Document 8VN2mDGBaqzXzrE8ekXe5N06K

FILE N A M E : C elanese (CEL) DATE: 1998 DOC#: CEL040 D O C U M E N T D E S C R IP T IO N : Legal - D e p o s itio n o f D ix o n , V o l II I I FILE N A M E : C elanese (CEL) DATE: 1998 DOC#: CEL040 D O C U M E N T D E S C R IP T IO N : Legal - D e p o s itio n o f D ix o n , V o l II - A j 1 2 -kj 3 4 5 S3 J 6 & 7 r-A 8 3 9 10 * 11 12 13 "71 14 15 -J 16 --1 `J 17 18 19 20 J 21 22 - 23 -- 24 25 I ! 264 Those persons present were as follows: JOSEPH C. BLANKS Attorney at Law Route 2, Box 3130 Woodville, Texas 75979 Counsel for Plaintiff NONA B. WALKER Gardere & Wynne 1601 Elm Street, Suite 3000 Dallas, Texas 75201 Counsel for Defendant, HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION MICHAEL E. HUTCHINS Hawkins & Parnell 303 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Suite 4000 Counsel for Defendant, HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION ERIC D. WEWERS DeHay & Elliston, L.L.P. 901 Main Street, Suite 3500 Dallas, Texas 75202 Counsel for Defendant, RILEY STOKER CORPORATION 265 1 RICK SMITH, CSR 2 Charlotte Smith Reporting, Inc. 235 Orleans Street 3 The Kyle Building Beaumont, Texas 77701-2399 4 5 VIDEOTAPE OPERATOR/TECHNICIAN: 6 Warriene Flatt Legal Images 7 P. O. Box 315 Gilchrist, Texas 77617 8 9 10 11 12 13. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I 267 1 Q Do you believe that it was the - Celanex 2 was a product made by Celanese when you joined the 3 company in 1965? 4 A I don't believe so. 5 Q And was this polyester resin product the 6 sort of thing that you would use with fiberglass 7 reinforcing to make glass reinforced polyester resin 8 hard goods? 9 A I don't recall at this point. There were 10 others -- There were a number of possibilities of 11 other materials that could be combined, but I don't 12 recall now. The only one that I was particularly 13 concerned about was the asbestos. So, I don't 14 remember now. We had a lot of similar products that 15 would get me confused easily. Not with asbestos, 16 b u t -- 17 Q Okay. I was just -- 18 A Yeah. 19 Q When you -- When you described it 20 yesterday as anengineering plastic, I got the --- 21 A Yeah. 22 Q -- sense that it was used to make shaped 23 or hard items kind of like you - you would typically 24 talk.about being a fiberglass product. 25 A I don't associate thefiberglass term I ! 266 1 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are on the 2 record at 9:17 a.tn. 3 3 4 RESUMPTION OF EXAMINATION BY MR. BLANKS: 5 Q Good morning again, Doctor, and welcome 1 6 back. 7 A Thank you, sir. Good morning. 8 Q Thank you for joining us again. When we 9 stopped yesterday afternoon I think we had begun to 10 talk about any programs at Celanese after or when 11 you came for monitoring workers exposed to asbestos 12 and such - medical monitoring and industrial hygiene 13 monitoring - just to kind of pick up from where we 14 were. 15 A Okay. 16 Q But I - in that connection I had a 17 question about the Celanex product that we talked 18 about briefly. Do you have any sense of how - how 19 early Celanex began to make - Celanese began to make 20 that polyester resin asbestos augmented product? 21 A I'm not sure. It hadn't been long before 22 we were looking at it when the standard came out, 23 but I don't recall precisely -- 24 Q Do you ... 25 A -- the details. 269 Q And when you began with Celanese in 1965, was there a medical doctor employed at the Bishop plant? A Not at the Bishop plant. There was a local designated physician. Q So, this would have been a contract doctor in the -- A Yes. Q -- area? A Yes. Q And do you recall what generally that doctor's duties would have been other than maybe dealing with injuries and -- A Well ... Q -- traumas? A ... I think he did most of the pre-employment exams, which were done on all employees; any special exams that had to be done for disability, exposure, any such phenomenon. And he attended to the Worker Comp-type injuries or any illnesses of the like that were thought to be related to the work, or in emergency situations, of course. Q . By chance do you remember that doctor's name? i 268 1 particularly. Fiberglass, of course, is used in 2 automotive body parts and whatnot and other -- But I 3 don't recall whether they made one with fiberglass 4 or not. S Q I'm sorry. I didn't mean to push you that 6 way. And it probably doesn't matter. But in other 7 words, this polyester resin was a liquid product 8 when Celanese sold it, to which I guess a catalyst 9 would be added to make it solidify? 10 A You know, I don't recall at this point. 11 Some polyesters were thermoplastic and some were in 12 solvent-based solutions. And they may have had it 13 in a form that was liquid. I would have thought it 14 would have been in a hard form, either pellets or 15 flakes or whatnot and melted; but I - I don't recall IS now. 17 Q Okay. I was just trying to understand. I 18 don't suppose it much matters for our business 19 today. 20 A Okay. 21 Q I'm sorry. 22 A Nothing. 23 Q Did you personally ever go to the Bishop 24 plant? 25 A Oh, yes. I I ! 270 1 A You know, I can't right at the moment. I 2 can see him, but I can't remember his name. 3 Q I would think that you likely met with him 4 on your first trip down to Bishop. 5 A Oh, absolutely. That was the first plant 6 I visited. 7 Q S A How - how was that? Why was that? They had a big safety award the week after 9 I joined the corporation. They won the Chairman's 10 Safety Award, and they had a huge to-do about it. 11 Nearly all the executives went down there for it. 12 And, so, I went; and I stayed several days so that I 13 could tour the plant and get to meet all of the key 14 people and so forth. 15 Q Did Glenn Fleming - the Celanese safety 16 director - go down there with you on this visit? 17 A Oh, you bet your boots, yes. 18 Q Was the medical program at Bishop then one 19 that included exams for just general health as well 20 as any possible occupational -- 21 A You mean a periodic type of -- 22 Q Yes, sir. 23 A No, it did not, not at that time. 24 Q Was that a feature that you added over 25 time; in other words, where the doctor would be 271 1 looking at the overall health of the worker as well .73 2 as any signs of an occupational -- 3 A At a later point, yes. 4 Q -- illness? Did you find or believe that 5 that - that aspect, in other words, the more general 1 1 6 health exam along with the occupational exam was 7 desirable in terms of keeping the confidence of the 8 workers and their willingness to participate in the 9 voluntary program? 10 A I'm not quite sure I understand the latter 7 11 part of the question. 12 Q Well, I was wondering if - if it was your 13 experience that examining the workers for general 14 health problems as well as occupational disease 15 symptoms was desirable? 16 A Yes, I see. I've got the picture now. 17 Yes, I do. JJ 18 Q I mean I would think that would 19 perhaps -- 20 A Very definitely. 21 Q -- make the worker more confident in - in 22 the process and more willing to participate and 23 maybe less inclined to be alarmed that you were 24 examining him because you thought there might be a 25 serious work problem. Am I thinking correctly? 272 1 A Y e s -- 2 Q Okay. 3 A -- very definitely. 4 Q So, in - in 1965 at least the contract 5 doctor was doing periodic examinations? 6 A No, there were no periodic -- 7 Q Oh, I beg your pardon. I misunderstood 8 you. 9 A There were pre-employment and then special 10 exams as needed as I cited in the case of injuries, 11 exposures or any special need; but not periodic 12 surveillance exams. 13 Q Okay. I beg your pardon. And I - I 14 a m -- 15 A Now, this is Celanese. 16 Q -- probably confusing what you talked 17 about from -- 18 A Yeah. 19 Q -- Cyanamid. 20 A Yeah, possibly. 21 Q Okay. So - so -- Let me make it clearer 22 and more concise. When you joined Celanese in 1965, 23 the medical program of Celanese did not include 24 periodic physical examinations of its plant workers? 25 A Well, you are talking about the 273 1 corporation? 2 Q 3 A Yes, sir. It was variable. 4 Q 5 A Could you elaborate on that? Well, we had five - essentially most of 6 the time that I was there we had five operating 7 divisional companies in effect, which we have talked 8 about a little before: Chemical, plastics, fibers 9 and so forth. And fibers operations did have some 10 periodic exams. One or two plants in some other 11 divisions had lesser degrees of it, but - but the 12 chemical company did not have it at all at that 13 point. 14 Q And I'm sorry. You raced through those 15 divisions. Chemical, plastics -- 16 A Well, there were -- There was chemicals, 17 plastics, fibers, coatings, and you could put 18 another batch together of specialty chemicals: 19 paints, coatings, food additives, that sort of 20 thing. 21 Q Well, we will just call them specialty - 22 specialty chemicals. 23 A Yeah. 24 Q . Okay. 25 A It wasn't quite that simple, but that's -- I1 274 1 The first four were full status, autonomous units 2 essentially. 3 Q How was it that the fibers division came 4 to have periodic exams by that time? 5 A Well, that was -- The first part of the 6 corporation was fibers. It started as a fiber 7 company. We talked about the two brothers from 8 Switzerland. And they went from one plant to four. 9 And that was at an early time. And for quite a 10 period the plants - those plants had nurses and two 11 of them had their own physician on staff; and the 12 other two had contract physicians. And the ones 13 that had the physician on staff did it, the others 14 did not. So, it was very variable. It was almost 15 local option. 16 Q Well, I was getting that impression. 17 A Yeah. 18 Q It was fairly decentralized and -- 19 A It was very decentralized at that 20 point. A cohesive hold but very loose -- 21 Q I gather that the plant managers operated fairly independently in terms of whether they were going to have a medical program or a hygiene program, at least back -- A At least the divisions ... 275 1 Q -- when you got there? 2 A ... or the - the companies did. There was 3 autonomy with the plants, but it was more the 4 division really. We use the term division or 5 company interchangeably. 6 Q Were you charged with - with shall we say 7 developing a comprehensive medical program for the 8 whole corporation when you got hired or -- 9 A Well, we talked about that some yesterday. 10 That was -- Part of the initial charge was for me to 11 assess our needs and recommend things. And 1 made 12 the point very early on that within my field we felt 13 that a full occupational health program for each 14 plant including health surveillance and all was a 15 must, even though we didn't have very many hazards, 16 but to keep track of employees and to find things 17 that we didn't suspect even. So ... 18 Q So, I take it you recommended then -- 19 A Well, I did. I made that a point in the 20 initial interviews that I had. But we agreed that I 21 would come back and assure them that I was convinced 22 that was a need and then try to sell it to them. 23 Q And were you successful in selling that 24 idea?. 25 A Not for a long time, no. I came close , 276 1 number of times, but ... 2 Q By the time -- Well, when if ever did you 3 persuade management that they -- 4 A Well, in the '70's with the onset of OSHA. 5 And particularly within the chemical company we set 6 up a very elaborate health surveillance system - 7 computerized. 8 Q So, you - you sort of cut me off there 9 and I'm -- 10 A I'm sorry. 11 Q -- I just really wasn't left with a full 12 question. But by 19 -- By the early '70's were you 13 able to persuade management to let you set up a 14 comprehensive and fairly uniform medical program for 15 the whole corporation? 16 A Initially it was only in the chemical 17 company as a pilot operation, and then it would be 18 spread to the other units if itseemed satisfactory 19 and everybody agreed to it . 20 Q And after the pilot program in the 21 chemical division was sort of up and running, what - 22 what followed? 23 A I'm sorry. My mind wavered for a moment. 24 Would you please say that again. 25 Q Yes, sir. After you got your pilot 277 1 program going in the chemical division, what 2 progress did you make in extending that to the rest 3 of the Celanese Corporation? 4 A Well, it was still in the process of final 5 development - it was in operation, and then it was 6 picked up by the fibers company and subsequently by 7 a good bit of the rest of the company after I left. 8 Everybody was pretty much committed to it by the 9 time I left in '81. 10 Q Do - do you have any view of why this was 11 such a difficult sell? 12 A Yes. 13 Q Would you share that with us? 14 A Well, it had a lot to do with the autonomy 15 of the companies, one of the things that companies 16 generally do is write a medical policy for the 17 corporation. And I never had a medical policy that 18 was acceptable to the whole corporation. One 19 division didn't like one thing, and another division 20 didn't like this. And we never did squeeze it 21 through until the very end when we were really 22 developing the health program. 23 Q I see. And I suppose as - as the company 24 had grown up, each division or company as you call 25 it - but each division had tended to be fairly 278 1 autonomous -- 2 A Correct. 3 Q -- in its - in its management? Sort of a 4 separate profit center, separate -- 5 A Exactly. 6 Q -- philosophies, separate products? 7 A (Nodding affirmatively) 8 Q I see. Okay. And I suppose the only way 9 you could have seen your unified program put in 10 place would have been if the very top management had 11 in fact imposed it on the divisions? 12 A They were loathed to do that, too. They 13 were - tended to delegate such responsibilities to 14 the operating companies. They would use their 15 influence where they felt it was strongly needed, 16 but ... 17 Q I guess that makes a point that surely is 18 not original but a novice starts thinking that this 19 occupational health problem really just involves the 20 doctors like yourself and industrial hygienists like 21 Mr. Laubly and the - the staff that - that helps 22 support them. But that's really not the whole 23 picture. Management is the critical third part of 24 this triangle, isn't it? 25 A Well, in terms of supporting it and 279 1 funding it and so forth; right. 2 Q And without the support of management the 3 knowledge and experience of the doctor or the 4 hygienist or other people with special talents is 5 not necessarily going to be applied and have - bear 6 any fruit? 7 A Yes, sir. 8 Q And this problem Isuppose is one that 9 stretches back -- 10 A Oh, yeah. 11 Q -- over the century and probably into the 12 future as well? 13 A Yes, no question about that. 14 Q Okay. So, could you tell us when, Doctor, 15 you think the -- Well, let me -- Let me -- Let me 16 begin again. How did you describe your unified 17 medical program or your new medical program, and 18 what - what term should I use to speak of it? 19 A We used - - W e called it the medical 20 surveillance program. Some people called it 21 monitoring, but officially it was the health 22 surveillance program. 23 Q Okay. And this medical surveillance 24 program is the one that was first put in place in 25 the chemical division of Celanese -- 280 1 A That is correct. 2 Q -- under your direction? 3 A Yes. 4 Q And roughly when was it that you were able 5 to implement the medical surveillance program in the 6 chemical division? 7 A We probably got the approval to - at least 8 in - by intent in the early '70's, '71 or '72. And 9 we had to spend quite a bit of time drafting what we 10 needed to do in preparing pretty elaborate 11 proposals, cost estimates, time requirements, all 12 the features that would be of importance to 13 management in making the decision. And that took a 14 good little period of time; at least a year I'm 15 sure. Because we had to do a lot of investigative 16 work as to how expensive it would be and what the 17 facets of it we would deal with were. And there are 18 a number of facets that make it complex. It's not 19 just simple. You just don't hire a doctor and a 20 nurse and a hygienist and you go. You have got to 21 have a lot of other things worked out. 22 Q What -- Would you elaborate briefly on 23 these facets -- 24 A Yes. 25 Q -- that played into it? l 281 1 A There were three fundamental components of 2 a health surveillance program. One was the personal 3 health information which would come from all of the 4 medical encounters with the staff, chiefly the 5 physical exams, but also injury, accident and 6 illness data. Second was the industrial hygiene 7 exposure data; and third was hazard information, 8 toxicological and other data associated with - 9 thought to be of relevance to each work assignment. 10 That's a simplification of it. You had to 11 have timing and - timing of different jobs and all 12 that sort of thing factored in; but that was the 13 essence of it so that it could be combined in a 14 computer program to match up all of these things so 15 that we would be able to relate what the job 16 assignment was, what the exposures were, how much, 17 what the hazards were and what the health experience 18 was so we could do epidemiologic studies really. 19 Now, these would be real epidemiologic studies. 20 And we had very great care given to being 21 as uniform as possible; unlike in Cyanamid where you 22 had different doctors using the same form but they 23 all used their own terminologies and a different 24 scheme of things. We used the National Standard 25 Coding Systems for diagnoses and so forth so that it 283 about it. You know, the Organization Resources Counselors in Washington. They had an OSHA project, and many of the companies had membership in this. And in the chemical industry group that were members undertook this particular project. Q So, this effort that didn't really ever get going -- A No. Q -- was one of the chemical companies? In other words, the chemical companies were the ones who were trying to get together and -- A Yes. The top ten or so, yes. Q Was this done under the auspices of the Chemical Manufacturers Association? A No, this was ORC - Organization of Resources Counselors. Q I'm sorry. That's - that's one I hadn't heard of either. A They were a very big company that - a very big consulting organization that had started soon after World War II largely to help companies cope with personnel-type problems in overseas assignments. And then they spread into other areas where corporations needed guidance and help and a place where they could have a common exchange of i 284 1 information and so forth. 2 Q Let me guess that du Pont was one of the 3 companies that had -- 4 A Oh, yes. 5 Q -- the system? 6 A Yes. 7 Q Who was the other - which was the 8 other -- 9 A Well, the chief ones were du Pont, Eastman 10 and -- Let me think. Which was the third one? 11 Q Dow? 12 A Dow.I believe it was Dow. They were 13 each different, and it had later turned out they 14 were not able to use those programs they had set up 15 because they just didn't meet all the objectives and 16 computerization needs. Some of them went through 17 two and three models before they -- 18 Q I can imagine. As you say it's not a 19 simple task and all the problems are far from clear 20 at the beginning. 21 A It was very complex. 22 Q Well, did you ever encounter a project or 23 an effort at the CMA or MCA as it wasearlier to do 24 this - this same sort of thing to pull together 25 health and exposure information? 282 1 was as standardized as you could make it. And this 2 was very complex. But once you get it established, 3 it runs fairly well. But it's a devil to get it all 4 together. 5 And this was really a state of the art 6 program. I mentioned I think earlier to you that 7 the - in the industry a number of us had tried to 8 get an agreement to set up a scheme of computerized 9 occupational health examinations and so forth - 10 surveillance; and everybody agreed to that. And 11 three of the companies who had - that had programs, 12 early programs, agreed that we could use their 13 programs. But they wouldn't allow any other program 14 to be used. 15 Q Umm. 16 A Actually they had theirs all going. So, 17 we never could swing it through. 18 Q I didn't remember that discussion from 19 yesterday, but -- 20 A Maybe not. I thought we had. 21 Q What time frame did that happen in? 22 A Oh, in the '60's; in the late '60's 23 probably. X don't recall an exact date. 24 Q Was this an effort that was 25 A It was under the ORC. I think we talked 285 1 A No, I didn't. The same people were 2 members of both. For some reason we took it up 3 there. 4 Q In your career did you - did you ever have 5 a time when - when you learned that the insurance 6 companies in - in their files had such information 7 of this sort, you know, that would correlate 8 diseases or claims of disease with exposure data and 9 such? 10 A Insurance companies? What type of 11 insurance companies? 12 Q Well, the casualty or the Workers' Comp, 13 or the -- I mean I'm thinking back to Mr. Laubly's 14 early experience with Kemper, for example -- 15 A Oh. 16 Q -- where he was in fact going out -- 17 A Where he was doing it under the auspices 18 of the insurance company. All right. 19 Q 20 A Yeah. Yes. They were doing surveys -- 21 Q -- and obviously the insurance carrier 22 would have been receiving some claims. 23 A Yes. Yes. I just couldn't place that at 24 first.. I have lost the thrust of the question. 25 Q Well, I hope I have it. Let me -- Let me 1 A 286 1 see. In your experience did you - did you ever 2 learn of any insurance company efforts to - to pull 3 together information about exposure data and 4 occupational disease to - that would be in the way 5 of an epidemiology study? 6 A I don't know about an epidemiology study, 7 but they did I'm sure pull together information. I 8 didn't have much exposure to that because we hired 9 our own industrial hygienists - you know, Laubly 10 from Kemper as soon as - or very shortly after I got 11 there. So, that wasn't an issue for us at that 12 point. And in the earlier days I don't recall 13 having that experience with an insurance carrier 14 and - and other companies. 15 Q Do you - - D o you have a recollection of 16 any insurance carrier in connection with American 17 Cyanamid? 18 A You know, I don't. Right off the top of 19 my head I don't. I'm sure I did know, but at the 20 moment I can't recall. It's far enough back to ... 21 Q I should have asked Mr. Laubly, but I 22 wondered if the inspections - the industrial hygiene 23 inspections or surveys that Kemper was doing for 24 Celanese before 1966 continued after Mr. Laubly 25 became the Celanese chief industrial hygienist? i 287 1 A It was my understanding they did not, but 2 I can't be positive of that. I never heard of it at 3 any rate. 4 Q Did health claims' information come to you 5 as the medical director for Celanese? 6 A Now, what kind of health claims? 7 Q Well, I guess any sort at all; but 8 obviously we -- 9 A Well ... 10 Q -- would be focusing on the, say, 11 occupational disease claims. 12 A Yeah. The insurers are pretty much not 13 willing to share personal illness information with 14 the corporations by in large but very definitely 15 shared the occupational health issues. 16 Q How - how do you remember that - that 17 information coming to you; I mean in what form did 18 it frequently -- 19 A As a matter of fact, I don't because - 20 certainly not to any degree because soon after I got 21 there we brought Laubly on board; and then that - 22 that wouldn't have occurred to my knowledge. 23 Q I - I guess I was thinking about -- From 24 an administrative standpoint as medical director 25 would you receive reports of, say, injuries from I i 288 1 plants? 2 A Oh, yes. From the plants, yeah; not the 3 insurer, though. 4 Q Well, I -- I'm sorry for misleading you 5 off - off the track there. 6 A Yeah. 7 Q You get the injury information from the 8 plants. 9 A {Nodding affirmatively) 10 Q I was wondering if claims information for 11 Celanese workers might have come to you from the 12 insurance company as well. 13 A I don't recall that. And I can't say that 14 it wasn't, but I do not recall it. We would get 15 involved with some claims that were under Workers' 16 Comp., providing additional information and that 17 sort of thing -- 18 Q Uh-huh. 19 A -- to them. And I guess there was an 20 exchange of information in that respect on 21 compensable matters. We kept our own incidents 22 information and so forth. They wouldn't have even 23 had that particularly. 24 Q 25 A "They" the insurance companies? I don't think so because a lot of it 289 1 didn't involve claims or insurance needs, but we 2 wanted data on all of the things that happened. 3 So, each division had to submit a report 4 to the safety director and to the medical director 5 and perhaps to some other people in management every 6 month on what their experience had been. Celanese 7 was a very safety conscious company. And it had a 8 very fine safety organization. Every plant had a 9 safety engineer. The central safety department was 10 excellent. And ... 11 Q I think you have told us -- 12 A And, in fact, they did many of the things 13 that weren't being done by others in that early 14 period healthwise. They oversaw exposure to a 15 degree and made sure that cases were properly 16 handled. And it was a very excellent service. 17 Q Well, you mentioned that Mr. Fleming had 18 been safety director at Celanese some 15 to 20 19 years -- 20 A When I got there he ... 21 Q -- by the time you arrived in '65. 22 A Yeah. 23 Q Could you elaborate on what sort of 24 exposure oversight the safety department had been 25 doing in the past? I I ! ! 290 < 1 A Well, we didn't have our own industrial 2 hygiene people at all. And they kept monitoring on 3 what was happening in the plants with respect to 4 exposures that would occur, failures of equipment, .1 5 personnel practices. They had a very highly active 3 mMi 6 employee training, had safety meetings, et cetera, i 7 so that the employees were very much on the front 8 edge of knowing as much as possible about what they 9 were doing and what hazards there were and what -I 10 precautions to be taken. It was a very strong thing 4 11 in Celanese Corporation. This came right down from 12 the Chairman. 13 Q i Did you find when you started with 14 Celanese in 1965 that the safety department of 1 15 Celanese Corporation had the equipment and the --< 16 expertise to do monitoring for dust? i 17 A No, sir, they did not do monitoring. That ; 18 was -- They basically didn't. There might have been -- 19 some exceptions, but that was not their 20 responsibility. Oversight from inspection and 21 visual walk-throughs and so forth was their mode of _; 22 operating. And whenever there was any industrial 23 hygiene work being done by the carrier - insurance -- 24 carrier or by our own staff even, they were usually 25 in accompaniment with us. So, it was a joint or 291 1 shared effort in the sense of keeping each side 2 fairly apprised of what was happening - the results, 3 et cetera. 4 Q So - but before Mr. Laubly came to 5 Celanese as the corporate industrial hygienist, are 6 you saying that the safety people would have 7 ordinarily accompanied a visiting insurance -- 8 A Yes. 9 Q -- hygienist -- 10 A Yes. 11 Q -- in his survey of the plant? 12 A Absolutely. In fact, it was Mister - - A s 13 I think I told you yesterday it was Mr. Fleming who 14 recommended our employing Chuck Laubly because he 15 had been so excellent to work with by - his group. 16 And he was right. I had great respect and 17 admiration for Mr. Fleming. He was a - Glenn. 18 Q Did your work at Celanese ever bring you 19 in contact with Herb Walworth from -- 20 A Well,Herb was Chuck'sboss. And I knew 21 him quite independent of that through the AIHA. 22 Q Well, I thought you might have. 23 A Yeah. 24 Q . And it was myunderstanding Mr.Walworth 25 for whatever reason had kept the Texas Celanese I ! 292 1 plants as - as part of his inspectorate in the - in 2 the years when Mr. Laubly was working at 3 A Yeah. I started to indicate that, but I 4 couldn't recall enough to safely try to describe 5 that. There was somebody else, and I don't know 6 whether he did it or some other person; but that was 7 true. Although Chuck was involved some in the - in 8 the chemical company operations, too. 9 Q Well, if I remember his - his testimony 10 correctly, he said that - Mr. Laubly said that - 11 that though he certainly visited Celanese plants all 12 around the country -- 13 A Yeah. 14 Q -- Texas was Mr. Walworth's territory for 15 the Celanese plants anyway. 16 A I guess that was probably true. It sounds 17 right. 18 Q And that I think prior to becoming a 19 Celanese employee Mr. Laubly had not, in fact, ever 20 been to the Texas Celanese plants, certainly not to 21 the Bishop plant; that Herb Walworth had -- 22 A Oh, he hadn't ever been there? 23 Q I think I remember that correctly, yes, 24 sir. 25 A I'm I'm not sure. 293 1 Q And Mr. Walworth of course is deceased 2 now. But can you give us any insight into his 3 qualifications or his reputation as an -- 4 A Oh, his qualifications and reputation were 5 fine, outstanding. He was a fickle character, but 6 he was all right. 7 Q And you say you became acquainted with 8 Mr. Walworth through the Industrial Hygiene 9 Association? 10 A I presume through the field, you know, 11 common interests and so forth. 12 Q Would you attend the - the annual meetings 13 of the Industrial Hygiene Association? 14 A Oh, yes. I was director for a time. I 15 was in fact the last medical person who was a 16 director on the national board of the AIHA. That 17 was just before the time they were spliting. And, 18 so, they've never had any physicians on it since. 19 Q What did you do, scare -- 20 A It wasn't because of me they ... 21 Q -- scare them off? 22 A No. 23 Q Had you begun attending AIHA meetings even 24 as a student at Kettering? 25 A Yes, because they were joint as I think I I ! 29< 1 told you the other day with the IMA - at that time 2 called the Industrial Medical Association. They 3 were joint meetings of actually three groups. The 4 physicians, the industrial hygienists and the 5 occupational health nurses all met at the same time. 3 6 The numbers of people weren't too great at that time a 7 to find a meeting facility that would cope with it. 8 Q And then I would expect you didn't miss .j 9 any of the annual meetings of the AIHA up until near 10 the time you retired. Would that be right? U.J 11 A That's virtually true. There was one 12 meeting I missed I know, and then in the last few 13 years I missed an occasional one. But I essentially 14 got to all of the meetings except when I had some 15 illness in the family one year. 16 Q Which year was that? 17 A '61. My wife had corneal transplants. At 18 that time there was a meeting in California, and I 19 missed that one. 20 Q Did you -- Would you remind me when 21 approximately it was that the IMA split - well, from 22 the AIHA, at least in their meetings? 23 A It was a horrible mistake, of course. And 24 it was railroaded by a very small number of the 25 physicians who acted a little too big for their ii 295 1 britches. We tried to bring it back again at later 2 times. And then both organizations had grown so big 3 that it just never became feasible to do so. It 4 must have occurred - well, it was sometime in the 5 '60's. Probably - probably by '65. I'm very 6 fuzzy -- I -- Don't hold me accountable to that 7 date. It might have been a little later than that. 8 I'm just trying to think. I'm not sure. 9 Q Were the proceedings of the annual 10 meetings published for the AIHA and the IMA? 11 A By in large papers given at these meetings 12 just as with most scientific meetings are requested 13 to be submitted to the journals for publication. 14 All of them didn't get there, of course. And the 15 journal doesn't necessarily always accept every 16 article, but basically they were. 17 Q And do you recall ever presenting a paper 18 at one of the annual meetings? 19 A I did, and I chaired sessions and so forth 20 and ... 21 Q I'm curious. What - what do you remember 22 what you had written on? 23 A I didn't publish it as a matter of fact. 24 I gave one paper there on health surveillance in - 25 in the late '60's. That was a subject I had written l 296 1 several publications on and -- But it was a -- They 2 had -- They had various sections of the AIHA annual 3 group. One was the medical section which we 4 referred to yesterday when we mentioned Dr. Selikoff 5 gave his presentation. 6 I was head of that for some of the time, 7 and then I chaired some of those meetings. I can't 8 recall specifically other particulars. But there 9 were so damn many meetings, it was pathetic. 10 Q And could you tell us what journals your 11 publications did appear in that you can remember? 12 A You will get that on my C.V. 13 Q Okay. 14 A There are about 10 or 12 of them. And 15 they are mostly in occupational health - American 16 Medical Association journal, International Congress 17 of Occupational Health. That sort of thing, yeah. 18 I did much more writing within the associations and 19 within the company of things than in publishing 20 articles as such. I had enough out there that I 21 didn't -- My reputation was pretty well established. 22 So, I didn't have to feed or famine like professors. 23 Q Uh-huh. 24 A If I had something worthwhile to write 25 about, I would do it; but not otherwise. l i. 297 1 Q So, at least you didn't recycle that 2 cholinesterase paper again 18 times? 3 A Well, as a matter of fact I did, but I 4 didn't list it for you. It got repeated by a number 5 of other journals in part or one thing or another. 6 I don't list it as such. 7 Q Did you -- Did you get acquainted with 8 Howard Kusnitz -- 9 A Oh, yeah. 10 Q -- in Cincinnati? 11 A Not in Cincinnati, but when he was with 12 Shell. 13 Q Oh. 14 A I might haveknown himinCincinnati. I 15 can't remember when I did first know him. I have 16 known Howard for many years. 17 Q Well, Herschelreminded me last night that 18 Howard had been at the U. S. Public Health School 19 training program in Cincinnati. He may have been 20 one of the people that got it going. And -- 21 A I recall something to that effect. 22 Q 23 A I thought maybe -- At an earlier time as I recall or 24 Q Well, I'm thinking that it was not 25 it was in the decade after the war I believe. 297 1 Q So, at least you didn't recycle that 2 cholinesterase paper again 18 times? 3 A Well, as a matter of fact I did, but I 4 didn't list it for you. It got repeated by a number 5 of other journals in part or one thing or another. 6 I don't list it as such. 7 Q Did you -- Did you get acquainted with 8 Howard Kusnitz -- 9 A Oh, yeah. 10 Q -- in Cincinnati? 11 A Not in Cincinnati, but when he was with 12 Shell. 13 Q Oh. 14 A I might have known him in Cincinnati. I 15 can't remember when I did first know him. I have 16 known Howard for many years. 17 Q Well, Herschel reminded me last night that 18 Howard had been at the U. S. Public Health School 19 training program in Cincinnati. He may have been 20 one of the people that got it going. And -- 21 A I recall something tothat effect. 22 Q I thought maybe --- 23 A At an earlier time as I recall or -- 24 Q . Well, I'm thinking that it was not too - 25 it was in the decade after the war I believe. 299 1 the '50's? 2 A Oh, he was a very top leader, very highly 3 regarded by in large and a very authoritarian and 4 dictatorial sort of person; but very nice despite 5 all of that. And most of us liked him very much. 6 And he was easy to work with. He would come out 7 with some fantastic pronouncements, and you could 8 beat him down, pretty good sometimes. 9 Q B u t --- 10 A He was verytopflight. 11 Q Sir? 12 A He was very top flight; a very good 13 researcher and administrator, too. He was really 14 one of the key people throughout the early years - 15 many years of the A.C.G.I.H., for example. IS Q Now, this is the first time in our 17 diagnosis I think you have mentioned the A.C.G.I.H. 18 A It is? Maybe so. Okay. 19 Q But that's - for those that might be 20 hearing this for the first time - the American 21 Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists -- 22 A Yes. 23 Q -- correct? 24 A Yes. 25 Q And could youtell us what contact you had .i 300 4 1 m.if 2 4J 3 4 95 3 . 6 n7 ~3 8 ".ff-J J 9 3 10 3 11 12 13 vJ 14 -*? 15 il 15 17 "4 18 T 19 j 20 --i 21 * -ij 22 - 23 -- 24 25 with that organization along the way. A Well, at one point when I was at the university -- The membership of that was made up primarily of health officers - local, state and Federal - who had responsibility for working in industry to help industries achieve safe working conditions and exposures to things encountered in the workplace that might be harmful. And the reason was there were no standards whatever. And I think right after the war when industrial hygiene really began getting going, these governmental agents really had no basis for making a prudent decision of what was a safe level of exposure to anything. And, so, they formed a -- It's a nongovernmental organization. It's a private organization, but constituted (sic) of governmental people and university people, too. And they met periodically to share data and to solicit data and to try to get a handle on what ought to be guidelines. And they specified and stressed there were guidelines for exposure limits to various hazardous materials. They started off with a very few things, and then over the years it built up to quite a lot. Q ' And this effort to create guidelines I- 301 1 guess was the beginnings of what later got turned 2 into standards for exposures? 3 A Well, they didn't like that concept, of 4 course. They -- Throughout their history they 5 specified and stressed that they were guidelines. 6 Q Is that a view that you shared? 7 A Yeah, I think that was quite fine because 8 science was rather crude in the early days. And 9 particularly it's still not as good as you would 10 like to have it. But they didn't want it to have a 11 regulatory import because it gave it some aura that 12 they didn't feel it - was appropriate in that time. 13 And they wanted to be comfortable in their own 14 deliberations and in their own standard setting. 