Document ByQL1EXKEbz0Kyo9E02X3benX
FILE NAME Owens Illinois OWILL
DATE 2006
DOC OWILL096
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION Article from Public Health Reports - Saving the Asbestos Industry 1960-2006
Public Health Chronicles
SAVING THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY
1960 TO 2006
JOCK MCCULLOCH PHD
Editor's note Jock McCulloch is an historian employed
at an Australian university Over the past 20 years he has on five occasions worked as a consultant for lawyers representing asbestos plaintiffs Those cases include the Cape Asbestos case which was settled out of court in London in 2003. Over a year period consultancy work has provided less than % of his income He has
played no role in any case in which J.C. Wagner was
involved including the Illinois case
THE INDUSTRY
The asbestos industry has its origins in the final decades
of the 19th century Within 30 years mines were operat-
ing in Canada South Africa Russia and Southern Rhodesia with most fabrication being done in the United States and the United Kingdom The larger U.S. and British manufacturers of asbestos products such as Johns Manville and Turner & Newall N owned Canadian and South African mines in what was an early 20th century example of vertical integration Besides its strategic importance during war time asbestos was essential to those products and industrial processes that came into vogue after 1945. The industry's peak
in North America coincided with what some econo-
mists term the Golden Age of Capital 1945-1972 and in that sense asbestos is an exemplar of modern industrial production and its attendant global divisions of labor Three major commercial varieties of asbestos fiber were mined and used in production chrysotile
white and amosite brown and crocidolite blue
which are known as amphiboles More than 90 of the fiber used during the 20th century was chrysotile
Asbestos is the most versatile of minerals It also an
efficient carcinogen Evidence of the risks of working with asbestos was well established in the early 1930s By 1960 medical research had proven the hazards of environmental exposure to airborne fiber Julian Peto et al estimated that in the UK alone asbestos will have killed around 250,000 men and women between 1995 and 2029. More recent estimates put the eventual global number of fatalities at more than 5 million The tide of litigation that began in the mid 1970s saw the
major U.S. producers including Johns Manville and Manhattan take refuge in bankruptcy and subsequently invent themselves as asbestos companies Simultaneously the industry shifted offshore to the developing world where despite the known dangers more than 2 million tons of chrysotile were used during 2004. The industry's survival has been due largely to its success in keeping alive the fiction that asbestos can be used safely Arguably its most potent weapons have been the suppression ofevidence about
the hazards of asbestos and even the corruption ofsci-
ence to promote doubt about the mineral's toxicity
THE SCIENCE
Asbestos causes three major diseases asbestosis lung cancer and mesothelioma a primary cancer of the lining of the lung or the abdominal cavity Asbestosis is an occupational disease confined to the workplace and there are other causes of lung cancer besides
asbestos In contrast mesothelioma can result from
trivial exposure which means the risk of injury crosses the boundary that usually distinguishes occupational
from environmental hazards Each of the three diseases
a caused crisis for the industry asbestosis in the 1930s
lung cancer in the 1940s and mesothelioma after 1960 The industry was able to survive each of those episodes without being forced to radically improve conditions in the workplace or entirely lose its markets It was a
Asbestos workers strip an asbestos carding machine at British Belting & Asbestos circa 1920s By the early 1930s evidence of the risk of working with asbestos was well
established
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remarkable achievement due largely to the industry's success in influencing medical discovery
In the late 1920s the asbestos insulation market was
expanding rapidly and the large producers were keen to ensure a reliable supply of fiber They were also keen to set prices to their advantage To that end they arranged an international cartel to exchange technical
information coordinate the export of asbestos and engage in mutual assistance to secure fiber on the
best terms As the rates of asbestosis among miners
in South Africa and Quebec and factory workers in the
UK and the U.S. began to rise the leading companies
suppressed evidence of occupational disease
Legal discovery
As the result of litigation in the U.S. and the UK the
industry's success in concealing the hazards of asbestos is now well documented Notable examples include the
Saranac studies of 1940 which a showed clear associa-
tion between asbestos and lung cancer and the South African state- and industry survey of asbestos
and mesothelioma in 1962.45 In both instances the
results of important research were withheld from public scrutiny The stories of Saranac and the South African survey which only reached the public domain because
of litigation are almost certainly fragments ofa more
reaching process that remains largely unreported The corruption of science from within is more subtle and potentially far more effective than the suppression of knowledge It is also more difficult to prove
