Document Ev8Lx7XwvEmMxxYGkxjongpk0

r ABD00036610 VISTA CHEMICAL COMPANY ABERDEEN, MISSISSIPPI HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY FOR THE NEW MODULE January 25, 1995 TEAM SIGNATURE: Terry Barnes Daniel Flippo Jerald Uptain Lee Roy Howell Joe Shackelford Allen Bodron ABD00036611 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.0 Hazop Study Summary...........................................................................................3 2.0 Purpose.........................................................................................................................3 2.1 Rational For Selecting HAZOP As The Preferred PHA......................................................................4 3.0 Scope..............................................................................................................................5 4.0 Risk Ranking Procedure ........................................................................... 6 5.0 Summary of Hazards and Recommendations 5.1 Preliminary Hazard Identification ............................. 9 5.2 Hazards Identified FromP&ID Review...............................10 5.3 Past Incidents...........................................................................................23 5.4 Facility Siting.....................................................................................28 5.5 EPA Release List.....................................................................................28 6.0 Human Factors........................................................................................................2 9 6.1 Human Factors Recommendations...................................................49 7.0 Methodology 7.1 Introduction............................................................................................5 0 7.2 Team Members.................................................................................................52 7.3 Documents Referenced..........................................................................53 Appendix A. Summary of All Team Recommendations .... 54 Appendix B. Team Leader Training Documentation........................57 Appendix C. Employee Participation Documentation. ... 59 Appendix D. HAZOP Analysis Data Forms...............................................63 Appendix E. P&ID's........................................................................................................314 Appendix F. OSHA PSM Regulation 29CFR 1910.119........................345 2 ABD00036612 1.0 Hazop Study Summary As a result of the New Module Hazop study, 13 hazards were identified that had a risk ranking of 4. No hazards were identified having a risk ranking of 1, 2, or 3. The thirteen hazards requiring mitigation are listed in section 5.2. Documentation of all hazards identified is in Appendix D. In section 5.3, the team reviewed past incidents and near misses that were considered in the Old Module Hazop but had no additional recommendations based on the review. The team recommends a siting study for the New Module. Also recommended are four VCM release modeling scenarios listed in section 5.5. In section 6.1, the team lists six recommendations which came as a result of human factors considered. A listing of all team recommendations is in Appendix A. 2.0 Purpose The New Module HAZOP was conducted for the following purposes: Provide Management and Operations personnel with the knowledge of where potential hazards exist in the New Module. Provide safe operation documentation for the system. Provide a quantitative assessment of the risks involved with the operation of the system. Provide documentation that risk management is taking place at the Aberdeen Plant. Provide training on HAZOP methodology and techniques for Vista personnel. Make recommendations which the team feels should reduce the risks identified. Performing a HAZOP study is generally an assurance that if procedural and/or engineering modifications are implemented to mitigate risk, the plant will then be operating under some lower risk. It is not, however, a guarantee that hazardous events or operating problems will not be encountered. 3 ABD00036613 2.1 Rational For Selecting HAZOP As The Preferred PHA HAZOP studies were chosen to fulfill OSHA's 29 CFR 1910.119 PHA requirement because of the size and complexity of the processes being studied, as well as the volume of acutely hazardous materials stored at the Aberdeen Plant. 4 ABD00036614 3.0 Scope Vista Chemical Company operates a nominal capacity 540 million pound per year PVC plant located in Aberdeen, MS. The plant polymerizes VCM in batch reactors to produce PVC. The New Module is the subject of this HAZOP study. The New Module HAZOP covers all equipment and piping shown on the New Module P&ID's. A P&ID list is given in section 7.3. The hazard identification study focused on the following potential hazards: Personal injury/death resulting from: Fire Explosion Toxic exposure Chemical Contact Thermal Burns Asphyxiation Impact injury Equipment/Property damage resulting from: Fire Explosion Corrosion Misoperation Overpressure Overheating Production loss resulting from: Equipment Damage Power failure Maintenance Turnarounds Equipment failure Environmental excursions resulting from: Spills Vapor Releases Emissions Waste Water Excursions Human Factors Past Incidents Facility Siting 5 ABD00036615 4.0 Risk Ranking Procedure The risk of each hazard identified during the HAZOP analysis was quantified by the following risk ranking procedure: Consequence Ranking Consequence Level I. Major II. High III. Medium IV. Low/None EXPECTED RESULTS OR IMPACT Employee Safety Equipment and/or Production * Loss of Life * Severe Injury * Health Effects * Permanent,total, or partial disability. * Hospitalization of 2 more people. Damage or Losses in excess of $1MM * Moderate Injury or Health affect * Temporary Disability * Restricted Duty * Medical Treatment of 5 or more people * Hospitalization of 2 or more people Damage or Losses of $100M - $1MM * Minor injury or health effects * First Aid, Minor Medical Treatment * Exposure above OSHA limits * Damages or Losses of $10M - $100M * Significant operating problem or nuisance No Impact Less than $10M Community and/or Environment * Damage or Injuries, * Widespread evacuation. * Lasting effect on community. * Minor damage or health effects on community. Media coverage or large reportable release. * Irritant/ Nuisance * Small reportable release No Impact 6 ABD00036616 Probability Rating A. Frequent Expected to occur at least once per year. B. Probable Expected to occur a number of times during the life of a facility. (Once every 2 years to once every 100 years). C. Possible Expected to occur no more than once during the life of a facility, (once every 100 years to 10,000 years). D. Remote - Very unlikely to occur during the life of the facility or is physically impossible. RISK RANKING MATRIX. Probability A I1 B 2 C 3 II 2 3 4 III 3 4 5 IV 4/5 5 5 D 4/5 5 5 5 1. Extreme Immediate mitigation of shutdown is required. 2. Excessive Risk Mitigation planning should begin immediately. Corrective action should be completed within 3 months. 3. Undesirable Corrective action to mitigate risk should be implemented within 12 months. 4. Marginal Review existing safety controls and/or procedures to ensure their proper use and adequacy. Complete review and take necessary corrective action within 24 months. 5. Low Risk No mitigation required. 7 ABD00036617 Notes: 1) For items I-D and IV - A, team should select the appropriate risk level depending upon the circumstances. 2) The timing guidelines for mitigation apply only to existing facilities. Design HAZOP1s items should be addressed prior to AFE. 3) Mitigation can include a more detailed hazard review that results in lowering the risk ranking. It may also include temporary administrative or procedural revisions to lessen the risk until permanent physical change can be implemented. A risk ranking of 1 must be brought to the immediate attention of the appropriate plant management personnel, It should not be left until the final HAZOP report is issued. 8 ABD00036618 5.0 Summary of Hazards and Recommendations 5.1 Preliminary Hazard Identification During the initial stage of the HAZOP, the team prepared a preliminary list of potential hazards likely to be encountered during the study. This served to establish the team's mind-set in hazard identification and focus attention during the study. The preliminary hazard identification yielded the following four hazards: * Fire - resulting from the ignition of a flammable material potentially causing physiological injury and or equipment damage. * Explosion - resulting from equipment overpressurization causing physiological injury due to missile fragment proj ectiles. * Toxic exposure - resulting from personnel exposure to an acutely hazardous material potentially causing physiological injury and or death. VCM was identified to a be potentially exposed material. * Bumps/Falls - resulting from misplaced equipment and/or tight operating spaces. 9 ABD00036619 5.2 List of Hazards Identified From P&ID Review The hazards appearing in this list are those that have a risk ranking of 4 or higher. These hazards require some sort of review or mitigation within the next two years. All hazards found in the study, including those with a risk ranking of 5, can be found in Appendix D. No hazards were identified having a risk ranking of 1, 2, or 3. Thirteen hazards were identified having a risk ranking of 4. New Module HAZOP Critical Rank: 4, IV A Marginal Risk = Medium Consequence = Frequent Occurrence Deviation : Low Temperature Equipment Number: DM-131 Equipment Description: Decal Tank Cause: 1) Process water valve left open 2) Charge water tank too cold 3) Decal tank not used for extended period 4) Charge water too cold Consequence: 1) Cold Reactor charge 2) Production loss 3) Hurts resin quality Suggested Mitigation: Install alarm or message on DCS to alert the lead cperator that the decal tank is too cold to charge. Resolution: Comments: 10 ABD00036620 New Module HAZOP Critical Rank: 4, Marginal Risk II = High Consequence C = Possible Occurrence Deviation: High Pressure Equipment Number: DM-741,742,743,744,& 745 Equipment Description: NM PVC Reactors Cause: 1. Loss of cooling water 2 . Loss of agitation 3 . Too much catalyst 4 . Reactor full - over charge 5 . Reactor vent failure 6 . Condenser dirty 7. Power failure 8 . DCS failure 9 . Cooling water to warm 10 . Multiple kill systems failure 11. Temp. indicator/controller failure Consequence: 1. VCM release 2 . Personnel exposure/injury 3 . Fire/explosion - death 4 . Safety disk blows/Relief valve lift 5 . Early kill 6 . Reactor overpressure /damage 7 . Loss of production/reactor downtime 8. Bad quality product Suggested Mitigation: Team recommends that existing procedures and safety controls are reviewed for adequacy and proper use. Resolution: Comments: 11 ABD00036621 New Module HAZOP Critical Rank: 4, III B Marginal Risk = Medium Consequence = Probable Occurrence Deviation: Condenser Tube Leak Equipment Number: DM-741,742,743,744,& 745 Equipment Description: NM PVC Reactors Cause: 1. Corrosion/Erosion 2. High Pressure 3. Improper tube cleaning/drilling Consequence: 1. VCM release into cooling water system 2. Minor VCM overexposure to personnel Suggested Mitigation: Weekly sampling of cooling water for VCM Resolution: Comments: 12 ABD00036622 New Module HAZOPQ5Pfl4 Critical Rank: 4, Marginal Risk III = Medium Consequence B = Probable Occurrence Deviation: Agitator Failure Equipment Number: DM-741,742f743,744,& 745 Equipment Description: NM PVC Reactors Cause: 1. Power failure 2 . DCS failure 3 . Agitator shaft breaks (stress/fatigue failure) 4 . Motor failure 5 . Coupling failure 6 . Gearbox failure 7. Misoperation 8 . Circuit breaker tripped 9. Agitator seal failure Consequence: 1. High reactor pressure 2 . Production loss 3 . Quality problems 4 . Aborted batch (harder to kill) 5 . Harder to dump and strip reactor Suggested Mitigation: Team recommends that a review be done on existing procedures and safety controls. The team also recommends that a review be done on existng preventative maintenance and inspection practices. Resolution: Comments: 13 ABD00036623 New Module HAZOP N/1 -Wot Critical Rank: 4, Marginal Risk III = Medium Consequence B = Probable Occurrence Deviation: Agitator Failure Equipment Number: DM-741,742,743,744 , Sc 745 Equipment Description: NM PVC Reactors Cause: 1. Power failure 2. DCS failure 3. Agitator shaft breaks (stress/fatigue failure) 4. Motor failure 5. Coupling failure 6. Gearbox failure 7. Misoperation 8 . Circuit breaker tripped 9. Agitator seal failure Consequence: 1. High reactor pressure 2 . Production loss 3. Quality problems 4. Aborted batch (harder to kill) 5. Harder to dump and strip reactor Suggested Mitigation: Team recommends that a review be done on existing procedures and safety controls. The team also recommends that a review be done on existng prevent^ive maintenance and inspection practices. Resolution: Comments: ABD00036624 Critical Rank: New Module HAZOP 4, Marginal Risk III = Medium Consequence B = Probable Occurrence MM' q5P5 Deviation: Cooling Water No/Low Flow Equipment Number: DM-741,742,743,744,& 745 Equipment Description: NM PVC Reactors Cause: 1. Manual valve closed 2. Cooling tower pump failure 3. Low cooling tower basin level 4. Control valve failure 5. Temperature controller failure 6. Plugged line 7. Cooling tower backpressure line control valve failure Consequence: 1. High reactor pressure 2. High reactor temperature 3. Bad resin quality 4. Early reactor kill 5. Production loss Suggested Mitigation: Team recommends review of existing procedures, training, and safety controls. Resolution: Comments: 14 ABD00036626 New Module HAZOP />f/V *)50O(* Critical Rank: 4, Marginal Risk III = Medium Consequence B = Probable Occurrence Deviation: Reactor Vent No/Low Flow Equipment Number: DM-741,742,743,744,& 745 Equipment Description: NM PVC Reactors Cause: 1. Plugged line 2. Valve failure 3 . High pressure on recovery line - another reactor in recovery at higher pressure 4. Manual valve closed on inert vent line Consequence: 1. Can't vent/recover/evacuate reactor 2. Early kill 3 . High reactor pressure and temperature 4. Production loss Suggested Mitigation: Review existing safety controls, operating & PM procedures, and training. Resolution: Comments: 15 ABD00036627 New Module HAZOP Critical Rank: 4, Marginal Risk III = Medium Consequence B = Probable Occurrence Deviation: Reverse flow on Normal Kill and Catalysts Charge Lines Equipment Number: DM-741,742,743,744,& 745 Equipment Description: NM PVC Reactors Cause: 1. Check valve failure with HPSW off and reactor valves open. 2. Charge Pot depressurized before catalyst valves closed. 3. Winterization circulation valve left open during catalyst charge/normal kill. Consequence: 1. VCM Release/Overexposure 2. Fire/Explosion Suggested Mitigation: Review of existing recirculation line be conducted along with a review of existing safety controls, procedures, and training. Resolution: Comments: 16 ABD00036628 New Module HAZOP Critical Rank: 4, IV A Marginal Risk = Low/None Consequence = Frequent Occurrence Deviation: Low Level Equipment Number: DM-760/761 Equipment Description: Recovery Knock Out Drums Cause: 1. Drain valve stuck open 2. Low level switch failure Consequence: 1. Resin carryover into recovery system 2. Cavitate pumps 3. Recovery system downtime - production loss 4. High pressure in Blowdown Tank 5. Bad resin quality (HP & contamination) Suggested Mitigation: Installation of a low level alarm on KO Drums Resolution: Comments: 17 ABD00036629 Critical Rank: New Module HAZOP 4, Marginal Risk III = Medium Consequence B = Probable Occurrence M-KbW Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Equipment Number: EX- 335 Equipment Description : Water Recirculation Cooler Cause: 1. External Heat 2. Inlet and Outlet valves closed - thermal buildup in cooling water Consequence: 1. High Pressure on EX-335 shell side Suggested Mitigation: Install Pressure relief on shell side of EX-335 Resolution: Comments: 18 ABD00036630 Critical Rank: New Module HAZOP 4, IV A Marginal Risk = Low/None Consequence = Frequent Occurrence MM' 15010 Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Equipment Number: VP-901/902, CP-903/904/905 Equipment Description: NM Recovery Vacuum Pumps & Recovery Compressors Ring Seal Water Cause: 1. Seal Water Pump failure 2. Flow controller failure 3. Plugged/Blocked line 4. Valve closed 5. Filter Plugged 6. Flow Transmitter plugged Consequence: 1. Slow/No recovery 2. Production Loss Suggested Mitigation: Replace existing flow meters with orifice plates and flow transmitters. Resolution: Comments: v^\ ^\ c r * 19 ABD00036631 i New Module HAZOP^5Q)0 Critical Rank: 4, IV A Marginal Risk = Low/None Consequence = Frequent Occurrence Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Equipment Number: VP-901/902, CP-903/904/905 Equipment Description: NM Recovery Vacuum Pumps & Recovery Compressors Ring Seal Water Cause: 1. Seal Water Pump failure 2. Flow controller failure 3. Plugged/Blocked line 4. Valve closed 5. Filter Plugged 6. Flow Transmitter plugged Consequence: 1. Slow/No recovery 2. Production Loss Suggested Mitigation: Replace existing flow meters with orifice plates and flow transmitters. Resolution: Comments: ABD00036632 New Module HAZOP Critical Rank: 4, Marginal Risk III = Medium Consequence B Probable Occurrence Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Equipment Number: EX- 334/36 Equipment Description : Seal Water Coolers Cause: 1. Blocked discharge or inlet 2. External Heat Consequence: 1. High Pressure in Seal Water Cooler shell 2. Rupture Seal Water Cooler shell Suggested Mitigation: Coolers shell side. Thermal relief on both Seal Water Resolution: Comments: 20 ABD00036633 Critical Rank: New Module HAZOP 4, IV A Marginal Risk = Low/None Consequence = Frequent Occurrence MlHSOlI- Deviation: Condenser Tube Leak Equipment Number: DM-317E & DM-317W Equipment Description: NM RVCM Receivers Cause: 1. Corrosion Consequence: 1. VCM in chilled water tank 2. VCM release Suggested Mitigation: VCM. Periodic sampling of chilled water for Resolution: Comments: 21 ABD00036634 New Module HAZOP Critical Rank: 4, III B Marginal Risk = Low/None Consequence = Frequent Occurrence Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Equipment Number: PP- 8 77/8 78 Equipment Description: HPSW to RVCM Transfer Pumps Cause: 1. Valve closed 2. Line Plugged 3. No HPSW Pressure 4. Regulator failure Consequence: 1. Damage Pump 2. Burn-up pump seal 3. VCM release Suggested Mitigation: None Resolution: Comments: N/VW3 U c- 22 ABD00036635 * ______________________________________New Module HAZOP_________________________ Critical Rank: 4, III B Marginal Risk = Low/None Consequence = Frequent Occurrence Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Equipment Number: PP-877/878 Equipment Description: HPSW to RVCM Transfer Pumps Cause: 1. Valve closed 2. Line Plugged 3. No HPSW Pressure 4. Regulator failure Consequence: 1. Damage Pump 2. Burn-up pump seal 3. VCM release Suggested Mitigation: None Resolution: Comments: 22 ABD00036636 5.3 Past Incidents All past incidents were reviewed. This included those that had the potential for catastrophic results and those that involved injuries. Information was obtained by researching all accident reports available and by meeting with vinyl operations personnel to recall accidents and near misses. The following list is the result of that study. 1. Incident: Time: Cause: Injuries: Mitigation: Reference: Worker got something in his eye while opening bottom reactor manway. February 6, 1987. Insufficient eye protection. One, eye irritation. Eye goggles must be worn while opening reactor bottom manways. Herbert Jackson Eye Injury. March 23, 1987. 2. Incident: Time: Cause: Injuries: Mitigation: Reference: Near miss crane accident on 501 blend tank. May 28, 1986 Lack of communication and planning. None A Vista maintenance supervisor oversees all personnel lifting operations. Near Miss Accident - 501 Blend Tank Cleaning. June 26, 1986 23 ABD00036636 5.3 Past Incidents All past incidents were reviewed. This included those that had the potential for catastrophic results and those that involved injuries. Information was obtained by researching all accident reports available and by meeting with vinyl operations personnel to recall accidents and near misses. The following list is the result of that study. 1. Incident: Time: Cause: Injuries: Mitigation: Reference: Worker got something in his eye while opening bottom reactor manway. February 6, 1987. Insufficient eye protection. One, eye irritation. Eye goggles must be worn while opening reactor bottom manways. Herbert Jackson Eye Injury. March 23, 1987. 2. Incident: Time: Cause: Injuries: Mitigation: Reference: Near miss crane accident on 501 blend tank. May 28, 1986 Lack of communication and planning. None A Vista maintenance supervisor oversees all personnel lifting operations. Near Miss Accident - 501 Blend Tank Cleaning. June 26, 1986 23 ABD00036637 3. Incident: Time: Cause: Injuries: Mitigation: Reference: Worker pinched the while repositioning rig on RX-745. skin on his finger the global drilling September 22, 1983 Inadequate procedure for safely setting up the drilling rig. One, pinched skin on finger. 1) Install secondary lifting davit on RX700 and RX-745, 2) Discuss incident with employees, and 3) Modify lighting for crane operator visibility. Accident Investigation - William Moore. October 14, 1983. 4. Incident: Time: Cause: Injuries: Mitigation: Catalyst bottles melted down while in a storage freezer. July 24, 1984. Improper freezer upkeep, freezer location in direct sunlight, and freezer abuse. None Freezers where put underneath open-side awnings to get the freezers out of direct sunlight. New freezer maintenance procedure. 24 ABD00036638 Incident: Time: Cause: Injuries: Mitigation: Reference: An air hose connected to a jackhammer came loose, and as it whipped around uncontrollably, hit a bystander in the knee. April 11, 1983 Equipment failure One, bruised knee. Ban all non-locking Thor air fittings from the plant. Lander Keaton Injury, April 11, 1983. April 22, 1983 6. Incident: Time: Cause: Injuries: Mitigation: Reference: Worker cut finger on rupture disk tag while opening a valve. July 6, 1991 Employee was not wearing gloves and all rupture disk tags have sharp edges. One, Cut finger. 1) Check all safety disks to see if they can be arranged more safely, and 2) Wear gloves while working in the field. Accident Investigation Report # 91-3 25 ABD00036639 7. Incident: Time: Cause: Injuries: Mitigation Reference: 8 . Incident: Time: Cause: Injuries: Mitigation: Reference: Worker was loading empty catalyst cardboard boxes in a dumpster. Instead of folding the empty boxes up before disposal, the worker was throwing several unfolded boxes in at a time. While doing so, a box knocked his glasses off. In his attempt to catch the glasses a box flap hit him in the eye cutting the lens. March 2, 1991 The worker was in a hurry to rain. In addition, he didn't glasses to hit the ground. beat want the his One, eye. 1) Fold boxes before disposal, hurry doing a job, and 3) employees and discuss accident. 2)don't inform Accident Investigation Report # 91-2 Worker pinched a nerve in his back while working on a pump from a squatting position. July 3, 1989 Excessive pulling and straining while trying to loosen some bolts. One, pinched nerve in worker's back. 1) Pump coupling halves are to be sprayed with an anti-seize solution at all subsequent similar maintenance, and 2) if more than normal effort is required to do a job of this nature, the pump is to be pulled and taken to the shop. Herbert Jackson Back Injury. July 21, 1989 26 ABD00036640 9. Incident: Time: Cause: Injuries: Mitigation: Reference: RX-700 evacuation valve failed to close resulting in a VCM release. February 20, 1992 This particular type of actuator and valve stem connection was not properly assembled. The type in question has a recessed valve stem and a transition piece between the valve stem and actuator. None 1) Identify, check, all valves of this type. Eventually replacing them with valves without recessed stems and transition pieces during shutdowns and downtime. 2) Added an interlock to shut the reactor evacuation valve if more than 8 psig is seen on a reactor. 3) Add pressure switches and interlocks on evacuation header to look for leaking valves. Investigation of RX-700 evacuation valve malfunction. March 23, 1992. Recommendations Based on a Past Incidents Review No recommendations were made after reviewing past incidents in the New Module. 27 ABD00036641 Facility Siting The Hazop team recommends that a separate siting study be performed on the New Module at the Aberdeen Plant. 5.5 EPA Release List The Hazop team identified the following pieces of equipment as possible sites for significant VCM releases. 1. VCM Receiver: DM-745, DM-317E, and DM-317W. 2. Reactor: RX-741. RX-742, RX-743, RX-744, and RX-745. 3. Compressor: CP-903, CP-904, and CP-905. 4. Vacuum Pump: VP-901 and VP-902. 28 ABD00036642 6.0 HUMAN FACTORS Policy Issues 1. a. Is upper management's commitment to employee health and safety clear? Yes. Plant management is involved in the development, implementation, and posting of safety and health policies. We have a representative on the Corporate Safety, Health and Environmental Council. We have a policy that addresses having adequate plant safety professionals. b. What policy statements communicate this commitment to employees? Policies related to safety and health are compiled in the Plant Safety and Health Manual. Policies are also posted on bulletin boards and the company has a Corporate Safety and Health Policy. c. Do workers understand these policies and are they convinced of upper management's sincerity? Yes, people are aware of these policies and manuals. Recently, new policies have come out and have been well publicized. As examples, new jewelry and Fire Retardant Clothing policies are aimed at improving plant safety. 2. a. Do supervisors and workers believe that safety has higher status with other business objectives in the organization? Yes, safety is mentioned first when setting goals. 29 ABD00036643 b. How does the company promote a "safety first" approach? All new hires and new contractors go through orientation and safety training. The Vista Aberdeen Safety Tours (VAST) program is a new way to measure safety practices. Safety is the first item on department and supervisor goals. The plant holds monthly employee safety meetings. Employees are involved in incident investigations. c. Have supervisors and workers been specifically told to err on the safe side whenever they perceive a conflict between safety and production? Always. 3. a. Will such decisions be supported throughout the management chain? Yes. b. Is management of worker health and safety an essential part of a manager's daily activities? Yes. 4. a. How are managers held accountable for their health and safety record, and how do the rewards and penalties compare to those for production performance? Safety is part of supervisor and department goals. Employees receive written recognition for safe performances as well as production performances. b. Is health and safety regularly discussed in management meetings at all levels? Yes, Plant safety is discussed in weekly staff meetings, central safety meetings, group safety meetings, and at the corporate management levels. 30 ABD00036644 5. a. Do such discussions involve more than a review of injury statistics? Yes. These meetings discuss the causes, prevention techniques, and include specific incident reviews. b. What actions are taken if an injury occurs? This is covered in our incident investigation policy. c. Are near misses discussed, and is any action taken to prevent recurrence? Our incident investigation policy includes near misses. 6. a. Have human factors engineering policies been established by upper management? No, we do not have a human factors policy, factors are considered during the different proj ec t reviews. but human levels of b. How are human factors engineering standards monitored to ensure implementation throughout the organization? Our engineering standards are based on industry standards which were developed with human factors in mind. Examples of this include equipment locations, types of equipment in different services, personal protective insulation, and platform standards. c. Do these standards apply to vendors and subcontractors? These standards apply all the way through projects. Standards are included in contracts. We use a contractor qualification checklist. We review contractors OSHA 200 Log and their Experience Modification Rate record for the past three years. Contractors must submit their written safety and health program for approval by the plant. d. How is noncompliance identified and resolved? Same answer as 10.a. 31 ABD00036645 Who has the authority to remedy human factors engineering deficiencies? Normal employee and supervisory authority limits and responsibility limits apply. In the areas of research, design, construction, procurement, operations, maintenance, management, and so forth, are there clearly defined procedures for evaluating the human factors engineering aspects of: - New and modified processes? - New and modified equipment? - New and modified procedures? - Special, abnormal, and one-of-a-kind procedures? Aspects o human factors engineering are considered during the process design review meeting, the mechanical design review meeting, the MOCA approval process, the PHA, and the PSSR. Many of these processes have clearly designed procedures. Are human factors engineering resources available in the organization, and are they readily available to help resolve design standards for human factors engineering? Vista's General Engineering Dept, develops and reviews standards. They are also available for questions and consultation. Do they periodically review the adequacy of the standards in conjunction with other groups (engineering, operations, maintenance, etc.)