15 They always - at least at some early point 16 after its inception - did a thing called - gave a 17 two year notice of intended changes. In other 18 words, they published at this point -- So, this year 19 a notice of intended changes that will take place 20 two years hence before they would adopt a new 21 change. 22 And during that time they solicited all 23 the information that was available that people would 24 supply them, from industry, from government, from 25 academia, from whatever source to help them to be I ! 302 1 sure that was the right thing. And then there was a 2 final vote - up, down or modified - before a 3 standard was - I say a "standard" - a safe level was 4 established. 5 Q Did you ever belong to the A.C.G.I.H.? 6 A No. As I said, I almost did when I was at 7 the University of Cincinnati. I had been invited S to; but I - I didn't. I.knew that would be a 9 temporary thing for me. So, I didn't even give it 10 further consideration. I was very much interested 11 in it, though. I met with the people in Cincinnati. 12 I got to know Herb Stockinger quite well because of 13 that. He taught some of -- And that was one of the 14 field stations that we spent time in where they 15 had - where you had the opportunity to see and meet 16 these - the key people there and see the research 17 they were doing and got to know that whole field 18 because that was very integrally important to 19 doctors and so forth in industry. So ... 20 Q And Herb Stockinger I think you said had 21 been very active in - in the development of the - 22 the guidelines -- 23 A Yes. 24 Q -- the exposure guidelines? 25 A Yes. 303 1 q And I suppose -- 2 A And he was one of the kingpins in 3 maintaining the whole thing for a long time. 4 q Would he have been an authority on this 5 matter of exposure guidelines -- 6 A Oh, he ... 7 q 8 A -- back in the '50's? That was his full -- That was throughout 9 his career. It was toxicology and related 10 administration and research and so forth. 11 Q In - in applying the guidelines to 12 preventive medicine and preventing exposures -- 13 A Preventive medicine? 14 Q Well, I --- 15 A Excuse m e . 16 Q Well, I - I guess I'm thinking that 17 industrial medicine at the best -- 18 A Finish your question. I'm sorry. 19 Q --- is preventive medicine. Okay. But in 20 using the guidelines in industrial medicine and in 21 industrial hygiene, would you differentiate between 22 whatever organ system might be affected by the - the 23 toxic material or the chemical that you are trying 24 to protect from or just simply try to keep your 25 exposures below the guidelines regardless? 304 1 A That's a complex question. I don't know 2 where to - how to answer it really. Could you break 3 it down a little bit, or -- It got convoluted. 4 Q That's - that's my bad habit I'm afraid. 5 A I'm sorry. 6 Q Let me come back to that if I can get my 7 thoughts better organized. 8 A I got the essence of something you were 9 saying, and then I lost track of the ... 10 Q And I'm losing it myself. These 11 guidelines that the American Conference of 12 Governmental Industrial Hygienists published for 13 exposures to different materials came out in a 14 little booklet form that was sent around to doctors 15 and hygienists that were interested in it. Would 16 that be right? 17 A Yes. 18 Q Okay. 19 A I don't recall when the booklet part 20 started. I have got most of them, but ... 21 Q Well, at least it was published? 22 A It was published, yes. 23 Q And also I suppose published in 24 the Industrial Hygiene Quarterly and -- 25 A I think so. I 305 1 Q -- elsewhere? 2 A I recall that it was, yes. 3 Q While at Cyanamid or at Western Electric 4 or Celanese did you ever provide any - any 5 information or data back to the A.C.G.I.H.? 6 A Yes, I did. Yes. 7 Q And what - what materials do you 8 remember -- 9 A There were two in particular. One was 10 vinyl acetate, and the other was acetone. There 11 were some others that we shared data on, but I had 12 major efforts on those two. 13 Q As a result of your input and that of 14 others, were the guidelines changed for those 15 materials? 15 A As a matter of fact they were, yes. 17 Q Were they raised or lowered? 18 A Well, in one instance a proposal for 19 lowering it two years hence was abolished. And in 20 the other it was actually raised. 21 Q That is to say the - the exposed - the 22 tolerable exposure was increased to a higher 23 concentration? 24 A Yes. Yes. It was a strange occurrence. 25 It had been at a higher level, and then it had been 306 1 lowered with no new data. And I objected to that 2 and got them to push it back up to where it had 3 been. 4 Q Was -- Because I k n o w -- 5 A It remains there still. 6 Q Out of -- Out of curiosity, which one -- 7 A Acetone. 8 Q Acetone was the one where the - the 9 guideline was raised again? 10 A Yeah. 11 Q And the vinyl acetate - the proposed 12 tightening of the standard was -- 13 A Rescinded, yes. 14 Q -- not implemented? 15 A There were other ones I worked on, but 16 those were two that more often we were providing 17 toxicity data or experience data that we had that 18 they could be using. 19 Q Now, this --- 20 A I very often went to their annual 21 meetings, too, when they did these deliberations. 22 It occurred just in the beginning. We were ahead of 23 the national AIHA meetings. And they were quite 24 fascinating meetings. So, I -- 25 Q Oh. So, the - though the membership 307 1 wasn't open to industry employees, the meetings 2 were? 3 A No. No, it was not; but the meetings 4 were. At the annual meeting at least, yeah. 5 Q Of course it's important to remember that 6 this was strictly a volunteer organization - the 7 A.C.G.I.H. 8 A Now. Wait a minute. It was a volunteer 9 organization of what? 10 Q Well, the A.C.G.I.H. was a - an 11 organization which people chose voluntarily to 12 belong to. 13 A Oh, yes. It wasn't a part of AIHA, 14 though. 15 Q No, sir. 16 A It just happened they had the meeting at 17 the time because the same people would be -- 18 Q The same people ... 19 A -- in attendance. 20 Q Okay. And all of their work of the 21 A.C.G.I.H. members on the guidelines for exposures - 22 or not all of it - but a lot of it would have been 23 done on their - in their free time and just as a 24 matter of I guess professional conscious? 25 A Yes. Those who had knowledge, of course, 308 1 contributed on the things they had knowledge about 2 and ... 3 Q But that - that would explain I suppose 4 why a lot of the materials on the guideline table 5 didn't really get a - the periodic review that - 6 that they had hoped for? 7 A Was that a question? 8 Q Well, it was trying to be. I mean you 9 appreciate, don't you, that - that though the - 10 their papers said that each guideline was reviewed 11 annually, that that in - in reality did not - did 12 not happen? 13 A Well --- 14 Q Some wereand someweren't? 15 A Well, every - every one was reviewed in 16 the sense that people in the committees - and this 17 wasn't done in the open meetings - but in their work 18 sessions and whatnot every compound was looked a t . 19 And if somebody had a basis for suggesting that it 20 ought to be reassessed, they would do it. But if 21 they didn't, they wouldn't. 22 Q I'm thinking, though, that the 23 organization was dependent upon industry to provide 24 the information that would assist in this review -- 25 A Well ... ir : 309 1 Q -- like just as you did on the acetone 2 a n d -- 3 A Yeah, industry or wherever they could get . 4 it. They preferred nonindustry work. But that was 5 a valuable source, particularly through the 6 toxicology programs within industry. 7 Q But in reality wouldn't it have been the 8 industry chemists and toxicologists that generally 9 would have - would have the best knowledge about 10 the - the new chemicals and new substances, the 11 ingredients in their products? 12 A Well, the ingredients in products of their 13 own, of course. But all kinds of people were 14 working on toxicology evaluations, probably as many 15 in industry - in universities and government as 16 there was in industry. And I think by in large to 17 avoid any appearance of bias they preferred to not 18 rely as much on industry-generated data, even though 19 they knew that most of these toxicologists and 20 whatnot were highly professional people and just as 21 honest as the government or their own people would 22 be - but it looked better perhaps. There was some 23 sensitivity to that issue. But they welcomed data 24 submitted by anybody, but they assessed it on their 25 own independently and accepted or rejected it as ii 310 1 they felt appropriate. 2 Q I suppose critical to making any good 3 scientific evaluation of the guideline would be new 4 data - medical data, exposure data, the sort of 5 thing - the sort of information that ycu were trying 6 to develop in your medical surveillance program, for 7 example? 8 A Yes. That's true, yes. 9 Q Because you -- None of it could be just 10 approached in a vacuum? 11 A That is correct. 12 Q And you needed exposure history 13 information and medical surveillance -- Well -- 14 A Everything you could get. 15 Q -- medical information? 16 A Absolutely. 17 Q Okay. And animal testing r 18 A Animal testing. 19 Q -- information? 20 A That was very important. 21 Q And am I right in thinking that if we go 22 back to the - the '50's, for example, that the 23 government's role in - in the testing of materials 24 and the regulation of materials used in industrial - 25 in industry and products was not near what it is II ! 311 1 today? 2 A Oh, goodness, no. Yeah. 3 Q So, we are back again to being largely 4 dependent on the manufacturers of specific materials 5 a s -- 6 A Well, you probably have to rely on 7 manufacturers, academic programs and governmental 8 programs. I would hazard a guess that they were 9 about equal parts. 10 Q Well, the Public Health Service, for 11 example, in those days did not have the - the legal 12 power to enter an employer's workplace - a factory 13 without -- 14 A Well, I'm talking about basic -- I'm 15 talking about basic research -- 16 Q Yes, sir. 17 A -- on the hazards of -- I know what you 18 are saying, yes. 19 Q And I - I don't suppose there was any 20 formal governmental program for gathering together 21 the - what shall we say - the mortality and 22 morbidity information from various trades that - 23 that would likely have industrial exposures, was 24 it - again, back to the '50's when you entered the 25 field? i l 312 1 A I'm a little fuzzy about what you mean by 2 that. I lost you somewhere in the ... 3 Q Okay. I was wondering what if any 4 government programs you recall from the '50's where 5 a State or Federal Government would collect 6 information about the incidence of, say, asbestosis 7 or silicosis or plumbism from, you know, the - the 8 industrial work force? 9 A Well, there were procedures for doing a 10 lot of that through reportable disease 11 requirements - reportable things that were required 12 or mandated. State and Federal Governments often 13 mandated the reporting of certain - of certain types 14 of data. When I got home last night I had the "New 15 Virginia" report on reportable diseases; there is a 16 section for occupational diseases at the end of the 17 whole thing. That was true for all of these. I 18 have kind of jumped the track here. 19 Q Well, we were talking about whether this 20 was going on in the '50's - this reporting of 21 industrial diseases. 22 A Yeah. I don't recall some of the other 23 parts. See, I came into it in the middle of 24 the '50's . And I'm just not sure how to answer your 25 question. I! 313 1 Q Well, now that I've asked you, I'm 2 thinking that there were some - some rudimentary 3 programs, maybe even in -- 4 A There was what? 5 Q There were some rudimentary programs for 6 gathering this information by industry, although 7 I - like at the New York Department of Labor. 0 A The labor department, of course. I 9 started to say that a minute or two ago, and I 10 failed to do so. The labor department, of course, 11 has retained a certain amount of data over the 12 years. It was probably not very sophisticated until 13 well into the '60'a and even later. 14 Q I think --- 15 A But they did have gross data on a lot of 16 things of this sort, yeah. That's in a sense like 17 what I was saying about the "Virginia." 18 Governmental organizations would have things that - 19 the mandated reporting of certain types of things. 20 And like in Virginia, for instance, infectious 21 diseases - there is a list of which ones mandate 22 inspections. And there is a listing of the ones 23 that are occupational - if they require data being - 24 incidence data being reported. 25 It's well-known through the years that the II ! 314 1 reporting has not been as good as it ought to be. 2 But it gave a rough sense of it - certainly a 3 proportional sense of what was occurring. 4 Q Would you mind stretching your legs for a 5 moment? 6 A I think that would be a very good idea. 7 Q All right. 8 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the 9 record at 10:15. 10 11 (AT THIS TIME A BRIEF RECESS WAS 12 TAKEN, AND THE PROCEEDINGS THEREAFTER 13 RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:) 14 15 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are on the 16 record at 10:53. 17 18 (By Mr. Blanks) 19 Q Doctor, we chatted yesterday about the 20 origins of Celanese and the Dreyfus brothers from 21 Switzerland and their first plant in Britain and 22 then opening the plant in American in 1915. 23 A Thereabouts, yeah. 24 Q Thereabouts. But I wonder if you are 25 aware of any dealings that Celanese had with the ii 315 1 Hoechst Chemical Company that preceded the merger or 2 acquisition? 3 A No, sir, I do not. 4 Q To your knowledge there were no joint 5 ventures or relationships that involved 6 producing -- 7 A If there were, I don't recall them. 8 Q You probably know that joint ventures were 9 used by some of the other European chemical 10 companies -- 11 A 12 q Yes. -- as a Way into the -- 13 A 14 Q Sure. -- the U. S. Market? I think, for 15 instance, Bayer and Monsanto created Mobay. 16 A And we had a division in the fibers with 17 ICI, synthetic fibers - nylons, polyesters. 18 Q How far back did that division go do 19 y o u -- 20 A That started in the - shortly before I 21 joined the company. 22 Q Uh-huh. But Hoechst just came on the 23 scene and acquired Celanesewhenever ---- 24 A .. The whole corporation, yeah. 25 Q -- whenever that happened? And did that 316 1 occur while you were still -- 2 A No, that was several years after I had 3 taken early retirement. 4 Q- I see. 5 A Probably about '85, somewhere like that. 6 Q Did your -- Did your work at Celanese or 7 at Cyanamid ever involve dealings with the ASA - the 8 American Standards Association? 9 A Not at -- Not at Cyanamid, but it did at 10 Celanese - I mean at Celanese Corporation, yes. 11 Q And am I right that the ASA became known 12 as ANSI? 13 A Yeah. ANSI, yeah. 14 Q American National Standards Institute? 15 A American National Standards Institute, 16 yes, sir. 17 Q Okay. And what kind of role did you have 18 w i t h -- 19 A Well, I was a member at varying times on 20 several of their committees. You know, they had a 21 complicated structure. And when they brought out 22 a - I can't recall whether they called them 23 standards or what - it had to be voted on by all of 24 the members and whatnot. It was a very complicated 25 operation. But I was on a number of their 317 1 committees. 2 Q Do you remember what some of the 3 committees were? 4 A Well, one of the chief ones was Z.77, 5 which was the respiratory protection. My C.V. will 6 list -- There was one other that I was on. I can't 7 recall what it was right now. But I also had some 8 little relationships with others as an advisor, but 9 not - I don't believe as a member. 10 Q Do you recollect there was a - an ANSI 11 committee that was focused on industrial hygiene, 12 per se? 13 A I don't recall specifically, but I believe 14 there was. 15 Q It just occurred to me; I thought -- 16 A They had a lot of committees, you know. 17 There were a lot of these standards. 18 Q I thought there was once an effort to try 19 and actually promulgate some industrial hygiene 20 standards out of an ANSI -- 21 A There may have been. I wasn't involved 22 with it as such, I don't believe. 23 Q Okay. And what - what - what - 24 A Although they did come out with some 25 standards as part of their recommendations on 318 q 1 certain elements of the papers, and I don't remember 2 just how the -- Because some of them were adopted 3 sometimes by other groups. In fact, I believe 4 OSHA'S adopted a few of their standards, or at least 5 in principle. 3 6 Q Uh-huh. 7 A I may be wrong. But they were considered 3 8 pretty authoritative, too. 9 Q What was the - the thrust of the 10 respiratory protection committee's efforts when you I 11 were on that committee? 12 A A lot had to do with the development of 13 new masks and devices and whatnot to preclude 14 exposure. It got very complicated with all the 15 different categories of respiratory protection, from 16 self-contained to self-filtration, air supplied and 17 all of the routine types with organic vapors and 18 dusts and whatnot. 19 And it was a matter of trying to 20 standardized some of the definitions and uses of 21 some of these things. 22 Q And would it also -- 23 A I never was there -- I bet I was on that 24 committee for eight years, and they never finished a 25 standard the whole time. They kept going back 319 fj 1 for -- They acted like our - The Republican Congress 2 this year. 3 Q Some of this work then is actually writing 4 a standard for, say, a mineral dust respirator or a 5 particular kind of vapor respirator in terms of what 6 it should filter out or do; or is that -- I mean is rii 7 that how that works? 8 A Yeah, at least generically. I don't know 9 that it related to specific materials. It probably 10 did in some instances, but -- 11 Q Okay. 12 A -- they were categoric like organic vapor 13 and -- There were some specific ones like lead. 14 It's just long enough ago that I can't remember all 15 the little details, but it was a very broad 16 coverage. 17 Q When you --Speaking ofrespirators, I 18 guess do you recollect that back when you began your 19 practice of industrial medicine that the respirators 20 were approved by some government agency? 21 A Well, yes. 22 Q That wouldhave been - what, theBureau of 23 Mines at the time? 24 A The Bureau of Mines by in large, yes. At 25 that time, yes. 320 1 Q Did you -- Did you ever get - become 2 acquainted with the - the way in which the 3 certifications were obtained or the approvals? 4 A No, I - I never did. That preceded - was 5 later when I became concerned with that. And their 6 role was greatly diminished because NIOSH took over 7 a lot of it. And much of the research was done out e at Los Alamos, for example, for the -- I was out 9 there quite a few times on projects associated with 10 that and other things, too. 11 Q You say you were out at Los Alamos -- 12 A Yes. 13 Q -- a number of times? 14 A Yeah. 15 Q In connection with which of your --- 16 A Well, in connection with ... 17 Q -- employments? 18 A ... respirators in part, and some other 19 projects that were not related to that. 20 Q Was this -- Was this while a Celanese --- 21 A They used me as a consultant ... 22 Q -- employee? 23 A ... or a source of information about a lot 24 of things. And the head of it - Harry Ettinger - he 25 was the one who edited the - John Pendergrass' i ] 321 1 attempt to bring the standards up to date with a new 2 version, and then it was knocked down at the very 3 end. But -- And there were others on that staff, 4 most of whom now are retired or dead. 5 Q Did you know Ed Hyatt outthere? 6 A Who? 7 Q Ed Hyatt. 8 A Yes. I did, yes. Not well, but I did 9 know him, yeah. 10 Q These --- 11 A I believethat's who it was, yeah. I'm 12 pretty sure that was him. 13 Q These LosAlamos visitsdidn't have 14 anything to do with your Celanese employment? 15. A Not as such.The AXHA board met out there 16 several times. Good, Lord, I can see the fellow's 17 name. They hosted our meetings a number of times so 18 that we could be out there and work with them on 19 some subjects. It was the national board -- 20 Q Uh-huh. 21 A -- of the AIHA. And that was in the 22 mid-'60's - mid to late '60's. 23 Q 24 A Did you find -Or early '70's, I guess. 25 Q Excuse me. Did you find that there was a 322 1 formal respirator program in - in place in the --.* vi 2 Celanese Corporation when you arrived in '65? 3 A When I arrived in '65, no, I don't believe J 4 there was, except insofar as safety might have had -J 5 one. They oversaw that in the early days. Later, j 6 of course, it became more under industrial hygiene SI 7 and medical because of testing and the medical A 8 provisions for approving respirator use, et cetera. 9 The standard of the AIHA is the respiratory 10 protection manual that we developed. j 11 THE WITNESS: Larry Birkner - do 12 you remember that name? 13 M R . HUTCHINS: (Nodding - 14 15 affirmatively) THE WITNESS: You know Larry. 16 A He was one of Chuck Laubly's assistants in 17 the later years. And he prepared a manual for ~ 18 Celanese Corporation and submitted it to AIHA for a 19 reference; and they adopted it as the AIHA manual, 20 recommending all the things appropriate for 21 respirator use at that time. I don't know if it's _ _ 22 still the -- It's probably been updated and whatnot 23 since. But I'm not quite sure where it stands today -- 24 because Larry changed jobs, and I haven't kept track 25 of it . I ! 323 1 Q I'm sorry. Say again his name. 2 A I said Larry changed jobs, and I haven't 3 kept track of just what happened with that 4 subsequently. 5 Q No. I missed his last name the -- 6 A Birkner - B-i-r -- B-i-r-k-n-e-r. It was 7 quite a nice piece of work. 8 Q And when approximately would this manual 9 have been put out? 10 A In the early -- Wait a minute. In the 11 mid-'70's, early to mid-'70's. Mid-'70's. 12 Q I take it then that the respirator 13 manufacturers had not come together individually or 14 collectively and - and provided such a recommended 15 program to industry by that time? 16 A Well, some did quite a lot like Mine 17 Safety Appliance Company and Willson and some of the 18 other people- They tried more often to tailor their 19 equipment to meet the needs than to recommend to 20 industry what they should do. I think that's a fair 21 statement. 22 Q Of course, the critical thing about the 23 respirator program is I guess recognizing that there 24 are a lot of individual variations in face shape and 25 size and -- 324 1 A That's why I said fit testing and so 2 forth. It's a very complex issue. That's why Los 3 Alamos was so involved because they had the ultimate 4 laboratory for working with all types of facial and 5 head sizes and all the rest of the variables that 6 were very significant in terms of fit testing 7 because they had to - the responsibility for 8 providing safe - working with everything from atomic 9 energy and radiation sources and bacterial and many 10 things in addition to industrial toxins. They were 11 the -- They were in the forefront of all the work 12 that was being done in research and that - that 13 whole subject. 14 Q I guess that's one facility where the 15 -hygienist really did have to aim at the complete 16 elimination of the exposures -- 17 A Well ... 18 Q -- to those materials? 19 A ... you never eliminate completely, but 20 cut it down to a very minimum possibility. If it's 21 in the -- If it exists, it's going to be there some; 22 but ... 23 Q Well, can you explain to the Jury simply 24 why .it's important to actually have a respirator 25 program for your employees as opposed to just 325 1 handing them a respirator off the shelf to go out 2 and use? 3 A Well, there are a very great number and 4 types of respirators. And one is appropriate for 5 each category of substances that - or substance that 6 might be - for which you are offering protection. 7 By in large respirators are not intended to be used 8 full time as a substitute for good engineering 9 practices that would control it without the use of 10 respirators. And the greatest extent of respirator 11 use - except under exceptional circumstances like 1 12 described in Los Alamos - would be for upset 13 conditions: Leaks, spills, or whenever there was an 14 excursion in the limit beyond that which was 15 allowable for a brief period to provide protection 16 or for getting - letting people get away from the 17 scene or whatnot. That's a quick and dirty ... 18 Q And then why is the fit testing critical? 19 A Because if there are any leaks based on 20 the fit - the mask not fitting tightly, completely - 21 and with all the different facial and head types and 22 variabilities, it's pretty hard to have a single 23 mask that can meet the requirements of all people. 24 And, of course, you have to make certain 25 provisions of the individual's usage, for example. 326 1 Beards, for example, by in large have to be excluded 2 from use in a good respiratory protection plan; 3 long hair, too much long hair and other - some other 4 things of that sort where they have to be very 5 carefully tailored. And then they have to be very 6 carefully checked. And there are techniques for 7 checking to see that there is no leakage. There are 8 odor tests; there are pressure tests, and there are 9 a variety of things that are used for being sure 10 that the fit testing is appropriate. 11 Q And then -- 12 A And then, of course, there are the medical 13 requirements to see that the person is fit to use a 14 respirator because some people find respirators 15 difficult. That's something that can be gotten 16 around with training and learning by in large. But 17 there are some medical conditions that - the extra 18 burden of respiratory protection because of 19 resistance and increased forces needed for breathing 20 to - like heart conditions or pulmonary conditions 21 that the individuals cannot successfully or safely 22 use respirators. 23 So, you test fit and fitness 24 appropriateness and the physical appropriateness of 25 the individual to use a mask - any respiratory 327 1 protection device, yeah. 2 Q And then there is a maintenance component 3 to the program? 4 A Oh, yeah, there are all kind of things 5 like that. Training is one of the most important 6 things. Second is providing the correct - the 7 correct -- The first thing is providing the 8 correct - I use the word mask as a general term - 9 generic - one that's appropriate for the particular 10 item that you want to exclude. If you are dealing 11 with a vapor, you don't want to use a dust mask. 12 There are some masks that combine certain features. 13 There are all types of variabilities, but you must 14 pick the right mask. 15 You must train the individual in how to 16 use it, how to maintain it, how to keep it clean, 17 how often to change elements of it such as the 18 cartridges on cartridge masks and then -- There are 19 many things of this sort. 20 And then there should be inspection by 21 somebody beyond the individual periodically to 22 assure that the conditions of the mask are 23 excellent; they haven't deteriorated or otherwise 24 mechanically failed to meet the needs of providing 25 the protection. I 328 1 Q So, a we11-conceived and properly 2 implemented respirator program ends up being a 3 fairly expensive -- 4 A Expensive, complex, difficult to 5 administer and it's a - it's a bitch. 6 Q Which would -- 7 A I mean it's a big, big issue. 8 Q Which brings us back I think to your 9 original point that respirators really rarely are 10 intended for full-time use, and cost is one of those 11 factors as well as the -- 12 A There are exceptionalcircumstances, of 13 course -- 14 Q Sure. 15 A --- but that's true. 16 Q Aggravation is -- 17 A And even then it's not full-time use day 18 in and day out but ... 19 Q I guess one exception to that would be, 20 for example, an air-supplied helmet for a 21 sandblaster. Now, that's - that's a case where you 22 absolutely have to have full-time use while you are 23 doing that work -- 24 A That is correct, yeah. For that period of 25 time, yeah. 330 1 point made a proposal to them on one of the 2 programs, and I can't recall which one it was. 3 That's when Hammond was medical director at that 4 point. 5 Q Did you mean to say Dr. Weaver? 6 A I meant Weaver, yeah. 7 Q You were thinking of James Hammond --- 8 A Jim Hammond. 9 Q -- the Exxon 10 A They were together downthere. 11 Q -- chief hygienist. 12 A We were -- I don't recall some of the 13 other things. We had a close -- He and I were very 14 good friends, too. And we used to meet periodically 15 and talk over things. 16 Q 17 A "He" meaning? Weaver. IB Q And you knew James Hammond as well I 19 gather? 20 A Oh, yes, very well. I knew Jim quite 21 well. 22 Q But did you know Dr. Weaver before he came 23 to - to the API as -- 24 A . Oh, yes. 25 Q -- as the medical director? 332 1 but I never had occasion to go to the -- There may 2 be one or two others even, but I - I don't recall. 3 q Did you find that the doctors and the 4 hygienists from Exxon - or Standard Oil as it was - 5 was called at one time - that these health 6 professionals from Exxon were open and inclined to 7 share health and safety information with people from 8 other companies? 9 A They certainly did. They certainly did 10 with me as far as I could tell, yeah. 11 Q Was that also common in the - in the 12 chemical industry in your experience? 13 A Pretty much, yes. There was no program 14 sharing, but it would be -- You utilized your 15 friends in other companies and whatnot as a resource 16 when you needed information, and they did the same 17 back. And then in some of the trade association 18 groups and the professional organizations even there 19 was a commonality or sharing things, sometimes 20 programs, but more often just informally between 21 individual participants - individual members I 22 should say. It was very good in the chemical 23 industrial I think by in large. 24 I never really -- I never had any 25 reservation about calling and saying, "Hey, how do 331 1 A We used to be tennis partners for years 2 and - and at some of the annual meetings and so 3 forth -- I knew him quite well. 4 Q And I take it you would have met Professor 5 Hammond during the - well, in Industrial Hygiene 6 Association activities? 7 A Yes, and - and others, too. Jim was - it 8 seemed like he was everywhere. 9 Q I'm sorry. He was what? 10 A I said Jim seemed to be everywhere. He 11 was one of those people that popped up all kinds of 12 places. 13 Q Do you recollect per chance the - the - 14 the Gulf Coast annual industrial hygiene symposia 15 that - that he organized for a number of years? 16 A I've heard of it. I've never attended it, 17 but ... 18 Q Okay. Just to jog your memory, I think 19 these typically occurred in Houston over a couple of 20 days. And he managed frequently to obtain national 21 caliber -- 22 A Yes. 23 Q -- speakers to come and -- 24 A California and the western states does a 25 similar thing, too, in the AIHA. I've gone to that, 334 1 other. 2 Q Let's speak briefly about the CMA again. 3 It's my understanding that at some point the CMA had 4 a medical committee of some sort and perhaps an 5 industrial hygiene committee, although -- 6 A Medical - medical committee. 7 Q Okay. 8 A I was chairman of it for several years. 9 Q Could you give me a time span we - we are 10 talking about here? 11 A Early '70's. 12 Q Was it -- 13 A Again, that's fraught with some 14 possibility of variation. I just don't recall 15 exactly at this moment. 16 Q So, you - you are saying you were chairman 17 of the medical committee -- 18 A Yes. 19 Q of the CMA ----- 20 A Yes. 21 Q -- sometime around the early '70's? 22 A For about twoyears as I recall. Two, 23 maybe three. 24 Q Had - had thiscommittee orsomething 2 5 equivalent to it existed for some decades at the 335 1 CMA? 2 A That's my recollection that it did. I 3 didn't know it until I -- My first exposure to it 4 really was when I joined Celanese Corporation. 5 Q What is your understanding of the function 6 and the - the activities of this medical committee? 7 A Well, it evolved during the time that I 8 was active in the CMA, and in addition longer than 9 the period that I was chairman. One of the big 10 functions of it was to review and write the medical 11 sections for the safety data sheets that were 12 industry standards for everything you needed to know 13 about a given chemical. Perhaps you have seen some 14 of those in years past. They were phased out in the 15 early to mid-'70's I guess - mid-'70's probably 16 because of the legal complexities that sharing 17 warning and other hazard information posed in 18 commerce. 19 It was a legal decision of the CMA to 20 abandon it even though it had been in existence for 21 many years and was the standard really for exposure 22 information, hazard information and all the 23 properties of the chemicals and things you needed to 24 know: Flammability, explosivity, what you could mix 25 with it, every kind of thing. It would be fairly 336 1 thick - 20- or 30-page bulletins. 2 And, so, that was a major responsibility 3 of the committee. And we reviewed them every - 4 well, periodically. I don't recall what the 5 frequency was. Probably every year or two to see if 6 there was -- Somebody reviewed them to make sure 7 they were update - they were updated - that they 8 were up to date. And if they weren't, they had to 9 be modified promptly. 10 We - we also dealt with common problems in 11 the chemical industry - medical problems. It was 12 strictly a physician group. Of course, it looked to 13 toxicological and industrial hygiene aspects as well 14 as clinical medical conditions. It was an 15 all-encompassing group who - of the CMA to which any 16 issue that had involvement with occupational health 17 would be brought, or the committee would bring their 18 awareness of a problem to the - the full body of the 19 CMA. 20 Q What was the - the name by which these 21 bulletins were commonly called in the -- 22 A Safety data sheets. And they were 23 numbered. There were probably -- As I recall there 24 were.about 60 of them. 25 Q And I take it these safety data sheets- 337 1 went back in time. They weren't just a creation of 2 the late '60's or the early '70's? 3 A No. Some of them had been existing for a 4 long time, and then others were added to it over 5 time. And occasionally one would get deleted. 6 Q Yes, sir. 7 A But I don't know when they started. It 8 was back some years, though, because I have seen 9 dates on some of them that preceded my time by quite 10 a period. But I don't remember what those dates 11 were. But it must have been in effect for ten or 12 more years. 13 Q I - I would presume that the creation and 14 modification of these safety data sheets would have 15 been a function of this medical committee at the CMA 16 in the prior decades? 17 A That was my understanding, too. 18 Q Okay. 19 A The medical part of it.They had other 20 components as I mentioned. 21 Q You might be interested or perhaps know 22 that the API had a series of "Toxicological Reviews" 23 as well. Had you come across those? 24 A I did. But I wasn't aware of them for a 25 long, long time. And I never did utilize them as a I ! 338 1 major source of things to the best of my 2 recollection. They were somewhat more specifically 3 tuned to the needs within the petroleum business 4 and - as I recall. And they were never - never 5 something that I got deeply familiar with or was 6 involved with or -- I don't even recall who prepared 7 them or the like. So ... 8 Q Well, actually Professor Drinker at 9 Harvard -- 10 A He started it? 11 Q -- was handling that project. And I 12 think it dates back to the late '40's and -- 13 A Late '40's then? 14 Q Yes, sir. 15 A Sure. 16 Q 17 A And on into '50, '51. Yeah. I believe I had heard that, too. 18 It - it sounds familiar. 19 Q Where do you think you - you first 20 encountered the "Toxicological Reviews" of the API? 21 A I - I don't recall. 22 Q Did you --- 23 A It was late, though, it seems to me. Even 24 though I knew - I knew the prior medical director 25 Harold Golz who had been my boss at Cyanamid, for 339 1 example. He went there after he retired as medical 2 director of the API. But I never had any dealings 3 with him about API stuff during the time that he was 4 medical director that I recall. We were very good 5 friends, and I would see him at meetings and 6 whatnot; but not -- I never had any work involvement 7 with him that I can remember. 8 Q Did you --- 9 A I just don't know. It seems like it must 10 have been way into the '70's somewhere. And I might 11 have known about them but didn't pay much attention 12 or thought they were addressed too specifically to 13 the petroleum industry. But my memory of that is 14 rather fuzzy. 15 Q Did you ever meet a Dr. Marshall Clinton? 16 A Who? 17 Q Marshall Clinton. He was with Mobil after 18 going through the Harvard Public Health School. 19 A I don't recall that name. 20 Q Okay. I think he ended up almost his 21 entire career practicing up in Albany. 22 A Where? 23 Q Albany. 24 A . New York? 25 Q Yes, sir. 340 1 A 2 Q Where? Mobil? Mobil had a refinery up there. 3 A Oh, they had a refinery. I don't recall 4 the name. I might have met him, but I don't recall 5 it. 6 Q Was there some industrial hygiene-related 7 committee at the CMA? 8 A Well, we had twohealth-related 9 committees. And I don't recall one that was AIHA - 10 I mean industrial hygiene per se. One was a medical 11 committee, and the other was a labeling and 12 precautionary informations committee of which I was 13 also a member and chairman for maybe one year. I 14 believe 1 was chairman of it for a year prior to my 15 being chairman of the medical committee. That may 16 not be correct, but it's close in that period. I 17 don't know if that answered your question or not. 18 I don't remember an industrial hygiene committee as 19 such. 20 Q And you - you did 21 A I can't say there wasn't, but I just don't 22 recall it. 23 Q Industrial hygienists were not members of 24 the medical committee, were they? 25 A Not to my recollection. We certainly 341 1 homed on them where we needed the help in a medical 2 standard or the like. They were members of the 3 "LAPI - the labeling and precautionary committee 4 meetings. We always called them "LAPI." In fact, 5 there were as many industrial hygiene and 6 toxicological people as there were medical on 7 t h a t -- 8 Q I would think ... 