sending country. Large-scale immigration to countries, their output would still be much less than in the United States therefore has enormous implications the United States. for world-wide CO2emissions. Assuming no change in U.S. immigration Some may be tempted to see this analysis as policy, 30 million new legal and illegal immigrantsare "blaming immigrants" for what are really America's likely to settle in the United States in the next 20 year^9 failures. It is certainly reasonable to argue that Americans Primarily because of immigration (new immigrants pits could do much more to reduce per capita emissions. And their descendents), the U.S. population is projected to it is certainly not our intention to imply that immigrants grow by more than 20 percent over this time period, or are particularly responsible for global warming. As we by at least 60 million.20 Even if per capita CQ emissions report in thisstudy, immigrants produce somewhat less could be reduced by 20 percent in the United States CO2 on average than native-born Americans. But to over the next 20 years, total annual U.S. CO2 emissions simply dismiss the large role that continuing high levels would remain the same. Total emissions are what matters of immigration play in increasing U.S. and worldwide for the global environment. Efforts to reduce greenhouse CO2 emissions is not only intellectually dishonest, it gas emissions must include some understanding of how is also counter-productive. One must acknowledge a 9 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000856-00008 Center for Immigration Studies problem before a solution can be found. The effect of Some involved in the global warming issue immigration is certainly not trivial. If immigrants in the have recognized immigration's importance. Chief U.S. United States were their own country, they would rank climate negotiator and special representative for the seventh in the world in annual CO 2 output, ahead of United States, Harlan Watson, has acknowledged high such countries as Canada, France, and Great Britain. immigration to the United States is thwarting efforts to Unless there is a change in immigration policy, slow its rising GHG emissions. "It's simple arithmetic," 30 million (legal and illegal) immigrants are likely to said Watson. "If you look at mid-century, Europe will be settle in the United States over the next 20 years. One can at 1990 levels of population while ours will be nearing 60 still argue for high levels of immigration for any number percent above 1990 levels. So population does matter.21 of reasons. However, one cannot make the argument for This research confirms Watson's observation. high immigration without at least understanding what it means for global efforts to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. Endnotes 5 Bloomberg News. 2007. "China overtakes U.S. in greenhouse gas emissions." International Herald Tribune 1 R. Beck, L. Kolankiewicz, and S.A. Camarota.2003. June 20. Accessed 3-19-08 online at: http://www.iht. Outsmarting Smart Growth: Papulation Growth, oom/art i cles/2007/06/20/busi ness/em i t. php. Immigration, and the Problem of Sprawl . Wash i ngton, 6 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information DC: Center for Immigration Studies. Available at http:// www.cis.org/articles/2003/sprawl .htm I. Administration. 2007. International Energy Annual 2005. Table H1cco2: World Per C^cita Carbon Dioxide 2 Committeeon theScienoeof Climate Change, National Emissions from the Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels, 1980-2005. Posted October 1,2007. Accessed 2-5 Research Council, National Academy of Sciences. 2001. Climate Chancp Science: An Analysis of Some Key 08 online at: http://www.eiadoe.gov/pub/international/ Questions National Academies Press: Washington, DC; iealf/tableh1coo2.xls Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2007. Climate Chan^ 2007: ThePhysical Science Basis -- Summary for Policymakers Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. 7 For more discussion of this issue see L. Kolankiewicz. 