? Standards are updated on an as-needed basis. Are adequate time and resources allocated to human factors engineering? Human factors engineering is part of the engineering review process. It is also covered when considering job task analysis and incident investigations. ABD00036646 b. How is human factors engineering integrated with the design process and the procedure-writing process? It is covered in all stages of the review process and is part of the process hazard analysis. It is also covered in PreStart-up Safety Reviews (PSSRs). Experienced employees from operations and maintenance departments review designs and procedures for human factor issues. c. Is human factors engineering different for new designs procedures and modified designs procedures? No, there are no distinctions. d. If so, are the differences justified? N/A 10. a. Do workers help identify error-likely situations in existing designs/procedures? Are they also involved in the review of new designs/procedures? Yes. We have several methods for identifying and evaluating health and safety concerns. The management of change policy and PSSR policy require a safety analysis of work orders and new projects. The VAST program and Employee Safety Action Request (ESAR) program are systems for encouraging employees to identify unsafe conditions in the work place. The plant is doing Hazop studies for existing units. Employees from different disciplines are involved in the different design review stages. Several employee meetings were held to explain and ask for employee input on the VAST program. Employee input was also used in developing the plant jewelry policy. Employees are involved in the Joint Safety Committee. b. How is worker input used? Worker involvement is an important part of each of the above mentioned systems. 33 ABD00036647 c. Are worker suggestions implemented? Yes. 11. a. Are workers encouraged to discuss potential human errors and near misses with their supervisors? Yes. b. Are such worker disclosures treated as evidence of worker incompetence, as unwarranted criticism of management, or as valuable lessons to be shared and acted upon? As valuable lessons to be shared and acted upon. We have a good history o acting on worker safety suggestions. c. What criteria and procedures exist for reporting and investigating accidents and near misses? Our incident investigation policy is addressed in the Safety and Health Manual. This program is monitored by the Central Safety Committee, which also evaluates follow-up and effectiveness of the corrective actions. All incident investigations are reviewed and approved by the plant manager. ESARs also help report unsafe conditions or behavior. d. Are they followed consistently? Yes. Do the investigations go into enough depth to identify the root causes of worker errors? The goal of the investigations is to find the root causes. 34 ABD00036648 How are the human factors engineering deficiencies identified during the investigation of an incident corrected at (1) the site of the original incident, (2) similar sites at the same facility, and (3) similar sites at other facilities? The incident investigation team makes recommendations for the plant that the incident occurs in. When appropriate these reports are shared internally and with other company sites. 12. a. Are supervisors trained and encouraged to identify error likely situations, unsafe behaviors, and personal problems that may adversely affect a worker's performance? Yes. This is covered in supervisor training and is a critical part of all our supervisor's job. b. What actions are taken if a problem is identified? Depending on the problem the proper policy is followed. 13 . Are data on human errors collected and made available to managers? We have several systems for analyzing safety and health data. We monitor trends and identify areas for improvement. Safety data and trends are reviewed at Central Safety Committee meetings. The VAST program specifically collects human factors kind of data. Our policy encourages collecting data on the number and kind of safe behaviors observed. b. Have the data been used as the basis for any management decisions? Data collected from incident investigations have often been used as the basis for management decisions. Examples include: the plant's truck unloading policy and its jewelry policy. 35 ABD00036649 14. a. Are the data collected routinely or are they only collected after an accident. VAST data is collected weekly and summarized monthly. Injury data is regularly reviewed by type and area. How are the problems associated with excessive or inadequate work loads handled? The plant uses contract workers and employee overtime to balance work load requirements. How is worker performance monitored and measured? Supervisors are trained in monitoring worker performance. There is also an employee appraisal system, which includes appropriate personnel counseling. The VAST program helps determine how well employees are practicing safe behaviors. Is there adequate supervision of the workers? Yes. What is the supervisor's role in detecting and correcting human errors? One of the supervisor's primary responsibilities is the personal safety of his/her group and the correcting of unsafe conditions and behaviors in his/her area(s). 36 ABD00036650 Job and Task Issues 1. a. Have critical jobs and tasks been identified? Yes. The team feels that all critical jobs and tasks are addressed in the operating procedures. b. Have the mental and physical aspects of such jobs been analyzed for both routine and emergency activities? Yes, those aspects were considered while writing operating procedures. c. What has been done to reduce the likelihood and/or consequences of potential human errors in the performance of these jobs? Installation and/or use of: 1) Distributed Control System interlocks. 2) Alarms for process deviations. 3) Fire protection. 4) Breathing Apparatuses. 5) Air Monitors. 2. a. Have jobs and tasks been designed to maintain worker interest and involvement? No. Jobs and tasks were designed to operate equipment efficiently, safely, and consistently. The team recommends no action in this area. b. Are assignments rotated to even out workloads and increase worker experience? Yes. The "A" operator's position is rotated. c. How have activities with safety implications been emphasized? By safety meetings, special training, warning signs around equipment, and emphasis on critical steps in written procedures. 37 ABD00036651 3 . Are tasks requiring either intense activity or uneventful monitoring minimized? Yes. Automation is implemented wherever possible. b. How are the problems associated with excessive or inadequate work loads handled? Contract labor or re-assignment. c. Is support from other personnel available when needed? No, not at all times. The team has no recommendations on this issue. 38 ABD00036652 Human-Machine Interface Issues 1. a. Has the human-machine interface ever undergone a human factors engineering review? Yes. This was part of the VCSM project review. b. Is the whole workplace arranged so the workers can maintain a good working posture and perform a variety of movements? No. There are several highly congested areas. The team has no recommendations for this issue. 2. a. Is adequate information about normal and upset process conditions displayed in the control room? Yes. b. Is the information displayed in ways the workers understand? Yes, for a properly trained worker. c. Do separate displays present information in a consistent manner? Yes. d. What kinds of calculations must workers perform, and how are they checked? No calculations are required. 3. a. Are workers provided with enough information to diagnose an upset when an alarm sounds? Yes. b. Are the displays adequately visible from all relevant working positions? Yes. 39 ABD00036653 Does the display provide adequate feedback on worker actions? Yes. 4. a. Do control panel layouts reflect the functional aspects of the process or equipment? Yes. b. Are related displays and controls grouped together? Yes. c. Does the control arrangement logically follow the normal sequence of operation? Yes. d. What are the consequences of worker intervention in computer-controlled processes? Intervention could cause severe consequences, but in these cases operators cannot gain access to control systems. They are locked out by computer pass-word access and control systems interlocks. The team recommends no action on this issue. 5. a. Are all controls accessible and easy to distinguish? Yes. b. Are the controls easy to use? Yes. c. Do any controls violate strong populational stereotypes (color, direction of movement, etc.)? No. 40 ABD00036654 d. Are any process variables difficult to control with the existing equipment? There have been no problems with control using existing equipment. e. How many manual adjustments must a worker perform during normal and emergency operations? The team feels that although there are several adjustments to be made, they can be made safely and efficiently in all cases. The team recommends no action on this issue. 6. a. Is there a formal mechanism for correcting human engineering deficiencies identified by the workers? PSSR's, VAST'S, and ESAR's. b. Have workers made any modifications to the displays, controls, or equipment to better suit their needs? Yes. c. How are designers made aware of the problems so they can improve future designs? Design reviews, PSSR's. 7. a. Are automatic safety features provided when either a rapid response or complex information processing is required to cope with a process upset? Yes. Deluge can be automatically tripped or manually tripped by a single switch. There is also DCS and field interlocks. 8. a. Are instruments, displays, and controls promptly repaired after a malfunction? Yes, by work orders. Promptness depends upon priority. ABD00036655 b. Are any instruments, displays, or controls deliberately disabled during any phase of operation? Yes. These cases have been reviewed as safe and are part of normal operating procedures. The team recommends no action on this issue. c . How are alarm setpoints and computer software protected from unauthorized changes? Password protection and non-authorized persons are restricted from areas where changes of the such can be made. 9. a. Is the work environment (temperature, noise, lighting, general cleanliness, etc.) maintained within comfortable bounds? There are recommends Module. several areas of poor lighting. The team a lighting survey be conducted on the New 10 . a. Are the right tools available and used when needed? No. There are some "home-made" tools that are used. The team recommends that home-made tools be replaced whenever possible with purchased tools designed for that particular need. "Home-made" tools should be used only when purchased tools are not available and only with prior approval from the employee's supervisor. b. Are special tools required to perform any tasks safely or efficiently? Yes. c . What steps are taken to identify and provide special tools? Operator feedback to supervision. However, there is no formal procedure. When a special tool can be justified it is supplied. 42 ABD00036656 Is there adequate access for routine operation and maintenance of all equipment? No, there are some highly congested areas. The team has no recommendations for this issue. 12. a. If protective clothing and equipment is required for the performance of some tasks, have the worker performance limitations imposed by the protective gear been evaluated for both routine and emergency tasks? Yes. b. Are adequate supplies of the protective gear readily available for routine and emergency use? Yes. 13. a. Is all important equipment instruments, controls, etc.) labeled? (vessels, pipes, valves, clearly and unambiguously No. More and better labeling would be helpful. The team recommends a program be initiated to address labeling needs and to assign responsibility for keeping labels updated. The team recommends a color coding system for hazardous materials piping and equipment (i.e. VCM, Propane, Natural Gas). b. Does your labeling program include components (e.g., small valves) that are mentioned in the procedures even if they are not assigned an equipment number? No. See above recommendation. c. Are the labels accurate? Yes, existing labels are accurate. ABD00036657 d. Who is responsible for maintaining and updating the labels? No one. See recommendation for question 13a. 14 . a. Were the needs for communication and teamwork considered the workplace design? Yes. b. How do different shifts communicate the process status {batch conditions, process abnormalities, equipment out of service, active work permits, etc.) to each other? Verbal and logbook, as required by written procedures. c . What is the procedure for communication between department s ? Meetings and memos. d. Is it followed? Yes. 15. a. Are there clear procedures during emergencies for communications between workers and emergency response personnel, plant management, corporate management, and public authorities? Yes, procedure is in the Plant Safety and Health Manual for each operating department. b. Are they regularly practiced? Yes, regular emergency drills are conducted under the auspices of the Emergency Drill Planning Team made up of representatives from each plant department. 16. a. Are workers encouraged to ask supervisors for assistance? Yes, if they are in doubt or have a question. 44 ABD00036658 b. Do workers know when to seek assistance? Yes. c. Are workers penalized for "unnecessary" shutdowns when they truly believe there is an emergency? No. 17. a. Is there adequate supervision of the workers? Yes, a supervisor is always available. b. How do supervisors interact with the workers? Verbally and/or in writing. c. What is the supervisor's role in detecting and correcting human errors? It is the supervisor's job to make sure each employee is fully capable and knowledgeable of a job task before he is allowed to perform it. 18. a. Are shift rotation schedules set to minimize the disruption of workers' circadian rhythms? No, However a 6-day long break is given every two weeks to compensate for the disruption. The team recommends no action on this issue. b. How are problems with worker fatigue resolved? Limits on how long a person can work (except emergencies) are established. "Long break" schedule. c. Is there a plan for rotating workers during extended emergencies? No. There is no written plan. Extra coverage would come from off-shift personnel. The team recommends no action on this issue. 45 ABD00036659 Procedural Issues 1. a. Is a complete, current set of procedures available for workers to use? Yes. b. How are specific, up-to-date procedures maintained? Management Of Change Authorization (MOCA). c. Do the workers themselves help review/revise the procedures? Yes, procedures are written by operators and reviewed by engineering and management. d. How often? As needed. e. Are known errors allowed to remain uncorrected? No. 2. a. Are procedures written for the right level of knowledge and understanding by the workers, considering their education, background, experience, native language, etc? Yes, procedures are written for simplicity. b. Is a step-by-step format used? Yes, in almost all instances. c. Are diagrams, photographs, drawings, etc. used to clarify the written text? Yes, Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams. d. Are cautions and warnings clearly stated in prominent locations? 46 ABD00036660 Yes. Warnings are on all VCM containing equipment. Does procedure nomenclature match equipment labels? Yes. f. Are there too many abbreviations and references to other procedures? No. 3 . a. Do worker practices always comply with written ! procedures? Yes. b. How are differences detected and resolved? Operator discussions, observation. training sessions, and visual c. Who can authorize changes and deviations from the written procedures? Department heads, but only with a completed MOCA. d. Does such authorization include a review of the safety implications of the change or deviation? Yes. e. Do cautions always precede action steps in the procedures? Yes, when appropriate. 4. a. Are work permit systems correctly used? Yes. b. How are contractors included in such systems? Identical to employee work permits. 47 ABD00036661 5 . a. Are the emergency procedures clearly written? Yes, they are written in the same format as normal procedures. b. Are they practiced regularly? Yes. They are planned by the Emergency Drill Planning Team. c. How many "immediate" actions are required? The team feels that although there are several actions to be made, they can be made safely and efficiently in all cases. The team recommends no action on this issue. d. Are the procedures designed so workers can cross-check each other's performance of the necessary tasks? Yes, when necessary. .6 a. Are checklists used for critical procedures? Yes, included with written procedures. b. Is only one action specified per numbered step? Typically yes. c. Are any instructions embedded in explanatory notes? No, but explanatory notes are included in procedures. d. Are the steps in the correct sequence? Yes. e. Do steps requiring control actions also specify the correct system response? Yes, when appropriate. 48 ABD00036662 1 Human Factors Recommendations 1. Support personnel are not available at all times. The team has no recommendations for this issue. 2. There are several highly congested areas in the New Module. The team has no recommendations for this issue. 3. There are several areas of poor lighting. The team recommends a lighting survey be conducted on the New Module. 4. There are some "home-made" tools that are'used for maintenance in the New Module. The team recommends that these tools be identified and replaced with purchased tools designed for that particular need whenever possible. "Home-made" tools should only be used whenever purchased tools are not available and only with prior approval by the employee's supervisor. 5. The team recommends a program be initiated to address labeling needs. The program also assign responsibility for keeping labels updated. The team also recommends a color coding system for hazardous materials piping and equipment. 49 ABD00036663 7.0 Methodology 7.1 Introduction A hazard and operability (HAZOP) study is a simple, yet structured methodology for hazard identification. A HAZOP study involves a systematic examination of design documents that describe a process. The study is performed by a team consisting of persons from various parts of the plant to identify potential hazards or operability problems that could result in an accident. Deviations from the design value of key parameters are studied using guide words to control the direction of the evaluation. This presumes that the design values of flow, temperature, pressure, and other process variables are inherently safe and operable. The study team consists of trained personnel, and has the necessary technical expertise to answer most questions raised during the review without outside assistance. To begin, we will define the following terms: Hazard: Anything (chemical reaction, equipment malfunction, or operator error) that can lead an unwanted event. Operability: Anything that causes the operator to improvise in his actions. These definitions are an important part of the basic HAZOP premise that if there are no deviations from the expected, by definition there are no hazard or operability problems. The agenda followed to complete the HAZOP analysis is a follows: * HAZOP methodology: A presentation is made by the team leader of the methodology to be used in the study. * Process review: Team leader discusses the design with the team, answers any questions the team may have about the design, and in short to ensure the team understands the process being reviewed. 50 ABD00036664 Identify Hazards: A preliminary identification by team members of hazards present within the process. This serves to focus the HAZOP study. Goal of the HAZOP: This serves to direct the HAZOP study. Establish criticality and frequency ratings: Review risk matrix, and how to determine consequence and frequency ratings. Line by Line Analysis of process nodes. This considers process hazards from human error, maintenance, failure of engineering and administrative controls, and emergency response systems. HAZOP Report: Teams findings as a result of the study. Human Error Analysis: Analysis of potential sources of human errors that could cause those items listed in the Hazop's scope. Facility Siting: Recommend a facility siting study. Past Incidents: Review of past incidents and near misses the process has experienced as well as past incidents of similar processes in industry. Release Scenarios: Determine what pieces of equipment should be modeled for a major VCM release. 51 ABD00036665 7.2 Team members HAZOP team meetings were held at the Vista Aberdeen Plant on Mondays beginning October 24, 1994 and ending January 23, 1995. Meetings were typically 6 to 7 hours long. The HAZOP study team included members with different areas of expertise, in order to have the broadest possible view of potential hazards. The team members conducting the HAZOP study on the New Module are as follows: Jerald Uptain Terry Barnes Joe Shackelford Lee Roy Howell Danny Flippo Allen Bodron Safety Engineer Vinyl Lead Operator Instrument Technician Maintenance-Mechanic Vinyl Chief Lead Operator Process Engineer Jerald Uptain, Safety Engineer - Jerald has been with Vista for 24 years and the nearly last 20 as Safety Engineer. Terry Barnes, Vinyl Lead Operator - Terry has been with Vista for 9 years and the last 8 as a vinyl operator. Vinyl Lead Operators are primarily responsible for running the DCS. Joe Shackelford, Instrument Technician - Joe has been with Vista for 26 years and the last 22 as an instrument technician. Instrument technicians are responsible for the maintenance of all process instrumentation and control systems. Lee Roy Howell, Mechanic - Lee Roy has been with Vista for almost 27 years. He has been in maintenance for the last 10 years. Mechanics are responsible for the maintenance of all mechanical equipment in the plant. Danny Flippo, Vinyl Lead Operator - Danny has been with Vista for 14 years with 10 of those years as a vinyl operator. Allen Bodron, Process Engineer and Team Leader - Allen has been with Vista for 2 years as a process engineer. Process engineers are primarily responsible for process designs of capital projects. Allen has had formal Hazop team leader training and previous Hazop experience (Appendix A). 52 ABD00036666 7.3 Documents Referenced Prior to the start of the HAZOP, the necessary reference material was assembled and made available for reference during the HAZOP study. A meaningful HAZOP study cannot be conducted without the required documentation to review. Assembly of the documentation optimizes the chance for a successful HAZOP. The documents used in this study were: * New Module P&ID's: # NM-090100-PID-D through # NM-090129-PID-D * New Module Equipment Spec. Sheets - Located in the equipment files in the maintenance conference room. * Safety Systems Design Basis: including relief valve settings and sizing basis, deluge system, fire water system, VCM detecting fixed point monitors and general monitors, and system shutdown. Located in the equipment files in the maintenance conference room. MSDS for acutely hazardous material (VCM) - Located in the Safety Dept. Electrical Classification Drawing: # GP-003000-EL-D New Module operating procedures - Located in the vinyl control room. Procedures also contain: 1) Process Chemistry. 2) Maximum Inventories of raw materials. 3)Safe upper and lower control limits. 4) Consequences of deviation from control limits. Vista engineering standards based on industrial codes. List of DCS control system safety interlocks. Plot Plan Diagram. Process Description. Written description of process control interlocks. 53 ABD00036667 APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OP ALL TEAM RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendat-i.Q-ns_bas.ed_ on_P&_ID review 1. Install low temperature alarm or message on decal tank (DM131). Risk ranking: 4. 2. Review existing safety procedures and controls for Reactor high pressure. Risk ranking: 4. 3. Install high level probe or level indication on reactors. Risk ranking: 5. 4. Perform weekly sampling of cooling tower water for VCM. Risk ranking: 4. 5. Review existing operating procedures, safety controls, preventative maintenance practices, and inspection practices on reactor agitators. Risk ranking: 4. 6. Review existing procedures, training, and safety controls on reactor cooling water supply/return. Risk ranking: 4. 7. Review existing procedures, training, safety controls, and preventative maintenance practices on reactor vent lines. Risk ranking: 4. 8. Review winterization recirculation line on Normal Kill and Catalyst charge lines. Also review existing safety controls, procedures, and training. Risk ranking: 4. 9. Install low level alarm on K.O. Drums (DM-760/761) . Risk ranking: 4. 10. Install pressure relief on shell side of water recirculation cooler (EX-335). Risk ranking: 4. 11. Replace ring seal water flow meters to recovery compressors and vacuum pumps with orifice plates and flow transmitters. Risk ranking: 4. 12. Install thermal relief valves on shell side of water coolers (EX-334/336). Risk ranking: 4. 54 ABD00036668 13 . Perform periodic VCM sampling of chilled water to RVCM receivers. Risk ranking: 4. 14. Review HPSW system to RVCM pumps. Risk ranking: 4. Recommendations Based on a Past Incidents Review No recommendations were made after reviewing past incidents in the New Module. Facility Siting Recommendations The Hazop team recommends that a separate siting study be performed on the New Module Facility at the Aberdeen Plant. EPA Release List The Hazop team identified the following pieces of equipment as possible sites for significant VCM releases. 1. VCM Receiver: DM-011, DM-012, and DM-013. 2. Reactor: RX-300. RX-400, RX-500, RX-600, andRX-700. 3. Compressor: CP-503 and CP-504. 4. Vacuum Pump: VP-107 and VP-108. 55 ABD00036669 Human Factors Recommendations 1. Support personnel are not available at all times. The team has no recommendations for this issue. 2. There are several highly congested areas in the New Module. The team has no recommendations for this issue. 3. There are several areas of poor lighting. The team recommends a lighting survey be conducted on the New Module. 4. There are some "home-made" tools that are used for maintenance in the New Module. The team recommends that these tools be identified and replaced with purchased tools designed for that particular need whenever possible. "Home-made" tools should only be used whenever purchased tools are not available and only with prior approval by the empolyee1s supervisor. 5. The team recommends a program be initiated to address labeling needs. The program also assign responsibility for keeping labels updated. The team also recommends a color coding system for hazardous materials piping and equipment. 