9 A -- maybe more, yeah. 10 Q At the API the hygienists were sort of 11 second-class citizens of the Medical Advisory 12 Committee. They -- 13 A Is that right? 14 Q -- were associate members and couldn't 15 vote. Only the doctors could vote. 15 A Yeah. We certainly had access to them as 17 w e -- 18 Q Sure. 19 A -- might need them. But the committee 20 membership was made up entirely of -- The medical 21 committee was made up entirely of physicians. But 22 the "LAPI" committee had a mixed - a mixed bag: 23 toxicologists, physicians, maybe some other - 24 industrial hygienists and perhaps some others. 25 Q Yeah, that would seem appropriate. 342 1 A 2 Q Huh? That would seem appropriate. 3 A Yeah, I think it was. 4 Q How far back does your contact with the 5 labeling and precautionary information committee go? 6 A Right after I joined Celanese in '65. At 7 that time Boyd Shaffer was the chairman. And he was 8 my former boss in toxicology at the Stamford 9 research laboratory of American Cyanamid. He was 10 the corporate director of toxicology, and he invited 11 me to join. As a matter of fact, Glenn Fleming was 12 really very much responsible for me joining both of 13 those. He said, "Get your butt down there and 14 join." So ... 15 Q Dr. Boyd had - was with Cyanamid? IS A Boyd Shaffer. 17 Q I'm sorry. 18 A Yeah. Yeah. He was adirector -- He's on 19 your list of people -- 20 Q Yes, sir. 21 A -- in the New York office. 22 Q And the name ofthecommitteeis pretty 23 self-explanatory, but I - I take it the purpose or 24 the goal of that committee was to develop clear and 25 complete warnings and labels to go on chemical i 34: n -j 1 products that would end up out in the marketplace? 2 A That is right. The principal function was 3 actually to develop language for use with the 4 varying types of requirements for labeling - safe 5 labeling; and then there were illustrative 6 examples -- They had a manual called the "LAPI" 7 manual - it became an industry standard pretty 8 much - that had all the language - it was 100 or 200 9 different statements of the kind of provisions for 10 this and that type of problem. It was trying to 11 make it standardized pretty much so that if you read 12 it on one label and read it on another, they would 13 say the same thing and people would get to know what 14 they meant because you know how wordings can -- Each 15 person has his own way of wording things, and they 16 might not meanthe same topeople. 17 Q Well -- 18 A And then they had illustrative examples of 19 a number of labels. It was a lesser number of 20 those. They were usually large volume 21 commodity-type chemicals and so forth - industrial 22 chemicals, yeah. 23 Q A n d --- 24 A And it wasstrictly for industrial 25 chemicals, too. It was not for consumer use. 344 1 Q 2 A That is -Do you remember we discussed that 3 yesterday? 4 Q - the latter? 5 A Huh? 6 Q The latter topic. I mean the "LAPI" 7 manual dealt with -- 8 A The chemical - industry use, not consumer 9 use. In other words, not for the householder. It 10 was for the chemical industry. We didn't label 11 chemicals for use in industry saying, "Do not 12 swallow" or "Do not take by mouth"; that was 13 implicit as part of an understanding of chemical 14 industry practices. And it didn't tell a lot of 15 things that a householder would need because these 16 were large volume chemicals and supplied from one 17 company to another and for use in making other 18 products by in large. And it was the intent of that 19 to cover just the industrial use hazards. 20 Q The intent of the labeling and the 21 precautionary information committee was just to 22 write labels and precautions for industrial use? 23 A Yes. 24 Q Was there a - a similar effort to deal 25 with the products that actually ended up in the 345 1 hands of - of end users? 2 A Well, I wasn't involved in that by in 3 large. And most people in the industry were not. 4 Now, if they had a consumer division, you know, they 5 might. But Proctor & Gamble did, for example, 6 because they marketed it directly to the 7 householders and so forth. But most of the chemical 8 companies did very little of that.- And if they had 9 a product -- Well, 1 think Carbide had one of the 10 big antifreezes, for example. 11 Q Prestone. 12 A And that would behandled by something 13 other than by the "LAPI" practices. 14 Q I see. Well, are you thinking that was, 15 in fact, a CMA committee that - that focused on 16 labeling for consumer products? 17 A No, I don'tbelieve there was because 18 that was not our thrust. The thrust was with 19 industrial chemicals -- 20 Q I see. 21 A -- period. Not - not consumer products. 22 Q Well, I'm glad you cleared that up. 23 A The companies that had consumer products 24 had to take that up some other way, and I don't 25 remember what was out there at that point. 346 1 Q Okay. So, if Celanese had some consumer 2 products that required warnings and precautionary 3 labeling, Celanese wrote those warnings -- 4 A I did. 5 Q -- themselves? 6 A Yeah. As a matter offact ---- 7 Q Sir? 8 A I did because I had responsibility for all 9 product safety. I had to approve every new product, 10 every new label, everything for the whole 11 corporation. It was a hell of a job. 12 Q That - that sounds very interesting and 13 very -- 14 A But there weren't that many products. It 15 still was a hell of a job. And we didn't have very 16 many products that had any toxicity that were - or 17 we had concern about because a lot of it -- Over 50 18 percent of the business was fibers - 60 percent 19 probably. We did have problems with some plastic 20 materials and some paints and coatings. On plastics 21 Charlie Hine and I ended up writing for the society 22 of the plastics industry a similar thing to the 23 "LAPI" manual. I don't know if that still exists 24 now or not. 25 Q I would like to amplify that point you I ! 347 1 made, though, about your responsibilities for 2 reviewing products and labels before Celanese put 3 something out in the market. Was this -- Well, one, 4 why - why was this thought to be necessary? 5 A Well, it was health and toxicology - 6 health and toxicologically related primarily. Those 7 were the issues. And who but me was the one in the 8 company that had that knowledge and capability. 9 Q I guess I was going to the broader 10 question: Why did Celanese bother to worry about 11 the labeling and the instructions on the packages 12 dealing with health and toxicology issues? 13 A Well, we didn't, of course, on industrial 14 chemicals, except insofar as there was labeling of 15 major shipment loads and so forth - the ICC rules 16 and things of that sort. But if we had commodity 17 chemicals and they were infrequent - a few in number 18 I should say - we would have to look at it from a 19 different perspective, of course. The homeowner's 20 use of a product is totally different than the use 21 in a factory of bulk chemicals. 22 Q Okay. In the factory you have a routine 23 process and procedure? 24 A Yes. Yes. 25 Q You have employees that are trained for 348 1 handling -- 2 A Exactly. 3 Q -- that material? You have equipment to 4 safely handle the material? 5 A And the knowledge and so forth. 6 Q Engineering controls to prevent 7 exposures -- 8 A That is right. 9 Q -- and such? 10 A By in large, yeah. 11 Q And I guess it's like we were saying 12 yesterday with the pesticide issue, the - the more 13 difficult control and training in - and the safety 14 problem comes in field use by - or in the home use 15 by the ultimate consumer -- 16 A (Nodding affirmatively) 17 Q -- correct? 18 A Well, for those chemicals that were sold 19 for home use and so forth, yes. 20 Q But I guess the point I was trying to get 21 you to make and which you didn't and may not yet 22 make but - was - was Celanese concerned about the - 23 relaying health and toxicology information to the 24 consumers of its - of its products, not the 25 industrial purchasers, but -- II . n? -4 349 \ - 1 J-l 1 A Well, we even did that, too. Yes, it * " 2 would be. I can't recall right off the top of my 3 head what products were that way. For example, more $ 4 than 50 percent of the company's business was in 5 fibers. I will never forget the time the Kentucky `-IJ **> 6 State Health Department got ahold of me to see what 7 was the hazard of polyester fiberfill, which was 8 pillow stuffing. I told them there was no hazard to f | 9 pillow stuffing. 10 Q Well, was it the policy at Celanese when ] Ml 11 you arrived to inform customers of the - the 12 perceived and suspected health hazards that went 13 with the Celanese chemicals and products? . .1 14 A Yes. I - I took a little license and \ 15 skipped over one element. We had what was called a 16 commercial hazards committee. There was a corporate .* 17 committee, and each of the operating committees -- / 18 Each of the operating companies had its - it's own 19 commercial hazards committee. And these were by *- 20 edict and with policies spelled out completely for 21 what the responsibilities were. . . 22 Every new product had to be submitted N 23 through the operating company's commercial hazards 24 committee to the corporate committee with all of the 25 data necessary to help support what was being 350 1 proposed. And I signed off on the health elements 2 of it. And then the whole committee had to sign off 3 on the acceptability of it for meeting other and all 4 labeling requirements. 5 We had lawyers, members of the - 6 executives of the units, toxicologists when we had 7 our own toxicology department finally, medical 8 information specialists, hazard information 9 specialists and so forth. So, it was intended to be 10 as complete a review as you could make to provide 11 that we met the requirements and responsibilities 12 legally to adequately warn where it was necessary - 13 necessary. 14 Q Now, this committee didn't just focus IS on - or didn't get involved after the product was in 16 production, did it? I mean this was a -- 17 A Well, it was done before it actually hit 18 the market by in large; but sometimes the variance - 19 the variance of a product, if it were minor, 20 wouldn't be taken up until after the fact if it was 21 thought that it wouldn't be materially different. 22 But by in large it was - it was something done prior 23 to its being put into the marketplace. And that 24 included industrial chemicals as well as - and it 25 was commercial I mean consumer products. 351 1 Q Was there a counterpart to this kind 2 o f -- 3 A Safety, too, I'm sorry. 4 Q 5 A Who was on I'm sorry. Safety was another - bee 6 there would be things like flammability, 7 explosivity, other hazards that might have a safety 8 perspective. So ... 9 Q Did American Cyanamid have a similar 10 procedure? 11 A They did. I wasn't directly involved with 12 it, but Boyd Shaffer by in large headed that up. 13 Maybe Dr. Hamlin had the overall sign-off, but -- 14 And I don't remember because I was not on corporate 15 staff. Don't forget that most of the time I was a 16 plant physician for the better part of the time - 17 plant or division. 18 Q Well ... 19 A We participated somewhat at times, but we 20 didn't have the responsibility or the administration 21 of it. 22 Q Dr. Dixon, when Celanese was considering 23 either using a new raw material or even considering 24 whether to make a new chemical product, did - was 25 there a similar review of the health and safety 352 1 aspects before deciding to produce it? 2 A Supposedly, yeah. And that had been going 3 on I might add for years before I got to the 4 company. Sometimes something would slip through, 5 but by in large it was prescribed to pretty fully. 6 Q And I suppose that inquiry - the 7 preproduction inquiry would - would be concerned not 8 only about the health hazards that the end product 9 might pose to customers but was also concerned about 10 the potential hazards to Celanese employees who 11 might be having to make the material? 12 A Well, thatinformation would be handled 13 separately. The one for the product would be 14 through commercial hazards; the other one would be 15 through the medical/industrial hygiene line 16 organization for use in the protection of employees. 17 That would be totally separate. 18 Q But both -- 19 A It would be the sameinformation 20 perhaps -- 21 Q Okay. 22 A -- but it would be handled - or similar 23 information, but it would be handled with respect to 24 its end objective, which in the one case was 25 employee protection and the other - our employee l 353 1 protection; and the other was consumer, industrial 2 or household or whatever. 3 Q But in - in either event your input would 4 have been critical to the - to that review? 5 A It was one part of it, yes. And it was 6 critical I guess. 7 Q When did you get a toxicology department 8 or a toxicologist I guess at Celanese? 9 A In the early '70's - mid - I guess early 10 to mid-'70's, the first one. We had had all of our 11 toxicity work farmed out to consulting groups at 12 established laboratories by in large prior to that 13 time. They worked at our pleasure, or unless we 14 oversaw what they did; but they did it, and they 15 advised us and whatnot. I mentioned one of them was 16 Hazleton right -- 17 Q Yes, sir. 18 A -- out here, for example. There were 19 many others. 20 Q And do you recall who your early 21 toxicologists were at Celanese? 22 A The first one was John Clary. We 23 employed John from the Haskell laboratory of 24 du Pont. And then he employed at least two 25 additional toxicologists before I left. And we went 354 1 through a repeat deliberation as we had gone through 2 two or three times earlier about whether we should 3 have our own toxicology laboratory or continue to 4 use outside consultants. And a decision was made 5 perhaps wisely to continue farming it out. 6 Q But did Celanese continue to have a 7 toxicologist on staff after -- 8 A Oh, yes, and they still do. I've had 9 acquaintance with some of them recently. 10 Q I mean after the decision was made to 11 continue farming out the laboratory work, you still 12 had a toxicologist on the -- 13 A Oh, yes. Yes. 14 Q -- on the payroll? And I suppose 15 Mr. Clary or Dr. Clary -- 16 A Doctor, yeah. 17 Q --- was working out of the central 18 research facility? 19 A No. He worked out of the corporate 20 headquarters. He worked in the medical department 21 in New York. 22 Q Do you --- 23 A That was a medical health function, not a 24 research function in that sense, yeah. 25 Q Is Dr. Clary still living? 355 1 A 2 Q Yes. Is heyounger than you do you think? 3 A Yes. 4 Q I was just curious about how long -- 5 A Anybody is younger than me, but go ahead. 6 Q Not really. Chuck Laubly is not. Do you 7 know approximately how long Dr. Clary had been at 8 Haskell laboratories at du Pont before joining 9 Celanese? 10 A Somewherebetween five and ten years. 11 Probably nearer five. I'm hazarding a guess. He 12 had been at one of the governmental agencies prior 13 to that, and I can't recall. I knew him before he 14 went to Haskell, but I can't remember where he was. 15 Q Okay. Well, that's another thing I can 16 check off. 17 A Haskell is thecorporatetoxicology 18 laboratory of du Pont. 19 Q Yes, sir. 20 A Yeah. 21 Q Down in Wilmington,Delaware, area I 22 think? 23 A Newark, yeah. 24 Q Okay. 25 A Newark, Delaware. It's not Newark, 356 1 "New'ark." 2 Q "New'ark." Actually we got to visit their 3 library once upon a time. 4 A Huh? 5 Q Herschel and I got to visit their library 6 once upon a time -- 7 A Yeah. 8 Q -- some years ago. It's a pretty good 9 size library. I wanted to finish dealing with these 10 organizations, and I'm fearful that you have already 11 told me about one other. The Industrial Hygiene 12 Foundation we talked about a little bit yesterday. 13 A Yeah. We talked about that pretty well. 14 Q We did. And I don't remember if you told 15 me that Celanese was a member of that organization. 16 A Yes, and I was on the board and all that. 17 Q Okay. 18 A And de Treville -- 19 Q Yes, sir, I remember that part. And do 20 you recollect that Cyanamid - American Cyanamid had 21 also been a member? 22 A I presume so.I don't recall who the 23 specific members were. It was pretty widely 24 subscribed to. But I didn't have a corporate 25 stature in the days in Cyanamid - in Cyanamid. i 357 1 Q Right. 2 A So, I didn't represent the company at any 3 of those functions. 4 Q You wouldn't have been --- 5 A Except on a rare circumstance. 6 Q -- back in those earlier years? 7 A Yeah. 8 Q Okay. And then the National Safety 9 Council we - we know was an important safety and 10 health information source in the decades gone by. 11 A Yes. 12 Q Would your job have you attending meetings 13 of the National Safety Council? 14 A Glenn Fleming wouldn't let me not go to 15 one of their meetings. 16 Q Okay. 17 A I don't recall anyspecific roles that I 18 had with them as such, like a committee or whatnot; 19 but I was involved with them, but ... 20 Q The -- I suppose there were local meetings 21 of the NSC sections or divisions? 22 A 1 don't know. 23 Q You would have attended the annual 24 National -- 25 A The ones in Chicago, the big meetings. 358 1 Q -- the Safety Congress? 2 A I might have attended some meeting when 3 they - if they had a special topic or something but 4 not otherwise. 5 Q You mean you wouldn't have attended a 6 local -- 7 A Local, yeah. a Q -- type meeting? 9 A In fact, I don't even recall whether there 10 was a local or not n Q 12 A Well, I --There may have been. 13 Q -- I'm not sure. 14 A Yeah. I'm not either. 15 Q So, you and Glenn Fleming would then go IS annually to the annual or National Safety Congress 17 they called it? 18 A And hef of course, went to much more than 19 I would. Sometimes he would accompany me to some of 20 the health and industrial hygiene meetings, too. 21 There was a very close -- Because he was very active 22 in it, and his organization had a very responsible 23 role as we talked about yesterday and - prior to our 24 developing our own program. 25 Q Well, this cross-pollination, so to speak, 359 1 between the - with the doctor and the safety man and 2 the hygienist are again a very important part of a 3 good program, aren't they? 4 A Yes, they were, extremely. 5 Q I mean you are kind of depending on those 6 other professionals to be your eyes and ears out in 7 the plants? 8 A It was very symbiotic, very important and 9 necessary that it be close. 10 Q And I suppose likewise the hygienist or 11 the safety man would be -- 12 A The same thing. 13 Q -- depending on you for 14 A And many of the ... 15 Q -- information. 16 A ... gentlemen were Certified Safety 17 Professionals so that they had dual interests. 18 Chuck was a CSP, for example. 19 Q Okay. 20 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Joe, can we 21 go off the record to change the tape? 22 MR. BLANKS: Well, please do. 23 THE VIDEOGRAPHER; Off the 24 record at 11:48. 25 I ! 360 1 (AT 11:4.8 A.M. THE DEPOSITION 2 WAS RECESSED FOR LUNCH. AT 1:02 P.M. 3 THE PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:} 4 5 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back 6 on the record at 1:02. 7 8 (By Mr. Blanks) 9 Q Doctor, did your - during your 10 professional career did you ever have any contact 11 with the Saranac Lake laboratories and the Trudeau 12 Institute? 13 A Not directly, no. 14 Q Were you aware of -- 15 A I was aware of it, but -- Yes, I was aware 16 of it. 17 Q And aware that even back into the '30's 18 and '40's that it had done a good bit of research in 19 the silicosis area? 20 A I was aware of that, yes. 21 Q And, of course,there was a tuberculosis 22 sanatorium there -- 23 A Yes. 24 Q -- as well. But you never attended any 25 symposia there? 361 1 A No. I grew up many years in Albany, and 2 we visited Saranac Lake; and I had seen the facility 3 in earlier years. But I never did have any 4 professional visits there. I was aware of some of 5 the people and things like that later. 6 Q Anybody from up there that you recall 7 knowing? S A Well, Art Vorwald for one. Prank Princi 9 was another. And, of course, we all know about 10 Schepers. 11 Q Yes, sir. I think he was the last 12 director of the laboratories. 13 A I presume that's correct. 14 Q He followed Dr.Vorwald? 15 A Yes. 16 Q Do you know where Dr. Vorwald went after 17 he retired -- 18 A Yes. 19 Q -- from Saranac? 20 A He -- Well, I don't know whether he 21 retired, but he left there and went to Wayne State 22 University as a professor of preventive and 23 occupational medicine. I don't -- I'm sure he's 24 retired. He may not be alive even now. 25 Q I think he 's been deceased for a number of i 362 1 years now 2 A Yeah, I think so, too; but I just can't 3 recall. 4 Q And what was Frank Princi? 5 A Huh? 6 Q What was Frank Princi? 7 A Well, Frank Princi was the No. 2 man at 8 the Kettering laboratory. And he had spent,a st.int 9 up there at some point prior to joining the 10 Kettering faculty as I recall. I don't think I'm in 11 error about that. He knew the people up there. He 12 knew - - H e had known Gardner, and he had known, of 13 course, Art Vorwald. I met Vorvald like I met so 14 many of the early leaders at Kettering when they 15 would come down and give seminars and so forth. You 16 know, there probably were a few other people; but I 17 can't - I can't think of their names at the moment. 18 Q Okay. Had you ever met Dr. Schepers 19 anywhere along the way? 20 A I think I met him one time back in the 21 early '70's. I have a recollection that I did, but 22 I wouldn't know him if I saw him. He lives just a 23 few blocks from where I am as a matter of fact. I 24 know.where his house is in Langley. He lives around 25 the corner. i i 363 1 Q Actually he had come over and worked a bit 2 with Dr. Lanza when - when Schepers - Dr. Schepers 3 was finishing his - I guess a dissertation as part 4 of his graduate studies. 5 A Schepers did? 6 Q Yes, sir. 7 A I guess I wasn't aware of that, yeah. 8 Q And I want to tell you that --- 9 A And he went to du Pont at some point. I 10 don't know whether it was before or after. 11 Q It was after. I think he -- If I remember 12 correctly he was a student of Dr. Lanza maybe in the 13 early postwar years - late '40's maybe and -- 14 A A student? 15 Q Sir? 16 A A student of Lanza? 17 q Well ... 18 A Because Lanza was in the Public Health 19 Service and then he went to Metropolitan and then he 20 got into academics after he retired from 21 Metropolitan as I recall. 22 Q Let me -- Then let me take that back. I 23 know that he conferred with Dr. Lanza and had some 24 guidance on his dissertation and that project. 25 A Oh. 364 1 Q And I think if I remember 2 A Yeah. I don't know where he - what 3 training he had. I guess he's a Ph.D. 4 Q He's an M.D. and I think a DSC like 5 yourself. 6 A Yeah. Okay. 7 Q I believe. Lanza had sent him around to 8 various industries to -- 9 A Yeah. 10 Q -- learn about the programs here,- 11 j u s t -- 12 A Something like we did here. 13 Q Uh-huh. 14 A Well, was that in the period after Lanza 15 left Metropolitan? 16 Q You know, I confess; I am not clear in my 17 mind when Dr. Lanza left Metropolitan. 18 A I had trouble thinking about that the 19 other day. You know, I mentioned something about 20 that earlier. And I was trying to reconstruct 21 something in my mind. And I think that he left 22 Metropolitan in '49 or '50 - '49 or '50. It was 23 right along in that period, and then he established 24 the New York University program in industrial 25 medicine and so forth because I applied there. 365 1 Q 2 A Okay. Yeah. In '53 getting ready for the '54 3 entry 4 Q That sounds right -- 5 A Okay. 6 Q -- to me, too. In the '50's it was the 7 case. wasn't it, that doctors and hygienists at the 8 NYU school were available as consultants for hire to 9 industry; or were you aware of that? 10 A I presume some of them were, yeah. Most 11 of the schools did that, yeah. 12 Q And I think the - Kettering we 13 discussed -- 14 A Yes. 15 Q -- did consulting work for industry? 16 A Yes. 17 Q And at somepoint the Saranac Lake 18 laboratories also provided these kind of services; 19 correct? 20 A I - I -- That's my understanding, yes. 21 And I don't know how they were sponsored or 22 whatever, but I know they did -- Industry was 23 involved some with their work, so - probably 24 supporting it and so forth. 25 Q And Ibelieve the IndustrialHygiene 366 1 Foundation also provided such consulting services 2 for a fee. 3 A At varying times. Not all periods, but at 4 varying times. 5 Q And I guess the point of that was that 6 even for companies smaller than a Celanese or a 7 Cyanamid or a du Pont, there were at least 8 professionals available with training like you had 9 and like Chuck Laubly had -- 10 A Yeah. 11 q -- to - for consultation to deal -- 12 A Although ... 13 Q --- with problems? 14 A ... the field wasn't developed with the 15 numbers of people, and it wasn't a widely known 16 thing to the degree that it became later; but still 17 I think it did exist. Well, I know it existed, yes. 18 Q You mentioned this morning before we began 19 that you found the old copy of Industrial Dust -- 20 A Yes. 21 Q -- that you have in your library. 22 A Yes. 23 Q Drinker - The Drinker and Hatch book. 24 A Drinker and Hatch book written in '36. 25 Q Was A I opened the thing up and the first thing I saw was a bookplate - A. G. Cranch. His daughter gave me his books when he died. So ... Q Would that text have - or reference book still have been in use when you went through medical school and -- A Medical school? Q Yes, sir. A Well, I wasn't aware of it. q How about when youwere studying at Kettering, when you -- A I wasn't aware of it I don't think at that time. As a matter of fact, when I opened it and looked at it just briefly in the middle of the night when I was wandering around because I couldn't sleep, I was astounded at finding the Cranch bookplate. And in the back was some little publication - it didn't relate to things we are concerned with here - but dated 1920. And it was an order sheet for something - a bulletin of some sort. And I don't think I had ever opened that book. Q Okay. A Because it was old by the time I got it. I got it in '65 or '66. Yeah, in the - in the - a month or two after I joined Celanese; right after 368 1 Dr. Cranch died. 2 Q It would be true, though, wouldn't it, 3 that dust was recognized as a hazard in industry in 4 the - at least a decade before you went to medical 5 school? . 6 A Wait a minute. Say it all over again. 7 I'm sorry. 8 Q I said it would be true, wouldn't it, that 9 dust was recognized as a potential health hazard in 10 industry even before you went to medical school? 11 A Before I went to med school? 12 Q Oh, yes. As evidenced by this 1936 book. 13 A There were some duststhat were. 14 Q Yes, sir. 15 A Many dusts that aren't,yeah. 16 Q Okay. 17 A I mean dust categorically wasn't 18 necessarily considered significantly harmful, except 19 as a nuisance. But there were specific dusts that 20 were pathognomonic of various -- 21 Q They were what? 22 A Pathognomonic. 23 Q Okay. 24 A . In other words, that means they are able 25 to produce abnormal results and so forth. 369 1 Q And among those obviously were the silica 2 dusts - free silica dusts? 3 A Yes, that was one of the chief ones. 4 Q And asbestos as well was recognized as a 5 dust hazard even in -- 6 A When? 7 Q Well, certainly in the - in the 1930's 8 again as reflected in the publication of that era. 9 A By people who were involved in that area 10 of concern. I don't think generally this was 11 understood. I don't think physicians generally knew 12 it. Even the whole time I was at Kettering we 13 referred to it primarily as a nuisance dust/ that if 14 it were - otherwise if exposure is higher than what 15 were encountered in this country - were encountered, 16 it might produce what was then being called 17 asbestosis. But we didn't expect to see it and in 18 large measure did not in those days. 19 Q I suppose the best indicator of what was - 20 was knowable to doctors and industrial hygienists in 21 those years before you began your studies would be 22 the publications in the field, the literature - the 23 medical literature and the industrial hygiene and 24 toxicology literature in -- 25 A In what period? 370 1 Q Well, in - certainly in the decade before 2 you started your medical school studies. 3 A What? I'm having a little troublewith 4 the question. 5 Q Okay. 6 A I'm sorry. I got that part of it, but 7 then I lost the front part. 8 Q Let's start over. 9 A My fault. 10 Q Looking back to these years before you 11 went to medical school, one way of seeing what - 12 what the concerns and the information was for 13 doctors and hygienists and toxicologists would be 14 the published medical literature of whatever era you 15 are looking at; correct? 16 A You mean would that be the source of 17 information about it? 18 Q Yes, sir. 19 A Well, I presume so. There wasn'tmuch, of 20 course. I glanced in the Drinker/Hatch book last 21 night just to see what - if it covered asbestosis; 22 and it did in a few little sentences here and 23 there. And it did allude to the fact that there 24 could be asbestos, but - asbestosis, but that it 25 wasn't seen really much in this country. And - but 371 1 it gave a pretty short description. And it didn't 2 relate to any other problem than the possibility of i 3 asbestosis. 4 Q Okay. And 5 A That was in '36. 6 Q Okay. And by then Dr. Lanza and others 7 had done at least -- 8 A Excuse me. I was -- Let me add one other 9 thing. I should say that even through the whole 10 period that I was at Kettering through 1957 - and I 11 have gone back and - earlier, not in connection with 12 this case - but verified by talking to some of my 13 classmates and others who were there at that time 14 that asbestos was essentially not mentioned. The 15 big concern was silicosis and silicotuberculosis and 16 some other types of problems that were very much 17 around. And coal dust was the big issue that we 18 were concerned with at that point during the 19 mid-'50's. And that was a - quite a -- It was a 20 very - kind of a quagmire getting through all of 21 that. And asbestos just never emerged as something 22 we even talked about. I don't ever recall it being 23 mentioned there as something specific; so - through 24 '57. 25 Q Mentioned where, sir? 372 1 A Huh? 2 Q You said you didn't recall it being 3 mentioned there. And I was wandering where you -- 4 A At Kettering. I'm talking about -- The 5 whole thing I was talking about was Kettering, yeah, 6 while I was there in the training program. I'm 7 sorry. I'm having a little trouble pulling that 8 together. 9 Q Okay. And I guess a lot of the focus at 10 Kettering would necessarily have been on new 11 materials and chemicals that had come out of the - 12 the wartime industry and the - the decade and -- 13 A Well, from a research standpoint. 14 Q Yes, sir. 15 A But from a teaching standpoint we had to 16 go through all of the traditional things that were 17 known to exist pretty much, but the research program 18 would have been more related to new or on things 19 where we needed further information. 20 Q Okay. When you arrived at the Celanese 21 headquarters to take up your new job there in 22 association with Dr. A. G. Cranch in 1965, what did 23 you find by way of a library or a reference 24 collection that - for the medical department - 25 medical director? 373 1 A It was a fairly good library. We had -- 2 We had subscriptions to all the major regular 3 publications in the field of occupational health, 4 general medicine; a fair representation of 5 textbooks. As I said, Dr. Cranch had his own 6 library there - not all of it, but it was there. 7 And Dr. Osterritter had some additional stuff. But 8 it was reasonably adequate. 9 Q And I would assume Dr. Cranch's books 10 dealt largely with occupational medicine topics? 11 A All the books of his to my recollection 12 were occupationally oriented. 13 Q And didn't he have a toxicology background 14 as well? 15 A Yes, from Carbide as you recall. And he 16 had been one of the authors in the Patty textbook, 17 as had Dr. Hamlin at Cyanamid. 18 Q And as youmentioned, Dr.Cranch's 19 widow -- 20 A His daughter, yeah. 21 Q I'm sorry. --- hisdaughter basically 22 bequeathed -- 23 A Yes. 24 Q -- these books to you when he passed 25 away? I ! 374 1 A Or I guess maybe when he was sick or at 2 some point. I was away. He got sick, and in four 3 days he was dead. And I never saw him after he 4 became ill. So ... 5 Q 6 A Well, that's a pity. Yeah. 7 Q 8 A Dr. Cranch was an M .D .? Oh, yes. Yes. He was a medical director 9 for Carbide. 10 Q Formally the medical director at Union 11 Carbide -- 12 A Yes. 13 Q -- before he became or immediately before 14 he became the consulting medical director for 15 Celanese Corporation? 16 A That's correct. 17 Q We - you mentioned medical journals or - 18 excuse me - you mentioned journals that you received 19 at Celanese and which you found in the library 20 there - the medical library. 21 A Yes. 22 Q These would have included such journals as 23 the Journal of the American Medical Association? 24 A . Yes. Although -- Well, go ahead. Yes. 25 Q Would Lancet have been among those I I 375 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 . 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 journals? A I don't believe so. At some point at a later time I did get Lancet at varying times, but not even on a regular basis later. Q Okay. So, that's not -- A We could have access to it at one of the med schools if something appeared in it that was meritorious. Q How would you learn of articles appearing in publications that you didn't subscribe to? A Well, there was a service in the New York area. 1 first encountered it when I was at Stamford research headquarters of American Cyanamid company in which index pages of journals were photocopied and circulated to subscribers to - in this service. And I got quite a compendium of those. They were inexpensive, and you could look through them very quickly to see if there was anything that you wanted to look through. I don't recall the -- I'm sure Lancet was one of them in that listing. Q B u t --- A That was British. Q Yes, sir. A But not too many foreign ones. I think most of them were domestic. 378 1 there a predecessor medical director to the - to 2 your predecessor at Celanese - Dr. Osterritter? 3 A Well, Dr. Cranch -- 4 Q 5 A Okay. -- had filled that role. Prior to that 6 time we had the one consulting dermatologist 7 involved who recommended we have that. Otherwise, 8 all medical services were contracted as needed from 9 physicians in the vicinities of locations of the 10 company. 11 Q Okay. And among the - the occupational 12 health publications that came to either you or to 13 Cyanamid would have been the -- 14 A Wait a minute. To who? 15 Q To either you or to -- 16 A Celanese? 17 Q -- Celanese. Excuse m e . 18 A Yes, sir. 19 Q Among the publicationseitheryou received 20 or Celanese received we would find the Industrial 21 Hygiene Quarterly from the -- 22 A Yes. 23 Q -- AIHA? 24 A . And its successors or whatever. 25 Q And the - the periodicals from the 377 1 tax your mind to figure out - figure out what the 2 hell the subject is. 3 Q How far back approximately did the - this 4 collection of medical journals and hygiene journals 5 go at Celanese when you -- 6 A How far back? 7 Q e A -- got there? Yes, sir. I don't recall I don't recall. 9 Q I mean did it look like several years' 10 worth or just -- 11 A I don't even know. I didn't - didn't 12 utilize that at all because I had my own collection 13 as part of my membership to the Society of 14 Toxicology, AXHA, Industrial Medical Association and 15 others. They came to my home, and I read them at 16 home by in large. 17 Q So, you h a d -- 18 A So, we had most of them in the library. I 19 could run in there and get them if I needed to. 20 Q Okay. 21 A In fact, we terminated some of those 22 subscriptions before too long, and I just brought my 23 in and let them be kept there instead of piling up 24 at home. 25 Q Perhaps you told me yesterday, but was- I 378 1 there a predecessor medical director to the - to 2 your predecessor at Celanese - Dr. Osterritter? 3 A Well, Dr. Cranch --- 4 Q Okay. 5 A -- had filled that role. Prior to that 6 time we had the one consulting dermatologist 7 involved who recommended we have that. Otherwise, 8 all medical services were contracted as needed from 9 physicians in the vicinities of locations of the 10 company. 11 Q Okay. And among the - the occupational 12 health publications that came to either you or to 13 Cyanamid would have been the -- 14 A Wait a minute. To who? 15 Q To either you or to --- 16 A Celanese? 17 Q --- Celanese. Excuse me. 18 A Yes, sir. 19 Q Among the publications either you received 20 or Celanese received we would find the Industrial 21 Hygiene Quarterly from the -- 22 A Yes. 23 Q --- AIHA? 24 A . And its successors or whatever. 25 Q And the - the periodicals from the 341 1 homed on them where we needed the help in a medical 2 standard or the like. They were members of the 3 "LAPI - the labeling and precautionary committee 4 meetings. We always called them "LAPI." In fact, 5 there were as many industrial hygiene and 6 toxicological people as there were medical on 7 t h a t -- 8 Q I would think ... 9 A -- maybe more, yeah. 10 Q At the API the hygienists were sort of 11 second-class citizens of the Medical Advisory 12 Committee. They -- 13 A Is that right? 14 Q -- were associate members and couldn't 15 vote. Only the doctors could vote. 16 A Yeah. We certainly had access to them as 17 w e -- 18 Q Sure. 19 A -- might need them. But the committee 20 membership was made up entirely of -- The medical 21 committee was made up entirely of physicians. But 22 the "LAPI" committee had a mixed - a mixed bag: 23 toxicologists, physicians, maybe some other - 24 industrial hygienists and perhaps some others. 