2002. Population Growth -- The Neglected Dimension of America's Persistent ErergyTEnvironmental Problems October. NumbersUSA Education and Research Foundation. Avai lable onl i ne afittp://www. numbersusa. oom/about/books.html. 3 Coal: Fned Freme, Energy Information Administration (El A). 2007. U.S. Coal Supply and Demand -- 2006 f^view. April. Accessed onlineat: http://www.eia.doe. gov/cneaf/coal/page/special/feature.html; Petroleum: El A. 2007. Petroleum Products Consumption. Accessed online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/infoshffits/ petroleumproductsconsumption.html; Natural oas: EIA. 2008. Natural gas total consumption MMcf. Accessed online at: http://tonto.eia.cte.gov/dnav/ng/ h st/ n9140us2A. htm. 8 The Center for Immigration Studies projections are in 100 Million More: Projecting the Impact of Immigration On the U.S. Population, 2007 to 2060, which can be found at: www.cis.org/articles/2007/back707.html. A recant Rsw Hispanic Center report estimated that 82 percent of population growth between 2005 and 2050 will be from immigrants and their descendents. Theeport , U.S. Population Projections: 2005-2050, can be found at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/85.pdf. The last time the Census Bureau did population projections 4 Pi lot projects to capture and sequester carbon dioxide -- thus circumventing its release to the atmosphere -- are now underway, but whether "carbon capture and sequestration" on a huge scale will ever prove technically feasible and economically vidale is highly uncertain at this juncture. under different immigration scenarios was in 2000. Table F of the methodology section of that report shows the impact of different immigration scenarios on U.S. population size. See " Methodology and Assumptions for the Population Projections of the United States: 1999 to 2100": U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division Working Raper No. 38. Issued January 13, 2000. 9 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000856-00009 Center for Immigration Studies Available at http://www.oensus.gov/population/www/ 13 World Bank. 2007. World Development Indicators projections/natproj. html. 2007. Table 1.1: Size of the economy. Accessed 02-04 9 SA Camarota. 2007. "Immigrants in the United States, 2007: A Profile of America's Foreign-Born 08 online at http://www.siteresouroes.worldbank.org/ DATASTATISTICS/RESOURCES/teble1_1 .pdf. Population." Washington, DC: Center for Immigration 14 Includes al I immigrants from other countries not Studies Backgrounc^r. November. specifically listed in the top-25 countries, broken down 10 Energy Information Administration. 2Qdhtemational EnergyAnnual 2005. Table H1coo2: World Per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels, 1980-2005. Posted October 1, (and apportioned according to their relative frequency) by the following regions: Europe, South Asia, East Southeast Asia, Middle East, Central America, Caribbean, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Oceana 2007. Accessed 2-5-08 online at: http://www.eia.doe. 15 Thefiguresare from the March 2007 Current gov/pub/international/iealf/tableh1cco2.xls. Population Survey collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. 11 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. 2008. Emissions of Greenhouse Gases Report. Report No.: DOE/EIA-0573(2006). http:// www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/carbon.html, released November 28, 2007: "In the longer run, residential [carbon] emissions are affected by population growth The numbers are for all persons from each country. The income figures are based on the total income of persons 18 and older. Most researchers think about 90 percent of illegal immigrants respond to the Survey. This the figures in the table represent the total income of immigrants and natives. and income;" Proceedings of the National Academy 16 Based on the March 2007 Current Population Survey of Sciences. 