56 ABD00036670 APPENDIX B TEAM LEADER TRAINING DOCUMENTATION 57 CERTIFICATE OF EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT ABD00036671 Instructor V Manager ABD00036672 APPENDIX C EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION DOCUMENTATION 59 ABD00036673 To: New Module Hazop Team Members Interoffice Communication From: Date: Subject: J. A. Bodron October 13, 1994 Meeting Notice VISTA The New Module Hazop Team will hold a kickoff meeting on Monday, October 17th at 8 a.m. in the Vinyl Conference Room. The team will discuss the HAZOP procedure and the methodology used. M- Allen Bodron Team Leader cc: Team Members, RAC, MLC, JEN, RHS ABD00036674 To: All Employees Interoffice Communication From: Date: Subject: Allen Bodron October 18, 1994 VISTA OSHA Employee Participation - New Module HAZOP As part of OSHA's PSM regulations, Vista will perform a Hazard Operability Study on all its existing processes. The regulation emphasizes employee participation. To comply with the regulation a team representing operations, maintenance, safety, and engineering has been formed to complete the HAZOP. The team began analysis of the New Module this week. Team members include: 1. Danny Flippo 2. Terry Barnes 3. Lee Roy Howell 4. Joe Shackelford 5. Jerald Uptain 6. Michael Harvey 7. Allen Bodron To promote employee participation and to perform the best HAZOP analysis possible, the team is asking your assistance. If you have any comments or suggestions regarding the team's assignment please contact me or anyone on the team. Thanks, Allen Bodron Team Leader Posting Date >1 ABD00036675 To: Distribution Interoffice Communication From: Date: Subject: J. A. Bodron January 12, 1995 Hazop Team Meeting Notice VIS1A The New Module/SA Module Hazop team will resume meeting on Monday, January 23 at 8:00 in the conference room over the lab. The team will continue to meet every Monday until mid-March. It is necessary that the same team members meet on the 23rd to complete the NM Hazop, but they can be replaced after that for the SA Module. Please inform me of who will be on the team from your area by Jan. 22. J. A. Bodron Hazop Team Leader ABD00036676 APPENDIX D HAZOP ANALYSIS DATA FORMS 63 ABD00036677 Node 01 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: DM-745 FVCM Receiver Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: High Level Cause: 1. PUMPING FROM TANKFARM 2. LEVEL XMITTER FAILURE 3. BLEEDOVER FROM RVCM RECEIVERS Consequences: 1. VCM RELEASE 2. OVERPRESSURE RECEIVER 3. BLOW RUPTURE DISK/LIFT RELIEF VALVE 4. VCM EXPOSURE TO PERSONNEL 5. FIRE/EXPLOSION/MINOR BURNS Safeguards: 1. HIGH LEVEL PROBE/SHUTOFF 2. HIGH LEVEL ALARM 3. VCM ISOLATION VALVES & DCS TARGET 4. LEVEL DISPLAYED ON DCS 5. SIGHT GLASSES ON RECEIVER 6. DCS INTERLOCKS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 64 ABD00036678 Node 01 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: DM-745 FVCM Receiver Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. HIGH LEVEL 2. EXTERNAL HEAT 3. HIGH LEVEL IN RVCM RECEIVERS 4. INERTS FROM RVCM RECEIVERS Consequences: 1. ALL FROM HIGH LEVEL 2. SHUT VCM TRANSFER PUMP OFF Safeguards: 1. RV/RD 2. PRESSURE XMITTERS/FIELD MOUNTED PRESSURE GAUGES 3. DCS INTERLOCKS/ALARMS 4. ALL FROM HIGH LEVEL Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 65 ABD00036679 Node 01 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: DM-745 FVCM Receiver Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE MONITORS/DELUGE SYSTEM 2. SAME AS HIGH PRESSURE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 66 ABD00036680 Node 01 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: DM-745 FVCM Receiver Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: N/A Safeguards: N/A Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating A Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 01 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: DM-745 FVCM Receiver Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED BLOCKED LINE 2. EMPTY RECEIVER 3. VALVE MALFUNCTION Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. LOST PRODUCTION Safeguards: 1. SAME AS HIGH PRESSURE 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 67 ABD00036681 Node 02 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: FVCM Line from Sphere Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. TRANSFER PUMP FAILURE 2. PLUGGED / BLOCKED LINE 3. SPHERE EMPTY 4. RUPTURED LINE 5. INTERLOCKS Consequences: 1. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. 2 TRANSFER PUMPS 2. LEVEL INDICATOR ON SPHERE AND RECEIVER Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 68 ABD00036682 Node 02 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: FVCM Line from Sphere Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: Reverse Flow Cause: 1. RUPTURED LINE 2. OPEN BLEEDER 3. HIGHER PRESSURE IN RECEIVER Consequences: 1. VCM RELEASE 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. VCM ISOLATION VALVES 2. INTERLOCKS 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES 4 . GC ' S 5. CHECK VALVE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 69 ABD00036683 Node 02 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: FVCM Line from Sphere Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. HIGH TEMPERATURE 2. NO FLOW 3. HIGH PRESSURE IN RECEIVER Consequences: 1. LINE RUPTURE 2. VCM RELEASE Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. INTERLOCKS 3. SAME AS HIGH PRESSURE/HIGH TEMPERATURE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 70 ABD00036684 Node 02 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: FVCM Line from Sphere Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. LINE RUPTURE DUE TO OTHER MEANS 3. NO FLOW Consequences: 1. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. INTERLOCKS 3. 2 TRANSFER PUMPS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 71 ABD00036685 Node 02 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: FVCM Line from Sphere Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 02 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: FVCM Line from Sphere Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences : N/A Safeguards: N/A Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 72 ABD00036686 Node 03 i Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: FVCM Charge Line Drawing Nos. NM-090100-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104,PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D. Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE INCLUDING FILTER 2. VALVE MALFUNCTION 3. PUMP FAILURE 4. RUPTURED LINE OR BLEEDER OPEN 5. LOW LEVEL IN RECEIVER 6. HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE Consequences: 1. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. DUAL FLOW INDICATORS 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. INTERLOCKS 4. DP GAUGE ON FILTER PACKS 5. SPARE CHARGE PUMP 6. SPARE FILTER PACK Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Note: RX-745 VCM Charge Line enters reactor, not charge/dump manifold. 73 ABD00036687 Node 03 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: FVCM Charge Line Drawing Nos. NM-090100-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D, NM-0 90104, PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D. Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. DEAD HEAD PUMP 2. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. RUPTURED LINE 2. VCM RELEASE 3. FIRE 4. VCM EXPOSURE 5. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. INTERLOCKS 2. VCM ISOLATION VALVES 3. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES 5. LOCAL PRESSURE GAUGE ON FILTER PACKS 6. RD/RV ON FILTER PACKS AND LINES Consequence Rating: II Probability Rating: D Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 74 ABD00036688 Node 03 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: FVCM Charge Line Drawing Nos. NM-09010 0 -PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104,PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D. Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2 . RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 3 . VALVE CLOSED ON SUCTION OF PUMP 4 . BLOCKED/PLUGGED LINE 5 . EMPTY RECEIVER Consequences: 1. PRODUCTION LOSS 2 . NO/LOW VCM CHARGE FLOW 3. CAN'T CHARGE Safeguards: 1. FLOW INDICATION 2 . DCS INTERLOCKS 3 . OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 75 ABD00036689 Node 03 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: FVCM Charge Line Drawing Nos. NM-090100-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104,PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D. Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 76 ABD00036690 Node 03 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: FVCM Charge Line Drawing Nos. NM-090100-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104,PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-0 90105 -PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D. Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. RUPTURED LINE FROM WATER IN LINE FROM RVCM RECEIVERS Safeguards: 1. TEMP INDICATION ON LINE 2. DRAIN WATER FROM RVCM RECEIVERS 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 77 ABD00036691 Node 04 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Recovery Lines to Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 2. VALVE CLOSED Consequences: 1. CAN'T RELIEVE EQUIPMENT 2. CAN'T RECOVER EQUIPMENT FOR MAINTENANCE Safeguards: 1. NONE 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 04 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Recovery Lines to Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: Reverse Flow Cause: 1. HIGH PRESSURE ON RECEIVER AND 82X709 VALVE IS OPEN Consequences: 1. N/A Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. INTERLOCKS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking 5 78 ABD00036692 Node 04 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Recovery Lines to Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. RELIEF VALVE LIFT 2. EXTERNAL HEAT 3. HIGH PRESSURE ON PUMP 4. HIGH PRESSURE IN RECOVERY SYSTEM Consequences: 1. VCM RELEASE 2. LINE RUPTURE Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 3. INTERLOCKS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 04 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Recovery Lines to Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: N/A Consequences: N/A Safeguards: N/A Consequence Rating: N/A Probability Rating: N/A Risk Ranking: N/A Action/Other Considerations: 79 ABD00036693 Node 04 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Recovery Lines to Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. SAME AS HIGH PRESSURE 2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: S Node 04 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Recovery Lines Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D to Blowdown Tank Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences : NONE Safeguards: NONE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 80 ABD00036694 Node 05 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to FVCM Pumps Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. BLOCKED/PLUGGED FLOW 2. PRESSURE REGULATOR FAILURE 3. HPSW PUMP FAILURE Consequences: 1. SEAL FAILURE ON VCM CHARGE PUMPS 2. VCM RELEASE 3. PRODUCTION LOSS 4. DAMAGE VCM CHARGE PUMP Safeguards: 1. FLOW METER IN FIELD 2. OPERATOR CHECK OF FLOW METER ONCE PER DAY 3. HPSW PUMP DISCHARGE LOW PRESSURE ALARM ON DCS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 81 ABD00036695 Node 05 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to FVCM Pumps Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause 1. NONE Consequences : N/A Safeguards: N/A Consequence Rating: Probability Rating: Risk Ranking: N/A Action/Other Considerations: Node 05 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to FVCM Pumps Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. NO/LOW FLOW Consequences: 1. SAME AS NO/LOW FLOW Safeguards: 1. SAME AS NO/LOW FLOW 2. PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 82 ABD00036696 Node 05 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to FVCM Pumps Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE -- NO/LOW FLOW RESULTING Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 05 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to FVCM Pumps Drawing No. NM-090100-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. NO/LOW FLOW Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE 2. FLOWING MOST OF THE TIME Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 83 ABD00036697 Node 06 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water Charge Tank Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: High Level Cause: 1. INLET VALVE MALFUNCTION 2. HIGH LEVEL SWITCH MALFUNCTION Consequences: 1. OVER FILL TANK WASTE WATER & HEAT 2. ALGAE GROWTH ON WALKING SURFACES IF OVER FLOWS FOR EXTENDED PERIODS. Safeguards: 1. LEVEL INDICATOR 2. OVER FLOW PIPE 3. HIGH LEVEL ALARM 4. SIGHTGLASS Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 1. P&ID WRONG ADD LEVEL XMITTER TO BOTTOM OF TANK. OF TANK IS ACTUALLY LS. LT SHOWN AT TOP 84 ABD00036698 Node 06 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water Charge Tank Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Low Level Cause: 1. LEVEL CONTROLLER FAILURE 2. INLET VALVE FAILURE 3. COLD HOT WATER MAKE-UP 4. DRAIN VALVE OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. LEVEL INDICATION & ALARM 2. SIGHTGLASS ON TANK Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 85 ABD00036699 Node 06 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water Charge Tank Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. ATMOSPHERIC VENT & OVERFLOW PLUGGED 2. BACKFLOW VCM INTO TANK DURING RXR CHARGE Consequences: 1. OVERPRESSURE TANK Safeguards: 1. 2 ATMOSPHERIC VENTS 2. LOW FLOW SHUTDOWN ON WATER CHARGE LINE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 06 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water Charge Tank Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. BOTH VENTS PLUGGED, PULL VAC ON TANK WITH CHARGE WATER PUMPS Consequences: 1. SUCK IN TANK WALLS ------- LOST PRODUCTION Safeguards: 1. 2 ATMOSPHERIC VENTS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating D Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: 86 ABD00036700 Node 06 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water Charge Tank Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. TEMP CONTROLLER MALFUNCTION 2. STEAM SUPPLY VALVE MALFUNCTION Consequences: 1. DAMAGE CHARGE WATER PUMPS Safeguards: 1. TEMP INDICATION ON TANK Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 87 ABD00036701 88 ABD00036702 Node 07 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water from Centrate Exchanger Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED FILTER 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3. RUPTURED LINE, BLEEDER OPEN 4. CONTROLLER FAILURE 5. VALVE CLOSED/MALFUNCTION Consequences 1. LOW TANK LEVEL Safeguards: 1. BACKUP HOT WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 07 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water from Centrate Exchanger Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Reverse Flow Cause 1. RUPTURED LINE 2. BLEEDER OPEN Consequences : NONE Safeguards: NONE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: D Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 89 ABD00036703 Node 07 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water from Centrate Exchanger Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE OR FILTER Consequences: 1. LINE RUPTURE Safeguards: 1. INSULATION ON LINE 2. RV ON FILTER PACK Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 07 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water from Centrate Exchanger Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 2. PUMP FAILURE Consequences: 1. LOW/NO FLOW Safeguards: SEE NO/LOW FLOW Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking 5 90 ABD00036704 Node 07 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water from Centrate Exchanger Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. TEMP CONTROLLER MALFUNCTION 2. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HOT WATER TANK ABOVE SETPOINT 2. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. RV ON FILTER PACK Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations Risk Ranking: 5 Node 07 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water from Centrate Exchanger Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. TEMP CONTROLLER MALFUNCTION 2. WEATHER WHEN LINE NOT IN USE Consequences: 1. LOW CHARGE WATER TANK TEMP Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE 2. BACKUP HOT WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM 3. TEMP INDICATION Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 91 ABD00036705 Node 08 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process Water To Pic-Heater Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: SAME AS NODE 07 Consequences: Safeguards: Consequence Rating: Probability Rating Risk Ranking Action/Other Considerations: Node 08 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process Water To Pic-Heater Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Reverse Flow Cause: SAME AS NODE 7 Consequences: Safeguards: Consequence Rating: Probability Rating Risk Ranking Action/Other Considerations: 92 ABD00036706 Node 08 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process Water Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D To Pic-Heater Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: SAME AS NODE 7 Consequences : Safeguards: Consequence Rating: Probability Rating : Risk Ranking: Action/Other Considerations: 93 ABD00036707 Node 08 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process Water To Pic-Heater Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: Consequences : SAME AS NODE 7 Safeguards: Consequence Rating: Probability Rating Risk Ranking: Action/Other Considerations: Node 08 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process Water To Pic-Heater Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: SAME AS NODE 7 Consequences : Safeguards: Consequence Rating: Probability Rating : Risk Ranking: Action/Other Considerations: 94 ABD00036708 Node 09 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Misc. Process Water Lines Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. BLOCKED/PLUGGED LINE Consequences : NONE Safeguards: NONE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 09 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Misc. Process Water Lines Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Reverse Flow Cause: NONE Consequences: NONE Safeguards: NONE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking 5 95 ABD00036709 Node 09 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Misc. Process Water Lines Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. HIGH TEMP Consequences: 1. LINE RUPTURE Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 09 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Misc. Process Water Lines Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. EMPTY WATER TOWER Consequences: NONE Safeguards: WATER TOWER LEVEL CONTROL AND ALARM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 96 ABD00036710 Node 09 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Misc. Process Water Lines Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: LINE RUPTURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 2. INSULATED LINE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: D Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 09 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Misc. Process Water Lines Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. LINE RUPTURE 2. NO FLOW Safeguards: INSULATED LINE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 97 ABD00036711 Node 10 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Cold Charge Water Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 2. RUPTURED LINE 3. VALVE MALFUNCTION 4. TEMP. CONTROLLER MALFUNCTION 5. LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR Consequences: 1. HOT CHARGE 2. BAD PRODUCT QUALITY Safeguards: 1. TEMP INDICATION ON CHARGE LINE 2. INTERLOCKS 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 98 ABD00036712 Node 10 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Cold Charge Water Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. HIGH TEMP. Consequences: 1. LINE RUPTURE Safeguards: 1. RV ON FILTER PACK Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 10 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Cold Charge Water Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. EMPTY WATER TOWER 2. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 3. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE Consequences: 1. NO/LOW FLOW Safeguards: SAME AS NO/LOW FLOW Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 99 ABD00036713 Node 10 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Cold Charge Water Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. RINSE REACTOR WITH HOT WATER Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. HOT CHARGE - BAD QUALITY Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 2. INSULATED LINE 3. TEMP INDICATION ON CHARGE LINE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 100 ABD00036714 Node 11 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Steam To Pic-Heater Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED/MALFUNCTION 2. BOILERS DOWN 3. LINE RUPTURE 4. TEMP CONTROLLER MALFUNCTION Consequences: 1. COLD MAKE-UP TANK 2. COLD CHARGE - BAD QUALITY, LOST PRODUCTION Safeguards: 1. TEMP INDICATION ON HOT WATER LINE 2. BACK-UP HOT WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 101 ABD00036715 Node 11 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Steam To Pic-Heater Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: NONE Consequences: N/A Safeguards: N/A Consequence Rating: N/A Probability Rating: N/A Risk Ranking: N/A Action/Other Considerations: Node 11 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Steam To Pic-Heater Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. BOILERS DOWN 2. NO FLOW Consequences: SAME AS NO FLOW Safeguards: SAME AS NO FLOW Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 102 ABD00036716 Node 11 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Steam To Pic-Heater Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. LOW PRESSURE Consequences: SAME AS LOW PRESSURE/NO FLOW Safeguards SAME AS NO FLOW Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 103 ABD00036717 Node 12 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D, NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. CHARGE PUMP FAILURE 2. VALVE MALFUNCTION 3. RUPTURED LINE/ BLEEDER OPEN 4. EMPTY HOT WATER TANK 5. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 6. PLUGGED FILTER 7. INTERLOCKS Consequences: 1. PRODUCTION LOSS 2. BAD PRODUCT QUALITY 3. DAMAGE CHARGE WATER PUMP Safeguards: 1. DUAL FLOW METERS 2. INTERLOCKS & ALARMS 3. 2 CHARGE PUMPS 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES 5. HOT WATER TANK LEVEL INDICATION Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: PID NM-090102-PID-D Wrong - ARROW #36 SHOULD GO TO MN-090105-PID-D 104 ABD00036718 Node 12 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D, NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104 -PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Reverse Flow Cause: 1. NO CHARGE WATER FLOW, BACKFLOW VCM DURING RXR CHARGE Consequences: 1. VCM RELEASE 2. OVERPRESSURE HOT WATER TANK 3. PERSONNEL EXPOSURE Safeguards: 1. LOW FLOW SHUTDOWN & OTHER INTERLOCKS 2. CHECK VALVES 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 105 ABD00036719 Node 12 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D, NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. BLOCKED/PLUGGED LINE WITH PUMP RUNNING Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE 2. LIFT RELIEF VALVE 3. EQUIPMENT DAMAGE Safeguards: 1. RV FILTER PACK 2. PUMP DEAD HEAD PRESSURE UNDER MAX PIPE PRESSURE RATING Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 12 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D, NM-090102-PID-D NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104 -PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: SAME AS NO/LOW FLOW Consequences: Safeguards: Consequence Rating: Probability Rating Risk Ranking Action/Other Considerations: 106 ABD00036720 Node 12 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D, NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. HIGH TEMP IN HOT WATER TANK 3. TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER FAILURE Consequences: 1. DAMAGE PUMPS 2. HOT CHARGE - BAD QUALITY, PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 2. REACTOR TEMP INDICATION 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES 4. INTERLOCKS 5. INSULATED LINE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 107 ABD00036721 Node 12 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hot Water Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090101-PID-D, NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER 2. TEMP CONTROLLER MALFUNCTION Consequences: 1. COLD CHARGE - BAD QUALITY, LOST PRODUCTION Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE 2. TEMP INDICATION ON REACTOR Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 108 ABD00036722 Node 13 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank DM-131 Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. DISCHARGE VALVE CLOSED 2. DISCHARGE PLUGGED/BLOCKED 3. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. LIFT RELIEF VALVE 2. OVERPRESSURE VESSEL 3. LOW MOL PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVE ON VESSEL Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: D Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 109 ABD00036723 Node 13 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank DM-131 Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. INLET LINE CLOSED 2. VENT OPEN 3. VESSEL EMPTY 4. BYPASS VALVE OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE REACTOR WITH DECAL WATER 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. CHARGE WATER FLOW METER Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 110 ABD00036724 Node 13 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank DM-131 Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. HOT WATER CHARGE TANK TOO HOT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. HOT CHARGE - COURSE BATCH Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVE 2. TEMPERATURE TRANSMITTER ON TANK Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 111 ABD00036725 Node 13 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank DM-131 Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. PROCESS WATER VALVE LEFT OPEN 2. CHARGE WATER TANK TOO COLD 3. DECAL TANK NOT USED FOR EXTENDED PERIOD 4. CHARGE WATER TOO COLD Consequences: 1. COLD CHARGE 2. PRODUCTION LOSS 3. RESIN QUALITY Safeguards: 1. TEMPERATURE TRANSMITTER 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT AN ALARM OR MESSAGE BE PUT ON THE DCS TO ALERT THE LEAD OPERATOR THAT THE DECAL TANK IS TOO COLD TO BE CHARGED. 112 ABD00036726 Node 014 DELETED Combined with Node 12 113 ABD00036727 Node 15 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Inlet Line & Filter Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3. FILTER PLUGGED 4. CHARGE WATER PUMP FAILURE 5. BACK FLUSH VALVE LEFT OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. CHARGE WATER FLOW METERS 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. DP CELL ON FILTER PACK Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 114 ABD00036728 Node 15 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Inlet Line & Filter Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. EXTERNAL HEAT W/ NO FLOW (ELEC. TRACE ON) 4. FILTER PLUGGED Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET 2. OVER PRESSURE FILTER PACK Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVES ON FILTER PACK/DECAL TANK 2. PRESSURE GAUGES IN FIELD 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 115 ABD00036729 Node 15 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Inlet Line & Filter Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. CHARGE WATER PUMP FAILURE 2. RUPTURED LINE 3. BLEEDER OPEN 4. FILTER PACK OPEN 5. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE WITH DECAL WATER 2. QUALITY ISSUE ON LOW MOLE Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE GAUGES IN FIELD 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. FLOW METERS & LOW FLOW ALARMS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 116 ABD00036730 Node 15 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Inlet Line & Filter Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. ELEC. TRACE STAYS ON WHEN NOT NEEDED 3. CHARGE WATER TOO HOT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. HOT CHARGE -- COURSE BATCH Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 2. CHARGE WATER TEMP. INDICATION & CONTROL 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 117 ABD00036731 Node 15 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Inlet Line & Filter Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER 2. CHARGE WATER TOO COLD 3. HAVEN'T USED DECAL TANK FOR A WHILE Consequences: 1. COLD CHARGE 2. PRODUCTION LOSS 3. RESIN QUALITY 4. FROZEN LINE -- LINE RUPTURE Safeguards: 1. ELECTRIC TRACED LINE 2. TEMP. INDICATION Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 118 ABD00036732 Node 16 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Outlet Line & Filter Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3. FILTER PLUGGED 4. CHARGE WATER PUMP FAILURE 5. BACK FLUSH VALVE LEFT OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE 2. PRODUCTION LOSS 3. CAN'T MAKE-UP BRINE FOR REGENERATION Safeguards: 1. CHARGE WATER FLOW METERS 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. DP CELL ON FILTER PACK Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: 119 ABD00036733 Node 16 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Outlet Line & Filter Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: SAME AS NODE 15 Consequences: SAME AS NODE 15 Safeguards: SAME AS NODE 15 Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 16 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Outlet Line & Filter Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: SAME AS NODE 13 Consequences: SAME AS NODE 13 Safeguards: SAME AS NODE 13 Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking 5 120 ABD00036734 Node 16 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Outlet Line & Filter Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: SAME AS NODE 15 Consequences: SAME AS NODE 15 Safeguards: SAME AS NODE 15 Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 16 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Outlet Line & Filter Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: SAME AS NODE 15 Consequences: SAME AS NODE 15 Safeguards: SAME AS NODE 15 Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating A Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: 121 ABD00036735 Node 17 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Brine to Decal Tank Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 4. TK-702 BRINE CHARGE TANK EMPTY Consequences: 1. CAN'T REGENERATE DECAL TANK Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 122 ABD00036736 Node 17 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Brine to Decal Tank Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. DEAD HEAD PUMP 2. EXTERNAL HEAT 3. ELECTRIC TRACE FAILURE Consequences: 1. LINE RUPTURE/BLOW GASKET 2. DAMAGE PUMP Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE GAUGE IN FIELD 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. PRESSURE RELIEF ON PUMP DISCHARGE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 123 ABD00036737 Node 17 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Brine to Decal Tank Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. EMPTY TANK 2. PUMP FAILURE 3. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 4. BLEEDER OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T REGENERATE SOFTENER 2. DAMAGE PUMP Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE GAUGES 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 124 ABD00036738 Node 17 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Brine to Decal Tank Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. ELECTRIC TRACE FAILURE Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE RELIEF ON PUMP DISCHARGE 2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 17 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Brine to Decal Tank Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. FROZE LINE/RUPTURE LINE 2. CAN'T REGENERATE SOFTENER Safeguards: 1. ELECTRIC TRACED 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 125 ABD00036739 Node 18 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Regen. Lines & Water Supply Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. EMPTY WATER TOWER Consequences: 1. CAN'T REGENERATE DECAL TANK Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 126 ABD00036740 Node 18 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Regen. Lines & Water Supply- Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. ELECTRIC TRACE FAILURE Consequences: 1. LINE RUPTURE/BLOW GASKET Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 18 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Regen. Lines & Water Supply Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. EMPTY WATER TANK 2. RUPTURED LINE 3. VALVE CLOSED / BLOCKED OR PLUGGED LINE 4. BLEEDER OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T REGENERATE Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE GAUGES 2. WATER TOWER LEVEL INDICATION & LOW LEVEL ALARM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 127 ABD00036741 Node 18 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Regen. Lines & Water Supply Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. ELECTRIC TRACE FAILURE Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 18 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Decal Tank Regen. Lines & Water Supply Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE 2. CAN'T REGENERATE DECAL TANK Safeguards: 1. ELECTRIC TRACED 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations Risk Ranking: 5 128 ABD00036742 Node 19 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Rinse Supply Line Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. CLOSED VALVE 2. PUMP FAILURE 3. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 4. SPRAY HEAD PLUGGED 5. REACTOR VALVE LEAKING THROUGH -- VCM FREEZES WATER IN LINE 6. WATER TOWER EMPTY 7. INTERLOCKED OUT {i.e. CHARGING ANOTHER REACTOR) Consequences: 1. CAN'T RINSE REACTOR -- CONTAMINATION/HP PROBLEMS 2. REACTOR DOWNTIME Safeguards: 1. LOW FLOW METERS 2. INTERLOCKS 3. HPSW TO SPRAY NOZZLE TO PREVENT PLUGGING 4. TWO PUMPS 5. LEVEL XMITTER ON WATER TOWER & LOW LEVEL ALARM 6. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 129 ABD00036743 Node 19 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Rinse Supply Line Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT W/ NO FLOW 2. DEAD HEAD PUMP DUE TO NO FLOW Consequences: 1. LIFT FILTER PACK RELIEF VALVE 2. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET Safeguards: 1. FIELD MOUNTED PRESSURE GAUGES 2. FILTER PACK RV 3. PUMP RECIRCULATION LINE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 130 ABD00036744 Node 19 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Rinse Supply Line Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-0 90107 -PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. RINSE PUMP FAILURE 2 . PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3 . WATER TOWER EMPTY 4 . VALVE CLOSED 5. HPSW PUMP FAILURE 6 . BLEEDER OPEN/RUPTURED LINE Consequences: 1. DIRTY REACTOR - QUALITY PROBLEMS 2 . CONDENSER PLUGGING 3 . REACTOR DOWNTIME 4 . VCM RELEASE/BACK-UP VCM INTO HPSW LINE Safeguards: 1. FLOW METERS 2 . PUMP RUN INDICATION 3 . CHECK VALVE ON HPSW LINE 4 . INTERLOCKS 5 . OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 131 ABD00036745 Node 19 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Rinse Supply Line Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. HOT CHARGE WATER VALVE OPEN TO RINSE WATER LINE Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. QUALITY PROBLEMS Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 2. INTERLOCKS 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 132 ABD00036746 Node 19 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Rinse Supply Line Drawing No. NM-090102-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE 2. VCM RELEASE INTO LINE OR ATMOSPHERE DURING POLY Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE 2. RINSE WATER LINE USED FREQUENTLY 3. HPSW LINE ALWAYS FLOWING Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 133 ABD00036747 Node 20 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor 741,742,743,744,745 Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. LOSS OF COOLING WATER 2 . LOSS OF AGITATION 3 . TOO MUCH CATALYST 4 . REACTOR FULL -- OVER 5. REACTOR VENT FAILURE 6. CONDENSER DIRTY 7. POWER FAILURE 8 . DCS FAILURE 9. COOLING WATER TOO WARM 10 . KILL SYSTEMS FAILURE 11. TEMPERATURE INDICATOR/CONTROLLER FAILURE Consequences: 1. VCM RELEASE 3. FIRE/EXPLOSION - DEATH 5. EARLY KILL 7. BAD QUALITY PRODUCT 2. PERSONNEL EXPOSURE/INJURY 4. SAFETY DISK BLOWS/RELIEF VALVE LIFT 6. REACTOR OVERPRESSURE/DAMAGE 8. LOSS OF PRODUCTION/REACTOR DOWNTIME Safeguards: 1. INTERLOCKS & DCS ALARMS 2. AUTOMATIC EMERGENCY KILL 3. MANUAL EMERGENCY KILL 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES 5. DELUGE SYSTEM/FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/GAS CHROMOGRAPHS 6. EMERGENCY COOLING WATER & MANUAL BYPASSES 7. RELIEF VALVES/RUPTURE DISKS 8. ROUTINE VESSEL INSPECTION PROGRAM 9. EMERGENCY POWER TO DCS 10. INSTRUMENTATION CALIBRATION & CHECK ON PERIODIC BASIS 11. OPERATOR CHECK BEFORE CHARGING EACH BATCH 12. SLURRY TEMPERATURE CONTROL 13. DUAL FLOW METERS ON ALL INGREDIENT CHARGE LINES 14. CONSTANT MONITORING OF ALL REACTORS IN CONTROL ROOM 15. FIELD AND PANEL PRESSURE INDICATION 16. REACTOR VENTS TO RECOVERY SYSTEM AND ATMOSPHERE 17. FIELD BACK-UP EMERGENCY KILL SYSTEM Consequence Rating: II Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: Note: RX-745 same as others except larger, more relief valves. TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT EXISTING PROCEDURES AND SAFETY CONTROLS ARE REVIEWED FOR ADEQUACY AND PROPER USE. 134 ABD00036748 Node 20 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor 741,742,743,744,745 Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. TOO MUCH COOLING WATER 2. AMS LEAK INTO REACTOR/AMS IN VCM RVCM RECEIVERS 3. NOT ENOUGH CATALYST 4. MISCHARGE - WRONG AMOUNT OF CHARGE INGREDIENTS 5. INCORRECT SLURRY TEMPERATURE READING 6. COLD CHARGE Consequences: 1. PRODUCTION LOSS 2. BAD QUALITY Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. INSTRUMENTATION CALIBRATION 3. DUAL PRESSURE INDICATION & FIELD PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 135 ABD00036749 Node 20 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor 741,742,743,744,745 Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. COOLING WATER FAILURE 3. LOSS OF AGITATION 4. TOO MUCH CATALYST 5. UNABLE TO VENT REACTOR INERTS 6. DIRTY CONDENSER 7. INCORRECT SLURRY TEMPERATURE INDICATION 8. COOLING WATER TEMPERATURE TOO WARM 9. POWER FAILURE 10. DCS FAILURE Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. BAD QUALITY 3. REACTOR DOWNTIME/PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. SAME AS HIGH PRESSURE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: NOTE: HIGH PRESSURE CONSEQUENCES AND PROBABILITY WERE ADDRESSED DURING HIGH PRESSURE DEVIATION STUDY 136 ABD00036750 Node 2 0 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor 741,742,743,744,745 Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106 -PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. TOO MUCH COOLING WATER 2. COLD CHARGE 3. STEAM FAILURE TO RX-745 OR HEAT-UP LOOP Consequences: 1. BAD QUALITY 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. SLURRY TEMP INDICATION 3. COOLING WATER TEMP. AND FLOWRATE INDICATION Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 137 ABD00036751 Node 20 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor 741,742,743,744,745 Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-0 90105 -PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Level Cause: 1. OVERCHARGE REACTOR 2 . REACTOR NOT EMPTY 3 . TOO MUCH SEAL WATER OR SPRAY HEAD WATER 4 . REACTOR FOAMING OR SPLITTING DURING POLY OR RECOVERY Consequences: 1. BAD QUALITY 2 . ABORTED BATCH 3 . PRODUCTION LOSS 4 . HIGH PRESSURE 5. CARRYOVER OF RESIN INTO RECOVERY SYSTEM Safeguards: 1. DUAL FLOWMETERS ON ALL CHARGE INGREDIENTS 2 . DUAL PRESSURE INDICATORS IN CONTROL ROOM, PRESSURE GAUGE IN FIELD 3 . DCS INTERLOCKS 4 . OPERATING PROCEDURES 5 . SEAL WATER AND SPRAY HEAD WATER FLOWRATES CHECKED EACH CHARGE 6 . VCM AND WATER CHARGE METERS CHECKED PERIODICALLY 7 . REACTOR IS VERIFIED EMPTY BY PANEL OPERATORS AFTER EACH DUMP Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT LEVEL INDICATION OR HIGH LEVEL PROBE BE INSTALLED ON EACH REACTOR 138 ABD00036752 Node 20 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor 741,742,743,744,745 Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Condenser Tube Leak Cause: 1. CORROSION/EROSION 2. HIGH PRESSURE 3. IMPROPER TUBE CLEANING/DRILLING Consequences: 1. VCM RELEASE INTO COOLING WATER SYSTEM 2. MINOR VCM EXPOSURE TO PERSONNEL Safeguards: 1. GC'S IN REACTOR MODULES 2. CONDENSER INSPECTION 3. PERIODIC REACTOR PRESSURE CHECK Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS PERIODIC (WEEKLY) SAMPLING OF COOLING WATER FOR VCM 139 ABD00036753 Node 20 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor 741,742,743,744,745 Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, & NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Agitator Failure Cause: 1. POWER FAILURE 2. DCS FAILURE 3. AGITATOR SHAFT BREAKS (STRESS/FATIGUE FAILURE) 4. MOTOR FAILURE 5. COUPLING FAILURE 6. GEARBOX FAILURE 7. MISOPERATION 8. CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIPPED 9. AGITATOR SEAL FAILURE Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. PRODUCTION LOSS 3. QUALITY PROBLEMS 4. ABORTED BATCH {HARDER TO KILL) 5. HARDER TO DUMP AND STRIP REACTOR Safeguards: 1. LOW AND HIGH AGITATOR AMP ALARMS 2. BACK-UP DCS CARD 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES 4. AGITATOR START/STOP BUTTONS ON HARD PANEL 5. GEARBOX PM 6. SEAL OIL AND SEAL WATER FLOW AND PRESSURE CHECKED BEFORE EACH CHARGE 7. DCS INTERLOCKS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT A REVIEW BE DONE ON EXISTING PROCEDURES AND SAFETY CONTROLS. THE TEAM ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT A REVIEW BE DONE ON EXISTING PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION PRACTICES. 140 ABD00036754 Node 21 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Slurry Dump Header Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090116-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED LINE 2. EMPTY REACTOR 3. DUMP VALVE CLOSED 4. SLURRY DUMP TANK LEVEL CONTROLLER FAILURE 5. INTERLOCKED OUT Consequences: 1. PRODUCTION LOSS 2. OVERFILL REACTOR Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. FLOW INSTRUMENT ON BULLS EYE - NO FLOW ALARM ON DCS 3. BULLS EYE AND TV CAMERA ON DUMP LINE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating A Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: 141 ABD00036755 Node 21 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Slurry Dump Header Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090116-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. FLUSHING DUMP HEADER WITH CHARGE WATER PUMPS Consequences: 1. BLOW BULLS-EYE OUT 2. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 142 ABD00036756 Node 21 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Slurry Dump Header Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090116-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: Consequences : NONE Safeguards: Consequence Rating: Probability Rating: Risk Ranking: Action/Other Considerations: Node 21 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Slurry Dump Header Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090116-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: Consequences : NONE Safeguards: Consequence Rating: Probability Rating: Risk Ranking: Action/Other Considerations: 143 ABD00036757 Node 22 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: S.A. Charge Lines Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. SA CHARGE PUMP FAILURE 2. SA CHARGE TANK EMPTY 3. BLOCKED/PLUGGED LINE 4. VALVE CLOSED 5. RAM VALVE FAILURE/HUNG 6. 745 F-50 FILTER PLUGGED 7. LINE BROKEN/BLEEDER OPEN 8. DCS INTERLOCKS Consequences: 1. COURSE/ABORTED BATCH 2. BAD QUALITY 3. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. DUAL FLOW METERS & LOW FLOW ALARMS 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. SPARE CHARGE PUMP Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Note: RX-744 & RX-745 same as other except more SA charge lines (same interlocks, valve/piping configuration). 144 ABD00036758 Node 22 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: S.A. Charge Lines Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. DEAD HEAD PUMP 2. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. LINE RUPTURE/BLOW GASKET 2. DAMAGE CHARGE PUMP 3. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 2. DCS SEQUENCING ON PUMP START-UP/SHUT-DOWN AND VALVE OPENING/CLOSING 3. LOW FLOW SHUTDOWN Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating C Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: 145 ABD00036759 Node 22 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: S.A. Charge Lines Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3. VALVE CLOSED 4. CHARGE TANK EMPTY 5. BLEEDER OPEN/LINE RUPTURE 6. 745 F-50 FILTER PLUGGED Consequences: 1. SAME AS NO/LOW FLOW Safeguards: 1. SAME AS NO/LOW FLOW Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 146 ABD00036760 Node 22 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: S.A. Charge Lines Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED LINE 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. ELECTRIC TRACED 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 147 ABD00036761 Node 23 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Dump/Charge Manifold Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED DURING DUMP 2. VALVE MALFUNCTION 3. VALVES INTERLOCKED OUT Consequences: 1. CAN'T DUMP/RINSE 2. CAN'T CHARGE 3. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. BULLSEYE ON DUMP LINE 2. FLOW INDICATOR ON DUMP LINE 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES 4. VALVE POSITION INDICATION Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Note: RX-745 same as others except no VCM charge line, additional dump line. 148 ABD00036762 Node 23 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Dump/Charge Manifold Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. VALVES LEAKING THROUGH 2. MAIN CHARGE/DUMP VALVE CLOSED 3. EXTERNAL HEAT DEAD HEAD CHARGE PUMPS Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET 2. VCM OVER EXPOSURE 3. VCM RELEASE - FIRE 4. DAMAGE PUMPS Safeguards: 1. LOW FLOW SHUTDOWN ON CHARGE PUMPS 2. DCS INTERLOCKS 3. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM & GC'S 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 149 ABD00036763 Node 23 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Dump/Charge Manifold Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 150 ABD00036764 Node 24 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP i Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Cooling Water Supply/Return Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. MANUAL VALVE CLOSED 2. COOLING TOWER PUMPS FAILURE 3. LOW COOLING TOWER BASIN LEVEL 4. CONTROL VALVE FAILURE 5. TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER FAILURE 6. PLUGGED LINE 7. COOLING TOWER BACKPRESSURE LINE CONTROL VALVE FAILURE Consequences: 1. HIGH REACTOR TEMPERATURE - SEE NODE 20 2. HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE - SEE NODE 20 3. BAD RESIN QUALITY 4. EARLY REACTOR KILL 5. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. FLOW INDICATORS 2. HIGH TEMP/PRESS. INDICATORS/ALARMS ON RXRS 3. COOLING WATER RETURN TEMP. INDICATION 4. COOLING TOWER LOW LEVEL ALARM 5. OPERATING PROCEDURES 6. THREE PUMPS ON COOLING TOWER 7. EMERGENCY COOLING WATER 8. CONTROL VALVE BYPASSES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS REVIEW OF EXISTING PROCEDURES, TRAINING, AND SAFETY CONTROLS. 151 ABD00036765 Node 24 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Cooling Water Supply/Return Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-0 9010 5 -PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. MANUAL VALVE CLOSED ON RETURN LINE 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE ON RETURN LINE 3. EXTERNAL HEAT WITH NO FLOW Consequences: 1. LIFT RELIEF VALVE 2. OVERPRESSURE RXR JACKET 3. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVE 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 152 ABD00036766 Node 24 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Cooling Water Supply/Return Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105 -PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. COOLING WATER PUMP FAILURE 2. BACK PRESSURE CONTROLLER FAILS OPEN. 3. LOW COOLING TOWER LEVEL 4. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE Consequences: 1. LOW/NO FLOW Safeguards: 1. FLOW INDICATOR 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 153 ABD00036767 Node 24 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Cooling Water Supply/Return Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. COOLING TOWER FAN FAILURE 2. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. POOR RXR COOLING - HIGH TEMP/HIGH PRESSURE - SEE NODE 20 Safeguards: 1. COOLING WATER TEMP INDICATION 2. COOLING TOWER FAN FAILURE ALARM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 154 ABD00036768 Node 25 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Heat-up Loop Supply/Return Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D NM-090122-PID-D Deviation: No Flow Cause: 1. PUMP/VALVE FAILURE 2. BLOCKED/PLUGGED LINE 3. CONTROLLER FAILURE Consequences: 1. LONGER RXR HEAT-UP 2. LOST PRODUCTION Safeguards: 1. PUMP FAILURE ALARM 2. TEMP. INDICATION 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 ABD00036769 Node 25 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Heat-up Loop Supply/Return Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D NM-090122-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE FAILURE - DEAD HEAD PUMP 2. NO FLOW - INJECT RAW STEAM INTO LINE Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVE 2. TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER/INDICATION 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 156 ABD00036770 Node 25 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Heat-up Loop Supply/Return Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D NM-090122-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP/VALVE FAILURE 2. NO WATER IN HEAT-UP LOOP 3. BLEEDER OPEN/RUPTURED LINE Consequences: 1. LOW/NO FLOW Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. PUMP RUN INDICATION Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 157 ABD00036771 Node 25 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Heat-up Loop Supply/Return Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D NM-090122-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. NO/LOW WATER FLOW 2. TEMP CONTROLLER FAILURE 3. EXTERNAL HEAT 4. SET POINT TOO HIGH Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. REACTOR TOO HOT - OVERSHOOT POLY TEMP Safeguards: 1. TEMP INDICATION 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 158 ABD00036772 Node 25 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Heat-up Loop Supply/Return Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-0 9010 5 -PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D NM-090122-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. NO STEAM 2. CONTROLLER FAILURE 3. SYSTEM DOWN FOR EXTENDED PERIOD Consequences: 1. LONG RXR HEAT-UP 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. TEMP. INDICATION 2. STEAM PRESSURE INDICATION 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 159 ABD00036773 Node 2 6 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Clean Wall Supply Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-0 9010 7 -PID-D, NM-090128-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED NOZZLE 2. VALVE FAILURE 3. STEAM FAILURE 4. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE Consequences: 1. CAN'T CW REACTOR 2. BAD QUALITY 3. RXR DOWNTIME 4. PLUGGED CONDENSER Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. FLOW TRANSMITTER Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Note: RX-745 same as others except additional line to condenser. 160 ABD00036774 Node 26 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Clean Wall Supply Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090128-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE FAILURE 2. PLUGGED LINE 3. LOW STEAM PRESSURE 4. NO CLEAN WALL SUPPLY 5. RUPTURED LINE/ BLEEDER OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T CLEANWALL -- SEE NO/LOW FLOW Safeguards: 1. FLOW INDICATION 2. FIELD MOUNTED PRESSURE GAUGE 3. VALVE POSITION INDICATION 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 161 ABD00036775 Node 2 6 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Clean Wall Supply Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-0 90105 -PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090128-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature/Pressure Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. ELEC. TRACE FAILURE Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE - RUPTURED LINE/BLOW GASKET Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 3. RELIEF VALVE ON SUPPLY PUMP DISCHARGE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 26 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Clean Wall Supply Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-0 90105 -PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-0 90107-PID-D, NM-090128-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE - SEE NO FLOW Safeguards: 1. ELECTRIC TRACED LINE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 162 ABD00036776 Node 27 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Auto Kill (Isonox) Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED LINE 2. VALVE FAILURE 3. NO ISONOX SUPPLY {TANK EMPTY, 4. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN NO NITROGEN) Consequences: 1. CAN'T AUTO KILL RXR WITH ISONOX Safeguards: 1. BACK-UP KILL SYSTEMS 2. VALVE ALARMS 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES 4. DUAL FLOW INDICATION Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Note: RX-745 same as others except separate header & Emergency Kill line enters Isonox line. 163 ABD00036777 164 ABD00036778 Node 27 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Auto Kill (Isonox) Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106 -PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 2. LOW N2 PRESSURE 3. VALVE FAILURE 4. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 5. STORAGE TANK EMPTY Consequences: 1. NO/LOW FLOW 2. CAN'T AUTO KILL Safeguards: 1. FLOW INDICATOR 2. BACK-UP KILL SYSTEMS 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 165 ABD00036779 I Node 27 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Auto Kill (Isonox) Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. ELECTRIC TRACE FAILURE Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 27 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Auto Kill (Isonox) Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE - NO/LOW Safeguards: 1. ELECTRIC TRACED LINES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 166 ABD00036780 Node 28 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Vent Lines Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM - 090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-0 9010 7-PID-D, NM-090122 -PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED LINE 2. VALVE FAILURE 3. HIGH PRESSURE ON RECOVERY LINE - ANOTHER RXR PRES. 4. MANUAL VALVE CLOSED ON INERT VENT LINE IN RECOV. @ HIGHER Consequences: 1. CAN'T VENT/RECOVER/EVACUATE REACTOR 2. EARLY KILL 3. HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE & TEMPERATURE 4. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. CONDENSER TEMP INDICATION - IF NO RISE, 2. WEEKLY PM ON VENT LINES 3. VALVE POSITION INDICATION LIGHTS ON DCS 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES 5. PRESSURE INDICATOR ON RECOVERY LINE 6. EMERGENCY/AUTO KILL INDICATION RXR NOT VENTING Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS REVIEW OF EXISTING SAFETY CONTROLS, PROCEDURES, & TRAINING OPERATING AND PM 167 ABD00036781 Node 28 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Vent Lines Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090122-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. HIGH PRESSURE ON RECOVERY LINE PRES. - ANOTHER RXR IN RECOV. @ HIGHER Consequences: 1. CAN'T VENT REACTOR 2. EARLY KILL Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. KILL SYSTEMS 3. PRESSURE INDICATION ON RXRS 4. CONDENSER TEMP INDICATOR Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 2 8 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Vent Lines Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105 -PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 168 ABD00036782 Node 29 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: AMS Emergency Kill Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090120-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Charge Pot Low Level Cause: 1. VALVE FAILURE 2. CLOSED MANUAL VALVE 3. PLUGGED LINE 4. NO/LOW NITROGEN PRESSURE 5. NO AMS IN AMS CHARGE POT 6. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 7. RXRS BEING BUMPED FREQUENTLY Consequences: 1. UNABLE TO BUMP/KILL REACTOR 2. HIGH TEMP./PRESSURE IN RXR Safeguards: 1. PRE-CHARGE CHECKS BEFORE EACH CHARGE 2. AMS VALVE FAILURE ALARM 3. HARD PANEL AMS KILL BACKUP BUTTONS 4. AMS AUTO KILL IN DCS PROGRAMMING 5. WEEKLY CHECKS OF AMS SYSTEM 6. OPERATING PROCEDURES 7. AUTO & NORMAL KILL SYSTEMS AS BACKUP 8. LOW PRESSURE AND LOW LEVEL ALARMS ON CHARGE POTS 9. SIGHT GLASS ON CHARGE POT Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Note: RX-745 same as others except enters Isonox line. 169 ABD00036783 Node 2 9 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: AMS Emergency Kill Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090120-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. NITROGEN BOTTLE PRESSURE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION 2. HIGH TEMPERATURE/EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. BLOWN SAFETY DISK/RELIEF VALVE LIFT ON CHARGE POT 2. LINE RUPTURE/POT RUPTURE 3. AMS OVEREXPOSURE TO EMPLOYEE(S) 4. UNABLE TO EMERGENCY KILL RXR WITH AMS SYSTEM 5. PRODUCTION LOSS/DOWNTIME Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE ALARM 2. OPERATOR CHECK BEFORE EACH CHARGE 3. RELIEF VALVE/SAFETY DISK 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES 5. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 6. FIELD MOUNTED PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 170 ABD00036784 Node 2 9 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: AMS Emergency Kill Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-0 90105-PID-D, NM-090106 -PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090120-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. LOW NITROGEN PRESSURE 2. PRESSURE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION 3. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 4. CHARGE POT RV/RD OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T BUMP/KILL RXR WITH AMS SYSTEM Safeguards: 1. OPERATOR CHECK BEFORE EACH CHARGE 2. LOW PRESSURE ALARM ON CHARGE POT 3. WEEKLY CHECK BY OPERATIONS 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES 5. PRESSURE GAUGE IN FIELD Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 171 ABD00036785 Node 2 9 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: AMS Emergency Kill Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090120-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: Consequences: NONE Safeguards: Consequence Rating: Probability Rating: Risk Ranking: Action/Other Considerations: 172 ABD00036786 Node 30 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Jacket Steam Supply Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090121-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. SUPPLY VALVE FAILURE/MANUAL VALVE CLOSED 2. LOW/NO STEAM PRESSURE 3. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE OR EDUCTOR 4. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN Consequences: 1. SLOW RXR HEAT-UP 2. PRODUCTION LOSS 3. QUALITY PROBLEM Safeguards: 1. VALVE POSITION INDICATION 2. STEAM PRESSURE INDICATOR 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Note: RX-745 same except 3 eductors instead of 1. 173 ABD00036787 Node 3 0 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Jacket Steam Supply Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090121-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. NO STEAM 2. WEATHER Consequences: 1. SLOW RXR HEAT-UP 2. PRODUCTION LOSS 3. RUPTURED/PLUGGED LINE 4. QUALITY PROBLEMS Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 174 ABD00036788 Node 31 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Stripping Steam Supply- Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-0 9 0105 -PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090121-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow or Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE MALFUNCTION 2. MANUAL VALVE CLOSED 3. LOW/NO STEAM PRESSURE 4. STRIPPING STEAM CONTROL VALVE/CONTROLLER MALFUNCTION 5. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE 6. STRIPPING STEAM TEMP. XMITTER MALFUNCTION Consequences: 1. UNABLE TO STRIP/RECOVER RXR 2. PRODUCTION LOSS 3. HIGH RESIDUAL VCM IN RESIN - POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE - QUALITY PROBLEM Safeguards: 1. STEAM FLOW INDICATOR 2. STEAM PRESSURE INDICATOR 3. LOW STEAM PRESSURE ALARM 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 175 ABD00036789 Node 31 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Stripping Steam Supply Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-0 9010 5 -PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-0 90107-PID-D, NM-090121-PID-D Deviation: Reverse Flow Cause: 1. STEAM PRESSURE LOSS DURING STRIPPING Consequences: 1. BACK REACTOR CONTENTS INTO STEAM HEADER Safeguards: 1. FAIL CLOSED STEAM SUPPLY VALVES 2. INTERLOCKS ON LOW STEAM PRESSURE - VALVES CLOSE 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 176 ABD00036790 Node 31 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Stripping Steam Supply Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090121-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER 2. NO STEAM PRESSURE/FLOW Consequences: 1. RUPTURED LINE 2. CAN'T STRIP/RECOVER RXR 3. PRODUCTION LOSS 4. QUALITY PROBLEM Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 177 ABD00036791 Node 32 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Normal Kill and Catalyst Charge Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: No Flow Cause: 1. VALVE FAILURE 2 . PLUGGED/BLOCKED/RUPTURED LINE 3 . NO POT PRESSURE 4 . BLEEDER OPEN 5 . INTERLOCKED 6 . MANUAL VALVE CLOSED Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE CATALYST OR NORMAL KILL RXR 2. DOWNTIME/PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. BACK-UP KILL SYSTEMS 2 . OPERATING PROCEDURES 3 . PRESSURE GAUGES ON POT 4 . DCS ALARMS 5 . HPSW METER Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 178 ABD00036792 Node 32 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Normal Kill and Catalyst Charge Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: Reverse Flow Cause: 1. CHECK VALVE FAILURE WITH HPSW OFF AND RXR VALVES OPEN 2. POT DEPRESSURIZED BEFORE CATALYST VALVE CLOSED 3. WINTERIZATION CIRCULATION VALVE LEFT OPEN DURING CATALYST CHARGE/NORMAL KILL CHARGE Consequences: 1. VCM RELEASE/OVEREXPOSURE 2. FIRE/EXPLOSION Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. GC'S 3. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 4. DCS MESSAGE ABOUT RXR VALVES OPEN TOO LONG 5. PRESSURE GAUGE ON CHARGE POT Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT A REVIEW OF THE EXISTING RECIRCULATION LINE BE ,CONDUCTED. EXISTING SAFETY CONTROLS PROCEDURES, AND TRAINING SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. 179 ABD00036793 Node 32 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Normal Kill and Catalyst Charge Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. RXR CHARGE VALVE FAILURE OR SLOW TO OPEN 2. EXTERNAL HEAT 3. CATALYST DECOMPOSITION IN CHARGE POT 4. HPSW LEFT ON AND CATALYST VALVES CLOSED (1 OF 2 VALVES) Consequences: 1. RUPTURE DISK BLOWN 2. RUPTURE LINE OR CATALYST POT 3. PRODUCTION LOSS 4. CAN'T CHARGE/NORMAL KILL RXR Safeguards: 1. RUPTURE DISK ON CHARGE POT 2. PRESSURE GAUGE ON POT 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES 4. CHARGE POT HIGH PRESSURE ALARM ON DCS 5. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 180 ABD00036794 Node 32 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Normal Kill and Catalyst Charge Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. HPSW FAILURE 2. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 3. RUPTURE DISK BLOWN 4. LINE PLUGGED 5. VALVE CLOSED 6. FUNNEL VALVE LEFT OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE CATALYST/CAN'T NORMAL KILL 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE GAUGE 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. HPSW LOW PRESSURE INDICATOR 4. HPSW FLOW INDICATOR Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 181 ABD00036795 Node 32 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Normal Kill and Catalyst Charge Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. CATALYST DECOMPOSITION 3. STEAM/ELECTRIC TRACING ON Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. PRESSURE GAUGES AND HIGH PRESSURE ALARM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 32 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Normal Kill and Catalyst Charge Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE Safeguards: 1. RECIRCULATION LINE 2. STEAM/ELECTRIC TRACING 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 182 ABD00036796 Node 33 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Seal Oil Supply/Return Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090126-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. SEAL OIL RESERVOIR LEVEL LOW 3. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 4. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 5. PLUGGED FILTER 6. REGULATOR FAILURE 7. RXR SEAL BLOWN 8. VALVE CLOSED Consequences: 1. RUIN AGITATOR SEAL AT RXR. 2. PRODUCTION LOSS 3. GET OIL IN RXR. BAD QUALITY Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE XMITTERS ON EACH RXR - LOW PRESSURE ALARM 2. PRE-CHARGE CHECKS TO CHECK LEVEL AND PRESSURE 3. LOW LEVEL ALARM ON RESERVOIR 4. PRESSURE GAUGE ON INLET AND OUTLET OF AGITATOR SEAL 5. OPERATING PROCEDURES 6. FLOW INDICATION Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 183 ABD00036797 Node 33 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Seal Oil Supply/Ret urn Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-0 9010 7-PID-D, NM-090126-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. REGULATOR FAILURE 2 . CLOSED VALVE 3 . PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 4 . PLUGGED FILTER Consequences: 1. BLOW RXR SEAL OUT - OIL IN RXR 2 . LIFT RELIEF VALVE Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVE 2 . HIGH PRESSURE ALARM 3 . PRESSURE REGULATOR 4 . PRESSURE GAUGE 5 . OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 184 ABD00036798 185 ABD00036799 Node 34 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Lip Seal Flush Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090119-PID-D Deviation: More Flow Cause: 1. WRONG FLOWMETER IN LINE 2. MANUAL VALVES OPEN TOO MUCH 3. FLOWMETER BYPASS VALVE OPEN Consequences: 1. HIGH REACTOR LEVEL - SEE NODE 20 Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. REACTOR FOAMING AN INDICATION OF HIGH LEVEL 3. REACTOR PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 186 ABD00036800 Node 34 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Lip Seal Flush Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090119-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. PRESSURE REGULATOR FAILURE Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE 2. OVERFILL REACTOR 3. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE GAUGES IN FIELD 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES - PRE-CHARGE CHECKS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 187 ABD00036801 Node 34 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Lip Seal Flush Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090119-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2 . PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3 . REGULATOR FAILURE 4 . VALVE CLOSED 5 . BLEEDER OPEN/LINE RUPTURE Consequences: 1. NO/LOW FLOW Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE GAUGES 2 . FLOW METERS 3 . SPARE PUMP 4 . LOW PRESSURE ALARM ON DCS 5. OPERATING PROCEDURES - PRE-CHARGE CHECKS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 188 ABD00036802 Node 34 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Lip Seal Flush Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090119-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 2. RUPTURE LINE Safeguards: 1. STEAM TRACED LINES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating C Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: 189 ABD00036803 Node 35 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Reactor Atmospheric Vent Drawing No. NM-090103-PID-D, NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D, NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 2. VALVE FAILURE 3. DCS INTERLOCKED Consequences: 1. CAN'T DUMP REACTOR 2. REACTOR WON'T RINSE WELL Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. VALVE POSITION INDICATORS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 190 ABD00036804 Node 36 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 Low Mol Dump Header Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090117-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED BLOCKED LINE 2. REACTOR ATMOSPHERIC VENT NOT OPEN 3. RUPTURED LINE 4. VALVE CLOSED 5. LEVEL CONTROL VALVE MALFUNCTION 6. DCS INTERLOCK 7. REACTOR EMPTY Consequences: 1. CAN'T DUMP REACTOR 2. PRODUCTION LOSS/DOWNTIME Safeguards: 1. SIGHTGLASS 2. FLOW SWITCH 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 191 ABD00036805 Node 36 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 Low Mol Dump Header Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090117-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE LEAKING THROUGH FROM REACTOR 2. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. VCM RELEASE THROUGH DUMP HEADER 2. RUPTURE LINE Safeguards: 1. DOUBLE BLOCK VALVES ON REACTOR 2. GC'S 3. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 192 ABD00036806 Node 36 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 Low Mol Dump Header Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090117-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. NONE Safeguards: 1. DUMP HEADER USUALLY EMPTY Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 193 ABD00036807 Node 37 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 BME Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. LOW HPSW PRESSURE 2 . CLOSED VALVE 3 . BLEEDER OPEN/RUPTURED LINE 4 . PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 5 . DCS INTERLOCK Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE BME 2 . QUALITY PROBLEMS 3 . REACTOR HIGH PRESSURE 4 . PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2 . DCS CHARGE SEQUENCE 3 . ELECTRIC TRACING 4 . PRESSURE SWITCHES -- DCS INTERLOCKS Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 194 ABD00036808 Node 37 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 BME Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: Reverse Flow Cause: 1. BLEEDER OPEN DURING CHARGE Consequences: 1. VCM RELEASE TO SEWER Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. DCS INTERLOCKS & VALVE SEQUENCING Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 195 ABD00036809 Node 37 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 BME Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. CHARGE VALVES SLOW TO OPEN 2. VALVE FAILURE 3. EXTERNAL HEAT 4. PRESSURE SWITCH FAILURE Consequences: 1. BLOW RUPTURE DISK ON CHARGE POT 2. LINE RUPTURE/BLOW GASKET 3. CAN'T CHARGE BME Safeguards: 1. HIGH PRESSURE SWITCHES ON CHARGE POT 2. VALVE SEQUENCING BY DCS 3. PRESSURE GAUGES 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES 5. SAFETY DISK/RELIEF VALVE ON CHARGE POT Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 196 ABD00036810 Node 37 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 BME Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. NO HPSW 2 . LOW HPSW PRESSURE 3 . VALVE FAILURE 4 . BLEEDER OPEN/LINE RUPTURE 5 . SAFETY DISK BLOWN/RV OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE BME 2 . REVERSE FLOW 3 . QUALITY PROBLEMS 4 . NO FLOW Safeguards: 1. DCS INTERLOCKS 2 . PRESSURE GAUGE 3 . PRESSURE SWITCH 4 . OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 197 ABD00036811 Node 37 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 BME Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. RV/RD 2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking 5 Node 37 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 BME Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D, NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED LINE 2. RUPTURED LINE 3. CAN 1T CHARGE BME Safeguards: 1. STEAM TRACING & INSULATION 2. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 198 ABD00036812 Node 38 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 Polyvic Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. LOW PRESSURE 3. RUPTURED LINE/GASKET BLOWN 4. BLEEDER OPEN 5. LINE PLUGGED 6. RAM VALVE MALFUNCTION 7. DCS INTERLOCK Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE POLYVIC 2. QUALITY PROBLEMS Safeguards: 1. LOW FLOW ALARM -- DUAL FLOW METERS 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 199 ABD00036813 Node 38 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 Polyvic Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED -- DEAD HEAD PUMP 2. HIGH TEMPERATURE - EXTERNAL HEAT 3. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET 2. NO/LOW FLOW Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVE ON DISCHARGE OF CHARGE PUMP 2. FLOW METERS -- LOW FLOW SHUTDOWN 3. VALVE POSITION INDICATION 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 200 ABD00036814 Node 38 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 Polyvic Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. BLEEDER OPEN/RUPTURED LINE 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3. VALVE CLOSED 4. LOW INLET PRESSURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE POLYVIC 2. QUALITY PROBLEMS Safeguards: 1. LOW FLOW ALARM & SHUTDOWN - DUAL FLOW METERS 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. VALVE POSITION INDICATION Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 201 ABD00036815 Node 38 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RX-745 Polyvic Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER 2. ELECTRIC TRACE FAILURE Consequences: 1. TOO VISCOUS TO PUMP 2. LINE RUPTURE 3. PLUGGED LINE 4. CAN'T CHARGE POLYVIC Safeguards: 1. ELECTRIC TRACE 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating C Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: 202 ABD00036816 Node 39 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: BME Metering Line Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. CLOSED VALVE 3. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 4. TOTE EMPTY 5. NO AIR PRESSURE TO PUMP 6. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 7. PRESSURE ON CHARGE POT/CHARGE POT FULL 8. DCS INTERLOCKED Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE BME 2. CAN'T PUMP BME TO METERING POT Safeguards: 1. SIGHTGLASSES 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 203 ABD00036817 Node 39 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: BME Metering Line Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET 2. FIRE - BME IS FLAMMABLE Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVE/RUPTURE DISK ON CHARGE POT 2. POP-OFF VALVE ON BME STORAGE TOTE 3. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 39 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: BME Metering Line Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. FIRE Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVES 2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 204 ABD00036818 Node 4 0 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: BME/Nitrogen Purge Line Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. NO NITROGEN PRESSURE 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3. REGULATOR FAILURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T PURGE BME TRANSFER LINES Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 4 0 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: BME/Nitrogen Purge Line Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. N2 REGULATOR MALFUNCTION Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE GAUGES 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 205 ABD00036819 Node 40 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: BME/Nitrogen Purge Line Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: Low Pressure Cause: 1. RUPTURED LINE 2. LOW N2 BOTTLE PRESSURE 3. REGULATOR MALFUNCTION Consequences: 1. CAN'T PURGE BME LINES Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE GAUGES 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 40 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: BME/Nitrogen Purge Line Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 2. PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 206 ABD00036820 Node 41 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to BME Charge Pot Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. PLUGGED BLOCKED LINE 2. VALVE MALFUNCTION/CLOSED 3. HPSW PUMP NOT RUNNING - NO HPSW 4. BLEEDER OPEN/RUPTURED LINE 5. DCS INTERLOCK Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE BME Safeguards: 1. FLOW METER - LOW FLOW ALARM/SHUTDOWN 2. LOW PRESSURE XMITTER ON HPSW SYSTEM 3. PRESSURE SWITCH ON BME CHARGE POT 4. PRESSURE GAUGE/SWITCHES ON BME CHARGE POT 5. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 41 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to BME Charge Pot Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences : 1. NONE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 207 ABD00036821 Node 41 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to BME Charge Pot Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUG LINE 2. RUPTURE LINE Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE 2. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 208 ABD00036822 Node 42 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to BME Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. RUPTURED LINE 2. PLUGGED LINE 3. VALVE CLOSED Consequences: NONE Safeguards: Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 42 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to BME Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. LINE RUPTURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 209 ABD00036823 Node 42 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to BME Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating B Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 42 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to BME Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090108-PID-D, NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. LINE RUPTURE Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE 2. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 210 ABD00036824 Node 43 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Rxr. Recovery Lines to K.O. Compressors Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D Drums & Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. LINE RUPTURED 3. PLUGGED LINE 4. CONTROL VALVE FAILURE 5. DCS INTERLOCKED 6. HIGH K.O. DRUM PRESSURE 7. RECOVERY SYSTEM NOT RUNNING W/ RECOVERY VALVE ON RXR OPEN Consequences: 1. PRODUCTION LOSS 2. UNABLE TO VENT REACTORS 3. UNABLE TO RECOVER REACTORS Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE INDICATOR/XMITTER ON RECOVERY LINE 2. VALVE POSITION INDICATORS 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES 4. AMP INDICATORS ON COMPRESSORS & VAC. PUMPS 5. SEAL WATER CONTROLLERS TO VAC. PUMPS & COMPRESSORS 6. DISPLAY OF CONTROLLER OUTPUT & SET POINT TO PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 211 ABD00036825 Node 43 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Rxr. Recovery Lines to K.O. Compressors Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D Drums & Deviation: More Flow & High Pressure Cause: 1. PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE FAILURE 2. LINE RUPTURE 3. PRESSURE CONTROLLER SET POINT TOO HIGH 4. PRESSURE CONTROLLER IN MANUAL OPEN 5. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. FOAM REACTOR - CARRYOVER RESIN INTO RECOVERY SYSTEM 2. BLOW SAFETY DISK/LIFT RELIEF VALVE ON K.O. DRUMS 3. VCM RELEASE 4. PRODUCTION LOSS 5. MUST CLEAN RECOVERY SYSTEM 6. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE XMITTER 2. PRESSURE GAUGES ON SYSTEM 3. SAFETY DISK/RELIEF VALVES 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES 5. DCS INTERLOCKS 6. AMP INDICATION ON COMPRESSORS & VAC. PUMPS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 212 ABD00036826 Node 43 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Rxr. Recovery Lines to K.O. Compressors Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D Drums & Deviation: High Level in K.O. Drum Cause: 1. HPSW LEFT ON 2. DRAIN CONTROL NOT WORKING 3. DRAIN LINE PLUGGED 4. PUMP NOT RUNNING 5. BLOWDOWN TANK HIGH PRESSURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T RECOVER RXR 2. PRODUCTION LOSS 3. HIGH AMPS ON REC. COMPRESSORS & VAC. PUMPS 4. POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO REC. COMPRESSORS & VAC. PUMPS 5. BLOW SAFETY DISK/LIFT RELIEF VALVE Safeguards: 1. HIGH LEVEL SWITCH CONTROLS FLOW TO BLOWDOWN TANK 2. SIGHTGLASS 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES 4. PRESSURE XMITTERS 5. AMP INDICATION ON REC. COMPRESSORS & VAC. PUMPS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 213 ABD00036827 Node 43 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Rxr. Recovery Lines to K.O. Compressors Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D Drums & Deviation: Low Level in K.O. Drum Cause: 1. DRAIN VALVE STUCK OPEN 2. LOW LEVEL SWITCH FAILURE Consequences: 1. RESIN CARRYOVER INTO RECOVERY SYSTEM 2. CAVITATE PUMPS 3. RECOVERY SYSTEM DOWNTIME - PRODUCTION LOSS 4. HIGH PRESSURE IN BLOWDOWN TANK 5. BAD RESIN QUALITY {HP & CONTAMINATION) Safeguards: 1. SIGHTGLASSES 2. LEVEL CONTROL SWITCHES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT A LOW LEVEL ALARM ON THE K.O . DRUMS IS INSTALLED ON THE DCS. 214 ABD00036828 Node 43 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Rxr. Recovery Lines Compressors Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D to K.O. Drums & Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. PRESSURE XMITTER Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 215 ABD00036829 Node 44 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Water/VCM from KO Tank, Recirc. Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D, NM-090115-PID-D Line & to Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 3. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 4. K.O. DRUMS UNDER VACUUM 5. VALVE CLOSED/MALFUNCTION 6. HIGH PRESSURE ON BLOWDOWN TANK 7. SPRAY HEAD PLUGGED IN K.O. DRUM 8. K.O. TANK EMPTY Consequences: 1. HIGH K.O. TANK LEVEL 2. RESIN CARRYOVER - QUALITY PROBLEMS/PRODUCTION LOSS 3. DAMAGE RECIRC. PUMPS Safeguards: 1. TWO RECIRCULATION PUMPS 2. LEVEL CONTROL ON K.O. DRUMS 3. SIGHTGLASS ON KO DRUMS 4. PRESSURE GAUGES 5. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 216 ABD00036830 Node 44 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Water/VCM from KO Tank, Recirc. Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D, NM-090115-PID-D Line & to Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. KO TANK EMPTY 2. NO FLOW - DEAD HEAD PUMPS 3. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE - VCM RELEASE 2 . HIGH PRESSURE IN BLOWDOWN TANK 3 . DAMAGE PUMPS Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. RELIEF VALVE ON BLOWDOWN TANK Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 44 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Water/VCM from KO Tank, Recirc. Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D, NM-090115-PID-D Line & to Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 217 ABD00036831 Node 44 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Water/VCM from KO Tank, Recirc. Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D, NM-090115-PID-D Line & to Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUG LINE 2. RUPTURE LINE Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking 5 218 ABD00036832 Node 45 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Cooling Water to EX-335 Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. COOLING TOWER PUMP NOT RUNNING 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. LINE RUPTURED/BLEEDER OPEN 4. LINE BLOCKED/PLUGGED 5. TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER FAILURE 6. INSTRUMENT AIR LOW/NO PRESSURE Consequences: 1. HIGH KO DRUM TEMPERATURE Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE GAUGES 2. TEMPERATURE GAUGE ON DISCHARGE 3. BYPASS AROUND CONTROL VALVE 4. COOLING TOWER PUMP FAILURE ALARM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 219 ABD00036833 Node 45 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Cooling Water to EX-335 Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. INLET AND OUTLET VALVES CLOSED - THERMAL BUILDUP IN COOLING WATER Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE ON WATER RECIRC. COOLER SHELL SIDE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS PRESSURE RELIEF ON SHELL SIDE OF WATER RECIRC. COOLER 220 ABD00036834 Node 46 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to KO Drum LG/Level Switches Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. LINE RUPTURED 3. LINE PLUGGED/BLOCKED 4. HPSW PUMPS NOT RUNNING Consequences: 1. CAN'T RINSE OFF SIGHTGLASS OR LEVEL SWITCHES 2. SIGHTGLASS OR LEVEL SWITCH PLUGGED WITH RESIN Safeguards: 1. FLOW METER TO EACH K.O. DRUM 2 . HPSW PUMP FAILURE ALARM 3. PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 46 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to KO Drum LG/Level Switches Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature and High Pressure Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT W/ NO FLOW Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. LINE OR SIGHTGLASS RUPTURE 3. VCM RELEASE Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 2. CONTINUOUS FLOW OF HPSW THROUGH LEVEL WELL Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: D Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 221 ABD00036835 Node 47 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: VCM Vapor Lines Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVES CLOSED 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3. RUPTURED LINE 4. HIGH PRESSURE IN KO DRUMS Consequences: 1. CAN'T EQUALIZE PRESSURE IN RECOVERY SYSTEM 2. CAN'T RECOVER RVCM/VCM RECEIVER FOR MAINTENANCE/INSPECTION 3. CAN'T VENT BLOWDOWN TANK VAPORS TO KO DRUMS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 47 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: VCM Vapor Lines Drawing No. NM-090109-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. HIGH KO DRUM PRESSURE Consequences: 1. DIFFICULTY RECOVERING EQUIPMENT IN RECOVERY SYSTEM 2. LINE RUPTURE/BLOW GASKET Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT 2. KO DRUM PRESSURE CONTROL Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 222 ABD00036836 Node 48 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: VCM Vapors to Vac. Pumps, Rec. Compressors, & Seal Water Separators Drawing No. NM-090110-PID-D, NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 4. COMPRESSOR OR VACUUM PUMP FAILURE 5. HIGH RECOVERY SYSTEM BACKPRESSURE 6. DCS FAILURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T RECOVER REACTOR 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. DCS ALARMS 3. VALVE POSITION INDICATION 4. COMPRESSOR / VAC. PUMP RUN INDICATION Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 223 ABD00036837 Node 48 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: VCM Vapors to Vac. Pumps, Rec. Compressors, & Seal Water Separators Drawing No. NM-090110-PID-D, NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Cause: 1. BLOCKED FLOW ON DISCHARGE OF COMPRESSORS 2. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. BLOW SAFETY DISK /LIFT RV ON COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE 2. VCM RELEASE Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE XMITTER ON COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE 2. RELIEF VALVE/ SAFETY DISK 3. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 4. VALVE POSITION INDICATORS 5. DCS INTERLOCKS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 48 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: VCM Vapors to Vac. Pumps, Rec. Compressors, & Seal Water Separators Drawing No. NM-090110-PID-D, NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED LINE Safeguards: 1. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 224 ABD00036838 Node 48 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: VCM Vapors to Vac. Pumps, Rec. Compressors, & Seal Water Separators Drawing No. NM-090110-PID-D, NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: Seal Water Separator High Level Cause: 1. HPSW LEFT ON 2. LEVEL CONTROLLER MALFUNCTION 3. PLUGGED DRAIN LINE 4. PUMP FAILURE Consequences: 1. SLOW RECOVERY 2. HIGH RECOVERY SYSTEM PRESSURE 3. LIFT RV/BLOW RD Safeguards: 1. SIGHTGLASS 2. LEVEL CONTROLLER 3. HIGH LEVEL ALARM 4. PUMP RUM INDICATION 5. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 225 ABD00036839 Node 48 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: VCM Vapors to Vac. Pumps, Rec. Compressors, & Seal Water Separators Drawing No. NM-090110-PID-D, NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: Seal Water Separator Low Level Cause: 1. LEVEL CONTROLLER FAILURE 2. NO HPSW 3. DRAIN VALVE STUCK OPEN 4. RUPTURE LINE/BLEEDER OPEN Consequences: 1. SLOW RECOVERY 2. VCM RELEASE 3. NO RING SEAL WATER TO COMPRESSORS & VAC. PUMPS Safeguards: 1. SIGHTGLASS 2. LOW LEVEL ALARM 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES 4. AMP INDICATION ON COMPRESSORS AND VAC. PUMPS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 226 ABD00036840 Node 49 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to Vac. Pumps & Recovery Compressors Drawing No. NM-09Q110-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. HPSW PUMP FAILURE 2 . VALVE CLOSED 3 . BLOCKED/PLUGGED LINE Consequences: 1. SEAL FAILURE 2 . SLOW/NO RECOVERY 3 . DAMAGE VAC. PUMPS/RECOVERY COMPRESSORS Safeguards: 1. FLOW METER IN FIELD 2 . PRESSURE XMITTER ON HPSW PUMP AND LOW PRESSURE ALARM ON DCS 3 . OPERATING PROCEDURES DAILY CHECK OF HPSW PUMPS Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 49 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to Vac. Pumps & Recovery Compressors Drawing No. NM-090110-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED LINE 2. RUPTURED LINE 3. NO/LOW FLOW Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 227 ABD00036841 Node 50 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Ring Seal Water Drawing No. NM-090110-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. SEAL WATER PUMP FAILURE 2. FLOW CONTROLLER FAILURE 3. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 4. VALVE CLOSED 5. FILTER PLUGGED 6. FLOW XMITTER PLUGGED Consequences: 1. SLOW/NO RECOVERY 2. LOST PRODUCTION Safeguards: 1. FLOW METERS 2. VALVE POSITION INDICATION 3. MOTOR AMP INDICATION ON COMPRESSORS AND VAC. 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES PUMPS Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT EXISTING FLOW METERS BE REPLACED WITH ORIFICE PLATES AND FLOW XMITTERS. THIS WOULD REDUCE MAINTENANCE WORK AND VINYL DOWNTIME. 228 ABD00036842 Node 50 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Ring Seal Water Drawing No. NM-090110-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED LINE 2. RUPTURED LINE 3. NO/LOW FLOW 4. SEAL WATER TOO COOL TO VAPORIZE VCM - COMPRESSORS WON'T PULL Safeguards: 1. RUNS ALL THE TIME IN COLD WEATHER 2. STEAM TRACED 3. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 229 ABD00036843 Node 51 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Relief Valve Header to Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090110-PID-D, NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED ON INLET OR OUTLET OF RV 2. PLUGGED LINE 3. NORMAL OPERATION Consequences: 1. HIGH HIGH PRESSURE IN INLET TO VAC. PUMP OR DISCHARGE OF COMPRESSORS IF RELIEF SYSTEM IS PLUGGED Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 230 ABD00036844 Node 52 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Seal Water Separator Pressure Equalization Bypass Header Drawing No. NM-090110-PID-D, NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. COMPRESSORS RUNNING 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. LINE PLUGGED Consequences: 1. PRESSURE STAYS ON RVCM RECEIVERS AND SEAL WATER SEPARATORS Safeguards: 1. VALVE POSITION INDICATION Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 231 ABD00036845 Node 53 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Water/VCM Recirculation Line Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D, NM-090112-PID-D, NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. SEAL WATER SEPARATORS EMPTY 2 . PLUGGED FILTERS 3 . PUMP FAILURE 4 . VALVE CLOSED 5 . PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 5. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 6 . CONTROLLER FAILURE ON SEAL WATER COOLERS Consequences: 1. NO/SLOW RECOVERY 2. NO RING SEAL WATER 3. HIGH SEAL WATER SEP. LEVEL Safeguards: 1. LOW LEVEL ALARM ON SEAL WATER SEPS. 2. RUN INDICATION ON PUMPS 3. PRESSURE GAUGES ON FILTERS 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 232 ABD00036846 Node 53 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Water/VCM Recirculation Line Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D, NM-090112-PID-D, NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. HPSW LEFT ON SEAL WATER SEP. TO MAKE-UP LEVEL Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE 2. LIFT RELIEF VALVE 3. SMALL VCM RELEASE CONTAINED IN WATER Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVES 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 233 ABD00036847 Node 53 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Water/VCM Recirculation Line Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D, NM-090112-PID-D, NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. TEMP. CONTROLLER FAILURE ON SEAL WATER COOLERS 2. NO COOLING WATER TO SEAL WATER COOLERS 3. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. RAISE DISCHARGE PRESSURE OF RECOVERY COMPRESSORS - SLOW RECOVERY Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 2. RECOVERY COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP. 3. SEAL WATER COOLERS ALARM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 234 ABD00036848 Node 53 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Water/VCM Recirculation Line Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D, NM-090112-PID-D, NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE 2. SEAL WATER TOO COOL TO VAPORIZE VCM - COMPRESSORS WON'T PULL 3. LOW COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. TEMP. CONTROLLER ON OUTLET OF SEAL WATER COOLERS 2. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 235 ABD00036849 Node 54 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Cooling Water to Seal Water Coolers Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER FAILURE 3. COOLING TOWER PUMP FAILURE 4. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE Consequences: 1. HIGH SEAL WATER TEMP TO REC. COMPRESSORS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. TEMP. GAUGES ON COOLING WATER SUPPLY Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 54 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Cooling Water to Seal Water Coolers Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Cause: 1. BLOCKED DISCHARGE OR INLET 2. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE IN SEAL WATER COOLER SHELL 2. RUPTURE SEAL WATER COOLER SHELL Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS THERMAL RELIEF ON SEAL WATER COOLER SHELL SIDE 236 ABD00036850 Node 55 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to Seal Water Pumps and Seal Water Seps. Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. HSPW PUMP FAILURE 2. BLOCKED/PLUGGED LINE 3. VALVE CLOSED Consequences: 1. DAMAGE PUMP SEAL 2. CAN'T MAKE-UP LEVEL TO SEAL WATER SEPS. Safeguards: 1. FLOW INDICATION TO PUMPS 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. LOW PRESSURE ALARM ON HPSW PUMPS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 55 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to Seal Water Pumps Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. NO/LOW FLOW 2. RUPTURE LINE Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE 2. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES 3. CONSTANT FLOW Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 237 ABD00036851 Node 56 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hydroquinone System Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. INJECTION PUMP FAILURE 2. MIXING DRUM LEVEL EMPTY 3. VALVE CLOSED/ BLOCKED LINE 4. RECOVERY SYSTEM NOT RUNNING Consequences: 1. CAN'T FEED HYDROQUINONE Safeguards: 1. LOW LEVEL ALARM ON MIXING DRUM 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 56 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Hydroquinone System Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. LIFT RELIEF VALVE ON PUMP DISCHARGE OR MIXING DRUM Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 238 ABD00036852 Node 57 Aberdeen New -Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: VCM Vapors to RVCM Coolers to RVCM Receivers Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D, NM-090112-PID-D, NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. PLUGGED LINE 3. INTERLOCKED BY DCS Consequences: 1. CAN'T RECOVER 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. VALVE INDICATION Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 239 ABD00036853 Node 57 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: VCM Vapors to RVCM Coolers to RVCM Receivers Drawing No. NM-090111-PID-D, NM-090112-PID-D NM-090113 -PID-D Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Cause: 1. FOULED CONDENSERS - REDUCED COOLING 2. NO COOLING WATER TO CONDENSERS 3. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. SLOW/STOP RECOVERY Safeguards: 1. COOLING WATER BYPASS OPEN 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 240 ABD00036854 Node 58 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Cooling Water to RVCM Condensers Drawing No. NM-090112-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. COOLING WATER PUMP FAILURE 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. BLOCKED/PLUGGED LINE 4. BLEEDER OPEN/RUPTURED LINE Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE ON NODE 57 Safeguards: 1. TEMP. GAUGES 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 58 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Cooling Water to RVCM Condensers Drawing No. NM-090112-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. SUMMERTIME OPERATION Consequences: 1. MORE BACKPRESSURE ON RECOVERY SYSTEM Safeguards: 1. NONE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 241 ABD00036855 Node 59 COMBINED WITH NODE 57 242 ABD00036856 Node 60 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Inert Gas Vent Lines to Incinerators Drawing No. NM-090112-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. LINE PLUGGED/BLOCKED 2. VALVE CLOSED Consequences: 1. HIGHER PRESSURE IN RVCM RECEIVERS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: ABD00036857 Node 61 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to RVCM Condensers Drawing No. NM-090112-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. BLOCKED LINE 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. NORMAL OPERATION Consequences: 1. CAN'T FLUSH CONDENSERS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 244 ABD00036858 Node 62 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Condenser Recovery Line Drawing No. NM-090112-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. PLUGGED LINE Consequences: 1. CAN'T RECOVER CONDENSERS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 245 ABD00036859 Node 63 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Condensers Cooling Water Drain Lines Drawing No. NM-090112-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. PLUGGED LINE Consequences: 1. CAN'T DRAIN CONDENSERS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 246 ABD00036860 Node 64 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Receivers DM-317E, DM-317W Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: High Level Cause: 1. NOT CHARGING RVCM 2. LEAKING VALVES 3. PUMPING VCM FROM OLD MODULE 4. LEVEL XMITTER FAILURE 5. HIGH LEVEL PROBE & ALARM FAILURE Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE 2. VCM RELEASE 3. BLOW RD/LIFT RV 4. PERSONNEL EXPOSURE 5. MINOR BURNS/FIRE/EXPLOSION Safeguards: 1. HIGH LEVEL PROBE/SHUTOFF 2. HIGH LEVEL ALARM 3. VCM ISOLATION VALVES & DCS TARGET 4. LEVEL DISPLAYED ON DCS 5. SIGHT GLASSES ON RECEIVER 6. DCS INTERLOCKS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 247 ABD00036861 Node 64 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Receivers DM-317E, DM-317W Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: Low Level Cause: 1. NO RVCM TO CHARGE 2. LEVEL XMITTER FAILURE Consequences: 1. NO RVCM TO CHARGE - NO REAL CONSEQUENCE Safeguards: 1. SIGHTGLASS 2. LEVEL XMITTER Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 248 ABD00036862 Node 64 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Receivers DM-317E, DM-317W Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. HIGH LEVEL 2. EXTERNAL HEAT 3. RECOVERING VAPOR INSTEAD OF LIQUID - NOT CONDENSING VAPOR 4. VENT TO INCINERATORS BLOCKED 5. TOO MANY INERTS 6. RVCM CHILLER FAILURE 7. EQUALIZATION VALVES CLOSED Consequences: 1. NO/SLOW RECOVERY 2. OVERPRESSURE RECEIVER 3. LIFT RV/BLOW RD 4. VCM RELEASE 5. FIRE/EXPLOSION 6. PERSONNEL EXPOSURE Safeguards: 1. PRESSURE EQUALIZATION LINE 2. INERTS VENT LINE 3. HIGH LEVEL SAFEGUARDS 4. RV/RD 5. PRESSURE XMITTERS/FIELD MOUNTED PRESSURE GAUGES 6. DCS INTERLOCKS/ALARMS 7. ALL FROM HIGH LEVEL Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 249 ABD00036863 Node 64 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Receivers DM-317E, DM-317W Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. SAME AS HIGH PRESSURE 2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 64 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Receivers DM-317E, DM-317W Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. FREEZE WATER IN BOTTOM OF RECEIVER 2. CAN'T PUMP FROM/TO BOTTOM OF RECEIVER 3. DOWNTIME Safeguards: 1. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES 2. STEAM TRACING ON BOTTOM OF RECEIVER Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 250 ABD00036864 Node 64 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Receivers DM-317E, DM-317W Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: Condenser Tube Leak Cause: 1. CORROSION Consequences: 1. VCM IN CHILLED WATER TANK 2. VCM RELEASE Safeguards: 1. CHILLED WATER LINE TIED TO BLOWDOWN TANK FOR RECOVERY Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: TEAM RECOMMENDS PERIODIC SAMPLING OF CHILLED WATER FOR VCM CONTAMINATION 251 ABD00036865 Node 65 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. RVCM RECEIVER EMPTY 3. FILTER PLUGGED 4. VALVE CLOSED 5. INTERLOCKED OUT Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE RVCM Safeguards: 1. LOW FLOW SHUTDOWN 2. PRESSURE GAUGES ON FILTER 3. PUMP RUN INDICATION 4. VALVE POSITION INDICATION 5. OPERATING PROCEDURES 6. RECEIVER LEVEL INDICATION Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 252 ABD00036866 Node 65 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET 2. LIFT RELIEF VALVE TO RECOVERY SYSTEM Safeguards: 1. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 65 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. HIGH PRESSURE Safeguards: 1. SAME AS HIGH PRESSURE Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating C Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: 253 ABD00036867 Node 65 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RVCM Charge Line Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER - WATER IN LINE Consequences: 1. PLUG LINE/RUPTURE LINE Safeguards: 1. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES 2. ELECTRIC TRACED Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 254 ABD00036868 Node 66 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to RVCM Pumps Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2 . LINE PLUGGED 3 . NO HPSW PRESSURE 4 . REGULATOR FAILURE Consequences: 1. DAMAGE PUMP 2 . BURN-UP PUMP SEAL 3 . VCM RELEASE Safeguards: 1. FLOW METER 2 . HPSW LOW PRESSURE ALARM 3 . OPERATING PROCEDURES - DAILY CHECK OF HPSW 4 . FIELD MOUNTED PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 4 Action/Other Considerations: NO RECOMMENDATIONS FROM TEAM Node 66 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to RVCM Pumps Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. PRESSURE REGULATOR FAILURE 2. DISCHARGE VALVE CLOSED Consequences: 1. BLOW PUMP SEAL OUT Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. FLOW METER Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 255 ABD00036869 Node 67 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Recovery, Relief, Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D and Drain Lines to Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. RVCM RECEIVERS EMPTY 3. LINE PLUGGED 4. FILTER PLUGGED 5. RUPTURED LINE Consequences: 1. CAN'T DRAIN WATER FROM RVCM RECEIVERS 2. CAN'T RECOVER FILTER PACK & PIPING 3. QUALITY PROBLEMS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. STEAM TRACING ON SOME LINES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 256 ABD00036870 Node 67 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Recovery, Relief, Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D and Drain Lines to Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. NO/LOW FLOW 2. RUPTURED LINE Safeguards: 1. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES 2. STEAM TRACING Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 257 ABD00036871 Node 68 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Chilled Water to RVCM Condensers Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D, NM-090114-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. PLUGGED LINE 3. VALVE CLOSED 4. NO WATER IN STORAGE TANK 5. BLEEDER OPEN 6. RUPTURED LINE 7. LOW LEVEL SWITCH MALFUNCTION 8. POWER FAILURE 9. LOW FLOW SWITCH MALFUNCTION 10. HIGH TEMP SWITCH MALFUNCTION Consequences: 1. HIGH RECEIVER TEMP/PRESSURE 2. SLOW RECOVERY 3. PRODUCTION LOSS 4. HIGH VCM CONCENTRATION IN VENT TO INCINERATORS Safeguards: 1. FLOW METERS TO EACH CONDENSER 2. LOW FLOW SWITCH 3. LOW LEVEL ALARM 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES 5. TIE-IN TO OLD MODULE CHILLER SYSTEM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 258 ABD00036872 Node 68 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Chilled Water to RVCM Condensers Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D, NM-090114-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. DEAD HEAD PUMP THERMAL EXPANSION Consequences: 1. LINE RUPTURE 2. DAMAGE CHILLER PACKAGE Safeguards: 1. LOW FLOW SWITCH 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 68 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Chilled Water to RVCM Condensers Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D, NM-090114-PID-D Deviation: High Temperature Cause: 1. CHILLER PACKAGE FAILURE 2. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. CHILLED WATER SYSTEM SHUTDOWN 2. HIGH RVCM RECEIVER TEMP/PRESSURE 3. HIGH VCM CONCENTRATION TO INCINERATORS 4. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. HIGH TEMP SWITCH 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 259 ABD00036873 Node 68 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Chilled Water to RVCM Condensers Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D, NM-090114-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER 2. CHILLER PACKAGE MALFUNCTION Consequences: 1. RUPTURED/PLUGGED LINE Safeguards: 1. ETHYLENE GLYCOL IN WATER 2. TEMPERATURE GAUGES IN FIELD 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 260 ABD00036874 Node 6 9 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Inerts Vent Line Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. LINE PLUGGED 3. PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE MALFUNCTION 4. VCM ISOLATION VALVES CLOSED 5. INTERLOCKED Consequences: 1. HIGH RECEIVER PRESSURE 2. CAN'T VENT INERTS TO INCINERATOR 3. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. FLOW CONTROL & INDICATION TO INCINERATORS 2. PRESSURE GAUGES & INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 261 ABD00036875 Node 70 Aberdeen New> Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Line To Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D, NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. LINE PLUGGED\BLOCKED 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. LINE RUPTURED Consequences: 1. CAN'T DRAIN RECEIVERS 2. CAN'T RECOVER FILTER PACK, 3. PRODUCTION LOSS PIPING Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 262 ABD00036876 Node 71 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Chilled Water to Blowdown Tank Drawing No. NM-090113-PID-D, NM-090114-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. LINE PLUGGED 3. NORMAL OPERATING CONDITION Consequences: 1. CAN'T RECOVER CHILLED WATER SYSTEM IF CONTAMINATED W/ VCM Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 263 ABD00036877 Node 72 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Make-up Water to Chilled Water Tank Drawing No. NM-090114-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE FAILURE/CLOSED VALVE 2. RUPTURED LINE 3. NO WATER PRESSURE 4. LINE PLUGGED Consequences: 1. CAN'T MAKE-UP WATER TO STORAGE TANK AUTOMATICALLY 2. LOW STORAGE TANK LEVEL Safeguards: 1. LOW LOW LEVEL ALARM l SHUTDOWN ON STORAGE TANK i 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 72 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Make-up Water to Chilled Water Tank Drawing No. NM-090114-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED LINE 2. RUPTURED LINE Safeguards: 1. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking 5 264 ABD00036878 Node 73 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Chilled Water Tank Drawing No. NM-090114-PID-D Deviation: High Level Cause: 1. MAKE-UP VALVE FAILURE 2. HIGH LEVEL SWITCH MALFUNCTION Consequences: 1. OVERFLOW TANK Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. SIGHTGLASS 3. HIGH LEVEL SWITCH 4. OVERFLOW LINE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 73 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Chilled Water Tank Drawing No. NM-090114-PID-D Deviation: Low Level Cause: 1. MAKE-UP VALVE FAILURE 2. LOW LEVEL SWITCH FAILURE 3. MANUAL VALVE CLOSED Consequences: 1. NO WATER IN CHILLED WATER TANK Safeguards: 1. SIGHTGLASS 2. LOW LEVEL ALARM & SHUTDOWN Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 265 ABD00036879 Node 74 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Blowdown Tank, DM-746 Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: High Level Cause: 1. DRAIN LINE PLUGGED 2. STRAINERS PLUGGED ON DRAIN 3. PUMP MALFUNCTION 4. VALVE CLOSED 5. BLOWDOWN TANK UNDER VACUUM 6. LEVEL XMITTER MALFUNCTION 7. BWS HIGH LEVEL OR PRESSURE Consequences: 1. OVERFILL BLOWDOWN TANK 2. CAN'T DRAIN KO TANKS, SEPARATORS, 3. PRODUCTION LOSS 4. HIGH PRESSURE IN RECOVERY SYSTEM RVCM RECEIVERS Safeguards: 1. 2 HIGH LEVEL ALARMS 2. DUAL STRAINERS 3. 2 PUMPS 4. SIGHTGLASS 5. LEVEL INDICATION ON DCS 6. OPERATING PROCEDURES 7. AUTO PUMP OVER PROGRAM ON DCS Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 266 ABD00036880 Node 74 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Blowdown Tank, DM-746 Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: Low Level Cause: 1. MANUAL DRAIN VALVE OPEN 2. LEVEL XMITTER MALFUNCTION 3. PUMP CONTROL MALFUNCTION 4. RUPTURED DRAIN LINE Consequences: 1. CAVITATE PUMPS Safeguards: 1. LOW LEVEL ALARM 2. LEVEL INDICATION ON DCS 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 267 ABD00036881 Node 74 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Blowdown Tank, DM-746 Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Cause: 1. RVCM RECEIVERS, KO TANKS DRAIN LINE STUCK OPEN 2. EXTERNAL HEAT 3. RECOVERY VALVE ON FILTER PACK LEFT OPEN OR LEAKING 4. STEAM FLOW / TEMP CONTROLLER MALFUNCTION 5. MANUAL STEAM SUPPLY BYPASS VALVE LEFT OPEN Consequences: 1. BLOW SAFETY DISK/LIFT RV 2. VCM RELEASE 3. RUPTURE VESSEL Safeguards: 1. HIGH PRESSURE ALARM 2. AUTO PRESSURE RECOVERY BY RECOVERY SYSTEM 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 268 ABD00036882 Node 75 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Blowdown Tank Vapor Vent Lines Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2 . LINE PLUGGED Consequences: 1. CAN'T RECOVER/VENT BLOWDOWN TANK 2. CAN'T RECOVER OLD UNIT EMISSION SYSTEM Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 269 ABD00036883 Node 76 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Blowdown Tank Steam Supply- Drawing No. NM-090115 -PID-D, NM-090121-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. NO STEAM PRESSURE 2. STEAM / TEMP CONTROLLER FAILURE 3. PRESSURE SWITCH MALFUNCTION 4. CLOSED VALVE 5. PLUGGED LINE Consequences: 1. CAN'T HEAT-UP BLOWDOWN TANK Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. STEAM CONTROLLER BYPASS 3. LOW PRESSURE SWITCH Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 270 ABD00036884 Node 77 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: From RX-741 SA Charge Header Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: Consequences: Safeguards: Consequence Rating: Risk Ranking Action/Other Considerations: LINE IS 0.0.S. 271 ABD00036885 Node 78 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Water to Batch Water Strippers Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. STRAINER PLUGGED 2 . PUMP FAILURE 3 . VALVE CLOSED 4 . BLOWDOWN TANK UNDER VACUUM 5 . PLUGGED LINE 6 . BLEEDER OPEN 7 . BLOWDOWN TANK EMPTY Consequences: 1. CAN'T PUMP OVER TO BWS Safeguards: 1. PUMP RUN INDICATION 2. 2 PUMPS 3. 2 STRAINERS 4. HIGH LEVEL ALARM ON BD TANK 5. LEVEL INDIC. ON BD TANK 6. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 272 ABD00036886 Node 78 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Water to Batch Water Strippers Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. ELEC./STEAM TRACING STUCK ON Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 3. PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 78 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Water to Batch Water Strippers Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUG/RUPTURE LINE Safeguards: 1. ELECTRIC/STEAM TRACED LINE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking 5 273 ABD00036887 Node 79 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. LINE PLUGGED 3. HPSW PUMP FAILURE Consequences: 1. NO SEAL WATER TO BD TANK TRANSFER PUMPS 2. DAMAGE PUMPS 3. NO FLUSH WATER TO BD LEVEL POT AND SIGHTGLASS Safeguards: 1. FLOW METER ON PUMPS 2. FLOW METER ON LINE TO LEVEL POT 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 79 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUG LINE 2. RUPTURE LINE Safeguards: 1. STEAM TRACED Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating B Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: 274 ABD00036888 Node 80 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process Water Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED/FAILURE 2. LINE PLUGGED 3. NO/LOW WATER PRESSURE 4. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 5. INTERLOCKED Consequences: 1. CAN'T FLUSH LINE TO BWS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. VALVE INDICATION Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 80 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process Water Drawing No. NM-090115-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE 2. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations Risk Ranking: 5 275 ABD00036889 Node 81 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process Water to Dump Systems Drawing No. NM-090116-PID-D, NM-090117-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. LINE PLUGGED 3. NO/LOW WATER PRESSURE 4. PW FILTER PLUGGED Consequences: 1. NO WATER TO LEVEL CONTROLLER 2. CAN'T FLUSH SCREENER 3. CAN'T FILL DUMP TANK AFTER DUMP - CAVITATE PUMP ON NEXT DUMP Safeguards: 1. WATER TOWER LEVEL INDICATION 2. VALVE ALARMS & POSITION INDICATION 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 81 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process Water to Dump Systems Drawing No. NM-090116-PID-D, NM-090117-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUG/RUPTURE LINE Safeguards: 1. INSULATED LINE ON OLD SYSTEM, LOW MOLE SYSTEM IS ELECTRIC TRACED 2. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 276 ABD00036890 Node 82 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Slurry Screeners and Dump Tanks & Pumps Drawing No. NM-090116-PID-D, NM-090117-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. PLUGGED SCREENER 2. PUMP FAILURE 3. NO DUMP TANK LEVEL 4. SCREENER DISCHARGE PLUGGED 5. SLURRY LEVEL CONTROL VALVE FAILURE 6. DUMP TANK DISCHARGE PLUGGED 7. SLURRY LINE PLUGGED 8. CLOSED VALVE 9. INTERLOCK 10. SCREENER MOTOR FAILURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T DUMP RXR 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. BULLS EYE 3. FLOW SWITCH 4. VALVE POSITION INDICATOR 5. PUMP/SCREENER RUN INDICATOR 6. DUMP TANK HIGH LEVEL ALARM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 277 ABD00036891 Node 82 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Slurry Screeners and Dump Tanks & Pumps Drawing No. NM-090116-PID-D, NM-090117-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. OPEN RXR UNDER PRESSURE TO DUMP TANK Consequences: 1. BLOW UP SCREENER Safeguards: 1. INTERLOCKS Consequence Rating: II Probability Rating: D Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 278 ABD00036892 Node 83 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to Dump System Drawing No. NM-090116-PID-D, NM-090117-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. CLOSED VALVE/VALVE FAILURE 2. PLUGGED LINE 3. HPSW PUMP FAILURE 4. INTERLOCKS Consequences: 1. DAMAGE PUMP 2. CAN'T UNPLUG PUMP DISCHARGE TO BLEND TANKS OR RECIRCULATION LINE Safeguards: 1. VALVE POSITION INDICATION 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. LOW HPSW PRESSURE ALARM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 83 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to Dump System Drawing No. NM-090116-PID-D, NM-090117-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE Safeguards: 1. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES 2. INSULATED LINE 3. USED OFTEN Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 279 ABD00036893 Node 84 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Slurry Screener and Dump Tank Exhaust Drawing No. NM-090116-PID-D, NM-090117-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. EXHAUST FAN FAILURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T EXHAUST VAPORS FROM SCREENER/DUMP TANK Safeguards: 1. FAN RUN INDICATION & ALARM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating B Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: 280 ABD00036894 Node 85 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Wet Calcium Stearate Addition System Drawing No. NM-090116-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. NO/LOW AIR PRESSURE TO PUMP 2. DRUM EMPTY 3. PLUGGED LINE 4. PUMP FAILURE 5. VALVE CLOSED Consequences: 1. NO CALCIUM STEARATE ON SLURRY - QUALITY/TRANSFER PROBLEMS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 85 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Wet Calcium Stearate Addition System Drawing No. NM-090116-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE 2. FREEZE-UP DRUM Safeguards: 1. ELECTRIC TRACED LINE 2. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 281 ABD00036895 Node 86 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW Pumps Drawing No. NM-090118-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. FILTER PLUGGED 3. VALVE CLOSED 4. NO WATER 5. RUPTURED LINE/BLEEDER OPEN 6. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE Consequences: 1. NO HPSW IN NEW MODULE Safeguards: 1. HPSW PUMP RUN INDICATION AND PUMP FAILURE ALARM 2. LOW PRESSURE ALARM 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES - PUMPS CHECKED 2 TIMES PER SHIFT 4. FILTERS CHANGED ONCE PER MONTH Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 282 ABD00036896 Node 86 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW Pumps Drawing No. NM-090118-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. CLOSED VALVE 2. PLUGGED LINE 3. RECIRCULATION LINE ORIFICE PLUGGED Consequences: 1. RUPTURED LINE Safeguards: 1. RECIRCULATION LINE 2. PRESSURE GAUGES 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 283 ABD00036897 Node 86 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW Pumps Drawing No. NM-090118-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE 2. RUPTURED PUMP HOUSING Safeguards: 1. CONSTANT FLOW 2. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 284 ABD00036898 Node 87 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process Water Drawing No. NM-090118-PID-D, NM -090119-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. NO WATER 2 . VALVE CLOSED 3 . LINE PLUGGED 4 . LINE RUPTURED 5 . FILTER PLUGGED 6 . LOW WATER TOWER LEVEL Consequences: 1. NO HPSW 2 . NO PROCESS WATER IN NEW MODULE Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2 . WATER TOWER LEVEL INDICATION 3 . PRESSURE GAUGE ON FILTER Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 87 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process Water Drawing No. NM-090118-PID-D, NM-090119-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE Safeguards: 1. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES 2. CONSTANT FLOW Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 285 ABD00036899 Node 88 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Mechanical Seal Water Purge Drum Drawing No. NM-090119-PID-D Deviation: Low Level Cause: 1. NO PROCESS WATER 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. DRAIN VALVE OPEN Consequences: 1. NO MSPW DURING POWER OUTAGE OR PUMP FAILURE Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 88 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Mechanical Seal Water Purge Drum Drawing No. NM-090119-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. NITROGEN BOTTLE REGULATOR FAILURE Consequences: 1. LIFT RELIEF VALVE 2. RUPTURE TANK Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. RELIEF VALVE ON TANK 3. REGULATOR ON N2 BOTTLE 4. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 286 ABD00036900 Node 88 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Mechanical Seal Water Purge Drum Drawing No. NM-090119-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 2. FREEZE WATER IN DRUM Safeguards: 1. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 287 ABD00036901 Node 89 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: MSPW to Rxr Rinse Nozzles Drawing No. NM-090119-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. LINE PLUGGED/RUPTURED 4. RXR RINSE NOZZLE PLUGGED Consequences: 1. PLUG RXR RINSE NOZZLE 2. NO MSPW TO RXR SEALS Safeguards: 1. PUMP RUN INDICATION/FAILURE ALARM 2. PRECHARGE CHECKS 3. FLOW METER ON RINSE NOZZLE 4. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 288 ABD00036902 Node 89 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: MSPW to Rxr Rinse Nozzles Drawing No. NM-090119-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: More Flow Cause: 1. VALVES OPEN TOO MUCH 2. FLOW METER FAILURE Consequences: 1. OVER FILL RXR Safeguards: 1. PRECHARGE CHECKS 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. FLOW METERS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 289 ABD00036903 Node 89 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: MSPW to Rxr Rinse Nozzles Drawing No. NM-090119-PID-D, NM-090103-PID-D NM-090104-PID-D, NM-090105-PID-D NM-090106-PID-D, NM-090107-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE 2. NO/LOW FLOW Safeguards: 1. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES 3. STEAM TRACED LINE Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 290 ABD00036904 Node 90 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: AMS Transfer System Drawing No. NM-090120-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. NO/LOW INSTRUMENT AIR PRESSURE 3. DRUM EMPTY 4. VALVE CLOSED 5. LINE PLUGGED/RUPTURED 6. AMS POT PRESSURED UP 7. INSTRUMENT AIR REGULATOR FAILURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T FILL AMS POTS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. SIGHTGLASSES ON AMS POTS 3. PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 291 ABD00036905 Node 90 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: AMS Transfer System Drawing No. NM-090120-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. DEADHEAD PUMP 2. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE 2. LIFT RELIEF VALVE Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVE 2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 292 ABD00036906 Node 91 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Clean Wall Steam Supply- Drawing No. NM-0 90121-PID-D, NM-090128-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. NO STEAM PRESSURE 3. LINE PLUGGED Consequences: 1. CAN'T CLEAN WALL RXR 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. STEAM PRESSURE INDICATION & LOW PRESSURE ALARM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 293 ABD00036907 Node 92 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: New Module Steam Supply Drawing No. NM-090121-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. BOILERS DOWN 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. LINE RUPTURE/BLEEDER OPEN Consequences: 1. NO STEAM IN NEW MODULE 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. LOW PRESSURE ALARM & PRESSURE INDICATION 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 294 ABD00036908 Node 93 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: RXR Steam Ejectors Supply- Drawing No. NM-0 90122-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. BOILERS DOWN 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. BLEEDER OPEN/LINE RUPTURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T EVACUATE RXR Safeguards: 1. LOW PRESSURE ALARM & PRESSURE INDICATION 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 295 ABD00036909 Node 94 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process & Cooling Water to TK-751 & EX-800 Drawing No. NM-090123-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. CW PUMP FAILURE 3. LINE PLUGGED 4. LINE RUPTURED/BLEEDER OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T COOL DOWN TK-751/EX-800 Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 94 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process & Cooling Water to TK-751 & EX-800 Drawing No. NM-090123-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure & High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT - THERMAL EXPANSION Consequences: 1. OVER PRESSURE TK-751 JACKET/EX-800 SHELL 2. LIFT RV ON EX-800 Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. RV ON EX-800 Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 296 ABD00036910 Node 94 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process & Cooling Water to TK-751 & EX-800 Drawing No. NM-090123-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE/EQUIPMENT 2. PLUG LINE Safeguards: 1. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 297 ABD00036911 Node 95 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process & Hot Water to TK-751/752 Drawing No. NM-090123-PID-D,NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. LINE PLUGGED 3. NO HOT WATER 4. PROCESS WATER TOWER EMPTY 5. BLEEDER OPEN/LINE RUPTURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T PUT WATER IN TK-751/752 Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 Node 95 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Process & Hot Water to TK-751/752 Drawing No. NM-090123-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUG/RUPTURE LINE Safeguards: 1. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 298 ABD00036912 Node 96 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Steam to TK-751/752 Drawing No. NM-090123-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. LINE PLUGGED 3. BLEEDER OPEN/RUPTURED LINE 4. LOW/NO STEAM PRESSURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T HEAT UP TANKS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. LOW STEAM PRESSURE ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: A Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 299 ABD00036913 Node 97 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: North/South Make-up Tanks and Transfer Sys. Drawing No. NM-090123-PID-D, NM-090124-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. XFER PUMP FAILURE 2. PLUGGED LINE 3. VALVE CLOSED 4. TANK EMPTY 5. BLEEDER OPEN/RUPTURED LINE 6. FILTER PLUGGED Consequences: 1. CAN'T XFER SA TO CHARGE TANKS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. 2 PUMPS 3. 2 FILTERS Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 300 ABD00036914 Node 97 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: North/South Make-up Tanks and Transfer Sys. Drawing No. NM-090123-PID-D, NM-090124-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE 2. SPILL PVA Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 301 ABD00036915 Node 98 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: South System and Old F-50 Charge Tanks & Piping Drawing No. NM-090124-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. PUMP FAILURE 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 4. INTERLOCKED 5. BLEEDER OPEN/LINE RUPTURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE EXPERIMENTAL PVA 2. PVA SPILL Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. FLOW METER 3. VALVE POSITION INDICATION 4. PUMP RUN INDICATION Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 302 ABD00036916 Node 98 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: South System and Old F-50 Charge Tanks & Piping Drawing No. NM-090124-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure and High Temperature Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. DEAD HEAD CHARGE PUMP Consequences: 1. RUPTURE LINE 2. SPILL PVA 3. DAMAGE CHARGE PUMP Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. INTERLOCKS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 98 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: South System and Old F-50 Charge Tanks & Piping Drawing No. NM-090124-PID-D, NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED LINE 2. RUPTURED LINE Safeguards: 1. ELECTRIC TRACED LINE 2. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 303 ABD00036917 Node 99 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Steam & Process Water to TK-701 Drawing No. NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. LINE PLUGGED 3. BLEEDER OPEN Consequences: 1. NOT NORMALLY USED Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 304 ABD00036918 Node 100 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: East Additive Make-up and Charge Tanks Drawing No. NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: Low Level Cause: 1. CHARGE TANK DRAIN VALVE OPEN 2. LOW LEVEL SWITCH ON CHARGE TANK FAILURE Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE BRINE TO DECAL TANKS Safeguards: 1. SIGHTGLASS 2. LOW LEVEL SWITCH 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 100 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: East Additive Make-up and Charge Tanks Drawing No. NM-090125-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. LOW TK-702/701 LEVEL 2. PUMP FAILURE 3. VALVE CLOSED 4. LINE PLUGGED Consequences: 1. CAN'T TRANSFER/CHARGE BRINE Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 305 ABD00036919 Node 101 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Seal Oil Tank Drawing No. NM-090126-PID-D Deviation: DM-754 Low Level Cause: 1. DRAIN VALVE OPEN TO SEWER OR SEAL OIL RESERVOIRS Consequences: 1. NO MAKE-UP SEAL OIL TO RESERVOIRS 2. SEAL OIL SPILL Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. SIGHTGLASS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating C Risk Ranking 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 101 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Seal Oil Tank Drawing No. NM-090126-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. NO LEVEL IN SEAL OIL TANK 3. LINE PLUGGED Consequences: 1. CAN'T MAKE-UP OIL TO RESERVOIRS Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. SIGHTGLASS Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 306 ABD00036920 Node 102 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Steam to Seal Oil Units, ME-299/300 Drawing No. NM-090126-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. STEAM TRAP FAILURE 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 4. LOW STEAM PRESSURE Consequences: 1. VICIOUS SEAL OIL IN WINTER - HARD TO PUMP Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. PLANT STEAM PRESSURE INDICATION Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: Node 102 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Steam to Seal Oil Units, ME-299/300 Drawing No. NM-090126-PID-D Deviation: More Flow Cause: 1. STEAM TRAP FAILURE Consequences: 1. SEAL OIL TOO HOT - BREAK DOWN OIL Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. HIGH TEMPERATURE ALARM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 307 ABD00036921 Node 103 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Cooling Water to Seal Oil Units, ME-299/300 Drawing No. NM-090126-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3. LOW COOLING WATER PRESSURE Consequences: 1. SEAL OIL TOO HOT IN SUMMER Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. HIGH TEMPERATURE ALARM Consequence Rating: IV Probability Rating: B Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 308 ABD00036922 Node 104 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Emergency Seal Oil Drum Drawing No. NM-090126-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Level Cause: 1. VALVE CLOSED 2. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 3. DRAIN OPEN Consequences: 1. NO EMERGENCY SEAL OIL 2. BURN UP RXR SEAL Safeguards: 1. OPERATING PROCEDURES 2. USED ONLY WHEN PUMPS ARE OUT Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 309 ABD00036923 Node 105 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to Kill/Charge Pots Drawing No. NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow and Low Pressure Cause: 1. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. HPSW PUMP FAILURE 4. DRAIN VALVE OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T CHARGE/KILL WITH POTS 2. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. OTHER KILL SYSTEMS 2. FLOW METERS 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES 4. PRESSURE GAUGES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Action/Other Considerations: Risk Ranking: 5 310 ABD00036924 Node 105 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: HPSW to Kill/Charge Pots Drawing No. NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: Low Temperature Cause: 1. WEATHER Consequences: 1. PLUGGED/RUPTURED LINE 2. CAN'T KILL/CHARGE RXR WITH POTS 3. PRODUCTION LOSS Safeguards: 1. STEAM TRACED LINE 2. WINTERIZATION PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 311 ABD00036925 Node 106 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Kill Solution Transfer System Drawing No. NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: No/Low Flow, Low Pressure, and TK-600 Low Level Cause: 1. FILTER PLUGGED 2. VALVE CLOSED 3. PLUGGED/BLOCKED LINE 4. TRANSFER PUMP FAILURE 5. AIR PUMP FAILURE 6. DRAIN/BLEEDER OPEN Consequences: 1. CAN'T KILL FROM POTS 2. AMS/ISONOX SPILL IF DRAIN/BLEEDER OPEN Safeguards: 1. SIGHTGLASS ON STORAGE TANK 2. STORAGE TANK BYPASS 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: Probability Rating: Risk Ranking: Action/Other Considerations: 312 ABD00036926 Node 106 Aberdeen New Module HAZOP Equipment/Line Description: Kill Solution Transfer System Drawing No. NM-090127-PID-D Deviation: High Pressure Cause: 1. EXTERNAL HEAT 2. DEADHEAD PUMP Consequences: 1. LIFT RV 2. AMS/ISONOX SPILL 3. RUPTURE LINE/BLOW GASKET Safeguards: 1. RELIEF VALVES 2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Consequence Rating: III Probability Rating: C Risk Ranking: 5 Action/Other Considerations: 313 ABD00036927 APPENDIX E P&ID1S USED DURING NEW MODULE HAZOP 314 ABD00036928 1 ABD00036929 ABD00036930 ABD00036931 ABD00036932 tPIPING INSTRUMENTATION NEV MODULE REa CTcr R X -743 DIAGRAM ABD00036933 ABD00036934 ABD00036935 DM- r - rR X -7 4 5 BME METERING fv soo 2 iwUCfrf: J00PSfc POT ?S & =; tnc e -- 5U $ 1s a* o <1 (X--1 511 i-a--wo--u "5 ----------- ' $n IS DM -757 R X -74-5 BME CHARGE irii<r co r-s' s.'s **W: 300PSC POT ABD00036936 ABD00036938 ABD00036939 E X -3 3 8 RECOVERED VCM CONDENSER EX^.337 RECOVERED VCM CONDENSER ABD00036940 ABD00036941 ABD00036942 -- SM ido psc (r.) iscr r F L -5 8 6 /F L - BLOWDOWN TANK STRAINERS ABD00036943 G R -735 SLURRY SCREENER * MESH J l SS SCREW F N -2 5 0 SLURRY SCREENER EXHAUST TAN !U W : 4010 SCfK T K -7 6 6 SLURRY DUMP TANK V -<T 0 J '-fl" STR SC ABD00036944 ABD00036945 ABD00036946 DM-7Sq MECHANICAL SEAL purge water drum ABD00036947 ABD00036948 ABD00036949 0 1 au<. 8 Q*O V CD | DESC IRPTION | <^ 5uj =o ^5 2 O III it 2i *O S|y e S E i %w *_ 1I I I o $2 \- N * `ss. V\. -N) E X -1 13 STEAM INJECTION HEATER 1 ,7 $ VP-7Q Q A/VP-7Q 0B REACTOR STEAM EJECTORS K S . UOTTvS P H S i liO P5I SAT. STL** ABD00036950 ABD00036951 SOUTH T K -7 5 3 SYSTEM CHARGE f - c ioiITuU--#crIOsCmf$d 40 J.M S TANK T K -1 3 3 F - 5 0 CHARGE TANK ABD00036952 ABD00036953 A 1c \ < Ol ' V ti t 'O s Z ABD00036954 T^I ABD00036955 ABD00036956 D M -- 116 NEW MODULE CAUSTIC HOLD TANK ABD00036957 ABD00036958 APPENDIX F OSHA PSM Regulation 29CFR 1910.119 345 ABD00036959 Federal Register / yol. 57, No.-36 / Monday, February/24,<1992 if Rules arid,Regulations 403 the country. Nonetheless, states with occupational safety and health plans Approved under section 18 of the OSHA l\ot will be able to develop their own state standards to deal with any special problems which might be encountered in a particular state. Moreover, because this standard is written in general, performance-oriented terms, there i6 considerable flexibility for state plans to require, and for affected employers to use, methods of compliance which are appropriate to the working conditions covered by the standard. In brief, this proposed rule addresses a clear national problem related to occupational safety and health in general industry. Those states which have elected to participate under section 16 of the OSHA Act are not preempted by this standard, and will be able to address any special conditions within the framework of the Federal Act while ensuring that the state standards are at least as effective as that standard. State comments were considered prior to ' promulgation of this final rule. VII. State Plan States The 25 States and Territories with their own OSHA approved occupational safety and health plans must adopt a comparable standard within six months of the publication date of this final ^standard. These 25 States and ^Territories are: Alaska. Arizona, California, Connecticut (for State and local government employees only], Hawaii, Indiana.Towa, Kentucky. Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York (for State and local government employee only), North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina. Tennessee. Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Virgin Islands, Washington, and Wyoming. Until such time a state standard is promulgated. Federal OSHA will provide interim enforcement assistance, as appropriate, in these states. List of Subjects in 29 CFR Part 1910 Explosive, Flammable liquids and gases, Hazard analysis, highly hazardous chemicals, Hazardous materials, Occupational safety and health, Safety, Process hazard analysis. Pyrotechnics. Authority This document has been prepared under the direction of Dorothy L. Strunk, Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health. U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington DC 20210. . Accordingly, pursuant to sections 4.6. Rand 6 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 653,655, 657); Section 304, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-549, Nov. 15.1990, reprinted at 29 U.S.C. 655 Note (Supp. 1991)); Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-90 (55 FR 9033); and 29 CFR part 1911, 29 CFR part 1910 is amended os set forth below. Signed at Washington, DC, this 14th day of February, 1992. Dorothy L. Stnink, Acting Assistant Secreta.y ofLabor. PART 1910--OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS 1. The authority citation for Subpart H of Part 1910 is revised to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 4,6.8, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 653,655, 657); Secretary of Labor's Order No. 12-71 (38 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR 25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736) or 1-90 (55 FR 9033), as applicable. Sections 1910.103.1910.106,1010.107, 1910.108,1910.109,1910.110,1910.111 and 1910.119 are also issued under 29 CFR part 1911. Section 1910.119 is also issued under Sec. 304, Clean Air Act Amendments of1990 (Public Law 101-549, Nov. 15.1990, reprinted at 29 U.S.C 655 Note (Supp. 1991)). Section 1910.120 is also issued under Sec. 126, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorizatioa Act of 1986 as amended (29 U.S.C. 655 note), 5 U.S.C. 553, and 29 CFR part 1911. 2. Section 1910.109 is amended by revising paragraph (k) to read as follows: 1910.109 Explosives and blasting agents. ***.' (k) Scope. (1) This section applies to the manufacture, keeping, having, storage, sale, transportation, and use of explosives, blasting agents, and pyrotechnics. The section does not apply to the sale and use (public display) of pyrotechnics, commonly known as fireworks, nor the use of explosives in the form prescribed by the official U.S. Pharmacopeia. (2) The manufacture of explosives as defined in paragraph (a)(3) of this section shall also meet the requirements contained in 1910.119. (3) The manufacture of pyrotechnics as defined in paragraph (a){10) of this section shall also meet the requirements contained in 1910.119. 