25 Q Yeah, that would seem appropriate. 342 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A Huh? q That would seem appropriate. A Yeah, 1 think it was. q How far back does your contact with the labeling and precautionary information committee go? A Right after I joined Celanese in '65. At that time Boyd Shaffer was the chairman. And he was my former boss in toxicology at the Stamford research laboratory of American Cyanamid. He was the corporate director of toxicology, and he invited me to join. As a matter of fact, Glenn Fleming was really very much responsible for me joining both of those. He said, "Get your butt down there and join." So ... Q Dr. Boyd had - was with Cyanamid? A Boyd Shaffer. Q I'm sorry. A Yeah. Yeah. He was adirector your list of people -- Q Yes, sir. -- He's on A -- in the New York office. Q And the name ofthecommittee ispretty self-explanatory, but I - I take it the purpose or the goal of that committee was to develop clear and complete warnings and labels to go on chemical products that would end up out in the marketplace? A That is right. The principal function was actually to develop language for use with the varying types of requirements for labeling - safe labeling; and then there were illustrative examples -- They had a manual called the "LAPI" manual - it became an industry standard pretty much - that had all the language - it was 100 or 200 different statements of the kind of provisions for this and that type of problem. It was trying to make it standardized pretty much so that if you read it on one label and read it on another, they would say the same thing and people would get to know what they meant because you know how wordings can -- Each person has his own way of wording things, and they might not mean the same to people. Q Well --- A And then they hadillustrative examples of a number of labels. It was a lesser number of those. They were usually large volume commodity-type chemicals and so forth - industrial chemicals, yeah. Q A n d --- A And it wasstrictly forindustrial chemicals, too. it was not for consumer use. 1 344 1 Q 2 A That is -Do you remember we discussed that 3 yesterday? 4 Q - - - t h e la tte r? 5 A 6 Q Huh? The latter topic. I mean the "LAPI" 7 manual dealt with -- 8 A The chemical - industry use, not consumer 9 use. In other words, not for the householder. It 10 was for the chemical industry. We didn't label 11 chemicals for use in industry saying, "Do not 12 swallow" or "Do not take by mouth"; that was 13 implicit as part of an understanding of chemical 14 industry practices. And it didn't tell a lot of 15 things that a householder would need because these 16 were large volume chemicals and supplied from one 17 company to another and for use in making other 18 products by in large. And it was the intent of that 19 to cover just the industrial use hazards. 20 Q The intent of the labeling and the 21 precautionary information committee was just to 22 write labels and precautions for industrial use? 23 A Yes. 24 Q Was there a - a similar effort to deal 25 with the products that actually ended up in the 345 a \ i 1 hands of - of end users? 2 A Well, I wasn't involved in that by in .J 3 large. And most people in the industry were not. 3 4 Now, if they had a consumer division, you know, they 5 might. But Proctor & Gamble did, for example, 1 6 because they marketed it directly to the 7 householders and so forth. But most of the chemical 1 8 companies did very little of that.- And if they had J 9 a product -- Well, I think Carbide had one of the 10 big antifreezes, for example. ] 11 Q Prestone. 12 A And that would behandled by something 13 other than by the "LAPI" practices. 3 14 Q I see. Well, are you thinking that was, 3 15 in fact, a CMA committee that - that focused on 16 labeling for consumer products? i 17 A No, I don't believe there was because 18 that was not our thrust. The thrust was with ] 19 industrial chemicals -- 20 Q I see. 21 A -- period. Not - not consumer products. 22 Q Well, I'm glad you cleared that up. 23 A The companies that had consumer products 24 had to take that up some other way, and I don't 25 remember what was out there at that point. 346 1 q Okay. So, if Celanese had some consumer 2 products that required warnings and precautionary 3 labeling, Celanese wrote those warnings 4 A 5 q I did. -- themselves? 6 A Yeah. As a matter offact ---- 7 Q Sir? 8 A I did because I had responsibility for all 9 product safety. I had to approve every new product, 10 every new label, everything for the whole 11 corporation. It was a hell of a job. 12 Q That - that sounds very interesting and 13 very -- 14 A But there weren't that many products. It 15 still was a hell of a job. And we didn't have very 16 many products that had any toxicity that were - or 17 we had concern about because a lot of it -- Over 50 18 percent of the business was fibers - 60 percent 19 probably. We did have problems with some plastic 20 materials and some paints and coatings. On plastics 21 Charlie Hine and I ended up writing for the society 22 of the plastics industry a similar thing to the 23 "LAPI" manual. I don't know if that still exists 24 now or not. 25 Q I would like to amplify that point you 347 1 made, though, about your responsibilities for 2 reviewing products and labels before Celanese put 3 something out in the market. Was this -- Well, one, 4 why - why was this thought to be necessary? 5 A Well, it was health and toxicology - 6 health and toxicologically related primarily. Those 7 were the issues. And who but me was the one in the 8 company that had that knowledge and capability. 9 Q I guess I was going to the broader 10 question: Why did Celanese bother to worry about 11 the labeling and the instructions on the packages 12 dealing with health and toxicology issues? 13 A Well, we didn't, of course, on industrial 14 chemicals, except insofar as there was labeling of 15 major shipment loads and so forth - the ICC rules 16 and things of that sort. But if we had commodity 17 chemicals and they were infrequent - a few in number 18 I should say - we would have to look at it from a 19 different perspective, of course. The homeowner's 20 use of a product is totally different than the use 21 in a factory of bulk chemicals. 22 Q Okay. In the factory you have a routine 23 process and procedure? 24 A Yes. Yes. 25 Q You have employees that are trained for 348 1 handling -- 2 A 3 Q Exactly. -- that material? You have equipment to 4 safely handle the material? 5 A And the knowledge and so forth. 6 Q Engineering controls to prevent 7 exposures -- 8 A That is right. 9 Q and such? 10 A By in large, yeah. 11 q And I guess it's like we were saying 12 yesterday with the pesticide issue, the - the more 13 difficult control and training in - and the safety 14 problem comes in field use by - or in the home use 15 by the ultimate consumer -- 16 A (Nodding affirmatively) 17 Q correct? 18 A Well, for those chemicals that were sold 19 for home use and so forth, yes. 20 Q But I guess the point I was trying to get 21 you to make and which you didn't and may not yet 22 make but - was - was Celanese concerned about the - 23 relaying health and toxicology information to the 24 consumers of its - of its products, not the 25 industrial purchasers, but -- 1 I . - "-4 349 --J 1 A Well, we even did that, too. Yes, it if 2 would be. I can't recall right off the top of my --- 3 head what products were that way. For example, more 4 than 50 percent of the company's business was in ~r> 5 fibers. I will never forget the time the Kentucky j **> 6 State Health Department got ahold of me to see what $ 7 was the hazard of polyester fiberfill, which was 8 pillow stuffing. I told them there was no hazard to ' ! -- 9 pillow stuffing. n 10 Q Well, was it the policy at Celanese when mi 11 you arrived to inform customers of the - the 12 perceived and suspected health hazards that went 13 with the Celanese chemicals and products? . .i mi 14 A Yes. I - I took a little license and 15 skipped over one element. We had what was called a i 16 commercial hazards committee. There was a corporate 17 committee, and each of the operating committees -- l 18 Each of the operating companies had its - it's own -- 19 commercial hazards committee. And these were by 20 edict and wih policies spelled out completely for 21 what the responsibilities were. . J 22 N 23 tmtmd 24 --- X 25 Every new product had to be submitted through the operating company's commercial hazards committee to the corporate committee with all of the data necessary to help support what was being 350 1 proposed. And I signed off on the health elements 2 of it. And then the whole committee had to sign off 3 on the acceptability of it for meeting other and all 4 labeling requirements. 5 We had lawyers, members of the - 6 executives of the units, toxicologists when we had 7 our own toxicology department finally, medical 8 information specialists, hazard information 9 specialists and so forth. So, it was intended to be 10 as complete a review as you could make to provide 11 that we met the requirements and responsibilities 12 legally to adequately warn where it was necessary - 13 necessary. 14 Q Now, this committee didn't just focus 15 on - or didn't get involved after the product was in 16 production, did it? I mean this was a -- 17 A Well, it was done before it actually hit 18 the market by in large; but sometimes the variance - 19 the variance of a product, if it were minor, 20 wouldn't be taken up until after the fact if it was 21 thought that it wouldn't be materially different. 22 But by in large it was - it was something done prior 23 to its being put into the marketplace. And that 24 included industrial chemicals as well as - and it 25 was commercial I mean consumer products. 351 1 Q Was there a counterpart to this kind 2 o f -- 3 A Safety, too. I'm sorry. 4 Q Who was on --- 5 A I'm sorry. Safety was another - because 6 there would be things like flammability, 7 explosivity, other hazards that might have a safety 8 perspective. So ... 9 Q Did American Cyanamid have a similar 10 procedure? 11 A They did. I wasn't directly involved with 12 it, but Boyd Shaffer by in large headed that up. 13 Maybe Dr. Hamlin had the overall sign-off, but -- 14 And I don't remember because I was not on corporate 15 staff. Don't forget that most of the time I was a IS plant physician for the better part of the time - 17 plant or division. 18 Q Well ... 19 A We participated somewhat at times, but we 20 didn't have the responsibility or the administration 21 of it. 22 Q Dr. Dixon, when Celanese was considering 23 either using a new raw material or even considering 24 whether to make a new chemical product, did - was 25 there a similar review of the health and safety i i 352 1 aspects before deciding to produce it? 2 A Supposedly, yeah. And that had been going 3 on I might add for years before I got to the 4 company. Sometimes something would slip through, 5 but by in large it was prescribed to pretty fully. 6 Q And I suppose that inquiry - the 7 preproduction inquiry would - would be concerned not 8 only about the health hazards that the end product 9 might pose to customers but was also concerned about 10 the potential hazards to Celanese employees who 11 might be having to make the material? 12 A Well, that information would be handled 13 separately. The one for the product would be 14 through commercial hazards,- the other one would be 15 through the medical/industrial hygiene line 16 organization for use in the protection of employees. 17 That would be totally separate. 18 Q But both -- 19 A It would be the sameinformation 20 perhaps -- 21 Q Okay. 22 A -- but it would be handled - or similar 23 information, but it would be handled with respect to 24 its end objective, which in the one case was 25 employee protection and the other - our employee l 353 1 protection; and the other was consumer, industrial 2 or household or whatever. 3 Q But in - in either event your input would 4 have been critical to the - to that review? 5 A It was one part of it, yes. And it was 6 critical I guess. 7 Q When did you get a toxicology department 8 or a toxicologist I guess at Celanese? 9 A In the early '70's - mid - I guess early 10 to mid-'70's, the first one. We had had all of our 11 toxicity work farmed out to consulting groups at 12 established laboratories by in large prior to that 13 time. They worked at our pleasure, or unless we 14 oversaw what they did; but they did it, and they 15 advised us and whatnot. I mentioned one of them was 16 Hazleton right -- 17 Q Yes, sir. 18 A -- out here, for example. There were 19 many others. 20 Q And do you recall who your early 21 toxicologists were at Celanese? 22 A The first one was John Clary. We 23 employed John from the Haskell laboratory of 24 du Pont. And then he employed at least two 25 additional toxicologists before I left. And we went J 1! . 354 1 through a repeat deliberation as we had gone through 2 two or three times earlier about whether we should 3 have our own toxicology laboratory or continue to 4 use outside consultants. And a decision was made 5 perhaps wisely to continue farming it out. 6 Q But did Celanese continue to have a 7 toxicologist on staff after -- 8 A Oh, yes, and they still do. I've had 9 acquaintance with some of them recently. 10 Q I mean after the decision was made to 11 continue farming out the laboratory work, you still 12 had a toxicologist on the -- 13 A Oh, yes. Yes. 14 Q -- on the payroll? And I suppose 15 Mr. Clary or Dr. Clary -- 16 A Doctor, yeah. 17 Q --- was working out of the central 18 research facility? 19 A No. He worked out of the corporate 20 headquarters. He worked in the medical department 21 in New York. 22 Q Do you --- 23 A That was a medical health function, not a 24 research function in that sense, yeah. 25 Q Is Dr. Clary still living? 355 1 A Yes. 2 Q Is he younger than you do you think? 3 A Yes. 4 Q I was just curious about how long -- 5 A Anybody is younger than me, but go ahead. 6 Q Not really. Chuck Laubly is not. Do you 7 know approximately how long Dr. Clary had been at 8 Haskell laboratories at du Pont before joining 9 Celanese? 10 A Somewhere between five and ten years. 11 Probably nearer five. I'm hazarding a guess. He 12 had been at one of the governmental agencies prior 13 to that, and I can't recall. I knew him before he 14 went to Haskell, but I can't remember where he was. 15 Q Okay. Well, that's another thing I can 16 check off. 17 A Haskell is the corporate toxicology 18 laboratory of du Pont. 19 Q Yes, sir. 20 A Yeah. 21 Q Down in Wilmington, Delaware, area I 22 think? 23 A Newark, yeah. 24 Q Okay. 25 A Newark, Delaware. It's not Newark, 356 1 "New'ark." 2 Q "New'ark." Actually we got to visit their 3 library once upon a time. 4 A Huh? 5 Q Herschel and I got to visit their library 6 once upon a time -- 7 A Yeah. 8 Q -- some years ago. It's a pretty good 9 size library. I wanted to finish dealing with these 10 organizations, and I'm fearful that you have already 11 told me about one other. The Industrial Hygiene 12 Foundation we talked about a little bit yesterday. 13 A Yeah. We talked about that pretty well. 14 Q We did. And I don't remember if you told 15 me that Celanese was a member of that organization. 16 A Yes, and I was on theboard and all that. 17 Q Okay. 18 A And de Trevilla --- 19 Q Yes, sir, Iremember that part. And do 20 you recollect that Cyanamid - American Cyanamid had 21 also been a member? 22 A I presume so. I don't recall who the 23 specific members were. It was pretty widely 24 subscribed to. But I didn't have a corporate 25 stature in the days in Cyanamid - in Cyanamid. I I 357 1 Q 2 A Right. So, I didn't represent the company at any 3 of those functions. 4 Q You wouldn't have been -- 5 A Except on a rare circumstance. 6 Q -- back in those earlier years? 7 A Yeah. 8 Q Okay. And then theNational Safety 9 Council we - we know was an important safety and 10 health information source in the decades gone by. 11 A Yes. 12 Q Would your job have you attending meetings 13 of the National Safety Council? 14 A Glenn Fleming wouldn't let me not go to 15 one of their meetings. 16 Q Okay. 17 A I don't recall anyspecific roles that I 18 had with them as such, like a committee or whatnot,- 19 but I was involved with them, but ... 20 Q The -- I suppose there werelocal meetings 21 of the NSC sections or divisions? 22 A I don't know. 23 Q You would have attended the annual 24 National -- 25 A The ones in Chicago, the big meetings. 358 1 Q -- the Safety Congress? 2 A I might have attended some meeting when 3 they - if they had a special topic or something but 4 not otherwise. 5 Q You mean you wouldn't have attended a 6 local -- 7 A Local, yeah. a Q -- type meeting? 9 A In fact, I don't even recall whether there 10 was a local or not. n q well, I --- 12 A There may have been. 13 Q -- I'm not sure. 14 A Yeah. I'm not either. 15 Q So, you and Glenn Fleming would then go 16 annually to the annual or National Safety Congress 17 they called it? 18 A And he, of course, went to much more than 19 I would. Sometimes he would accompany me to some of 20 the health and industrial hygiene meetings, too. 21 There was a very close -- Because he was very active 22 in it, and his organization had a very responsible 23 role as we talked about yesterday and - prior to our 24 developing our own program. 25 Q Well, this cross-pollination, so to speak, 359 1 between the - with the doctor and the safety man and 2 the hygienist are again a very important part of a 3 good program, aren't they? 4 A Yes, they were, extremely. 5 Q I mean you are kind of depending on those 6 other professionals to be your eyes and ears out in 7 the plants? 8 A It was very symbiotic, very important and 9 necessary that it be close. 10 Q And I suppose likewise the hygienist or 11 the safety man would be -- 12 A The same thing. 13 Q -- depending on you for 14 A And many of the ... 15 Q -- information. 16 A ... gentlemen were Certified Safety 17 Professionals so that they had dual interests. 18 Chuck was a CSP, for example. 19 Q Okay. 20 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Joe, can we 21 go off the record to change the tape? 22 MR. BLANKS: Well, please do. 23 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the 24 record at 11:48. 25 360 1 (AT 11:48 A.M. THE DEPOSITION 2 WAS RECESSED FOR LUNCH. AT 1:02 P.M. 3 THE PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:) 4 5 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back 6 on the record at 1:02. 7 8 (By Mr. Blanks) 9 Q Doctor, did your - during your 10 professional career did you ever have any contact 11 with the Saranac Lake laboratories and the Trudeau 12 Institute? 13 A Not directly, no. 14 Q Were you aware of -- 15 A I was aware of it, but -- Yes, I was aware 16 of it. 17 q And aware that even back into the '30's 18 and '40's that it had done a good bit of research in 19 the silicosis area? 20 A I was aware of that, yes. 21 Q And, of course,there was a tuberculosis 22 sanatorium there -- 23 A Yes. 24 Q -- as well. But you never attended any 25 symposia there? 361 1 A No. I grew up many years in Albany, and 2 we visited SaranacLake; and I had seen the facility 3 in earlier years. But I never did have any 4 professional visits there. I was aware of some of 5 the people and things like that later. 6 Q Anybody from up there that you recall 7 knowing? S A Well, Art Vorwald for one. Frank Princi 9 was another. And, of course, we all know about 10 Schepers. 11 Q Yes, sir. I think he was the last 12 director of the laboratories. 13 A I presume that's correct. 14 Q He followed Dr.Vorwald? 15 A Yes. 16 Q Do you know where Dr. Vorwald went after 17 he retired -- 18 A Yes. 19 Q -- from Saranac? 20 A He -- Well, I don't know whether he 21 retired, but he left there and went to Wayne State 22 University as a professor of preventive and 23 occupational medicine. I don't -- I'm sure he's 24 retired. He may not be alive even now. 25 Q I think he 's been deceased for a number of 362 1 years now. 2 A Yeah, I think so, too; but I just can't 3 recall. 4 Q And what was Prank Princi? 5 A Huh? 6 Q What was Frank Princi? 7 A Well, Frank Princi was the No. 2 man at 8 the Kettering laboratory. And he had spent,a st.int 9 up there at some point prior to joining the 10 Kettering faculty as I recall. I don't think I'm in 11 error about that. He knew the people up there. He 12 knew - - H e had known Gardner, and he had known, of 13 course, Art Vorwald. I met Vorwald like I met so 14 many of the early leaders at Kettering when they 15 would come down and give seminars and so forth. You 16 know, there probably were a few other people; but I 17 can't - I can't think of their names at the moment. 18 Q Okay, Had you ever met Dr. Schepers 19 anywhere along the way? 20 A I think I met him one time back in the 21 early '70's. I have a recollection that I did, but 22 I wouldn't know him if I saw him. He lives just a 23 few blocks from where I am as a matter of fact. I 24 know .where his house is in Langley. He lives around 25 the corner. I 363 1 Q Actually he had come over and worked a bit 2 with Dr. Lanza when - when Schepers - Dr. Schepers 3 was finishing his - I guess a dissertation as part 4 of his graduate studies. 5 A Schepers did? 6 Q Yes, sir. 7 A I guess I wasn't aware of that, yeah. a Q And I want to tell you that --- 9 A And he went to du Pont at some point. I 10 don't know whether it was before or after. n Q It was after. I think he -- If I remember 12 correctly he was a student of Dr. Lanza maybe in the 13 early postwar years - late '40's maybe and -- 14 A A student? 15 Q Sir? 16 A A student of Lanza? 17 Q Well ... 18 A Because Lanza was in the Public Health 19 Service and then he went to Metropolitan and then he 20 got into academics after he retired from 21 Metropolitan as I recall. 22 Q Let me -- Then let me take that back. I 23 know that he conferred with Dr. Lanza and had some 24 guidance on his dissertation and that project. 25 A Oh. I 364 1 Q And I think if I remember -- 2 A Yeah. I don't know where he - what 3 training he had. I guess he's a Ph.D. 4 Q He's an M.D. and I think a DSC like S yourself. 6 A Yeah. Okay. 7 Q I believe. Lanza had sent him around to 8 various industries to -- 9 A Yeah. 10 Q -- learn about the programs here; 11 j u s t -- 12 A Something like we did here. 13 Q Uh-huh. 14 A Well, was that in the period after Lanza 15 left Metropolitan? 16 Q You know, I confess; I am not clear in my 17 mind when Dr. Lanza left Metropolitan. 18 A I had trouble thinking about that the 19 other day You know, I mentioned something about 20 that earlier. And I was trying to reconstruct 21 something in tny mind. And I think that he left 22 Metropolitan in '49 or '50 - '49 or '50. It was 23 right along in that period, and then he established 24 the New York University program in industrial 25 medicine and so forth because I applied there. I ! S 365 y*.'4 1 Q Okay. % 2 A Yeah. In '53 getting ready for the '54 .y 3 entry. 1 4 Q 5 A That sounds right -Okay. 3 6 Q -- to me, too. In the '50's it was the 7 case, wasn't it, that doctors and hygienists at the i 8 NYU school were available as consultants for hire to Inr 9 industry; or were you aware of that? i 10 A I presume some of them were, yeah. Most 11 of the schools did that, yeah. 12 Q And I think the - Kettering we 13 discussed -- ** j 14 A Yes. "5 15 Q _*J 16 A -- did consulting work for industry? Yes. ili 17 Q And at some point the Saranac Lake j 18 laboratories also provided these kind of services; 19 correct? ? 20 A I - I -- That's my understanding, yes. 21 And I don' t know how they were sponsored or -/ 22 whatever, but I know they did -- Industry was - * 23 involved some with their work, so - probably 24 supporting it and so forth. 25 Q And I believe the Industrial Hygiene 366 1 Foundation also provided such consulting services 2 for a fee. 3 A At varying times. Not all periods, but at 4 varying times. 5 Q And I guess the point of that was that 6 even for companies smaller than a Celanese or a 7 Cyanamid or a du Pont, there were at least 8 professionals available with training like you had 9 and like Chuck Laubly had -- 10 A Yeah. 11 Q -- to - for consultation to deal -- 12 A Although ... 13 Q --- with problems? 14 A ... the field wasn't developed with the IS numbers of people, and it wasn't a widely known 16 thing to the degree that it became later; but still 17 I think it did exist. Well, I know it existed, yes. 18 Q You mentioned this morning before we began 19 that you found the old copy of Industrial Dust - 20 A Yes. 21 Q 22 A -- that you have in your library. Yes. 23 Q Drinker - The Drinker and Hatch book. 24 A Drinker and Hatch book written in '36. 25 Q Was 367 1 A I opened the thing up and the first thing 2 I saw was a bookplate - A. G. Cranch. His daughter 3 gave me his books when he died. So ... 4 Q Would that text have - or reference book 5 still have been in use when you went through medical 6 school and -- 7 A Medical school? 8 Q Yes, sir. 9 A Well, I wasn't aware of it. 10 Q How about when youwere studying at 11 Kettering, when you -- 12 A I wasn't aware of it I don't think at that 13 time. As a matter of fact, when I opened it and 14 looked at it just briefly in the middle of the night 15 when I was wandering around because I couldn't IS sleep, I was astounded at finding the Cranch 17 bookplate. And in the back was some little 18 publication - it didn't relate to things we are 19 concerned with here - but dated 1920. And it was an 20 order sheet for something - a bulletin of some sort. 21 And I don't think I had ever opened that book. 22 Q Okay. 23 A Because it was old by the time I got it. 24 I got it in '65 or '66. Yeah, in the - in the - a 25 month or two after I joined Celanese; right after I ! 368 1 Dr. Cranch died. 2 Q It would be true, though, wouldn't it, 3 that dust was recognized as a hazard in industry in 4 the - at least a decade before you went to medical 5 school? 6 A Wait a minute. Say it all over again. 7 I'm sorry. 8 Q I said it would be true, wouldn't it, that 9 dust was recognized as a potential health hazard in 10 industry even before you went to medical school? 11 A Before I went to med school? 12 Q Oh, yes. As evidenced by this 1936 book. 13 A There were some duststhat were. 14 Q Yes, sir. 15 A Many dusts that aren't,yeah. 16 Q Okay. 17 A I mean dust categorically wasn't 18 necessarily considered significantly harmful, except 19 as a nuisance. But there were specific dusts that 20 were pathognomonic of various -- 21 Q They were what? 22 A Pathognomonic. 23 Q Okay. 24 A . In other words, that means they are able 25 to produce abnormal results and so forth. 369 1 Q And among those obviously were the silica 73i 2 dusts - free silica dusts? 3 A Yes, that was one of the chief ones. rr*. ..ij> 4 Q And asbestos as well was recognized as a 5 dust hazard even in -- 6 A When? 7 Q Well, certainly in the - in the 1930's, 8 again as reflected in the publication of that era, J 9 A By people who were involved in that area n 10 of concern. I don't think generally this was J 11 understood. I don't think physicians generally knew 12 it. Even the whole time I was at Kettering we 13 referred to it primarily as a nuisance dust; that if 14 it were - otherwise if exposure is higher than what 15 were encountered in this country - were encountered, J 16 it might produce what was then being called 17 asbestosis. But we didn't expect to see it and in 18 large measure did not in those days. 19 Q I suppose the best indicator of what was - 20 was knowable to doctors and industrial hygienists in 21 those years before you began your studies would be 22 the publications in the field, the literature - the 23 medical literature and the industrial hygiene and 24 toxicology literature in -- 25 A In what period? 370 1 Q Well, in - certainly in the decade before 2 you started your medical school studies. 3 A What? I'm having a little troublewith 4 the question. 5 Q Okay. 6 A I'm sorry. I got that part of it, but 7 then I lost the front part. 8 Q Let's start over. 9 A My fault. 10 Q Looking back to these years before you 11 went to medical school, one way of seeing what - 12 what the concerns and the information was for 13 doctors and hygienists and toxicologists would be 14 the published medical literature of whatever era you 15 are looking at; correct? 16 A You mean would that be the source of 17 information about it? 18 Q Yes, sir. 19 A Well, I presume so. There wasn'tmuch, of 20 course. I glanced in the Drinker/Hatch book last 21 night just to see what - if it covered asbestosis; 22 and it did in a few little sentences here and 23 there. And it did allude to the fact that there 24 could be asbestos, but - asbestosis, but that it 25 wasn't seen really much in this country. And - but 371 1 it gave a pretty short description. And it didn't 2 relate to any other problem than the possibility of i 3 asbestosis. 4 Q Okay. And 5 A That was in '35. 6 Q Okay. And by then Dr. Lanza and others 7 had done at least -- 8 A Excuse me. 1 was -- Let me add one other 9 thing. I should say that even through the whole 10 period that I was at Kettering through 1957 - and I 11 have gone back and - earlier, not in connection with 12 this case - but verified by talking to some of my 13 classmates and others who were there at that time 14 that asbestos was essentially not mentioned. The 15 big concern was silicosis and silicotuberculosis and 16 some other types of problems that were very much 17 around. And coal dust was the big issue that we 18 were concerned with at that point during the 19 mid-'50's. And that was a - quite a -- It was a 20 very - kind of a quagmire getting through all of 21 that. And asbestos just never emerged as something 22 we even talked about. I don't ever recall it being 23 mentioned there as something specific; so - through 24 '57. 25 Q Mentioned where, sir? 372 1 A Huh? 2 Q You said you didn't recall it being 3 mentioned there. And I was wondering where you -- 4 A At Kettering. I'm talking about -- The 5 whole thing I was talking about was Kettering, yeah, 6 while I was there in the training program. I'm 7 sorry. I'm having a little trouble pulling that 8 together. 9 Q Okay. And I guess a lot of the focus at 10 Kettering would necessarily have been on new 11 materials and chemicals that had come out of the - 12 the wartime industry and the - the decade and -- 13 A Well, from a research standpoint. 14 Q Yes, sir. 15 A But from a teaching standpoint we had to 16 go through all of the traditional things that were 17 known to exist pretty much, but the research program 18 would have been more related to new or on things 19 where we needed further information. 20 Q Okay. When you arrived at the Celanese 21 headquarters to take up your new job there in 22 association with Dr. A. G. Cranch in 1965, what did 23 you find by way of a library or a reference 24 collection that - for the medical department - 25 medical director? 3 73 1 A It was a fairly good library. We had -- 2 We had subscriptions to all the major regular 3 publications in the field of occupational health, 4 general medicine; a fair representation of 5 textbooks. As I said, Dr. Cranch had his own 6 library there - not all of it, but it was there. 7 And Dr. Osterritter had some additional stuff. But 8 it was reasonably adequate. 9 Q And I would assume Dr. Cranch's books 10 dealt largely with occupational medicine topics? 11 A All the books of his to my recollection 12 were occupationally oriented. 13 Q And didn't he have a toxicology background 14 as well? 15 A Yes, from Carbide as you recall. And he 16 had been one of the authors in the Patty textbook, 17 as had Dr. Hamlin at Cyanamid. 18 Q And as youmentioned, Dr.Cranch's 19 widow -- 20 A His daughter, yeah. 21 Q I'm sorry. --- hisdaughter basically 22 bequeathed -- 23 A Yes. 24 Q -- these books to you when he passed 25 away? Ii 374 1 A Or I guess maybe when he was sick or at 2 some point. I was away. He got sick, and in four 3 days he was dead. And I never saw him after he 4 became ill. So ... 5 Q Well, that's a pity. 6 A Yeah. 7 Q 8 A D r . Cranch was an M.D.? Oh, yes. Yes. He was a medical director 9 for Carbide. 10 Q Formally the medical director at Union 11 Carbide -- 12 A Yes. 13 Q -- before he became or immediately before 14 he became the consulting medical director for 15 Celanese Corporation? 16 A That's correct. 17 Q We - you mentioned medical journals or - 18 excuse me - you mentioned journals that you received 19 at Celanese and which you found in the library 20 there - the medical library. 21 A Yes. 22 Q These would have included such journals as 23 the Journal of the American Medical Association? 24 A . Yes. Although -- Well, go ahead. Yes. 25 Q Would Lancet have been among those I i 375 'i 1 journals? 2 A I don't believe so. At some point at a 3 later time I did get Lancet at varying times, but 4 not even on a regular basis later. 5 Q 1 6 A Okay. So, that's not -We could have access to it at one of the 1 7 med schools if something appeared in it that was 'J 8 meritorious. 9 Q How would you learn of articles appearing 10 in publications that you didn't subscribe to? 11 A Well, there was a service in the New York r 12 area. I first encountered it when I was at Stamford 13 research headquarters of American Cyanamid company 14 in which index pages of journals were photocopied 15 ,, and circulated to subscribers to - in this service. 16 And I got quite a compendium of those. They were 17 inexpensive, and you could look through them very 18 quickly to see if there was anything that you wanted 19 to look through. I don't recall the -- I'm sure 20 Lancet was one of them in that listing. 21 Q B u t --- 22 A That was British. 23 Q Yes, sir. 24 A But not too many foreign ones. I think 25 most of them were domestic. -1 378 1 there a predecessor medical director to the - to 2 your predecessor at Celanese - Dr. Osterritter? 3 A Well, Dr. Cranch -- 4 Q Okay. 5 A -- had filled that role. Prior to that 6 time we had the one consulting dermatologist 7 involved who recommended we have that. Otherwise, 8 all medical services were contracted as needed from 9 physicians in the vicinities of locations of the 10 company. 11 Q Okay. And among the - the occupational 12 health publications that came to either you or to 13 Cyanamid would have been the -- 14 A Wait a minute. To who? 15 Q To either you or to ---- 16 A Celanese? 17 Q -- Celanese. Excuse m e . 18 A Yes, sir. 19 Q Among the publications either you received 20 or Celanese received we would find the Industrial 21 Hygiene Quarterly from the -- 22 A Yes. 23 Q -- AIHA? 24 A And its successors or whatever. 25 Q And the - the periodicals from the i 377 1 tax your mind to figure out - figure out what the 2 hell the subject is. 3 Q How far back approximately did the - this 4 collection of medical journals and hygiene journals 5 go at Celanese when you -- 6 A How far back? 7 Q -- got there? Yes, sir. 8 A I don't recall . I don't recall. 9 Q I mean did it look like several years' 10 worth or just -- 11 A I don't even know. I didn't - didn't 12 utilize that at all because I had my own collection 13 as part of my membership to the Society of 14 Toxicology, AIHA, Industrial Medical Association and 15 others. They came to my home, and I read them at 16 home by in large. 17 Q So, you h a d --- 18 A So, we had most of themin the library. I 19 could run in there and get them if I needed to. 20 Q Okay. 21 A In fact, weterminatedsome of those 22 subscriptions before too long, and I just brought my 23 in and let them be kept there instead of piling up 24 at home. 25 Q Perhaps you told me yesterday, but was- 378 1 there a predecessor medical director to the - to 2 your predecessor at Celanese - Dr. Osterritter? 3 A Well, Dr. Cranch --- 4 Q Okay. 5 A -- had filled that role. Prior to that 6 time we had the one consulting dermatologist 7 involved who recommended we have that. Otherwise, a all medical services were contracted as needed from 9 physicians in the vicinities of locations of the 10 company. 11 Q Okay. And among the - the occupational 12 health publications that came to either you or to 13 Cyanamid would have been the -- 14 A Wait a minute. To who? 15 Q To either you or to --- 16 A Celanese? 17 Q -- Celanese. Excuse m e . 18 A Yes, sir. 19 Q Among the publications either you received 20 or Celanese received we would find the Industrial 21 Hygiene Quarterly from the -- 22 A Yes. 23 Q --- AIHA? 24 A . And its successors or whatever. 25 Q And the - the periodicals from the I I 379 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Industrial Hygiene Foundation? A I presume we did. I'm almost -- Oh, I'm sure we did, yes. And, of course, when I was active with them, I know we did, too. Q The Public Health Reports from the U. S. Public Health Service? A Yes. They deteriorated badly in subsequent years, but I had been used to that from the days in the Public Health Service before I went to Kettering. In fact, one of my publications was in the Public Health Reports. Q Do you recollect seeing any of the bulletins from the New York Department of Labor that we discussed -- A Well, we talked about thatyesterday. And I presume that there wassomeawareness of that. I don't recall anything very specific about it. I know Morris Kleinfield and so forth. Q Do you recall, Doctor, if the State of New Jersey had a Department of Health or a Department of Labor that - that had some specialists in occupational health or industrial hygiene? A In New Jersey? Q Yes, sir. A Do I recall it? 380 1 Q Yes, sir. 2 A Well, I knowthey had adepartment. I 3 don't recall physicians in it. I remember the 4 industrial hygienists like Lynn Schall. 5 Q Schall? 6 A S-h -- S-c-h-a-1-1. I don't recall who 7 the medical director of it was even though I lived 8 in New Jersey. I dealt with the industrial 9 hygienists quite often when I was with Cyanamid. 