Document GkjXnR40qVv2daVGkzVydpBv
26, Thursday, 2000
Combustion Engineering Knew Asbestos Caused Asbestosis and Lung Cancer
Combustion Engineering Knew of Health Hazards of Asbestos
1. 1919-1983, C-E publishes Combustion magazine.
In 1936, Combustion (Vol. 7 No. 7, lan. 1936) recommended Dust , by S. Cyril Blacktin.
"Dust is recommended as an authoritative reference work for research engineers, plant managers, health officials and all
who have to deal with the dust problem in manufacturing, science and disease." (p.42)
2.
1930-1939, C-E receives Engineering and The
Both engineering magazines
Engineer .
discuss the hazards of asbestos.
C-E advertises in magazine and
has articles about C-E product
developments in magazine.
3. 1934-1939, C-E receives Mechanical
Mechanical Engineering,
Engineering as part of its membership in the
published by ASME, carried
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
articles on toxic dust, which included asbestos. The magazine
(ASME).
also published Philip Drinkers;
Uses and Limitations of Respiratory Protection. C-E executives were members and officers of ASME and attended their meetings.
? 1930-1963, C-E and future subsidiaries are
In 1931, E.R.A. Merewether's
members of American Ceramics Society and
article on "Effects of Asbestos
receive The Bulletin, Ceramic Abstracts , which contain many articles on asbestos related
Dust on the Lungs and Dust Suppression in the Asbestos Industry," abstracted.
diseases and preventative measures.
Dozens of articles on the health
hazards of asbestos were
abstracted over the years.
?
1934, Refractories & Insulation (R&I becomes
R&I was sued in 1963 by Marie
C-E subsidiary 1963) begins making asbestos containing pipe insulation, block insulation and insulating cement.
Vicelich, the widow of an insulator who died of asbestos caused lung cancer. This case was discussed in C-E's
negotiations with the company and
the sale agreement mentions the
case. C-E paid $25,000 on the
claim. (scan in document and link
here)
6. 1949, C-E member in American Petroleum
Access to work of Dr. Phillip
Institute; Foster Wheeler was also a member of
Drinker and Roy Bonsib, chief
the API.
safety expert for Standard Oil, later (Esso) Exxon.
In 1949, experts at Exxon knew
that asbestos caused cancer and
that the exposures of bricklayers,
insulators and others put them at
risk.
Used Dr. Drinker to lobby
ACIGH for lower TLVs
Despite their knowledge of TLVs
(however corrupted by the
industry), C-E stated that they
never advised workers of such
threshold limit values or relied on
them.
Quote:
"Sept. 30, 1970 Potter and Borel
interrogatories.
Q: "Have you ever advised those using
your products of your so-called threshold
limits?"
A: "This defendant has no so-called
`threshold limits' of its own for any
product it manufactures or sells."
7. 1963, C-E/R&I plant dust study by Pennsylvania.
lan Lieben, MD, Director of the division of Occupational Health, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania made recommendations to the plant manager of the C-E/R&I plant regarding asbestos dust abatement and industrial hygiene.
http://www.egilman.com/ce/Combustion%20Engineering/CEOverview.htm
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26, Thursday, 2000 8. 9.
10.
11.
Combustion Engineering Knew Asbestos Caused Asbestosis and Lung Cancer
1966, 91 Plant workers Chest X-rays positive for asbestos. 1969, workers were tested again and at least one worker who had asbestosis in 1966, had died of lung cancer in 1969.
Dec. 23, 1966 Claude Tomplait v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. (1967 USDC TX)
1969, C-E placed began to place a label on some of the asbestos products it made. As the Borel case proved, this label was inadequate for warning workers of the hazards of asbestos.
Through their own study of plant workers, C-E knew that their own workers were dying of lung cancer from asbestos exposure.
C-E also received recommendations to institute an industrial hygiene program to abate the asbestos dust problem and protect workers from breathing the deadly dust.
C-E was sued and answered interrogatories in this case in 1968. In these, they said that they had not warned workers about the hazards of asbestos because it was "not dangerous." Moreover, they did not warn workers that respirators gave them a "false sense of security."
Acting on the advice of industry spokespeople, C-E placed a "cautionary" label on some of the asbestos products it manufactured. According to their ATI in Potter (March 30, 1970)
1972, C-E begins reformulation of its products to become asbestos-free.
( They did not, however, place "cautionary" labels on the asbestos-containing materials that they manufactured for Kaiser, even though it was the same product.
They began this reformulation in response to worries about the future of asbestos products.
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