2007. Vol. 104, No. 24. Published online which is the primary datasource used in this study for Mey 22, 2007. http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/ immigrants, we estimate that the average annual income full/104/24/10288: "Nearly constant or slightly of illegal immigrants over age 18 was $17,497. We increasing trends in the carbon intensity of energy also estimate that the average annual income for legal [emissions/energy] have been recently observed in both immigrants 18 and older was $34,473. In effect, illegal developed and developing regions;" Panel on Policy immigrants account for 18 percent of the aggregate Implications of Greenhouse Warming, National Academy ncomeearned by all immigrantsand legal immigrants of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, Committee on Science, Engineering, and Pubi ic Pol icy. 1992. Policy Implicationsof Greenhouse Warming: Mitigation, Adaptation, and the Science Base . National Academies Press: Washington, DC. From Appendix N, Population Growth and Greenhouse Gas account for 82 percent of the aggregate income. For more discussion of the characteristics of the illegal immigrants see "Immigrants in the United States 2007: A Profile of America's Foreign-born Population," available at www. cis.org/articles/2007/back1007.html. Emissions: "Annual CO2 emissions are calculated from 17 The March 2007 Current Population Survey shows population and income projections. It is assumed that that the vast majority of immigrants in the United States CO2 emissions increase proportionately with population arrived in 1980 or later. Global CO, emissions from fuel for all income levels. For low income levels (i.e., multiples consumption and flaring were 18,331 million metric below five), it is assumed that CQemissionsadditionally increase proportionately with per capita income growth. For higher incomes, CO 2 emissions increase less than proportionately with per capita income growth (i.e., at 0.8 for income multiples betwean five and 10, 0.7 for multiples betwean 10 and 30, and 0.6 for higher multiples)." tons in 1980. Global emissions in 2005 were 28,193 million metric tons. Thusjannual world output of CO2 increased by 9,862 million metric tons during this quarter-century, or 54 percent. The estimated increase in immigrants' CO2 emissions in the United States over what they would have been in their countries of origin is 482 million metric tons. 12 New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2 nd edition, Accessed May 1,2008at:http://www9.georgetown.edu/ feculty/aml6/pdfe&zips/F^lgraveEKC.pdf. is Iran is another country whose immigrants in the United States are much more educated than the average person in Iran. Wedo not adjust their assumed output for the following reason: Iran has relatively high per capita emissions for a developing country mainly 90 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000856-00010 Center for Immigration Studies because of the flaring of natural gas associated with its 20 Projections by the Census Bureau, the Center for oil industry. However, much of the oil Iran produces Immigration Studies, and the Pew H ispanic Center all is consumed outside of I ran. Thus the actual per capita show that the U.S. population grows by about 1 percent output actually attributable to fossil fuel consumption each year. This, over a 20 year period, population growth by the people of Iran is less than is implied by their per is very roughly 20 percent. The Center for Immigration capita numbers found in Tables 3 and 4. So it makes Studies projections can be found at, www.cis.org/ Iittlesense to adjust their figures upward in the way articles/2007/back707.html. The Pew Hispanic Center wedo India, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Of estimatescan be found at: http://pewhispanic.org/files/ course, this means that immigration from Iran to the reports/85.pdf. The Census projections can be found at: United States representsan even larger impact on world http ://www.oensus.gov/i pc/www/usi nteri mproj /. wide CO 2 emissions because emissions caused by the consumption of the people of that country are actually 21 Doyle, Allister. Aug 30, 2007. Reuters Newsservice, lower than implied by the tables. http: / /africa reuters.com/wi re/ news/usn L30472039. html. 19 In recant years the Current Population Survey and the American Community Survey, both collected by the Census Bureau, have indicated that about 1.5 million