10 Q I was wondering. Howwere youdealing 11 with him? 12 A Well, they -- In - in some of their 13 activities they used the Bound Brook plant of the 14 company as a training site. We let them do that. 15 And a place to show people -- It had some marvelous ie things in it including the best environmental waste 17 control system known to man at that point. It was 18 just finished. 19 Also on at least one occasion Lynn 20 Schall - who was head of industrial hygiene for the 21 state, and his sidekick whose name escapes me right 22 now - came into our plant and did some measurements 23 or assessments of one thing that -- And I can't 24 remember what it was even now. But they wanted us 25 to change some stuff. And I went back home and 381 1 calculated it all out and found they had made a 2 massive error, got them back in and convinced them. 3 And we didn't have to do anything on it. 4 But Lynn Schall and I became very good 5 friends then. He was quite active in the local AIHA 6 and the national AIHA. In fact, he was the - acted 7 as general manager of the AIHA in the interim as 8 they were moving before Bill McCormick took over. 9 Q Do you recollect there being any New 10 Jersey regulations that pertained to, you know, 11 workplace contaminants and guidelines for exposure 12 levels and such as that? 13 A New Jersey? At this point I can't 14 recall. You know, there could well have been. 15 Q Do you remember becoming aware of such 16 regulations in any of the other states where 17 Celanese had plants? 18 A State regulations you mean like -- 19 Q Yes, sir. 20 A --- TLV's or --- 21 Q Well, the equivalent. 22 A Well, the only state through that period 23 and even a considerably later time that had anything 24 of that sort was Pennsylvania that adopted the 25 A.C.G.I.H., much to the chagrin of the - the i i 382 1-^'d Lii) l~St 1 A.C.G.I.H. The doctor there was -- Good, Lord. Oh, 2 hell. I can't think of his name. I will think of 3 it in a second. fi 4 Q Fulton? 5 A He had worked for us in cyanamid earlier 6 as a plant physician in one of the plants in 7 Pennsylvania. And then he became the head of the -- 8 Good, Lord. I saw his name the other day. I just 9 can't think of it. It doesn't matter. But he was 10 the one who broke the cycle and the first one to 11 statutorily arrange for the adoption of the 12 A.C.G.I.H. list as a regulatory level. Ultimately 13 OSHA adopted the '68 A.C.G.I.H. levels for their 14 first PEL'S or whatever they called them at that 15 point. Originally they were MAC'S - maximum ie allowable concentration and then threshold limit 17 values and finally I guess PEL'S. 18 Q Do you -- Are you thinking perhaps of a 19 Dr. William Fulton from Pennsylvania? 20 A William who? 21 Q 22 A William B. Fulton, M.D. I don't recognize the name. Where was 23 h e -- 24 Q He was the chief of industrial hygiene in 25 the Department of Labor and Industry 383 1 A Where? 2 Q in Pennsylvania back in the late 3 '30's. I don't know what -- 4 A Well, that's way, way back. No, I 5 wouldn't have any knowledge of him. 6 Q Well, he might still have been there. 7 That was all I was thinking. 8 A The name of that guy - it's on the tip of 9 my tongue. It doesn't matter. No, I wasn't aware 10 of that. 11 Q Anyway, Celanese didn't have any plants up 12 in Pennsylvania, did it? 13 A Yes, we did. Oh, not Celanese. No, I'm 14 sorry. 15 Q Cyanamid did? 16 A Cyanamid did, yeah. I don't recall any 17 plants of Celanese in Pennsylvania. Oh, I take it 18 back. We had a small one out near Pittsburgh, a 19 plastics plant. It was one we had acquired in some 20 deal. We didn't have it very long. 21 Q That would have been acquired after you 22 arrived? 23 A Yes. Yes. It wasn't operated very long. 24 But that's the only one I can recall in 25 Pennsylvania. 384 1 Q If I remember correctly I think you told 2 us Celanese had some plants down in the Carolinas. 3 A Celanese? 4 Q Yes, sir. 5 A Yes. All of the fibers plants were in - 6 well, in Virginia, Carolina, Georgia. Actually 7 there were two in Carolina. The - and the 8 headquarters of the fibers operation was in 9 Charlotte. But the two -- But the plants were the 10 Amcel plant in Maryland. That's the first plant. 11 I'm getting this all mixed up. The Celco plant in 12 Narrows, Virginia. The Celriver plant in South 13 Carolina and the Rome, Georgia, plant up in Rome, 14 Georgia. Celanese had built and established all of 15 the plants except for Rome, Georgia. That had been 16 purchased. It was a former Viscose plant, and it 17 was converted to acetate - cellulose acetate. 18 Q Did you ever come to be aware of the dusty 19 trades laws in the Carolinas? 20 A In the Carolinas? 21 Q Well, I'm - I'm thinking it - it might 22 have been in both, but I believe certainly in South 23 Carolina. 24 A . I don't recall it as such. 25 Q I think Mr. Laubly had mentioned that it 385 1 was some sort of a registry for workers in what they 2 called the dusty trades and required a state card 3 really with -- 4 A I don't recall it, no. 5 Q -- periodic chest examinations 6 A Yeah. 7 Q -- and so on. 8 A I guess we wouldn't have thought that 9 applied to us. 10 Q What were the -- What was the - or what 11 were the end uses for these fibers that Celanese 12 manufactured over the years? 13 A Well, primarily inapparel, incarpeting 14 and drapes. All cloth products. 15 Q And to your knowledge did any of those 16 Celanese fibers ever contain asbestos, something 17 woven in with them? 18 A Oh, no. Because they wereextruded fine 19 filaments from a hot mix. We couldn't put anything 20 in them. They came through a very precision, 21 finally-honed, small aperture that if you put 22 anything in it, you would have fouled up the works 23 in a hurry. 24 Q Celanese - 25 A It had to be superfiltered to keep anything from ever being in it in the way of a foreign particle. Q I was just thinking perhaps of fibers being spun in with the fiber - the -- A Not the -- Not with the acetates or the fibers company -- Q Okay. A -- nor in the ICI/Celanese synthetic fiber operations. Q And where was that plant - the ICI/Celanese -- A The what? Q Where wasthe ICI/Celanese plant? A Well, we ended up withfour plants at one point mostly in the Carolinas. One in Salisbury. One in Shelby, North Carolina. One in - well, near Charleston. I can't think of the town. I'm missing one, and I can't think of where it was. all in that Carolina, Georgia -- They are Q And what time period was this -- A Well, it started about the time I joined Celanese. Maybe just before I joined, and then it expanded. They had the development of their second, third and fourth plants. They were huge. They made either nylon and - or polyester for largely apparel 387 1 use, although there was a tremendous expansion in 2 polyester to provide tire cord. 3 Q In the pre-steel belt days? 4 A Yeah. 5 Q Okay. Do you recall or recognize the name 6 of a Lewis R. Morrison? 7 A Lewis R. Morrison? 8 Q Yes, sir. 9 A It doesn't ring a bell. 10 Q Okay. I think I picked that up from 11 Mr. Laubly's deposition. And I just thought I would 12 ask you about it. How about Charles Francis? 13 A Charles Francis? 14 Q Yes, sir. 15 A Well, Charlie Francis was a Vice-president 16 of personnel at Celanese Corporation throughout my 17 time of being there - and Chuck's, too. 18 Q And that reminds me. I was wondering to 19 whom you reported as medical director of Celanese - 20 or to what office and to what person? 21 A Well, it's ironic you would ask that at 22 this moment because my original boss was Charlie 23 Francis - Charles B. Francis. But I reported to 11 24 different people during my time there - from 25 Executive Vice-president to the Personnel Director, 388 1 and all levels in between. There was a lot of 2 motion and mobility and changes in the corporation 3 during that time. 4 Q I was just trying to get a sense of where 5 the medical department fit into the organizational 6 hierarchy. You really were sort of -- 7 A The medical director was in the executive 8 category, of course, in terms of salary level and 9 perks and that sort of thing; but on the low 10 side ... 11 Q To - to which department or office would - 12 would you have to submit your budget proposals and 13 y o u r -- 14 A To each or any of those 11 people, 15 according to who was in charge at a given time - the 16 Personnel Director all the way up to Executive 17 Vice-president. 18 Q How long a time were you under the 19 Personnel Director? 20 A I'm sorry. What? 21 Q How long were you under the Personnel 22 Director? 23 A I - I would guess that I was under him 24 longer than anybody else. Probably four or five 25 years. And then there were a series of changes with 389 1 Human -- What's the word? 2 Q Human Resources. 3 A Yeah, Human Resource-type things and 4 other -- And somebody would leave, and you would get 5 moved to somebody else. And I knew all of them 6 pretty well. And Jim Kennedy was Executive 7 Vice-president who I had interviewed with when I was 8 hired. I reported to him for a time - and then 9 another Executive Vice-president. Now, he -- Jim 10 was actually Vice-chairman of the Board. He had 11 been kicked upstairs. 12 Q Jim - Jim who? 13 A Kennedy. You have his name earlier. He 14 was the - the official that I saw initially and had 15 my first dealings with in the corporation. 16 Q Was there any year when your budget 17 requests were not approved ultimately? In other 18 words ... 19 A Well, except -- The answer would be 20 basically, no, except when we had proposed some of 21 the developments that we had planned to do,- and then 22 an economic downturn or some other circumstance came 23 along and we had to cancel the project. But other 24 than that, the basic -- I don't recall that we ever 25 had a rejection of our fundamental basis - 390 1 fundamental budget, no. 2 Q Which - which of the projects were not 3 approved that you remember? 4 A Well, trying to go ahead and expand the 5 occupational health program. I told you there were 6 several times when we had almost gotten general 7 consensus -- 8 Q Uh-huh. 9 A -- to do so, but then it was not 10 expedient to proceed at that moment because of 11 economic or other considerations that made it bad 12 timing. It was just deferred really. It got 13 deferred two or three times until we finally got 14 approval in the '70's . 15 Q 16 A Do you recall Dave Barrett? Very well. 17 Q And what was Mr.Barrett's job? 18 A Dave was the head industrial hygienist in 19 the Celanese Chemical Company. And he was the real 20 mover on pushing and getting approval for the 21 occupational health surveillance program in the 22 chemical company. I was the nominal head of it 23 afterwards, but he was the real instigator and 24 pusher. And he was amazing how he succeeded when I 25 failed repeatedly. It was a good time, too. it was ! . r--\ 391 ^ ) \ l % 2 Jf 3 4 .i 5 j.1 6 7 i 8 Ji 9 *7 \ 10 11 --w. ! 12 13 - 14 -- 15 --jf 16 17 18 - 19 20 21 __ 22 23 -- 24 --- -r' 25 during a period of good economics. And OSHA was coming down Che road; and, so, it was timely. And - but he was a wonderfully great guy. Q Did you have a role in - in the decision to add his position and to - to hire him? A Only in that I did approve and recommend - and it had to be approved that we did hire the industrial hygiene staff for the chemical company. We hired David - Dave Barrett as the head of it and then four additional industrial hygienists early on after that - one for each of the chemical plants. I don't believe we had one at the tech center full time. Probably at the other facilities, but I could be wrong about that. But at least there were four others. And then it followed with the nurses and the doctors and ... Q When - when was it, Dr. Dixon, that you - since you first recommended that a hygienist be hired for the chemical division at Celanese? A Well, it was probably pretty early on when we were trying to set up the health surveillance schemes. One industrial hygienist was nowhere like enough for a whole corporation of that size. And I am sure we recommended getting an industrial hygienist for each of the major divisional 392 1 companies - or at least more than one corporate one. 2 There could be some sharing of duties. 3 But I guess originally we envisioned 4 hiring some additional members on the corporate 5 staff and then supplying that service out to the 6 plants and the divisions. But that becomes unwieldy 7 and difficult to operate conveniently and 8 economically. And, so, if you can get them to be in 9 the division and residing at their sites, it's far 10 superior to the other way. 11 Q Well, you managed to obtain approval for 12 hiring Mr. Laubly as the first industrial hygienist 13 for the corporation -- 14 A Yes. 15 Q -- by '66 or -- 16 A Yes, early '66. 17 Q And I think Mr. Laubly made surveys of all 18 the plants in the Celanese organization as rapidly 19 as he could. 20 A Yes. In fact, we both participated in it 21 to the greatest extent jointly in the early days. 22 Later on we did it and did not according to how 23 convenience - convenient it was. 24 Q , And are you thinking that it would have 25 been shortly after you and Mr. Laubly had made this 393 1 company-wide or corporate-wide survey of plants 2 that - that you recommended getting some more 3 hygienists on staff? 4 A Well, as I told you the first day - 5 yesterday, early - I told Jim Kennedy the 6 executive - the Vice-chairman of the Board and - 7 with whom I interviewed -- And don't forget, Glenn B Fleming was the one that pushed this in the 9 beginning, which - or getting Laubly, for example. 10 I was completely in accord with it. But I knew we 11 had a rather weak department in the sense of an 12 internal staff of our own, even though we used other 13 services? and that I would want ultimately to 14 develop our own programs. 15 And I was told, "Well, that's 16 understandable and meritorious; but why don't you go 17 and review them all and make some assessment and get 18 back to us with your recommendations." So, that was 19 then in my recommendations that followed and was 20 variously ready to go or not ready to go as I 21 explained just a few moments ago (sic). 22 Q I guess what I'm trying to get a sense of 23 is how long it took before this recommendation to 24 hire hygienists for the different plants or the 25 different divisions was fulfilled. 394 1 A Well, very early on after Chuck and I got 2 to go through - - M y first recommendation was to hire 3 the one corporate industrial hygienist. And then 4 we - the two of us then pursued the inspection and 5 the assessment of what the needs would be beyond 6 that. And Chuck helped me to prepare a 7 recommendation at that point that went back to - a well, Charlie Francis and Jim Kennedy and Lord knows 3 who else in the corporation at that time for 10 approval. And it looked like we were going to get n approval on at least the beginnings of it pretty 12 soon. But then there was a cyclic downturn or 13 whatnot and programs got snatched and we got held up 14 on it. And that happened two or three more times 15 before we finally got to do it in the '70's really. 16 There were some exceptions because there were some 17 places where we were able to get programs started 18 because they had some need differently than others. 19 Q Is it so then that Mr. Barrett got hired 20 in - in the early 1970's --- 21 A That's my recollection. 22 Q --- at Celanese? 23 A Yeah. 24 Q Okay. 25 A I was aware of it as soon as he was hired. 395 1 I had nothing to do with his selection, however, but 2 I certainly approved it. 3 Q And would Mr. Barrett have been the second 4 industrial hygienist hired by Celanese; that is, the 5 o n e -- 6 A I believe that's correct. 7 Q 8 A -- after Laubly? I'm trying to think if we had anybody else 9 at that point. I don't think so. I'm very sure 10 that he was the second one, yeah. 11 Q Okay. 12 A Well, I could be wrong on that because we 13 might have hired the extra - the additional ones in 14 the New York office by that time. It was very 15 close. 16 Q All right, sir. 17 A Okay. 18 Q And then did you ultimately persuade 19 management to hire hygienists for the plastics and 20 fibers and coatings and other divisions? 21 A Well, that was in the works at the time I 22 left the company. It was -- It had been approved 23 for fibers and plastics. We had an industrial 24 hygiene -- No. Wait a minute. I believe just 25 plastics and fibers at that first point. And then / 396 1 there were some other units of the corporation, and 2 they fell in along - along after I -- It was after I 3 left I guess before it finally got completed. *} 4 They had to develop the computerized - and 5 the whole scheme of the health surveillance program 'i 6 first before there was anything else to do. Then we 7 piloted that into the chemical company to see if - 8 did it work; was it meritorious. And it did. And i J 9 then that then served as a model. In fact, it was 10 the state of the art thing at that point and still 11 is, I think. 12 Q Were any epidemiology studies completed of 13 the Celanese work force before you retired in 1981? 14 A Yes. Yes, there were a number. 15 Q Were those published or just internal 16 A No, they were internal. Well, I take it 17 back. Subsequently there have been publications by 18 the doctors that followed as additional work was 19 done on these particular subjects. They were mostly 20 in the fibers companies it turned out to be because 21 there were solvent vapor potential exposures that 22 were of concern to OSHA, had been of concern to the 23 A.C.G.I.H. and so forth. So that we had a pretty 24 elaborate system in place - well, soon after I got 25 there to do this. 397 -r, > ! . -V 1 t* 2 . j 3 u'3 4 5 y\ 6 7 8 --i 9 J 10 11 -*v-\ 12 13 -J 14 15 -- 16 17 18 - 19 20 21 22 23 -- 24 25 -- We had an automated system for monitoring methylene chloride, for example, where one of the early big gas chromatographs had ten ports that went to the breathing areas of workers in ten different stations in that operation. And it continuously rotated monitoring throughout the day and night of these operations so that we got a good, continuous, all-time picture of what exposure levels were so that we could then compare that with health results and known information about hazards, et cetera. Q Did your medical surveillance program as - as proposed by you include surveillance of Celanese retirees? A No. Not basically, no. Q Did there come a time before you left Celanese that an effort was made to follow retirees for health problems? A We gave serious consideration to it, and it never was adopted. It was still an open agenda item when I left, and I don't know what transpired with it in that respect later. I don't believe anything followed on that. We did have an open invitation for retirees to come back if they had problems or needed help with health directives - what doctors to go-to 398 1 for even personal illnesses. And we listened to 2 their health problems and - to see if we felt they 3 were doing the right things on them. But that 4 wasn't adopted. That was not a highly formalized 5 program. Some people took advantage of it. A lot 6 of them would just come by anyhow and say, "Hello. 7 Oh, by the way, I got a bunion" or -- 8 Q Yes, sir. 9 A But it was not a formal program like some 10 of the corporations later developed like du Pont and 11 some of the others. 12 Q Was there ever a program at Celanese to 13 gather death certificate information on retirees? 14 A Yes, indeed. 15 Q That was going on -- 16 A This was part of the health surveillance 17 system. I didn't go into some of these details, but 18 the plan and the actual practice of it would be to 19 follow everybody to death. 20 Q So, this - this feature was - was underway 21 before you retired? 22 A Oh, yes. Yes. And there had been some 23 instances where we had had selective use of getting 24 the death certificates to see if there was an 25 unusual incidence of anything. Particularly when 399 1 companies like in the Chemical Manufacturers 2 Association or the other trade associations brought 3 up a question: Had anybody seen an incidence of 4 thus and such excessively? And if we had seen 5 anything, we could join in the game and get the 6 death certificates. 7 They became -- They were very hard to get 8 in the earlier years. They became much easier to 9 get by the '70's or even the late '60's I guess. 10 Q Uh-huh. 11 A And we participated with industry groups 12 on a number of instances like that. One that we did 13 was on vinyl chloride, for example - the monomer, 14 but ... 15 Q And how far back did those vinyl chloride 16 studies go do you think? 17 A You mean when did they occur? 18 Q Yes, sir. 19 A Well, theangiosarcoma problem developed 20 at Goodrich in about - well, I will guess - say '68, 21 plus or minus a couple of years. And there were a 22 lot of studies that were done immediately in this 23 country and abroad - mostly in Italy with Maltoni. 24 I'm getting off track. Wait a minute. I forgot 25 where the question was leading me. 400 1 Q I was just -- 2 A Was it about the death certificates still? 3 Q Well, and the vinyl chloride studies you 4 mentioned -- 5 A Well, we did epidemiologic studies in the 6 plastics part of the corporation - not the chemical 7 part of the corporation - that made some of the 8 vinyl compounds because the piping systems - the 9 largest amount of it was vinyl chloride; but the 10 polymer - not the monomer - the monomer being one 11 atom of vinyl - not atom - but molecule of vinyl 12 chloride; whereas the polymer - the polymer was 13 multiple - it had different chemicals and other 14 characteristics. And you could make piping out of 15 it. IS The monomer was a gas, for example. But 17 when you polymerized it, it became a gunk; and you 18 could make things out of it . But there was some 19 liberation - potential for liberation of vinyl 20 chloride from piping as it was being made or 21 possibly even afterwards. 22 It later became evident that there was 23 very little liberation from the piping. And we had 24 five-- We had plants from five different 25 acquisitions - small acquisitors - relatively small 401 1 acquisitions that were making pipe and then were 2 combining into the - as part of the plastics 3 company. And we volunteered - I can't recall which 4 organization it was - oh, through one of the trade 5 associations to participate in this study. We even 6 helped pick the epidemiologist. And that would be 7 at Georgetown University. 8 And I thought we were going to be a good 9 source, but these companies had gone through - all 10 but one of them had gone through two or three 11 purchases and spin-offs and whatnot in prior years, 12 and we couldn't trace the records back adequately 13 to - for them to do an epidemiologic study. We did 14 get death certificates on a few of the people in the 15 one unit, but it wasn't enough to be good. We 16 tried, you know. 17 Q So, I gather there was some period when 18 Celanese made PVC pipe? 19 A Oh, yes. 20 Q I - I thought that I associated the name 21 w i t h -- 22 A I suspect ... 23 Q 24 A -- that. ... the current operator of all that still 25 does. I don't know what happened. 402 1 Q Okay. Does James Ramey ring a bell? 2 A Oh, yeah. 3 Q 4 A And what - what was Mr. Ramey? Well, James was a - a technical chemist 5 operator out of the - not an operator - but a -- I 6 think he came out of the laboratories originally and 7 had risen into the ranks of management in the 8 chemical company. And he then came up to New York 9 just in the period shortly before I left and joined 10 the then new department of - we called it DEHSA - 11 Department of Environmental Health and Safety 12 Affairs. And he headed a lot of the work involved 13 in some of the product safety and other types of 14 activities as that program got expanded. 15 Q Well, would he have been working under 16 your supervision? 17 A No, he wasn't directly. We worked very 18 closely together. But a former head of the plastics 19 research division was brought in to head the new 20 department - the DEHSA department. And he - he 21 reported to that man. 22 Q Do you remember who that was? 23 A Huh? 24 Q Do you recall who that was? 25 A Yeah, Lee Starr. Starr like the guy in 403 1 Washington. 2 Q And Mr. Starr - Dr. Starr or whatever he 3 w a s -- 4 A He was a Ph.D., yes. 5 Q Dr. Starr had spent - what, most of his 6 professional career at Celanese? 7 A You know, I'm not sure when he went there. 8 He was there when I joined the company and probably 9 had been there for some years. But I don't know 10 what his earlier experience had been. 11 Q If we could bounce back to your medical 12 library in Celanese. Do you recall seeing any 13 technical bulletins from Kemper Insurance? 14 A At the moment I can't recall any. I 15 imagine there were some in an earlier day. The 16 library was really developed. That was - - M y second 17 employee that I hired was Judith Tins, who was the - 18 had the nominal title of coordinator of toxicity 19 information. And among her responsibility was to 20 organize and systematize the library and the data 21 that we had on toxicity and so forth. And she did 22 quite a fine job on that for many years. 23 Q Was - was the lady a librarian, per se, 24 o r -- 25 A No. Well, she -- No. She was the 404 1 coordinator of toxicity data. 2 Q Well, that sounded like a good title 3 t o -- 4 A Well, it ... 5 Q -- push off on management, you know, 6 t o -- 7 A Well, it was hard to get a title - - W e had 8 problems with the women employees. I hate to say 9 it, but we did. That was way back in '67 - late 10 '66, early '67. She was a well-educated, very 11 brilliant Ph.D. - not Ph.D. - a Phi Beta Kappa 12 person who had worked in Diamond Shamrock for four 13 or five years in their patent acquisitions and 14 licensing and informational services or whatnot. 15 And she knew the chemical world remarkably. And 16 that's what we needed desperately in the early 17 period. And she filled the whole role of that and 18 ultimately got involved with many other things, 19 including very active in the product safety and 20 other parts of the department. 21 Q Well, I gather she had a technical 22 background? 23 A I beg your pardon? 24 Q She had a technical education and 25 background? '! 405 1 A She was a Cornell chemistry graduate. Phi 2 Beta Kappa; she was very bright. 3 MR. HUTCHINS: Is this a good 4 time for a break? 5 MR. BLANKS: Sure, a good time. 6 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are off 7 the record at 1:56. 8 9 (AT THIS TIME A BRIEF RECESS WAS 10 TAKEN, AND THE PROCEEDINGS THEREAFTER 11 RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:) 12 13 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back 14 on the record at 2:21. 15 16 (By Mr. Blanks) 17 Q Doctor, do you remember a Dr. Lejinski? 18 A Doctor who? 19 Q Lejinski. 20 A Lejinski? How do you spell it? 21 Q I'm thinking L-e-j-i-n-s-k-i or s-k-y. 22 A It wasn't Levinkas? 23 Q No. I think it's Lejinski. 24 A Where was he? 25 Q At the National Cancer Institute maybe: 406 VJ ~=~ 7 J 1 A I can't say that I know him. The name ~r\ 2 rattles in my head. I knew some of the people at 3 NCI. But I can't recall that particular name. 4 Q Did you ever meet Dr. Hueper while he was I 5 at the NCI? 3 6 A I think I met him at one time at one - at 1 7 some meeting very early on in my career. But I - 8 I'm not positive of it. I never had any direct < !iS 9 dealings with him thereafter certainly - or ever 10 really. I J 11 Q Okay. v^, 12 A I may -- Somebody later had told me that 1 13 had met him, but I don't remember. I can't recall . J -Jj 14 it either. So ... *. .`J 15 Q j 1 Can you contrast for us how the Celanese 16 occupational health program compared to what seemed 17 to be the chemical industry norm at the time you 18 joined the company? 1 19 A Well, the chemical industry norm was -- 20 There were two norms. There were the norms for the 21 big companies that had lots of hazards. And they 22 had - like du Pont, Dow, Monsanto, Eastman - the top 23 five companies. In the bottom five was a lesser -- .. 24 degree because most of them were sufficiently 25 smaller. We were in the upper level of the bottom 407 1 five, but so was Cyanamid and so was -- What did I 2 saw we were -- There were three kind of tied for 5th 3 place - 6th place. Well, it doesn't matter. But -- 4 Let me think where I was going. 5 Q Two tiers. 6 A Two tiers. The companies thatwere 7 smaller - and particularly those that didn't have 8 high risk and known bad exposure incident experience 9 in the past -- Oh, Cyanamid was the other one. 10 Cyanamid -- Who did I say? Cyanamid, Celanese 11 and ... 12 Q Was Hercules in there? 13 A No. They were down below further - 14 considerably. Well, it doesn't really matter. But 15 Cyanamid was the only one in that smaller group that IS had a very big program. The top companies who had 17 tremendous - lots of chemicals and many hazardous 18 materials and so forth did have by in large more 19 extensive programs than the - than the bottom tier. 20 The one exception was Cyanamid because of its 21 horrendous experience with highly toxic materials in 22 the earlier period - you know, the body counts and 23 all that sort of thing. 24 And within this scope of the bottom group 25 we were probably mid position in terms of the 408 1 development of our own program. Although in terms 2 of content of what we did, I think we did as well as 3 any of them. We were better than one or two of 4 them. 5 Q Do - do you think over your 16 years or so 6 with Celanese that you managed to improve the 7 company's relative standing in terms of its medical 8 program? 9 A In terms of the other companies? 10 Q Yes, sir. 11 A Probably not a hell of a lot because 12 everybody else was also expanding and doing things 13 in that time. But we sure brought it up - up to 14 speed in terms of our getting it to be a first rate 15 program, at least in the first operations of it; 16 and then it later became expanded to other units. 17 So, we set the thing in motion; and it was a huge 18 success. And it may be one of the better ones in 19 existence right now. 20 Q Going back to the late '40's when you - if 21 I'm remembering the dates right - going back to when 22 you started your Public Health Service work, the 23 TLV's of the American Conference of Governmental 24 Industrial Hygienists had just recently been put 25 out; isn't that right? 409 1 A Well, they started in about 1946 or '47. 2 The AIHA was one of those years, and the A.C.G.I.H. 3 I think was first just the year before I believe. 4 So, it was right after the war. 5 Q And 6 A They are having - I guess it is having its 7 50th anniversary. It must be '48, yes. 8 Q And those guidelines that we discussed 9 yesterday in more detail listed the common workplace 10 contaminants that were recognized during that 11 period? 12 A The ones thattheyaddressed, yes. 13 Q Yes, sir. And the list as you said got 14 larger as -- - 15 A That iscorrect. 16 Q -- time went by? 17 A Yes. 18 Q And even when youbeganyour occupational 19 medicine career, wasn't it true that good practice 20 required you to reduce exposures to workplace 21 contaminants down to a safe level? 22 A Yes, by in large where we knew what a safe 23 level was, of course. And the MAC'S, TLV's, PEL'S, 24 whatever you want to call them at different times, 25 were hoped to achieve that to the greatest extent 410 1 possible with a wide margin of safety, although 2 there may be a few individuals who might be 3 unusually susceptible or something of that sort. 4 Q Well, that's a good point. I mean the - 5 the most susceptible individuals were not 6 necessarily protected by the guidelines -- 7 A Well ... 8 Q -- were they? 9 A ... we don't know whether they were or 10 were not. We assumed that there was always that 11 potential that there were outliers. Like on any 12 distribution curve there are people or phenomenon 13 outside of the bell-shaped curve, or there can be. 14 And that's a pretty hard thing to ascertain. But it 15 was intended to get all but somebody who was an 16 oddball or an outlier because they provided like a - 17 essentially a ten-fold safety factor. And ... 18 Q And even the language in the guidelines 19 says that -- 20 A Of the A.C.G.I.H.? 21 Q Yes, sir. 22 A Okay. 23 Q says that it's - it's at levels at 24 which it's expected that most workers -- 25 A Exactly. 411 1 Q -- won't b e 2 A Yes, sir. 3 Q -- won't be harmed? 4 A That's correct. 5 Q And when you were applying these to reduce 6 exposures to contaminants, really the - the organ 7 system affected by the contaminant was immaterial to 8 you, wasn't it? 9 A Immaterial - the organsystem? 10 Q Yes, sir. 11 A Oh, you mean as far as meeting an 12 objective of exposure level -- 13 Q Yes, sir. 14 A -- pure and simple? I guess you would 15 have to say that, yes. 16 Q Because the task, though, was to prevent 17 h a r m -- 18 A Yes. 19 Q -- to the - to the worker; correct? 20 A Yes. Yeah. 21 Q And I suppose if you knew that a 22 contaminant can cause disease at some levels, then 23 you should try to prevent exposures to that 24 contaminant? 25 A To the degree that was being required, 412 1 yes. 2 Q 3 A Okay. Or better. J 4 Q Because that would really be the only way 5 that - that you or a hygienist like Mr. Laubly would i 6 have to prevent incidents of that disease in your ''i 7 work force; that is, by preventing exposures? 8 A You mean by keeping them down *-- 9 Q Yes, sir. 10 A -- to within the required limits or 11 lower? Yes. 12 Q Okay. And there are assumptions in the 13 guidelines - the exposure guidelines -- 14 A Well, we don't call them guidelines. They 15 were levels established, and they were to be 16 utilized only as guidelines instead of as regulatory 17 or statutory things. They were to be used as v-i 18 guidelines, not rigid confirmation - of the 19 A .C .G .I .H . now. 20 Q Yes, sir. And that's -- 21 A All right. 22 Q -- that's what I'm trying to focus on. 23 A Okay. 24 Q And leave the rules of the '80's and the 25 '90's 413 1 A I'm sorry. What? 2 Q I was trying to focus on the language and 3 the material you had to work with in the '50's and 4 the '60's -- 5 A Oh, yes. 6 q -- as opposed to -- 7 A Yes. 8 Q -- more recent times. But one of the 9 assumptions in using these TLV's would be that the 10 worker to be protected had not had earlier exposures 11 outside your company's experience that might have 12 been beyond or well beyond those threshold limit 13 values; true? 14 A That would be true for things that had a 15 persisting potential or that left some residual 16 effects; but not for things - simple chemical 17 toxicities, for example, by in large. 18 Q But there would be a number of things 19 that - for which it would be true? 20 A That is true. 21 Q Your fibrogenic dusts,forexample, that 22 accumulate in the lung a - accumulate there? 23 A Yes, sir. 24 Q And the priorexposures -the total 25 dosed - dose in the past is going to be a factor in 414 1 the man's likelihood to develop a disease? 2 A It could be if there was a sufficient 3 magnitude of exposure, either in the prior or in the 4 subsequent - or both times, yes. 5 Q Right. So, part of the assumption is that 6 if those prior exposures aren't so great - if we are 7 talking about -- Let me start over. Focusing again 8 on the fibrogenic dusts that remain in the lung -- 9 A Yeah. 10 Q -- in using the - the TLV's you are 11 assuming that he doesn't have an accumulated dose 12 from the past that is already -- 13 A Assuming he does not? 14 Q That he doesn't, to which - that - that 15 it's not big enough in the past to - to where the 16 future exposures are going to tip him over the edge 17 and cause disease? 18 A I'm not following that. Was that a 19 question -- 20 Q I'm not either. 21 A -- for example? 22 Q Don't make it worse. 23 A Yeah. I really had trouble with that. 24 Q . I did, too, obviously. 25 A Okay. 415 1 Q Maybe I ought to just forgetit. 2 A I'm sorry. 3 Q No. I mean you - you learned that for a 4 dust disease like silicosis, for example, that the 5 dose was a critical part of determining whether 6 somebody was likely to develop a silicosis or not? 7 A Yes. 8 Q And that the greater the intensity of the 9 exposure and the longer the duration of the exposure 10 the more risk the worker had? J 11 A Or likeliness, yes. 12 Q Okay. So that, you know, with - with a 13 bad exposure history it might be that keeping future 14 exposures down just under the TLV would not be 15 sufficient to prevent him from getting disease? 16 A That's kind of a complex question. It 17 would depend on the magnitude. If he had a 18 significant exposure and an effect there, he would 19 already have some degree of the disease. So, you 20 are not going to preclude it, but you would minimize 21 the expansion - the extension of it or whatnot in - 22 in most materials. 23 Q `Per chance -- 24 A Do you know what I'msaying? 25 Q Yes, sir. 416 A Okay. Q I mean per chance were you in the same section at the 1964 asbestos symposium where Dr. John Wells attended? A Who is Dr. John Wells? Q He was a gentleman that was a plant physician for U. S. Rubber Company down in --- A I don't know him. Q -- down at Georgia. I thought per chance you might have met him. A I don't recall him, no. Q You didn't happen to remember overnight the part of the program that you were chairman of? A No, I didn't. I tried to reconstruct that. And they did not list the session chairmen in the program. They listed everybody else. Some of us were pretty pissed off at that. But nevertheless, they didn't. And it was such a confused meeting. It was utterly chaotic. And nobody could attend everything. And the place was bulging with press and everything else, and there was a -- It's a big blur in my memory - the whole thing. Q Would - would you say that if a worker's job involved breaking, crushing, disintegrating, 417 1 grinding or mixing of asbestos material that that 2 worker would be potentially exposed to asbestos? 3 A A worker doing -- What were the jobs 4 again? Breaking -- 5 Q If it involved breaking asbestos -- 6 A What do you mean by "breaking"? 7 Q Just taking asbestos materials and 8 breaking them apart -- 9 A All right. 10 Q -- or crushing them. 11 A All right. Or crushing? 12 Q Or doing something that - that caused 13 the 14 A Okay. 15 Q -- the disintegration of it. 16 A And what were the others? 17 Q Grinding --- 18 A Grinding. 19 Q -- or mixing. 