Document KGQ3o23RB3gq2Xwoq2e9qdwn6

^Goodrich INTER-O&GANIZATlON CORRESPONDENCE TO MIKE BRECKENRIDGE FIELD POINT OR DEPT. 8c 81DG NO. RESIN MANUFACTURING MANAGER FROM FIELD POINT OR OEPI. & BLDG. NO. ISIAH SUBJECT PARKER "A" SHIFT FOREMAN - RESIN FLAQUEMINE PLANT REPETITIVE INCIDENT - TYPE 15 MISCELLANEOUS - MONITORING EXPOSURE ABOVE 1 PPM , DATE YOUR LETTER DATE THIS LETTER 07/13/92 SUMMARY On May 27, 1992, wore personnel monitoring badges to sample their exposure to VCM vapors during that day. both samples indicated levels above 1 PPM during the period worn, without the use of respiratory protection. Neither employee reported any unusual physical effects. BOARD OF REVIEW A Board of Review was conducted on June 24, 1992. people were present: The following C. Bayard - Plant Manager M. Breckenridge - Mfg. Manager T. J. Gui1lot - Prod. Coordinator M. Comeaux - Safety Foreman J. Richards - Process Engineer M. Thompson - Environmental Spec H. Catoir - Frod/Maint Coord. D . Pre jean - Safety Ass't. - Operator Tech Resin Foreman NARRATIVE The day on which the employees were monitored was basically routine. Mr. as Resin Foreman, did not knowingly have an opportunity to wear respiratory protection. He made several trips through each reactor area and the VC Recovery Area. He did not notice any VC (Vinyl Chloride) leaks. as Shift Floater, spent most of the day cleaning up in the finishing building (non-regulated area). However, approximately 3 hours of Mr time was spent in Train I area to clean the pit under ID autoclave. was also involved in this task. Neither man noticed any high concentrations of VC vapors during that task. No respiratory protection was worn by during the day he wore the monitor. FACTS SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT 1. The value of 1.79 PPM was the result of Mr. Weighted Average) sampling. TWA (Time 2. The value of 1.93 PPM was the result of . TWA sampling. redacted nn" NGC 13682 3. K. . authorised the entry to clean the pit under the autoclave. The readings from the gastech meter indicated allowable limits, not requiring respiratory equipment. 4. The area reading from the chromatograph on the day of the incident was not unusually high. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 3. HVESTIGAT ION 1. Neither individual is knowledgeable as to where he may have come into a high concentration of VC to give a TWA above one. The pit cleaning task is the only incident that both employees worked on together during the day of the monitoring. 2. Mr. have been trained on vessel entry and have performed this task imny Limes. 3. There was no safety rule violation. CONCLUSIONS The two probable sources of hinh concentration which could have caused the exposure are: fugitive omissions within the reaction area, and intermittent high concentrations in the resin being removed during the pit cleaning. CORRECTIVE ACTION 1. Evaluate the use of Canister Respirators 2. All foremen will be mem hen. s of VCM Exposure Reduction Task Force to 'e': low their exposures M. Comeaux T.J. Guillot 3. Increa- 1 emphasis on actions taken from area chromat ...graph monitor i rrj Re sin For email 4. Wear air respirator while cleaning reactor pits T. J. Guillot Isiah W. Parker pc: Board of Review Managers All Foremen NGC 13683