Document Dy06dyabE3Oqa26LENma40JM
I INTERNAL CORRESPONDENCE
BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAI
UNION CARBIDE
CORPORATION if ci inilal i;rnter
f'f.i. ' ; 1 .* , / a . ^.ioiJTi i
I- I ARLINGTON, WV !G30
Mr. T. Harrison Taft Plant (519)
Ms. Z. A. Boroughs - 519 Mr. D. L. Brucker - 519 Mr. L. G. Griffin - 519 Mr. B. I. Hurdle - 510 Mr. R. J. Ireland - 500/M3537 Mr. V. H. Johnkoski - 511 Mr. R. G. Meadows - 511 Mr. P. J. O'Connell - 511 Mr. J. M. Poulson - 511 Mr. R. L. Powell - 519 Mr. T. L. Rapp - 519 Mr. J. E. Sanders - 511 Mr. W. E. Shackelford -50Q/M3535
December 9, 1983
Central Engineering
Safety/Health
Final Report Operational Safety/Health Survey Oxide-Glycol II Unit Taft Plant
Mr. G. D. Twait - 511 Mr. W. R. van der Hoeven - 500/M3536 Dr. P. H. Wadia - 511 Ms. J. E. Wallace - 511 Mr. D. T. Watters - 511 Mr. H. W. Wegert - 511 Mr. J. D. White - 519
Dear Mr. Harrison:
Attached is the final report for the Operational Safety/Health Survey of the Ethylene Oxide-Glycol II Unit at the Taft Plant, which was conducted October 24-28, 1983.
Overall, the OS/HS Team found the area reviewed to be a well-managed, well-maintained facility from the safety/health standpoint. However, during our reviews of unit documentation, interviews with site personnel, and visual inspections of the processing unit, several concerns were identified. Although none of these concerns involves an imminent hazard, several are worthy of prompt attention. The most serious of the Team concerns involve:
1. Ethylene oxide field storage tank monitoring capability at times when Oxide II technician attention may be at reduced levels.
2. A potential for bypassing isolation valves in the ethylene oxide feed line to the glycol system via delta P permissive hardware.
As described in the Operational Safety/Health Guidelines, it is customary for the surveyed unit to publish an action plan addressing the concerns outlined in the report within about 60 days of receipt of the final report. The response should be addressed to Mr. W. R. van der Hoeven with copies distributed as indicated on Pages 11-12 of the Guidelines.
UCC 022375
BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL
FINAL REPORT OPERATIONAL SAFETY/HEALTH SURVEY
OXIDE II UNIT TAFT PLANT
SURVEY DATES: OCTOBER 24-28, 1983 REPORT DATE; DECEMBER 9, 1983
D. A. Gosselin B. I* Hurdle P. J. O'Connel1 J. M. Poulson (Part-time) G. D. Twait J. E. Wallace
UCC 022376
Ih
BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL
LESSER CONCERNS - Continued
SL6.4 Vibration Probe Reliability
It was noted that several vibration probes around the air train and cycle machine turbine are bypassed because of reliability problems with these probes. Lack of adequate devices for sensing vibration of rotating equipment can lead to damage to such equipment when vibrations go unnoticed. In some instances, hazardous vapor releases can result.
Recommendation
An investigation should be made into why the bypassed vibration probes have failed, and these probes should be placed back into service or replaced as soon as the problem can be corrected. Until then, the rotating equipment concerned should be closely monitored to prevent possible damage due to undetected vibrations.
SL6.5 Asbestos Gaskets in Ethylene Oxide Service
Spiral-wound asbestos filled gaskets are occasionally discovered as having been used in ethylene oxide service. Because ethylene oxide attacks the asbestos, the use of asbestos gaskets in oxide service increases the potential for fugitive oxide emissions in the unit from leaking flanges.
Comment
Continue to stress the importance of not using asbestos gaskets in ethylene oxide service and tighten administrative controls, where possible, to keep this from recurring.
SL7. HUMAN FACTORS
SL7.1 Lone Supervisor for Two Units at Night
On night shifts, the Oxide II Supervisor is also responsible for the Oxide I Unit, which could result in inadequate supervisory coverage if both units have problems at the same time. Because of the interruption of the plant steam system when either unit goes down, it is likely that the other would be in trouble, as well as other areas in the plant. Furthermore, whenever the Emergency Squad is called out, the supervisor goes, taking one technician from each Oxide Unit. This leaves both units shorthanded and with no supervision.
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UCC 022377