20 A Mixing. Okay. 21 Q Or even cleaning up theresidue from that. 22 Would that worker be potentially exposed to 23 asbestos? 24 A Potentially. He would bepotentially 25 exposed. 418 1 Q And would you agree that you can't 2 scientifically rule out harmful exposures to 3 asbestos in such a worker -- 4 A In a what? 5 Q -- in a worker such as we described 6 without actually measuring the exposure levels? 7 A The first part of the question was you 8 couldn't rule out -- 9 Q Let me start over. 10 A Yeah. I'm sorry. This is my fault. I 11 got distracted with the second part. 12 Q Okay. If - if we speak of a worker whose 13 job involved that sort of manipulation of asbestos 14 material, would it be right that you could not 15 scientifically rule out harmful exposures to 16 asbestos in that worker without actually monitoring 17 his work environment? 18 A You couldn't rule it out or rule it in 19 either. It would be totally a guess. 20 Q It would not be sufficient to - to just 21 make a visual survey of - of his work area and 22 conclude that there weren't any excessive exposures 23 involved, would it? 24 A . No. Except that you know certain types of 25 things and the degree to which they are in the open 419 1 or whatnot are worse than others. And you might 2 make an assessment. And if it was a small amount 3 and just minor involvement with manipulation, there 4 wouldn't be very much. If it was a massive hunk of 5 it or a large - a lot of it and he had to do it, 6 then there could be more. The quantitative aspect 7 of it would depend on a variety of factors, yes. 8 Q But the only way to really get hard data 9 to work with would be to do air monitoring of that - 10 t h a t -- 11 A Yeah. 12 Q -- activity? 13 A Are you talking about an isolated job, for 14 example, as opposed to what he did regularly or -- 15 Q Well ... 16 A It could be quite a difference sometimes. 17 Q In either context. I mean you really 18 wouldn't know what kind of exposure potential there 19 was without doing some - some monitoring? 20 A That - that is true, yes. 21 Q And would you agree that unless you know 22 that that worker is getting no harmful exposures 23 that you do need to protect him in order to - to 24 prevent the possibility of disease? 25 A You said ingetting no ... ; i 420 1 Q I said isn't it right that unless you 2 know -- 3 A oh, you know, yeah. 4 Q -- unless you know that he's getting no 5 harmful exposures, then you have to - to assume that 6 he might be and act to protect him? 7 A See, that's -- It was the other no I was 8 asking about - n-o. We don't like to talk about no 9 exposure -- 10 Q Well, I ... 11 A -- like zero, for example. We are all 12 exposed to asbestos. You are breathing it right in 13 here. 14 Q Well, let me start over because I -- 15 A Yeah. 16 Q -- I tried to deal with that concern -- 17 A Yeah. 18 q - - - o f yours. 19 A Yeah. 20 Q I said isn't it right that unless you 21 k n o w -- 22 A K-n-o-w. 23 Q -- that that worker is getting no harmful 24 exposures to asbestos, then you need to protect him 25 in order to prevent disease? 1' i 421 1 A Unless you know that there is no harmful 2 exposure, you need to protect him. Well, of course, 3 that would be a form of protecting if you know it. 4 If you know he has no harmful exposure, that is a 5 form of protection. Now, does that answer it? 6 Q And if you don't -- 7 A If you don't know ... 8 Q -- know that, then you should -- 9 A Well, yeah. You would have a hard time 10 making an assessment. But again, you can make 11 certain estimates based on the magnitude of 12 potential of exposure to a degree. Some forms of 13 asbestos in the - the form in which it exists such 14 as that bound into washers or gaskets or whatnot, 15 there is no hazard in handling it all day and 16 banging it and doing whatever you want to with it. 17 It doesn't give you any hazard. 18 But you talked about pulling it apart and 19 milling it and -- And all the milling today is 20 always done internally in a closed system as opposed 21 to some of the early systems that were all out in 22 the open. 23 Like in the book last night, I was amazed 24 to see an early grinding operation where there were 25 two big wheels in a floor. They moved them up and 422 *\ '4 1 'n 2 _v! 3 33 .<5* 4 5 ,, j 6 , i, 7 8 J 9 10 11 ** 12 13 14 -; 15 16 17 18 -- 19 20 21 -- 22 23 -- 24 25 down against the floor wide open. This had to do with silica. But the same thing would apply. If it were in an enclosed system, that's different than if it were in an open -- Every - every operation has its characteristics and its potential for exposure of consequence or not. And you have to judge it in -- You can make some judgments that are quite reasonable based on even a visual observation of the process - that are reasonable; otherwise, you may have to do sampling. Q Certainly if you observe visible dust in the air in connection with the - the handling of a fibrogenic material, you at least would be alerted to do some sampling and monitoring? A If that's the full content of the - of the dust is the fibrogenic material. Some of the early work, for example, measured total dusts in a very dusty work environment. And only a very 9mall part of it many times was asbestos or silica or whatever. So, again, you have to know what you are dealing with and -- But you are basically right. Q Which brings us back again in -- A Yes. Q -- a circle to do you have to monitor to know what you got and do analysis? 423 1 A Yeah. By in large that's correct. 2 Q Would you say, Dr. Dixon, that up to the 3 time you retired from Celanese that you ever knew 4 what the - the zero effect level of asbestos 5 exposure was? 6 A I don't know the zero effect level of 7 anything. We talked about that yesterday as you 8 recall. 9 Q Uh-huh. 10 A We don't use that zeroterminology or no 11 exposure because anything that exists is likely to 12 be present in any environment to some degree. 13 Q Well, then --- 14 A We know that many ofthe airborne 15 materials, be they allergens, fibrogenic dusts or 16 whatever are omnipresent; they are always out 17 there. And you know right here today you are 18 inhaling asbestos and probably some silica even, but 19 mostly more likely asbestos based on structures, 20 vehicles, all the things that happen. The National 21 Academy of Sciences some years ago did studies of 22 airborne asbestos in metropolitan communities, and 23 many of them had a level higher than the current 24 PEL. So ... 25 Q But it's true that even by the early 424 1 1980's it wasn't known what was the maximum amount 2 of asbestos exposure a susceptible person could have 3 without any health effects? 4 A Or even a nonsusceptible person. We don't 5 have a cutoff point. It's not been scientifically 6 possible to nail it down. And even if you could 7 nail it down generically or generally, it wouldn't 8 apply to every individual necessarily because of the 9 variability of people. 10 Q Was there during your time at Celanese 11 ever a program to remove all of the 12 asbestos-containing materials from Celanese plants? 13 A To remove all? 14 Q Yes, sir. 15 A Not to my recollection. IS q s o --- 17 A There was a move to stop using it in new 18 applications. But it's kind of like the schoolhouse 19 problem. It's - there are a lot of variables, dos 20 and don'ts. And I'm not aware that we undertook 21 that, except insofar as when materials might be 22 removed -- 23 Q Yes, sir. 24 A -- they would then try to substitute 25 something else in its place. 425 1 Q And then it would be the case that by 1981 2 there were still in all probability 3 asbestos-containing insulation materials in place .- j 4 in, say, the Bishop plant, for example? 5 A I presume so. Oh, I know there was some, 1 6 yes. 7 Q What sort of asbestos health hazard 8 information did you as a medical director or as a 9 plant doctor at Cyanamid ever receive from the 10 manufacturers of the asbestos insulation products 11 that were used in your plants? 12 A I'm not aware of any specifically. I 13 presume at some point in the late '70's or during 14 the time I ended - I don't know when it began - the 15 companies who provided asbestos itself did begin to 16 label the content hazard and so forth. And, of 17 course, OSHA required it from '72 on. But I don't 18 have a recollection of just what it was earlier. 19 Q And the truth is you have never personally 20 seen a warning on an asbestos product or package 21 as - that would have been used in Celanese 22 facilities, have you? 23 A I think I did by the mid-'70's after the 24 OSHA act because they began to do it . 25 Q Okay. 426 1 A You know, the act itself made monitoring 2 and labeling and placarding and so forth a 3 requirement. And I'm sure I saw it. I know I saw 4 it. I can't recall -- I can envision seeing it; but 5 I - my - my memory of that is fuzzy. But -- 6 Q I know that ... 7 A -- I have seen it since then, too. And, 8 of course, it's hard to keep in mind -- 9 Q Yes, sir. 10 A -- which was which. 11 Q A little variation on that --- 12 A Yeah. 13 Q -- do you remember ever receiving any 14 toxicological data about asbestos from the 15 manufacturers of asbestos insulation products? 16 A Well, we never called it toxicological for 17 fiber; but some people do. But you mean did I 18 personally receive any? 19 Q Yes, sir. 20 A I'm not aware that I did. It may have 21 come into our office, but I honestly can't recall 22 that I personally saw - saw it. I may well have, 23 but I just don't recall. 24 Q ,, If you had been provided with information 25 that asbestos was a suspected carcinogen, would that 427 1 have been useful to you in your practice of medicine 2 at Celanese in the '60's? 3 A Well, not really because -- Well, no, not 4 really. 5 Q And why is that? 6 A Because we already had begun to hear some 7 of the early indications of that possibility - of 8 the problem particularly from the Selikoff symposium 9 and the papers he presented at that point. It was 10 hard to believe some of that because it was so 11 foreign to what we expected or had any reason to 12 anticipate. 13 But it certainly alerted us to the fact 14 that this needed further study and at some point 15 might prove to have some merit. But it took some 16 years before that was finally accepted generally 17 as - as was always the case, particularly in the day 18 prior to the electronic transmission of stuff and 19 whatnot. A new medical finding is always suspect 20 initially. 21 And then it required replication, further 22 study, peer review. And at some point the basic 23 body of the people with sufficient expertise will 24 make a decision yes, it is. And that will be 25 disseminated. But it takes a long time before it 428 1 gets out and is widely known. I would be surprised 2 i f -- 3 Q Well, let's go back ... 4 A -- not more than ten doctors you would 5 ask on the street about it knows today. But those 6 in the work areas would have knowledge sooner. But 7 it - it doesn't come quickly. 8 Q Well, let's go back a decade further to 9 when you began working at Cyanamid - American 10 Cyanamid Company. 11 Would information then that asbestos was a 12 suspected carcinogen have been useful to you in 13 doing your work? 14 A Would it have been useful? 15 Q Yes, sir, useful. 16 A What do you mean by ''useful"? 17 Q Well, I mean would - would you have 18 inquired further into the subject or would you -- 19 A I ... 20 Q -- have just ignored it? 21 A I presume I would have been startled and 22 would have wanted to find out what this was all 23 about. But it certainly wouldn't be something we 24 would act on immediately. We would talk to our 25 experts and see what they thought and what they were 429 1 doing to try and find out was this, in fact, the 2 truth - I mean was that a real finding because there 3 was no knowledge generally that that was a potential 4 back in that period. 5 Q Which persons would you include in that - 6 that group of experts that would have been 7 appropriate to consult in the 1950's for the 8 confirmation of -- 9 A Well, I think ... 10 Q -- asbestos' suspected carcinogenicity? 11 A Say again. If -- What - what group would 12 I want to go to? 13 Q (Nodding affirmatively) 14 A Well, people who had expertise in 15 carcinogenesis - chemicals and other carcinogenesis; 16 people who were familiar with the dust diseases and 17 so forth. And you would end up going to some of the 18 professional or trade association groups; people 19 whose opinions you value in trying to assess this 20 sort of thing. It probably couldn't be resolved on 21 an immediate basis because there wouldn't be a basis 22 of additional study from whatever the source of that 23 comment had arisen (sic). 24 Q Can you -- Can you think of any 25 individuals that would fall into that group of 430 1 experts that would have been people to consult in 2 the late '50's? 3 A You mean individuals themselves? 4 Q Yes, sir. 5 A Well, let me think about that. I would 6 certainly want to go to some of the National Cancer 7 Institute people who were the chief custodians and 8 most knowledgeable people about chemical and other 9 carcinogenic activities. I would talk to people - 10 medical directors and others in industries that had 11 a significant potential for exposure to the 12 compounds let's say - or a potential for exposure to 13 the compounds; the associations that dealt with the 14 dust diseases and so forth. That type of -- You 15 would seek that type of expertise. Back at that 16 time I don't know who particularly or specifically 17 you would ask. But I would have to think about 18 that. 19 Q I guess we can image at that time, the 20 last half of the '50's, that Anthony Lanza, for 21 example, would - might be a candidate having - 22 having surveyed asbestos manufacturing plants while 23 in the Public Health Service and having had dealings 24 with some of the insulation manufacturers. 25 A What time period was this? 431 1 Q I'm thinking, you know, when you were 2 getting out of school from Kettering. 3 A When I was getting out? 4 Q Yes, sir, around '56, '57. 5 A Well, I would even talk to the people at 6 Kettering who had a lot of interest and knowledge 7 about the various dust diseases and had worked to 8 some extent -- Certainly the people at Pitt like 9 Hatch and others who had done much of that work. 10 But I wouldn't have known really who the experts 11 were on that at that time because I had never 12 encountered the problem. 13 Q No, I'm not being critical. 14 A Oh, no. I'm just saying I wouldn't have 15 known -- 16 Q Uh-huh. 17 A -- at that time because I wasn't aware 18 that there was a potential for that at that time. 19 Q Would you agree with me that if a 20 manufacturer had animal testing data showing that an 21 ingredient in its product was a - was a carcinogen 22 that it - it should pass on that information to 23 users? 24 A You say if a --- 25 Q If a manufacturer of a product actually 432 1 had animal testing data that showed suspect 2 carcinogenicity -- 3 A You are talking about ingeneral? 4 Q In general. 5 A Yes. And, you know, we did that with 6 1.3 - not 1.3 - but betapropiolactone. 7 Q Did that with what? 8 A The compound betapropiolactone that I 9 discussed yesterday that I went to the OSHA hearings 10 on and presented our data and recommended that it be 11 added to the list of carcinogens, which it was and 12 still is. That would be a very fine way to do it. 13 Q Well, Celanese did it because it was the 14 right thing to do, didn't it? There wasn't any law 15 for you to do it? 16 A We thought so at that time. It later 17 turns out that it may have been a false cry or 18 crying wolf unnecessarily because we have never seen 19 a case in humans. So, it's -- You are damned if you 20 do and you are damned if you don't. But I think we 21 did the right thing. 22 Q Well, the better course would be to --- 23 A Well, we took the prudent course and ... 24 Q . -- to share what you knew, wouldn't it? 25 A But then later when you find that the 433 n i , : J i evidence doesn't support -- Animal studies aren't 2 translatable accurately to human experience. And 3 -.1 3 even isolated human experiences aren't necessarily 1 4 5 3 6 17 8 --i j 9 10 useful to reflect what other individual experiences might be. And as I said earlier, if something comes along that is totally foreign to what you have known about something in the beginning, you look at it with a great deal of skepticism. How many things have you read in the papers in just the last few j 11 months about some new compound that's going to cure 12 ^ i 13 * j I 14 this or going to cause that, and then you never hear another damn thing about it in the future because it just never cut the - cut the mustard. r** 15 Q But !J J 16 A It was never substantiated or peer 17 reviewed to be reasonable. jji Q \ 1 8 Well, certainly it wouldn't be right to I 19 suppress and withhold information that you had about 20 a product - a product's potential harm and health 21 effects, would it? 22 A Well, that's an awkward subject. When - 23 if somebody encounters something like this in the 24 i* 25 very first blush of it, he's probably pretty astounded himself and not even comfortable that this 434 i* *1 J ~-`A1 1 is realistic. You would even want to repeat your 2 observations or do whatever you could to clarify 3 "Well, is this truly what it looks like it is or is J "1 .{ J ,* 1 4 it just some fluke or is it one of these things like 5 the things published in the paper that you never 6 hear about again?" 7 And if it's a product, for example, you 8 might want to hold back releasing deleterious Ml 9 commercial information because - deleterious -1 10 information that would be commercially damaging J J 11 until you had a reasonable basis for feeling i 12 13 comfortable that it was rea.l. That was somewhat the case with what we w 14 ran into with betapropiolactone. We now don't think 15 it probably was real even though we had some *1 16 evidence from the animal studies. All I'm saying is 17 that you use some good judgment about what you say 18 and so forth. You just don't go running out -- 19 blabbing it and putting papers out that aren't 20 scientifically valid or whatnot. 21 It takes a substantial body of information . 22 before one even poses the likelihood of something, 23 except to say, "Here is a finding and it is 24 something that needs further study." That would be 25 the maximum extent of an early observation of 435 1 something of the sort. 2 Q Well --- 3 A And that could be warranted based --- 4 Q And you ... 5 A -- on whether it was realistically 6 sounding enough or sufficiently prevalent to warrant 7 that kind of approach. 8 Q Well, if you - you had that kind of 9 information about your product, wouldn't you be 10 obliged to - to look further into the - the question 11 and do more experiments? 12 A That was just what I said, yes. 13 Q Okay. You wouldn't be a -- You wouldn't 14 b e -- - 15 A Or have others do it or whatever, 16 Q It wouldn't be okay to just sit back on - 17 on your suspicions and do no more and keep selling 18 the product, would it? 19 A Not if it was something that had the 20 likelihood of real significance, of course. If it 21 was some little isolating fly-by-night-type thing, 22 it wouldn't necessarily require that type of 23 approach. But certainly if it were something that 24 had some potential of being significant, you would 25 want to see it pursued. Now, whether you did it-or 436 1 you stimulated others to do it or whatnot is another 2 matter. 3 Q Certainly in applying - in applying 4 information you obtained as an industrial physician 5 you didn't require absolute scientific certainty 6 about a material or - or its health effects before .1 7 instituting precautions and - and exposure controls, 8 did you? 9 A Not if it was very realistic. And I 10 illustrated that on the betapropiolactone. We L.J 11 instituted very rigid controls immediately so that * 12 we protected to the greatest degree that we 13 reasonably could in the interim period while it was 14 being further assessed and decided what to do. That 15 would be prudent -- 15 Q To err ... 17 A -- action. 18 Q To err on the side of caution? 19 A Exactly. 20 Q Okay. Because you are notgoing to get a 21 second chance if you end up with exposures without 22 precaution; you don't get to go back and do it 23 again? 24 A That's exactly right. 25 Q You just end up counting the bodies as you 437 1 had said? 2 A Yeah. 3 Q 4 All right, MR. BLANKS: Doctor, I think I 5 have exhausted the subject for the 6 moment. I can see others rising to 7 the task here, though. 8 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 9 MR. BLANKS: Thank you. 10 11 EXAMINATION BY MR, WEWERS: 12 Q Dr. Dixon, can you hear me from here okay? 13 A Yes, sir, very well. 14 Q As I introduced myself to you yesterday 15 I'm Eric Wewers, and I represent a defendant in this 16 matter. 17 A Who is that just so I'm ... 18 Q Riley Stoker Corporation. 19 A Okay. 20 Q I want to jump back with you a little bit 21 to the New York Academy of Sciences symposium 22 in '64 -- 23 A '64, okay. 24 Q . -- and kind of use that as a starting 25 point to maneuver from. 438 1 Based on what you have testified to 2 today - I want to make sure my understanding is 3 correct - in your opinion asbestos-related 4 diseases -- Well, let me back up and do it this 5 way. 6 Prior to 1964 what was your opinion or 7 your understanding of the potential health hazards 8 associated with asbestos exposure? 9 A I assumed that in this country with the 10 principal types of asbestos used early on in this 11 country and the experience of virtually no cases, 12 that we would have a very low incidence of 13 asbestosis. And we knew of no other hazards of 14 asbestos but asbestosis. I think that was ... 15 Q And did your understanding of the IS development of asbestosis include a - a certain 17 level of exposure for a certain period of time? In 18 other words, did it have to be a large amount of 19 exposure to asbestos for a significant period of 20 time? 21 A Yes, and some of the earlier studies 22 that - ended up giving rise to the level of 5 23 million particles per cubic foot as a proposed safe 24 standard, based on the early data. And that 25 lingered for many years before it eventually was - 439 t i 1 by different methods of analysis was lowered n. 2 somewhat and then subsequently lowered several times 3 subsequently to provide wider and wider safety 4 margins. But that -- Did I respond to that 5 properly? 6 Q You did. And - and the 5 million 7 particles per cubic foot of air threshold limit 8 value or TLV that would - that you just referenced 9 is the same that you talked with Mr. Blanks about 10 that went into effect from the A.C.G.I.H. in 1946; 11 correct? ;h 12 A It had been informally instituted even in 13 prior years from the early work, yes. 14 Q Okay. 15 A I didn't know it at that time, of course. 16 Q But that remained in effect until "N 17 approximately 1969 or so; isn't that correct? 18 A Yes, somewhere in that '60 period. 19 Q Now, considering - or taking into 20 consideration all the conversations that you have - 21 that you have had throughout your career with - with 22 the people Mr. Blanks has talked to you about, your 23 committee positions and organization positions that 24 you've had, was - was it - was your view or your 25 understanding of asbestos-related problems - health I : * _ 440 l : .1 - ^ t 1> hazards prior to 1964 the generally accepted view 2 within the scientific and medical community at that 3 time? 3 . . ^ mil 4 5 6 A MR. BLANKS: foundation.. I believe ... Object, lack of //a 7 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry? 8 MR. BLANKS: I was just making 9 an objection. j 10 A I believe so. That is among people of -4 --y 11 informed nature, less so for others. ' I 12 Q Okay. Now, when Dr. Selikoff made his 13 presentation in 1964, did his study and the data 14 that he presented basically confirm the generally -* 15 accepted view as you understood it at that time; or --wi 16 did it contradict the generally accepted view? 17 A Well, it contradicted it very strongly. IB And it presented data of extremely heavy exposure mV 19 levels in the shipyards, for example, and of mixed 20 types of asbestos that we weren't commonly used to 21 experiencing in the earlier period upon which the ,, 22 judgments had been made previously. 23 Q And after Dr. Selikoff had made this -- _ 24 presentation of his study and his data, what type of 25 reaction did that evoke from, the scientific and 441 !i >^%i W.J 1 _li 2 V* 3 4 3 A 5 wi ' 6 7 '5 8 V* 9 7> 10 ij 11 s-- ! 12 13 -J 14 S*4 IS 4 0* 16 t 17 -5i 18 _ 19 --* 20 21 __ 22 23 "V- 24 25 ~ medical community at the time? MR. BLANKS: Objection, lack of foundation. A There was a multiple reaction in effect. There was startle, of course, initially because it seemed so foreign to anything that we had reason to suspect; concern, of course, feeling the need for further clarification of the subject; a little bit of anger even in the sense because in the early day Selikoff had been considered a renegade, an outlier because he had been very negative on industry for good reason as we later learned. But nevertheless, the original reactions involved all of those things - suspicion, but concern and feeling the need that, gosh, this has got to be looked into. Q And your understanding of the reaction of the scientific and medical community, did that come from your attendance at this symposium and in talking to the other doctors and industrial hygienists that were there? A Yeah, and subsequently, too -- Q Okay. A -- over a long period of time. Q Prior to that symposium - I believe yesterday you testified that you had Dr. Selikoff 442 1 come and speak to a section that you were -- 2 A The AIHA annual convention, the 3 medical -- 4 Q Okay. 5 A -- section. 6 Q And did Dr. Selikoff present some of these 7 same views at that section meeting that he spoke at? 8 A To the best of my recollection he did. It 9 was a very preliminary report. And then he 10 augmented that substantially at the later meeting 11 of his - at the New York Academy of Sciences '64 12 meeting. 13 Q Was the reaction at - at the section 14 meeting the same or similar to the reaction at the 15 symposium and thereafter that you experienced? 16 A It's a little hard to remember back to it 17 exactly. He was an awesome performer in giving this 18 paper. And we had the worst bunch of papers 19 otherwise in that meeting. I never saw such a bunch 20 of dog papers. But he gave a very fine presentation 21 and very low key. And I think it kind of almost 22 went over our heads a little bit to some degree. 23 But he indicated at that time that there 24 would be further information coming out very shortly 25 and alluded to the meeting. So, it didn't create a I 443 I 1 mass hysteria or anything of this sort; but 2 certainly concern and -- And he gave a remarkable 3 impression by the way he conducted himself at the 4 meeting. 5 Q You have -- You have talked earlier today 3 6 and yesterday about how when new information comes 7 out or contrary information comes out, it takes 8 awhile for that to be become assimilated into the - fry .J 9 scientific and medical community. 10 A ..V JJt 11 Q Even as a question, Was the data and the study presented by 12 Mister - Dr. Selikoff in 1964 of such a situation 13 that it took the medical and scientific community a 14 period of time to digest it, review it, confirm it, 15 examine it? 16 MR. BLANKS: Lack of 17 foundation. 18 A Very definitely. 19 MR. BLANKS: Speculation. 20 Q Why would -- Why wouldn't the medical and 21 scientific community just automatically accept the 22 study by Dr. Selikoff or the study by any doctor? 23 A Well, you don't accept anything like that 24 that's totally new and foreign and sounds strange 25 just from a single set of observations. You would 444 1 2 3 3 4 5 3 vj 6 $ 7 8 9 10 11 I 12 13 "I -J 14 v;** 15 f C*-' 16 17 J 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 want to see some replication of it; certainly a very careful peer review of it to see if - did it make sense; were the methods used appropriate; all of the elements of it to -- And this takes time. And it took a lot more time in that period than maybe can be accomplished with something urgent today because of the telecommunications, electronics and so forth. Everything was very slow. And the profession was very stodgy, too, in the old days. They didn't want to accept something new too quickly. If it was horrendous or earth shaking, they would. But something like this probably wouldn't be perceived in that magnitude at that time. And particularly since it was so foreign to what their experience had been previously. Q Now, Dr. Selikoff's study dealt with roughly 17,000 or so insulation workers on board ships? A I can't remember the numbers. The number 17 something - 1,700. I have forgotten the number, but it was a substantial number. Q And it was of insulation workers that worked on board ships in shipyards? A Exactly. Q Now, you would -- Well, would you agree 445 1 that the exposures of insulators on board ships - 2 inside the bows of the ships is a significantly 3 different exposure than what one might expect in a 4 chemical plant out in the open air? 5 MR. BLANKS: Objection, 6 speculation; lack of foundation. Go 7 ahead. 8 Q You can go ahead and answer. 9 A Oh, very definitely. It's very 10 substantially different. And there is a magnitude 11 difference in terms of its exposure potential. 12 Q How would the -- What would be those 13 differences? 14 A You mean w h a t -- 15 MR. BLANKS: Objection, 16 speculation; lack of foundation. 17 A As I said it would be large orders of 18 magnitude - a difference of exposure mainly because 19 it's in a confined space by in large without air - 20 adequate air circulation or space for it to 21 distribute itself away from the worksite. Whenever 22 one works in an enclosed, tight quarter, I think the 23 potential for exposure to any given substance which 24 is released is greatly accentuated. 25 Q Based on -- A And that was a new type of thing that Nobody had encountered anything like that except perhaps in the textile operations in England in the early years. So ... M R . BLANKS: Obj ect ion, nonresponsive. I'm not sure what he was responding to. Q Based on your work as an industrial hygienist throughout your career, your work and training as a doctor and the experience that you have had, do you have an opinion as to when there was documented scientific medical research and literature available so that the scientific and medical community were aware that insulation workers were at a risk of developing an asbestos-related cancer? A We are just confining it to the insulator workers? Q Right now, yes, sir. A Well, I guess in general even it was quite well into the '70's and some even as far as the '80's . We had to accept some of this in the early '70's because of the OSHA standard. But I think many of us felt -- Most of -- A great deal of people felt that this was excessive control. But it takes 447 1 a long time for something like that to come through 2 and be assimilated. And as I said a little earlier, 3 I don't suspect many physicians in practice today 4 have any inkling of what can happen with asbestos, 5 except those physicians who had occasion to need to 6 deal with it - occupational and others doing that u .j l :.j m m 7 type work. 8 Q Would it be fair to say that 9 Dr. Selikoff's presentation of data in 1964 raised 10 the question and the question then wasn't answered 11 in terms of asbestos-related cancers until sometime 12 in the early to mid-'70's after research and 13 analysis had been performed by the scientific and 14 medical community? 15 MR. BLANKS: Objection, calls 16 for speculation and lack of 17 -J 18 A foundation. Well, that's certainly true, yes. 19 Q And, Doctor, when we are talking -- When I 20 reference asbestos-related cancers, are you - are 21 you familiar with mesothelioma? 22 A Yes. Generally, yes. 23 Q And in terms of when mesothelioma was 24 associated with asbestos exposure, would that hold 25 true with your - with what you previously answered 448 1 in terms of asbestos-related cancers? 2 MR. BLANKS: Objection, 3 hopelessly vague. 4 A I'm not quite sure where -- 5 Q Okay. 6 A -- you are coming from - a time or what. 7 Q Okay. Let me -- Let me ask it this way 8 then. Doctor, do you have an opinion based on your 9 training and your experience as an industrial 10 hygienist and as a physician as to when there was an 11 association between asbestos exposure and 12 mesothelioma? 13 MR. BLANKS: Lack of foundation. 14 A It followed the work of 15 MR. BLANKS: Speculation. 16 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 17 MR. BLANKS: Go ahead. I'm 18 sorry to interrupt you, Doctor. 19 A Forgive me. It followed the work of 20 Wagner in South Africa who published a report on 21 this back in the 1960's I recall or thereabout. And 22 it caused quite a stir because mesothelioma, of 23 course, was a very rare tumor. It occurred with 24 some other exposures; namely erionite and some of 25 the other mineral deposits in Turkey and some other I! I 449 \ i j -*N .> -s4>' Ji f i wJ r* -` "i -- i '* - J -- 1 places. and with medical contrast media used in like 2 kidney - internal kidney X rays and some other 3 things. Some of it occurred without any known 4 reason. 5 But here was a significant incidence that 6 was very - obviously had to be related to something 7 new; and exposure was established and subsequently 8 clearly proven. But it took awhile for it to be 9 broadly accepted. But people jumped on 10 investigating and looking at it very promptly. It 11 was so unusual. It was such a remarkable thing. 12 Q Dr. Wagner's study in 1960 dealt with 13 miners out of South Africa; isn't that correct? 14 A I believe it was miners, yes. 15 Q That study ----- 16 A It may have been some other category, too. 17 But I think - - M y recollection it was with miners, 18 yes. 19 Q Primarily miners of asbestos; correct? 20 A Of amosite. Well, non-serpentine. 21 Q Okay. 22 A Crocidolite or whatever, you know, the . . . 23 Q That study didn't address insulation 24 workers or people who were applying or working 25 directly with insulation which may have utilized I ! II 450 1 asbestos, did it? 2 A Not to my recollection. 3 Q Based on your work as an industrial 4 hygienist and your membership on committees and in 5 organizations and your training, do you have an 6 opinion as to when it was generally accepted in the 7 scientific and medical community that there was a 8 risk to insulation workers of contracting 9 mesothelioma from asbestos exposure? 10 MR. BLANKS: Calls for 11 speculation; lack of foundation. 12 A I honestly don't know the answer to that. 13 I may have it somewhere; but I - I can't pull it up. 14 Q Would it be fair to say that it was at 15 least 1960? 16 A Oh, it was after that, yes. 17 Q Okay. 18 A But I can't recall just how long before it 19 w a s -- 20 MR. BLANKS: The same 21 objections. 22 A I should know it, but I'm just not -- I 23 said I feel like I should know it but I'm just not 24 bringing it up out of my head at the moment. Maybe 25 it's because of last night not sleeping. 1 451 1 Q Well, Doctor, would you agree that 2 knowledge of potential health hazards is a 3 constantly changing area; new information is 4 constantly being developed? 5 A In general? 6 Q Yes, in general. 7 A Oh, yes. Yes. 8 Q That's not a static arrangement of 9 information. It's not like you just learn something 10 and that's it? 11 A Oh, Lord. 12 Q It's constantly changing. And what might 13 be considered safe and appropriate one day, ten 14 years from then may not be? 15 A That's right. That's exactlytrue. 16 Q And advancements in technology and - and 17 analytical equipment provides for this change in 18 in-depth analysis, doesn't it? 19 MR. BLANKS: Objection, vague. 20 A Among other things, yes. 21 Q While you were working at Celanese, 22 Doctor, would it be fair to say that one of your 23 primary responsibilities was to protect the health 24 and the safety of the Celanese employees while they 25 were working at the plant? I ! 452 1 A Yes, sir. It was a preventive program 2 thrust basically. 3 Q And one way to do that was to participate 4 in the committees and organizations that you did so 5 that you could continuously learn of potential 6 hazards that may exist? 7 A That is correct. 8 Q In addition to just examining the work 9 environment and the occupational environment there 10 at the various plants? 11 A Absolutely, yes. 12 Q And when you -- When you in your role at 13 Celanese learned of potential hazards, would it be 14 fair to say that you saw that the necessary steps 15 were taken to protect the health and safety of the - 16 the employees that may potentially be affected by 17 those hazards? 18 A In general you are talking about? 19 Q Yes, sir. 20 A By in large, yes. Oh, yes, very 21 definitely, to the extent possible, of course. 22 MR. WEWERS: Doctor, I believe 23 those are all the questions I have 24 for you. I appreciate your time. 25 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 453 1 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: I need to 2 change the tape. We are off the 3 record at 3:IB. 4 5 (AT THIS TIME A BRIEF RECESS WAS 6 TAKEN, AND THE PROCEEDINGS THEREAFTER 7 RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:) 8 9 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back 10 on the record at 3:19. 11 12 EXAMINATION BY MR. HUTCHINS: 13 Q Dr. Dixon, as you know, my name is Mike 14 Hutchins,- and I represent Celanese in this case. I 15 would like to ask you a few questions based on the 16 testimony that you have already given in response to 17 questions asked you by Mr. Blanks and other 18 counsel. 19 You mentioned in your testimony that you 20 worked for the United States Public Health Service 21 in the early 1950's working with pesticide products 22 and their application. Do you remember that, 23 Doctor? 24 A Yes, sir. 25 Q Was your goal and that of the other U. S. 454 1 Public Health Service professionals you worked with 2 to eliminate or bring down to zero all exposures to 3 the pesticides that you were studying? 4 A To bring down or what? 5 Q To eliminate or bring down to zero all 6 exposures to the pesticides that you were studying. 