new immigrants settle in the country each year. There is some undercount in these surveys of recently arrived immigrants, and therefore it is more likely that 1.6 million new immigrants arrive each year. The Pew Hispanic Center assumes a 5.2 percent undercount in the overall immigrant population. This is based research by Passel, Van Hook, and Bean as part of a Census Bureau contract through Sabre Systems. But even assuming only 1.5 million new arrivals would still place the total number of new arrivals over 20 years at 30 million --1.5 x 30. It is also worth noting that immigration to the United States, both legal and illegal, has been steadily increasing for 40 years. If that long-standing trend continues, then significantly more than 30 million new immigrants will arrive in the United States, assuming no change in policy. 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA 99 ED_001523_00000856-00011 17CV1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED 001523 00000856-00012 Backgrounder Immigration to the United States and World-Wide Greenhouse Gas Emissions By Steven A Camarota and Leon Kolankiewicz The findings of thisstudy i ndicate that future levels of immigration will ha/e a significant impact on effortsto reduceglobal CO 2emissions Immigration totheUnited States significantly increases world-wide CQemjssions because it transfers population from lower-polluting pats of the world totheUnited States; which isahi^na-polluting country. On average immigrants increase their omissions four-fold by coming to America Among the findings Theestimated CO 2emissionsoftheavaageimmigrant (legal or i 11 egal) i n the u ni ted States ere 18 percent I ess than those of the a/erage native-born American. Howo/er, immigrantsin theUnited States produce an estimated four times more CO 2 n theUnited States as th^< would havein their countries of origin. 10-08 Center for Immigration Studies 1522 K Street, NVV Suite 820 Washington, DC 20005-1202 (202) 466-8185 (202) 466-8076 center@ds.org www.ds.org &KULVL )H3-0L )LRP 6H3V 7R &F 6XHvHW SMEFKFHW /XBWN\ L -R3W<DQL /XBW/N^ -RlWmFSCM JFY! 0R3D\ L -XD\L 1 L 1 5] - L 5] i _ l 30 &KULVl )H2-DL PDULGEM BJDH3C><M3^ JRf L -+DPPLVW/ L -HQLIHJ L /L L 5\OEQGL </ 6KHUJKL1 5( L )2,$L 5HEXHW- (3$- +4| 1 5] - | F - T )2,$L hT t L 3LFGKRALR3- 6H/VL L - 1 - 331 Z ] L UL ,QL LHSFQH- V\RL \R<UL )U+GPL RI L ,QIRJFDALFQl $RAA- IWW- GWG- OD\ G L 1 M L J 5H !! !! h - T L (3$l LVl FCNLGJl W<H- ILGDDL SJFGXRALFQ1- RI L G3FXFHM IRJ-W<H- DJU+GL XSFC ! c LV\RL $XJXW- : p ' < 3RJ/\LFQP RI L UHSFQ/LYH- G3FXFHM IOHL B+QL UH3DR/\IH )2,$l H[HPSALTCX/l l DCGl |- l DP GW- RPWdP IDFH- RI LV\KHL UFFRJG/^ L ,QL DGGWRX L D OEFXFHWLVmD3 L HTOLQJ- - h L SDJH/n L KDvHL B+QL Z/\KKFOGL lQLVmUL HWJUHM L XIHJ ) G-OE-LDALYH- SURFHPP SULYLCHJH^ L <R<L ZU3OL UFFHLYH- DL VLPLDUl FH/VDJH-WOEKJK- )2,$R2DLCH DFFHA/L V\KH - OEFXFHWL $VL GLVFXMGL FQL 0D\L - P : L (3$L ZEX/L V\RL SUR2XFH- OEFXFHWL IRJ-W<H- GULRZH3L < \R<L ZRXDGL DG/LVH- LI L \RXL ZLVKlV\Rl SXLMXH- \RXLP UHD<HW- IXLJ/\KHJ^ L $VL ZH GLPFXPHP FQL UMDOL FFDLCXP RJL R/mj- UFFRJGP H[SCDL1GJ L RJL IWJL DQL H[SOEEiWFQL Ri L 8CFDQl 3RZHJ 3CDQl ZRCGl SLHWV- BWG- - G H n L V\RL h H I! L SUFRWjH- GWL E\L IHSFQ/LYH- UHG1GP GxULGJ PAI^ DIVXHJ $XJXW- : P P 7KLVl LVl B-RWH- ILCD0L]H3l FQlV\IW- GM L DCGLW<H- ILDDL LPCH- FfWU/L GLI IHjHW- YDQxHP RPW<H- QXPBU E\ " " L HjHIRJH l vm- QUURZH3L GM UDQJH- LVL W<H- UDQJH- UFDRGK)\L OLN-D\L V\RL L 3CHZVH- FRWW- 0DULGDl AX/ZH3O L MWV- 8QMH3L /W/L WRJCHP L E\L SKFCHL <njLoei pfWzmk l dq\ l tx-w\lfcml rjl ffqfhucv^ l L d 1 !! 1 7KDCN - W L -FOW<DQl /XBWN\l & L i|uL W I LUL:}v-| Z-, vL L A L tv L-W v - L UL D n L L L L UL L L L I L L L LW1 L L J [ d pLW i Z ] L & - o ]L n L J D & - o ]L :h / /J >tJ d P XKZ'J A y Z LW1 8K/J LZ W y L W L r ,YL rL L L I L L rL L L L L L L Z ] L UL d Z -| v I L }pL (}L + n ]vPL } p L j vL: p v L L L UL L L L L L v t H p ] vL ]]}vL o - L D L )X v - n - -] } v n oL L XL /L j ] o oL I d Z -, v I L } M L UL : } vn L Z n vL - ] + P-pL L L j L L } & L } uZ W g n L o oe }L Wo& ] l ll^ l l o ]L 0;h zj >tJ dI ,l A L D/ } VVW L UL D L L L L UL L L L L L L L V\A L L W)L 17cv1906 Sierra Club v. EPA ED_001523_00000857-00001