The asbestos industry has been almost as resilient as its products Despite the evidence about lung cancer 1940s and mesothelioma 1960 the production of asbestos products rose inexorably It is a chilling statistic that more than half the fiber consumed during the
20th century was consumed after 1975. Those who
worked with asbestos were not told of the risks they faced nor were company shareholders or the consumers of asbestos products As production levels rose so too did the tide of illness contracted from workplace exposure However until 1960 there was no suggestion that asbestos posed a threat to the relatives of workers or to those who used asbestos products That was all changed by research carried out in South African
mining communities
The mining of amphibole fiber began in the Northern Cape province of South Africa in 1893 and ended just over a century later The mines were hazardous and the mills released so much fiber into the atmosphere that people living in asbestos towns like Prieska and Kuruman developed the occupational disease asbestosis from environmental exposure In addition mill waste was used to seal roads footpaths golf courses and even
school playgrounds thereby increasing the number of those at risk By 1950 mining had been going on
for 60 years and there were sizeable communities with
occupational and environmental exposure to a single
type of fiber crocidolite The area was isolated and
there were no significant industries to compromise
the results an an epidemiological survey The Northern
Cape was the ideal place to study the effects of asbestos Unfortunately apartheid made it relatively easy for the industry to suppress medical evidence of disease
South African science In 1954 the government mining engineer in Pretoria became interested in the asbestos fields To explore the problem of occupational disease a young scientist named J.C. Wagner was appointed to the Pneumoconiosis Research Unit PRU in Johannesburg Wagner's work was ostensibly on asbestosis No research had been done on that subject in South Africa since 1930 and Wagner hoped to produce significant results At medical school he had been told nothing of mesothelioma which was believed to be extremely rare Wagner began working on asbestosis but then shifted stream to study the unique tumors that were
appearing among people living in the Northern Cape
It was a brave decision made more difficult by the prevailing medical orthodoxy that viewed mesothelioma as a secondary cancer and by the growing reluctance of the mining industry to tolerate Wagner's research Wagner's paper on mesothelioma published in 1960 is generally credited with being the first to emphasize the association with asbestos knowledge that was pivotal to the introduction of new safety standards in the UK in 1969 and to the industry's decline in North America.10 Wagner's article was based on an analysis of 33 cases of pleural mesothelioma with all but one patient having a proven exposure to Cape blue asbestos Only eight of the 33 had evidence of occupational exposure but 20 of the remaining 25 had as infants lived near the mines Ironically what was to become one of the great occupational health discoveries of the 20th century was based principally on cases drawn from outside the
workplace Wagner's article changed the understanding of the dangers of asbestos and suggested a nexus
between work the environment and cancer The move-
ment of fiber through the cycles of mining milling and transport and the global movement of asbestos as an international commodity made the discovery even more significant Wagner's research could not have come at a worse time for the South African industry which had invested heavily in new mines and mills to meet rising world demand
Wagner paid a high price for his discovery His article
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caused a storm in Johannesburg and it was rumored
that the asbestos industry threatened to have Wagner
shot He was under such pressure to stop researching
asbestos disease ARD in South Africa that in 1962 he accepted a position at the Pneumoconiosis Unit
at Llandough Hospital in the UK where he worked until his retirement in 1988. When Wagner returned briefly to Johannesburg in 1966 he was confronted by senior figures from what he termed the South African medical establishment who accused him of damaging the local economy He was taken aback but glad he
had chosen to leave South Africa If he had been less
creative and continued to work on asbestosis rather
than mesothelioma he would probably not have been subject to what was in effect campaign of intimidation The PRU where Wagner had done his research subsequently bore the full brunt of the industry's fury The South African Asbestos Producers Advisory Committee SAAPAC used its close relations with the Department
of Mines and the national government in Pretoria to
get its representatives onto key committees at the PRU From that position it monitored research proposals and eventually established a right of veto over PRU publications The SAAPAC was so successful in stifling medical discovery that in the 1980s scientific committees in Johannesburg were still debating whether or not asbestos is a carcinogen.A further measure of
its success is the fact that South Africa continued to
export crocidolite until 1996
Wagner went on to a distinguished career at Lland-