7 A No, quite to the contrary. There we were 8 trying to determine safe levels to which people 9 could be exposed. And if they weren't exposed, it 10 wouldn't control the vectors. 11 Q Okay. Would it be fair to say that in 12 your work with pesticides it was assumed that there 13 would, in fact, be some exposure to pesticides? 14 A Exactly, yes. 15 Q All right. And you were attempting then 16 to determine what a safe level of exposure for the 17 worker would be? 18 A That is correct. 19 Q You have given some testimony previously. 20 Dr. Dixon, regarding what we have referred to as 21 MAC'S, TLV's and PEL'S, am I right? 22 A The MAC'S? 23 Q Right. 24 A Yes. 25 Q And that's an acronym that stands for I 455 1 maximum allowable concentrations; right? 2 A Correct. 3 Q And TLV's refer to threshold limit values? 4 A Yes. 5 Q And PEL'S - that's anotheracronym that 6 stands for permissible exposure levels? 7 A That is correct. 8 Q Okay. Now, I know you have given 9 testimony about these already. I believe you told 10 us that these were promulgated in part by the 11 American Conference of Governmental Industrial 12 Hygienists; is that right? 13 A Yes.That's true. 14 Q Okay. 15 A Even thePEL's which were theOSHA numbers 16 because they adopted the A.C.G.I.H. levels. 17 Q Over time have these MAC'S, TLV's or PEL'S 18 sought to eliminate exposures to various substances; 19 or do they assume some level of exposure to each - 20 each substance and seek to find a safe level of 21 exposure? 22 A Well, if the product exists,there's going 23 to be exposure, of course, potentially. It may be 24 very, small or not, but they -- Our objective is to 25 find out a level below which it would be rare to 456 1 find any adverse effects. It had a wide enough 2 safety margin in addition to the actual level that 3 would be - that would be needed to be cut down to to 4 catch almost all people. 5 Q All right. Over the course of your 6 professional experience in the field of industrial 7 health, has there always been an MAC or a TLV or a 8 PEL for asbestos? 9 A During what period? 10 Q During the course of your - your 11 professional experience in the field of industrial 12 health. 13 A Well, there was early on the 5 million - 14 5 million part per cubic foot levels that were 15 established rather informally, later adopted by 16 A.C.G.I.H. and whatnot. None of those were 17 statutory or regulatory levels until OSHA came 18 along. And actually OSHA developed - adopted the 19 1968 A.C.G.I.H. levels for its first list. I hope 20 that was - addressed your question properly. 21 Q Well, yes. It sounds like what you are 22 saying then is that the - these exposure levels for 23 asbestos - whether you want to them call an MAC, 24 TLV,.PEL - have changed over time? 25 A They have. I! i 457 1 Q Okay. But whatever the level at any given 2 period of time, the - the permissible exposure level 3 if you would for asbestos assumes that there is some 4 exposure to asbestos to the working man; isn't that 5 correct? 6 A Potentially some exposure, yes. 7 Q Okay. And again, I think you said that 8 what these levels seek to do is to establish broadly 9 speaking a safe level of exposure? IQ A That is correct, for most people. 11 Q Okay. And that would be -- 12 A For a long ... 13 Q And that would be over an eight-hour 14 working day? 15 A Yes. It's actually predicated upon the 16 consideration of exposure for an eight-hour day, 17 five-day-a-week lifetime exposure. 30 years is 18 normally considered lifetime on average. So, it's 19 for an aggregate exposure through time - every work 20 day throughout the working history. 21 Q I believe you testified that you went to 22 college and medical school. Where was that. Doctor? 23 A The University of Virginia. 24 Q Would you consider that to be a good 25 medical program, sir? 458 X A Yes, air. 2 Q And you graduated from the University of 3 Virginia Medical School in what year? 4 A 1947. 5 Q Were you taught anything in either your 6 undergraduate education or in medical school 7 regarding the characteristics of asbestos or 8 potential asbestos health risks? 9 A No, sir, not to my recollection. 10 Q I believe you testified that you served 11 for a period of time as a doctor in the United 12 States Navy stationed at: Portsmouth? 13 A That's right. Yes, sir. 14 Q Did you acquire any information or were 15 you told anything while in the U. S. Navy regarding ie the characteristics of asbestos or possible 17 asbestos-related health risks? 18 A I do not recall any. 19 Q Now, X believe it has been your testimony 20 that you took your second doctorate in industrial 21 health at the Kettering labs of the University of 22 Cincinnati? 23 A That is correct. 24 Q . And you --- 25 A Correct. Excuse m e . I! 459 1 Q And you graduated in 1957 after 2 a three-year program? 3 A Yes, sir. 4 Q Then and since that time, based on your 5 experience in the field, how has Kettering been 6 regarded in terms of the quality of education it has 7 offered in the fields of industrial health? 8 A Well, it's been throughout its history 9 probably the No. 1 center for education, research 10 and the like in occupational health, industrial 11 hygiene and toxicology in the country - probably in 12 the world. 13 Q Were the people who taught there and those 14 who visited to share their experience or teach 15 well-regarded in their fields? 16 A Very highly, yes. 17 Q Can you tell us just a little bit about 18 some of the people who visited Kettering to share 19 their experiences with the - the fellows there such 20 as yourself and where they may have been from? 21 A Well, the leader at the Kettering lab at 22 the University of Cincinnati was Dr. Robert Kehoe, 23 K-e-h-o-e, who was one of the world leaders in the 24 early field of industrial toxicology, occupational 25 health. He was the physician who undertook to 460 1 resolve the very painful issues relating to the use 2 of tetraethyl lead in gasoline --- 3 Q Right. 4 A in the early period of the 5 automobile. And without the work he did, the 6 government would have banned the use of these lead 7 compounds and literally stopped the development of 8 the combustion engine for use in that purpose. 9 He didn't prevent the lead from being 10 toxic, but he learned what the toxicity was, how to 11 control it and set up procedures and testing and so 12 forth and medical monitoring that would preserve the 13 health of workers and preclude the rather horrendous 14 experience they had before there was any control 15 measures. 16 Q Did Dr. Kehoe or anybody else on the 17 faculty at the Kettering labs teach you about or 18 pass on to you any information regarding the 19 characteristics or - of asbestos or asbestos-related 20 health risks? 21 A Could I go back to the prior question 22 first just for a second? 23 Q Certainly. 24 A You had asked meabout other people --- 25 Q Uh-huh. I 461 3 Ji 1 A -- and whatnot, and I didn't proceed with 2 that. Dr. Kehoe was vitally interested in 3 developing a cadre of experts in the field of 4 occupational health. And he was very dedicated in a5 his training and made sure all of his other people 6 were. And one of his special attributes or I7 accomplishments was attracting leaders in the field 8 from all over the world, particularly in the United ~n 9 States, to come to the Kettering - and we had 10 Saturday seminars that these leaders in the field 11 would come and tell of their experiences and get 12 acquainted with us. It was during the course of a 13 whole day with dinner and lunch and - and we had the a 14 seminars and whatnot. And it gave us a leg up on 15 any other organization in terms of getting us 16 acquainted with the field broadly - of the experts J 17 in the field. 18 Q I believe -- 19 A Now -- I'm sorry. 20 Q And just to follow up on that, I believe 21 you testified earlier that Dr. Arthur Vorwald was 22 one of the visiting lecturers? 23 A Yes, sir. 24 Q Have you ever heard of a man named Richard 25 Doll? I 462 1 A Yes. 2 Q Was Richard Doll one of the visiting 3 lecturers? 4 A I can't recall whether he came over here 5 or whether we got to know him in the meetings that 6 Dr. Kehoe insisted we go to and paid the way for it 7 and all of that. 8 Q Dr. Dixon, while at Kettering did any of 9 the faculty or did any of these visiting lecturers 10 share with you any information or provide any 11 specific instruction regarding the characteristics 12 of asbestos or asbestos-related health risks? 13 A I don't recall it at all. And X verified 14 that with my - some of my other group in training at 15 the same time because it was sort of troubling to 16 not be sure of what that experience was; and I have 17 verified it. 18 Q Did any of the faculty at Kettering or any 19 of these visiting lecturers share with you or pass 20 on any suggestion that there was a cancer risk or a 21 carcinogenic potential associated with asbestos? 22 A Absolutely not. 23 Q And I believe you also testified that 24 while you were at Kettering as part of what I think 25 you called your preceptorship program -- I ! 463 1 A Year. 2 Q year 3 A Third year, yes. 4 Q -- you actually went into plants in the 5 field as it were. 6 A We did it all through the whole program. 7 I'm sorry. Yes. 8 Q Okay. In your visits to these plants 9 while you were going through your training period at 10 Kettering, did anybody there pass on to you any 11 information regarding the characteristics of 12 asbestos, asbestos-related health risks or possible 13 carcinogenicity associated with asbestos? 14 A No. The principal concerns in those days 15 was silica, silicotuberculosis and coal dust, which 16 was a new phenomenon - coal dust disease at that 17 time. And I never heard of anybody that I can 18 recall even mention asbestos. 19 Q All right. I believe -- 20 A I can't say they didn't, but it was 21 certainly not recalled. 22 Q I believe youtestified, Dr. Dixon, that 23 you went to work for American Cyanamid after you 24 graduated from Kettering in '57? 25 A Yes, sir. 464 1 Q Was asbestos or asbestos-containing 2 insulation used in the various plants or facilities 3 at Cyanamid for which you had responsibility? 4 A I presume that it was. I didn't address 5 the issue specifically, but I presume so. 6 Q In the various occupational health 7 positions that you occupied at Cyanamid, did you 8 see, did you hear or did you have reported to you 9 any claims of asbestos-related injury? 10 A Not that I can recall, no. 11 Q You were asked by Mr. Blanks about an 12 extensive number of industrial hygienists or 13 occupational health physicians who you worked with 14 or knew at Cyanamid. 15 A At Cyanamid? 16 Q 17 A At Cyanamid. Yes, sir. 18 Q I don't want to go through all those names 19 again. 20 You also were asked by Mr. Blanks about an 21 extensive number of individuals you had contacts 22 with in other companies whiles you worked at 23 Cyanamid. 24 A . Yes. 25 Q Industrial health 465 1 A Yes. 2 Q -- physicians, industrial hygienists, 3 those types of folks. 4 A Yes. 5 Q In your interaction with any of those 6 people, industrial health doctors or industrial 7 hygienists within Cyanamid or outside of Cyanamid, 8 did you discuss, did you hear or did you receive any 9 information regarding the characteristics of 10 asbestos? 11 A Not that I can recall at all. 12 Q Asbestos-related health risks? 13 A No. 14 Q Possible cancer risks associated with 15 asbestos? 16 A No. 17 Q You testified earlier I believe that the 18 Cyanamid industrial hygiene program involved what 19 you referred to as the constant surveillance of 20 operations. 21 A Constant? 22 Q (Nodding affirmatively) 23 A I don't know that I used that term. There 24 was a repetitive and frequent - you know, try to 25 keep a current evaluation of it. It wouldn't be 466 1 constant like every minute of the day, but it was an 2 ongoing, continuing effort. 3 Q What was being surveilled, if you would, 4 or monitored for at the Cyanamid plants? 5 A Any one plant in particular or just 6 generally? 7 Q In general. 8 A Well, whatever agents there were being 9 manufactured or.used in processes that were known to 10 be hazardous if - if worker exposure occurred. By 11 in large that would be the correct answer. 12 Q And that would be chemicals? 13 A Largely chemicals. But it was noise and 14 radiation and some other things - dusts, vapors. 15 Q You mentioned earlier that Cyanamid had to 16 have a particular type of program because it had 17 particularly dangerous chemicals that it 18 manufactured or used. Can you share with us what 19 some of those chemicals would have been? 20 A Well, there were a lot of organic 21 compounds. We manufactured at the one plant in 22 Bound Brook, for example, over 900 different 23 chemicals - many - many similar, but differing 24 categories and whatnot. And a large number of them 25 were quite toxic. They were in the organic amino 467 .... 1 groups and the - the anilines and solvents that were 2 highly hazardous and the like so that -- And the - 3 experience had been very bad in the earlier years * 4 with fatalities and illness and all because .J " n 5 exposures were excessive and people were harmed. 6 Q I believe you testified earlier that y 7 Cyanamid made efforts to make sure that workers or .j 8 people at the plants knew about hazards. 3i J 9 A Very definitely. n 10 Q . 'i Would those be the hazards associated with .J 11 these same chemicals that you have been talking 12 about? 13 A Yes, any chemical to which a worker might -J 14 have exposure or a category of chemicals or a class * *r} 15 of chemicals or whatnot. There were as most - in 16 most of the chemical companies there were regular, 17 usually weekly, safety meetings that covered '1 18 physical hazards, chemical hazards, whatever adverse 1 1 19 effects that might be encountered by the work force 20 in their particular area of assignment. And this 21 was carried out very intensively and was very -- 22 religiously subscribed to and it was mandatory to 23 attend and so forth. -- 24 Q . Was the same program of monitoring for 25 chemical risks and other known hazards and !i -- _ 468 1 disseminating information about those hazards 2 pursued by Celanese when you came there later or 3 not? 4 A You said "monitoring" meaning what? 5 Q Assessing risk associated with chemicals 6 in the work -- 7 A Assessing risk,, yes. Yes. Monitoring can 8 be considered a variety of different things. That's 9 why X wasn't quite sure. 10 Q So, this same type of program that you are 11 talking about at Cyanamid would be pursued at 12 Celanese as well? 13 A Yes, although it was less intensive in - 14 at Celanese because we didn't have the magnitude of 15 hazards. IS Q Dr. Dixon, you testified that you belonged 17 to the American Industrial Hygiene Association, the 18 Industrial Medical Society and a number of other 19 groups. \ 20 A (Nodding affirmatively) 21 Q Is that correct? 22 A That is correct. 23 Q At any time in the 1940's, the 195Q's or 24 the 1960's, from any of the professional 25 organizations that you belonged to, do you recall i II i 469 1 receiving any information specifically related to 2 the characteristics of asbestos? 3 A I don't. But the - the period would not 4 have included the '40's. It would have included 5 from the mid-'50's on. 6 Q I see. During that same period from any 7 of these industrial hygiene, occupational health 8 groups, did you receive or do you recall receiving 9 any information specific to asbestos health risks or 10 potential carcinogenicity associated with asbestos? 11 A Well, the latter absolutely not; and I 12 don't recall any of the former either. 13 Q Let me shift to other professional groups 14 or trade associations that either you or your 15 employers may have had dealings with. And I believe 16 you have talked about the American Public Health 17 Association. You have been asked about the 18 Industrial Hygiene Foundation, the National Safety 19 Council. I believe you have testified about the 20 Organization of Resource Counselors. I believe you 21 have mentioned the Manufacturing Chemists 22 Association, what later became known as the Chemical 23 Manufacturers Association. 24 A Yes. 25 Q In any of your dealings with those groups, / I 470 1 .,.j 1 do you recall receiving any information from those 2 groups or people employed by them regarding the 3 characteristics of asbestos? 1 4 A Up until when? 5 Q Up until in the 1960's let's say. 6 A Oh, absolutely not. No. I'm sorry. I 7 forgot you had already specified the date. 8 Q During that same period, Dr. Dixon, do you ..j 9 recall receiving any information from those groups ] 10 regarding potential asbestos health hazards or any 11 cancer risk associated with asbestos exposure? 12 A N o , I do not. 13 Q You have been asked some questions earlier 14 about people you knew in the petroleum or the oil .3 15 industry. Do you remember those questions? 16 A More or, less, yes. 17 Q These were individuals who you had 18 professional dealings with from time to time. 19 A Yes, sir. 20 Q I believe you mentioned a Dr. Hammond and 21 a Dr. Weaver, for example. 22 A Yes. Yes, sir. That's true. 23 MR. BLANKS: Hang on. 24 MR. HUTCHINS: Pardon? 25 MR. BLANKS: I think Mr. Hammond i n -- _ 471 was - was not in fact a doctor. MR. HUTCHINS: Okay. A He was not a physician. MR. BLANKS: James Hammond. A James Hammond - he was not a physician. He was the Exxon head of industrial hygiene. (By Mr. Hutchins) Q And I believe that you testified that 10 these individuals generally were open and inclined 11 to share industrial hygiene information? 12 A Oh, we all were, yes. 13 Q Did any of the people who you knew 14 employed by the petroleum or the oil industry share 15 with you as you recall any information specific to 16 asbestos, asbestos-related health risks or possible 17 cancer risks associated with asbestos? 18 A No, not until after the New York Academy 19 of Sciences meeting when it became the subject of 20 inquiry, but not information. 21 Q Did anybody in the petroleum industry or 22 outside the petroleum industry ever share with you 23 any report on industrial hygiene prepared by a man 24 named Roy Bonsib? 25 A No, I don't know that name. i 472 1 Q Have you ever seen that report? 2 A "Bonsim"? 3 Q Bonsib - B-o-n-s-i-b. 4 A No. I think I have heard of it; but I - 5 I - I was not aware of it. I have only heard that 6 name just quite recently. I don't know. 7 Q Let me ask basically the same questions 8 about your employment with the Bell System and 9 Western Electric. 10 Was asbestos or asbestos-containing 11 material used in the facilities of the Bell System 12 or Western Electric? 13 A Well, there was asbestos in the - some of 14 the undersea cable operations. It was a heavy, 15 gunky mess - a mixture of oily resinous material and 16 rope-like that was used in a sense to - in one of 17 the stages of wrapping multiple layers of it. It 18 would not emit asbestos - respirable asbestos, of 19 course. And it was put on in this wet, gunky, 20 sticky state. And then the whole thing was heat 21 cured after subsequent layers of coatings had been 22 applied to - coverings had been applied to it. It 23 had to be able to withstand deep sea life for 24 years. So, it was very heavily constructed. 25 Q In your employment as an occupational i i 473 1 health doctor with the Bell System and Western 2 Electric, do you recall receiving any information, 3 hearing of or seeing any claims of asbestos-related 4 injury at the Bell System or Western Electric? 5 A I don't recall it, no. 6 Q Do you recall receiving any information 7 from the Bell System or Western Electric or people 8 working there regarding asbestos, asbestos health 9 risks or any cancer risk associated with asbestos? 10 A No, I don't. 11 Q You were asked some questions earlier 12 regarding a book authored by a man named Hueper. Do 13 you remember those questions? 14 A Yes, I know we discussed Hueper here 15 today. 16 Q And I think you indicated that at some 17 point you obtained a copy of a book written by 18 Hueper. 19 A Well, it's a tabulation, yes. 20 Q Okay. Do you recall when you acquired 21 that book. Dr. Dixon? 22 A Sometime probably in the mid-'70's - mid 23 to late '70's . 24 Q . Would you have been aware of that book or 25 had a copy to it - of it before that time? 474 1 A NO. 2 Q I believe you gave testimony earlier that 3 you had heard of Hueper prior to that time? 4 A Yes. That is correct. 5 Q And I believe you gave -- 6 A I believe it was prior to that. Yeah. 7 I'm sure it had to be, yes. 8 Q And I believe you had given testimony that 9 what he had published was not considered to be 10 authoritative? 11 A Well, suspect certainly. He grabbed any 12 fact and put them in these tables. It was one of 13 these books that's very long, for example, so that 14 there were charts and many columns of things and 15 abbreviations and whatnot. And he had it all coded 16 in such a manner that you could get a lot of data on 17 there. And he would indicate things that might be 18 suspect as such or indicate a possibility, but never 19 with respect to asbestos that it was carcinogenic, 20 for example. 21 Q In response to a question from counsel 22 earlier you made reference to a 1960 study on 23 mesothelioma published by J. C. Wagner. 24 A That is correct. 25 Q Were you aware of Dr. Wagner's study in ! 475 i 1960? 2 A No, sir. 3 Q Is that something you have become aware of 4 since you have gone into consulting work? 5 A Well, it was much, much later than that 6 before I did because I wasn't involved in any 7 concerns with asbestos in the earlier period or 8 whatever. 9 Q When would you say would be the first time 10 that you heard a report or a mention that there 11 could be a cancer risk, whether mesothelioma or 12 otherwise, associated with asbestos exposure? 13 A I suppose really the Selikoff papers in 14 the mid-'60's. But that again was preliminary 15 information. It wasn't a definitive answer. 16 Q When Dr. Selikoff made his report 17 regarding asbestos and cancer, was - did that 18 coincide with or did that differ from what you had 19 been taught and what you believed in the field of 20 occupational health? 21 A It was totally different, if I understood 22 the question correctly. 23 Q What Dr. Selikoff had to say regarding 24 asbestos and cancer, did that -- 25 A I missed the first couple of words there. 476 1 I'm sorry. 2 Q All right. I will try it again. What 3 Dr. Selikoff reported regarding asbestos and cancer, 4 did the health consequences that he spoke of track 5 or differ from what you had seen in the work forces 6 you had been responsible for as an occupational 7 health doctor? 8 A Well, it was totally different. 9 Q Prior to Dr. Selikoff's report had you 10 ever personally seen or been made aware of any case 11 of occupationally related cancer said to be 12 associated with asbestos exposure? 13 A No, absolutely not. 14 Q I don't want to belabor the point. I IS think you indicated earlier that there was 16 wide-spread skepticism and certainly skepticism or 17 doubt on your part regarding what Dr. Selikoff had 18 to say in his 1964 presentation? 19 A That is correct. 20 Q Why was there skepticism. Dr. Dixon? 21 A Well, it was something that was totally 22 different from all that we might have known about 23 asbestos. I didn't know much about it at that 24 point, but the experience in this country had been 25 that we didn't have a problem with it. I guess we I ! 477 1 all knew that it was considered a - almost a 2 nuisance-type dust that might if exposures got very *l\v 3 high create the inflammatory or fifarogenic disease {J O a J 4 that had become known by that time I guess as 5 asbestosis. But beyond that, nothing. 6 Q I believe you indicated in response to 7 earlier questions that Dr. Selikoff's findings were \ 8 so unusual or so in variance with experience that - sj 9 that verification and further study was required? 10 A .,v 11 Q Absolutely. When did you come to believe or accept 12 that there was some risk of cancer of whatever form *v 13 associated with asbestos exposure? 1.I 14 A Well, you had to assume some little 15 element of concern from a report of that sort. But w 16 it wasn't until in the '70's and maybe even the late 17 '70's before we accepted that - that there was 18 verification this was true; that it occurred only 19 under unusual - what were considered unusual 20 exposure conditions, et cetera. 21 But there was verification that it could 22 exist, and gradually it became peer reviewed and 23 ultimately most physicians who were knowledgable 24 about occupational type diseases accepted it. And, 25 of course, OSHA then when it came along mandated I !' ! 478 1 acceptance of - at least the principles of 2 protection. So ... 3 Q Now, you mentioned that OSHA mandated the 4 principles of - of protection associated with 5 asbestos. I'm not asking you for precise details, 6 but did you have information while you were at 7 Celanese regarding whether or not Celanese's plants 8 complied with those OSHA regulations? 9 A Oh, you mean after the regulations came 10 out? 11 Q That's right. 12 A 13 Q Yes, they - they did. Okay. And that was information reported 14 to you at that time? 15 A Yes. 16 Q 17 A 18 Q All right. After the act became effective. I think you just --- 19 A I mean after the regulation on asbestos 20 became effective, not the OSHA act. 21 Q I see. I believe that you just said that 22 it was sometime in the 1970's where a consensus 23 emerged that there was some - indeed some cancer 24 risk associated with asbestos exposure? 25 A That is correct. ! 479 i Q At ieast based on what you knew and the 2 people who you dealt with? 3 A Yes. 4 Q Were all questions settled for all time 5 regarding asbestos -- 6 A No. 7 Q -- and cancer risk even then? 8 A No, nor have they still. 9 Q Is that still an evolving and ongoing 10 A Yes. 11 Q -- process? 12 A Sure. But the basics of that were, of 13 course, established. 14 Q You have been asked questions about air 15 sampling or air monitoring. Do you recall those 16 questions, Doctor? 17 A Some of them, yeah. I'm not sure which 18 ones you are referring t o . 19 Q Has the technology or the technique 20 associated with air sampling and air monitoring 21 remained static over time or has that changed based 22 on your experience. Doctor? 23 A It has changed quite dramatically really. 24 The early methods -- Or should I ... 25 Q Sure. 480 1 A The early methods were by today's 2 methodology, standards and whatnot quite crude and 3 ineffective. We have optical microscopy and related 4 type things today. We have got all kinds of new, 5 fancy equipment - electron microscopy and better 6 sampling, collection equipment. And, so, there is a 7 substantial improvement in - in the types of both 8 sampling and analytical testing that goes on. 9 Q Based on your experience at the facilities 10 where you worked or where you had responsibilities, 11 was air sampling something that was commonly done' in 12 the late 1950's or the early 1960's? 13 A Essentially not. It wasn't done at all to 14 my knowledge anywhere that way. 15 Q Was it - 16 A In the companies and the - the industry 17 that I knew. 18 Q Would the same be true in the late 1960's? 19 A Yes. 20 Q If air sampling was not done, what 21 techniques would be employed by professionals to 22 assess exposures and make judgments about potential 23 risk? 24 A Say it once more. 25 Q Certainly. If air sampling was not I 481 1 commonly done during this period we have just been 2 talking about -- 3 A Yeah. 4 Q -- what techniques would be employed by 5 professionals to make judgments about exposures or 6 potential risks? 7 A For asbestos? 8 Q Asbestos or any other substance. 9 A Or any other substance. I'm still having 10 trouble with the question. By the time you get to 11 the end of it, I'm forgetting the first part. 12 Q Okay. 13 A It's my fault. Forgive me. 14 Q In the late 1950'sthroughout the1960's 15 what techniques would commonly be used or relied 16 upon by health professionals to assess exposures in 17 a plant environment? 18 A To anything? 19 Q To anything. 20 A Well, primarilyassuming it was a physical 21 material or a gas or whatnot, there were collection 22 devices by which the air would be drawn through 23 them. And any substance - a particular substance, 24 for example, would be caught by filters - filters 25 and the like. ! 482 1 Liquids, mists, gases would be caught in - 2 more often in a liquid medium. And then after 3 sampling on standardized formats of time and what 4 volume of material - air had been sucked through 5 them, one would analyze the amount of material in 6 the sample and then could calculate what the air 7 concentration per unit of air would be from that 8 analysis. Is that -- 9 Q Well, those are certainly techniques, 10 yes. Thank you. 11 Were those -- Again, I believe you told me 12 earlier that that type of air sampling would not 13 have been routinely done in the '50's or the 1960's? 14 A No, it was not. 15 Q Was there some other approved or generally 16 accepted technique or a set of techniques for 17 assessing exposures during that time period? 18 A Not really. One, of course, would 19 visually inspect the operations as we did. The 20 basic -- The basic thrust of industrial hygiene in 21 general in the early days was actually inspection, 22 was to see if the equipment was operating correctly, 23 were there leaks, was there opportunity for spillage 24 or air contamination; look to see what the work 25 practices were so that the workers themselves were 483 1 doing it in a safe manner, and related type things 2 to keep exposure down to a reasonable minimum. 3 And I think that would be the principal 4 way because actually air sampling or analysis of 5 sampling was very difficult. It was costly. It was 6 time consuming. It was inaccurate and essentially 7 involved wet-type chemical bench analyses of the 8 results, which compared to the current methods of 9 quick, easy electronic measurements of things was 10 something that could avoid as much as you could 11 (sic). So ... 12 Q Was observation and the use of 13 professional judgment a common practice in 14 industrial hygiene at that time, or would it have 15 not been common? 16 A It was the -- It was the most common 17 thing, yes. 18 Q Would that be true up, say, through the 19 late 1960's of all of the various companies where 20 you worked? 21 A Yes. There were exceptions of that to 22 certain specific problem chemicals, for example, 23 lead. And there were methods for analyzing that and 24 some .of the very highly toxic solvents and organic 25 chemicals, which you could analyze chemically pretty i l 484 1 easily. 2 But by in large more of it was the - by 3 observation and following the precepts I mentioned 4 earlier about seeing that it looked safe, if the 5 equipment was proper and the workers were doing safe 6 work practices, et cetera. 7 Q Let me move on here and try to finish. 8 Let's move on to your employment as the corporate 9 medical director at Celanese, Dr. Dixon. 10 A Yes, sir. 11 Q You gave some testimony regarding a . 12 substance called betapropiolactone. Do you remember 13 that? 14 A Betapropiolactone, yes. 15 THE WITNESS: Do you want the IS spelling? 17 THE REPORTER: No, sir. 18 M R . HUTCHINS: He knows how to 19 spell betapropiolactone. 20 21 (By Mr. Hutchins) 22 Q when did Celanese becomeinterested in 23 looking at betapropiolactone as you remember, 24 Doctor? 25 A When did they do what? _ 485 1 Q When did Celanese start looking at the 2 possible hazards associated with betapropiolactone? 3 A It was prior to my joining Celanese. I 4 know the history was that betapropiolactone, 5 although a very simple compound, was extraordinarily 6 active - a reactive chemical; and it reacted with 7 tissues, too. If a worker got some of the normal 8 concentration of material on the skin and didn't 9 wash it off very, very promptly, later that day or 10 that night they would find an ulcerated lesion that 11 had evolved and it eroded through the skin. And 12 they were very hard to heal and whatnot. 13 The very fact that it was so reactive 14 stimulated our company and the company for whom we 15 made this product, which happened to be Goodrich - 16 or Goodyear - no. One of the tire companies. I 17 have forgotten which one it was right now. I will 18 think of it in a second - to consider that this was 19 a remarkable phenomenon and that it might indicate 20 some other potential for harm. 21 Therefore, they charted a study that was 22 undertaken at New York University to determine the 23 nature of these burns and to see did it have a - a 24 carcinogenic potential because highly reactive 25 compounds were the kind of ones that would be most I __ 486 1 suspected as being that way. 2 And to everybody's chagrin - and they had 3 just gotten the results of this when I came to the 4 company. It was very highly carcinogenic in mice 5 and rats and whatnot in animal studies. 6 Q Now, this was a chemical; correct? 7 A It's a chemical, yes. 8 Q All right. And betapropiolactone was a 9 chemical used by Celanese in one of its own 10 processes? 11 A Well, we manufactured it for use by the 12 tire companies and some other people. The 13 government was very active and interested in it 14 because it was very useful in the sterilization of 15 bacteria and whatnot, and the chemical warfare 16 people were interested in it so that -- But the 17 basic product was made for a rubber additive. 18 Q And if I understood you correctly, 19 Celanese sponsored a study - an animal study into 20 possible cancer risks associated with that chemical? 21 A Yes. Among other hazards, yes. 22 Q And the results of that study were 23 reported in toto directly back to Celanese? 24 A And the tire company, yes. 25 Q Okay. And I believe you testified in ' II 487 1 response to an earlier question that based on a 2 conclusion that betapropiolactone could cause 3 cancer, that Celanese chose to report that 4 information to OSHA? 5 A That is right. 6 Q What did OSHA do with that information -- 7 A It was very ... 8 Q -- when - when Celanese reported it? 9 A Excuse me. This was very early in the 10 history of OSHA. When they had a hearing on 11 establishing a carcinogen standard, there was one in 12 which would include those known industrial materials 13 which should be classified as potentially 14 carcinogenic. 15 And the initial thrust of that was to cite 16 12 compounds as the first list. And the people in 17 companies, government, academia and whatnot who had 18 data on these 12 compounds presented their findings 19 in support.of that at this meeting of OSHA. It was 20 a carcinogen standard meeting. 21 And in my company we decided that this 22 information should be presented to OSHA for 23 consideration of including that material on the list 24 of human carcinogen - known - chemicals with - 25 industrial chemicals with human cancer causing _ 488 1 potential. 1 2 I actually presented that data at the 3 meeting and recommended that it be adopted for 4 addition to the list. So, it became the 13th item J 5 on the initial carcinogen list - so as to make 6 something that everybody knew about. 3 7 Q Doctor, when you came to Celanese did 8 Dr. A. G. Cranch or Dr. Osterritter -- 9 A Dr. Osterritter, yes. 10 Q -- pass on to you in any way any 11 information regarding asbestos, asbestos health 12 hazards or any carcinogenic potential associated 13 with asbestos? 14 A Certainly not to my recollection. 15 Q And throughout the entirety of your career 16 as the corporate medical director at Celanese, did 17 you receive information, hear of or know of any 18 claims involving a Celanese employee said to be 19 injured because of asbestos to exposure - exposure 20 to asbestos? 21 A Excuse me. No, I did not. 22 Q 23 A Asbestosis? No, sir. 24 Q Did you receive any claims while you were 25 employed by Celanese that a Celanese employee had I 489 . X 1 incurred some sort of cancer said to be related to 2 asbestos exposure? 3 A No, I did not. 4 Q Would that type of information regarding 5 occupational illness be reported to you as the 6 corporate medical director? 7 A Yes, it should have been. 8 Q All right. And was it typically or was it 9 not? 10 A It was typically, yes. We received 11 monthly reports from each of the divisions of the 12 corporation compiling experiences in essential areas 13 throughout their plants. " I 14 Q I believe you have testified that over the 15 course of your career you had reason to visit many 16 plants or facilities operated by many different 17 companies. 18 A Yes, sir. 19 Q How would you rate the cleanliness or the 20 housekeeping practices followed at Celanese's plants 21 against all the other company plants that you 22 visited in the course of your career? 23 A I don't think I ever saw a company that 24 maintained - maintained its properties better, 25 maintained good housekeeping, cleanliness. And they I ! ! 490 1 were immaculate, even the old plants. It was a 2 startling sight to behold. It was so profoundly . I 3 good. % 4 Q You visited each of the Celanese -a 5 facilities from time to time? n. j j 6 A Every facility, y e s . Most of them every i7-,'-i5 7 year at least once. A 8 Q Would that include the Bishop plant? 9 A Yes, it did. 10 Q Did you visit those plants in the course 11 of their ordinary operations, or was this some sort 12 of special tour arranged just for you? 13 A Well, normally during their regular 14 operating conditions and whatnot. 15 Q Did you ever notice in the course of those 16 visits dust clouds or excessive amounts of dust from 17 whatever source being generated at the facilities? 18 A No, I did not. There would be vapor J 19 clouds sometimes of moisture and whatnot and 20 inversion conditions like you would get with a 21 chimney at home,- but nothing other than that. 22 Q Would clouds of dust based on your 23 professional training and experience cause you to at 24 least look into the situation had you seen those 25 types of conditions? 491 1 A Oh, absolutely. That would be one of the 2 objectives of the industrial hygiene surveys and 3 observations we would make in the plants. Any 4 untoward operating condition like that would be 5 immediately red flagged. 