3. A new 1910.119 and appendices A through D to 1910.119 are added to read as follows; 1910.119 Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals. - Purpose. This section contains requirements for preventing or minimizing the consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive chemicals. These releases may result in toxic, firei ' or explosion hazards. (a) Application. (1) This section applies to the following; (1) A process which involves a chemical at or above the specified threshold quantities listed in Appendix A to this section; (ii) A process which involves a flammable liquid or gas (as defined in 1910.1200(c) of this part) on site In one location, in a quantity of 10,000 pounds (4535.9 kg) or more except for (A) Hydrocarbon fuels used solely for workplace consumption as a fuel (e.g., propane used for comfort heating, gasoline for vehicle refueling), if such fuels are not a part of a process containing another highly hazardous chemical covered by this standard: (B) Flammable liquids stored in .. atmospheric tanks or transferred, which are kept below their normal boiling point without benefit of chilling or refrigeration. (2) This section does not apply to: (i) Retail facilities; (ii) Oil or gas well drilling or servicing operations; or, (iii) Normally unoccupied remote facilities. . v.' (b) Definitions. Atmospheric tank, means a storage tank which has been designed to operate at pressures from atmospheric through 0.5 p.s.Lg. (pounds per square inch gauge, 3.45 Kpa). . Boiling point means the boiling point of a liquid at a pressure of 14.7 pounds - per square inch absolute (p.s.La.) (760 mm.). For the purposes of this section, where an accurate boiling point is unavailable for the material in question, or for mixtures which do not have a " constant boiling point, the 10 percent point of a distillation performed in accordance with the Standard Method of Test for Distillation of Petroleum Products, ASTM D-86-62. may be used as the boiling point of the liquid. Catastrophic release means a major uncontrolled emission, fire, or explosion, involving one or more highly hazardous chemicals, that presents serious danger to employees in the workplace. Facility means the buildings, containers or equipment which contain a process. Highly hazardous chemical means a substance possessing toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive properties and specified by paragraph (a)(1) of this section. Hot work means work involving electric or gas welding, cutting, brazing, or similar flame or spark-producing 1 r operations. G404. ABDOOO36960 ,Fefierat'Registgr /.vyol. 57 No. 36 /-Monday; February-24,-1992 / Rules arid Regulations Normally unoccupied remotejacility means a facility which is operated,:, maintained or serviced by employees wh^isit the facility only periodically to its operation and to perforin n^^sary operating or maintenance tasks. No employees are permanently stationed at the facility. Facilities meeting this definition are not contiguous with, and must be geographically remote from all other buildings, processes' or persons. Process means.any activity involving a highly hazardous chemical including any use, storage, manufacturing, handling, or the on-site movement of such chemicals, or combination of these activities. For purposes of this definition, any group of vessels which are interconnected and separate vessels which are located such that a highly hazardous chemical could be involved In a potential release shall be considered a single process. Replacement in kind means a replacement which satisfies the design specification. Trade secret means anyconfidential formula, pattern, process, device, information or compilation of information that is used in an employer's business, and that gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it Appendix D contained in 1910.1200 sets out the criteria to be used^fcpvaluating tra.de secrets. (cEmployee participation. (1) - Employers shall develop a written plan of action regarding the implementation of the employee participation required by this paragraph. (2) Employers shall consult with employees and their representatives on the conduct and development of process hazards analyses and on the development of the other elements of process safety management in this standard. (3) Employers shall provide to employees and their representatives iccess to process hazard analyses, and o all other information required to be leveloped under this standard, (d) Process safety information. In iccordance with the schedule .set forth a paragraph (e)(1) of this section, the mployer shall complete a compilation f written process safety information efore conducting any process hazard nalysis required by the standard. The ampliation of written process safety (formation is to enable;the employer ad the employees involved in operating le process to identify and understand, te hazards posed by those processes volving highly hazardous chemicals. iis process safety information shall. cIu^^Hormation pertaining to the hazards of the highly hazardous and generally accepted good engineering chemicals used or produced by the practices. process, information pertaining to the (iii) For existing equipment designed technology of the process, and and constructed in accordance with information pertaining to the equipment codes, standards, or practices that are in the process. no longer in general use, the employer (1) information pertaining to the shall determine and document that the hazards of the highly hazardous equipment is designed, maintained, chemicals in the process. This inspected, tested, and operating in a information shall consist of at least the safe manner. following: \/, (rn , , ^ (e) Process hazard analysis. (1) The (1) Toxicity information: / C^ ' - employer shall perform ah initial (ii) Permissible exposure limits; process hazard analysis (hazard (iii) Physical data; evaluation) on processes covered by this (iv) Reactivity data; standard. The process hazard analysis (v) Corrosivity data; shall be appropriate to the complexity of (vi) Thermal and' chemical stability the process and shall identify, evaluate, data; and and control the hazards involved in the (vii) Hazardous effects of inadvertent process. Employers shall determine and mixing of different materials that could document the priority order for foreseeably occur. conducting process hazard analyses Note: Material Safety Data Sheets based on a rationale which includes meeting the requirements of 29 CFR such considerations as extent of the 1910.1200(g) may be used to comply with process hazards, number of potentially this requirement to the extent they affected employees, age of the process, contain the information required by this and operating history of the process. subparagraph. The process hazard analysis shall be (2) Information pertaining to the conducted as soon as possible, but not technology of the process, (i) later than the following schedule: Information concerning the technology (1) No less than 25 percent of the of the process shall include at least die initial process hazards analyses shall be following: completed by May 20,1994; (A) A block flow diagram or (ii) No less than 50 percent of the simplified process flow diagram (see initial process hazards analyses shall be Appendix B to this section); (B) Process chemistry; (C) Maximum intended inventory; (D) Safe upper and lower limits for such Rems as temperatures, pressures, flows or compositions; and, (E) An evaluation of the consequences of deviations, including those affecting the safety and health of employees. (ii) Where the original technical information no longer exists, such information may be developed in conjunction with the process hazard analysis in sufficient detail to support the analysis. (3) Information pertaining to the equipment in the process, (i) Information pertaining to the equipment in the process shall include: (A) Materials of construction; (B) Piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's); (C) Electrical classification; (D) Relief system design and design basis; (E) Ventilation system design; (F) Design codes and standards employed; . (G) Material and energy balances for completed by May 26.1995; (iii) No less than 75 percent of the initial process hazards analyses shall be completed by May 26.1990; (iv) All initial process hazards analyses shall be completed by May 26, 1997. (v) Process hazards analyses completed after May 20,1987 which meet the requirements of this paragraph are acceptable as initial process hazards analyses. These process hazard analyses shall be updated and revalidated, based on their completion date, in accordance with paragraph (e)(6) of this section. (2) The employer shall use one or more of the following methodologies that are appropriate to determine and evaluate the hazards of the process being analyzed. (i) What-lf; (ii) Checklist; (iii) What-If/Checklist; (iv) Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP): (v) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA); (vi) Fault Tree Analysis; or processes built after May 26,1992; and, (vii) An appropriate equivalent (H) Safety systems (e.g. interlocks, methodology. detection or suppression systems). (3) The process hazard analysis shall (ii) The employer shall document that address: equipment complies with recognized (i) The hazards of the process; ABD00036961 Federal Register-/ VoL 57, No* 36 /. Monday, February 24,1992 / Rules and Rogulations ' - ..^..^.6485 (ii) The identification of any previous incident which had a likely potential for ^catastrophic consequences in the ^Mvorkplace; (iii) Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases. (Acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors.); (iv) Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls; (v) Facility siting; (vi) Human factors; and (vii) A qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls on employees in the workplace. (4) The process hazard analysis shall be performed by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations, and the team shall include at least one employee who has experience and knowledge specific to the process being evaluated. Also, one member of the team must be knowledgeable in die specific process hazard analysis methodology being used. (5) The employer shall establish a system to promptly address the team's findings and recommendations; assure ^fet the recommendations are resolved ^0ra timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; develop a written schedule ofwhen these actions are to be completed; communicate the actions to operating,, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions. (6) At least eveiy five (5) years after the completion of the initial process hazard analysis, the process hazard analysis shall be updated and revalidated by a team meeting the . requirements in paragraph (e)(4) of this section, to assure that the process hazard analysis is consistent with the current process. (7) Employers 6hall retain process hazards analyses and updates or revalidations for each process covered by this section, as well as the documented resolution of recommendations described in paragraph (e)(5) of this section for the life of the process. . (f) Operatingprocedures (1) The employer shall develop and implement written operating procedures that kvide clear instructions for safely Iducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least the following elements. (i) Steps for each operating phase: (A) Initial startup; (B) Normal operations; (C) Temporary operations; (D) Emergency shutdown including the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required, and the assignment of shutdown responsibility to qualified operators to ensure that emergency shutdown is executed in a safe and timely manner. (E) Emergency Operations; (F) Normal shutdown; and, (G) Startup following a turnaround, or after an emergency shutdown. (ii) Operating limits: (A) Consequences of deviation; and (B) Steps required to correct or avoid deviation. (iii) Safety and health considerations'. (A) Properties of, and hazards presented by, the chemicals used in the process; (B) Precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment; (C) Control measures to be taken if physical contact or airborne exposure occurs; (D) Quality control for raw materials and control of hazardous chemical . inventory levels; and. (E) Any special or unique hazards. (iv) Safety systems and their functions. (2) Operating procedures shall be readily accessible to employees who work in or maintain a process. (3) The operating procedures shall be reviewed as often as necessary ta assure that they reflect current operating practice, including changes that result from changes in process chemicals, technology, and equipment, and changes to facilities. The employer shall certify annually that these operating procedures are current and accurate. (4) The employer shall develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations such as lockout/tagout; confined space entry; opening process equipment or piping; and control over entrance into a facility by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel. These safe work practices shall apply to employees and contractor employees. (g) Training. (1) Initial training, (i) Each employee presently involved In operating a process, and each employee before being involved in operating a newly assigned process, shall be trained in an overview of the process and in the operating procedures as specified in paragraph (0 of this section. The training shall include emphasis on the specific safety and health hazards, emergency operations including shutdown, and safe work practices applicable to the employee's job tasks. (ii) In lieu of initial training for those employees already involved in operating a process on May 28,1992, an employer may certify in writing that the employee has the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to safely carry out the duties and responsibilities as specified in the operating procedures. (2) Refresher training. Refresher training shall be provided at least every three years, and more often if necessary, to each employee involved in operating a process to assure that the employee understands and adheres to the current operating procedures of the process. The employer, in consultationwith the employees involved in operating the process, shall determine the appropriate frequency of refresher training. (3) Training documentation. The employer shall ascertain that each employee involved in operating a process has received and understood the training required by this paragraph. The employer shall prepare a record which contains the identity of the employee, the date of training, and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training. (h) Contractors. (1) Application. This paragraph applies to contractors performing maintenance or repair, turnaround, major renovation, or specialty work on or adjacent to a covered process. It does not apply to contractors providing incidental services which do not influence process safety, such as janitorial work, food and drink services, laundry, delivery or other supply services. (2) Employer responsibilities, (i) The employer, when selecting a contractor, shall obtain and evaluate information regarding the contract employer's safety performance and programs. (ii) The employer shall inform contract employers of the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to the contractor's work and the process. (iii) Hie employer shall explain to contract employers the applicable provisions of the emergency action plan required by paragraph (n) of this section. (iv) The employer shall develop and implement safe work practices consistent with paragraph (f)(4) of this section, to control the entrance, presence and exit of contract employers and contract employees in covered process areas. ABD00036962 5406 - Federal Register;/Vol.'57, No. 36 / Monday, February 24; 1992 / Rules and Regulatioha'-';' (v) The employer shall periodically evaluate the performance of contract en^tayers in fulfilling their obligations as^Bcified in paragraph (h)(3) of this secron. (vi) The employer shall maintain a contract employee injury and illness log related to the contractor's work in process areas. (3) Contract employer responsibilities. (i) The contract employer shall assure that each contract employee is trained in the work practices necessary to safely perform his/her job. (U) The contract employer shall assure that each contract employee is instructed in the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to his/her job and the process, and the applicable provisions of the emergency action plan. (iii) The contract employer shall document that each contract employee has received and understood the training required by this paragraph. The contract employer shall prepare a record which contains the identity of the contract employee, the date of training, and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training.. (iv) The contract employer shall assure that each contract employee follows the safety rules of the facility including the safe work practices rea^ud by paragraph (f)(4) of this se^M. (vjThe contract employer shall advise the employer of any unique hazards presented by the contract employer's work, or of any hazards found by the contract employer's work. (1) Pre-startup safety review. tl)The employer shall perform a pre-startup safety review for new facilities and for modified facilities when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the process safety information. . (2) The'pre-startup safety review shall confirm that prior to the introduction of highly hazardous chemicals to a process: (i) Construction and equipment is in accordance with design specifications; (ii) Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate; (iii) For new facilities, a process hazard analysis has been performed and recommendations have been resolved or implemented before startup: and . modified facilities meet the requirements contained in.management of change, paragraph (1). . (iv) Training of each employee involved in operating a process has been completed. {^^techanical integrity. (1) . Afli^mitibn.Paragraphs (j)(2) through (j)(6) of this section apply to the following process-equipment: (1) Pressure vessels and storage tanks; (ii) Piping systems (including piping components such as valves); (iii) Relief and vent systems and devices; (iv) Emergency shutdown systems; (v) Controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks] and, (vi) Pumps. (2) Written Procedures. The employer shall establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment. (3) Trainingforprocess maintenance activities. The employer shall train each employee involved in maintaining the on-going integrity of process.equipment in an overview of that process and its hazards and in the procedures applicable to the employee's job tasks to assure that the employee can perform the job tasks in a safe manner. (4) Inspection and testing, (i) Inspections and tests shall be performed on process equipment. (ii) Inspection and testing procedures shall follow recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. (iii) The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers' recommendations and good engineering practices, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience. (iv) The employer shall document each inspection and test that has been performed on process equipment The documentation shall identify the date of the inspection or test, the name of the person who performed the inspection or test, the serial number or other identifier of the equipment on which the inspection or test was performed, a description of the inspection or test performed, and the results of the inspection or test. (5) Equipment deficiencies. The . employer shall correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits (defined by the process safety information in paragraph (d) of this section) before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation. (6) Quality assurance, (i) In the construction of new plants and equipment, the employer shall assure that equipment as it is fabricated is suitable for the process application for which they will be used. (ii) Appropriate checks and inspections shall be performed to assure that equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications and the manufacturer's Instructions. (iii) The employer shall assure that maintenance materials, spare parts and equipment are suitable for the process application for which they will be used. (k) Hot work permit. (1) The employer shall issue a hot work permit for hot work operations conducted on or hear a covered process. (2) The permit shall document that the fire prevention and protection requirements in 29 CFR 1910.252(a) have been implemented prior to beginning.the hot work operations; it shall indicate the date(s) authorized for hot work; and identify the object on which hot work is to be performed. The permit shall be kept on file until completion of the hot work operations. . (1) Management ofchange. (1) The employer shall establish and implement written procedures to manage changes (except for "replacements In kind") to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures; and, changes to facilities that afreet a covered process. (2) The procedures shall assure that the following considerations are addressed prior to any change: (1) The technical basis for the proposed change; (ii) Impact of change on safety and health; (iii) Modifications to operating procedures; (iv) Necessary time period for the change; and, (v) Authorization requirements for the proposed change. - (3) Employees involved in operating a process and maintenance and contract employees whose job tasks will be affected by a change in the process shall be informed of, and trained in, the change prior to start-up of the process or affected part of the process. (4) If a change covered by this paragraph results in a change in the process safety information required by paragraph (d) of this section, such information shall be updated accordingly. (5) If a change covered by this paragraph results in a change in the operating procedures or practices required by paragraph (f) of this section, such procedures or practices shall be updated accordingly. (m) Incident investigation. (1) The employer shall investigate each incident which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of highly hazardous chemical in the workplace. (2) An incident investigation shall be initiated as promptly as possible, but not ABD00036963 '* Federal Registerj/ Vol. 57, No. 36 / Monday, Flebruary 24,,1992 /.Rules omdRe^atipris.- . 6407^ --------------------------------- :--: 1 ---- later than 48 hours following the incident. (3) An incident investigation team shall be established and consist of at east one person knowledgeable in the Ktrocess involved, including a contract employee if the incident involved work of the contractor, and other persons with appropriate knowledge and experience to thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident (4) A report shall be prepared at the conclusion of the investigation which includes at a minimum: (i) Date of incident (ii) Date investigation began; (iti) A description of the incident; (iv) The factors that contributed to the incident and, (v) Any recommendations resulting from the investigation. (5) The employer shall establish e system to promptly address and resolve the incident report findings and recommendations. Resolutions and corrective actions shall be documented. (6) The report shall be reviewed with all affected personnel whose job tasks are relevant to the incident findings including contract employees where applicable., (7] Incident investigation reports shall be retained for five years. (n) Emergencyplanning and response. The employer shall establish and implement an emergency action plan for entire plant in accordance with the rvisions of 29 CFR 1910.38(a). In ditiotu the emergency action plan shall include procedures for handling small releases. Employers covered under this standard may also be subject to the hazardous waste and emergency response provisions contained in 29 CFR 1910.120 (a), (p) and (q). (o) Compliance Audits. (1) Employers shall certify that they have evaluated compliance with the provisions of this section at least every three years to verify that the procedures and practices developed under the standard are adequate and are being followed. (2) The compliance audit shall be conducted by at least one person knowledgeable in the process. (3) A report of the findings of the audit shall be developed. (4) The employer shall promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that deficiencies have been corrected. (5) Employers shall retain the two (2) most recent compliance audit reports. (p) Trade secrets. (1) Employers shall make all information necessary to comply with the section available to those persons responsible for compiling ^j^roCess safety information (required by paragraph (d) of this section), those assisting in the development of the process hazard analysis (required by paragraph (e) of this section), those responsible for developing the operating procedures (required by paragraph (f) of this section), and those involved in incident investigations (required by paragraph (m) of this section), emergency planning and response (paragraph (n) of this section) and compliance audits (paragraph (o) of this section) without regard to possible trade secret status of such information. (2) Nothing In this paragraph shall preclude the employer from requiring the persons to whom the information is made available under paragraph (p)(l) of this section to enter into confidentiality agreements not to disclose the information as set forth in 29 CFR 1910.1200. (3) Subject to the rules and procedures set forth in 29 CFR 1910.1200(i)(l) through 1910.1200(i)(12), employees and their designated representatives shall have access to trade secret information contained within the process hazard analysis and other documents required to be developed by this standard. Appendix A to 1910.119--List of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, Toxics and Reactives (Mandatory) This Appendix contains a listing of toxic and reactive highly hazardous chemicals which present a potential for a catastrophic event at or above the threshold quantity. CHEMICAL name CAS* TQ** Acetaldehyde ~...................... 75-07-0 Acrolein (2-Propenal) 107-02-8 Acrytyl Chloride 614-66-6 AJIyl Chloride......... . -.... --. 107-05-1 Atlytamlne...................... ,,.... .. 107-11-8 Alkytalumlnums................ ....... Varies Ammonia, Anhydrous-______ 7664-41-7 Ammonia solutions (>44% ammonia by weight).______ 7664-41-7 Ammonium Perchlorate__...__ 7790-96-9 Ammonium Permanganate___ 7787-36-2 Arsine (also called Arsenic Hydride)............. .................. 7784-42-1 Bis(Chloromethyl) Ether.....___ 542-88-1 Boron Trichloride................ 10294-34-5 Boron Trifluoride.......... ..... ._ 7637-07-2 Bromine........................... -- . 7726-95-6 Bromine Chloride___ _______ 13863-41-7 Bromine Pentafluoode___ - . 7789-30-2 Bromine Trifluoride......... 7787-71-5 3-Bromopropyne (also called Propargyl Bromide)_______ 106-96-7 Butyl Hydroperoxide (Terti- ary)--------- -------- _ 75-91-2 Butyl Porbenzoate (Tertiary) -- 614-45-9 Carbonyl Chloride (see Phos- gene)__ ................... ... . 75-44-5 Carbonyl Fluoride__________ 353-50-4 Cellulose Nitrate (conoerv traton > 12.6% nitrogen__ 9004-70-0 Chlorine-................................ 7782-50-5 Chlorine Dioxide............... ...... 10049-04-4 2500 150 250 1000 1000 5000 10000 15000 7500 7500 100 100 2500 250 1500 1500 2500 15000 100 5000 7500 too 2500 2500 1500 1000 CHEMICAL name CAS* TQ** Chlorine Pontrafluoride --.... 13637-63-3 1000 Chlorine Triftuoride................. 7790-01-2 1000 Chkxodiethytalumimim (also called Diethytaluminum Chloride)....... ...................... 96-10-6 5000 14Dhk>fO-2.40initrobertzene... Chloromethyl Methyl Ether..... 97-00-7 5000 107-30-2 500 Chloroplcrin............. --..... 76-06-2 SQO Chloropicrln and Methyl Bro- mide mbrture__ ____ .____ None 1500 Chtoropicrin and Methyl 1500 Cumene Hydroperoxide--.-- 80-15-9 5000 Cyanogen ,,--__--... ' -- 460-19-5 2500 Cyanogen Chloride.--L.-- 506-77-4 500 675-14-9 100 Diacetyl Peroxide (Concert- tratioo >70%). 110-22-5 5000 Diazomethane .... .... 334-88-3 500 Dibenzoyt Peroxide___ ______ 94-36-0 7500 Diborane____ _------------------ 19287-45-7 . 100 Dibutyl Peroxide (Tertiary)__-- 110-05-4 5000 7572-29-4 250 4109-96-0 2500 Diethylzinc___' ____ Diisopropyl Peroxydicarbon- 557-20-0 10000 105-64-6 7500 Dilaluroyl Peroxide______ ....... 105-74-6 7500 75-78-5 1000 Dimethythydrazine, 1.1-... 57-14-7 1000 Dimethylamine, Anhydrous-- 124-40-3 2500 2,4-OinitroartUne _________ 97-02-9 5000 Ethyl Methyl Ketone Peroxide {also Methyl Ethyl Ketone Peroxide: concentration >60%)............................... 1338-23-4 5000 Ethyl Nitrite_______________ 109-95-5 5000 Ethylamine ................. ......... 75-04-7 7500 Ethylene Floorohydrin...... -- 371-62-0 100 75-21-8 5000 Ethyleneimine....--.............. . 151-56-4 .1000 Fluorine-- .....................- 7782-41-4 1000 Formaldehyde (Formalin) --___ 50-00-0 1000 Furan _. Hexaftuoroacetone 110-00-9 500 ___ 684-16-2 5000 Hydrochloric Add. Anhydrous.. 7647-01-0 5000 Hydrofluoric Add, Anhydrous-- 7664-39-3 1000 Hydrogen Bromide -- ..... 10035-10-6 5000 Hydrogen Chloride ............... 7647-01-0 5000 Hydrogen Cyanide, Anhy- drous----------------------------- 74-90-3 1000 Hydrogen Fluoride__________ 7664-39-3 1000 Hydrogen Peroxide (52% by weight or greater) ............... 7722-64-1 7500 Hydrogen Selenide...... ........... 7783-07-5 150 Hydrogen Sulfide____ ______ 7783-06-4 1500 Hydroxylamine_____________ 7803-49-8 2500 Iron, Pentacarbonyd___ --. 13463-40-6 250 Isopropylamine--______ ____ 75-31-0 5000 Ketene-- _ __ _ 463-51-4 100 Methacrylaldehyde...........-- 78-85-3 1000 Methacryioyl Chloride_______ 920-46-7 150 Methacryioytoxyethyt Iso- cyanate----- , --....-- 30674-80-7 Methyl Acrylonitrile..... ........... 126-96-7 100 250 Methytamine, Anhydrous........ Methyl Bromide-..................... 74-89-5 1000 74-83-9 2500 Methyl Chloride-............ -..... Methyl CNoroformate - 74-87-3 15000 79-22-1 500 Methyl Ethyl Ketone Peroxide (concentration >60%)____ 1338-23-4 5000 Methyl Fluoroacetflte__ --... 453-18-9 . 100 Methyl FloorosuWate__--__ 421-20-5 100 Methyl Hydrazine- ............. 60-34-4 100 Methyl Iodide----._______ ___ 74-68-4 7500 Methyl Isocyanate......... -- 624-63-9 250 " Methyl Mercaptan....... .......--. 74-93-1 5000 Methyl Vinyl Ketone____ -- 79-84-4 100 Methyltrichkxosflane____ -- 7S-79-6 500 Nickel Carbonly (Nickel To- tracarbonyl)--......-...---------- 13463-39-3 150 6408; ABD00036964 m *'& ^ederal'JRegister:Vol. 57, No. 36 /;Mon4^y/,j\ebj^^'Ey,;2^v^992.?/fRuIes\and^Regiilation3' . . CHEMICAL name. CASr., TQ" CHEMICAL name CAS' TQ" CHEMICAL name CAS* TQ** Acid (94.5%' bv wetaht ......... --,, 7697*37-2 nBcOxkJe................ .--; .. 10102-43-9 Nitraanlllne (para Nttroanfline~. 100-01-6 75-52-5 Nitrogen Dioxide..______--... 10102-44-0 Nitrogen Oxides (NO; NO*; N204; N203)........................ 10102-44-0 Nitrogen Tetroxlde (also called Nitrogen Peroxide)__ 10544-72-6 Nitrogen Trifluoride 7783-54-2 10544-73-7 Oleum (65% to 00% by weight; aiso catted Fuming Sulfuric Add) 6014-94-7 Osmium Tetroxlde- ' 20818-12-0 Oxygen Difluoride (Fluorine Monoxide) .... 7783-41-7 Ozone ---------------- ----- 10028-15-6 19624-22-7 Peracetic Add (concentration >60% Acetic Add; .also called Peroxyacetic Add)__ 78-21-0 Perchloric Add (coocentra- tion >60% by weight)__ _ 7601-90-3 Perchloromethyl Mercaptan 594-42-3 500 250 5000 2500 250 250 250 5000 250 1000 100 100 100 100 1000 5000 150 Porchkxyl Fluoride.................. 7616-94-6 5000 Peroxyacetic Acid (concen tration >60% Acetic Add; also called Peracetic Add)-.- 79-21-0 1000 Phosgene (aiso called Car- bonyl Chloride).................... 75-44-5 . 100 Phosphine (Hydrogen Phosphide).................................. 7803-51-2 too Phosphorus Oxychloride (also called Phosphoryl Chloride)..................... ....... 10025-67-3 Phosphorus Trichloride______ 7719-12-2 1000 1000 Phosphoryl - Chloride (also called Phosphorus . Oxychloride)............._____ -- 10025-67-3 Propargyl Bromide__ _______ 106-98-7 1000 100 Propyl Nitrate.....;.---- ----------Sarin........... .. ...................... Selenium Hexafluoride---------- 627-3-4 107-44-8 7783-79-1 2500 100 1000 SGbine (Antimony Hydride)-- 7803-52-3 500 Sulfur Dioxide (liquid)---- 7446-09-5 1000 Sulfur Pentafluoride___ :-------- 5714-22-7 250 Sulfur Tetrafluoride ' ............. 7783-60-0 250 Sulfur Trioxide (also called Sulfuric Anhydride)_______ 7448-11-9 1000 Sulfuric Anhydride (also called Sulfur Trioxldo)......... 7446-11-9 Tellurium Hexafluorido............ 7763-80-4 Tetrafluoroethylene................. 116-14-3 Tetratkjorohydrazine............... 10036-47-2 Tetramethyl Lead.......... ........ 75-74-1 Thtonyt Chloride................... 7719-09-7 Trichloro ' (chloromethyl) Silane.......................... -....... 1558-25-4 Trichloro (dichlorophenyl) Silane....................... 27137-85-5- TrichJorosflane--.--............ 10025-78-2 Trifkwrochlofoethylene............ 79-38-9 Trimethyoxysffane---- --------- 2487-90-3 1000 250 .5000 5000 1000 250 100 2500 5000 10000 1500 . 'Chemical Abstract Service Number. "Threshold Quantity in Pounds (Amount neces sary to be covered by this standard). Appendix B to 1910.113--Block Flow Diagram and Simplified Process Flow Diagram (Nonmandatory) KLUHQ COOC 4510-2S-U f I I