ough and in 1985 he received the Charles S. Mott Prize for the most outstanding recent contribution related to the causes and ultimate prevention of cancer When he died at Weymouth UK in June 2000 the British press rightfully described him as an outstanding international authority on asbestos cancer It is ironic that the obituary also noted that Wagner had left the world a safer place.12
THE STRATEGY
The threat to the industry posed by mesothelioma was
far greater than from the other two asbestos diseases
The risk was not just to those who worked in mines or factories but to anyone who came into contact with asbestos products Wagner's paper and the subsequent research by Irving Selikoff in New York 1964 and Muriel Newhouse in London 1965 based on cohorts with exposure to all types of fibers suggested there was no safe way of mining or transporting asbestos and no safe way of manufacturing or using asbestos
products.13.14 There was nothing in the work of Wagner
Selikoff or Newhouse to indicate that chrysotile was any safer than amphiboles
In the wake of Wagner's paper the industry used a number of techniques to counter growing public concern The primary strategy favored by chrysotile producers in Canada was to distinguish between their fiber and the amphiboles They argued that only South African amphibole asbestos caused mesothelioma while chrysotile could be used safely This was a convenient strategy since the amphiboles comprised less than 10 of the global market and were only mined in South Africa and at a single site in Australia The Department of Mines in Pretoria believed some
justification Canadian producers had singled out amosite and crocidolite in the hope of gaining a
greater market share for their own asbestos.15
The research process
The industry has a long history of funding professional
and autonomous associations such as the Asbes
tos Institute the Textile Institute and the Asbestosis
Research Council to gather and share information At times of crisis those organizations have been used to counter bad publicity Acting in concert with U.S. parent companies in 1965 the Quebec Asbestos Mining
Association QAMA formed the Institute of Occupa-
tional & Environmental Health IOEH in Montreal to monitor and fund research Within six years QAMA had spent more than $ million on research projects Most of that money went to Dr. Corbett McDonald of McGill University who in 1966 began a cohort study of the health effects of chrysotile Like most of the indus funded research that reached the public domain
McDonald found little evidence of disease
The distinction between fiber types of which the
industry has made so much was disingenuous Asbestos deposits often feature a mixture of fibers and in
practice miners were usually exposed to more than one type of asbestos A geological survey conducted in
the late 1950s documents the presence of crocidolite
in Quebec's chrysotile mines Similarly the mine at Penge in South Africa's Northern Province was
the world's only source of amosite yet the seams of
amosite were often mixed with crocidolite Once the
ore was brought to the mills both fiber types were processed together Consequently those who used amosite downstream were always inadvertently using crocidolite In addition to the variable seams at Penge and in Quebec the distinction between fiber types was blurred during asbestos cement manufacture In that
process white and blue asbestos were invariably mixed to enhance the quality of the final product.19
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On December 4 1970 the Asbestos Information
Association America AIA was formed at a meeting at Johns Manville headquarters in New York The work of the AIA was in addition to the publicity campaign the industry was already running and to which in 1971 Johns Manville allocated 200,000.20 The AIA's stated objectives were to provide a channel of communication to the public about asbestos to rebut irresponsible and uninformed criticism of the industry and its products and to propagate the benefits and indispensability of asbestos through advertising publicity and speeches Internal documents reveal that operating on an annual budget of almost 300,000 the
AIA monitored medical conferences in North America
at which asbestos was discussed such as those by the American Thoracic Society the American Medical Association annual convention and the Air Pollution
Association collected papers then initiated lines of action to counter criticism of its products Such methods were expensive They also proved futile as medical evidence linking mesothelioma to all types of
asbestos continued to accumulate
As the crisis over mesothelioma deepened the
Canadian and South African governments sided
uncritically with industry In 1984 the Asbestos Institute AI was formed in Quebec From its inception the AI has been dedicated to the safe use of chrysotile asbestos through conferences public
relations initiatives and the dissemination of scientific
information AI which describes itself as a non-
profit organization has been subsidised by Canadian governments By 1999 it had received in excess of 40 million in sponsorship.22 That scale of investment in defense of chrysotile helped the industry shape both the research process in Canada and the public percep-
tion of the hazard
A career
Wagner left South Africa in 1962 to pursue a successful
career in the UK Over the next three decades he made