6 Q Sir, at any time during your career at 7 Celanese, using your best professional judgment and 8 your experience and the knowledge of the conditions 9 in Celanese's plants, did you ever form an actual 10 subjective belief that any Celanese employee stood 11 at a potential risk of harm because of asbestos 12 exposure? 13 A I did not. 14 Q Did you ever form any actual subjective 15 belief that any Celanese employee stood at a 16 potential risk of incurring asbestosis? 17 A You said objective or -- Subjective I 18 believe was the word you used. 19 Q 20 A Well, either. No. 21 Q 22 A Objectively or subjectively -Neither one, no. 23 Q Objectively or subjectively based on what 24 you saw in our plants and your professional judgment 25 and experience -- _ . 492 1 A That is correct. 2 Q -- did you form any belief that any 3 Celanese employee stood at a potential risk of any 4 asbestos-related cancer? 5 A No, 1 did not. 6 Q One last question, Doctor. You indicated 7 that you knew Dr. Selikoff. 8 A Yes. 9 Q Subsequent to 1964 I believe you indicated 10 that you had dealings with Dr. Selikoff. 11 A Subsequent to? 12 Q Right. 13 A Yes. Yes. Not before but after; right. 14 Q And I believe it was your testimony that 15 Dr. Selikoff appointed you to be a director or be on 16 the board of some particular organization? 17 A Yes. 18 Q And what was thatorganization that - 19 A That was the ERCor EducationResource 20 Center of the - the four major medical schools and 21 the Hunter College of Women's nursing school into a 22 group that collectively had occupational health 23 training, et cetera. This was a -- The ERC had 24 probably - there were nine or ten of them created 25 around the country funded by NIOSH to have regional II 493 1 opportunity and - to be able to avail people in the *9 2 vicinity of these areas that come to have training 3 in occupational health, industrial hygiene and 4 related subjects in a convenient manner and .J JI 5 whatnot. Some other missions, too. 6 But he appointed me to the board of -- He 9 7 was the - - H e happened to be chairman of the - from Ji 8 the Mt. Sinai school. And he appointed me to the 9 board of directors sometime I guess in the early - 10 mid-'70's - probably the mid-'70's. 11 Q Doctor, did you -- Was Dr. Selikoff a 12 professional colleague, or did you consider him to 13 be a friend? 14 A Well, neither in the beginning. I - I - I 15 was apprehensive about what his motives were and how 16 honest he might be and that sort of thing. But in 17 time I came to respect him and to ultimately become 18 good friends with him really. 19 Q And did you maintain contact -- 20 A He moderated considerably as time went 21 along, but ... 22 Q Did you maintain contact with Dr. Selikoff 23 up until his death? 24 A Yes, more or less in the last several 25 years. I didn't have frequent contact with him, I _ 494 1 but - being away from New York. I remained on his 2 board until I left up there. But we would see each 3 other at meetings. Several times we would bump into 4 each other on airplanes. And one time over in 5 Yugoslavia we met in the late '70's or early '80's 6 possibly, just before I moved down here - I came 7 back here. And we were quite friendly. 8 MR. HUTCHINS: Doctor, I think 9 those are all the questions I have 10 for you. One moment, please. 11 I think those are all the 12 questions I have for you at this 13 time, Doctor. I appreciate your time 14 and your patience. 15 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 16 MR. BLANKS: I need a few t 17 minutes. 18 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are off 19 the record at 4:08. 20 21 (AT THIS TIME A BRIEF RECESS WAS 22 TAKEN, AND THE PROCEEDINGS THEREAFTER 23 RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:) 24 25 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: we are o n 'the 495 1 record at 4:19. 2 3 RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. BLANKS: 4 Q Okay, Doctor, trying to wrap up. You were 5 asked a lot of questions about what people in the 6 medical and scientific community knew or believed 7 about asbestos and carcinogenicity and so on. But 8 wouldn't you agree that probably the best evidence 9 of what was known out there in the occupational -- 10 Wouldn't you agree, Doctor, that what was known in 11 the medical - in the occupational medicine field and 12 in the industrial hygiene field back in the '60's 13 and the '50's and the '40's and even in the '30's 14 is going to be best reflected in the - the written 15 word from that time; that is, what the - the authors 16 and the writers of that time were saying in their 17 publications? 18 A Back in the '30's and the '40's? 19 Q As far back as you go that's the best 20 evidence we have, isn't it? 21 A It was something that never drew our 22 attention, of course, because we didn't feel that 23 there was any problem in this country. And, 24 therefore, it was not a matter that we looked at or 25 studied or whatnot until at a later point when 496 1 really after Selikoff made his presentation and - 2 and subsequently. I was totally oblivious to 3 anything that had been published about asbestos 4 prior to that time. There was some, but it was 5 rather limited. 6 Q Okay. But my point was: If we want to 7 know what - what information was out there for 8 doctors or hygienists to - to work with, we would 9 look to the - to the professional journals and the 10 medical textbooks -- 11 A You don't look at everything. You look at 12 those things that you think are problems. And I had 13 no occasion to do so as most did not at that point. 14 And I didn't. I know that history now in 15 retrospect, but I did not know it; had no occasion 16 to even look to find it. So ... 17 Q I'm sorry. And I didn't mean to 18 A 19 Q 20 A -- Oh, no. to be I'm just critical say of in y g o that u. .. No. No. I'm not -- I'm just 21 expressing that -- 22 Q Okay. 23 A -- as an answer. 24 Q And how - how did Celanese go about 25 assuring that its boilermakers and its pipefitters I i 497 1 and maintenance workers did not have asbestos 2 exposures above the MAC or the TLV in the years 3 before you got there? 4 A In the years before I got there? 5 q Yes, sir. 6 A I don't know what happened in the years 7 before I got there. 8 q And how did Celanese assure that its 9 boilermakers and pipefitters and maintenance workers 10 did not have asbestos exposures above the TLV or the 11 MAC after you began there in 1965? 12 A Well, ourobservation of the limited work, 13 the short duration of particular projects that were 14 undertaken like a repair of one small area or 15 something and then the replacement of it was not 16 thought to - by us at least and most people in a 17 comparable state of knowledge - to be detrimental. 18 And I still think the same thing. 19 Q Okay. 20 A But we would test today inaddition to 21 observing and knowing what was being done. Or we 22 could test and do some. You have to do some. 23 Q In your - - I n your professional lifetime 24 have, you ever done air sampling for asbestos? 25 A Me? ! 498 1 Q Yes, sir. 2 A Well, I have rarely done air sampling 3 myself except to help when it was being done because 4 that wasn't my role. I know all the -- I'm familiar 5 with it. I'm qualified in it. But I didn't 6 actually do the work myself. I would be there when 7 it was being done quite often, and sometimes I would 8 help the people doing it. But that was not my role 9 to do the actual testing myself, nor the analysis 10 either. 11 Q Isn't it true if we - if we look back to 12 the pesticide studies that you worked on in your 13 Public Health Service years that, in fact, for that 14 study to - to accomplish its purpose, you doctors 15 really needed to - to find let's say high exposures 16 in order to have detectable consequences from which 17 to promulgate safe exposure levels? 18 A Say that all over. I couldn't follow 19 that. Excuse me. 20 Q I said your - your pesticide study, in 21 order to - to have any useful results really was 22 dependent on there being shall we say excessive 23 exposures so that you could observe the level at 24 which symptoms appeared? 25 A Well, not necessarily. We could observe i 499 1 m* *i . -j i i 1 l i 'A J .J -J 1 *4 -- --*i ' -- l lower levels to see if they did induce measurable 2 responses. That would be the primary thing. If 3 there were excess exposures, we used that 4 information as an adjunctive basis for having a 5 better understanding of what these materials could 6 do. We had a lot of knowledge of that, of course, 7 anyhow from the German experience in World War II. 8 We had access to all of that from the 9 military. So, we weren't looking for worst case 10 scenarios. We were looking for normal type 11 scenarios and to see -- You forget perhaps what the 12 objective was. This was not for industrial exposure 13 potential. It was really for use on - in population 14 groups who were exposed to insect vectors of disease 15 in foreign countries by in large. 16 The problem arose because we were using - 17 the government was using these things and 18 recommending these things to other countries in 19 disease eradication. Malaria was the biggest single 20 thing. That was the greatest killer in the world of 21 anything we have ever had. 22 And, so, people brought up the fact "Well, 23 what's the hazard of the material?" And we didn't 24 really know. So, we were charged -- The CDC was 25 charged with trying to be sure that what we were i ii 500 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 ' 24 25 recommending was safe; not what the worst case situation was, but what the normal usage might induce in the way of harm. But it inevitably had to be involved in actual exposure to the population because you can't spray a population without them being exposed. Q Okay. A Do you know what I'm saying? Q Yes, sir. In the -- In the mid-'60's when you went to Celanese, what was Celanese doing then to - to determine what the frequency of exposures to asbestos was among its boilermakers and its pipefitters and its maintenance people? A Nothing other than observation as we did with our walk-through industrial hygiene surveys to see if the practices, the equipment, the worker practices themselves and so forth was realistic for what we thought they ought to be doing. It would be true for any of the dust diseases or other diseases for that matter -- Q Do you know of any ... A -- for which there was not an established known - widely known hazard as such; and we didn't think there was. Q Do - do you know of any time motion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 studies or other surveys of Celanese maintenance workers and boilermakers and such to show really how much time they spent involved with - with asbestos insulation? A 1 can't tell you that at this point. But I know this was something that was looked at. It was sporadic and isolated to usually small areas. If it had been -- It was on existing equipment by in large. They weren't doing the installation of insulation themselves and so forth on basic equipment. They were doing repair work. If something went wrong with the equipment or during maintenance turnarounds, they would have to remove a square of asbestos to get to a fitting or a joint or somewhere there was a leak or something of the sort so that the potential -- Just like you were talking about taking the asbestos and breaking it apart and milling it and all those things, the quantity of it was small, it was of short duration; totally unlike the kinds of exposure people got in mines, mills, shipyards and all where it was a continuous high level exposure day in and day out. It would be short term, limited duration, limited potential for exposures so that we didn't I! I 502 1 have any real substantive reason - knowledge at that 2 time to do any specific testing. And testing was 3 very difficult - very, very difficult. 4 Q And if a man in his job - if his job was 5 to do repair work of boilers and pipes and such 6 where that involved daily contact with the 7 insulating materials, then your assumptions would 8 not be correct, would they? 9 A They wouldn't. But in - in reality that 10 was what they were doing. Boilermakers, for 11 example - our employees didn't have a great deal of 12 potential for exposure there. If there was an 13 installation job, this was done by the contract 14 maintenance people or outside companies would come 15 in and do that sort of thing. Our exposure 16 potentially would be very low. 17 Q And it is your belief that Celanese did 18 not have its own in-plant, in-house insulators? 19 A Some. Probably they were contract 20 employees for the more - for the most part. We did 21 have some of our own boilermaker and - and people of 22 that ilk on tap. But most of them were not our 23 actual Celanese employees. You know, the chemical 24 company used -- Most of its maintenance work, 25 custodial work and so forth was done by outside I ! ! _ 503 1 contractors. And it was the outside contractor's 2 job - management to be sure they did the work safely 3 for their employees. 4 It was a cooperative review. But there 5 wasn't much of it as far as we -- We weren't 6 impressed that there was a lot of it at any point. 7 Q Can you point us. Dr. Dixon, to any -- B H 8 A sorry? 9 Q Can you direct us or recall any written 10 evidence or reports that - that tell us that the 11 maintenance workers at the Bishop plant did not have 12 asbestos exposures above the MAC'S? 13 A Above the what? 14 Q Above the MAC'S and the TLV's. 15 A Well, I don't guess there were TLV's at 16 that time. They were MAC'S. And they didn't have 17 the guidelines - the A.C.G.I.H. things until the 18 late '60's. It was assumed based on what little we 19 knew about it that the - the sense about asbestos as 20 opposed to these other dusts like silica, coal dust 21 and some other known toxic dusts did not require 22 this in - at -- Normal operations as we had 23 experienced it in this country did not result in 24 exposures excessive to that, nor did we see 25 instances of the disease - any disease effect. It I !. ! 504 1 was very rare for asbestosis, for example, to be 2 found in this country in the early days. It was not 3 until way after World War II. 4 Q You don't have any - never saw any written 5 record to show what the measured dust exposures of 6 Celanese maintenance workers were, did you? 7 A In the days prior to -- 8 Q Before OSHA. Before 1972. 9 A Well, there might have been a little bit 10 of it in anticipation of the - of OSHA coming along 11 by the people who did testing. But I -- I don't 12 know that history. 13 Q Okay. 14 A I mean I don't recall at this point what 15 that history w a s . 16 Q You mentioned Dr. Richard Doll as someone 17 that you had met in connection with your Kettering 18 studies Ibelieve. 19 A Yes. 20 Q Dr. Doll wasa respected researcher --- 21 A Indeed. 22 Q -- and a fairly authoritative medical 23 author -- 24 A That is right. 25 Q -- in the - in the mid-1950's? 505 1 A Yes. 2 Q Which would have been when you -- 3 A It would be in the late '50's, yes, sir. 4 Q Okay. Can you tell us the other 5 individuals that were in your class, the other four 6 folks? 7 A Well, there were five in addition to me. 8 There was Dr. Carl Zenz who has been in Wisconsin 9 most of his career. He's the author of the 10 principal textbook - several editions of 11 Occupational Medicine. 12 There was Dr. Bert Dinman who was a 13 professor. After years of experience in du Pont and 14 some other companies and whatnot became a professor 15 at the University of Michigan and ended his career 16 as medical director of ALCOA. He's still living and 17 still works on the emeritus staff at the University 18 of Pittsburgh. 19 There was one person named Al - Alvin 20 Davis who defected from the field and entered other 21 aspects of public health. 22 And there was a -- Who am I forgetting? 23 Oh, Dr. John Peterson who was from the Air Force. 24 And he went back to the Air Force by - as was 25 required for being sponsored at the university for 506 1 many years. And then after he retired he went to 2 ITT at one of their big plants out in California 3 until retirement time. I think he's still living. 4 I talked to him a few months ago. 5 Q I -- 6 A So, it was a pretty stellar group by the 7 way except for Dr. Davis. We were all Presidents of 8 this and chairmen of that and a director of this and 9 on the national committees and many things that 10 have - have evidence of i t . We were quite proud of 11 our class. 12 Q Would - would I be right that you 13 regularly read your industrial hygiene journals and 14 your medical journals, or at least -- 15 A As best you can. You end up scanning IS them and like scanning those lists and whatnot and 17 reading those things that were applicable to your 18 needs at the time. 19 Q Yes, sir. 20 A You can't read everything. At times you 21 missed important things because you weren't 22 interested in it or had no reason to be; but then 23 you would go back and pick it up later if you do. 24 Q Isn't it possible, Dr. Dixon, that you 25 have, in fact, forgotten some of the things you 507 1 learned about asbestos and asbestos hazards over the 2 years? 3 A Me forget? I'm sure that's true. That's 4 a never-ending problem. 5 Q If we talk about a material - well, like 6 the asbestos -- Sir? 7 A Excuse me. Talking about forgetting made 8 me just remember. Jan Lieben was the Pennsylvania 9 Health Department physician who adopted - had the 10 A.C.G.I.H. standards adopted statutorily in the 11 State of Pennsylvania against the wishes of 12 everybody else. I had known him a long time because 13 he worked for Cyanamid during the early period that 14 I was in the company. So ... 15 Q Oh, thank you. 16 A I'm sorry. It's just --- 17 MR. HUTCHINS: It doesn't seem 18 he forgets much. 19 THE WITNESS: What? 20 MR. HUTCHINS: It doesn't seem 21 that you forget much. 22 THE WITNESS: No. But you can't 23 remember a lot of it right off the 24 top of your head sometimes. And then 25 you do forget. i i * 508 1 Q Talking about this evolution of - of 2 medical knowledge and scientific knowledge, if we - 3 let's posit a - the question of a carcinogen or - or 4 leave the cancer out of it and just a - a 5 contaminant, a potentially toxic material. I 6 suppose in the beginning absence some - well, maybe 7 just in the beginning your first evidence causes you 8 to have some suspicion that a material may be 9 harmful and there's a continuum along there where 10 maybe your next state of knowledge would be that 11 it's a possible toxin. Is that reasonable so far? 12 A You mean does that possibility exist? 13 Q Well, I mean is this -- How - how you 14 approach the problems of diagnosis and - and 15 causation and control of -of hazards --- 16 A Well, what's the question? 17 Q Well, I'm - I'm building up to it. 18 A Oh, I'm sorry. 19 Q All right. You spoke that there was an 20 evolution of knowledge, and I suppose it would begin 21 with the suspicion that a particular material could 22 be harmful; right? 23 A That's right. 24 Q And then maybe there's some case reports 2S and some evidence and the material might come to be I! ! __ ' 509 1 suspected as harmful. 2 A (Nodding affirmatively) 3 Q And then there is a - perhaps the point 4 where it has come to - where it's believed to be 5 probably a harmful material. 6 A (Nodding affirmatively) 7 Q And - and perhaps with later evidence - I 8 don't know how much - it's thought to be harmful to 9 a medical certainty. Does this pretty well describe 10 the way things worked? 11 A I see what you are saying, the evolution 12 of it. Yes. 13 Q Okay. At what point along this continuum 14 of increasing knowledge or confidence is it 15 appropriate for the occupational physician and the 16 industrial hygienist to begin to take precautionary 17 measures to control and prevent exposures? 18. A Well, it's at a point where you are 19 reasonably convinced of a high probability that an 20 adverse effect can be caused; and you've assured 21 yourself that it's a realistic - reasonably 22 realistic thing. Usually you get advice and 23 evaluation by other people of the data. You may 24 prefer, of course, to have it replicated or repeat 25 studies to see if in fact it was not a fluke as I _ 510 'W- - i d 1 opposed to being real. =71 2 The whole scientific method is involved in a 3 that respect. And at such time as you can 1 1!'A . Vj 4 reasonably conclude that there is a high probability 5 that something in fact is harmful that way, then you 6 would begin to consider what steps you should take 3 7 8 vj Aid 9 10 J ' 11 r ' 12 m* 13 *3 J 14 to follow it. I cited the example of betapropiolactone earlier. This was a most unusual thing. We experienced these bad burns. This was very unusual except for an acid or something, and that would b u m instantly. And this was something that if it got on the skin didn't have its effect until some hours later, but it was profound; very difficult to heal 15 and so forth. few 16 This clued us in to - that there was 17 something going on there that was not the usual. .... 18 And it was most mysterious and troublesome. So, we -- 19 embarked on preliminary animal studies. And the 20 incidence of cancer in the animal skins in two 21 species was so high that it was alarming. And you _ 22 can't extrapolate really animal work to humans with 23 precision. 1 24 But the best minds at that time felt that, 25 one, if it.was that active and produced such a high 511 1 incidence, it almost certainly would be carcinogenic 2 in humans. And at that point without doing other 3 studies or replicating it - but after many people 4 had evaluated it and agreed with this, we then 5 decided to take the steps which were to announce it 6 and to tighten up our own operation until we could 7 find a substitute material and avoid exposure to the 8 greatest extent possible - extreme extent possible. 9 And then, of course, we were fouled up and 10 we were fooled. And so far we have never seen a 11 case of cancer in all the people, including those in 12 the early days when it was still an early process 13 and we had lots of trouble with it - like a pilot 14 plant operation. A lot of varying exposures to it 15 during that early period. And we never saw a case. 16 So, we cried wolf; but we still felt good about it. 17 Q Well -- 18 A We are not going to remove - - W e are not 19 recommending removal of it because this happens. We 20 haven't seen it. But there wasn't enough human 21 exposure to really make an epidemiologic study. And 22 everybody agrees it's wise to leave it on the list 23 at this point. 24 Q Certainly it was better to find out in 25 laboratory animals than to wait for -- 512 1 A If you can do that, yes. 2 Q 3 A for it in industrial workers; right? If you can do that. Some materials don't 4 lend themselves well to animal studies, or the 5 animals don't respond in the manner -- Like asbestos 6 inhalation studies don't really tell you very much. 7 So, it's a very complex issue. And I know it's 8 troubling to everybody. It's difficult to 9 administer and to - even to bring sound science to 10 the judgment you make. And you can be wrong. 11 Q If - if we go back to this question of the 12 continuum of evolving knowledge from suspicion to 13 certainty, if you ever get to certainty -- 14 A Right. 15 Q --- a --- 16 A I might add one other thing. A material 17 that hasn't been widely accepted as being hazardous 18 or causing certain things or you don't think because 19 of the way you use it here as opposed to where it 20 was used there, you perhaps get lulled into a false 21 sense of security. But there isn't any basis for 22 it. And then if an alarm gets sounded, then you 23 begin to look at it. And that's, of course, what 24 happened with asbestos. God, nobody expected 25 anything like this. 513 1 Q Looking back at this issue of the 2 continuum of knowledge from suspicion to certainty, 3 in your view does the - the severity of the 4 suspected harm affect the amount of probability or S certainty that you require before - before 6 implementing controls? 7 A If I understand that correctly, I guess 8 the answer is yes. I'm not quite sure it is because 9 I'm - the question is a little bit compound. But 10 certainly -- You are talking about the severity of 11 the harm -- 12 Q Yes, sir. 13 A -- would affect the -- Well, you tell me 14 w h a t -- 15 Q I guess the better question would be how 16 does the - the severity of the suspected harm affect 17 the amount of certainty you require before it's 18 reasonable to act to prevent exposures? 19 A Well, the greater the degree of severity, 20 certainly the greater the interest in establishing 21 for sure that it is and then to take appropriate 22 steps. 23 Q If you get to the point where you have 24 information that - that causes you to conclude that 25 a material is a suspected let's say carcinogen, is i _ 514 1 it then appropriate to take steps to control 2 exposures for -- 3 A As asuspected ---- 4 Q Yes, sir. 5 A Well, there are various degrees of 6 suspecting. For example, I think Selikoff in his 7 report - that was suspected at that point. And then 8 it was felt like this was not a realistic study, 9 that the exposures were so intense and that - and 10 complicated by other exposures in the ship 11 breaking-type operations that we didn't know what to 12 make of it. 13 He was attributing it all to asbestos. 14 And there was a real question - was it asbestos or 15 was it other things? For example, with - with 16 welding torches, heating other structures, the 17 asbestos doesn't exist alone there. It's all kinds 18 of other things. 19 There were many questions about it. And 20 he himself is, you know, a suspect in the beginning 21 because of circumstances. But the warning was 22 heeded. And further work was undertaken as quickly 23 and expeditiously as it could be reasonably. And 24 ultimately it was accepted and OSHA recommended - 25 accepted it. Their acceptance of it hastened the I 515 1 broad acceptance of it I'm sure. 2 Q Well, by the time the leading writers in 3 the field -- 4 A By the time what? 5 Q By the time the - the prominent writers in 6 the field conclude that - say asbestos is a probable 7 carcinogen, is it then time to - to implement 8 controls? 9 A As a probable --- 10 q Probable. 11 A Well, that's the time to begin looking at 12 it more intensively. 13 Q Is it time then, though, to - to implement 14 controls at work to prevent exposures; or do you 15 wait until you have that scientific -- 16 A Well ... 17 q -- certainty that you say came much -- 18 A If one has overwhelming evidence that is 19 likely to be supportive, you would consider probably 20 taking some steps. But until you reach that point 21 you may not. Particularly not if you had been of a 22 persuasion that there was no problem. Until such 23 time as somebody sounded an alarm in this country, 24 there, was no reason for suspicion about asbestos. 25 And that's why most of us knew nothing about it; I i! ! 516 1 knew nothing about the early history of the - such 2 findings, limited findings as they were. 3 The Doll report wasn't even widely 4 accepted, and it failed to consider cigarettes and 5 other things so that it didn't really make an impact 6 except retrospectively after the subsequent more 7 clear establishment that it was in fact a probable 8 carcinogen - it was a carcinogen. 9 Q What facts would you need or what things 10 would you need to see in order to form a subjective 11 belief that an employee was -- 12 A Was what? 13 Q -- that an employee was at risk for an 14 asbestos related disease? 15 A You used the word "subjective." 16 Q A subjective belief. 17 A As opposed to objective? 18 Q Yes, sir. 19 A What do you mean? 20 Q I'm just using it the same way that 21 Mr. Hutchins had used it earlier. 22 A Who? 23 Q I was using the term the same way 24 Mr. Hutchins used it earlier I think when he asked 25 you some questions about this -- 517 1 A You are throwing me off. Can you use some 2 other word or rephrase it or whatnot? I don't quite 3 know what the word subjective has -- That's quite 4 contrary to objective. We look for objective things 5 in scientific things. Subjective can be those 6 things that people imagine or sense or feel or - 7 et cetera, as opposed to things that are hard and 8 factual as I interpret the meaning of the word. 9 So, 1 don't see how that relates. It's my 10 problem I guess, but maybe you can help me. 11 Q Well, I think you were asked if you ever 12 formed an actual subjective belief that any Celanese 13 employee was at potential risk for asbestosis or an 14 asbestos-related cancer, that sort of thing? 15 A See, I don't see how the word 16 "subjective" -- You have got to take that into 17 consideration if I'm going to answer the question. 18 And I don't understand the use of the word 19 "subjective" there. Subjective and objective, for 20 example, are completely opposite sorts of things. 21 Is there some other word you could 22 substitute in there to make me understand what you 23 are saying or rephrase it in some way? That word is 24 just hanging me up completely. 25 Q Well, I - I'm assuming that what you say I! I 518 1 about that word applies to the question you 2 answered - the questions you answered earlier for 3 M r . Hutchins then? 4 A I don't recall what it was that I 5 answered. It may have been less confusing. I just 6 don't recall. But I don't understand. If that word 7 weren't in there I might - or if some other 8 alternative word might be in there I might have a 9 clear sense of the question. 10 Q Well, what would you need -- 11 A I don't know what yes or no means even, 12 for example, in that type of question. 13 Q What would you need to - to see or - or 14 know to form an objective belief then that a 15 Celanese employee was at potential risk for an 16 asbestos disease? 17 A Could you just take out objective or 18 subjective and leave it as a question? 19 Q 20 A Well, I What would I need to 21 Q 22 A If you can't answer it without No. No. 23 Q 24 A objective in it, I will take it out. What - what would I need to - to do what? 25 Q What would you need to know or observe to I !. I 519 1 form a belief that a Celanese employee was at a 2 potential risk for an asbestos-related disease? 3 A At what point? 4 Q Well, at the point you form that belief. 5 A Well, through well into the '70's I didn't 6 have any reason to suspect that it would. But if we 7 started seeing cases then it would certainly be 8 evidence that we ought to be paying attention to 9 it. We didn't through the period -- To '81 I never 10 heard of a case of asbestosis or any 11 asbestos-related disease, no malignancies or 12 anything. 13 That doesn't mean we might not have missed 14 something. But I mean I was never aware of any 15 case, and I have never heard of one since now. But 16 I haven't been on the scene; so, I can't say for 17 sure that there has never been a case in the last 18 16, 17 years. But in the absence of any evidence 19 whatever, I have to assume no. 20 Q Do I understand correctly that - then that 21 absent seeing a case of asbestosis or an asbestos 22 disease in a Celanese employee you would have no 23 reason to believe that any Celanese employees had 24 been .at risk for an a s b e s t o s -- 25 A No. 520 1 Q -- disease? 2 A No. Since the period of certainly shortly 3 after OSHA, but certainly by the end of the '70's or 4 certainly by the early '80's we had to realize that 5 there was pretty widely established evidence that it 6 was a potential carcinogen. And certainly at that 7 point and sooner - because we were required to by 8 OSHA, even if you didn't believe it, you had to 9 objectively test. You had to do medical 10 monitoring. You had to do air sampling and some 11 other requirements; provide protection and so forth 12 if the levels were exceeded and so forth. 13 As the levels got lowered as you recall - 14 they were lowered through - to the point that it's 15 now down to - I think it's .1 part - particle per 16 cubic centimeter. That's down from a 10 or 12 on 17 the new scale, which they departed from the 5 18 million particle per cubic foot measuring scale. 19 They are not comparable really in - for 20 translating. But this is a hundredth essentially of 21 what the initial OSHA and the late A.C.G.I.H. 22 requirements were to provide a more and more margin 23 of safety. 24 Q And I - I apologize. I am not meaning 25 to - to argue with you and I am not intending just 521 to be repetitive and hammer at you; but I don't - I don't know that I'm making my question clear enough. But are there any specific things that you could - could list for us that you would need to know in order to form that belief that - that any of your work force was at risk for an asbestos disease? A In any of our work force? Q Yes, sir. A In actual reality -- Q Well ... A Actuality? Q Right. A Well, if they had exposure levels that exceeded the prescribed safety limits, you would be concerned . Certainly if you began to see clinical signs of any fibrogenic developments, pleural plaques or anything else that related to it; you would be hyper-concerned if they were smokers, at least for asbestosis; and tumors - I mean cancer, not mesothelioma but with cancer; and you would want to take steps to minimize both exposure and adverse practices that -- I recall during that period that Johns-Manville - Paul Kotin got the company to insist that the work force became a nonsmoking force because of the horrible accentuation of the hazard 522 1 if they were smokers as opposed to not being. So, 2 you'd undertake all the things that were 3 realistically important. 4 Q Okay. 5 A Mainly minimizing exposure to the greatest 6 extent you could, but certainly well below the 7 threshold limit value. 8 Q I think that we have an answer, and I 9 thank you. 10 A Okay. 11 MR. BLANKS: Shall we quit? 12 MR. HUTCHINS: Give me one 13 moment. 14 MR. BLANKS: Okay. 15 16 RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. HUTCHINS: 17 Q Dr. Dixon, this is Mike Hutchins again. A 18 couple of quick questions if I might. 19 You were asked what Celanese had available 20 to it to determine industrial hygiene risks prior to 21 your coming to Celanese. Would it be true that 22 before you came to Celanese that there were 23 industrial hygiene surveys done of Celanese's plants 24 by Kemper Insurance Company? 25 A Yes. Yes. 523 1 Q You were asked questions regarding a - a 2 continuum, moving from suspected risk up to probable 3 risk and so on. When something is determined to be 4 a probable risk - you were asked a question about if 5 whether one of the things you would consider would 6 be the severity of harm that might result. 7 A Yes. 8 Q Would it be true that one of the other 9 things that you would take into account would be 10 your appreciation of whether your work force had 11 enough exposure to that substance to be at any risk 12 of harm at all? 13 A I believe the answer is yes, that would be 14 correct. 15 Q Did you at any time while you were 16 employed at Celanese believe that any Celanese 17 employee had enough exposure to asbestos to be at 18 risk of any asbestos-related disease -- 19 A' I didn't. 20 Q -- to include asbestos-related cancer? 21 A I did not. 22 MR. HUTCHINS: Thank you, 23 Doctor. 24 A I did not. 25 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are off 524 1 the record at 4:56. 2 3 (WHEREUPON THE VIDEO DEPOSITION WAS CONCLUDED.) 4 5 REPORTER'S NOTE: (DR. DIXON'S 6 C.V. WAS NOT RECEIVED BY THE TIME THE 7 TRANSCRIPT WAS COMPLETED. UPON 8 RECEIPT OF THE C.V., IT WILL BE 9 FORWARD TO COUNSEL REQUESTING SAME.) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 524 1 the record at 4:56. 2 3 (WHEREUPON THE VIDEO DEPOSITION WAS CONCLUDED.) 4 5 REPORTER'S NOTE: (DR. DIXON'S 6 C.V. WAS NOT RECEIVED BY THE TIME THE 7 TRANSCRIPT WAS COMPLETED. UPON 8 RECEIPT OF THE C.V., IT WILL BE 9 FORWARD TO COUNSEL REQUESTING SAME.) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 526 1 THE STATE OF TEXAS; 2 COUNTY OF JEFFERSON: 3 4 I, RICK SMITH, a Certified Shorthand 5 Reporter for the State of Texas, hereby certify 6 pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 7 and/or agreement of the parties present to the 8 following: 9 That this deposition transcript is a true 10 record of the testimony given by ERNEST MALCOLM 11 DIXON, M.D., the Witness named herein, on October 12 13th and 14th, 1998, after said witness was duly 13 sworn by me. 14 SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED by me in Beaumont, 15 Texas, on this the. day of . 1998. 16 17 18 19 RICK SMITH, CSR Certification No. 2644 20 Expiration Date of Current Certification: 12/31/99 21 Charlotte Smith Reporting, Inc. 235 Orleans Street 22 The Kyle Building Beaumont, Texas 77701-2399 23 (409) 839-4407 24 25 527 -- . .... 1 DEPOSITION STIPULATIONS 2 NO. 96-3348-E 3 Deposition of: Ernest Malcolm Dixon. M.D. 1 4 Please complete this Stipulation or state 3 your agreed Stipulations on the record. C The Attorneys for all parties present 6 stipulate and agree to the checked items as follows: / '4 1. Deposition is being videoed. Yes__X No 8 | J 9 Video Operator: Warriene Flatt 10 2. Deposition is taken pursuant to: 11 X a. Texas Rules of Civil Procedure b. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 X c. Notice X d . SubDoena 13 e . Agreement f . Court Order 14 15 3 . Objections: 16 X a. Reserve all objections, except as to form and responsiveness 17 b. Reserve all objections to time of trial 18 c. Make all obiections at the time of deposition 19 X d. An obiection bv one defendant shall be considered an objection 20 by all defendants 21 4 . Signature: 22 a. Signature of Witness is waived 23 X b. Witness to read and sign deposition 24 * X c. If deposition is not signed by time of trial,, unsigned copy may 25 be used as though signed and timely filed 528 1 5. 2 3 4 6. 5 6 7 8 7. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Custodial Attorney: The deposition original will be sent to______ Joseph C. Blanks_____________ for safekeeping and use at the time of trial. Jurisdiction: If necessary, the Court Reporter may swear the Witness in a non-Texas jurisdiction. Original deposition cost: X ______ a. Shall be borne by the Attorney asking the first question. b. Shall be divided equally among: ________ All Plaintiffs ________ All Defendants.