a major contribution to the literature and for most of that period his research and views were orthodox Like other leading figures he believed all types of asbestos cause all three types of ARD As a panel member in 1979 Wagner endorsed the International Agency for Research on Cancer's IARC's finding that chrysotile causes mesothelioma a conclusion supported by his
own animal studies Less than 12 months later Paul Kotin Johns Manville's senior vice president wrote
to Wagner asking him if he had evidence about the hazards of low levels of exposure Wagner's reply can hardly have pleased Kotin We did produce 2 mesotheliomas in rats after a single day's exposure
Wagner wrote and we did get a few mesotheliomas with the Canadian chrysotile He went on to comment that he was unsure how regulatory authorities would interpret his results Wagner's position was in line
with that of the IARC the Environmental Protection
Agency the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health all of which regarded chrysotile as
a cause of mesothelioma
Ironically as evidence linking chrysotile to mesothelioma continued to accumulate Wagner changed his mind In May 1990 Wagner testified in a court case involving the U.S. conglomerate Raymark formerly Manhattan Under oath he endorsed the
three pillars of the industry position on mesothelioma
the disease is always dose related even heavy exposure to chrysotile does not cause mesothelioma and 20
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This ad appeared in the trade publication Asbestos in November 1981. The global death toll from asbestosrelated diseases is expected to reach more than 5 million
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of mesotheliomas are not caused by asbestos He also disputed the toxicity of amosite Under cross
examination Wagner admitted to providing monthly reviews of the current literature to a lawyer named Shaw but he could not recall how much he was being paid for these services He admitted to having sent Shaw and his colleagues drafts of work he was doing with another scientist E.B. Ilgrin thereby suggesting
or at most minimal At the time my lay view was that this position was scientifically unsupportable For that reason Hanley thought Shaw would be unable to persuade Wagner " was therefore quite surprised when in a paper written two years later Dr. Wagner wrote in a published paper that the evidence was
overwhelming that the main cause of mesothelioma
was crocidolite asbestos that amosite asbestos
the research was commissioned Wagner denied that in the previous year he had worked for any asbestos
was implicated in just a few cases The paper fails to
mention any financial support from O Documents
company.25 In 1991 Wagner served as a member of the Health
Effects Asbestos Research Literature Review
Panel.26 The panel's 18 members included several
tended during the Texas case reveal that beginning in 1986 O made regular payments to Wagner through its legal firm Nelson Mullins Riley and Scarborough The
documents also reveal that the arrangement continued
leading figures in the field noted for their conservatism
for more than 15 years and in total Wagner probably
4i Wagner was the only one to dissent from the panel's received in excess of 300,000 That income compares
finding that all types of asbestos including chrysotile
to the 30,000 per year salary typical for medical
cause mesothelioma In a statement appended to the final report Wagner rejected that orthodoxy.27 He also argued that there was a background rate of
mesotheliomas unrelated to asbestos exposure and
emphasised instead the role played by passive smoking
researchers in the UK at that time Neither Wagner nor O ever acknowledged Wagner's employment at
the numerous conferences Wagner attended during
the period his association with the asbestos company
remained secret It was an association he even denied
and radon.28 Wagner's dissent in such an important forum helped keep alive debate about the toxicity of
under oath It is equally significant that Wagner's stance on chrysotile shifted at a time when the evidence
chrysotile
linking all types of asbestos to mesothelioma had
A day in court
become overwhelming
The intensity of asbestos litigation and the vast sums
of money involved have sometimes led to a falling out
between asbestos companies One such case was that of
CONCLUSION Robert Procter coined the term the social construction
Illinois O which had used large quantities of amosite and chrysotile and N a national
company based in the UK The case began in the eastern district court of Texas in June 2000. One of the issues at stake was I's level of knowledge about the dangers of asbestos and in particular the company's attempts to improperly influence the medical literature An affidavit presented in defense of & by Paul Hanley a New York attorney involved Dr. Wagner
According to Hanley on December 16 1987 Hanley
met a lawyer named R. Bruce Shaw who at that time
was representing both & and O Hanley recalled At the December 16 meeting Mr. Shaw also informed me that O had been paying Dr. Wagner 6,000 per month for some period of time irrespective of whether Dr. Wagner did any work for O Hanley agreed to attend a meeting in the UK with Shaw and Wagner to
discuss mesothelioma
According to Hanley Mr. Shaw privately confirmed to me after the meeting that he was trying to persuade Dr. Wagner to say or write publicly that only crocidolite
asbestos was an undeniable cause of mesothelioma
and that the role of amosite asbestos was existent
of ignorance to describe the strategy used by tobacco and asbestos companies in maintaining doubt about the dangers of their products.30 So long as there was a discourse about the toxicity of chrysotile the industry could argue that the banning of asbestos was not justified It could also use the opinion of its own experts in court to oppose plaintiffs claims for
compensation Wagner was in a strategic position to mediate the reception of knowledge about asbestos
disease It appears that his brief with O was to keep
alive doubt regarding the causal link between chrysotile and mesothelioma If so it was a role he played with some success as his secret employment by O impacted upon both science and the law During that period the asbestos industry also spent large sums of money
on publicity to counter growing public concern about its products As a result the industry gained a year reprieve in the industrial states It flourishes today in the developing world where in countries like India
Kazakhstan and Thailand sponsored research is used to justify the continued mining of asbestos and the manufacture of asbestos products
The asbestos industry was global as was the produc-
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tion of knowledge about ARD The major companies that operated both mines and manufacturing plants knew far more than regulatory authorities in individual countries about hazards in the workplace Employers knew for example which parts of the production process were most dusty had access to the health records of employees and had access to data about disease rates among miners and factory workers Litigation
in the US the UK and South Africa over the past two
decades has revealed the widening gap between what regulatory and industry leaders knew about risk in the workplace It is on the basis of such knowledge that courts have found against companies such as Johns Manville O , and Manhattan
Wagner was forced to leave South Africa in 1962 because of the industry's opposition to his research He
spent the last two decades of his career in the secret
employ of an asbestos company When I interviewed
Wagner at his home in Weymouth he complained that beginning in the mid 1950s the industry set out to frustrate scientific discovery and gave only minimal cooperation to researchers like himself He
added that sometime in the 1970s the whole scientific
endeavour was hijacked by lawyers and the press and he expressed regret that he had ever worked on
asbestos disease On reflection it was not such an
odd lament
Jock McCulloch is an historian with the School of Social Science and Planning at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University
Address correspondence to Jock McCulloch School of Social Science and Planning City Campus GPO Box 2476V Melbourne 3001 Australia mail jock.mcculloch@rmit.edu.au
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2 La Dou An international review of occupational and environmental asbestos issues funding of international agencies Proceedings of the Chrysotile Debate Canadian Asbestos Conference A Global Problem 2003 Sep 12 1H4ouse of Commons Ottawa
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6 Virta RL Worldwide asbestos supply and consumption trends from 1900 to 2000. U.S. Geological Survey Open Report 03-83 Washington Department of the Interior US 2008
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John Christopher Wagner The Guardian 2000 Jul 1 13. Selikoff IJ ChurgJ Hammond EC The occurrence of asbestosis
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15. Department of Mines South Africa Report of the Department of Mines for the year ending 31 December 1978. Pretoria Government Printer 1979. p 7
16 Institute of Occupational and Environmental Health A review of background and projects sponsored & archive Reel 71 frame 2-045 Manchester UK Manchester Metropolitan University n.d. c 1974
Brodeur P. Expendable Americans New York Viking Press 1974
p 131-4
De A. Petrology of dikes emplaced in the ultramific rocks of South Eastern Quebec PhD dissertation Princeton NJ Princeton University 1961
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Mar 20. p 6
23 International Agency for Research on Cancer Evaluation of the carcinogenic risk of chemicals to humans Lyon IARC Monographs 1979 Sep. p 23
24 Wagner JC personal communication 1980 Apr 17
Deposition ofJ. C. Wagner May 30 1990 Stafford Hotel London In Claude Cimino et al plaintiffs vs. Raymark Industries Inc. et al The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
Beaumont Division Civil Action No. 86-0456 p 1-245
26 The Health Effects Institute Asbestos in commercial buildings a literature review and synthesis of current knowledge Boston HEI
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27. Wagner JCW Statement by Dr.J. Christopher Wagner concerning
some of the conclusions of the Literature Review Panel August
27th 1991. In The Health Effects Institute Asbestos in Commercial
Buildings a literature review and synthesis of current knowledge Boston HEI 1991 p S2-1 to S2-3 28 Stone R. No meeting of minds on asbestos Science 923-
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29 Affidavit of PaulJ.HanleJyr. 24 Jan 2000 in support of defendant's motion for relief from default Judgment In Illinois Inc.
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30 Procter RN Cancer wars how politics shapes what we know and don't know about cancer New York Basic Books 1995. p 8-9
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